

Institute for Strategic Assessments

**RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES: PERSPECTIVES OF MILITARY
REFORM AND EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE**

NATO Grant of 1997-1999
The Final Report

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Evolution of the basic national security principles of Russia

To understand the foundations, driving force and the limits of the military reform it is absolutely necessary to have a look upon the transformation of Russia's vision of its place in the post-Cold War world and its vision of the main threats to its security. This would give the feeling of the national security priorities of Russia - what threat is Russia going to oppose and whether Russian military political community see or foresee any threats at present and in the future.

A very high and positive start was given to Russian Western relation by president Yeltsin in his speech in the UN Security Council, in February 1992 (which, perhaps, was the central «partnership-like» speech) when it was emphasized that Russia sees America and other Western countries as «not just partners but allies and friends».

But even facing commonly different challenges and threats provoked by the new geopolitical situation and domestic crisis in our country Russia and the West failed to transform the declaratory partnership relations (up till the latest times regularly confirmed by the first figures of the states during the summits) into the military political and technical realities, common clarification of existing threats and preparation of a coordinated response to them. There is a number of obvious illustrations to this conclusion - the preservation of the nuclear deterrence concept and nuclear potentials opposing each other, the NATO enlargement process initiated by the West contrary to the Russian position, complete disengagement on the forceful methods that were used by NATO against Yugoslavia bringing the situation close to military opposition etc.

The whole sphere of the national security theoretical foundations is in the process of the constant «revision». The «Main Foundations of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation» (MFMD, adopted in November 1993) are considered to be inadequate to the present geopolitical situation. This document was the first to announce that Russia gives up the principle of no-first use of nuclear weapons. At that time it was difficult to say where then Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev have seen the new threat being so immense that it needed immediately to introduce new principles into the military doctrine of Russia.

Some time later more or less logical explanations were given when it was said that “nuclear umbrella” is needed to provide Russian security at a

time when there is a decisive inferiority in conventional weapons (if to compare potentials with NATO and the West) and the Army itself is weakened by the military reform going on. Though such explanations could be taken it was still difficult to understand how could nuclear deterrence strategy and strategic nuclear arsenals still existing vis-a-vis US, France and England could coexist with the declared partnership relations with the same countries. Such inner controversy could not last for long. Some of the two controversial tendencies had to overcome.

This happened now when the deterioration in our relations with the West me to such point when the deterrence started to seem normal way of interrelations in a situation when due to the Western policy Moscow has lost confidence in the former partners. In its turn the West was never sure in the irreversible character of the democratic changes in Russia (which served in the minds of some of the politicians as a justification for the NATO enlargement process).

Still in the political circles there was felt the necessity to present a number of documents of broad military political character presenting to the whole world a set of views and national security principles which would explain the foundations and serve as a basis for the relations of new democratic Russia with the rest of the world.

First appeared the document completely which essentially was the policy of the national security (PNS) - a special «Address on the National Security of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Council» (June 13, 1996).

It was the insistent efforts of then the special Advisor to the President on National Security Yury Baturin and the special, very limited in number, analytical group (with two authors of this paper being participants to it) under the presidential administration who made the appearance of the Address possible. This document largely included the provisions of the special report «National Security Policy of the Russian Federation (1996-2000). Project» (NSP Project), prepared by the analytical group mentioned above. It should be noted that the provisions formulated in the NSP Project which then were taken as the integral part of the Presidential Address were not only revolutionary for its time - they formulated a set of principles which had to be somehow included or addressed in all documents to follow. This conclusion appeared to be true also with the Concept of National Security (CNS) prepared by the Security Council and approved by the President in

December 1997.

The PNS Address of the President for the first time appeared to be a document which on the very high level presented officially the national interests of Russia. Around the principle of them all other interests and aims (national defense priorities among them) had to be build. The PNS introduced the newly formula of «providing the development of an individual person, sustainable growth of the level of his life conditions and prosperity on the basis of the preservation of his rights and freedoms, stimulation of his responsibility; democratic development of the country». The project of the National Security Policy, presented by a working group of the Administration of the President as an unofficial document two months earlier, added some new features to the notion of this interest - the necessity to provide the worthy level and quality of life .

The CNS followed suite but moving the accent a little bit. The document considered «the actual provision of constitutional rights and freedoms, personal security, in raising the quality and level of life» to be more in the sphere of interests of the personality - not the state.

Based on this rather humanistic-oriented background it was necessary among all to solve one of the principle problems for the adequate provision of the national security, defense priorities and for the orientation of the military doctrine in the proper direction. This was the problem of threat assessment. Following the mainstream of the Russian political thought leads us to the formula of the perception, at that time, of the greatly diminished external threat along with the growing attention to the internal existing and potential menaces which are considered to be of higher priority.

Here lied a very significant change in the direction of ordering security priorities - understanding of the great emphasis on domestic factors as sources of threat to security which was initiated in the PNS. The main domestic challenge to the security was declared to be connected with the «incompleteness of creation and instability of the democratic institutions». To improve this drawback was considered to be a formidable task for the nearest future.

Only less then two years ago there was a certain consensus in the upper echelons of power that, as it was stated in the CNS, the analyses of the threat to the national security of Russia demonstrates that main of them at present and in the foreseen perspective «do not posses the military dimension, presumable have the domestic character and are concentrated in

the domestic political, economic, ecological, informational and spiritual spheres».

Still number 2 domestic challenge (after the democratic institutions «underdevelopment» case) in the PNS is considered to be the «regional separatism and nationalism». The CNS does not follow the priorities of the PNS and considers the «crisis-like condition of economy to be the main cause (!?-auth.) of appearing of the threat to the national security of the Russian Federation». Such «economizm» or economic orientation of the presidential document in the national security is extremely strange and illustrates ones more tremendous lack of coordination even between the «friendly institutions» working upon similar tasks. Moreover such a shift to the economic priorities was not even explained by the authors of the document from the Security Council - not to forget that actually they were changing the presidential position. This is a clear cut illustration to the disorder going on when elaborating national security positions as well.

Another important factor having a key significance for the elaboration of the national defense priorities is the official recognition of Russia's temporary limited abilities. This factor undoubtedly restricts the potential of the country to make some kind of a «global projection» of its power. It was one of the few cases when the former Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov could considered to be right acknowledging in this connection that «the defense should be feasible to the economy of the state».

In this connection the PNS treats Russia as an «extremely important world center» which is some kind of substitute for the great power rhetoric but more in a sense that no decisions of the global or of the regional level may be made without Russia. More cautious formula is given by the CNS where it is stated that Russia has only «all provisions to support and strengthen its positions as a state power, capable of providing flourishing of its people and to play important role in the world processes».

These statements are extremely important for from that time on they govern to a certain extend the sphere of the military modernization and the directions of the military reform.

In the CNS there appears a provision that the interests of the national security and the «evolution of the geopolitical situation in the world may demand under certain circumstances the necessity of the military presence of Russia in some strategically important regions of the world». Being said at that time this provision appeared to be true now when with very small

quantity of paratroopers Russia managed to mark the necessity to count upon her when solving the regional security problems.

In both documents there was a prevailing understanding of the essential need first to establish order within the country and to promote friendly relations with the states in the near abroad. Thus the relations with the Western countries only followed suite.

The key factor in the formulation of the national defense priorities of course belongs to the perception of the level of the external threat. It was a real breakthrough when in 1993 in the MFMD it was stated that the «immediate threat of unleashing direct aggression against the Russian Federation in present conditions has diminished significantly».

But much more important was to make practical conclusion out of this - to use the ability to draw more resources and attention to the domestic needs. This is done in the CNS where it is declared that the decreasing of «the threat of the direct aggression» against Russia opened «the principally new possibilities to mobilize resources for the resolution of the domestic problems of the country».

Discussion on the existing threat for Russia among the politically affiliated and independent experts was always still very intensive. Many of them were never positive at all to the idea of the diminished threat and called for the «defense on all azimuth».

Starting from the middle of the 90-s it was a fact that the NATO enlargement process was constantly playing the principle negative role in the formulation of the threat perception mode in Russia. Moreover it had its negative impact on all sides of the decision-making process in the sphere of Russian national security (both - external and domestic aspect) and arms control. And if , despite the partnership-like relations, there was always a sizable consent about the necessity of the nuclear deterrence on different levels it was mainly due to the thoughtless (in view of the relations with Russia and first of all in the form of its organization) enlargement policy.

A new important component started to be added to the «collection» of the deterrent tools - tactical nuclear weapons. And what should bring more concern is the fact that there is certain consensus between the representatives of different and even opposite wings of the political spectrum on this item - tactical nuclear weapons are needed by Russia.

Declaratory partnership was always very poorly transferred into the

military technical realities. An illustration to this was the constant discussion going on upon the poor correlation of the conventional forces being not in favor of Russia (4:1 with the new three new NATO members being added). As it was mentioned above this brought Russian architects of the military concepts to the necessity of the nuclear deterrence based on the first use posture. Though the «turnover» in this part of the security thinking took place in 1993 now it is adding more popular support and valid arguments.

According to the initial understanding such nuclear deterrence should be valid not only on the nuclear but on the conventional level as well. The presidential PNS declared that the preservation of the status of nuclear power was needed «for the prevention of a nuclear attack or a wide-scale aggression using the conventional forces». In the CNS almost the same formula was preserved with the only addition of the hypothetical perspective of prevention of the «regional war» with the same “nuclear deterrent tool”.

Definitely the nuclear deterrence may be considered as an obvious remnant of the cold war thinking. But it may be removed realistically only by combined efforts and not solely by Russia. Till that time the deterrence (and even return to the first use concept, as in Russian case) would be present in the strategic calculations of nuclear powers, the nuclear arsenals would be deployed still in view of the number and quality of the arsenal of the other sides. Thus the necessity of the «first use» concept will definitely be reflected in other documents to come including the new edition of the military doctrine.

The PNS had to emphasize that Russia «is implementing the policy of nuclear deterrence». The key role in its implementation is played by the maintenance on the «adequate level» of the Russian Federation nuclear potential of the «global level (strategic nuclear forces), as well as of the regional, local scale (operational tactical and tactical nuclear weapons), as well as of the deterrent potential of non-nuclear means».

Some prominent Russian experts are very critical about the validity of the «first use doctrine». In fact to rely upon such understanding as an operational strategy would be rather dangerously. At the same time it is not yet clearly stated what would be the main «practical» concept of implementation of nuclear weapons adopted in Russia - retaliatory strike or launch on warning. The latter one of course is much more dangerous from the point of strategic stability but the justification for its existence was, besides all, the disengagement of the former early warning and C3I system

of the USSR. But the process of unification of the Military Space Forces and Missile Space Defense within the Missile Strategic Forces that is considered to be accomplished opens new possibilities for the raising of efficiency of the early warning and adoption of the purely retaliatory strike concept.

In the documents may be clearly traced the desire to step away from the «classic deterrence». The notion of «realistic deterrence» which should not be based on pure parity but on certain potentials appears in the Concept of National Security. The PNS emphasizes the necessity to keep the nuclear potential “on the adequate level...preserving the balance of strategic forces”

In this context one of the realistic threat having a military meaning listed is the NATO enlargement. The «extension of the military unions» (a very explicit hint on NATO enlargement) in more or less explicit form is present in all security related documents. At present conditions such declaration may be the may have immediate results - in case of the continuation of the enlargement process it would be immediately used as a conceptual foundation to support the necessity for the responsive measures in purely military field including.

In their discussions the experts also did not exclude the perspective of worsening relations between Russia and the West (USA in particular) which may give new life to the nuclear deterrence. As we see now those specialists were not two much away from the truth.

Within other realities of the security environment - the existence and the growing number of limited conflicts is quite obvious and worrisome tendency which demands some security arrangements which in their turn make specialist address the nuclear deterrence.

Analyses of the development of the geopolitical situation in the second half of the 90-s was bringing the experts to the conclusion that there was a probability of only local or regional conflicts that Russia may be facing at the beginning of the next century. Some military experts expressed the opinion that Russia may be involved into the local war only in the process of providing the allied aide to the CIS states attacked from the outside.

There are very specific, not coinciding with the Western countries understanding of potential threats to Russia. For instance due to the historic and political reasons the threat from Iran, Iraq or North Korea is very lowly (if any) perceived by Moscow. The same may concern the nuclear and missile proliferation processes. In a certain sense Moscow actually feel itself much more safe in the world to come than the West

Still the formulation of the scale of the conflict for which Russia have to prepare is on the agenda and very essential. For this would mean the scale of defensive preparations, the correlation of the aims of the military reform. If in some future documents to come it would be stated the possibility of the wide scale conflict with the participation of Russia it would be difficult to speak about the «optimization» of the military potential of Russia on which the presidential documents are insisting. In the CNS happily a rather balanced look upon this prevailed and it was stated that «the most probable threat to Russia in the defensive sphere is represented by the existing and potential spots of local wars and armed conflicts close to its borders».

The Committee on Security and Defense of the Council of the Federation (the upper chamber of the of the Federal Council – Russian Parliament) in Spring 1999 have undertaken the special hearings “On the Realization of the Concept of National Security”. This was not for the first time that such review was undertaken – thus to a certain extend the hearings may be considered to be the “planned ones”. At the same time, and it was emphasized at the hearings, in the latest period there appear principally new challenges to the Russian security which dictate the need to introduce changes in the CNS being created when the “security conditions” were much softer. It is interesting to note that less than a year and a half has passed since the adoption of the CNS (December 1997). But the conclusions made by the senators and experts were directly connected with the Western policy and activity which created principally new and very unfavorable for Russia geopolitical conditions.

It was stated that the latest activities of the West brought introduced new negative changes and represented a new step in Western policy. Thus the West, and fist of all the US, has shifted from the stage of declaring the policy of leadership in the world to the practical implementation of such policy. The examples of Iraq bombing, the move of NATO to the borders of Russia, the latest actions in Yugoslavia where such policy was implemented demonstrated how dangerous it is to the international security and to the security of Russia. This was one of the principal thesis expressed by the speakers. Thus the main provisions of the CNS were declared to “have become hopelessly outdated”

At the same time it was stated that the CNS up till now has no status of the legislative act as it was not considered by the parliament (the peculiarity of the situation is in the following: it is absolutely clear that the present composition of the parliament would definitely have no time to do so

before the election and the new president elected in June-July next year will definitely give an order to create a new document which would reflect the changes in the geopolitical environment of Russia).

This discussion that took place very lately is very symptomatic for it reflects the revision of the basics of the national security thinking and of the military reform. Up till the latest times we could speak about certain consensus within the decision-makers, most of the representatives of the executive power, many MPs and experts that the economic crisis in Russia, the principal drawbacks in the functioning of the democratic institutions, lack of civil control upon the force structures, lagging behind in the implementation of the military reform represented a much more significant menace than the whole scope of external threats under any worst case scenario. And this is demonstrated quite clearly by the analyses of the documents adopted in Russia before the latest devastating Kosovo crisis in our relations. Because of this the situation is drastically and fluently changing and these changes are already finding their negative reflection in the security related documents being prepared, in the process and “ideological background” of the military reform.

Legal foundations of the military reform

The legal provisions which should support the military reforms in Russia are perhaps “organized” in a same chaotic way as the execution of the military reform itself. Why does it happen? Besides the specific reasons connected with difficulties in creating of the state mechanism in Russia, of the limitations due to the critical financial and economic situation there is a very specific set of reasons connected with the deterioration of the Russian - Western relations.

Already in the beginning of the 90s the NATO enlargement policy which was undertaken completely neglecting the Russian opposition and with no place for Russia in this process started to “spoil” the internal political atmosphere in the country. The opposition have got the trump-card which could not be beaten - they were constantly repeating that: Russia is not considered to be an equal partner; Russian democrats, who in the beginning of the 90s declared the Western-oriented policy, in fact have no authority in the West; such attitude to Russia and the strive for leadership in the world may easily lead to much more infringement of Russian security interest which

may put us both on the edge of military confrontation.

It is a bitter truth but the prophecies of the communists almost entirely came true - though in a rather farce way. As a result of Western pressure and completely illegal usage of force in Yugoslavia, new attempts to minimize Russian role and presence in Kosovo about 200 of Russian peace-keepers made a fluent march to Pristina. So for a certain period of time there existed a "self-declared" Russian "section of responsibility" and troops from any other countries were not let through this zone. The situation could become much more serious but this time the politicians rather quickly found the way out of this situation. Would it be possible to do the same next time?

The situation amazed the West, it was compelled to provide Russia with much more noticeable place in the post-war peace-making process in Yugoslavia than it initially was planning to do. This is the definite understanding now in Russia shared but the representatives of all parts of the political spectrum (democrats including). Another not less spread popular understanding is that the factor of power have not disappeared from the international relations - quite to the contrary - the West would not hesitate in the future in some other scenarios when Russian national interests may be touched again. Thus the Western policy in the two aspects mentioned above in particular is having a negative impact on the whole process of decision-making in Russia in the sphere of national security and arms control. The fundamental changes (discussed further on) are already being introduced into the foundations of the national security concept, in the military doctrine, in the programs of weapons modernization thus having a decisive impact on the course of the military reform. The same must be said about the process of lawmaking in Russian Parliament.

Sometimes Western specialists wonder - how in particular NATO enlargement (and now - together with Kosovo "settlement") may negatively influence the process of democracy building in Russia. It should be reminded by the way that when the NATO enlargement was declared as an "inevitable" happening it was said that the course of the West would be two-fold - enlargement of the Alliance and support of the democratic process in Russia. This was in particular how the policy was presented by then the US Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter in September 1994. The Western politicians preferred not to understand the "cross-killing effect" of such course of the Western policy.

But one of the obvious illustrations for this is easily in the process of

lawmaking. There the provisions of the laws which are considered in the whole world as the obligatory components of the democratic system are hardly, if ever, finding the proper place in the national legislation. Not speaking about the extremely prolonged terms of the whole process - up till now some fundamental laws which are critical for the military reform and for the construction of the system of democratic-like civil military relations are still not adopted. The principle question is still officially unresolved - against which enemy we should be prepare to fight. But unofficially now the question is much more clear than before.

Still it is not a coincidence at all that almost unanimously and extremely fluently the State Duma has adopted at the end of June 1999 the law "On the Financing of the State Defensive Order for the Strategic Nuclear Order". The text of the law is a secret or "closed" one which is again a feature of return to the practice of closeness in the military sphere. The main aim of the law is the provision of financing of the strategic forces "under any weather", under any conditions of financial and economic situation in the country. It is the privilege which no other sphere of "man's activity" in Russia enjoys. Knowing where our strategic nuclear potentials are aimed at it is completely clear for which purpose such laws are adopted - to deter the potential adversary or enemy (depends on the individual perception which does not change the essence of the undertaking). It may be easily understood now who in particular is meant by such actions and who should be deterred first of all.

Hence one more and, perhaps, the most fundamental outcome of the Western "Kosovo policy" is the restoration of the missing for some period of time image of the potential enemy for most of the experts and politicians in Russia. Thus the gulf between the declared still cooperative (not partnership-like already) policy with the West declared on the very top of the Olympus of power finds almost no support on all levels of the executive and legislative power. The practical conclusion is very simple - Russia has to accumulate military strength not paying too much attention to its present poor economic conditions. The tendency which coincides very little with the task of creating the democratic legislation for the military reform. The tendency which introduces very specific features in the particular steps within this military reform.

One of the latest examples of the depth of changes taking place are the maneuvers «West-99» (the name is rather symbolic identifying the opponent and the geographic direction of the threat - liquidation of the military units of

the enemy breaking the Russian border) which took place at the end of June 1999. The maneuvers were unprecedented in their scale - they embraced five military districts with the participation of the Baltic and the Northern fleets. One should not forget that only a year or two ago no money could be found for very limited sea trials or exercises of one regiment scale. One should not also forget that up till the latest times we had a lot of combined maneuvers with the West and in the year 1994 Russian-American military exercises took place in the heartland of Russian territory - in the Sverdlovsk region.

As a result of all these changes it should be emphasized once more that the process of lawmaking for regulation of the military reform is going very slowly. The principal law which should regulate the process of the military reform - "On the Main Content and Organization of Performance of the Military Reform in the Russian Federation" was at last after prolonged debates adopted in the State Duma. It happened after several years of prolonged debates upon this document.

This bill should regulate the principal content of the military reform. The principal aim of the military reform is declared to be the creation of the unified state military organization - the Armed Forces and making the military potential of the state to be adequate to the objective needs of the armed defense of the country and provision of the state security.

The principles of the military building through the period of the military reform are formulated there too. The two stages of the reform are formulated in the bill which should embrace the period from 1997 to 2005. The main principles and aims of recruiting are presented in the bill - it is considered that presumably it should be enlistment. The contract service should be mainly presupposed for the submission of the sergeant vacancies.

Other necessary principles of the military reform are present in the bill as well. But up till now they can not be realized into practice. At present the upper chamber of the Parliament - the Federal Council is opposing the adoption of the law.

In this particular case the difficulties are connected not only with the absence of consensus among the MPs upon the basic foundations, main parameters and principle stages of the military reform. It is the position of the executive power and especially of the administration of the president which is opposing the mere concept of the military reform being regulated by the parliamentarians but not by the decrees of the president and decisions of the government.

There is a group of laws directly connected with the problem of transfer from the conscript to the voluntary service: “On the Military Duty and the Military Service” and “On the Alternative Civil Service”

There was always a wide understanding of the necessity of the law being already adopted after prolonged debates which should regulate the sphere of the military service. The main differences of the new law are: the provision is adopted which concretely numerates the number of military formations and organizations where the military service is introduced; the provision is undertaken on the military patriotic breeding of the citizens and the introduction (or to be true - the return of) of the military courses in the education process in the schools; new delays are for military service are introduced (including the students in the Institutes with the military chairs) etc.

Of course the bill on the alternative service would be the most difficult to adopt. It addresses of the very delicate problems on which there is a direct opposition between the representatives of the army and a big part of the society, a number of the public organizations supporting the principle not only of the voluntary service but of the alternative service as well. A significant part of the Russian public opinion is opposing the situation when there is quite a sizable element of the “mobilization society” in the organization of the society itself. It is abnormal in principle if the young person can not use its Constitutional right and choose the alternative service which is the same kind of service to the state as the military service – moreover the state may use its right and direct the person to the service which at present is most of all in the interests of the society. The law is returned by the State Duma after the first reading. Many deputies criticized the bill for it was “undermining” the military preparedness in view of the growing threat from NATO and the Western policy. The direct negative involvement of Western behavior on the process of building democracy in Russia is very illustrative in this case too.

Due to the existing problems (some of them mentioned above) and lack of national and even inter-institutional consensus on the problem of the military reform one of the principal bills in this sphere - “On the Civil Control and Guidance of the Military Organization and Activity in the Russian Federation” - is not adopted.

The peculiarity of the situation in Russia with the military reform is brilliantly illustrated by the mere essence of the bill “On the Introduction of

the Additions to the Federal Law “On Defense”. The main meaning of the bill is to make the Ministry of Defense to provide the interested institutions with the precise figure of existing and planned quantity of personnel for the beginning and for the end of the year. The bill is not adopted by the upper chamber. Thus up till now it is impossible to calculate correctly the sums needed for the Army when elaborating the military budget because the Ministry of Finance does not obtain the correct information about the proper number of personnel which should be maintained.

The law “On the Introduction of Changes to the Federal Law “On the Budget Classification” is a step back from the positions of unprecedented openness achieved by the law itself. The law on the classification of the budget was critically important for the implementation of the proper balance of the civil military components in the society. It demanded the division of Defense budget into more than one hundred articles and thus allowing to control through mechanism of financing more than one thousand military programs. For such openness stand even the Ministry of Defense for it is interested to demonstrate the MPs the real critical situation with the financing. And thus the Ministry of Finance was always against the law for it was interested in the concealment of the whole process of financing thus to be asked less questions about the constant underfinancing of the defensive sphere.

But the project introduced into the Stated Duma by the government leaves in the opened part of the budget only three lines and not very many lines in the closed part of the budget. Unfortunately the bill was adopted. The tendency which is completely contrary to openness definitely start to prevail for as a result the Federal Budget for the year 1999 appeared to be one of the most “covert” ones. Besides the budget becoming more covert the mere essence and the perspective of the military reform is constantly challenged every year by low level of financing.

One more law which should be mentioned and which definitely influences the framework of the military reform is the law “On the Martial Law” which defines the procedures enacted in time of war.

A very significant and in a number of cases a critical element in the arguments of the “patriotic opposition” composed of leftists is the perception of the military threat from the West which unfortunately provides a number of pretexts (some of them - being mentioned above) for the opposition to think in this way. A new feature now is that the “negative

vision” of the perspectives of security cooperation with the West is wide spread among all deputies - the most democratic of them, being included in this number unfortunately due to the unpleasant developments in the Western policy. Thus the West has almost completely lost the support for the cooperative policy in the security sphere. This may be easily illustrated by nonratification by the Russian parliament of the principal arms control laws.

The example which appears to be “classic” is the START-2 Treaty. Its ratification was seriously prepared several times in the year 1998 and 1999 but it was always the factor of Western (US) policy or forceful actions (some new act in NATO enlargement, bombing of Iraq, Kosovo etc.) which precluded the MPs from voting. For the latest two years at least the START-2 ratification has very little to do with the military technical arguments “pro” and “contra”, but is almost directly dependent upon the state of the Russian - Western relations and besides it was several times used as a card in the internal political games.

It is early to say whether some “new hopes” of some kind of the “new detante” after Kosovo, if some “technical” progress would be achieved in “consultations” on nuclear offensive and defensive forces, may be realized into the ratification of the START-2 Treaty as well. But what may be said definitely that it would not be done by this composition of the State Duma (new elections taking place in December 1999). Due to what has happened already in our relations will make the theme of criticism to the West as one of the principle ones in the campaign of all the political parties and of the overwhelming majority of the candidates to the State Duma. We have already touched upon the causes of these political moods.

Starting from the year 1994 non-ratified is the Open skies Treaty. Its provisions are considered to be too unequal and sensitive to Russian security. Some agreements which may be considered as being definitely in the interests of Russian security are being “processed” through the State Duma. This is for instance the Chemical Weapons Convention. Its ratification became possible after the after the intensive pressure form the executive power and after the government have presented the scheme of financing of the process of chemical weapons annihilation.

As this scheme is not fulfilled properly at present many MPs are becoming more critical to the arms control process as a whole. At the same time it is already obvious that all ratification arguments should be addressed to the new composition of the State Duma.

But it must be emphasized that only due to the poor state of present Russian - Western relations a number of crucial signed, planned or finalized treaties have been «frozen» without ratification: START-2, START-3, CTBT, «Open Skies». Up till now a very critical attitude exists towards the CFE adaptation. And what is even worse is the fact that some of the past agreements are more and more put under doubt: START-1 (which is also undermined by US strategic defense program), CFE, IMF-SRF, parallel reduction of tactical nuclear arms, and de-targeting of strategic missiles.

Plans to reform the Russian Armed Forces in the second part of 90-s

By the mid-90-s it became absolutely clear that Russia is unable to maintain and to develop the military machine inherited from the Soviet Union. It needed substantial reductions and deep structural changes. Of course, a military reform could not be limited with reductions and reorganization of armed forces only. But the huge military machine was the primary target to focus upon reform's efforts.

Only the Soviet ground forces what represented the world's strongest military formation in the recent past and included 8 military districts, 14 armies, 8 corps, and more than 60 active duty divisions quickly degraded loosing its combat ability and readiness and facing dramatic lack of financial resources. By the end of 1996 two main views confronted in the Russian political leadership on perspectives and necessity of changes in the Russian armed Forces. One approach has been developed and supported by the apparatus of Defense Council and its Secretary Ju.Baturin. In brief it could be described in the following way.

The defense budget approved by the State Duma for the year 1997 104,3 trillion rubles (the amount is given before denomination of the Russian currency) should be considered as an absolute theoretical ceiling, that the country could allocate for military needs under current economic circumstances. It would be a wishful thinking to insist on getting more financial resources. Having in mind the real situation with collecting taxes and state revenues in general it is much more likely that in reality the Ministry of Defense will receive part of this sum. All this resulted in formulating the following task: what is the most efficient way to spend the amount of money given in the state budget. Which structural and numerical changes are necessary in the armed forces to save the nucleus of military organization and to ensure the highest possible level of defense.

The Defense Ministry position was quite opposite. Defense Minister I.Rodionov and Chief of General Staff General V.Samsonov submitted evaluations made by the military experts which showed that minimal sum which would allow maintaining the existing military machine on the lowest possible level is 160,3 trillion rubles. In other words they insisted to increase the defense budget of 1997 by 60%. In other words military insisted to get for their needs 10% of GDP and around a half of all federal budget. This would mean immediate death of social programs education and health care systems.

It was a paradoxical situation, because the Defense Ministry experts were correct in their calculations. Preservation of the Soviet military heritage without its serious cuts and restructuring would really demand the amount of resources the Defense Ministry insisted on. But the country could not survive under this burden any longer. That is why the Defense Council experts were absolutely correct too. Reorganization of military sphere should be undertaken urgently under given financial limits, and any delay or waiting for extra financial resources could result in complete destruction of military organization in Russia.

Practically the dispute between Defense Council and Defense ministry was concentrated over basic question: is Russia going to reduce and modernize its armed forces in accordance with real security needs and financial abilities of the country, or the army will have to change the state in the way making it supplementary mechanism to satisfy all the needs of existing military machine.

To support the Defense Ministry position I.Rodionov said about possibility for Russia to be engaged not only in local or regional conflict but in the large scale war. In December of 1996 the minister attended international conference "Development of Strategic Partnership and Military Political Integration among the CIS States". Addressing the conference General I.Rodionov characterized the most important potential military threats to Russia – growth of the USA influence and NATO enlargement - and identified possible military enemies to Russia – Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Japan, and China. If the statement about negative effect of NATO enlargement corresponded with perceptions of majority either political elite or expert evaluations, the identification of potential military adversaries for Russia proposed by I.Rodionov looked provocative and politically counterproductive.

By the end of 1996 the Security Council has published its plan of deep changes in military sphere based on economic realities. The Defense Council

has started with Ground Forces (Army) and proposed drastic reductions in quantity of active duty units deployed. At the same time it was supposed that remaining divisions should be saturated with personnel and armaments and substantially increase their combat readiness. In particular the plan proposed to save in the Ground Forces (Army) 10-12 active duty and fully deployed motorized-rifle and tank divisions, 3-5 paratroopers divisions (in Russian terminology VDV) and 2-3 paratroopers brigades. The other part of the plan proposed to have in the Army 10-15 extra cadre divisions containing 30% of total manpower and serving as training centers for mobilization reserve. All the remaining Ground Forces units were to be transformed into storage of weapons and munitions with minimal personnel needed to guard the military property.

In Navy the plan proposed to save generally existed Fleets structure and to save as many combat ships as possible by transferring them into reserve with further conservation. In other words it was planned to shrink an active duty Navy till one combat group in each fleet concentrating the main efforts, financial and material resources during 2-3 years to come on conserving the rest of combat ships to save them for the better time or for the case of emergency. As for Naval component of strategic nuclear forces it was supposed not to add something to existing obligations to reduce the number of nuclear submarines mainly in the framework of START but to diminish substantially the density of their patrolling duties.

For the Air Force it was proposed to concentrate the main efforts on saving trained pilots and giving them an opportunity to support more or less acceptable level of professional skills. For reaching these goals the amount of flying hours should grow till 100 per year what defined a principally other level of spare parts and fuel supply. Of course 100 flying hours per year seems too low in comparison with NATO standards. But this was much better than a contemporary reality in the units of Russian Air Force (20-30 flying hours per fighter pilot yearly). Like for the Ground Forces the plan recommended to follow the same path: to diminish the number of active duty units deployed but to saturate the remaining ones with flight crews which would be ready to fulfill combat missions. It was proposed in particular to use more actively combat aircraft in the active duty units by increasing number of crews per aircraft from 1,5 till 3.

The changes proposed in Defense Council plan looked very serious and deep and were strongly opposed by the Russian military leadership. Observers mentioned different reasons of such strong resistance but all of them agreed – the Defense Council plan first time in the post Soviet history

seriously damaged the military group interest on the highest level. It was evaluated that realization of this plan would inevitably result in reductions of roughly 500 General's positions.

In January 1997 the initial plan of the Defense Council was developed and clarified in some new details of reforms in military sphere till the year 2005. This plan included structural changes in the Armed Forces aimed at shift initially from existing five Services structure towards four Services and finally to three ones. The other problem included in the Defense Council proposals were linked with the huge number (more than 15) of state ministries and agencies were officially allowed to have own military formations usually called the other than Defense Ministry forces. Needless to say that even a very rich and prosperous country can hardly afford to maintain more than 15 different armies simultaneously. For Russia in its contemporary economic situation it was an absolutely unacceptable burden.

The other problem included in the set of top priority actions related to the administrative-military division of the Russian territory. Russia was divided on Military districts of defense Ministry. But besides that It contained districts of Interior Ministry, districts of the Border Guard Service and Regional Centers belonging to the Ministry of Emergency Situations. The administrative borders of different ministry's districts never coincided. Each of them had own Staff, infrastructure and absolutely no coordination with their counterparts from the other agencies. The Defense Council plan proposed to rationalize the military administrative division of the Russian territory putting districts of different Ministries in the same borders, liquidating parallel elements in the infrastructure and making all existing types of forces available in case of war time emergency to fulfill the same military mission under command of General Staff.

The plan declared as well serious numerical reductions of the armed forces already during the first stage of its realization – 1997 –2000 year. It was stated that by the beginning of 1999 the size of Defense Ministry forces will be reduced till 1,2 million servicemen and the other Agencies troops will be reduced by 30%. During the same period it was supposed to complete the changes in the Service structure of the Armed Forces.

The second stage (2000 – 2005) the plan dealt with structural changes in the remaining Armed Forces, numbers of units deployed etc. The universal system of military education graduating officers for different Services should be introduced as well. It was supposed that inevitable financial limits would not allow during these two periods to buy in substantial quantities new weapons and military technique. That is why the plan recommended to

concentrate at that time limited resources not on military purchases but exclusively on military R&D, not to lose technological edge and be ready to manufacture and to buy the next generation of weapons while financial situation allows that.

The third stage of this plan was scheduled on the period after the year 2005. This should be the time when reorganized Armed Forces start to be supplied with new modern weapons designed in the previous ten years. It is important to note that the plan contained some doctrinal ideas and military strategy recommendations. It said that in foreseeable political situation Russia might be engaged in different types of military conflicts. In case of local one the forces of 1-2 military districts, which use conventional weapons only, should stop it. In case of regional conflict (higher level of intensity) troops of 2-3 military districts must be able to de-escalate and stop it. If the conflict threatens to exceed the limits of regional one and to grow into wide scale war, Russia reserved the right to use all the means available including first use of nuclear weapons to disarm the enemy and to ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. This statement was not deeply thought reconsideration of the Russian nuclear strategy. Most likely this reflected the growing concern of Russian political and military leadership that weaknesses in conventional forces may not allow them to fulfill their mission in case of large-scale conventional conflict.

The Defense Council plan was sharply criticized by the Defense Ministry and situation reached the stage of an open conflict. To get out of this deadlock President B.Yeltsin has fired Minister I.Rodionov from his position and substituted him with Army General I.Sergeev. But this would be an oversimplification to interpret the change as a victory of Defense Council views over conservative position of Defense Ministry. Shortly after this move Yeltsin liquidated the Defense Council and transferred the responsibility over military matters in his Administration to the Security Council and its newly appointed (August 1997) Secretary Andrei Kokoshin.

A.Kokoshin was not an active participant of public debates over perspectives of military reform. But in his previous position First Deputy Defense Minister he and his staff made a lot of practical steps constructing necessary foundations of deep military reform. First of all already in 1996 his group developed the wide complex of doctrinal problems and analyzed different variants of optimal structures for Russian Armed Forces till the year 2005 and further. As A.Kokoshin wrote in one of his articles "after long and painful efforts of specialists from General Staff, Committee on military-technical policy of Defense Ministry, General Directorate of Defense Budget

and Financing some basic elements of economic information were identified. For instance the real costs of one motorized rifle or tank division maintenance during a year, the same for the fighter regiment of front aviation, one Army officer's college etc. This information was of crucial importance to plan anything about size and structure of the future armed forces".

One of the most important idea developed in A.Kokoshin's group was the concept of multifunctional (multipurpose) Army division having different types of armaments and being successfully perform combat missions in different theaters and large scale conflicts as well as peace-keeping operations. There should be organized a relatively few number of that type units in peace time, but they should serve as the bases for mobilization deployment in case of military emergency.

At that period A.Kokoshin contributed as well in development of the Russian maritime strategy. In particular he promoted the idea to create so-called the "Northern Strategic Fortress", in other words strong enough Naval group supported by properly deployed ground forces able to ensure naval component of strategic nuclear triad based in the Russian Arctic region to perform their combat mission. A.Kokoshin considered as well that Russia should organize the military build-up in Naval sphere in the way to guarantee its naval supremacy in the seas which play a crucial role for Russian military and economic security, namely Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Barents Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, etc.

Later on in early 1997 the necessity of urgent actions in reorganization of military sphere was presented in the report "Concept of the Military Reform in the Russian Federation" prepared by special Commission organized under the auspices of Russian Academy of Sciences and headed by Dr. Alexei Arbatov. The report stated in particular: "The most complex and the most urgent problem now is not only and not primarily to ensure the defense of the country against external threats but to save the Russian army and defense industry facing the perspective of complete collapse. The situation in military sphere is so critical that the military leadership is already warning about possibility of social explosion in the army which would result in loosing political control of the state over its military. It is evident that the military reform in such situation is a top priority of national security".

The other prominent public organization - Council on Foreign and Defense Policy - has published in mid-1997 its version of the report "Military Reform in the Russian Federation" which contained conceptual views on the key directions of reforming military sphere in Russia. These included:

- bringing the military organization of the Russian state in accord with the needs of national military security and contemporary economic abilities of the state;

- setting up of the military organization and conducting military policy which would ensure maximum personal safety of the Russian citizens, civilians and military in peace time and in the war period;

- reliable civilian control over military sphere and its transparency for society;

- creation of the legal bases for military build up and practical implementation of military reform in Russia. ,

Programs and first practical moves to reorganize the military sphere in Russia which started in mid 1997

In summer 1997 the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation I.Sergeev made very important statement which characterized the decisive turn in Defense Ministry position. Practically he appeared to be the first Russian Defense Minister who stopped meaningless fighting for non-realistic increase of defense budgets but comprehended inevitability of deep changes in the Armed Forces. He wrote in particular: “To save the Armed Forces for Russia we must immediately reform them”. At the same time the Minister stressed out that “today Russia is facing the imperative of radical military reform. Structure, composition, combat readiness and technical level of armaments and military equipment do not correspond any longer neither with real security needs of the state, nor with its economic abilities. The financial resources allocated for defense purposes do not satisfy the maintenance needs of the Armed Forces in their contemporary quantity and structure”.

In September 1997 Defense Minister Sergeev has published a conceptual article where he described the detailed plan of the Russian Armed Forces reorganization. As one may see this plan absorbed a lot of elements from the previous works made by Defense Council or A.Kokoshin and his staff. Among the main priorities I.Sergeev mentioned the following: to save and to develop Strategic Nuclear Forces under the limitations defined by the nuclear arms control treaties. Strategic nuclear forces remain the key component of deterrence potential, guarantor of strategic stability. The other top priority is formation of the nucleus consisting of fully deployed, combat ready saturated with personnel and armaments units of the new type in reorganized Services. The number of these new units should be sufficient to

act even in a peace time to prevent and neutralize armed conflicts of different scale.

The other top priority - changes in the defense budget structure. First of all this means substantial growth in the spending allocated for combat readiness. This article defines the real combat readiness of Army, Air Force and Navy. That is why it was planned to increase during the period of reforms the per capita level of combat readiness spending by 12 times. The other close indicator is resource supply of the Armed Forces. In 1997 Russian Armed Forces were lagging behind their American counterpart by 13,5 times. As the Defense Minister stated Russia has planned to increase the resource supply of armed Forces by 2 times in the year 2001 and by 3 times in the year 2005. The procurement of armaments and military R&D spending were supposed to grow by 3 times to the year 2001 and by 4,5 times by the year 2005.

The Minister added as well that it is important to liquidate irrational misbalance in defense budget when almost all money are spent to pay military personnel. The defense budget structure should be brought to normalcy when 60% of its total amount will be allocated for personnel payment, maintenance, and combat readiness but 40% will be spent on military purchases and defense R&D. In case of successful realization of that plan by the year 2025 the Russian Armed Forces will be rearmed with modern types of weapons.

The plan of Armed Forces reorganization was divided in three stages. The first one should last from 1997 till 2000 and included the following steps. To transform the Armed Forces structure from existed five Services to four Services mode. To realize this goal it was decided to merge Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), Military Space Forces, which were responsible for launchers and exploitation of military space crafts, and Forces of Rocket Space Defense, previously they were a part of Air-defense Forces (PVO). These forces included as well the Early Warning System of Ballistic Missiles Attack. Altogether these forces should form the new Service - Strategic Rocket Forces. This idea was implemented in practice in 1997.

During the same first stage of the proposed plan several other steps were to be undertaken. These included a numerical reduction of military districts and their transformation in Operational-strategic or Operational-territorial Commands. This idea related not only to the forces and military districts of Defense Ministry but the organizational structures of the other power ministries. In other words the ambitious goal was to organize instead of existed structures (eight military districts and four fleets of MOD, seven

military districts of Interior Ministry, and nine regional centers in the structure of the Ministry of Emergency Situations) six Operational-strategic or Operational-territorial Commands, which would be in charge to use in common actions units of all Services and power ministries to defend the country in case of military emergency.

These six Strategic Directions would include: Western (with center located in Moscow), South-western (with center deployed in Rostov-na-Donu), North-western (center in Saint-Petersburg), Central-Asian (center in Samara), East-Siberian (center in Ulan-Ude or Chita), and Far eastern (center in Khabarovsk).

The first stage of proposed plan included as well reorganization of Ground Forces command. The Agency of Ground Forces Commander in Chief was to be liquidated and replaced with Main Directorate of the Ground Forces subordinated to the Deputy defense Minister. But the key element of the Ground Forces reorganization was the decision to deploy in each strategic directions mentioned above fully saturated with personnel and weapons and combat ready units of new type. Chief of General Staff General A.Kvashnin stressed out the multipurpose character of these units. They will contain landing assault and motorized rifle components. These multipurpose divisions would have attack helicopters Ka-50 and other weapons. Composition and structure of these divisions should vary to make them most suitable for combat actions in the conflicts which are perceived as the most likely ones in this very direction. Each division of that type would have a manpower around 10000 servicemen. According to the expert assessments initially four combat ready divisions of new type were to be deployed in existed military districts - Moscow, Leningrad, Far eastern and North Caucasus.

The plan took an idea previously proposed by the Defense Council to drastically diminish a quantity of active duty division and transform substantial number of undermanned units into bases to store weapons and military equipment. According to information given by General A.Lebed the Ground Forces should save 25 active duty divisions, four corps, and seven armies, while 26 division were planned to be transformed into bases to store weapons and military equipment.

The second stage of this plan - from year 2000 till 2005 - should be spent mainly to reach one goal: transformation from four Services structure of the Armed Forces into three Services variant based on the spheres where these Services would have to act: land, air and space, and sea.

The third stage of the Armed forces reorganization plan which would start after year 2005 should deal primarily with complete rearmament of the Russian troops with new generations of modern weapons. This process should be completed by the year 2025.

The proposed plan could hardly be evaluated as a comprehensive program of military reform, but it should be inevitably seen as its integral part aimed at deep changes in organization and structure of the Russian Armed Forces. From the very beginning of its realization this plan met a lot of practical complications.

From the plan to its practical implementation: problems of Armed Forces reductions and restructuring

Already the first steps started to be undertaken for practical implementation of Defense Ministry plan showed enormous difficulties the military leadership will face to reach main goals proclaimed in the plan. The decision to form multifunctional fully deployed and saturated with personnel and weapons combat ready units in each strategic direction was practically tested first in Moscow area. As it was mentioned already the first variant of Defense Council plan proposed to have in the Ground Forces 10-12 divisions of new type. The first of this dozen (3-ird motorized rifle division) was formed in Moscow military district in 1977 on the bases of two tank divisions - 47-th Guard and 31-st - withdrawn from Germany.

The division has a dense schedule of combat training. By the April of 1998 there were organized several hundred exercises of company level several dozens of battalion exercises and regiment scale maneuvers were in the combat training plans too. To some extent this division was a test site or a polygon to identify the optimal structure to the new type units. The 3-rd MR division has non-traditional organizational structure. It consists of three motorized rifle and two tank regiments. But this is non seen as a final and absolutely universal variant of division structure. For instance it is clear that such a structure may be too heavy for actions in local and even regional conflicts. Division Commander Major General A.Stolyarov considers that the division may be composed of four motorized rifle regiments and one extra tank battalion.

The division has 7000 servicemen and 830 of them are serving on contracts. The others are conscripts. The main personnel problem in division is the shortages with in low and mid rank officers especially among platoon -

company commanders. Only 30% of division officers are career military, the others are conscripts for two years officers term after graduation from colleges and universities. Of course this situation should not be accepted as normal especially for the unit which formed to be the best ground forces formation in the military district. Division of the permanent combat ready status needs professional officers as the different level commanders but not yesterday students capable in the definite branches of knowledge but having absolutely no military experience.

It would be exaggeration to say that 3-rd MR division has the most advanced and modern weapons. Motorized rifle units use a well known and tested in combat actions vehicle - BMP-2. The tank regiments are armed with gas-turbine T-80B main battle tanks. Artillery units have self-propelled howitzers «Msta-C» and «Akatsia». The most modern weapons are in the division air-defense units. They have air defense complexes «Tor-M1» and «Tunguska».

The formation of 3-rd MR division illustrates all the problems Russian Armed Forces are facing now. Commander of Moscow military district Colonel General L.Kusnetsov got directly from the Defense Minister I.Sergeev authority to supply the 3-rd MR division with everything necessary starting with fuel even at expense the other units of the military districts. But the other units in turn got only 20% of the fuel they needed. It is evident that almost all the fuel was «confiscated» by the 3-rd division. but even after such confiscation the 3-rd MR division got 60% of own needs in gasoline and diesel fuel.

The further moves aimed at practical implementation of Defense Ministry plan met a lot of practical complications. As it was stated by Defense Minister I.Sergeev decisive stage of armed forces reductions and restructuring started in May 1998. It was a painful process with numerous collisions inside and among Services. For instance in May 1998 Kamchatka Army corps was re-subordinated to pacific Fleet Command. Of course, among ground forces commanders in Far eastern military district this decision was seen as a mistake but the General Staff insisted on this structural change. It has been decided as well to make all the air defense units based in Kamchatka an integral part of the Pacific Fleet.

In the Siberia region it has been decided to diminish a number of air defense missile regiments deployed from four to one. The remaining air defense missile regiment was supposed to be deployed in city of

Novosibirsk. But the decision to disband one other of these regiments was strongly opposed by its officers and local division of Peoples-patriotic public movement. It was about the regiment deployed in Barnaul. One must accept that the protest was pretty well argued. First of all this Barnaul regiment was proclaimed in 1997 the best air defense missile units in air defense system of Siberia. Second, this regiment was equipped with the most advanced air defense missile system C-300PM. The officers of the regiment reasonably consider that it would be more logical to begin the reductions with the units which armed with outdated weapons. Finally, officers expressed their concern that liquidation of air defense missile regiment in Barnaul would damage the basic principle of air defense missile units primary mission - to protect the bases of Strategic Rocket Forces. Liquidation of Barnaul regiment would leave unprotected two Strategic Rocket Forces divisions deployed in this operational zone.

Practically similar examples could be shown for any region of the Russian Federation. For instance Chief of Staff in the Leningrad military district Lieutenant General P.Labutin reported that troops in the North West of Russia should be reduced by 40%.The district has to reform or to liquidate 107 units and resign more than 5000 cadre officers. But with all practical difficulties, inevitable mistakes, and social tensions reductions and structural changes in the armed forces practically started in summer 1998. During the year 1998 the system of military education was engaged in the reformation process. It is announced that number of military colleges and academies will be reduced from 101 till 57. Seven units of permanent combat readiness were formed on the main Strategic Directions. These are three divisions and four brigades. But by the year 1999 the very term military reform has almost disappeared from the language of the Russian military leadership. There were several main reasons for slowing down reformation of military sphere. Among them continuing economic shortage and financial crises which damages all spheres including military one. The other factor which negatively impacted the reformation of military sphere in Russia was linked with dramatic changes in political situation primarily with situation around Iraq and Kosovo which re-opened discussions on military risks and challenges Russia may face in not distance future.

Financial crises in Russia as the main obstacle to the military reform

During 90-s economic crises in Russia resulted in serious reductions

of GDP and budget income. In 1998 GDP and budget income were around 60% and 45% of year 1992 respectively. In the same period the share of defense spending in GDP was diminishing as well from 5,56% in 1992 till 2,88% in 1998. While the main share of defense budget, almost 67% of its total amount, is spent to maintain the existing armed forces, this money are not enough to fulfill the obligations in number of budget items (personnel payments, uniforms and other of material supply, medical treatment, etc.) on the level of acting norms but the norms themselves are lagging far behind contemporary market realities. For instance daily meal ration of soldier is calculated as 12 rubles (50 cents) per capita. One should not be a specialist to see irrationality of that norm.

Spending which would ensure the proper level of combat readiness and material supply of troops with spare parts, fuel etc. should reach at least a half of personnel payment. This means that Russia should allocate on this items of defense budget not less than 25 billion rubles. The real sums will most likely be 2-3 times lower than necessary amount. Military purchases and defense R&D are planned in 1999 defense budget as 25 billion rubles, what does not allow not only to design and to buy new modern weapons but even to pay debt of armed forces to defense industry for contracts done in the previous years.

As it was mentioned above the Defense Ministry plan identified the total size of the Armed Forces as 1,2 million servicemen. If we accept the per capita resource supply norms which exist in the armies of Poland and Hungary the Russian defense budget would have been 230-270 billion rubles what on the other hand would immediately bankrupt the Russian economy. Bearing in mind all these and many other similar economic factors one can easily see why the defense ministry plans were put under serious doubts again at the beginning of 1999.

Practically the public discussion was re-opened January 1999 when the Independent Military Review a weekly supplement to The Independent Paper (Nezavisimaia Gazeta) has published a «Prognoses of Financial Economic Resources Available for Armed Forces Buildup in Russia for the Period till the Year 2010». Reportedly this material was prepared by the analytical group in the General Staff. It gave a detailed description of minimal financial resources which are necessary to maintain the army of the size (1,2 million servicemen) which was identified in Defense Ministry plans. The division of these sums among defense budget items is given in Table 1.

Prognoses of defense spending needed for the period 1998-2010 years

billion of rubles in 1998 prices

Table 1.

years	personnel payments	combat training	military purchases	military R&D	military construction	others	total
1998	33,8	12,6	15,1	10,8	3,3	6,1	81,7
1999	45	36	36	25	7	9	158
2000	45	36	36	25	7	9	158
2001	47	38	36	25	7	9	179
2002	50	40	36	43	6	10	185
2003	52	42	36	43	6	10	189
2004	55	44	36	43	6	11	194
2005	57	46	72	29	6	11	221
2006	60	48	72	29	6	11	226
2007	62	50	72	29	6	11	230
2008	64	52	72	29	6	12	234
2009	65	52	72	29	6	12	235
2010	67	54	72	29	6	12	240

The August crises of 1998 inserted serious corrections in the previous plans of Armed Forces reforms. Bearing in mind the lag between economic realities and armed forces financial needs the General Staff analytical document proposed three possible strategies to get out of the critical position the Russian Armed Forces appeared at that moment.

1. To increase the defense share of GDP till 6-6,5% for the period 1999 - 2005.

2. To reduce the size of the Armed Forces to the level which can be normally financed with the amount of money which would not exceed 3-3,5% of national GDP.

3. To save existing size of the Armed Forces, to continue substantially underfund them but to change the defense budget structure to avoid a complete degradation of the military industrial complex.

The first of these three strategies has to be thrown away as non-realistic under contemporary economic conditions. The second strategy means that preserving the defense budget on the level of the year 1998 during

coming 3-4 years would allow Russia to have the Armed Forces of maximum size 550-600 thousand servicemen.

If the third strategy is chosen this would demand shifts in budget priorities.

- To finance in a full scale the personnel payment;
- To finance slightly above critical level the military purchases and R&D to save at least a nucleus of defense industry. But the beginning of new weapons supply would move at least to the year 2002;
- To finance spending on combat readiness and organization of military infrastructure from the funds remaining after first two items. Realization of the third strategy would mean preservation the Armed Forces of the planned size, minimum level of contract works for defense industry, but practically no combat training and extremely low level of combat readiness for substantial period. The analytical document concluded that in the most optimistic case of Russia's development the Defense ministry can expect the full size financing not early than year 2005 what respectively postpone plans and programs related to the military reform.

In March 1999 there was published an article written by the former Interior Minister of Russia Army General A.Kulikov. Where he made the same conclusion and even said that «the ship of military reform in Russia crashed on the rocks of economic realities». General A.Kulikov sees only one way to save Russian Armed Forces under current circumstances to cut them to the size of 550 thousand manpower. He proposes that as a temporary move to prevent army from self-degradation. But all discussions of that sort lasted in Russia till the moment NATO started its operation in Yugoslavia. And this event can be taken as a watershed in approaches towards military issue by Russian political elite and general public.

Kocovo syndrome and its impact on military reform in Russia

It is too early to discuss in details the consequences of NATO operation in Yugoslavia for political situation in Russia and further moves in the military sphere including directions of military reform. The analyses of NATO operation itself is far beyond framework of this report. But some practical actions launched by Russian political and military leadership directly resulted from NATO's unilateral moves. In any case many assessments and

recommendations on the Russian defense policy start now with the phrase: «Bearing in mind what happened in Yugoslavia». There are a lot of publications in Russia now which recommend the dramatic changes in the Russian policy. Some experts are saying that NATO action in Kosovo made obsolete and meaningless all the system of arms control. This includes not only START, CFE, and CTB treaties but even INF. Some high rank military propose Russia to withdraw from all these treaties. It is interesting to note that the main problem for these analysts are not the numerical limits of the treaties but on site inspections and other CSBM which accompany these treaties.

After NATO operation started in Yugoslavia it was seen unacceptable to allow officers from NATO countries to visit Russia for different types of inspections. For instance the proposal to withdraw from the INF Treaty did not presupposed restoration of SS-20 missiles manufacturing but removal of American inspectors who are monitoring the perimeter of Votkinsk missile plant where these missiles were assembled before liquidation of their production lines.

But the most impressive practical move which followed from NATO operation in Yugoslavia was the Security Council meeting held on April 29 and chaired by the president Yeltsin. The meeting was surrounded with unprecedented security measures. It is publicly known only that the Council dealt with nuclear issues and approved three documents. No one of them was published and only one document's title is publicly available - «Concept of Development and Use of Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons»

Some experts came to conclusion that this document put the beginning of works over new generation of tactical nuclear weapons. But they consider that decision is not limited with battlefield tactical nuclear weapons but relates to the whole spectrum of nuclear weapons tactical and strategic. There are those who consider that the goal of this program to make a limited nuclear war thinkable and possible. Non-symmetrical answer which Russia can give to American smart precision guided bombs and cruise missile would be the capability to precisely hit targets with nuclear weapons of extremely low yield power.

Some details of this concept are not absolutely new and were exposed in 1966 by the that time Minister of Atomic Energy V.Mikhailov in the open media. The modernization program is based on the technological possibility to design a nuclear warhead with the yield power from several dozens till

hundreds ton of TNT (one thousand time lower than yield power of Hiroshima bomb). In 1996 V.Mikhailov proposed to develop and to deploy up till 10000 nuclear warheads of that class to respond on NATO enlargement in Europe. The other part of the program is linked with strategic missile warheads modernization to make them easily and quickly readjustable to vary their yield power from the current several megaton equivalent to hundred tons of TNT, in other words to diminish yield power by 1000 times in comparison wit initial one.

All this should be seen as an attempt to make nuclear deterrence more convincing especially in the conflicts which look most probable in the current and foreseeable political situation. In 1996 V.Mikhailov failed to convince Russian political leaders to finance this program. The reality of nuclear war even in the form of point fits was threatening Kremlin. But NATO strikes in Yugoslavia helped Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to breakthrough the defensive lines constructed by politicians and to get official sanctions to begin the program.

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After event in Yugoslavia Russia appeared on the crossroad in its approach towards reorganization its military sphere in general and Armed Forces in Particular. On the one hand economic reality dictates drastic cuts of armed forces and defense budgets and concentration on solving problems in domestic economy. On the other hand NATO's operation in Yugoslavia dramatically increased the filling of military weakness and vulnerability what demands to undertake immediate measures canalizing enormous resources into military sphere. To realize the second variant of strategy is possible under mobilization economy conditions. Mobilization economy would demand in turn political changes which have nothing to do with democracy development. Each missile or bomb explosion in Yugoslavia put one more nail in the coffin of liberal democratic experiment in Russia, and it is too early to judge whether this experiment is still alive. Return of operation in Kosovo the legal field under the auspices of UN Security Council gives some hope for positive outcome from this situation. But too much has been either

damage or completely destroyed in idea of partnership between Russia and the West. Nobody can say now whether the recovery of close partnership idea is possible at all. But it would for sure require a lot of time, mutual efforts and enormous political will.

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