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**NATO AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY  
INSTITUTIONS AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN  
BULGARIA**

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**BULGARIA**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1.</b>	
<b>NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPEAN DIMENSION</b>	
1.1. Before the beginning	6
1.2. Immediate impact of enlargement – southeastern European perceptions	8
1.3. NATO non-enlargement in the Balkans: the doomsday scenario	9
<b>CHAPTER 2.</b>	
<b>NATO BULGARIA RELATIONS: THE IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE DEFENCE INSTITUTION</b>	
2.1. Country developments 1990/1999	10
2.2. Civil-military relations: institutional and legal basis	15
2.3. The militaries under democratic political oversight	19
2.4. NATO challenges the military professionalism	22
2.5. A difficult choice for the defence industry	24
2.6. The new approach to national security	29
2.7. The new Military Doctrine	30
2.8. Preparing for membership: <i>Army 2004</i>	32
2.9. Policy developments: national security in the Programme “ <i>Bulgaria 2001</i> ”	36
2.10. NATO challenges to the national political decision-making process: The Kosovo case	37
<b>CHAPTER 3.</b>	
<b>BULGARIA ON THE ROAD TO BRUXELLES</b>	
3.1. The Washington Summit	42
3.2. Reflections on defence policy	43
3.3. Defence policy recommendations	43
<b>CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING FORWARD</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>ANNEX A: The National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria</b>	
<b>ANNEX B: The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria</b>	
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	
Publications	i
Documents	vi

Web-sites

xii

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Colonel Valeri Ratchev

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper distils those features of the NATO enlargement issue, which are concerned with south-eastern Europe and most of all Bulgaria.

The main goal of the text is to present the direct impact of the NATO expansion issue on the development of Bulgarian security policy and defence institutions. Bulgaria is a country, which, with difficulty, made its choice of a model of security. There are both internal and international reasons for this. This study is focused on the period from 1996 to May 12 1999 when Bulgaria/NATO relations benefited from significant improvement.

Following the radical political changes since 1997, there have been important developments in charge in the areas of military reform, civil-military relations, and defence conversion. Interoperability with NATO in political, doctrinal, organisational and functional areas is the cornerstone of these changes.

The involvement of NATO in Kosovo (which is 56 km from Bulgarian borders) seriously changed the national security decision-making process. In practice during the crisis, Bulgaria became much closer to NATO membership than in all-previous years. As a result the issue is not only for formal guarantees for national security based on formal membership in NATO. The informal political-military and military-technical relations, and the programmes for their improvement are so have progressed that we can recognise that the country has finally passed through the very difficult period of reorientation and now is looking for rapid integration.

This monograph has a more policy-paper character than was initially envisaged. The only reason for this is the author's desire to evaluate the contemporary status of national security and defence issues, and to suggest policy recommendations for co-operation policy and integration strategy. Special attention is given to the top-priority security issue of common NATO and Bulgarian interests – the solution of the crisis on the Balkans.

The paper is based on publications, speeches and reports prepared by the author during his period of the Fellowship as well as research result from the study of the latest developments in security and defence affairs in Bulgaria and south-eastern Europe.

The attached annexes include two official documents in the preparation of which the author has participated during the period of the fellowship.

## INTRODUCTION

The opening of NATO to the new European democracies indicates a deep change in European political and strategic thinking. These developments, and especially the decisions of Madrid'97, will not just move eastwards the artificial lines of division imposed by the Cold War, but will make these lines history, together with all Yalta logic. For this reason Bulgaria, together with most of the Balkan countries, welcomed these decisions which marked the beginning of the realisation of the idea of a free, prosperous and indivisible Europe.

It is very difficult - practically impossible - to make any evaluation of the developments the NATO enlargement which could reflect all aspects of the issue. Therefore this analysis is based on some hypotheses that might be shared by other researchers of the Balkan countries.

The first hypothesis is that NATO enlargement serves the all-European vital interests in the spheres of security and stability, and, that this role can not be objectively played by any other organisation; NATO must adapt entirely to this new role.

The second hypothesis is that the countries of the region need as many as positive unifying factors as possible. There must be unification not based on common enemies and threats, but around common interests and goals that are in harmony with the *European Idea*.

The third hypothesis reflects the internal political decision-making process in foreign and security policy affairs. In all states like Bulgaria, which are engaged in the NATO enlargement process, the governments have an Euro-centric orientation. They apply programmes for preparation for integration in NATO and the European Union. These governments require immediate successes in order to maintain the motivation of the people for reform. They need real successes and stable progress towards the goals in order to avoid a re-vitalisation of the alternative illusions; they need a realisation of their efforts to make people feel the reality of the *European Idea*.

It is well known that Bulgaria is one of the ex-communist countries, which most difficulty made its choice of the model of security. The reasons for this are mainly related to the evaluation of the character of the political transition period in which the thesis "social transition from socialism to market economy" prevailed.

The Government's decision of February 17, 1997, for Bulgaria to start a real process of joining NATO put an end to the inconclusive debate about the country's position on this. Bulgaria is no longer the "particular case" in Europe. The leadership of the country has passed from unclear and non-committed statements of the previous governments to a period of intensive conceptual, organisational and practical work for Bulgaria's integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. In a very short time the active work of the President and the Government has led to an official recognition of our efforts. The Washington Summit confirmed that Bulgaria is a potential member of NATO, which has produced quick and comprehensive movement in the integration process.

## CHAPTER 1.

### NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPEAN DIMENSION

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in the late 1990, the question of the future of NATO has been brought to the centre of European security analysis and discussions. NATO was designed in the late 1940s as the lowest common denominator of interests involving Western Europe and the US in joint efforts to contain possible Soviet aggression. The demise of the Eastern block has restricted NATO's purpose of monitoring Russia's nuclear power and the observation of the bilateral East - West treaties of arms reduction.

#### **1.1. Before the beginning**

The debates about the future of NATO in the beginning of the 1990s has largely been influenced by the growing diversity of interests among the partners of the Alliance. One basic group of problems has been the agenda for the near future. What type and what scale of American support for the European security? The isolationist tendencies in the US have produced sharp reduction in the US military commitment to Europe. The European reaction to this tendency has been quite controversial - from embracing the idea of an autonomous European security project to the unwillingness to bare the whole responsibility of containing the multidimensional instability, originating from the demise of communism. The positions of the Western European partners on those issues have been quite diverse from the claims for continued full scale US involvement to the security of Europe (the position of London), to the alternative projects for autonomous European security system based on the enlargement of the Western European Union role as effective co-ordinator of military planning, and on creating joint European forces (the plans of Paris). More and more voices could be heard about the lack of purpose for NATO after the Soviet block dissolution. Was there a real role for NATO in post-communist Europe or should the Alliance follow the Warsaw pact into the history of bipolar confrontation?

The new role for NATO has not been designed in the West, but has been claimed by the former Soviet block countries in Central and Eastern Europe. At the time when the very existence of NATO has been questioned in the West, the new democracies of East Europe claimed membership in the Alliance as the only means to fight multidimensional security challenges of the post-communist era. East Europe has saved NATO's reason to exist and adapt to the new international environment in the Old Continent.

Why was NATO essential to the security of the new born democracies in the East? In facing the complex disintegration and rise of conflicts inside and between the eastern societies, NATO proved to be the international structure with unique capabilities to challenge the new insecure environment. NATO has been the only international organisation with a real internal power structure, capable to implement particular international principles and realise international authority in situations, where no other responsible authority exists. Bosnia and Kosovo are the clearest, but not the only proofs of this thesis. The expectation of NATO of acting as a legitimate agent of the international community in particular crises in Europe has become the basis for the new role of NATO - the institutional structure of the new common security system in Europe. The OSCE, WEU and EU might have proved helpful in defining the principles and values of international and inter-communal co-existence in post Cold War Europe, but NATO has proved to be the ultimate means to execute those principles and values.

The extension of NATO to the East is the most essential part of the Alliance's evolution from a block structure of the Cold War era to a multi purpose security system, covering the whole Euro-Atlantic space. Containing the insecurity factors in the world of today involves radically different methods compared to the logic of the nuclear containment of communism. The focused, concentrated enemy of the past has been replaced by the multifacial threats of the disintegrated post-communist world:

- The ethnic-religious, intercommunal strife, challenging nation state institutions and the international principles of human rights and democratic behaviour
- The dangers of nuclear arms and nuclear materials proliferation, potentially enabling irresponsible factors like terrorist groups and all kinds of dictators to blackmail the international community with nuclear threats
- The international Mafia networks, responsible for drugs smuggling, illegal prostitution, dangerous weapons proliferation, money laundry etc.
- International terrorism, using the weakened nation states structures to broaden the scope and the effectiveness of its activities
- Fundamentalist movements, dictatorial regimes and restoration imperial - nationalist movements, challenging democratic principles of the international community

The extension of NATO to the East of Europe is the most essential part of creating a new security system for the Old Continent after the end of the Cold War era. The new security system has step-by-step transformed and restructured substantial and powerful interests in Europe. This is the basic reason why the extension of NATO created and continues to create such intensive political mythology. The largest share of this mythology is dedicated to the new geopolitical and geo-strategic interests of the great powers. Is it true that the West wants "to besiege" Russia by extending its security alliance to the south-east of Europe? Does Bulgaria really want and can oppose Russia's strategic interests by joining NATO? What are the legitimate "great powers interests"?

In his speech for the Carnegie Report and *The Balkans Today* Conference in Sofia - Bulgaria (April 2, 1995) Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Carter emphasised that "NATO will only come to the Balkans, when it no longer has to impose security and stability in the region, but can instead secure an existing stability". This has been a very delicate way to say that the post-communist Balkan countries have no place in the Alliance for the observable future.

Rightly or not, the Balkans will enter the Twenty-first century as a byword for instability and conflict. In fact, south-eastern Europe has undeniable strategic advantages. The region is a link between East and West, between North and South, it is situated on the geo-strategic diagonal that relays the North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. It is a strategic, political, economic and information "*point of contact*" of the European Union to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Central Asia. The region shapes the NATO Southern Region, it increases its strategic depth without significantly extending the outer borders of the Alliance. The main threat to security in south-eastern Europe is instability - economic, social and ethno-religious - emerging on the background of existing nationalism and of aspirations to national and ethnic self-determination and related territorial disputes. The collapse of totalitarian forms of government has activated a number of latent contradictions, forcefully hidden by the old regimes, that have become new risks and challenges to security.

The Balkans cannot reproduce security and stability itself until security and stability is not achieved throughout the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian geo-political realms. The Balkans traditionally

reflects and amplifies all waves of instability generated throughout Europe. Baring the legacy of three powerful empires of the past (the Ottoman, the Habsburg and the Russian Empire), the Balkans is the embodiment of all-European divisions, rivalries, utopian nationalist projects and ambitions. The Peninsula is the cultural border of Europe, the frontier, where all European dilemmas - ethnic, nationalist, religious and ideological - reach their possible extreme and absurd maximum.

The Balkans of today painfully reflects the collapse of the Versailles - Yalta international status quo. Yugoslavia - the most important regional embodiment of Versailles - disintegrated in bloody wars among her constituent nations and ethnic groups, confirming the artificial nature of its federal state building. Another issue of conflict - the Albanian question - will be even harder to manage and resolve than the Bosnian issue itself.

There are two possible options to entirely resolve the post Yugoslav crisis. The first option is the classical European way of creating ethnically and culturally unified nation states. It means two things - legitimisation of ethnic cleansing and reshaping of borders. Both those things require continuing violation. The second option is creating democratic state structures, based on multicultural living under the international community supervision. What international institution is capable of executing this supervision on the spot? The history of Bosnian and Kosovo bloody warfare provides the final answer - only NATO through IFOR and KFOR can succeed in bringing peace. Only NATO has the real authority to preserve peace. Prof. Brzezinski's assumption may prove incorrect - NATO is needed in the Balkans *before* real security and stability is established in the region.

### **1.2. Immediate impact of enlargement – southeastern European perceptions**

The consequences of NATO's enlargement in general, and in south-eastern Europe in particular, may be evaluated in different ways, depending on the observer's point of view and on the scope of his perceptions. A viewpoint is first determined by understanding what is positive and what is negative for a nation and a state and to what extent their interests are compatible to the interests of other countries of the region. An analysis of the official statements and academic research papers presents that there are number of possible consequences of lasting importance, which will no doubt have either a positive or a negative influence in the region. The principal consequences, which the Balkan people await to have a positive effect for the region, is as follows:

- As a result of the general (FR of Yugoslavia excluded) desire for membership and the related implementation of common criteria and conditions, the Balkans will become a homogeneous political space in which these nations rapidly adopt the rules and regulations for international and internal political, economic and military-strategic behaviour inherent in Western standards. The adherence of the Balkan nations these symbols of the democratic world will make them participants in a process which has absolutely clear rules, parameters and perspectives and in which the improvisations in the field of collective security are extremely rare.

- The new conditions will create objective conditions to fully respect national sovereignty - a problem of which the Balkan nations are particularly sensitive. It is a myth that NATO membership restrains sovereignty. At the end of this Century, sovereignty has completely different dimensions compared to those from the times of ideological hostility. Outside NATO the sovereignty of a state might be recognised but might also be completely ignored. The NATO mechanism of political decision-making guarantees to each member-state not only the right to its own position but also obliges the allies (and not only them) to conform to it. Therefore, by joining NATO the Balkan nations will enter an environment where they may develop a regional security strategy which strengthening their national sovereignty.

- The Balkan nations will join a political and military system with great potential and international prestige. The zone of security and stability that NATO extends over the territory of its members cannot be compared to any other. This is true of today but of the near future as well. The future role of NATO is motivated by an understanding of almost all European states that even without the existence of a direct military threat it is simpler, much more reasonable and profitable that the national security be guaranteed in the framework of a multinational organisation than a "*defence on all azimuths*" be organised.

- Preconditions are being created for establishing a new character, content and scope of political, economic and military relations with the leading countries of the world. By joining NATO, the Balkan countries will enter a zone with a higher security level that will change positively the political and economic attractiveness of the region. Foreign investors' complaints of unstable conditions for capital investment will to a great extent be neutralised. Six of the seven most developed countries in the world are NATO members. It is politically inadmissible to miss the possibility of joining these powers in a unified organism, especially when each country in the region has such enormous need of support in practically all fields. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that precisely these countries control international financial institutions, which obviously will be a leading factor in the economic transition of the Balkan countries. An adherence to NATO will strengthen the positions of these countries in the region looking for full membership of the European Union.

- A solid foundation for stabilisation with new characteristics and scope will be created in south-eastern Europe. By becoming members of the Alliance, the Balkan countries will be able to efficiently prevent the establishment of any hostile regional configurations. After this, there will be more states in the region with common strategic interests than with strategic contradictions.

- The external guarantees received by the countries of the region will have a predominantly preventive character, which in the case of the Balkans is much more valuable than the ability for immediate defence.

- The adaptation process of the countries in the region to a large number of NATO standards, regulations and agreements will result in the simultaneous solution of legal problems of internal and international character, such as the consolidation of the separation of powers, establishment of democratic civil-military relations, etc. This will also create a new internal and external environment favourable for the execution of international economic projects of strategic importance.

- The problem of the regional military power imbalance (to which the Balkan countries are traditionally sensitive) will receive new stimulus to be solved in order to diminish the direct military presence and the probability of new armed conflicts.

At the same time, Russian opposition to the enlargement will continue to produce problems for the Balkan countries. Moscow has repeatedly declared that the strong desire to join NATO expressed by the countries in the region, including Bulgaria, will adversely influence the bilateral relations. But there is no doubt that this desire irritates Russia and may lead - at least for a certain period - to difficulties in the export, in the import mainly of strategic raw material such as petrol and gas. The armed forces in particular may have problems with the spare parts and the repairs.

### **1.3. NATO non-enlargement in the Balkans: the doomsday scenario**

It is difficult to foresee all possible consequences of this scenario but in any case, it will have a negative impact on the developments in the region. The case of Kosovo beyond any doubt presented the Peninsula with its needs in terms of security. It is highly probable that the countries and the region as

a whole will be considered as unattractive and political and economic partners. The political will of the international financial institutions to assist the structural reforms in the region will strongly diminish. Only projects of importance to the European Union and of a transitional importance for the Balkan countries will be supported.

This feeling of insecurity will be lastingly implanted in the Balkan peoples, in the country's governments, political powers, economies and security institutions. The impression of isolation and even hostility to them will be strengthened.

The crises in the former Yugoslavia and Albania, the disputes about Cyprus and the Aegean region and around the recognition of Macedonia has had an severe impact on the image of south-eastern Europe. The political and economic rating of countries like Bulgaria, that are not only uninvolved in these conflicts, but on the contrary - significantly contribute to the success of the international efforts for their solution, has been fixed of a low level. It is, therefore, in the interest of all countries of the region that all conflicts should be settled by peaceful means, so that the south-eastern Europe recovers the chance to become an integral part of unified Europe.

## CHAPTER 2.

### NATO BULGARIA RELATIONS: THE IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND DEFENCE INSTITUTIONS

#### 2.1. Country developments 1990/1999

*Political developments.* During the past decade, particularly deep-running and dramatic processes took place in Bulgarian society. The changes in Eastern Europe which started with the fall of the *Berlin Wall* and which marked the collapse of the Communist dictatorship and the end of the Cold War unleashed the people's confidence in their abilities to decide their own fate. As it was in other post-Communist states, in Bulgaria too a fast process of transformation of the totalitarian type of society into a democratic one started. A new political class came to be formed gradually, a number of parties came into existence and the party monopoly of the country's government ended. A new constitution was adopted, recognising the pluralistic and democratic nature of the political and social structure. The democratic institutions of civil society, based on the principle of division of powers, started to be formed and strengthened.

Free elections for Parliament, President and local self-administration were held several times. Bulgarian society's political culture improved. Free and independent media came into existence. Bulgarian citizens were granted the opportunity to travel freely around the world. A political spectrum came into existence and started the formation of independent civil alliances. Private property and private entrepreneurship developed.

In the initial period of the changes in 1990-1991, Bulgaria had serious economic and human potential, which was a guarantee for the realisation of a smooth and relatively painless transition from a centralised economy to a market one. The country was spared the grave economic and social crisis of the 1980s in Poland and Romania. It was not as isolated as Albania. Without exaggerating, one may claim that the country's potential made possible its being among the first on the road of transformation.

These objective potentials, however, were wasted and Bulgaria reached the bottom of the economic and social catastrophe at the end of 1996. Unlike Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary there was no real political opposition during Communist rule. The powers of the practically spontaneously formed opposition were not concentrated and it lost power in the first democratic elections in 1990. This gave an opportunity to the old rulers to strengthen their power in new positions and launch a policy of penetrating into the state's economic and financial structures. In this way, a new oligarchy started to be formed in the country, one capable of controlling the political and social processes. This was the establishment, in practice, of a second, parallel power, with its laws, rules and interests different from those wanted by the public at large. Within a short time this second power gained strength and self-confidence and gradually was pushing the state away from of its original reforms oriented course.

It laid its hand on the state-owned enterprises and placed its companies at entry and exit points, siphoning out not only their profits, but also their subsidies from the state budget. A number of private banks were set up, which, getting transformed into *Ponzi* schemes, took in personal deposits and huge state funds. Crime reached unknown levels. Bulgaria became a link in the drugs and human trafficking rings for Western Europe and of the stolen car rings from the West to Russia and the former countries of the Soviet Union. The situation reached absurd dimensions in a situation where Bulgaria, which is well-known for its farm produce, suffered shortages of bread and animal feed in 1996 due to uncontrolled exports from companies close to members of the government of Mr. Zhan Videnov (a

coalition, dominated by the Bulgarian Socialist Party). Corruption developed on a large scale in the state administration.

The autumn of 1996 saw the cumulative effect of the financial and production crisis, the loss of the international financial institutions' confidence, galloping inflation and the dramatic pauperisation of the population. The resources for macro management were exhausted and the Socialist government was practically paralysed: it became a helpless witness of the process of disintegration in state and in society. Public discontent reached critical levels. Confidence in the government dropped dramatically. Even in the circles of the ruling Socialist party discontent was growing with the impotent and incompetent rule, which had brought the country to the brink of overwhelming catastrophe.

The first sign of discontent in the government's policy was the election of an opposition politician as president by an overwhelming majority. President Peter Stoyanov was elected on November 3, 1996 and took office on January 21, 1997.

In early 1997, the situation reached ever more dramatic dimensions and there was a real danger of civil riots taking place. In January 1997, thousands of people went out on the streets of Sofia and the other major cities to protest against the government. The then parliamentary opposition backed the protests and started negotiations with the government for scheduling early parliamentary elections.

At the beginning of February 1997, this was done and the newly elected President formed a caretaker cabinet that busied itself with the most urgent economic problems and preparations for elections. The international financial institutions were urgently asked to support the shaky economic and financial state of Bulgaria.

The elections for the 38th ordinary national assembly were held on April 19, 1997. The Parliament was formed of 137 MPs of the United Democratic Forces, 58 MPs of the Democratic Left, 19 MPs of the Alliance for National Salvation, 14 MPs of the Euro-Left and 12 independent MPs. Parliament was chaired by Yordan Sokolov. There are five parliamentary groups in the National Assembly: the United Democratic Forces, the Democratic Left, the Popular Union, the Alliance for National Salvation and the Euro-Left.

The United Democratic Forces (UDF) formed the incumbent Cabinet and Ivan Kostov has been Prime Minister since May 21, 1997. This way, for the first time after the start of transition, a situation developed in Bulgaria in which the parliamentary majority, the Government and the President were representatives and adherents of one and the same political idea. In Parliament, the UDF was supported in its governmental programme by another two political formations: the Euro-Left and the Alliance for National Salvation, which gave grounds to speak of *a reforming majority*. Based on it National Assembly adopted a document that is unique in recent Bulgarian history: a *Declaration for National Salvation*, which was signed by all parliamentary political forces.

The state institutions gradually got into option; the processes of disintegration in society were controlled. Parliament started passing the laws needed to tie state government. The Government started putting the state administration in order. The combat against crime and corruption was launched. The Bulgarian Prime Minister said: "we shall win the state back from the criminals".

Particularly serious efforts were taken about the economic stabilisation of the society. A currency board scheme was introduced in Bulgaria on July 1, 1997 as a mechanism of moving out of the crisis. The Bulgarian lev was pegged to the German mark. This came to be decisive in halting the negative processes in the Bulgarian economy. Enterprises started to be gradually released from the many intermediary companies that had occupied them. As a result, inflation, which in February 1997 reached the record high 242.7% for one month, at the end of the same year dropped to 1.5% per month and in March, 1998 a deflationary process started. Annual inflation in 1997 was curbed to

578.6%; the figure accounted for mainly by the first months of that year. Annual inflation for 1998 was for about 16.4% and for 1999 is planned at 5-6%. At the beginning of 1997 within three months alone the lev depreciated as much as 10 times. After the introduction of the currency board, this process was practically terminated.

The efforts at reviving the economy are already producing positive results. For the first time during the past 8 years, a 4% GDP growth was realised in 1998 and by 5-6% is expected by the year 2000.

The process of privatisation of the state-owned enterprises which by 1997 was 1.2% per year, kicked off in practice in 1998 (to reach approximately 50% by the end of the year) and is expected to be finalised by the end of 1999. The fact that there was no real privatisation, or suitable economic and social conditions, were the reasons for the very low interest in Bulgaria on the part of foreign investors. Annual investment in Bulgaria by 1997 was between \$ 150 and 200 million while in 1997 it reached \$ 626 million. Stabilisation was reached in economic and financial sectors following the introduction of a currency board, which are positive indicators for international business circles. At the end of 1997, the prestigious US investment banks *Merrill Lynch* and *J.P. Morgan* were attracted as intermediaries in the privatisation process. In 1998 foreign investment was about \$ 1,000 million but currently (1999) the level will be significant reduced because of the Kosovo crisis. According to economic experts, investors' interest in Bulgaria can grow only in the case of the implementation of the rehabilitation side of the *Pact of Stability*. The Government plans the privatisation process to be completed by the end of 2000. Stronger investor interest is expected in late 2000.

Despite the Kosovo crisis there is still justification to believe that Bulgaria could become an infrastructure centre of south-eastern Europe.

***Societal developments 1996/1999.*** 1997 was definitely a crucial year in Bulgaria's post Cold War history. At the price of sequence of cabinet failures and the 1996 economic collapse the presidential (October 1996) and parliamentary (April 1997) elections brought democrats in office because voters hoped they could make a difference in running the country. The next logical conclusion was the understanding of "good governance", the idea of which was explicitly underlined by then recently elected President Petar Stoyanov in his inauguration address to the Bulgarian Parliament, appealing for "a new civic contract for the Bulgarian society".

The ruling elite understood the fact that its political survival is dependent on good governance and this is feasible only through effective institutions. For the first time good governance became a strategic goal. A complete state administration reform with the goal of making it more capable of provoking and carrying out the changes first became an agenda item after the elections on 19 April 1997.

Economic growth *per se* does not guarantee better living standards, a greater number of choices or a more secure existence. However, it is a necessary pre-condition for all these but it is a question of the government's willingness and ability to utilise those pre-conditions and to what ends. In terms of economic performance, as well as of reforms in general, 1997 was the year of the "second beginning". Its main feature was the replacement of one economic philosophy - that of active government interference in the economy justified by the "(mainly social) obligations of the state" - by a neo-liberal philosophy of state withdrawal from interfering in economy. After the first years of attempted transition the state sector was turned into a vent for draining the economy and decapitalising the industrial sector. Loss-making enterprises were kept on the surface both through direct and hidden subsidies (for example through subsidised energy prices) and the re-distributive role of the budget

increased. The result was disastrous both in pure economic terms (the economy faced virtual collapse in 1996) and in human development terms.

The new Bulgarian government's general orientation in its reform programme "*Bulgaria 2001*" is towards liberalisation. Its first objective was to dismantle the old subsidies-based system and the data show significant progress in this respect. Hence, the government is already facing a serious contradiction between its long and short-term objectives. In the long term the declared objective is to de-regulate economic activities, to privatise, to withdraw from its inherited and overwhelming presence in the economy. But in the short terms it tends to (and often has to) strengthen the role of the state for "putting things in order" despite the tendency to create strong incentives for corruption on both a large and small scales.

The end of 1997 was marked by macroeconomic and financial stabilisation although on an extremely modest level of income and consumption. Hence unlike 1996 when society faced the worse phase of the crisis and people were forced into survivalist strategies, in 1997/1998 developing strategies became an important issue. From this point of view, 1997 should be analysed not just in terms of growth rates but also in terms of changing strategies and mentality. Things in 1998 have really started to change and this is what people have received despite the price of harder every-day living. Further rise of incomes can be related only to economic growth expected in 2000 and later because of Kosovo crisis.

Economic growth, however, should be consistent with human development and pending issues. Creating new job opportunities should be one of the objectives. Given the fact that the private sector is already contributing more than 50% of the gross value added it will be responsible for the future growth and for the creation of employment opportunities. In this respect, small and medium size enterprises are the potential reservoir for human development.

Provision of security is one of the sectors where the role of the state remains dominant. The state is still the main provider of security - both internal and external. The changes affect mainly social dimensions of security. Although in this domain the state retains its control, the relative importance of private provision of services in the field of social security will rise through private health insurance and pension funds.

Personal security (of the individual) refers to issues directly affecting the security of the individual and is separate from the security of other individuals (individual rights, social security, pension systems, access to health services). Collective security (of the society, the nation) refers to the nation as a collective body (national security, environmental security). It is obvious that those issues are indivisible on the level of a single individual.

This distinction, to a certain degree, overlaps with the division between internal and external security issues. Internal security in most cases includes the elements of personal security. It refers however to broader issues such as internal political stability, issues of organised crime, which affects, indirectly, the individual. In addition, environmental security, although being mostly internal issue, is a typical example of collective security. External security refers mostly to the security of the nation as a collective body although also in this case overlapping and interdependence between the two levels exists. As the experience from the last decade shows, conflicts in the Balkans come from within states, not from outside which makes the issue of the internal determinants of external security of crucial importance. Concerning the "addressee" in the case of external security we also face an important evolution directly affecting the role of the state - the evolution from security of the state (i.e. from state security) to security of the nation (i.e. national security).

On the level of national security, the already obvious choice - European and Euro-Atlantic integration - should further acquire concrete dimensions of the necessary steps towards NATO membership. NATO membership should turn into a common denominator of both Bulgarian foreign policy and of the general direction of social and economic transformation.

All the *segments* of the process of transition - good governance, deregulation of the economy, abolishing of "borrowing from next generations", creating a new basis for social cohesion and sustainable basis for security, both internal and external, are the elements of a clear European and Euro-Atlantic choice. It is often labelled as a "civilizational" one. Europe in all the dimensions of this term is the ultimate goal of the nation.

The government of Mr. Ivan Kostov treats membership in NATO and EU not as a matter of solely political decision. Membership can be a result of the long-lasting transformation of Bulgarian society. Hence, the process of change preceding the act of accession is no less important than accession itself - and certainly more difficult and longer lasting. The integration agenda concentrates on domestic efforts, is aimed at reaching a level of development (political system, institution building, structural reform, economic growth, changing patterns, legislative frameworks, interoperability of the Armed Forces and security structures, etc.) corresponding to the requirements for membership.

## **2.2. Civil-military relations: institutional and legal basis**

*The National Assembly (Parliament).* The National Assembly is the main institution for political direction and control over the Armed Forces and the other security structures. It carries out these functions through its legislative activity, the adoption of decisions and other acts and parliamentary control. In the security sphere, the National Security Committee assists.

The legislative acts adopted by the National Assembly in the national security field include: the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, the Law of Defence and the Armed Forces, other basic laws, such as on the special intelligence means and the Consultative Council for National Security.

The National Assembly: resolves the declaration of war and concludes peace; approves the deployment and use of Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) outside the country's borders, and the deployment, crossing and use of foreign troops on its territory; on a motion from the Prime Minister introduces martial law or a state of emergency in all parts of the country's territory; ratifies or rejects by law all international initiatives which are of a political and military nature; envisages corrections to the national borders. The National Assembly ratifies international treaties, both bilateral (e.g. for friendship and co-operation with different states) and multilateral (e.g. the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe - CFE, the "Open Sky" Treaty, etc.), conventions, as well as laws regulating particular issues of defence, internal order, security, the military-industrial complex (The Law of Control over Foreign Trade Activities with Armaments and Goods and Technologies with Dual Purpose Application).

The *Law of Defence and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria* (LDAF), adopted in 1995, added the following powers to the National Assembly: to adopt by decision the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine as proposed by the Council of Ministers; to adopt long-term programmes for the development of the Armed Forces; to determine the size of the Armed Forces as proposed by the Council of Ministers; to ensure the necessary legislative norms for the establishment of units for civil defence and for the carrying out of humanitarian tasks in the case of natural and industrial disasters; to establish, re-shape and close Military Academies and Schools.

The National Assembly also adopts statements and decisions (e.g. on the position concerning the crisis in former Yugoslavia, on the relations with the Russian Federation); positions of the National Security Committee (e.g. on the state, development, and the perspectives of the Air Force, the military-industrial complex), etc.

The National Assembly carries out parliamentary control on the activities of the Ministry of Defence, and in consequence - over the BAF, Military Intelligence and Military Counter-Intelligence; over the Ministry of Interior, and in consequence - over the Border Forces and the Gendarmerie, the National Security Service (Counter-Intelligence); National Intelligence Service and the National Protection Service (which are under the authority of the President of the Republic).

The Parliamentary National Security Committee and the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign and Integration Policy assists the activities of the National Assembly and carries out parliamentary control on its behalf.

*The President of the Republic.* The President is Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. He appoints and dismisses the higher command of the Armed Forces and bestows all higher military ranks, acting on a motion from the Council of Ministers. The President presides over the Consultative Council for National Security, the status of which is established by law. The National Intelligence Service and the National Protection Service are under his authority.

On a motion by the Council of Ministers, he declares general or partial mobilisation in accordance with the law. Whenever the National Assembly is not in session and cannot be convened, he proclaims a state of war in cases of armed attack against Bulgaria or whenever urgent action is required by virtue of an international commitment. He proclaims martial law or any other state of emergency. The National Assembly is convened forthwith to endorse the President's decision.

The Law of Defence and the Armed Forces specifies that the President: acting on a proposal by the Council of Ministers approves the strategic plans for activities of the Armed Forces and alerts the Armed Forces or part thereof to an advanced alert; at a military conflict or war he co-ordinates the foreign policy efforts for participation in international organisations and security structures with the aim of terminating the military conflict or war; commands the Supreme Headquarters, issues acts for the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for war or for carrying out military activities; brings into implementation the wartime plans at the request of the Council of Ministers; introduces a restrictive regime for the dissemination of information connected with the defence of the country; introduces proposals for making peace to the National Assembly.

With the introduction of martial law, the declaring of war or with the actual start of military activities, the President forms the Supreme Headquarters (SHQ). The SHQ assists the Supreme Commander in leading the defence and the Armed Forces. The Supreme Command in Chief shall include the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Territorial Development and Construction, the Chairman of the Committee for Posts and Telecommunications, the Chief of the General Staff and other individuals, designated by the Supreme Commander.

*The Council of Ministers (Government).* The structure of the Government concerning the national security issues comprises: the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Committee for Posts and Telecommunications, the Civil Protection, the Inter-Agency Committee on Issues of the Military-Industrial Complex and the Mobilisation Readiness of the

Country, the Directorate of Confessional Issues, the General Directorate “State Reserve and Wartime Supplies (Stockpiles, Stores)” the National Council for Struggle Against Narcotics Abuse and Narcotics Traffic, the National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and Refugees, etc.

The amendments in the Law of Defence and the Armed Forces in 1995/1997 added the following authority to the Council of Ministers: to implement the general command of the Armed Forces; to lead the establishment, preparation and full ensuring of the Armed Forces so they are kept in combat and mobilisation readiness; to command and implement the military policy of the country; to approve the structure of the Bulgarian Army and the other armed formations; to approve the plans for organisational establishment of the Armed Forces and mobilisation plans; to approve a Regulation for the Regular Military Service (conscripts) and the regulation of the Armed Forces; to approve, acting on a motion from the Minister of Defence, a general wartime plan of the state and assign its implementation; to approve a wartime draft budget, acting on a motion from the Minister of Finance; to command and control the production of and trade with military production and production with special destination; to determine the standards and the order for accumulation, preservation and use of raw materials and materials for wartime; to implement the general command and mobilisation of the Armed Forces and the transition of the country from peace to military state; to organise duty and announcement for transition from peace to a state of war, disaster or accidents; to open, transform and close facilities, branches, institutes and colleges at the Military Academy and the High Military Schools and military-scientific organisations and determine their status, acting on a motion by the Minister of Defence or the head of another institution; to organise the conscription, the preliminary training and the formation of interests in young men for going to professional military service and approve programmes for the staff readiness in the Armed Forces; to approve requirements to the transport, energy, communications and storage systems, the settlements and the production and the economic sites in compliance with the needs of the defence; to approve statutory regulations for pre-military service training of youth, acting on a motion from the Minister of Defence; to approve statutory regulations connected with the defence and the Armed Forces of the country; to make proposals to the President of the Republic for assigning and discharging the higher command of the Armed Forces and for bestowing all higher military ranks; to approve statutory regulations connected with the assistance and care of the state for the citizens, who suffer at or in connection with the defence of the country.

The Law of Defence and the Armed Forces, as amended in 1997, added the following authority to the Council of Ministers: to approve the deployment and use of Bulgarian military units outside the country’s borders for execution of humanitarian ecological, educational, sports and other tasks of a peaceful (non-military) character; to approve the deployment and use of individual unarmed military outside the country’s borders for the execution of official or representative tasks by virtue of international commitments of the Republic of Bulgaria; to approve the deployment and use of military equipment outside the country’s borders; to approve the deployment of foreign troops in Bulgaria or their crossing of Bulgaria’s territory for the execution of tasks of a peaceful (non-military) character, if there is no other provision in the law.

It is evident that the Government has decisive functions in the formation, and implementation the country’s defence policy and takes a very active part in the decision-making process and the overall spectrum of national security.

*The Ministry of Defence.* The Minister of Defence commands and is responsible for the conduct of the state’s policy in the System of the Ministry of Defence. He is a civilian person who rules the Ministry of Defence and implements civilian oversight the BAF.

The Minister of Defence implements civil control over the Bulgarian Army by: participating in the development and updating of the National Security Concept; compiling the draft of the State's budget in its part for the System of the Ministry of Defence; allocating the budget of the System of the Ministry of Defence and commanding the financial and material-technical ensuring of the Bulgarian Army; ruling personnel policy and being responsible for the recruitment of personnel for the Bulgarian Army and the training of the officers; organising cultural-educational and patriotic activities; implementing general oversight on the military academy, higher military schools, military scientific and research institutes; making motions to open, transform and close military academies, higher military schools, faculties, branches, institutes and colleges at them, as well as military-scientific organisations (in co-ordination with the Minister of Education and Science); opening, transforming and closing military schools and research units; implementing international co-operation in the defence field; organising and realising social, economic and financial policy; commanding pre-military service training, military archives, bodies of labour protection in the System of the Ministry of Defence; commanding and controlling (jointly with the Minister of Transport) the use of the airspace and the air traffic control system; approving a list of non-international airfields that may receive foreign aircraft, as well as the air corridors of the Republic of Bulgaria; approving a list of military airfields that may be used as reserve airfields by the civil aviation; determining the order for the registration of military aircraft in the Register of State Flight Means of the Republic of Bulgaria and organising the updating of information concerning military aircraft in that Register; issuing regulations, ordinances, instructions and orders and being responsible for the legal basis in the Ministry of Defence; organising activities for the support and care for citizens who have suffered at or in connection with the defence of the country; being responsible for the management and keeping of the state military properties, sports activities and for the development of the sports infrastructure; organising the inspection activities of the Ministry of Defence; submitting to the Council of Ministers a high ranking general to be appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff; approving the staff of the central administration of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff; commanding the information, publication and public relations activities of the Ministry of Defence, the Military Police and Military Counter-Intelligence; co-ordinating the decisions for the flight of foreign militaries over Bulgaria's territory.

The Minister of Defence, acting on a proposal by the Chief of the General Staff submits to the Council of Ministers: a draft for the Military Doctrine of the country; a draft about the number, the structure and the plan for the organisational establishing of BAF; a draft for a general state wartime plan; a proposal for the assigning and discharging of the higher command staff and for awarding of higher military ranks; a proposal for announcing a general or partial mobilisation. Following the same procedures he accepts officers for regular service and confers first officer rank; promotes to a higher rank, downgrades to a lower rank and discharges from military service officers of the Bulgarian Army; appoints and recalls the Bulgarian defence and military attaches abroad and the representatives of the Ministry of Defence to international organisations. The Minister of Defence is assisted by Deputy Ministers who are civilians.

The Defence Council under the authority of the Minister of Defence, is composed of the Chief of the General Staff and his deputies, the Deputy Ministers of Defence, the Commanders of the different Armed Forces, the Chief Inspector and other officials, determined by the Minister of Defence.

For the implementation of its controlling functions the Minister of Defence is supported by an Inspectorate in which civilian and military staff are included. The Inspectorate makes checks on: the observation of the statutory regulations and the orders of the Minister of Defence; the effective implementation of the budget, financial, economic and procurement policy; observation of the human

rights, labour safety, proposals, signals, the applications and the appeals in the BAF; personnel and recruitment policy; social policy and protection of the environment; the pre-military service training of youth, the physical condition of the personnel and the sports activities; information for corruption, squandering and misuse of material and financial resources, military order and discipline; management and keeping of state military properties; observation of international agreements; activities of the military academies, institutes, schools and training centres.

*The Ministry of the Interior.* In accordance with the Law of the Ministry of the Interior, adopted in 1997, the Ministry of Interior consists of the National Security Service, National Police Service, National Service for Struggle against Organised Crime, National Service for Fire and Disaster Safety, National Border Police Service, the National Gendarmerie Service, Specialised Unit for Anti-Terrorist Struggle, and other units.

The Minister of Interior, in co-ordination with the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff: submits to the Council of Ministers plans for organisational establishing, the training and the mobilisation deployment of the troops and officials subjected to him; maintains in state of combat and mobilisation readiness the national, the central and the regional offices of the Ministry of the Interior; develops the structure of the staff of the Border Police and the Gendarmerie.

*The Ministry of Transport, The Ministry of Territorial Development and Construction and The Committee of Posts and Telecommunications (CPT).* These ministries had under their control respectively Transport Forces, Construction Forces and Forces of the CPT. In accordance with the new Military Doctrine, they all have to be demilitarised according to special laws.

Beyond this the ministries, in co-ordination with the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff: develops statutory regulations for maintenance and use of railway, track and water transport, as well as the civil aviation and the post and communication net in wartime and submits them to the Council of Ministers; carries out the preparation of transportation, as well as the civil aviation and telecommunications for transition from a civil to a martial state.

*The Armed Forces.* The Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria guarantee the sovereignty, security and independence of the country and defend its territorial integrity. No tasks of an internal political character may be assigned to the Bulgarian Army. The Council of Ministers may assign to the Armed Forces the overcoming of the consequences of disasters and accidents.

The Minister of Defence implements the general leadership of the BAF. The immediate management of the BAF is implemented by the Chief of the General Staff who is the most senior military rank and position in the Republic of Bulgaria and is a chief of the whole personnel of the BAF. In wartime, the Chief of the General Staff is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

*Local self-government and Local Administration.* The regional Governors and the Mayors of municipalities implement the preparation of the economy and population for defence.

### **2.3. The militaries under democratic political oversight**

The democratic oversight on Armed Forces and the other national security structures may be applied only if all the elements of the separated powers function perfectly in the framework of their competence and if they co-operate efficiently on the basis of set principles.

It cannot be denied that certain problems exist in the functioning of the institutional system of the national security precisely in relation to democratic control over the Armed Forces and some of the security services. The provisions of the Constitution and the law do not sufficiently clarify the conditions necessary for constructing an efficient mechanism that would allow the state institutions to fully implement their constitutional obligations towards the Armed Forces. In this respect, some issues need to be further clarified:

- What should be the real powers and responsibilities of the President, the Council of Ministers, the National Assembly and of its committees?

- What should be the mechanism of the relations between the General Staff and the state institutions be: is the Chief of the General Staff accountable to the President, the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defence?

- Who has to make the final decision concerning the main military reforms, the purchase of high technology military equipment, assuming allied commitments, etc.?

**The National Assembly.** Objectively, parliamentary control over the Government in the security field is not equal to democratic control over the Armed Forces - it is just an element of the Government's responsibilities to the Parliament. In his article "*Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years*", Dr. Jeffrey Simon notes that the major weakness of the Bulgarian Parliament regarding oversight functions lies in its lack of continuity. Roughly 100 of the 137 UDF MPs are new, having no prior experience. Out of total 240 only seven MPs have a history from 1990 and only 20 (8%) from the previous Parliament. A "silent" majority (estimated 60% of the MPs) have never taken the floor. In contrast to other transition states where parliamentary expertise is slowly expanding with each Parliament, Bulgaria's seems to be shrinking. This factor affects the quality of Bulgaria's parliamentary oversight, including the Parliamentary Committees (Simon J., "Strategic Forum", Number 142, May 1998).

The National Assembly exercises its rights and responsibilities mainly through the budgeting that is the normal practice in the democratic countries. In the case of Bulgaria, however, it should be kept in mind that:

- The development of the BAF is not a priority "number one" and the financial means allotted to defence budget are just the needed for their existence (about 90-92% during the last years).

- The method of programme planning of financing has not been applied yet, and the debate on long-term expenses (e.g. for financing the military reform) each year starts "from zero".

- The domination of one and the same political party over the Parliament and the Government for one term of office (four years) in fact predetermines the debate already in the drafting of the budget. The Members of Parliament lack knowledge and experience and are not able to oppose the "party line" in the interest of the real defence needs of the country.

- Because of the one-sided understanding of the "de-politisation" of the militaries, the senior ranks are not put to use as experts by the political parties and Parliamentarian groups.

**The President of the Republic** exercises his control in two capacities - as the Head of State responsible for applying the Constitution, and as Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces who approves the defence plan of the country. This leads to some functional problems, such as:

- The President has to approve documents the quality of which he is not in a position to assess, because of the lack of appropriate staff, which means that the act of approval is a pure formality.

- The limited access to information forces the President to execute certain acts, not knowing what will follow (e.g. after declaring general or partial mobilisation).

- The President's right and obligation to appoint and dismiss the higher command of the Armed Forces (and subsequently to bear responsibility for these acts) would have a positive effect only if he had sufficient information about their personal qualities. In the present circumstances he, in fact, may have an objective opinion only on respecting the formal order for movement of the personnel.

A typical "transition paradox" exists: the General Staff prepares its budgetary requests, The National Assembly votes for defence spending, which in fact determines the character of the activities of the Bulgarian AF, the President appoints the persons who will command these activities, and the Government reports on their execution.

**The Government** is the collective controlling institution that stands closest to the Armed Forces. The immediate and constant exercising of democratic control is the right and obligation of the Minister of Defence. There is, however, a list of measures that are still in the process of developing before the concept of "Civilian Defence Management" to be implemented:

- *"Civilising" the Ministry of Defence.* It is not possible for the Minister of Defence to execute civilian control when his staff consists mainly of military prepares his decisions how it was before 1997. By 20 August, 1998, 1181 people were working in the Ministry of Defence. The proportion between military officers and civil employees is 1:2. By the end of 1998 more than 10 % cuts was carried out in the central administration. Civilians have been appointed on 28 posts of chiefs of departments and sections that were formerly occupied by militaries. This is a necessary prerequisite for strengthening civilian control and needs to continue in the future. In accordance with present reform, there is a trend to optimise the central administration structure, including the reduction of personnel, reshuffling of sections based on functional homogeneity and economic efficiency of work in the conditions of market economy.

- *Closing of the circle "direction-management-control" in the framework of the staff of the Minister of Defence who is a civilian person.* The functional and administrative re-structuring and personnel management of the process should be done in such a way that excludes "filtering" by different organisational tiers of the information and the orders that come from and to the Minister.

- *Adopting a managerial style of direction, management and control.* The authorisation of a person to carry out a determined activity and to bear responsibility for it is made by his/her appointment to the job, and not by re-signing his orders or collecting opinions on elementary questions. The control has to be exercised at certain stages and on the results, and not by constant feeling that something is "hanging over his/her head".

- *Adopting a programming method of resources management* the base of which is unconditionally the Minister of Defence's staff and not mainly General Staff offices. In this sphere of management, the professional military should be used exclusively as experts, and not as financial specialists and clerks.

- *Placing the Public Relations Office* among the priorities of the civilian minister's activities. The time will come when the Minister of Defence will start a "fight" for the budget that will be doomed without support of the public.

- *Expanding the military education and training* of the civil employees, Members of Parliament, journalists who work in the defence field, as well as the military who work in civil teams.

- *Optimising the administration scheme* in the defence field. It is not admissible that the institution that elaborates the tasks is not able to manage the resources needed for their implementation.

- *Adapting the military to modern society:*

- *In the social aspect* - maintaining the families of the military, regulating the civil-military relations at a local level, improving the veterans' status, expanding women's role in the Armed Forces

(Women may serve in the Bulgarian Army both on civilian and military positions. The military positions that may be occupied by women will be determined by the Minister of Defence, acting on a proposal by the Chief of the General Staff);

- *from a moral point of view* - psychological support of the personnel in the combat units, ethics in the management and administrating of the service processes;
- *From a legal point of view* - improving the legislation concerning military service, adapting the internal norms, regulations and mechanisms to the new needs of international relations of the Armed Forces etc.

What still has to be done is to solve the problems at national level in accordance with the *main requirements* adopted in all democratic countries:

- Clear and unequivocal separation of the obligations and responsibilities of each institution that takes part in the democratic control of the Armed Forces in accordance with the fundamental objective needs of the command and management of security and defence in peace time, in conditions of military-political crisis and in armed conflict
- Possibilities for objective, profound and detailed parliamentary control over the Armed Forces and all services, related to security and defence
- Clear differentiation of the functions of the General Staff and military professionals
- Ensuring adequate roles and place of the Armed Forces and the resources allotted to them.

#### **2.4. NATO challenges the military professionalism**

The general issue of professional motivation largely determines the attitude of military professionals towards NATO. Contrary to the impression that has been created over recent years, motivation among army officers and generals is not something, which can be substituted by strict subordination to the unconditional priority of political decisions. It is influenced by objective conditions and factors of varying sustainability and intensity which are manifested in the context of general political and public debate, as well as in specific professional attitudes and behaviour.

Primarily, military professionals do not view co-operation with, and possible membership of, NATO in isolation from the problems surrounding the reform processes in the BAF. The NATO factor is always present (although in varying degrees of intensity) in the motivational scheme of the military elite on all three strategic levels: security policy, military doctrine and military technical perspectives. The problem here is that the successes or failures in the various spheres of the reform process over recent years has left a marked imprint on the personal attitude of servicemen, as well as of army officers, towards the country's proposed membership of NATO.

Secondly, military professionals undoubtedly consider NATO issues in the context of relations with Russia. This is a natural reflex which cannot be cast off or modified as easily as may be the case among the representatives of the political, diplomatic, and business elite.

Next, the motivational framework is determined by the specific presence of NATO in the Balkans. Objectively, assessments are quite diverse, and sometimes opposing. Unlike politicians who more often than not use rather general categories in the security sphere, e.g. *détente*, confidence, and common security, the military operate with the specific parameters of the military presence and when there are negative, they perceive them as an obvious threat. They measure the distinction between "potential" and "real" threat by the quantitative, qualitative and temporal parameters of the fighting force, and find it difficult to substitute these factors for diplomatic accords.

Undoubtedly, the attitude of the military to NATO is determined also by the nature of the political and public debate. The existence of rather diverse views generally confuses the military, makes them wait and refrain from spelling out any opinions. Quite often the military elite uses the political stalemate in order to try to find a way of meeting the urgent needs of the army, which is understandable in the context of the objective difficulties, but does not promote consensus in political, social and military terms.

The framework of motivational factors can be completed with the perception of NATO as a challenge to military professionalism. In this case, the term “challenge” has both positive and negative connotations. It must be stated very clearly that readiness to accept any challenge is largely a function of the progress of the reform in BAF. The ambition or fatigue (or even indifference) is due to the specific results (or lack of results) of the various aspects of the military reform. This outline of the main conditions and factors which determine the thinking and behaviour of the military with respect to NATO can be placed in the context of the relationship between the community and the army, or the relationship between the two groups (united by motivation and goals) in the army, i.e. “the senior ranks” and the “young officers”.

In the eyes of the society and politicians, the senior army officers represent criterion such as “knowledge”, “professionalism”, “strategic thinking”, “experts’ skills”, etc. Usually the opinion of any military man on NATO weighs much more than the opinion of a politician or a public figure.

However, within the army itself, there is marked difference between the way in which the “military elite” on the one hand, and the “young officers” on the other, perceives NATO (like everything else that has happened in BAF over the last few years). There are no grounds to claim that there is a generally prevailing single body of opinion in the army, or that such an opinion can be derived as an arithmetical mean or average statistical assessment. Actually, “the senior ranks” are a coeval of NATO and has a detailed understanding with the development of the organisation. This awareness will normally influence attitudes towards the issue.

In the political and especially in the economic sphere, there has been a genuine sense of a socialist community, but that was not the case in the military sphere, paradoxical as this may sound. The army officers perceived the Warsaw Treaty as a military alliance between Bulgaria and the USSR rather than as a multinational alliance. Everything else, especially on the lower command levels, was an abstraction. The main reasons for this situation were the exclusive dependence on Soviet military arms and equipment, the word-for-word translations of field manuals and books, the study at Soviet military academies and colleges, the direct contact with the Soviet militaries, the exercises on Soviet territory, etc. All other allied relations were so far-fetched that they had no real chance of producing *allied thinking* among army officers.

The reflex to NATO is similar. The military elite usually identifies NATO with the United States. On the one hand, this is a natural reflex remnant of the past. On the other hand, the point is the perception of NATO having a very complicated leadership and command system where *the militaries play a secondary role* in the decision-making process. The case of the Kosovo crisis strengthens this impression.

Subsequently, the issue of the study of NATO, as it stands today, does not induce any change in the attitude of officers towards the Alliance. In fact, the military elite has not shown sufficient interest in studying the processes underway in NATO and their impact on Bulgaria’s security. No serious study

has been made covering the changes in the main documents of NATO, the enlargement process or Bulgaria's interests in acceding, or refraining from accession, to the Alliance. On the other hand, the elite obviously nurtures some apprehensions as to the changes that will objectively have to take place because of possible integration with NATO. Basically, this implies a *radical change of the military system*. At stake are new structures of BAF to meet the requirements of national security and the commitments made to the Alliance, a new system of training officers and soldiers as a whole, a new mobilisation system, a new philosophy of the military art, and a new system of making military-political, military-strategic and military-technical decisions. Military professionals will need *quite different skills of a political and military nature*. They will need expertise with respect to the allied concept of military behaviour and, generally, to the place and role of the military in the national policies and the coalition of States. This is a vast range of issues that the senior ranks approaches very cautiously and quite often in a prejudiced manner.

The attitude of “young officers” is also motivated by a number of factors and these presuppose the differences in attitude to NATO. The “young” view the policy of co-operation and accession as an impetus that can stir the stale waters of staff-related decisions. They expect that *the introduction of new criteria and new requirements will lead to the promotion of people of different qualities and expertise*. Unlike the elite, the “young officers” associate accession to NATO with the acquisition of a higher (adequate) social status for the military. The majority of the military elite does not strive for a higher social status; they are satisfied with the new regulations in the Law for Defence and Armed Forces that provides them with sufficient time in their military career. However, the opinion of the young is entirely different. They consider the possible accession of Bulgaria to NATO as a challenge and a chance. It means learning foreign languages, new opportunities for studies at military academies and colleges of a new type, international missions, new equipment, new contacts.

At the same time, some trends generate certain negative attitudes to a possible accession to NATO. The lengthy speculations about the attitude to NATO, and the lack of clarity with respect to the military political orientation of the country has provoked a kind of national patriotism as an alternative to the stalemate. This national patriotism rules out any alignment with structures of the NATO type. This trend is reinforced by the increasing loss of interest in the issue due to the aggravation of personal social problems, the mistrust resulting from the slow pace of the reform process, and the general lack of confidence that the system can substantially change.

As was explained earlier, it is very difficult to sum up the opinion of the military about the role of NATO for European security and Bulgaria's prospects for membership in the Alliance. Still, we can conclude that overall it adopts a wait-and-see position rather than taking a generally active stance. It has deliberately refrained from taking the initiative, which is thus handed over entirely to the politicians. It has reduced the area of military expertise to the importance of providing alternatives for guaranteeing the military security of the country. These attitudes are accompanied by a strict observance of all commitments to the government, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.

## **2.5. A difficult choice for the defence industry**

Currently and in the near future, in the field of military security in Europe, two tendencies can be outlined. On the one side, it is not expected that the *military factor* will dominate the European environment, no country has the ambition to become the dominant military power and the possibility of a mass military threat or aggression coming from outside the continent is very small. On the other side,

in some subregions, there are possibilities for internal- and inter-state armed conflicts most of all on ethnic-religious and territorial-border basis. The solution to these problems can be a question of direct military actions with different intensities as well as international intervention. The possible role of the international military factor in this case is first preventive, and - in extreme situations - defence actions.

The other tendency defines the *economic factor* as the decisive one to guarantee national security. The strategic goal is turning the national economy into a functional and system building national security mechanism.

In the internal economic aspect, the strategy aims at building a contemporary market economy through:

- Stabilisation and achieving a real economic growth
- Guaranteeing strategic resources
- Restructuring of the economy, subordinated to the market production mechanisms and competition of equal rights producers
- Improvement of quality of life standards and managing the social polarisation of the population
- Combating the corruption and illegal economic activities
- Developing and improving the economic legislation and normative basis.

The positive influence of the economic factor is strengthened by the increase in the importance for Bulgaria of the world, European and regional economies. The strategic priorities are the integration of the Bulgarian economy in the united European economic space, transforming the country into a regional communication and energy centre, and enlargement of the economic relations with the EU, the USA, CEFTA and the traditional partners.

In accordance with the second tendency that defines the role of economic factors, the economic conditions have a decisive influence on the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the defence potential of the country. The *main economic factors* that form these conditions in Bulgaria are: the general level of industrial production and, more particularly for the defence potential branches, the condition of the financial and bank system and possibilities for investment in the defence industry, flexibility and readiness of the economy for conversion and reconversion, sufficient strategic resources and sustainability of the supplies in cases of crisis and military conflict, level of research work and technological basis, qualification of the engineer personnel and the workers, level of management of the defence industry and level of normative regulation of the responsibilities of the economic subjects in terms of insurance of the defence potential in peace and war time.

The *defence industry* of the country is an essential element in the provision of equipment, ammunition, combat and other material to the defence and security.

The *production structure* of the defence industry was formed on the basis of what was conducted in the course of the past years' military doctrine of the members of the former Warsaw Pact as an element of their combined strategy. This places the production structure on a subordinated level because, in the majority of cases, it redefines the market possibilities for the production of arms, equipment and ammunitions. In recent years, the production structure has been strongly influenced by the conversion. It has resulted not only in the modernisation and enlargement of the spectrum of the produced civilian articles, but it also has outlined in a sufficient change in its relative share of the general scale, but also it has resulted in some negative economic reflections arising from the restructuring of the production programme through the replacement of highly profitable special production by unprofitable civil production.

**Alternatives for restructuring of the defence industry.** The main problem in the strategy of national defence, concerning the pre-structuring of the defence industry, is that overcoming the crisis can only be done through strategic decisions. Managing the crisis usually means taking anti-crisis measures in order to stabilise the situation and create conditions for evolutionary strategic changes. In the present condition of Bulgaria, however, the possibility for such approach has been neglected. The efforts to stabilise the existing model are unjustified from a political-economic, as well as from a military point of view.

The strategic pre-structuring of the defence economy in conditions of real crisis, as being a governing process, will have the following characteristics:

- Lack of time to discuss alternatives, to experiment and prepare whole concepts in detail
- Lack of resources for the implementation of the method "test-mistake-test"
- Serious national and international political consequences from an eventual failure
- Insufficient interest on part of foreign investors
- Fast pre-structuring of the defence sector in Europe - a process from which Bulgaria will be gradually falling behind in geometrical proportion with the delay of the processes.

These peculiarities enable us to define the main dichotomy pairs of problems, which the strategy for restructuring of the defence economy will have to deal with in such a way, that the process and results stay within the concept frame of national security.

**a) Preserving the model *or* immediate change.** Settling this dichotomy is part of the balance between the parameters of the real military strategic situation, from one side, and from the other - the dynamics of economic realities. From a military strategic point of view, if Bulgaria faces a direct military threat efforts must be directed to stabilise and actualise the present defence model. Adequate policy should include the quick rebuilding of the fighting capacity of the arms and the technique and concentrating efforts on the production of the most important fighting means - ammunition, spare parts, small arms.

If there is no such threat, efforts should be directed to the development of future defence potential. The right policy should include a system of financial regulations implied to the chain from scientific and research to development of prototypes and production. Equipment and spare parts, that are technologically and effectively compatible with NATO' requirements, "know-how" investments preferred to ready-made equipment investments, satisfying the need for arms and combat equipment of the new functional structures and, most of all, of the Rapid Reaction Forces, stressing mobilisation, planning and modernising the national technological and industrial base.

From an economic point of view the global situation is unique - for the first time the crisis envelops several world regions simultaneously. One of the expected forms of defence is the application of different protectionism approaches. In the sphere of military production, it will probably be the stimulation of national production, that nation based or produced in the European Union, and at the same time in terms of national export, protection will be exercised. Therefore, if we keep the existing model and do not integrate in a bigger system, there is the danger of being "swallowed" by producers that are more economically powerful.

**b) Entirely military production *or* double-purpose technologies.** Strictly, military technology policy presupposes stress on fighting parameters. Quality, efficiency and reliability should be the main criteria for the producer, and the state should be the main sponsor of scientific and research activities.

Double-purpose technologies are based on the requirement of civil-military research, technological and production integration together with minimising the expenditures, increasing

production potential and economic requirements of national defence. It is expected that this approach will give way to commercial competition, will increase the use of products that are not only needed for the army, will optimise expenses, introduce normal trade and production practices, including quality control standards which will stabilise control on part of the state, and will lead to improved training of state officials. The ideal characteristics of the future national technological and industrial base should include:

- Adequate tasks for the research sector potential
- Smooth access to civil technologies
- Reliable potential in the key defence sectors
- Structural and standardised mobilisation potential
- Good maintenance and repair work potential
- Integrated governing of the sectors with different forms of property

**c) State or private property.** The decision to preserve a strong private sector in the defence industry requires a change of rules so that the profit in industry is adequate to the risks taken, the specifics of the products and so on.

With this option, the state should follow a strategy which is primarily private sector orientated. In this respect, control should be exercised over some very important military technologies and production potential in enterprises owned and governed by the state. The analysis presents that there will unquestionably be the need to subsidise some companies in order to support their interest and the interest of the investors.

If a decision is taken in favour of the state sector in terms of the national defence industry, the government will inevitably have to take bigger financial and technological risks. This organisational form provides total state control over funds and equipment in enterprises and presupposes state financing of the whole production cycle.

The settling of the problem of property in the defence industry enterprises should correspond to the character of the product the state requires. Private business should provide products that are equivalent to defence products in accordance with the concept of "shelf-of-commerce". In case of production of a rare technology with no or minimal civil application, if the reasons for production secrecy prevail, and if there is no close commercial equivalent in the country then the possibility for the privatisation of the factory is quite small.

**d) Protectionism or market oriented conversion.** From the point of view of the national security and above all defence, the conversion towards dual production and market motivation is not synonymous. If the transformation of small-size manufacturers of military equipment into market entities is a matter of competitiveness and management, the conversion at the level of factories and conglomerates has to be assessed carefully. The defence factories cannot be "rehabilitated" if the defence production lines are stopped. As Richard T. Minick points "the time, political price and the difficulties from their decommissioning will be disastrous".

Moreover, the converted factories will have to be oriented to numerous buyers with specific requirements and not to the state with its clear and sustained standards. It is very difficult to estimate what investments will be necessary for that, if the factories do not have available incentives for modernisation and technological improvement. Even more that, it is presumed that the large military factories lack the flexibility in using the equipment and they cannot define precisely the range of their products at the right time. That will considerably delay the conversion process.

There is no doubt that both state protectionism and conversion requires high investment. This is even more true, when the country is in the process of market economy formation and economic

restructuring like Bulgaria. The conversion under such conditions could take an unacceptable period of time.

**Imperatives for defence industry.** The national defence industry needs restructuring and new dynamics. Restructuring is directed at the industrial operators' new competitiveness to comply with the double imperative: 1. To meet the direct needs of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, and 2. To achieve permanent place in international markets.

The first imperative requires the mobilisation of all capacities and resources, clarification of the military doctrine and operative concepts of the AF branches and units, modernised co-ordination between the staffs and logistic support units, and application of new methods of work at all levels. In this respect, the cost-efficiency ratio should be adopted as an unconditionally prevailing criterion.

The second imperative requires the simultaneous development of technological levels and national competitiveness. A new export concept is also necessary which should correspond to the new behaviour of Bulgaria in the international community of democratic countries. The sale of arms and equipment cannot be approached like an ordinary sales act, but should have a global consideration.

There are two extreme strategic approaches outlined in development of defence industry. The first is directed at the production orientation of state property and strong regulations. The second one is based on the non-contrasting outlines of sector borders, admittance of various forms of ownership, competition building, the implementation of a common defence industry policy stimulating all factories that could be potential manufacturers of defence products.

The use of the first approach applied under the conditions of an expanding market economy can result in the factories huge indebtedness to the sector. Adherence to this approach means the complex restructuring of a heavy resources burden for national economy and impossibility of using the defence complex' potential for achieving economical stabilisation and growth.

The solely admissible second approach requires developing and following a liberal defence industry policy. The major parameters of such policy can be:

- Government direction of production through market relations, bilateral and multilateral agreements and contracts. Building up of government institutions for directing production.
- Building up a system for government preferences for the stimulation of competitive and security oriented factories.
- Promotion of international co-operation resulting in strengthened production capacity.
- Promotion of defence research and development activities through the consolidation of state funds for scientific and technological development.
- The attraction of extra capital through privatisation of some of the production base, as well as the promotion of foreign investment in certain sectors of the latter.
- Structural reform and product diversification of the factories - general contractors, according to the national requirements and export potential.
- Conversion of factories manufacturing non-competitive defence products.
- Maintenance of strict state control of the export of arms, technologies and quality assurance of defence products.
- The establishment of a revolve state fund for crediting technological and product development of defence industry.

The solution of the double imperative makes Bulgaria get prepared for accepting and offering to its partners co-operation in the economic and financial spheres. The adherence to such a strategy will inevitably bring the establishment of a relationship of a new type with our partners all over the

world.

The key to the restructuring of the Bulgarian defence industry is in its global competitiveness. The new security strategy of Bulgaria poses the problem of compensating the reduction of defence potential by raising the economy's role as a national security guarantee. One of the government options is to focus on the "dual-use" technologies, i.e. technologies that can be applied to defence and contribute considerably to the international economical competitiveness of Bulgaria. It can only be realised with the availability of a strong and consolidated civil economy.

In the implementation of this approach, the focus falls upon technologies - both productive and processor technologies, which will strengthen economic competitiveness and that are of major importance to the private sector. At the same time, the government should keep the national technological potential both for supporting the current needs of defence and for the development of arms in the future. The Ministry of Defence has to work with private industry in order to consolidate and develop selected technologies so that they can support defence needs and private sector competitiveness (both the private sector and military will gain from this process). It has to monitor the effect of conventional market forces upon the defence industry as a whole and upon the status of key companies in the branch, and to prevent any breakdown or abandonment of major productions and products. The Ministry of Defence has to moderate the effect of reduced defence orders by establishing a more favourable background for defence factories and their workers.

The speeded up achievement of interoperability with NATO will be the driving force of the modernisation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and the national defence infrastructure.

## **2.6. The new approach to national security**

One of the most remarkable changes during the period of strengthening the preparation for NATO integration was the new approach to the conceptualisation of national security strategy. An acceptance of the comprehensive approach to security replaced the traditional defence oriented concept. The new understanding is that national security could be guaranteed when state borders, territorial integrity and independence of the country is safeguarded, when there is no danger of armed attack, violent change of constitutional order, political coercion or economic intimidation for the state and that the democratic functioning of the state and civilian institutions are guaranteed, thus enabling the nation to preserve and increase its property and development. Security is guaranteed when Bulgaria successfully realises national interests, goals and priorities, and is in a position, if necessary to defend them effectively from external and internal threats. The interests of the state require the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, achievement of political and financial stability of economic and social development, equality and mutually beneficial international co-operation. Three major factors determine the national security of Bulgaria:

1. The level of development and the available resources of the country.
2. The effectiveness of its foreign and internal policies.
3. The participation of Bulgaria in the collective systems for security and economic development.

The Government, the National Assembly and society have a common understanding that Bulgaria cannot not and does not, have any territorial claims and does not recognise such claims on its territory. This principle eliminates old tensions in the region while not creating new ones. It reaffirms Bulgaria's role as a source of security. Bulgaria does not build its security at the expense of other states or societies. The stated will for NATO membership aims to guarantee security and is not directed against third countries. Increased security for all countries in Europe and the world is essential for the

enhancement of the security guarantees for the country. Loyal and mutually beneficial relations with other states and international organisations are a priority policy of the Republic of Bulgaria. Today no hostile intentions are openly displayed against Bulgaria, and the Kosovo crisis showed that this is a correct conclusion.

The Government, supported by a large majority in the Parliament and society are confident that the security of Bulgaria can be guaranteed only by the Euro-Atlantic structures for collective security. Many official statements of the Prime Minister, the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the period between 1997 and 1999 and especially around the Kosovo crisis, have stressed that the process of integration into NATO and the European Union has a positive influence upon the security of Bulgaria. However, only full membership in these institutions will provide complete guarantees for the country. Membership in NATO and the European Union is a national priority that corresponds to the vital interests of the country.

The successful integration of Bulgaria into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures for security and development depends on the progress achieved in the peace building process in south-eastern Europe and is slowed down by the armed conflicts and the destabilisation of neighbouring countries. Henceforth there is a need for a very active Bulgarian foreign policy aimed at strengthening peace in south-eastern Europe. This policy is the most important element in the strategy for the preventive protection of Bulgarian interests.

Bulgaria's own security is determined by the degree to which the country projects security to its neighbouring countries. A specific aspect in the new approach to security is the acceptance of the thesis that Bulgaria aims security in south-eastern Europe and is against any military alliance and any kind of political axis and triangles in the region. Consequently, Bulgaria's regional initiatives are aimed at a greater mutual confidence in the political-military field supporting the strengthening of security and stability in south-eastern Europe.

The economic factor is decisive in guaranteeing of the national security. Only the stabilisation and re-establishment of growth in Bulgarian economy can satisfy the interests of society in solving the problems concerning the deficiency of resources, to improve living standards and increase the degree of social protection. The positive influence of the economic factor could be enhanced by the strategic involvement of the Bulgarian economy into the global, European and regional co-operation, as it is integrated into the unified European economic area.

The significance of Bulgaria's economy for national security and for a stable development depends on the capabilities to develop its own infrastructures as an important connecting link between European countries and the new markets in the Black Sea-Caucasian region, the Middle East and Central Asia. Strategic intercontinental transport, communication and energy corridors determine the national and European security passage through the territory of Bulgaria. The country's contribution to global and European security will depend on the establishment of these channels and the transformation of the country into a Balkan communication and energy centre.

There is a strong believe between politicians, executives and society in general that the reaffirmation of Bulgaria as an important component of European and regional security depends on the re-establishment of the lost positions of Bulgarian producers and tradesmen in traditional markets, on the development of joint activities and co-operation with the leading European manufacturers, as well as ensuring the energy independence of the country.

On 16 April 1998, the National Assembly adopted The Concept for National Security as (1) a political declaration of democratic government on the principle issues of security and (2) a system of milestones for organising the efforts of the nation and the state to reach strategic goals. The idea of the

Concept is contained in the conviction that national security exists when the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Bulgarian citizens, and the democratic functioning of the state and civic institutions is guaranteed. The Concept represents national interests as a reflection of the integral approach to the security of citizens, society and state, as well as the defence of their interests. The foundations of national security are the rule of law, the balance of interests and responsibilities for national security of individual, society and state, as well the interrelation and the interdependence between national and international security. The priorities and the factors of national security indicate the system of political and strategic milestones for development and guaranteeing national security in the period preceding Bulgaria's admission in NATO and the European Union.

## **2.7. The new Military Doctrine**

The National Security Concept defines the principles and landmarks which are the basis of the new Military Doctrine adopted by the Parliament on 8 April 1999. The document closed the circle of regulated responsibilities for national security and defence. It complements the set of missions and functions of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, as defined in the Constitution, the National Security Concept and the Law of Defence and the Armed Forces (1995, amended 1997). It emphasises their role for guaranteeing national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. For the first time a Parliamentary decision determined the size of the Armed Forces in peacetime and in case of war as well as the directions and landmarks for their development.

The philosophy of the new Military Doctrine consists of putting the accent on the thesis that involving the country in a military conflict should be avoided by strengthening international security and stability. At the same time the sovereignty, security and independence of Bulgaria should be guaranteed through interaction and integration in European and Euro-Atlantic security structures and through a national defence policy that is adequate to the potential threats.

The Military Doctrine enlarges the spectrum of functions being carried out by the Armed Forces. The deterrence and defence functions are complemented by peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue functions, by functions for assistance and by the acceleration of Bulgaria's integration in NATO, as well as by social functions for creating in the citizens of a feeling of security, for the education of youth in the spirit of patriotism and strengthening the ethnic cohesion of the nation.

*The new missions of the Armed Forces.* The main goals of the new Bulgarian military policy are: preventing the country's involvement in armed conflicts, contributing international security and stability, and guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. These goals determine the character of the Armed Forces' main missions.

Supporting the efforts of the international community for guaranteeing the peace and security. Despite that these missions are carried out abroad and in peacetime they are in the interest of the national security and defence because:

- By participating in the collective efforts for safeguarding the world peace, Bulgaria may count on support, if needed
- Settling the crises at the lowest possible escalation level improves the general state of international security. This is of interest both for national security in general and for implementing the country's national, economic, financial, resource, trade and other interests
- By joining the community of leading nations of the world, Bulgaria not only shares with them common values but participates in defending these values.

Missions abroad are a great challenge both to defence policy and to military professionalism. Bulgaria made a good start in 1992-1993 by sending to Cambodia a battalion of 850 people, 16 military observers and 5 staff officers. The internal situation over the last few years has impeded the active participation of Bulgarian forces in international efforts to settle the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Bulgaria sent two units - a transport and military-construction platoons to the SFOR corps. This resulted in raising the confidence of the Bulgarian military and was expressed by the invitation to include a road construction regiment in SFOR, as well by the readiness with which NATO accepted eight Bulgarian officers in Alliance' HQ and offices.

The Bulgarian AF have a very important mission in the integration of Bulgaria in NATO. The Army bears a big share of the efforts in responding to the criteria for accession. Without real progress in all aspects of interoperability, without a working system of effective democratic control and without an appropriate military educational system and well-trained officers' and sergeants' corps, membership in NATO will remain a dream. The integration mission has to turn from a task for the high-command officers into a task for the officers of all ranks. It has to become one of the criteria of the military profession and to determine the character and the pace of the military careers.

Preventing the country's involvement in armed conflicts is the best deterrence of the potential aggressor. The new approach corresponds to real situations and new requirements: *political* - Bulgaria is not supposed to "deter" countries with which it wants to be an ally, and *military-strategic* - Bulgaria is not in a position to deter its neighbours, taking into account its balance of power with them and their pronounced superiority in personnel and especially in quantity and quality of military equipment. This mission supposes working out and implementing a new strategy for crisis management and conflict prevention with the goal of avoiding the country's involvement in undesired or imposed armed conflicts. This strategy combines political, diplomatic and military steps at each stage of the escalation of the crisis and preserves the possibilities for cessation of the military activities at each stage of the war, in case it breaks out.

The traditional mission of guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country is concentrated in the preparation of the Armed Forces and the sistizen for defence in case of armed conflicts.

The Bulgarian AF possesses important potential for implementing its social mission. The Armed Forces may perform it by: contributing to the integration of the social and ethnic groups in society; educating youth in a "European" spirit; generating in citizens feelings of security and safety, of reliability in case of natural and other disasters; contributing to development of education, science and higher technologies; clarifying the goals and strategy for the integration of Bulgaria in NATO and EU.

## **2.8. Preparing for membership: Army 2004**

Discussions about the necessity of defence reform began in Bulgaria during the first non-communist government in 1992 (UDF with Prime Minister Mr. Filip Dimitrov and Minister of Defence Mr. Dimitar Ludghev). Since then all the efforts to transfer the Armed Forces into a new type and institution were symbolic, slowly achieved and limited in effect. For the first time the reengineering of the Armed Forces was placed among the major tasks and priorities in the programme "*Bulgaria 2001*" of Mr. Ivan Kostov's government. The declared goal is to structurally reform and optimise the personnel in view of the efficient realisation of tasks defined by the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine. The reorganisation is related to transforming the structure and personnel of the Army in compliance with the conditions of the military-strategic environment, financial-economic and

demographic capacities of the country and with the enhanced achievement of the high level of interoperability with NATO forces.

Certain difficulties have resulted from the inheritance from the Cold War characteristics of the Army - level of combat and mobilisation readiness, numerical and combat strength, the disposition which is impossible to maintain in terms of the economy, and, as far as the military and political situation is concerned, its maintenance is debatable and even groundless.

The reform of the Bulgarian AF being determined by the changed military and political and strategic situation in Europe and particularly on the Balkans, as well as by the economic state of the country and related problems of a financial and material and technical character. Additionally during the last few years, the demographic factor, which consists of the progressive decrease of human resources that are fit for service in the AF, is having a negative effect.

Because of the insufficient funding of the BAF, its combat training and provision of the troops with modern armaments and equipment has been considerably limited. The field, flight and naval training of the commanders, staffs and troops has been decreased to a considerable extent.

In these conditions in 1997, the General Staff suggested a Concept for organisational building and the structure of Bulgarian Army up to 2010 as well as a schedule for its realisation. The Government approved so called *Plan 2010* and its implementation started in 1997.

Two years later it became evident that this was not either the approach or concept that would prepare the Bulgarian AF to meet the challenges of the new millennium and requirements for NATO membership. The frames of the reform, timetable, set of priorities and balance between the aims, strategies, organisation and available resources were deemed to be unsatisfactory. The Prime Minister Ivan Kostov delivered a programme speech before senior military ranks. For the first time after the democratic changes the head of the government described what kind of military doctrine and armed forces the country needs to the military the political will of the democratic elected representatives. This speech and the follow-up governmental and parliamentary decisions marked the beginning of the real political control over defence policy and strategy. The developments showed how great the difference is between written rules of civilian and political leadership and their implementation in practice.

Based on the required new approach to the military reform, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) initiated a study of the *Plan 2010*. A working group of experts from MoD and the General Staff, headed by the Deputy Minister of Defence on the military policy and planning Mr. Velizar Schalamanov with the methodical and expert support of the MG Henry Kievenaar and General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie conducted global research of the system for defence and made important conclusions and recommendations. They indicated that in spite of the existence of some positive elements, "The plan for organisational building and the structure of Bulgarian Army up to 2010" as a whole did not fit in to the changed strategic environment, to the new political and military-political goals and priorities of the country. Its further implementation would not lead to achieving the model of the army laid down in the Military Doctrine of Bulgaria. The conclusions were that the Armed Forces should acquire a defensive structure and should be capable of protecting the territorial integrity and independence of the country with a reduced personnel up to 45 000 plus 5 000 (in MoD and central subordinated structures like Military Police, Counterintelligence, Civil Protection etc.) in peacetime (250 000 in wartime), with a combat potential mainly concentrated in Rapid Reaction Forces and Immediate Reaction Forces, a three-level chain of command and strongly reduced number of non-perspective arms. The recommendations required a number of radical improvements in the structure of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, the military educational system, logistics and personnel policy. Based on these for the first time in the history of the defence policy of the country the civilian

minister of defence Mr. Georgi Ananiev send to the chief of GS *Recommendations* for preparation of a new defence reform plan. Based on Article 35, Para (2), Section 2 of the *Law for Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria* and in implementation of Article 93 of the *Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria* he required the Chief of the General Staff to prepare “*Plan for the development of the Armed Forces to 2004*” (*Plan 2004*).

*Plan 2004* should be presented at the end of June 1999. It will develop in detail the following major issues: organisation, personnel and location of the Bulgarian Army, C4I, major armament systems and combat equipment, personnel and mechanisms for its reduction, defined by paragraph 93 of the *Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria*, logistic and financial provisions, a system for the preparation of troops, forces and HQs, and phases of the implementation of the plan. Special attention will be paid to the major transition programmes, to the goals and priorities of international co-operation in the field of defence. Projects and programmes for purchasing new equipment and armaments and the modernisation of the existing equipment and armaments will be undertaken in the field of command, management, communications, navigation, information and air defence as well as repairing equipment, envisaged in the *Plan 2004*. To that end, research will be done with the methodological assistance of NATO agencies and member countries.

**Principles and approaches in developing *Plan 2004*.** *Plan 2004* should reach four main aims: to make the Armed Forces adequate to the strategic environment and in condition to face the challenges of new types of conflicts and crises, to have a high level of interoperability with NATO no later than 2001-2002, to have potential for an effective contribution in peace support operations (PSO) and to have a realistic size in accordance with the level of resources the country can provide for defence. To fulfill these goals, when developing the plan, several basic principles and approaches should be followed:

- Ensuring that the Armed Forces have the resources to develop military strategic reasoning
- The transition to this model should lead to a gradual and constant increase in the capabilities of the Armed Forces
  - The organisational structure should be based on units and formations interoperable with the respective formations of NATO forces
  - The command and management system of the Bulgarian Army in peacetime should be developed on three levels - strategic, operational and tactical
  - The Rapid Reaction Forces should be a priority when recruiting career soldiers, armaments and equipment, and be provided with resources
  - The development of the reserve formations and units for peace time implies forming a unit fully recruited with personnel, armament, and equipment and reduced to a minimum staff and support elements
  - The restructuring of the units and formations should be accompanied by a reduction of the number of garrisons and barracks
  - In the course of the reform released resources should be used mainly to improve the living conditions of servicemen and their families, combat training, and increase of the interoperability of the Rapid Reaction and Immediate Reaction Forces, of certain elements of the air defence system and communication - information system.
  - In the development of the logistic and financial system the principle of centralised supply and provision should be used as a foundation

- The development of the system for training of troops and assets, the command staff and the HQs should be done via the resources for preparation of fully combat ready and trained units and formations.

The principles and approaches to achieve the new model of the BAF are realised by managing organs with a new profile under the comprehensive leadership of the General Staff. To this end the General Staff should be reformed and become adequate to the central administration of the Ministry of Defence adopting structures and functions which are in compliance compatible with the high military leadership organs of NATO member countries.

#### **Structure of Army 2004.**

The idea is that until 2004 the Army should be radically reorganised on operational and tactical levels. The reform has two main aspects - structural and functional.

Structurally, the Armed Forces are planned to adopt a defensive character, to be capable of defending the territory of the country without being directed against a specific adversary, and to achieve a high degree of interoperability with NATO forces as early as the preparation for accession. The Bulgarian Armed Forces comprise Army, Air Force, Navy and supporting elements. Functionally, it is planned that the forces to be organised in Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) and Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF). They should be an instrument to manage military-political crises, as well as preventing military conflict. They will also participate in NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and other *ad hoc* peace support coalitions, and take part in disaster relief operations and operations other than war). For wartime Defence Forces and Territorial Defence Forces will be deployed.

The three branches are the structural components of the BAF. They are restructured in compliance with the new tasks, resulting from the Military Doctrine (paragraphs 44-69) and the resource capacities of the country.

*Land Forces.* The Land Forces will comprise HQ, "Centre" Command, "East" Command, "West" Command and Land Forces package. "Centre" Command comprising all components of the Rapid Reaction Forces from Land Forces will include all service brigades, ready to act without additional recruitment and the Bulgarian contingent in the Multinational Peace Force—South-Eastern Europe (SEEBRIG) as well as other components put into place for participation in multinational forces. All units from "Centre" Command will be recruited with personnel strength of no less than 90 % and equipment level at 100 %. These units should also be trained to take part in operations other than war. A gradual professionalisation of the units from "Centre" Command should be a priority in comparison with the remaining part of the BAF. "Centre" Command should maintain Immediate Reaction Forces from Land Forces on rotation principally of battalion tactical group size. The rotation period can be from 6 to 12 months, recruited with professional (if possible) personnel and 100 % equipment.

"East" and "West" Commands should be built on territorial principle and in peacetime will be responsible for the combat preparation and troops mobilisation in the respective zones. These should prepare reserve and retired personnel who will participate in the formation of defence troops and territorial defence troops in wartime. "West" Command will comprise three reserve brigades, while "East" Command will comprise four reserve brigades.

*Air Force.* The Air Force should include a headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Air Defence Command, and an Air Force package. The Tactical Air Command should include an assault air base with operation-ready squadrons, and operation-reserve units, a helicopter air base with squadrons of operation-ready combat transport helicopters, and one operation-reserve unit each, a transport air base; and a Tactical Air Command package. This Tactical Air Command should maintain the following Rapid Reaction Forces: one assault fixed-wing aircraft squadron, one combat helicopter squadron, one

transport helicopter squadron, and six transport aircraft. The RRF should also include IRF, on a rotational basis (pursuant to paragraph 86 of the Military Doctrine), comprising one assault aircraft unit, one combat helicopter unit, one transport helicopter unit, and three transport aircraft.

The Air Defence Command will include anti-aircraft-missile units, a fighter air base, a radio-technical unit and AD Command package. Flying staff and equipment should be at 100%. The engineer and technical personnel should be manned at up to 80%.

*Navy.* The Navy will include a headquarters, Varna Naval Base, Burgas Naval Base, coastal missile unit, and a maritime package with combat support units.

Varna Naval Base should include a command, battalions, and combat support and logistic support units. Burgas Naval Base should consist of light forces, ship battalions, and combat support and logistic support units. The maritime package should comprise mainly combat support units. For rapid reaction purposes, the Navy should maintain 13 ships and fast boats, 4 coastal missile launchers, and 2 helicopters. In compliance with paragraph 86 of the Military Doctrine, for immediate reaction purposes, the Navy should maintain 2 missile fast boats, 1 frigate, 1 corvette, 2 coastal missile launchers. The rapid reaction forces should be manned at 80%, and the immediate reaction forces at 100% personnel strength.

*Command and Control System.* The command and control system of the Bulgarian AF in peacetime should consist of a General Staff, Staffs of the Services, commands and staffs of brigades (air and naval bases), regiments and battalions (squadrons). An enhanced establishment of the systems for early warning, air defence management, intelligence, warning and command-and-control of the RRF and IRF, as well as for human, material and financial resources management of the Bulgarian AF should be implemented simultaneously at all levels.

The structure of the General Staff (GS) is envisaged to comprise chancellery, directorates, commands and centrally subordinated formations. A Chief of the GS, who will be a four star General, the most senior military, assisted by Deputies, should do the leadership of the GS. They together with the Chiefs of HQs of the services should form the major advisory body of the Chief of the GS - Joint Chiefs of Staff Council. It is envisaged to establish three commands subordinate to the GS: "Special operations" Command, "Material - Logistic" Command, "Communications and Information Systems" Command which should incorporate management bodies, functionally designated troops and assets.

*Logistic Support System.* The logistic support system of the Bulgarian Army should be restructured to comply with the tasks assigned to the respective units, and should be implemented in a centralised manner, according to the principle of unified logistics, and by uniting all structures of the bodies dealing with armament, equipment and logistics. The central authority for logistic support management within the Bulgarian AF will be the Logistic Support Directorate of the General Staff, while the executive body should be the Logistic Support Command. The supplies for the troops in peacetime and wartime should be organised on a territorial principle. To this end, the Logistic Support Command should be established two regional supply zones, and all garrison supply stores should be subordinate to them in accordance with the number of garrisons as defined for the Bulgarian AF.

*Training of Officers, Staffs and Troops.* Changes are envisaged in the principles, methods and forms of conducting and reporting the operational, tactical and special training of staffs, troops and forces. The main efforts in terms of training should be directed towards the achievement by 2004 of combat-ready all-service brigades interoperable with NATO forces. The main forms of staff training during the period of restructuring should be staff exercises, command-post games and computer-assisted exercises, as well as simulation exercises (Art. 95 of the Military Doctrine). The training plans should also incorporate the PfP and "in the spirit of PfP" exercises. Officers will master

operational and tactical skills to be able to discharge the functions of the formations and units they serve in, by giving priority to interoperability with NATO, and the automation of processes. A National Training Centre for Conscripts and Junior Commanders of the Bulgarian AF should be established, while each individual Service will open a training centre for military professional qualifications.

### **2.9. Policy developments: national security in the Programme “Bulgaria 2001”**

Along with the reforms in important economic and social spheres, the issues in the military aspects of national security are invariably among the priorities of Government and National Assembly. Two years ago they have set goals to give security and stability to society and nation, and thus to create conditions for ending chaos, overcoming crises and for accelerating economic and social development. The new role of the military factor is to become a real instrument not only in national security policy but also in regional and above all – in integration policy of the Government.

Priority areas in the sphere of defence and armed forces are the forming of a new mechanism for the preparation and conduct of military policy, guaranteeing effective democratic control and civil administration, reorganisation and restructuring of the Bulgarian AF, accelerating all aspects of the preparation for integration with NATO and giving new impulse to regional co-operation in the area of defence and security.

The forming of a new mechanism for preparation and conduct of military policy and guaranteeing effective democratic control and civil administration is a priority, set in the legislative programme of the Ministry of Defence and in the foundation of structural reform. A Defence Planning Directorate was formed in a short period and the consolidation of the scientific institutes for methodological support of decision-making began. A system for planning, programming, budgeting, implementation and control is being established systematically. In addition new Structural Regulations of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Defence and the creation of councils for horizontal co-ordination a mechanism have been institutionalised whose purpose is forming and implementing military policy and its dimensions in human resources, social, economic and financial spheres, integration with NATO and bilateral/regional co-operation.

For the first time, publicity of the ministerial budget and the plans for reorganisation and reduction of personnel was presented and served for real and effective parliamentary and civil control. The principle of civil administration in preparing and implementing military policy has been introduced in all structures of the Ministry. The application of professional military to new *Regulations for Military Service* began, thus realising a new approach in their professional development and in structural and office policy. They should lead to the “erection of the office pyramid” in a short time, thus opening opportunities for young officers and NCO.

The programme goals in financial and economic activities in the Ministry are implemented sequentially. As a whole, the process of developing the draft military budget, its defence, establishment, distribution and consumption is regulated to ensure full transparency. For the first time integrated planning of the reorganisation of the Armed Forces and the activities in the Ministry in direct dependence of financial – economic capabilities of the country was implemented in practice. A determined battle with misappropriations and corruption in all forms and on all levels began. The introduction of a modern automated Financial Management system in the Ministry as a part of the national treasury system began, and a Programme for privatising state enterprises in the Ministry of Defence is under way.

The Government Programme *Bulgaria 2001* is practically the first document through which Bulgaria makes its political, economic and security choices. The full interaction and the quick integration of Bulgaria with EU and NATO are strategic goals and political priorities which cannot be pushed aside by any situation regional events, regardless of how serious they may be. On the contrary, the development of the situation in south-eastern Europe during the last decade has shown that the most secure and effective road towards peace-keeping, conflict prevention and progressive development is the immediate support of and the quick integration with stable NATO countries and European political and economic organisations. The Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces systematically contributing to the efforts of the Government and Parliament to share the goals of NATO countries and are guided in their actions by the principles of Euro-Atlantic solidarity.

Programme *Bulgaria 2001* of the Government takes into account the current situation in its basic directions and strategic goals. The most important in the defence sphere is that decisive steps are made towards the building of an optimal, combat capable and ready army, conditions for normal implementation of the structural stage of the military reform and for achieving the basic goals, contained in the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine.

### **2.10. NATO challenges to the national political decision-making: The Kosovo case**

*National security through the prism of the Kosovo crisis.* The Kosovo crisis attracted the attention of the whole world and became an exceptional challenge to international organisations, the democratic community, and Euro-Atlantic solidarity and especially to the fragile security and partnership mechanisms. It is ironic that many issues of the new world order are solved again in the Balkans: co-operative security and the relations among the global politic, economic and military powers, the fate of international law and international organisations, the future of national and multinational states, human rights and national sovereignty, the new-old role of the military factor as a continuation of policy, etc. The Kosovo crisis is a factor, which puts on trial some of the goals of the Government in the security and defence areas. The basic challenges were the questions: *Does the reform in the army stop because of the Kosovo crisis? Moreover, does NATO membership remain as a strategic goal?*

The Bulgarian national interest in the solution of the crisis is very clear – a quick end to combat, stopping the violence, the return of the refugees, democratic developments in Kosovo and the democratisation of Yugoslavia, the placement of international contingent in Kosovo primarily led by NATO forces, broad plans for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of all the countries of the region strongly supported by NATO countries and the EU in political, economic, financial and security aspects.

The condition of the post-crisis period, however, hide challenges to the peace and require a cautious and co-ordinated policy. For the aims of this paper they could be explained in terms of the current situation (the paper was finished at 12, June 1999) and in a mid-term context. Implementing the peace agreement could be challenged by developments like the following:

- The unknown variables in future are connected above all with the possible behaviour of president Miloshevich in the process of the implementation of the political agreement and especially his ability to control the army and the police.

- Kosovo refugees may also be able to become a serious destabilising factor. The absence until now of a vision of the possible schedule for their return poses the question for the continuation of the phase “reconstruction” of Kosovo and the beginning of the process of the “development” of the region, in which Bulgaria is particularly interested.

- An essential issue is also the behaviour of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The experience in many conflicts with similar character proves the great danger of criminalising of the para-military formations and their transformation to harsh transnational organised criminality.

Very important are also some possible developments which if they are not effectively managed can negatively influence the post-crisis improvements:

- The syndrome of the revitalised clash of great powers’ interests brings to the fore the issue of regional configurations as well as the well known “sanitary belt”. If this happens it will be a serious danger to the efforts to create regional security relations relative to the Euro-Atlantic context.

- It is very important for Bulgaria to receive a proper position in the post-crisis plans of NATO and EU. Bulgaria is not a country between these, which is part of the problem. State policy during the crisis confirmed that Bulgaria is a source of stability for the region and is ready to play a resultative pivotal role for NATO and EU policy of stability projection.

- An important issue for Bulgaria is in the condition NATO will exit the conflict. The alliance mission in Kosovo differs substantially in its basic parameters and especially in the way of conduct from the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no doubt, that operation “Allied Force” was a challenge to the political cohesion of the Alliance and for its ability to adapt its strategy and tactics to solve crises with specific characteristics such as the Kosovo one. It is very important to remember that a Stability Pact and everything that follows may become a fact for the region, if NATO does its job in Yugoslavia well and quickly.

The crisis also put on trial the regional military co-operation. It can be claimed that the relations among Ministries of defence and the general staffs not only sustain the provocative messages of Miloshevic but exit stronger and with far better perspectives for the process of the post crisis regulation of Kosovo. At the sequential meeting of deputy ministers of defence (in the format of the South-Eastern European Defence Ministerial process) in May 1999 (Sofia), the full commitment of the countries to the goals and principles of regional military co-operation was confirmed. The new subjects which emerged are in connection with the establishment of the engineering-construction multinational formation for the participation in the reconstruction in Kosovo and the beginning of the process of establishing mechanisms, procedures and instruments for co-operation in crisis management and conflict prevention.

Policy challenge. The crisis put the national security system in an extraordinary situation and on real and serious trial. At a political level, the stability and the resistance to pressure of the political system were put on trial. Regardless of the extreme and contradictory situation, the mechanism for non-standard anti-crisis political decision-making works satisfactorily and efficiently. The political risk stemming from unpopular decisions did not become an obstacle to making important decisions. They have already radically changed the value of the policy of the Government in regional and Euro-Atlantic context.

The system for immediate anti-crisis reaction of the Ministry of Defence was seriously challenged. The efforts of the administration, General Staff, military intelligence, Civil Protection and some air defence units (for the defence of the *Kozlodui* Nuclear Power Station) were organised and managed in a new way. The measures taken aimed at supporting Government policy in respect of the national commitment to the crisis and to guaranteeing the defence of the strategic sites, which may be in danger. At the same time, the military-technical characteristics of the crisis confirmed our conclusion for the necessity of a serious technological upgrade of the army with modern effective combat, surveillance and communication facilities.

The political administration and the military experts were placed in a completely new situation in negotiating NATO interoperability. In the frames of the Government policy, military-technical decisions were ensured, which guarantee reliable defence of the sovereignty of the country and capabilities for immediate reaction in case it is violated. That they achieved these during negotiations is a major success with far reaching consequences. It is a step towards interoperability with NATO in the key areas of administration air space control and air defence. Bulgaria is in practical terms already in a state of joint defence planning with NATO with operational and technical readiness for immediate joint reaction. The joint work of the teams of the Ministry with NATO specialists continues concerning the preparation of operation *Joint Guardian*, in whose framework the reconstruction of Kosovo will be done. On the basis of the decisions of the Council of Ministers in conjunction with NATO are decided all issues concerning unloading and transporting through the territory of the country freights, equipment and materials for Kosovo, for temporary storing some of this, and for the protection and security of the transport.

During the crisis, co-operation among institutions in times of military-political crisis was tested. The established Temporary Inter Institutional Situation Centre and the situation centres in the Ministry of Defence and other institutions are in compliance with the requirements, set in the National Security Concept and in the Military Doctrine in connection with crisis management. This system does not only cope with the information – analytical basis of administration, but also serves as a foundation for the gradual establishment of a national crisis management system.

An important moment in the management of the crisis is the work of the specially created team of the Ministry of Defence with experts from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Transportation, Agriculture and the Post and Telecommunications Committee in solving the problems concerning security and safety of flights in applying the *Agreement for transit air traffic of NATO aircrafts for the operation "Allied Force"*. The achievement of this group was extremely important for the realisation of Bulgaria NATO relations in direct and automatically activated national security guarantees. The establishment of a Bulgarian *Air Sovereignty Operations Centre* and granting of NATO "*F-F*" aircraft identification and early warning system are among the most important military-technical results from the joint work with NATO during the Kosovo crisis.

The Kosovo crisis puts on trial the national capabilities for explaining to the public and partner countries abroad the events, and Bulgarian's own anti-crisis responses. In this respect, the Ministry of Defence has a lot to do and to develop capabilities that are an absolute must for modern military policy and civil society.

In evaluating the immediate results of governmental and Ministry of Defence activities in the management of the Kosovo crisis can be seen that the national interests were securely defended in their military-political and military-technical aspect. The postulates of the National Security Concept and the

Military Doctrine were not doubted – especially in relation to the nature of the risks, threats, and ways in which Bulgaria should react. The Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces contributed to making sure that the strategic goal of integration with NATO was not put under suspicion. Relations with NATO are furthered positively and those prerequisites were created for a radical change of the position of Bulgaria in the Alliance's policy in south-eastern Europe. The regional military-political and military relations strengthened and developed – the establishment of a Multinational engineering-construction brigade in south-eastern Europe (SEECONBRIG) began, a process of harmonisation of legislation and crisis management procedures has developed, transparency through the broadening of shared information in military activities deepens. The political leadership did not allow the military reform to be delayed and its goals redefined because of the crisis. On the contrary, after thorough preparation and acceleration and a radicalisation of the structural part of the reorganisation of the Bulgarian AF commenced.

Strategy challenges. National expertise during the armed phase of the Kosovo crisis indicated the need for serious developments in the decision-making process. A basic problem is the way to prepare and conduct the crisis management. Operational administration of national security is impossible without planning with political, military-political and military scenarios. The scenarios are the basis for political early warning with NATO and member countries and for organising effective accomplishment. In the Ministry of Defence an organisation was created to meet and operationally solve the problems in collaboration with the Security Council in the Councils of Ministers, National Security Committee in the National Assembly, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Transportation. This organisation should be developed in nationwide system for crisis management and conflict prevention.

The Kosovo crisis clearly showed the character of the risks and threats to national security, which will be typical for the next century. The political, economic and social instability viewed through the prism of existing nationalism will be the main challenge to the security of Bulgaria and the region. The armed forces should prepare exactly for the forced and armed aspect of such crises. At the present, the Bulgarian Armed Forces appear to be unprepared to deal with a crisis such as Kosovo in many aspects.

In the course of the crisis many legislative cases in the co-operation with NATO emerged and continue to appear. The update of legislation on these issues is among the essential problems which should be solved immediately.

Peace in Kosovo will continue to require collaboration with NATO in relation with the control and the use of Bulgarian air space. It is important to achieve the maximum possible elements of collective defence with NATO, to establish interoperable bodies and means of communication and to prepare as many infrastructure facilities for joint use as possible.

Along with all its negatives the crisis opens new opportunities. The situation in the defence area has great potential for long-term measures to achieve the strategic goals set in Programme *Bulgaria 2001*. The important conclusion for us is that dynamic, consistent, flexible and purposeful actions in all directions of military policy are needed.

### **Recommendations:**

In the political plan the main national interest in the context of the Kosovo crisis is not to allow the disappearance of the state form in the region, not to allow the forced creation of new states through

violence and to avoid new forms of economic and communication sanctions. In this sense, the only reasonable perspective is *to participate with an active persistent policy in the reconstruction of the region*. The armed forces have the unique opportunity to support this national interest combining its participation in missions for guaranteeing the political agreement with participation in restoring of Kosovo and in providing favourable conditions for the quick return of the refugees. Together with this, Bulgaria has potential to continue and to enlarge the aid for *Radusha* refugee camp.

In the strategic plan the perspective of security policy of Bulgaria is connected with the perfect and subsequent combination of the two main permanent factors positively influencing the situation in the region: first, looking to decisions for practical applying the initiatives of the NATO Washington Summit for stabilising the Balkans, and second, tracing out the future role of the process of the South-eastern Defence Ministerials in the period after the finishing of the crisis

In the military-political aspect the main premise is lasting and stable security and stability of the region. This makes up a collective strategic vision for the rules that have to be applied in the region. These rules have to be accepted as regular policy. In this policy the military factor must, first, guard the process of post-crisis rehabilitation; second, create important channels to transfer openness, fidelity and predictability, and third, be transformed as an important factor to accelerate the integration process.

## CHAPTER 3. BULGARIA ON THE ROAD TO BRUXELLES

### 3.1. The Washington Summit

The essential message from the Washington Summit is not subject to any dramatic interpretations: NATO doors remain open for every democratic European country which wishes to join and is able to bear the ensuing responsibilities and duties. The Bulgarian political leadership welcomed with satisfaction the acknowledgement of the Alliance of the need for strengthening stability and security in south-eastern Europe. The officials and the political majority were also encouraged by the unambiguous acknowledgement of Bulgarian achievements not only on the road to democratic reforms and stable economic development, but in the actual preparation for integration.

From the point of view of Bulgarian interests the Government has to be especially pleased that NATO adopted complex approach to the security problems in south-eastern Europe, which coincides fully with Bulgarian position – an integrated and long-term strategy should be applied. If complemented with the expected *Stability Pact* and other international measures for political, economical and security stabilisation and development, and if fully supported with real efforts from the partner-states in the region, this approach will change the strategic picture of the Balkan region and will make integration with Europe inevitable and imminent.

The NATO decision to propose a strategic *Membership Action Plan* (MAP) is a token of the Alliance's responsibility for the growth effect on the states, which have categorically stated a wish for integration. The plan confirms the trust in these countries and the readiness to give integrated methodological and technical support in membership preparation. The Bulgarian politicians and security community of the country are convinced that such opportunities are created only for real partners, which are viewed as future members. The Government assessed that the framework and the technical procedures of the MAP outline the parameters of a real negotiation process for integration. In a special speech Minister G. Ananiev stressed that "... the plan is national, and the issue of preparation for integration with NATO is also national" underling this way that not only the MoD and Armed Forces are responsible for its implementation and success (like was previous years). "There can be no doubt that in its preparation and implementation the maximum possible resources should be concentrated not only in the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in the other institutions, as well as in the non-government sector".

A very important result from the Washington Summit is the adoption of the new Allied Strategic Concept. Apart from the other security issues, the concept confirms the NATO perception of the principles of co-operative security in Europe. NATO orientation towards crisis management missions and conflict prevention is a confirmation of what everybody expects - Europe should have a real military contingent, capable in a case of a need to act immediately and decisively. The basic principles in the NATO's Strategic Concept, including the assessments of the strategic background, risks and threats for security, completely covered with those in the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria (1999). This fact reflects the rightness of the Bulgarian strategic choice as well as the character and content of the military reform.

### 3.2. Reflections on defence policy

The Kosovo crisis will change many international organisations and especially NATO. This is the first military operation carried out by the Alliance assuming full political and military responsibility. The results and the assessments of it undoubtedly will have a serious effect upon the internal transformations and further enlargement of NATO. Of course, not only the relations with membership-candidates will change, but also the criteria for their readiness.

During the crisis, the Government and the parliamentary majority shown that principally and consequently are following of declared strategic goals. Bulgaria must preserve the political achievements in terms of its relations with NATO. The practice of mutual cognisance and political early warning which the Government gradually imposes, are an important element of informal borders for national security. In crisis conditions, Bulgaria and NATO passed from PfP to real interaction and collaboration. A great step to interoperability in key for defence of the country fields was made. Bulgaria has the opportunity to save and develop this process, making it a main part of the military reform.

The conclusion is that the strategic choice Bulgaria made in 1997 remains unchanged. The conditions are challenge to the ruling democrats, the administration and military establishment. This is also a possibility for the efficient development for proving the power of national decisions. In spite of Kosovo, it is important not to allow delay or postponement of measurements, reformulating of goals and priorities.

The operation of NATO in Kosovo redefined its commitment to the membership candidate countries of the region. It is impossible for NATO to leave the Balkans and Bulgaria could be among the first to take advantage of this for the sake of the national interest. From the analytical point of view, the Programme *Bulgaria 2001* in the field of security and defence is implemented, but it must be developed with new decisions and actions. It is extremely important that the horizon outlined by the Government and Parliament with the National Security Concept of and Military Doctrine passes the test of Kosovo and for the first time the country has no ground to doubt in declared goals. In this way the political support for military reform provided by the Government, the Prime Minister himself and by the Members of Parliament is a condition and a guarantee the armed forces to pass the anti-crisis policy successfully and to move to a strategy for development and integration with NATO.

### 3.3. Defence policy recommendations

*The road to Brussels* is symbolic in the title of this chapter. It unites in the name of a town the hopes and endeavours for Bulgaria. The Government has to find the right approach to go down this road and to keep public support for the difficult decisions. In the frame of the years up to 2004 as main could be outlined the following fields of action:

**A. The Military Reform and *The Plan for the development of the Armed Forces to 2004*.** The Programme *Bulgaria 2001* raises high the horizon in the field of security and defence. The new conditions require not to be changed the goals and methods, but to rearrange the priorities and to concentrate national efforts and recourses upon those of them that outline the success in key fields of security, military reform and integration.

The reengineering of the Armed Forces is among the main national assignments and priorities. There are issues of professional dignity, responsibility and prestige in the military reform. Large financial and material resources are concentrated there. This is also focused the attention of society as well as of the partners abroad. Important programme goals of the Government in the field of national security and defence of the country, integration policy and strategy, regional relations, restructuring of state expenses, civil-military relations and democratic control over the military activities are connected to the success of the reform.

The reform of the Armed forces is a political problem and in solving it the Government has to count on the military-professional expertise of Bulgarian officers and on the partners from NATO armies. In this way, the Ministry of Defence has to strive to achieve the maximum results at minimum expense and in shortest timeframe. In this way, with reformed and interoperable Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence and General Staff shall give to the Government a powerful argument in negotiations with NATO and EU. In creating *Plan 2004* the following basic principles should be adhered to:

- Creating resourced and military-strategic well-founded armed forces;
- Legitimising this model must lead to a gradual and permanent increase of the fighting efficiency of the armed forces
- The organisational establishment must be based on the standardised NATO units
- The system of the control and command of the Bulgarian AF in peacetime has to be developed on three levels - strategic, operational and tactical
- The Rapid Reaction Forces have to be completed with professional soldiers and professional and effective equipment with an emphasis on the IRF from the three branches
- The development of peacetime reserve units and outfits must oversee the forming of fully equipped with personnel and armament units at minimum staff and service elements
- Restructuring of units and outfits will lead to a reduction in the number of garrisons and barracks regions
- In the course of restructuring, the resources have to be detached for improving the living conditions of the officers and their families, fighting efficiency and improving the interoperability of RRF and some elements of air defence and communication-information systems
- In the developing of the system for procurement, the financial provision has to be based on centralised provision and security
- The system for the training of the troops and forces, commanders and staffs has to be implemented through concentrating resources for training full fighting efficient units and outfits.

**B. Application of the *Membership Action Plan*.** Bulgaria is steadily following its way to NATO. The efforts Bulgaria has to undertake for preparing the national political, economic, and defence system to meet the requirements for membership are radical, graduate and concrete. The National programme of implementation of *MAP* has to be prepared in conformity with the decisions of Washington Summit. The Programme has to foresee:

- In a short-term plan up to 2000 the basic requirements for interoperability in the critical spheres of co-operation should be satisfied by achieving the goals of interoperability within the

framework of PFP reviewing and planning, realising all initial aims of partnership and accepting a new set of goals, which should reflect the interaction priority spheres, outlined by the Allied Strategic Concept and the decisions of the Washington Summit

- In medium-term plan up to 2002 the basic and all-embracing activities for achieving an objective necessary degree of interoperability in the spheres of defence planning, crises management, command, control and consultations system, air defence and air traffic control, military infrastructure and doctrinal and language preparation of the command staff should be accomplished

- Special attention should be given to the full readiness of all military and infrastructure elements which are conceded to NATO for the aims of planning collective defence and crisis management. At the end of this period, Bulgaria has to aim to receive an assessment, opening up the possibility and procedure for direct negotiations for membership

- In the period up to 2004 Bulgaria has to completely accomplish the reorganisation of the Armed Forces and to enter in a process of consecutive and complete modernisation of the armament, combat equipment, execution of the basic set of goals for partnership, compatible to the requirements for partnership, achieving the maximum compatibility with NATO in all basic directions of interaction.

Research projects and programmes for development should support that vision:

- A survey of the country's air defence capabilities is prepared in view its further development and modernisation

- Ministry of Defence should collaborate with NATO and the USA in organising international co-operation for developing of visions for interoperability in the sphere of command, control and communications systems, computers, information systems and surveillance

- Bulgaria is an initiator of a process for harmonising national legislation, procedures and systems for crisis management among countries in the region, participating in the Partnership for Peace. A significant project for establishing compatible Situation Centres directly connected with NATO's Crises Management Centre

- The establishing of an Air Sovereignty Operational Centre has to continue with NATO and U.S. support.

- Special attention should be given to levelling standards in training, preparation and equipment of armed forces with those of NATO with an aim of guaranteeing all necessary conditions for transition to complete integration of national defence within the framework of NATO's collective defence. At the end of this period Bulgaria, has to achieve *de facto* integration of the process of political decisions-making and actions concerning security and completely integrated defence planning

It is important the national programme to be realistic, be politically guaranteed, and well provided with resources. It unifies the vital national interests, the strategic political goals and the expectations of the Bulgarian nation as well as military-political visions.

**C. Participation in the mission for peacekeeping and recovery of Kosovo and continuing our contribution to SFOR.** It is not realistic to think that a successful route to Brussels is possible without complete co-operation and real contributions to NATO efforts for peacekeeping and the recovery of Kosovo. The Ministry of Defence reacted adequately to the proposals of the

Government for the refugee camp at *Radusha*. The military polyclinic' performs its tasks well. Its activity is provided and the personnel are changed every month. The Ministry of Defence also provides the logistic support and service of the refugees including a plane for urgent evacuation of sick people. In addition, 100 field kitchens with personnel for preparation of fresh food are provided. Up-to mid-May, the Ministry has sent food, water and medicines worth over 300 million leva.

Bulgaria has already declared its readiness to participate in the operation *Joint Guardian* with engineering unit, military hospital and observers. Meanwhile, a multinational engineer task force is being prepared among the countries, participants at the south-eastern Defence Ministerial will have important contribution in the restructuring.

The preparation for the transportation of goods and cargoes through Bulgaria for Kosovo as well as for the temporary storage of some of them is an important contribution of the country to the efforts for the fast return of the refugees.

The characteristics of the regulation after the crisis in Kosovo is likely to necessitate sustained use of Bulgarian air space. For this reason the National Assembly has to apply an agreement with NATO. Along with this all measures should be taken in order to establish relations to proceed and bring about a permanent form of combined operations.

As a result of the combined efforts, and particularly of the successful ploys of the Government, the international community is provoked by the persuasion that south-eastern Europe needs special attention and fundamental change which will turn the region into an integral part of political and economic Europe. Investment in the security of the region should surpass the situation in Kosovo. The expectation is for subsequent and purposeful policy with versatile dimensions mostly in the field of economic and social fields. Bulgaria should offer an approach to the regional security and stability including:

- Priority to the Euro-Atlantic orientation and immunity of the objectives for accession to NATO and EU;
- Constructive and successful regional policy;
- Openness and readiness for co-operation;
- Active application of regional approaches for the early solution of crises and prevention of conflicts.

Security policy of the country in the coming years will face complex military-political and military challenges. In the military-political aspect, the main challenge will be the completion of the structure reform in the Armed Forces and the political-social pre-definition of the military profession. In the international aspect: the development of regional military-political relations and of strategic partnership. In the military-strategic aspect main challenge will be the early warning against escalation of risk factors, absorption of joint military doctrine and moving on to integrated military planning with NATO. The technological development of the Armed Forces should be an aim for the next ten years.

## CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING FORWARD

### The NATO dimension

The main role of NATO - *to guarantee the defence of its members* - is valid today and will remain valid in the future. The reason is not the existence of a source of military threat but first of all the impossibility of the individual member-states to guarantee their national defence alone. The convergence of interests in the security sphere and the unification of the allied countries' defence potentials will secure the future of the Alliance.

- From the point of view of the global challenges the *Trans-Atlantic strategic community is more needed now than ever before*. Even consolidating their statute as a leading global power, the United States will continue to need permanent military and political allies. The main challenges for the Alliance are therefore the missions outside the zone of responsibility.

- The accent on the *NATO mission of crises management does not substitute the need of preserving the military block* - on the contrary. There is no crisis in Europe that can be settled without the participation of the United States - at least in the near future. The realisation of the CJTF Concept also imposes their participation. NATO may co-operate with OSCE but will never be under its hat (what is the theses of Russia).

- Today *NATO is much more a military organisation than during the Cold War*. While the arms were used then mainly as a political instrument, today they are playing their typical role. PfP is above all a military initiative. In NATO, itself there is no programme which diminishes the role of the Alliance as a military and defence structure.

- *NATO enlargement will continue to be the most dynamic process in Europe*. This dynamics is based above all on the strong desire of the Eastern European countries to become members of the Alliance. The motives officially submitted by them have nothing to do with their real problems: the theses that NATO is a factor of democracy, economic prosperity, etc. have their importance but are in no way leading (after the World War Two it was not NATO but the Council of Europe and OECD who integrated the new democracies, suppressed old hostilities and ensured conditions for economic recovery and development. Today their role is played by the EU and not by NATO.) The only result of the enlargement is strategic which means that the approach to enlargement has to be precisely strategic and not to follow other criteria of less importance in this particular case.

- *The only factor that may influence the enlargement and change its speed and the scope is the state of relations with Russia*. It should be noted, however, that the importance of this factor is being either overexposed or underestimated. The Paris Founding Act has its value for institutionalising the global military and strategic relationship between the United States and Russia. It will neither impede nor foster NATO enlargement. On the European level it will lead to nothing new - it is obviously unthinkable to expect Russia to work for the consolidation of NATO.

Will the NATO enlargement be enough to guarantee security? Hardly. However, NATO is a real instrument. NATO membership is therefore not a goal but a means for guaranteeing security.

### The regional dimension

The crisis of instability in the Balkans requires a new level of international institutional arrangement of the complex security issues of the region. It is hard to imagine that poor post-communist societies on the Balkans would ever be capable of modernising their weapon systems and army structures through their own efforts to the level of their NATO neighbours. It is also very unlikely

that the conflict potential of ex-Yugoslavia could be effectively contained without permanent international institutional involvement. The only institution, fitting for this task is NATO. It is much more reasonable to involve all responsible national actors in the region to full-scale responsibility for the regional security through full NATO membership, rather than supporting on a permanent basis emergency plans like the IFOR mission in order to sustain security challenges. NATO membership for Bulgaria and Rumania will create an effective political framework for comprehensive regional security and defence co-operation. The extension of NATO to the Balkans will stabilise the Southern Region. The extension of NATO membership to the Balkans will provide a permanent basis for conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the region, originating from the institutionalised multilateral efforts of the Alliance Balkan member states. And last, but not least, NATO's expansion in the Balkans will create an entirely new level of psychological security in the region.

### **The national (defence) dimension**

The development of the situation in the region, as well as the general course of the processes in the Euro-Atlantic space are reasons for drawing some conclusions about the programme development of defence AFTER 2001:

- The matter of national defence should be focussed on the real preparation for accession to NATO. This means that the ongoing military reform and the priority preparation for accession to NATO will fuse not only as a system of reference point (as it is now) but also as practice of the annual planning and preparation of the army.

- Co-operation with NATO should be materialised to level planning of interaction in case of military-political crisis. Bulgaria has the possibility to go on from a policy of search of formal guarantees which can not work in the realities on the Balkans to a policy of practical but automatic acting guarantees. Bulgaria should do its best to become to "*real capability*" in the Armed Forces and to participate in peace support operations lead by NATO.

- From the preparedness and capability of Bulgaria to share the responsibilities for promotion of international peace and stability will depend the political trust of the country and all political, economic and military consequences connected with it. From military point of view, Bulgaria will meet the requirements for membership in NATO. A guarantee for this will be the character and the successful result of military reform, bilateral and multilateral regional security policy, trust and co-operation, relations with NATO and strategic partnership with the leading countries in the Euro-Atlantic field.

- The potential of the Armed Forces will continue to be defensive. Because of reform, the Armed Forces will change the way of forming defence potential - the decreasing quantity will compensate the quality of the armament and preparation. Modernisation will begin in about 2003 and will comprise armament and equipment with defensive functions of the Rapid Reaction Forces and IRF, the systems for early warning, communications, air defence, infrastructure and aviation.

## **NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA**

### **Introduction**

1. The National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria represents formally adopted political views on protecting the Bulgarian citizens, society and state against external and internal threats of any nature, taking into account the available resources, and conforming to the level of guarantees which provide the global, Euro-Atlantic and European security system and steady development.

2. The Concept defines the goals and objectives in the period of the Republic of Bulgaria's accession into the efficient collective system of Euro-Atlantic and European security, and in view of the risk factors that currently threaten the security of this country. The basis of the Euro-Atlantic and European security system are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), the West European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

### **The New Realities**

3. Worldwide, the threat of a global nuclear conflict caused by the ideological opposition has decreased. There is a tendency towards promoting the role of law in settling disputable inter-state problems. The UN Security Council's mechanisms for crisis management are being improved. The danger of a direct military aggression against Bulgaria has considerably decreased. Nevertheless, the importance of military and force factors in the international relations is maintained.

4. A growing importance in Bulgaria's security is being played by the world economic, political, scientific and technological, environmental and information processes as well as by the fierce competition for access to resources and infrastructures, to markets and modern technologies.

A global information society has emerged; a world economic integration is underway, which poses new challenges for Bulgaria.

5. Bulgaria's accession into the international financial and commercial structures is opening new prospects for ensuring our security. The isolation of this country from the world integration processes in itself is threat to the Bulgarian citizens, society and state.

6. In Europe, the respect has been increased for European political and economic organisations as well as for the Euro-Atlantic military-political ones. This makes it very unlikely that unilateral decisions, including military ones, are imposed in regional or bilateral conflicts.

7. After the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was dissolved and the block opposition was overcome, there had been a tendency to promote confidence and cooperation. The European security architecture has been gaining greater importance.

8. The economic and social differences on the continent have deepened along with the emergence of a new insecurity and new risks. Conflicts of ethnic, religious and social nature have come into being. The contradictory transition in the states of Central and Eastern Europe represents a major challenge to their democratic institutions and to European structures.

9. On the continent, there is still no fully effective collective system for security and stability. Conflicts in former Yugoslavia have shown the insufficient effectiveness to implement peace agreements only through the means and mediation of the existing European structures.

10. European states are to a different degree integrated into world and continental military-political and commercial unions. On the continent, there is a "gray" zone consisting of countries that are partially or totally excluded from the integration processes. This zone is characterised by social insecurity, decline in living standards and emergence of international criminal networks.

A real threat to the fragile democracies in Central and Eastern Europe as well as to the economic development of the entire continent are not any adversary armies but illegal criminal groupings specialised in organised violence, goods-smuggling, and trafficking of people, drugs and arms.

11. In South-Eastern Europe, various religious and ethnic entities co-exist, some of which conflicting between each other. After the emergence of new states there has been a strive of some entities towards independence and closing themselves. This sharply increases the regional threats to our national security. The delayed pace of the democratic changes in the region leads to a deterioration of historically accumulated problems, and to an incapacity to settle them in line with the European democratic standards.

12. The states in this region differ considerably in the degree of ensuring their own security and membership in international alliances. The differences are political, institutional, and cultural, in living standards and in public practices. The status of states in the region is different in military terms. Regional and ethnic extremism put an imprint on local societies that lack strong democratic traditions.

13. The Balkans is an area of conflict and tension in Europe. This poses serious risks to Bulgaria's national security. This country suffered immense losses due to its isolation as a consequence of the imposed trade, economic and financial bans on former Yugoslavia. These bans created conditions for the development of organised crime and corruption, and for a long-lasting decline of the Bulgarian state institutions.

Thus, second after the regional wars, crime has become a major threat. The high degree of lawlessness is constantly threatening the security of individual citizens, undermining the economic prosperity and legitimacy of state institutions in the region.

14. Despite the fast technological changes, the Balkans has retained their important geo-political position. The significance of the region as a transport, infrastructure and energy crossroad is increasing with the future enlargement of the European Union and NATO as well as with the linking of Caucasus and Central Asian states to European markets.

15. Bulgaria now is overcoming the insecurity from the difficult economic situation of the country and the catastrophic decline in the living standards of the Bulgarian citizens. As a result of the grave economic crises, the interests of the people have been significantly deprived as well as their rights to good way of life, employment, social and health insurance.

16. Yet another insecurity concern, such as the citizens' fear for their lives, the fear of unpunished crimes against the individual, and the encroachment against private property, has been gradually neutralised.

Via legislative and administrative measures companies are alleviated from the tensions and hardships caused by blackmail and violence, by disloyal competition and corruption of the administration.

A tradition is being gradually established in the society to stand for the rights and freedoms of the individual. The state is being placed in service of the people, and not the other way around - submitting the people to the state. The structures of the civil society are gaining strength. Experience is being acquired in democratic procedures for their functioning and development.

17. The internal stability of the country will be consolidating along with the greater ability of the executive and judicial powers to protect the citizens, the civil society and the state against lawlessness. This will determine the success of the transition to democracy and market economy. Internal order and security will prevent a crisis in the rule of law in Bulgaria.

18. For Bulgaria, the transition to democracy and market economy, to Euro-Atlantic and European integration, and thus towards the establishment of a new security and stability, was blocked in the past by an unwillingness and inability for radical reform which lead to serious political conflicts. Economic crises were deteriorated and reinforced by inter-institutional wars. As a result, the renovation and reforms of the country were halted for quite a while.

This caused a grave demographic crisis reinforced by an unprecedented high degree of immigration. The average length of life decreased, and birth rate dropped sharply, which creates dangers for the future survival and protection of the nation.

19. Bulgaria is not in a position to ensure its security on its own or to seek security through neutrality, because of the insufficient financial, economic and military potentials. The new realities precondition the need of the country to join effective collective systems for security and economic development.

At the same time, new opportunities are emerging, and the importance of Bulgaria's own policies is enhanced in neutralising the adverse factors for the security of the country. Bulgaria has the potential to be a significant security and stability factor in South -Eastern Europe.

## **General provisions**

20. We can speak of national security when the major rights and liberties of the Bulgarian citizens are protected as well as the state borders, the territorial integrity and independence of the country, when there is not any danger of armed attack, violated change in the constitutional order, political dictate or economic compulsion for the state and the democratic functioning of the state and civilian institutions is guaranteed in result of which the society and the nation preserve and increase their prosperity and develop.

21. The Bulgarian citizens, society and state have obligations included in the Constitution and the laws of the country namely to be creators and guarantors of their security. At the same time they are mutually connected users of security and the violation of the security of any one of them violates the security of the rest. Together they constitute the unified security structure of Bulgaria.

22. The security is guaranteed when the country successfully realises the national interests, purposes and priorities and when necessary is in a position to defend them effectively from external and internal threats.

23. The level of security is defined by the degrees of protection and effective realisation of the interests of Bulgarian citizens, society and state that jointly comprise the national interests.

The interests of the Bulgarian citizens are expressed in the real guarantee of the constitutional rights and liberties, the personal safety, increase in the quality and level of living, of the social and the health insurance.

The interests of the civilian society are in the confirmation of democracy, the civilian control upon the institutions, and the freedom of associating, in the rights of the religious, ethnic and minority groups in the preservation of the national spiritual and cultural values and traditions.

The interests of the state require protection of the Constitution, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, achievement of political and financial stability of the economic and social development, strict keeping of legal order, equality and mutually useful international co-operation.

24. There are three major factors of the national security of Bulgaria:

1. the degree of development and the resources of the country
2. effectiveness of its foreign and internal policy, and
3. The participation of Bulgaria in the collective systems for security and economic development.

25. The national security is a priority for the Republic of Bulgaria. It defines the major purposes and programmes for its development. Forms the strategic purposes of the internal and foreign policy of the state.

26. The major pre-requisite for the realisation of the national interests is the preservation of the possibilities for Bulgaria to solve independently its internal,

political, economic and social problems, and arrange its relations with other states and communities despite the intentions, positions and interests of third countries.

### **Principles of National Security**

27. The National Security is built by strictly keeping to the Constitution, the laws of the Republic of Bulgaria and the ratified by the National Assembly international agreements and conventions. Bulgaria draws into accordance with the EU and NATO standards its legislation in the field of security.

28. The Republic of Bulgaria does not have any territorial claims and does not recognise such. This principle destroys the old and does not create any new regional tensions. It confirms Bulgaria as a source of security.

The Republic of Bulgaria does not build its security at the expense of other states or societies. The will expressed by it for NATO membership is with the purpose of guarantee of the security and is not aimed against third countries. The prerequisite for the increase of security guarantees for the country is the increase in the security of all the countries in Europe and the world.

29. The priority policy for the Republic of Bulgaria are the loyalty and the mutual benefit in the relations with other countries and international unions. Today no one expresses openly hostility against Bulgaria.

30. The security of Bulgaria is guaranteed by the world's and Euro -Atlantic structures for collective security.

31. The National Security is based upon the defensive Military Doctrine that specifies the elaboration and the use of the armed forces. Bulgaria seeks security on the Balkans and is against any military and political unions on the Balkans.

32. The Bulgarian intelligence and counter-intelligence bodies are acting on the base of special laws. They are acquiring information with own means and through the international organisations for the military-political state of the countries in the region and the accumulation of such military potential which can threaten the national security.

The specialised bodies are keeping the laws of the country and the international law by preserving the rights and liberties of the Bulgarian citizens.

33. By propaganda of the national historical and spiritual values, of the moral and cultural heritage of all Bulgarians is confirmed the national identity and ideal. Preserved is the territorial and national integrity of Bulgaria while considering the rights and liberties of the different ethnic and religious communities. Built is the image of Bulgaria as the Fatherland of all Bulgarians within and outside the boundaries of the country. Defended are their spiritual values and civilian rights.

### **Priorities and Factors of National Security**

34. The process of integration into NATO and EU has its positive influence upon the security of Bulgaria. But only the full membership in them will lead to its complete guarantee.

The national priority for Bulgaria is the membership in NATO and EU that corresponds to the long-term interests of the country.

35. The successful integration of Bulgaria into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures for security and development depends on the progress in the peace process in south-eastern Europe and is slowed down by the military conflicts and destabilisation of the neighbor countries. This presupposes that the country leads very active foreign policy for the creation of peace in the Balkans. This policy is the most important element in the strategy for the preventive defence of Bulgarian interests.

Its own security is defined by the degree to which Bulgaria generates security for the neighbor countries. This is the reason why with its regional initiatives for the increase of the mutual confidence in the political-military field the country helps for the increase in the security and stability in the Balkans.

36. The policy of security distributes the national resources in such manner as to protect Bulgaria from the imposing of foreign political and economic will and to ensure its right for a sovereign choice in all aspects of domestic and foreign policy, the policy for security and defence.

37. It is necessary that the Bulgarian positions in the supra-national bodies and structures according to the Paris Charter for new Europe which are in a process of establishment are strengthened. In this way Bulgaria is confirmed as an active and full-fledged partner in the global political and economic processes.

38. The economic factor is decisive for the guarantee of national security. Only the stabilisation, re-establishment and growth of Bulgarian economy are in a position to satisfy the interests of the Bulgarian citizens, society and state, to solve the problems concerning the deficiency of resources, to improve the living standard and increase the degree of social protection.

The observation and development of Bulgarian scientific and technical potential for the mastering of the new and creation of own high technologies is a perspective factor for the protection of national security.

39. The positive influence of the economic factor for the national security is enhanced by the strategic participation of the Bulgarian economy into the world, European and regional co-operation, when it is integrated into the unified European economic sphere.

40. The significance of the Bulgarian economy for national security and stable development depends on the capability for development of the own infrastructure as an important connecting link between the European countries and the new markets in the Black Sea- Caucasian region, the Middle East and Central Asia.

Through the Bulgarian territory pass the strategic inter-continental transport, communications and energy corridors from which depends the national and European security. From the establishment of these channels, and the transformation of the country into a Balkan communications and energy centre will depend the importance of Bulgaria for the world and European security.

41. The establishment of Bulgaria as an important component of the European and regional security depends on the re-establishment of the lost positions of Bulgarian producers and merchants on traditional markets and especially on the strategic market of the Commonwealth of Independent States, on the development of joint activities and co-operation with the leading European manufacturers, as well as the ensuring of the energy independence of the country.

42. The information factor for the guarantee of the national security is functioning by keeping the constitutional rights and liberties of the citizens in the field of preserving and exchange of reliable information through the development of modern Bulgarian communications and media.

43. The preservation of national security requires that the use of information should not be permitted for purposes of manipulation of public consciousness. It is also a priority to be guaranteed by special law the protection of the state information resource from leakage of political, economic, scientific and technical and any other information important for the country.

44. The Armed Forces and the security bodies are the main guarantees for the national security of the country. Their effectiveness depends on the resources provided to them, the force and stability of the laws, upon which they are basing their activity, the motivation of the human factor and the availability and precise character of the information concerning the threats and dangers.

45. The Military Doctrine of Bulgaria is developed on the basis of this Concept and the Law on Defense and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. On its basis the Program for the Reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and their modernization are done.

The guarantees for the security of the country are strengthened through realization of initiatives for increase of the military political confidence in the region and through the success of the PfP Program for integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures.

46. The security organs prevent and neutralize the threats and risks in close co-operation with the investigation and prosecution and together with the international organizations for combating the criminality.

47. The juridical organs establish respect for the laws in the country by imposing effective and just sanctions to those violating them. The long-term guarantee of the national interests requires development of the legislation and its harmonization with the norms of the European Union.

48. The effective functioning of the juridical organs presupposes reform and modernization of the juridical organs on the basis of a unified strategy for combating the criminality and corruption. The national interests require achieving a national consensus on the measures, politics and resources that should be allocated for this combat. The state strategy for combating criminality and corruption is a further development of this Concept in the field of internal security.

49. The environmental factor - protection, restoration and reproduction of the Bulgarian nature should provide a favorable living atmosphere for the Bulgarian

citizens and society. The national interests are realized when there is an optimum balance between the protection of nature and waters and the needs to use the natural resources for a steady development of Bulgaria.

### **Organization And Functions of the National Security System**

50. In compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria the President, the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers have responsibilities as far as the national security is concerned.

51. The President chairs the National Security Advisory Council, the status of which is defined by Law.

52. The National Assembly carries out the legislative building of the national security system. Through its Permanent National Security Committee it controls the executive power and the special security organs as far as the compliance with the law and effectiveness of the actions are concerned as well as the efficient use of the resources, makes an assessment of the political risks. Through its permanent Committee on Foreign Integration Policy it controls the executive power in the field of the foreign aspects of the national security.

53. The Council of Ministers on the basis of this concept and in the pursue of the responsibilities in the area of security imposed by the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria through a report to the National Assembly annually points out the risks for the country and makes an assessment of the level of protection of national interests.

The Council of Ministers allocates the resources of the country for increase of the level of protection of the national interests. The ministries and institutions within the framework of their competence develop and realize strategies and programs for the most efficient use of the political, military and economic resources of the country.

54. The Council of Ministers when implementing its functions is assisted by a Security Council comprising of: Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, their deputies, the Chief of GS of BA, and the Chiefs of the intelligence and counter-intelligence organs. The President personally or through his representatives can always participate in the work of the Council and at any time can require information from it.

55. The Security Council:

- summarizes, analyzes and makes conclusions from the whole current information about the risks the national security faces and makes a professional assessment and prognosis for the dynamics of the threats;
- plans concrete measures for the neutralization of the threats and proposes solutions in a crisis;
- coordinates the plans of the special organs for acquiring of information and provides position on resources division;

- develops and proposes to the Council of Ministers an annual report on the national security. The President, the Chairman of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister having in mind the main goals and tasks referring to the security of the country request information in the Security Council.

The Security Council provides an information equal in volume and contents to the President, the Chairman of the National Assembly, and the Prime Minister.

56. The civilian control upon the state policy for security and the bodies performing it is guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the country.

## **MILITARY DOCTRINE**

### **GENERAL PROVISIONS**

1. The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria is a system of strategic views, principles and approaches to ensure its national security in military-political and military terms.

2. The Military Doctrine explores the military-strategic environment, and defines defence policy priorities and directions of employment, build-up and development of the Armed Forces in the interest of defence and promotion of peace and stability in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU) in the period prior to its accession in them.

3. The Military Doctrine has been developed in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the National Security Concept, and international arrangements and agreements to which the Republic of Bulgaria is a Party. It is defensive in character, which is implemented through defence policies and defence planning.

4. Transparency and civilian control are obligatory principles in the implementation of the Military Doctrine.

### **MILITARY-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

5. The Republic of Bulgaria perceives its security in direct relation to regional security and European security.

6. The Republic of Bulgaria recognises that:

- a. the end of the political and military confrontation has minimised the threat of a global nuclear conflict and major destructive military collision;
- b. conditions have been created to globalise cooperation and interoperation, including the military field;
- c. a new all-European security and defence architecture is shaping based on NATO, WEU and EU with capabilities to meet the challenges and threats to international stability;
- d. in major part of South-Eastern Europe processes are underway to adopt European and Euro-Atlantic values in security and defence.

7. The democratic changes and the definition of new foreign policy priorities, the relations with NATO Nations as present partners and future Allies, the cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and most of all the

prospects of NATO membership have led to circumstances under which the Republic of Bulgaria does not perceive any country as adversary.

8. The positive processes and trends are accompanied by the emergence and development of new in their character risks and threats, including military ones.

9. Important elements of the military-strategic environment are such risks as the increasing number of states possessing, or developing, nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction; information warfare; policies of genocide towards ethnic minorities and religious entities; settlement of territorial and border disputes by means of military hostilities; armed secessionism; international terrorism, etc. Some of these are featuring South-Eastern Europe where there are areas with high degree of conflict and military tension, which under certain circumstances can evolve into threats to the national security of the Republic of Bulgaria.

10. For the Republic of Bulgaria, the main sources of military risk are the active and potential conflicts in various parts of the region. Its vicinity to conflict areas in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Caucasus is a risk factor of terrorist acts against Bulgarian strategic facilities.

11. For the Republic of Bulgaria, the military-strategic environment is complicated also by its vicinity to areas threatened by:

- a. illegal trafficking of arms and military materials related to armed extremism in various forms;
- b. smuggling of technologies and products for production and use of weapons of mass destruction implying a threat of terrorism with nuclear, chemical, biological and missile assets;
- c. growth of organised crime destabilising the political and economic situation;
- d. likelihood of mass surges of refugees;
- e. disintegration of statehood in some countries in the region as a result of internal political and economic collapse;
- f. risk of trans-border environmental problems;
- g. information risks and threats related to the transition towards information society.

12. The Republic of Bulgaria does not face any immediate military threat. A war is little likely to engage the entire region.

13. The Republic of Bulgaria takes into account the risks to its security and territorial integrity resultant from the destabilising effect of limited in size military and/or armed formations.

14. The Republic of Bulgaria assumes that it might be involved in a military-political crisis or military conflict primarily as a result of expansion or spread of a military or armed conflict close to its state border.

15. The Republic of Bulgaria views the military-political crisis as a status of inter-state relations, which poses military threat to its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

16. When there is a dangerous possibility for the Republic of Bulgaria to be involved in a military-political crisis or military conflict, the military threat against the country can be manifested by coercion to make political and other decisions under the threat of use of military force; deliberate violations of the ground and sea borders and air space of the country, and conduct of repeated subversive and terrorist acts; systematic support by a foreign country or individuals for secessionist or terrorist organisations; creation of offensive groupings near the state border; conduct of information attacks against national strategic systems by a foreign state.

17. Failure to contain a military-political crisis leads to engaging the Republic of Bulgaria into a military conflict. It can have limited political goals and involve a certain region or theatre, while large-scale strategic military activities and full mobilisation on the part of the aggressor are little likely. Such threats with a lower degree of probability are repelled by an appropriate in scale mobilisation of the Armed Forces.

### **GOALS, PRINCIPLES AND APPROACHES OF DEFENCE POLICIES**

18. Defence policies aim to ensure that, under the existing military-strategic environment, the Republic of Bulgaria possesses the necessary defence potential to neutralise military threats and to credibly defend its population, facilities, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. This status is a precondition for furthering the national ideals and vital interests of the country.

19. Defence policies are pursued in compliance with the Constitution and law of the Republic of Bulgaria, and are essential for its national security.

20. The Republic of Bulgaria pursues its defence policies through cooperation, integration, and long-term macroeconomic stabilisation and economic growth. The approaches to achieve its goals combine arrangements for active creation of a favourable international environment, for crisis management of various character, and for defence of the country.

21. In implementing its defence policies the Republic of Bulgaria:

- a. does not treat any nation as its adversary, and settles arising problems and contradictions threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity with non-military means;
- b. views its security and defence in unity regional, European and Euro-Atlantic security and defence systems;

- c. defines its partnership with and membership in NATO, the WEU and EU as a strategic priority for ensuring its national security and defence;
  - d. supports and takes part in initiatives for disarmament and military potentials' reduction;
  - e. is actively involved in the international military and military-political cooperation, and contributes to strengthening peace and security in South-Eastern Europe and to shaping the new European and Euro-Atlantic security architecture;
  - f. reserves its right to seek allies and military assistance upon emergence of a threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty;
  - g. supports the work of international organisations to preserve peace, and provides participation of Bulgarian servicemen and units in international military, humanitarian and verification missions compliant with the principles of United Nations (UN).
22. The primary goals in the field of defence are as follows:
- a. guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country against threats of military and armed nature;
  - b. ensure favourable military-strategic and military-political conditions to guarantee national security;
  - c. prepare for and join international security and collective defence organisations, and participate in their work;
  - d. protect the population in times of natural disasters, industrial accidents, catastrophes and hazardous pollution in the country and abroad.
23. Military policies, as part of defence policies, determine the accomplishment of above stated goals in the military field, by being aimed at:
- a. prevention of coercive involvement of the country in military conflicts, and strengthening international peace and security;
  - b. creating conditions to ensure the sovereignty, security and independence of the country, and defend its territory with military assets;
  - c. accession in NATO and the WEU.
24. Military policies are guided by the principles of:
- a. building national security without jeopardising the security of other states;
  - b. respect the equal security right of each state as a prerequisite of common security;

- c. maintain a defence potential that is adequate to the military-strategic environment and the resource capabilities of the country, while strictly complying with international arrangements in this field;
- d. optimal use of military, material and moral resources for defence of the state;
- e. taking into account the geographic location, historic, demographic and other realities.

25. The establishment and activation of the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe and other multinational forces is evidence of Bulgaria's resolve and that of the states in the region to pursue policies of good neighbourliness and cooperation.

26. The Republic of Bulgaria considers its membership in NATO and the WEU as an opportunity to share the responsibility of democratic states in defending common values as a prerequisite and guarantee of a stable democratic development of the country and pursuit of effective defence policies.

27. The Military Doctrine reflects the political will to undertake all commitments deriving from the future full membership in NATO, the EU and WEU, while the systematic preparation for that is defined as a military policy priority. The Republic of Bulgaria supports the enhancement of the European Security and Defence Identity.

28. In the interest of its integration policies the Republic of Bulgaria exchanges information, including state and official secrets, with those countries and organisations with which it has signed Agreements on mutual protection of classified information following a decision of the Council of Ministers.

29. In NATO and WEU-led operations other than war, in addition to contributing with its units, the Republic of Bulgaria can also participate with providing logistic and other support.

30. The military policies support the efforts of the UN and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of arms control, conflict prevention and restoration of peace. The Republic of Bulgaria views its participation with proficient military, police and other units in various operations and missions as a long-term investment to ensure its own security.

31. Military planning is aimed at: building up and maintaining an adequate defence potential and combat preparedness allowing for effective capabilities to deter and repel aggression; effective operation of the military components of the national crisis management system; participation in international initiatives for peace support and crisis prevention.

32. The responsive character of strategic and operational planning reflects the defensive essence of the Military Doctrine. This rules out the possibility that this country be the first to start hostilities in pursuit of aggressive goals.

33. The Armed Forces maintain readiness and resources for immediate action to protect the population and national infrastructure against natural disasters, industrial accidents and hazardous pollution of the environment. Provision of such assistance to foreign states as well is an important element of Bulgaria's policy of involvement in humanitarian crisis settlement.

## **DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY**

34. The defence of the Republic of Bulgaria is a system of activities to promote peace and security, to preserve the national human and material values by keeping the economy, Armed Forces, people and defence infrastructure ready for action; it is also a system of activities to safeguard its territorial integrity, dependence and sovereignty. It is an essential part of the national security system, and serves the efforts of integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic and military structures.

35. The defence of the Republic of Bulgaria is ensured through building up and maintaining of an adequate defence potential and integrated defence planning in cooperation with NATO and the WEU.

36. The leadership and management of defence are administered by authorities and through procedures as set out by the Constitution and the laws of the country with the purpose of making affective use of defence resources in peacetime, in crisis management and during military conflict. The Council of Ministers organises, and the Ministry of Defence controls and coordinates the work of the system for early warning, rapid reaction and integrated defence planning.

37. The preparation of the country for defence encompasses a system of activities preparing the national economy, Armed Forces, population, and the territory of the country as theatre. It is implemented through:

- a. drafting anew, amending the existing ones and applying such regulative framework, conceptual documents and defence plans that meet the requirements of the Military Doctrine and ensure interoperability with NATO;
- b. research and development activities;
- c. building a unified system for information, security, early warning and management of the country and its Armed Forces;
- d. unilateral provision of defence resources, and maintaining of combat and mobilisation preparedness;
- e. activities to protect the population and national economy.

38. The preparation of national economy in the interest of defence includes: development and execution of the military-technical policies of the state; elaboration and update of a General State Wartime Plan; coordination and management of the planning for transforming national economy branches from peacetime to wartime or other state of emergency.

39. Basis of the logistic support is the organised peacetime production of weapons, munitions, combat equipment, personal equipment and spare parts, as well as the construction and maintenance of capabilities for wartime operation of the national economy, national wartime reserve stocks and state reserves. These are established by a decision of the Council of Ministers following a proposal of the Minister of Defence. The norms and procedures of setting up, storage and use of reserves are outlined by the Law of State Reserve and Wartime Reserve Stocks.

40. The preparation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria is a complex of activities conducted under the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army. It is part of the process of their construction and development, and includes operational, combat and mobilisation preparations; planning of force employment; improvement of management and supply systems; command staff training; inspiring and maintaining patriotic motivation and morale.

41. The preparation of the population for the needs of defence includes: upholding national ethos; training of central and territorial administration personnel; drill training; building-up a mobilisation contingent; training for action in civil emergencies and territorial defence; treatment of wounded and sick people, and care for military disabled and victims.

42. The preparation of the territory of the country as theatre of hostilities includes the activities of Ministries, of central and territorial administration and of the Armed Forces to construct and maintain the infrastructure for defence and civil protection: barracks, bases, posts, ports, airfields, ranges, communications, depots, etc. For the purposes of defence, the national infrastructure is being developed so as to be interoperable with NATO and the WEU.

43. The resource support of defence is a complex of activities to provide the Armed Forces and the national economy with logistic, human and financial resources. Financial support of defence is executed through the defence budget, and in wartime through the wartime budget.

## **EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES**

44. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria are a basis of the defence of the country. They ensure its sovereignty, security and independence, and protect its territorial integrity.

45. In the framework of national security policies, the Armed Forces discharge the following functions: deterring and defensive; peacekeeping; humanitarian, search-and-rescue, integration and social ones.

46. The Armed Forces are a factor of the Republic of Bulgaria's integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures for security and regional cooperation.

47. The Armed Forces are employed, in accordance with procedures set out by the Constitution and the laws of the country, in:

- a. performing the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as regulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter;

- b. complying with international legal commitments for the purposes of operations other than war;
- c. natural disasters, industrial accidents and hazardous pollution of the national territory and abroad;
- d. international legal arrangements and decisions of relevant authorities for interaction with NATO, EU and WEU.

48. In peace time when there is no crisis, the Armed Forces:

- a. build and maintain combat potential and combat readiness, adequate to the risks and threats of non-military character within the framework of the allocated for the defence resources;
- b. support the efforts of the organs of state power for peace support, security and stability through the methods and forms of military co-operation;
- c. implement programmes for reform, modernisation and interoperability with the Armed Forces of the NATO partners by participating in bilateral and multilateral initiatives and military exercises;
- d. participate in the establishment and use of multinational military formations;
- e. participate in control activities on the implementation of international agreements and initiatives for strengthening and enlargement of the confidence and co-operation in the military field;
- f. participate in the preparation of the population, national economy, war time reserves and the infrastructure of the country for defence;
- g. control the air navigation and safe guard the air space of the country;
- h. maintain readiness for humanitarian relief and rescue operations on the territory and in the territorial waters of the country and outside them in compliance with the national legislation and the international arrangements, in which the Republic of Bulgaria is a Party.

49. In peace time in cases of crisis of non- military character, the Armed Forces:

- a. participate in the preventive and direct protection of the population in cases of threats or incidents, accidents and catastrophes.
- b. assist, in compliance with the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Bulgaria, to the security organs in their combat against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, illegal arms traffic, international terrorism and others;

- c. participate in the safe guarding of strategic sites and in operations to prevent the international organised crime or terrorist activities, after it is required by the competent organs in the defined by the legislation way.

50. In peace time in cases of international humanitarian crisis, the Armed Forces, participate with contingents in humanitarian and rescue operations. The allocated formations are transported to the threatened region, carry out rescue-evacuation, restrictive-restoration and other activities.

51. In the case of an international military political crisis, in compliance with the given to the country mandate, participate in peacekeeping operations and operations other than war.

52. In the operations other than war, the allocated contingents are assigned to and participate in missions in compliance with the respective arrangements.

53. In the operations other than war the contingents of the Armed Forces apply specific forms and means of action in compliance with the approved terms of use of Armed Forces.

54. The decisions for missions abroad within the framework of a mandate given by an international organisation with such prerogatives, by regular or especially established formations are taken by the National Assembly upon the proposal of the Council of Ministers , when the missions are of military or military political character. As for the other cases the decision is taken by the Council of Ministers.

55. The contingents' control during missions is done by a Situation Centre in the MoD.

56. In the case of an escalating military political crisis and direct threats for the country, the Armed Forces support the efforts of the state leadership to settle the crisis and strengthening of stability, and in compliance with the established by the Constitution and laws manner:

- a. activate the systems for early warning , rapid reaction and control;
- b. the troops, deterrence and defence groups are adequately increased;
- c. conduct activities for the protection of the troops and facilities.

57. The responsibilities of the state bodies, the central and territorial administration, the trading companies and organisations procedures in cases of crisis are regulated by law. In case of direct military threat or military conflict on the territory of the whole country or on part of it a “ state of war” or state of emergency are declared. The conditions and way for declaring a state of war or another state of emergency are stipulated by a law. When a state of war or a war are declared or when the combat activities start the defence and the internal order of the country are lead by the Supreme Command in Chief.

58. In the case of a military conflict (war) against the Republic of Bulgaria the Armed Forces answer to the aggression.

59. The combat activities on the territory of the country can start unexpectedly or through escalation of the military political crisis. In the case of unexpected start of a military conflict the troops and assets on duty, the control system, the rapid reaction forces and other formations start functioning.

60. When the conflict evolves the Armed Forces increase their troops on the combat theatre, do operational and in case of need do strategic deployment and with active military activities are blocking the further invasion of the aggressor and by decisive counteractions restore the integrity of the state boundary.

61. The use of Armed Forces in a military conflict is based on the following principles: choice of military strategic goals in compliance with the political tasks and the existing potentials; response character of the military activities; launching initiatives in all types of situation; decisive concentration of the forces; preserving the combat readiness of the troops and assets; economy of resources; suddenness, active position and decisiveness, continuous co-ordination and control, overall procurement.

62. The Armed Forces do the defence of the country through the implementation of the military strategic concept for protection of the national territory, fighting for information superiority, control over the air and sea space and defence of a threatened combat theatre.

63. The defence is a major type of military activities of the Armed Forces. Apart from it on the strategic scale the counter offensive is used and on the operational and tactical scale - the counter attack and counter effort. The defence can be done on the strategic, operational and tactical level, independently or within the framework of coalition groups.

64. The major forms of use of the Armed Forces in a military conflict are the combat operations, battles and actions, combats and attacks.

65. The Armed Forces plan, prepare and can conduct defence operation of several directions on one theatre.

66. The Armed Forces are doing their job independently or within the framework of multinational troops in compliance with the national legislation and the international arrangements.

67. The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. When state of war and military situation is declared he commands the defence of the country and takes decisions for the use of the Armed Forces. The plans for the preparation and conduct of combat operations are developed by the Commander in Chief and are approved by the Supreme Commander in Chief.

68. In times of war the Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

69. In the realisation of their tasks the Armed Forces provide the best possible defence within the framework of the available resources.

## **BUILD UP AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES**

70. The build up and development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria are activities of the state and military leadership to establish and maintain military potential, guaranteeing the defence of the country. They are done through the approval of main principles, legal norms and plans for: the build up; dislocation; training and education; recruitment; military service; mobilisation and emobilisation; combat and mobilisation readiness; creating reserves.

71. The Council of Ministers approves and leads the implementation of the plans and programmes for the build up and development of the Armed Forces.

72. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria are build up with the potential of conducting defence operations on one combat theatre. The formation and command of the defence groups and for participation in operations other than war are done in compliance with the CJTF concept.

73. The build up of the Armed Forces is based on the following principles: scientific reasoning; centralisation and unity; interoperability; adaptability to the changing conditions; comprising of modules; efficiency; sustainability; prospectiveness; mobility and flexibility for multipurpose usage; mixed principle of recruitment (both for career and conscripts); introducing contemporary military achievements; transparency to the society and partners; care for the health and life of the servicemen and the mobilised.

74. The Bulgarian Army is built and developed in compliance with the role, missions and functions defined by the Constitution, the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine, by grouping the servicemen and military in optimum for training and use structures, taking into account the specific capacities of the services, types of forces and special troops.

75. The Bulgarian Army is basis of the defence potential of the country.

76. The peacetime location of the Armed Forces provides for the adequate reaction to a possible aggression from each direction in case of reliable information provision and guaranteed command in all types of situations. It excludes the destabilisation possibility of the military strategic and military political situation in the region.

77. A main trend in the building of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria is building them as effective, comprising of modules, compact, flexible, combat ready and relatively independent and assured from all sides structures, able to provide the defence of the country and be an equal partner in the international peacekeeping initiatives.

78. The troops and assets of the Bulgarian Army are build for the implementation of different types of missions in doctrinal and technical; co-ordination between them and with NATO forces.

79. The troops and assets of the Bulgarian Army are kept ready for immediate or gradual transition from peace into state of war and achieving combat readiness, adequate to the military threat.

80. Separate formations can be included in multinational forces, established on bilateral or multilateral basis.

81. The Bulgarian Army comprises of General Staff, Land Forces, Air Force, Navy, formations and units centrally subordinated.

82. The Land Forces are a service which comprise of formations from the arms of service and the special troops. In peacetime they are in a permanent combat and mobilisation readiness and are trained for conducting high manoeuvre and resistant defence and operations other than war. In case of crisis are ready to generate the necessary contingents for operations other than war. In wartime they respond to the attacks of the enemy, suppress the actions in the area of theatre of operations. With active actions and together with the Air Force and the Navy at the sea front, the Land Forces destroy the enemy formations that have penetrated and restore the territorial integrity of the country

83. The Air Forces are a service which comprise of formations of the tactical aviation, the air defence troops and the types of services. In peacetime continuously control the observance of the flight regime and protection of the airspace of the Republic of Bulgaria, when required participate in contingents for operations other than war. In war time independently or together with the other services carry out tasks having to do with: gaining and maintaining air superiority; air defence of troops and sites on the territory of the country; isolation of the region of combat activities; air support to the Land Forces and the Navy; air reconnaissance and special activities.

84. The Navy is a service which comprises of formations of the arms of services and special troops. In peacetime it maintains favourable operational regime in the territorial waters of the Republic of Bulgaria and when required participate in contingent others than war. In wartime independently or together with the other services respond to the enemy's aggression from the sea, provide sea communications and support the sea flank of the Land Forces.

85. The troops and assets of the Bulgarian Army functionally are divided into rapid reaction forces, defence forces, territorial defence forces and reserve.

86. Rapid Reaction Forces formations from the three services, fully equipped with armaments and with no less than 70 % manpower. Parts of them are designed for rapid action in case of a military conflict and are recruited with personnel, equipment and armament at 100 %. They are built and trained to be fully interoperable with NATO Rapid Reaction Forces. In peacetime they participate in: search and humanitarian operations; international peacekeeping operations; destroying terrorist groups that have conquered a certain territory; international peacekeeping operations.

87. The defence troops are the major component of the Bulgarian Army. They are formations from the services with different level of equipment and combat readiness. After additional recruitment they respond to the aggression of the enemy.

The resistance and efficiency of defence as well as the achievement of its final goals rely on them. They are built and trained to be interoperable with NATO Major Defence Forces so that they are able to conduct joint operations in case of aggression. In case of mobilisation, military formations outside the Bulgarian Army are included as well.

88. The territorial defence troops of the Bulgarian Army formations that are recruited upon the territorial principle. They are designed to cover the state boundary with countries not participating in the military conflict, for combating air and sea assault and defence of important for the territory of the country sites, as well as other tasks on the territory of the country outside the conflict area. The issues related to the territorial defence are regulated by a law. In case of mobilisation, military formations outside the Bulgarian Army are included as well.

89. The reserve of the Bulgarian Army is permanent and mobilisation and is formed with the aim to recruit the Armed Forces with highly qualified personnel to take the war time and if necessary the peace time positions.

90. The military formations outside the Ministry of Defence are demilitarised and transformed into state enterprises with a law. These enterprises maintain readiness and carry out some mobilisation and territorial defence functions in war time.

91. By decree of the Council of Ministers the Armed Forces generate, train and maintain ready to act, contingents of troops and assets for participation in peacekeeping operations and operations other than war. Their personnel is selected on a volunteer principle and it signs a special contract. They are provided with resources and equipment and a trained in a way that ensures interoperability with NATO forces and which is in compliance with the requirements of the international organisation giving the mission mandate.

92. A centre for development of the interoperability and a centre for training of contingents to participate in operations other than war are established in the Ministry of Defence. The personnel who have attended such training are in the reserve and there is a special record for them.

93. The military strategic environment, the goals in the sphere of defence, the new missions and requirements for the Armed Forces as well as the resources of the country define the need of optimisation of the structure of the Armed Forces, so that their manpower does not exceed 45 000 people in peace time. The transformation is done through a Plan for the Build up, organisation and structure of the Armed Forces by the year 2004. The mobilisation plans of the Armed Forces are done for personnel up to 250 000 people.

94. The troops and assets are trained to realise tasks independently and within the framework of multinational forces of a temporary or permanent character.

95. In the training of troops and HQs together with the traditional methods the simulations and computer-assisted forms of training are applied. A priority in their training is foreign language learning to a level adequate to NATO standards.

96. The recruitment and modernisation of the Armed Forces with contemporary samples of armament and equipment is done through special programmes, taking into account the requirements for interoperability with NATO and in compliance with the resource capacities of the country.

97. A priority in the modernisation of the Armed Forces have the control, command, surveillance, intelligence, communications, mutual identification, computerisation, navigation, including with airspace systems, means and technologies, that provide interoperability with the Armed Forces of the NATO member countries and the transformation to information society in the country.

98. The principles of development of the Armed Forces are: reengineering of the processes, consolidation of activities, getting rid of excess articles and non typical activities and introducing the principle of competition when assigning orders.

99. The most important element of the Armed Forces is the human resource. The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria establishes conditions and guarantees to provide for the social and other needs of the engaged in the Armed Forces Bulgarian citizens in accordance with the importance, complexity and difficulty of the realised by them defence goals, as well as the optimum capacities and conditions for social adaptation of those leaving the Armed Forces.

100. The Military Doctrine reiterates the will of the republic of Bulgaria to fully contribute to the regional and international security and to the recognition of the country as one of the key factors of stability in South Eastern Europe. On that basis we are conducting our integration policy with NATO, EU, and WEU, with which the reform and modernisation of the Armed Forces are connected.

101. The clauses of the Doctrine are updated in compliance with the changes in the military political environment and military strategic visions. In changes in the Military Doctrine amendments are done in the respective normative documents, regulating the defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria.

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