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***THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE UNITED STATES.***

**The Implementation problem of the New Transatlantic Agenda's First
Objective of the Action Plan**

Final Report. JUNE 1999.

FELLOWSHIP.

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1997-1999

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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE U.S.

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Action Plan

"La Libertad es uno de los más preciosos dones que a los hombres dieron los Cielos; con ella no pueden igualarse los tesoros que encierra la tierra y el mar encubre; por la libertad se puede y se debe aventurar la vida."

Don Quijote de la Mancha. Miguel de Cervantes.

The price of liberty is eternal vigilance

Thomas Jefferson

CONTENS

I. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACHES.

- The Search of a New Consensus.
- The Triad in the New Consensus.

II. US FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR: AN ANALYSIS

1. US domestic constraints : the Congress, the American strategic culture and the Selective Engagement approach.

- The US Congress.
- US Strategic culture and the Selective Engagement approach.

2. The role of Europe in the US global policy: partner and competitor in Euroasia.

III. THE ROLE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN THE US-EU RELATIONS: THE MEANING OF NATO INTERNAL CHANGES AND ENLARGEMENT.

IV. THE EU AFTER AMSTERDAM AND THE 1999 NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT.

1. The EU Amsterdam Summit of 1997.

2. The NATO Washington Summit of 1999.

V. CONCLUSIONS: SELECTIVE PRIMACY VERSUS TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP?

- Recommendations.

ENDNOTES.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

I. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACHES.

In 1938, under the influence of europeist and federalist streams, Clarence K. Streit published "Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic".¹ This was a visionary Atlantic Union, a common government uniting the both sides of Atlantic. But this impossible dream in that era was sustained for the belief of that US Foreign Policy had to lead the construction of a federative linking the Western democracies, that the division among democracies was a catastrophe and that the Americans need a contemporary purpose in the world. In this vein, and after the end of the Cold War, the Bush Administration impuled the Transatlantic Declaration in order to enhance the relations with the European Community as a symbol of the change of the age, and the necessity of transforming the approach to the European traditional allies. The Administration Clinton put forward this process in 1995 after 2 years of erratic foreign policy toward Europe². In the 1994 US-EU Berlin Summit three working groups were created in order to focus the EU-US cooperation. They worked in three main areas: international crime, foreign and security policy and Central and Eastern Europe. However the groups only achieved limited results because of the lack of political support. But as a result of this debate, a set of new ideas for a revitalization of transatlantic relations were launched. They included the creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA)³ and a Senior Level Group carried out the task of developing a broad transatlantic agenda for the next century, centered more on substance rather than structure, and focused on common economic and political action to expand democracy,

prosperity and stability. An approach more focused in creating structures or institutions would have not been possible prior the 1996 IGC, and this other pragmatic approach permitted the creation of the New Transatlantic Agenda and the EU-US Joint Action Plan.

The Agenda provides the political foundation of the Action Plan in which there is a list of priority areas for joint action. The NTA underlines the continuity of the ties linking both sides of the Atlantic and the need to adapt and to strengthen the partnership. The first point of the NTA and the Action Plan is "Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development around the World". The bases for this point are the existence of a common strategic vision of Europe's security, the commitment to the construction of a new European security architecture, and the indivisibility of transatlantic security, of which NATO remains the centerpiece. NATO and EU enlargement are autonomous but complementary processes that should contribute to the extension of security, stability and prosperity of Europe. But it exists problems in the approaches and visions in a changing context. Problems in converging interests: substitution of geopolitical approaches for geoeconomics and asymmetries among these interests or their importance in different areas for each part. The debate over globalization has created the term geoeconomics to describe a world of economics blocks powered by rival, market-based philosophies, competing with one another in the global economy and the international institutions that manage it.

- The Search of a New Consensus.

This report analyzes these differences and the main problems in the strategic vision of European security and the role of the United States and the European Union in the conception of approaches in order to achieve the objectives of the Action Plan: the enlargement and reform in NATO and the European Union Intergovernmental Conference (I.G.C) as problems to develop the I Objective of the New Transatlantic Agenda. The report also studies the influence of certain domestic issues in the US as well as in the EU: for instance, the US Strategic conceptions, the role of Congress in foreign policy and the Senate ratification of NATO enlargement, the reestructuration of US Security Policy and the role of military, and its strategy toward Europe. It also studies the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union and the process of improving the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its relation with the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and the New Strategic Concept, and a brief assessment of the Kosovo crisis. This report seeks the problems in the transatlantic relations but also solutions and motives to a greater Transatlantic rapprochement:

- International Peace and Security framework in a process of new international structural ~~change~~ globalization and interdependency: different process.

- Globalization: support between US and EU to lessen the worst effects of globalization as a new Middle Age: lack of democratic government, economic desiguallity, transnational mafias and narcotraffic, quasi monopolistic control of some sector of the economy by supercompanies.
- Major long-term security risk: Future rise of China.
- Future of Russia as partner of West: in short term seems to pull toward a strategic alliance with China but in long term should look toward the US and Europe.

- **The Triad in the New Consensus.**

Transatlantic Relations needs a **New Consensus**: this approach contains a Triad.

- Common values as vital interests
- Atlantic Alliance as a vital interest: its a mean and end at the same time.
- Sharing Responsibility.

But the rising of China will also be a "glue" for the Transatlantic Partnership. In a long-term, both sides of the Atlantic will need to reach a Strategic Partnership from the current US Primacy. The future of Transatlantic Partnership lays on three foundations: common values as vital interests, Atlantic Alliance as vital interest and Sharing Responsibility. These three foundations has to be the core of the **NEW CONSENSUS**. At the end of the Second World War was created a consensus among the western democracies in order to secure the liberty and democracy against the Soviet threat, now it is necessary a new consensus

The US is the only superpower and unchallenged in hard and soft powers for a state or coalition of states. But the world has changed in a way where military power is less relevant than during the Cold War, while economic power and other related aspects have gained importance. Europe is now a civilian power basically congenital to the new ways that are changing the world: economy, communications, environmental concern, humanitarian problems. Europe has a comparative advantages to offer, including a rather limited military capacity in order to help the US in military operations: but this limited capacity is also a matter of will from the European governments.

From the demise of the Cold War, the US is building an international order as quick as it can, in preventing the rising of regional and global challengers. The US Defense Planning Guidance 1994-1999 stated: "Our strategy must now refocus on **precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.**" This position has been reaffirmed in different National Security documents from the Bush and Clinton Administrations.⁴ Thus, the strenghtening of the US structural powers since the end of the Cold War is consistent with this strategy: maintaining of political leverage through institutions as UN, NATO, WTO,

FMI etc; better economic capacity and performance through domestic adjustments and foreign economic relations with Latin America (NAFTA, Initiative for the Americas), Asia-Pacific (APEC) and the EU (NTA, TMP, TBD); strategic and regional alliances in Europe-NATO, The Greater Middle East-Central Asia, and Japan.; and to second no one militarily through technological supremacy⁵. From this position, the US created a Selective Primacy strategy with some features of Cooperative Security⁶. Moreover, the US maintains a position of privilege because this situation of primacy is reinforced for the absence of other limiting powers as the Soviet Union during the Cold War: EU have the potential but not the will and it is an US allied and partner as Japan; Russia has not the power and China has not still this capacity; the only limitation is the world market. Somehow, there is little understanding from the states governments about the interdependence and globalization: the systemic consequences of US policies on global financial and production structures during the Cold War have produced the outcome of a shift in the balance of power from markets to states⁷. The United States locked European, Latin-American and Asian economies into an open world market economy. This opened a wide range of benefits and opportunities for American business but policymakers did not fully understand the enhanced power they would give to markets over governments. But this US loss of power over world economy does not mean necessarily a US loss of power over states. In fact the US global power and authority is still superior to that of any society or government.

This strategy, however, is not a grand strategy as the Containment strategy and it is creating remarkable asymmetries between the rhetoric and declarative policy, and the implementation of this strategy and its foreign policy, and overall, frictions with the European allies and other powers as Russia, China and India. This situation has been produced for the action of several factors: Internal factors: the new assertiveness of Congress in Foreign Policy, the lackness of a clear vision and firmness of Executive, and the American strategic culture. External factors: the end of the Cold War and the globalization of economy, information and communications. The post-Cold War order is a task in order to maintain a continuation of the Long Peace of the Cold War or a Great Powers peace. Until now, great powers, overall in Europe and Japan are arguably satisfied with the international status quo. But Russia and China (even India) are not. His weakness does not permit Russia great movements challenging directly the international status quo and the same can be said about India. But China is not a member of the former satisfied coalition of states. Recent Chinese growth rates suggests that a potential transition to parity between the PRC and the US is possible in the next decades. Should such situation occur without any changes in Chinese evaluations of the status quo, challenge to the status quo is expected. The question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation on earth, but rather how long it will take her to achieve this status.

The relationship of Europe with the US will be determined to some extent by China. In the XXI century, China will be a major, if not the most significant, factor and player in international security: its size already makes it a major player and one scenario might be a Yugoslavia-like breakdown although it seems improbable. Anyway, on current performance it will be a power that others could not afford to ignore, and, with a military power enhanced, it will be a concern for others. If the China's economical and poblational growth pace and civil and military modernization going on at current level, beside the appearance of dynamism and internal social problems in the NICs and the "Tigers", China will exceed Japan in few decades in economic size, and after a generation will exceed the US. The U.S attempt of economic approach to China checks with the strategic shock and unbalance that will produce the differents interests of China and the US. As the USSR looked for detente in Europe to reinforce stability in order to face the possibility of a Chinese danger, US ought to overcome the problems with the EU and Russssia, and to iniciate a joint long-term strategy with the EU, Russia and Japan to deal with China. U.S strategy (according to the JCS Defense Planning Guidance 1994-99) is to deny the possibility of a possible hostile rising hegemonic power that could dominate the region. But, in a long-term, this British Empire's European strategy style will not be effective if an engagement-containment strategy is not agreed among regional powers.

The relation between the US and China has change from the end of the Cold War. For the US, the relation with China was viewed as part of a Cold War strategy of coping with the Soviet Union. The Triangular Diplomacy of Nixon-Kissinger envisaged an opportunity to open relations with China in a period of US retrenchment⁸. Even during the last years of the Cold War, American policymakers wanted to develop a normalizacion of relations through domestic institutions that would contribute to stability in the relationship in order to prevent US hostility after the Cold War, because in the absence of this strategic necessity, domestic interests were to prevail in the making of China policy. At the same time, China sought accomodation because of the border clashing with the USSR in 1969, even accepting the maintainment of extensive security arrangements between the US and Taiwan. But at the end of the Cold War, the strategic cooperation was removed as foundation of the US-China relations. Chinese leaders viewed in the 1989 Tianamen demonstration a challenge to their political leadership as they were seen in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile their reaction was perceived in the US as a repressive and authoritarian leadership. The US leadership in organizing international and economic sanctions allowed the conservatives groups used China's US policy as a political instrument in intraleadership struggles. As the US Congress, China elite now encountered great preassures to distort policy to accommodate parochial domestic interests⁹. But paradoxically China depends on the US and European countries:

- US is a major trade partner, if not the most important, for China. Besides, the US FDI is \$2.5 billion. In 1996, the US imported \$51.5 billion worth of goods (not included the trade with Hong Kong), making China the US's fourth largest supplier of imports, surpassed only by Canada, Japan and Mexico. The US trade deficit with China is \$35.3 billion (\$46.9 billion including Hong Kong)¹⁰.
- At the same time China attempts not to depend on the American technology but it means that the flow of technology and inversion come from Europe: the EU-15 is the major supplier of advanced technology and equipment and it represents 43'8% of China's total imports of technology while that of Japan is 25'5% and the US 18'3%%.
- Finally, the lack of own sources of energy pushes China to search alternatives to its dependence from Middle East oil in the Southern and Eastern China Sea and the Caspian Region, or in environmentally dangerous projects as the Three Gorges Damm.

The problem is the perception of China elites of the dependence from the West and the control of US in all these areas: American and European oil companies and military protectorate of US in the Middle East; the dependence of the trade, the flow of grain from the US, and we also can include its perception of the US Japan alliance and its renovation in 1996-97¹¹; and finally the European-US alliance in NATO is perceived as the control of US on Europe and the necessary flow of technology to China. This general landscape creates a perception of a intrinsically weak position before the US and a siege mentality because of the American control in the Greater Middle East, the US policy in the Caspian region and the NATO. This vision has taken China to adopt a strategic alliance with a Russia which has some of the same perceptions about the US and its policies in Europe and Asia.

But, in the other hand, the situation in China could also be worrisome. China has 1.2 billion of inhabitants, 1/5 of the world's population but only 7 % of its farmland and much of this is of poor quality. The same can be said about water resources, almost a 7%, but in the north of the country 1/3 of the wells are dry. China's population is expected to increased another 490 million by 2030 to reach 1.6-1.7 billion, while prosperity is enabling a great part of its inhabitants to cosume more grain, meat and eggs. The combination of these trends will nearly double China's demand for grain by 2030 and the prospects for meeting this demand from domestic sources are not very favorable: the grain deficit will total some 207 million tons if there is no further increase in consumption of eggs, meat and beer, and it will rise to 369 million tons if grain consumption per capita increases to 400 kilograms yearly. This figure is nearly double the 200 million tons of grain that was available on world markets in 1994¹². Chinese government establishes that grain imports will filled the gap, but China would be compelled to pay the bill for the imports (600 million tons in 2010) by

releasing a torrent labor-intensive exports on World markets: to gain \$500 per capita its exports have to rise to \$750 billion, which is twice Japan's current total. China's trading partners could have serious problems to absorb on such a scale, and this can create demands for protectionism¹³. Interdependence can sometimes intensified rather moderated conflicts between states. Thus, it is very difficult that Chinese government permits to become heavily dependant on imports of grain from the US or the Western World, placing its country in a position where a dry season could create serious shortages or vulnerability to political pressures from grain exporters. This could push China to seek other solutions in order to assure the rice and grain supply from Asian countries. But it is the problem of energy the major concern for the US and Europe as we will see later.

1. US FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR: AN ANALYSIS

In 1994-95 the Clinton Administration changed the guidance of its European foreign policy after the most serious drifts between both sides of the Atlantic in many years. The intention of establishing a new Assertive Multilateralism along the strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, and the anti-eurocentric posture of the Department of State and Commerce, produces the perception of a decoupling in Europe. At the same time, the Democratic electoral setback in November 1994 Congressional elections changed his attitude toward the low perfil of Administration's foreign policy: a greater exercise of presidential power with more tangible success was needed. In this general framework, the Clinton Administration had to change his focus on domestic issues to foreign affairs. Since 1992, Clinton, as presidential candidate, accepted the rethoric of the New World Order and, in practice, based the US Foreign Policy on principles and morality rather than on defined national interests. This produced a dangerous asymmetry between the new bases of the foreign policy and the strategy of Primacy inherited from the Bush Administration. The pragmatism of a corrected Primacy was based on the belief that only from this position the US will assured the peace and stability, but introducing new concepts as Cooperative Security and Selective Engagement. The Clinton Administration tried to establish a new Assertive Multilateralism along Cooperative Security and Selective Engagement. This hampered in many cases the relations with traditional allies and other states, even neglecting the new relations that the Bush Administration had created with the European Allies and the effort of Secretary of State James Baker to approach the US and the EU.

The Bush Administration focused on managing relations among present and potential great powers

and regional hegemons: only from Primacy, the US can assure peace and stability although some characters from Selective Engagement and Cooperative Security were also introduced. This vision included some new aspects as the revitalization of UN and others institutions which facilitate and legitimate common actions, and a greater link with Europe where the European allies were the hard core of an enlarging democratic community toward Eastern Europe, taking a greater share of global responsibilities as a Partner in Leadership. This approach seems a modernized vision of a Concert of Powers: the objective is to preserve peace and stability between the great powers but maintaining the political, economic and military primacy on the rising of a global challenger¹⁴. This plan would seem created to a new European order but the objective is to establish this order with global basis under the premises of the European order: end of the international division, creation of a democratic community and an international rule of law, and to reestablish the original role of UN as constructive force of the international community¹⁵. This conception of Primacy was inherited for the Clinton Administration, and it enhances the aspects of Cooperative Security, but it has to face some pressures from the realities of domestic and international politics. The unilateralism and selective approach from the Congress and parts of US political elite; the less interest from the public in foreign affairs; and the Primacy's ambitious purposes produces more and major commitments in order to pursuit the world order the administration seeks.

1. US domestic constrains : the Congress, the American strategic culture and the Selective Engagement approach.

-The US Congress.

Since the end of the Cold War, the lack of consensus about the new security environment seems to produce a congressional assessment of national security and foreign policy in each vote at the floor in absence of a clear security strategy and the perception of the establishment of a security threats and risks set of concerns in his place. However, in spite of the opinion of analysts about of the new assertiveness of Congress in foreign affairs and even a new Tug-of-war in Congress-Administration relations¹⁶, the process has been different in some aspects. The roles and preferences of the Congress members seem more importants in this assertiveness than the end of the Cold War, and the rising of trade and economic relations to the front of the foreign policy could have changed the agenda and priorities in Foreign policy but not very much the policy making process¹⁷. If we follow the thesis of Samuel Huntington on the study of foreign and defense policy, we found three categories: crisis policy, strategic policy and structural policy¹⁸. The crisis policy is based in the perception of a immediate threat to US national interests; strategic policy establishes the objectives and

tactics of foreign and defense policy; and finally structural policy designs the use of resources, and the decision-making on layout policies about acquisition, appropriations, organization, deployment of military personnel and material. Normally the President dominates the crisis policy for his inherent and institutional advantages as the bureaucracy administrator and his role of Commander in Chief. However, the presidential powers are less extensive in the case of strategic policies. This kind of policies are initiated by the administration but the treaties and the trade policy depend on the control of the Congress: the President needs the concession of a fast track from Congress to negotiate trade agreements. And, albeit the initiative in structural policies is of the Executive, the control of the Congress is greater in structural policies, because it dominates the appropriations and acquisitions in defense policy and the funds necessary for presidential projects. The process of assertiveness from the 1970s has placed the Congress in its control of foreign affairs in a situation that probably had not since the pre-FDR years and the beginning of the Imperial Presidency era¹⁹. The rising of trade to the front of foreign policy allows Congress to control the presidential policies but the rising of domestic factors in foreign policy and the maintenance of ideological preferences and responsibilities with their electors can sharpen this trend. The Trade Act of 1974 permits Congress members to participate in trade negotiations and the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 permits to revoke the fast track to the President.

The budgeting process is the core element of the structural policies in US foreign and security policy. The Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee establishes the implementation of the general guidance created for each policy, and there also the members of Congress establish their preferences or *Pet rocks*, and their own interests or *pork*. These situations usually are defense programs which create jobs for their voting or contracts of the corporations which support them economically through the PACs (*Political Action Committees*). This tendency to Parochialism, however, is not an extensive explanation of the Congress behaviour, albeit it is an extended situation after the end of the Cold War because of the reduction of the defense contracts. Anyway, there are other reasons for parochialism as concentration of defense contracts in only some states, necessity to attack a rival or to achieve more power, and some studies establish that pork criteria or parochialism in Congress voting are less decisive than what one might lead to expect²⁰. The Congress have a medium role in the formulation of foreign and defense policy but the control on implementation and sometimes, electoral incentives, allow a greater control in this area. However, there is a tendency to micromanagement shared with the Clinton Administration due to the creation of multiple focus of his priorities, lacking a global vision of the great priorities of the administration and the US, and an overextension of objectives which are very difficult to achieve at the same time. The Congress usually see the DOD budget from a point of view of individual funds programs. In shorter cycles as in the House of

Representatives (2 years), the issue is purely political: the interests is the future reelection, not the strategic issues. Thus, foreign and defense affairs are seen from the level and localization of funds, not from strategic rationality. The budgeting process is a political process which means compromise, coalitions and different interests and objectives. However, there are situations where Congress members follow strategic approaches in foreign and defense policy as in the case of nuclear arms²¹. The Congress do not always act in a parochian sense because take in account the general guidances of strategic policy, but it also maintains situations of local preferences. There are other very important factors as the structure of committees, the decision-making process, the influence of lobbies, the role of fiscal policy and the vote tendency of the public. But the progressive demilitarization of foreign policy and the rising of trade policy, and the possibility to make a "domestic" foreign policy through the influence of economy in the national security affairs, allows greater dosis of parochialism and control of Congress since the end of the Cold War.

The Senate posture before the NATO Enlargement has been the core issue in the strategic policy since the end of the Cold War. The decision of Clinton Administration in order to expand the Atlantic Alliance in the December 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels opened a debate in the Administration and in the Congress following a serie of reports on the assessment of the enlargement and its costs as the Study on NATO Enlargement Study, the 1995 RAND study and the CBO report²². Before this, the US House of Representatives created the NATO Participation Act of 1994 to describe the criteria for membership: candidates must take significant progress towards establishing democratic institutions and free market structures, as well as civilian control of the military and a policy of no arms transferring to countries supporting terrorism. A process of hearings and debates before the House and the Senate Committees began in 1995-96 which finished first with the approval of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 and the European Security Act of 1997 in June 1997, addressing NATO enlargement and a range of issues including arms control and relations with Russia. The House version of this Act addresses the NATO-Russia Founding Act before its signing on May 27, 1997, and states that no commitments be made to Russia concerning conventional and nuclear force deployments that would have the effect of extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new members different from commitments to current members. Moreover, NATO should make no commitments limiting the construction of defense infrastructure or deployment of reinforcements on new member state's territory: nuclear cooperation in the Alliance is governed by the 1964 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic treaty for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information. Furthermore cooperation programmes exists on a bilateral basis between the US and those allies which request participation. The US Congress legislation also states that **no international organization and no non-alliance member**

should gain the authority to review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of Alliance decision-making body, the NAC, and the Senate resolution approving the enlargement also establishes clearly this point. Both House and Senate version of the European Security Act authorize the expenditure of funds for NATO's Partnership for Peace to eligible states, but the House states that the European members of NATO should pay the bulk of the costs of NATO expansion.

But the debate in Senate contained not only a discussion on the NATO enlargement but a debate on the future role of NATO as well. The Republican Senator Richard Lugar established that the debate had ignored the central question of NATO's central purpose. In the same vein of the former NATO General Secretary Manfred Wöerner's words, the Alliance must go out of area or out of business. Still, there were a wide range of different pro and against positions in the Senate toward the enlargement. Some Senate and House members opposed the enlargement or, at least, raised questions on its convenience. Representative Hamilton had expressed concern that the NATO expansion could create a gap between the US commitment in Europe and resources available due to the restructuring of US military after the Bottom-Up Review, overall in conventional forces, relying too heavily this commitment in US strategic nuclear forces: "We expanding dramatically our commitments but dramatically cutting back our capabilities"²³. A group of 20 bipartisan senators headed by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison sent to the President Clinton a letter in June 1997 which stated that the candidate states had greater economic rather military necessities and whether joining the EU instead might be a more stabilizing step for Europe. Senator Warner in the hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 1997, though endorsing NATO viability, expressed concern that the enlargement could weaken public support for NATO itself in the event of a crisis with US casualties in a place where the American public does not perceive US vital interests at risk. But the Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott in March 1997 had already appointed a Senate NATO Observer Group to monitor the enlargement process. The group included 20 members and 8 additional ex-officio members from the leadership of both parties co-chaired by Senator William V. Roth and Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. But the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would hold the hearings and the responsibility to send the treaty amendment to the Senate floor. Senator Jesse Helms chaired the committee and determined the manner in which handles the resolution. Senator Helms' support was not automatic and, during the hearings, he maintained that the Senate work was essentially to fix what was wrong with the Clinton Administration approach. In this vein the resolution approved in the committee stated a set of declarations and conditions for the enlargement:

- The core purpose of NATO must to continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO Members, not peacekeeping, or non-military goals.

- NATO Defense planning, command structure and force goals be centered on ensuring the territorial defense.

- Russia will have neither voice nor veto in NATO decision making; the Permanent Joint Council will be a forum for explaining -not negotiating-NATO policy.

- Extensive consultation is required in the case of changes in the strategic concept of NATO.

- NATO does not require the consent of the United Nations, or any other international organization, to take actions necessary to defend the security interests of its members.

- The US Administration will develop a plan for a NATO ballistic missile defense system to protect Europe.

- The costs of expansion will have a strict limits for US taxpayers; US does not subsidize the national expenses of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and the NATO allies will pay a fair share of the costs.

- The Senate reiterates the constitutionally-based principles of treaty interpretation and the appropriate role of the Senate in the consideration of treaties.

The formal opening of the debate was on October 7, 1997 when the Foreign Relations Committee began the hearings with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and the debate in the Senate floor began in March 1998 after the committee's approval (16-2). But even in the floor still had senators as Robert Smith, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, against the enlargement, supporting a policy to bring Russia into the West and seeing the enlargement as a risk to this policy. For him, there was not a rationale for a quick enlargement because there was not a serious threat to European security and the NATO could be enlarged in this case²⁴.

On April 30, 1998, the Senate approved the Resolution of Ratification on NATO Enlargement by 80-19 vote. The text of the resolution maintains and extends the points established in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's resolution. In the set of conditions exists some very important: the Senate assure its economic control on the US expenditures for payment to the common-funded budgets of NATO with a annual limitation which will not exceed the total of all such payments made by the United States in FY 1998. In regard to the strategic concept and defense planning, the Senate understand that the policy of the United States is the core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO, and the upcoming revision of that document, in this case the 1999 Strategic Concept, will reflect a set of principles addressed in the resolution:

- NATO is first and foremost a military alliance; NATO serves as the principal foundation for

defense the security interests of its members.

- The United States leadership role: the US maintains its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of US combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of US nuclear forces on the territory of Europe.

- The common threats: the potential re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe; rogue states and non-state actors possessing NBC weapons and the means to deliver them.

- Threats to the flow of vital resources and conflicts from ethnic and religious enmity, and actions of undemocratic leaders.

- Defense planning creates a capacity for collective self-defense, which remain the core mission of NATO; capacity to respond to common threats through its military force structure, commands and forces, which promote NATO's capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member is threatened. This will require that NATO members possess national military capacities to deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time and operate jointly with the US in high intensity conflicts.

- NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is a consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members.

- General description of the overall approach to updating the Strategic Concept of NATO.

In Senator Lugar's words, there were two strategic alternatives that could drive the Alliance purpose: one is that NATO be the guarantor of European security, where the main criterion is geography. The other is that NATO serves as the vehicle of the US and Europe to protect their interests wherever challenged. The latter subsumes the first.

- US Strategic culture and the Selective Engagement approach.

Certain US conceptions, due to its history and strategic culture, could be criticized in spite of its relative success after the end of the Cold War²⁵. From the colonization and independence era, the American society is deeply convinced that the world is destined to be governed by the precepts of American liberal democracy, and the victory in 1945 and the Soviet collapse has given the final proof of this superiority²⁶. This feeling and the conquest of a wild and wide territory have infused a great optimism in strategic and national security affairs. Moreover, this process produced an engineering, problem-solving approach and a cult to technology which created a mastery of logistics, but it did not solve its operational and strategic problems in

wars, for instance in the inferiority to the operational skills of German officers in the Second World War. Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that in the US has lacked comprehension toward long-term process, due to the influence of fitting the political and military-technological process to a given geographic situation²⁷. Moreover, it is impossible to undertake a conflict without the support of the American society as Vietnam war showed. From this conflict on, this support demand short, no-casualties and victorious operations, and this has urged the US to a massive use of force, with a tendency to air power which has not the limitations of ground warfare when force have to be used: it is very descriptive the opinion of one of the forefathers of the American way of war, the Union General Sherman: "War is cruelty.....the crueler it is, the sooner it will over". This conception would have his outcome in the World Wars, the SAC conceptions in the 1950s and the air campaigning against Iraq, and this approach has facilitated, despite all existent rethoric, his affinite with the theories of Henry Jomini instead of Clausewitz's, and strengthen the support on technology to the detriment of strategy to approach conflicts²⁸. The absence of a clear and present threat as the Soviet Union highlighted all these problems, because the primacy of the Containment focus allowed to ignore the necessity of other strategic conceptions and modifications in the state-of-art.

This inheritance has generally favored an engineerial and military approach to security instead of diplomacy and strategy. Each problem have a technical solution: what number of air sorties are necessary or calculations of damages produced for different scenarios of nuclear war. The RAND analysis of vulnerability and the precepts of stability have virtually avoided the recognition of the dominant role of policy in war and peace. The strategic studies in the Cold War years, with three central pillars as deterrence, limited war and arms control, was deeply respectful with Clausewitz. However, the elaboration of these pillars have been apolitical due to the trend toward administration rather than to politics²⁹. The final problem has been the indifferency to Strategy and the continental and maritime heritage. Despite the Mahan theories and the US Navy as the world's greatest naval power, the US is neither a natural sea power nor does a maritime perspective dominate its strategic culture. To the contrary, its way has been continentalist: the US can not wage a war unless control the relevant sea lines, it has also inherited the former role of the Royal Navy, and moreover, the value of Europe exacerbated this continentalist vision. However, Mahan theories on maritime strategy did not talk about balance of power politics but rather the linkage between military strategy and global trade, and this influenced on the concepts about a nuclear defensive strategy in its political character, as a strategic defensive navy, but with offensive aspect (tactical and operational offensive capacity of the navy) in regard to the capacities of its doctrines³⁰. But the search of decisive and quick victories does not fit with the slower and indirect approach of maritime control. The Eurocentric approach in the Containment strategy equalled

war with war in Europe in spite of the deployment of military bases around the world which would have allowed a maritime posture. The abundance of resources and its privileged situation, beside weak neighbours and a Europe confident in the Royal Navy's maritime control were an heritage which allowed not to worry about strategy, strenghtening this position the aparence of nuclear weapons: in fact, the tactics and doctrines of nuclear use were enmasked as strategies. Thus, the US did not face the necessity of a strategic thinking until the Korean war: the strategic problems were reduced to the national military capacity and decisive victories, and this conception exposed the strategic weaknesses and carencies, the lack of a clear political management and the erroneus election of a limited war approach for the conflict of Vietnam (instead of a counterinsurgency approach). This use of this conception of a limited war approach was also used in the NATO Flexible Response strategy although the INF treaty broke its funtionality. Evidently, the US strategic culture took advantage of its strong points and avoided its weaknesses, and even NATO worked far better than an assessment of theory might lead one to expect³¹. The problems of conception in a nuclear "strategy" beside the different interests of the Allies produced the sustitution of the Masive Retaliation for the Flexible Response. But this policy was not free of conception, interests and military problems either. These problems showed the dilemmas of the US strategy, but the end of the Cold War permitted to envisage the possibility of creating new visions and agreements on security policy and military forces role. But during this period, certain strategic practices have been maintained and they have been more resistant to change than what one might have expected. The US defense community entered the last decade of the 20th century with the belief in the declining utility of nuclear weapons and the creation of the Regional Strategy fulfilled the aims of containing regional disputes at first priority. But that task it is not easy to translate into identifiable demands for strategy utility. Moreover, US policymakers have embraced the notion that conventional deterrence lacks full strategic integrity in a age of nuclear and other WMD proliferation. And this, beside the preference for (jominian) offensive doctrines and the influence of PGMs and the RMA, have allowed the creation of a new mixed doctrine of counterproliferation, with strategic defensive aims through a set of non-proliferation policies (MTCR) but with large military measures as the deployment of ATM defenses and a counterforce (even pre-emptive) use of conventional missiles systems against possible WMD objectives³².

However, a tendency to strategic limitation in the role of the US exists in some political, military and social sectors which defend a selective engagement focused in US vital strategic areas, favored for the new international environment and the US military planning as JSCP (*Joint Strategy Contingences Planning 1992-95*), DPGSS (*Defense Planning Guidance Scenario Set 1992-1999*), selecting MRCs (*Mayor Regional Conflits*) in Europe, Middle East and Korea, and LRCs (*Lower Regional Conflits*) in Panama and Phillipines

as models, and counterinsurgency and counternarcotrafic operations. This shows that military force will be used in the relations core powers-periphery and periphery-periphery more than the relations within core powers, which will be economic cooperation-competition³³ but this is also a explicit acknowledge of a selective posture in regard to the relative importance of some regions for the US vital interests³⁴. The problem of a selective focus is that it does not really exist a partitioned security. For instance, a case of Indirect Deterrence from a rogue country with WMD and delivery means as missiles to a US allied country in Europe. In this case arms control, non-proliferation and Alliance policy converge, and this problem can not be divided regional or funtionally because affects the US Extented Deterrence and its posture as global guarantor. The selective approach is funtional in military strategy or doctrine but it is not for security policy or global strategic postures. This view has affected the position of Europe in the US strategic landscape³⁵.

1.2 The role of Europe in the US global policy: partner and competitor in Euroasia.

From the "Eurocentric" focus of the NSC 68's Containment strategy until the end of the Cold War, Western Europe was the top priority for United States Foreign and Security Policy. The importance of Europe was of a different order from that of any part of the world and for much of the the Cold War there was a coincidence of economic, political, and cultural affinities and values, and these values underpinned common security interests, producing a long period of stability for the European region. The most profound of this interests was countering the Soviet military and ideological threat which created a common security culture during many decades: this culture still plays a mayor role in sustaining the US-Europe security relationship. But the setting of the Soviet threat is diluting this culture and institutional memories, and besides this, greater threats and real competitive interests have grown in other regions: these dangers for the US strategic interests are in the Middle East and East Asia. The threats and dangers in the post-Cold War world lay outside of North Atlantic area: regional conflict, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, threats to economic wealthfare and the failure of democratic reform in the former Soviet Union. Despite this, a mayor European contingency is maintained in the US Defense Planning during the Bush and Clinton Administration with the capacity to fight two mayor regional conflicts almost simultaneously and unilaterally if needs be³⁶. On the Middle East, the US has "enduring interests", which include "assuring the security of Israel and our Arab Allies, and keeping the flow of oil at reasonable prices"³⁷. East Asia is now the focus of the intelectual defense community in the US: Japan and China are seen as potential superpower competitors and regional rivals operating in a regional environment of high economic growth, rapid social changes, deep and historical fears and no multilateral security framework.

American interests in and policy towards Europe is now just an element of Washington's global policy. Europe's primary value to the United States in the contemporary world is to provide moral and practical support to United States global policy: in the event of a major regional conflict, the US will look to its close Western European allies for a collective, multilateral effort. But if Western Europe do not assist the US, Washington will act unilaterally and then the European allies would then be diminished further in American's eyes. From the US point of view, it is in the interest of Europe to support the United States: conflicts are very damaging to the whole developed world. Europe will always be a leading political, economic and strategic interest of US foreign policy but now, despite Bosnia and Kosovo, is not a top-security concern as Middle East and East Asia: the conflicts in the Balkans, Georgia and Chechnya are viewed as peripheral to US central strategic concerns, and the same can be said of the perspectives of these conflicts from many European capitals. The conflicts will be important in regard with their disruption on the Atlantic Alliance because, for the US, UK and Germany, the permanence of NATO is central for their interests: UK has tried to maintain the special relationship with the US since the end of the Cold War; Germany created a "Partnership in Leadership" with US during the reunification process due to its security interests and its reassuring strategy toward their neighbours in Central and East Europe; and the US designed, from the Bush Administration, a strategy to maintain NATO as the core of their involvement and its strategic and political interests in Europe. And albeit there is a real reduction in the US military commitment in Europe, this still exceeded the US troops deployed in the Middle East and East Asia combined. But Europe is now less a subject than a partner with a strategic value for the flexibility and adaptability of the US forces in addressing the American national interests: US European Command area of responsibility includes not only Europe, but parts of the Caucasus, the most of Africa and Middle East, but essentially, the US security commitment to Europe is not only valued for its own sake as during the Cold War, but for what it can do for US global strategic policy. At the end of the Cold War, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin Powell created the Atlantic Force concept during the restructuring of the US Armed Forces under the Base Force Plan. This Atlantic Force means forces across the Atlantic, that is, on the European side of the ocean but not exclusively for use in Europe: the concept also incorporates the Middle East and South-West Asia. Powell saw heavy and very mobile US forces addressing not merely NATO European functions but national security missions in these other areas. Powell thought that European acceptance of this role for US forces and the European tolerance of the training required for it, was crucial to US Congress and public opinion acceptance of the maintaining of a rather high defense budget and US military forces in Europe after the end of the Soviet threat. European maintenance of its own force levels was also important to sustain the American will to deploy across the

Atlantic.

But Europe have a major role in US global strategy because of Eastern Europe. The DPG 1994-1999 stated that:

"Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This...requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power....Our strategy must now refocus on **precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor**".

This paragraph means a robust geostrategic Mckinder-style vision and respond to the Selective Primacy strategy. This posture is repeated in the 1998 NSSD:

"The United States will not allow a hostile power **to dominate any region of critical importance to our interests**"³⁸

From this point of view the enlargement of NATO responds to a global strategic objective: if we follow the Mckinder dictum, we obtain the answer:

- Who rules Eastern Europe commands the *Heartland* (Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia)
- Who rules the *Heartland* commands the *World Island* (Eurasia)
- Who rules Eurasia commands the World.

This dictum and other principles were the background of the internationalism of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan, and the Containment strategy, and it was maintained through the Cold War: the main objective of Containment, but not the unique³⁹, was to avoid the control of the Euroasian landmass by the Soviet Union through the neglectment of the control of the Heartland building peripheric alliances in the "rimland" with Great Britain, Germany, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Japan (and China during the Nixon-Kissinger years):the United States' most basic national security interests would be endangered if a hostile state or group of states were to dominate the Euroasian landmass⁴⁰.

The enlargement of NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program not only respond to the necessities of the intra-European security but to the US global policy, being one of the major reason (geostrategic objective) to maintain the Atlantic Alliance and the Transatlantic Link. Moreover, it responds to two points: to the rethoric of enlargement of democratic countries which was created in the Bush

Administration and the Clinton Administration stated in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, and to the Primacy strategy as an extension of Stability and to the Cooperative Security concept of indivisible security. First, for the European security, NATO enlargement permits to reassure the European security and the transatlantic link: Central and Eastern European countries assure finally their position between Russia and Germany and seen this enlargement as the premise of the future membership in the European Union; Germany reassure these countries with the presence of US and NATO, and spreads stability in one of his strategic areas; and the US introduces three "Atlantist" countries to support his policies in Europe. Secondly, from a global view, this enlargement neglects the possibility of the control over Eastern Europe to a possible new threatening Russia. Moreover, the extension of PfP to the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia permits to cooperate with these countries, avoiding a future threat from Russia or China. The PRC is very interested in the oil of Central Asia and claims that Kazakhstan and other former soviet republics are his natural area of interest and expansion⁴¹. This area will be the "Euroasian Balkans", and we will probably see the reemergence of the "Great Game" in this area as it was played by Great Britain and Russia in the XIX century⁴². In fact, in October 1998, US has expanded the USEUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) to the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and the former three countries from the Caucasus and the former Central Asia soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kirguizistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are members of the PfP. These latter will be included within USCENTCOM AOR in October 1999.

China, Japan and the most of the Asian countries depends on the Persian Gulf oil. In November 1993 China became a net importer of oil, and, although its consumption is far from Japan's or the US's and, in spite of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the dependence will deepen in the future since its industrial and automotive production is growing further. Despite the efforts to diversificate the oil supplies from different sources and places, it still, and much longer, depends on oil from Great Middle East. China appears to have huge reserves in the Tarim Basin in the Xinjiang province but it seems very difficult to extract and it would be necessary an intensive inversion in pipelines, roads and communications. Even with a major foreign assistance any change in short or medium term is little probably, at least beyond 2020, and the same limitations can be said about the prospections offshore in East and South China Seas. A dynamic China and Asia will become increasingly depend on the Great Middle East oil: now East Asian countries import 70% of the oil from Middle East; in 2000 this cifre will be 87%, and it will reach 95% in 2020; the numbers for China will be a million barrels per day in 2000, 3 million by 2010 and more than 7 million barrels in 2015⁴³. This also can mean a competition between China and Japan for oil and the control of sea-lines in order to protect the

supplies. This could fuel the aspirations of China to develop a blue-water fleet with aircraft carriers capable of force projection in South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Indian Ocean and beyond, producing a probable arms race and naval spiral with Japan and other countries, even Europeans if the US Navy does not maintain its maritime superiority and the protection of Greater Middle East and the maritime oil routes. Moreover, China has increased its relations with Iran and Iraq with significant arms transfers. This arrival of China to the Middle East means a possible risk for Europe due to the dependence of European countries from this oil: Europe imports from Middle East 85% of its consumption, however, the US imports less than 10% (Venezuela, Mexico, Canada supply more than twice as much oil to the US as the Arab OPEC countries)⁴⁴.

This Asian and European dependence from Middle East oil have also push both to search alternatives as natural gas and other zones of supplies as the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Caspian Sea could be an important alternative source of oil and, especially, gas for China, Japan and even for Europe. But the interests of Russia, Turkey and the US are very important there⁴⁵. The return of the United States toward Caucasus from 1994 is a consequence of economic and geopolitical factors: In one hand, the high actionarial participation of US oil companies as BP-Amoco, Unocal, Penzoil in the deal on the Azerbaijan oil and the inversion of Chevron in Kazakhstan⁴⁶. In the other hand, some states in the area as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan had the will to resist the Russian pressures, and others as Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan, wanted to explore the oportunities to cooperate with Western countries. These two aspects allowed the US to further its presence in the region, and to avoid a Russian-Iranian influence co-sphere in the Caucasus and Central Asia and to control the penetration of Chinese interests through Iranian companies in the Caspian and in Kazakhstan This also means to support the independence of Azerbaijan, the attraction of Georgia and Armenia and the total support to the position of Turkey. This strategy obtained the sintony between the geopolitical and economic interests although the decision on Iran embargo in 1995 broke the possibilities of maintaining this policy, even afecting the transatlantic relations due to European oil companies occupied the place of Americans in Iran. This miopy of the Dual Containment policy on Iraq and Iran and the incapacity of the Clinton Administration to control the position of the congressional supporters of the Armenian lobby (anti-turkish and anti-azerbaijan) and the support of the Greek lobby. In this situation Iraq have not to be forget because its another source of transatlantic tensions because of the close of the Iraq pipeline which produced enormeus losses to Turkey, but, at the same time, the European countries do not follow the US policy, with Russia and France ahead, to restablish positions in the oil negotiations with Iraq. The Dual Containment Policy have produced the reprochement of Iran and Iraq, to place Turkey in a very difficult

position and the break of the transatlantic solidarity because of the unilateralism of the US in its approach. The problem is that the EU have a low profile policy there, and due to the less weight of the EU and the US in the Transcaucasus, a coordination is very important to develop a joint economic and geopolitical strategy in the area.

III. THE ROLE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN THE US-EU RELATIONS: THE MEANING OF NATO INTERNAL CHANGES AND ENLARGEMENT.

After the Cold War, the alliance between the US and Western Europe could seem unnecessary, and therefore the Atlantic Alliance. From International Relations theory and from the point of view of neorealists as Kenneth Waltz, it would be the opposite: the importance of alliances is minor in a bipolar world than in a multipolar one because the superpowers dominance make them unnecessary for their security. However, Waltz established the future vanishing of NATO in spite of the rising multipolarity⁴⁷. But Pr. Waltz was right in one thing: the Cold War NATO was not to survive because the changing regional and global interests of the US would make that the NATO have to change in order to keep the organization with more and different ends than before: the Alliance is a different organization with a more important political role, different missions in which collective defense is more residual, nuclear deterrence is less important and Forward Defense is not necessary. Now it exists a greater importance in the Article IV issues, an out-of-area approach, operational doctrines instead of deterrence doctrines, mobile and flexible troops (CJTF) and power projection, intelligence and technological superiority and Stealth air forces as projected in the first Base Force and the Regional Defense Strategy studies. But, in this sense, the reorganization, reduction and modernization of US Forces has been achieved lacking a defense policy in strategic questions on the use of force's role and the relationship defense-foreign policy: it exists a greater interest on the aspects of budget design and management, and forces level. Assertive Multilateralism tried to develop a coherent strategy but produces internal contradictions between its conception and the military structure that have to endorse it, and at the same time, upsets foreign policy: Bottom-Up Review structure on force level versus

security interests ratio. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) does not change very much this situation: the QDR announced additional cuts of 50-60,000 active troops, however the US forces remained responsible for defending America, Europe, Middle East and East Asia including peacekeeping operations around the globe. These contradictions affects European security not only because of the role of U.S in European affairs but because the NATO military reform adopts a joint strategy, military doctrine, forces structure and budget considerations according to the Regional Defense Strategy planning and Forward Presence concept developed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1989. Meanwhile the NATO European members have also reduced their armed forces as fast as the US and from a much smaller base: from 1990 to 1995 the European defense budgets fell at an average of 4.4%.⁴⁸. The QDR addresses as a situation of strategic opportunity the current international situation within a general evaluation of the US military posture, outlining the military requirements of the United States for the the next two decades and emphasizing that the US armed foeces must take measures to "shape the international security enviroment" in ways which favor "US interests"⁴⁹. In one hand, the QDR raises some strategic concepts which are framed in a conception of Primacy strategy: the main characteristic of the current world is rapid change therefore the US must stay ahead of change in order to protect US security; the stature of the US in the world is unparalleled and must take the necessary steps to favor the spread of its political ideals and to assure the economic prosperity throughout the world. However, the QDR does not disscus the implications of these propositions: it defines the goals but do not conect the ends with the means. It maintains certain proactive policies approach in order to take steps to counter potential dangers, but the QDR concieves US foreign policy objetives in a reactive way, static policy and short-term analysis⁵⁰. In the other hand, we see the use of military in this strategic framework in order to influence in the implementation of US security policy. The armed forces' mission on "shaping the international environment" is dangerous: they do not have the authority to form alliances, issue declarations on US commitmens and policies. Security Policy is inseparable from diplomacy, economics and national goals. Moreover, it has some questions without clear position as operational problems, what use of forces, rules of engagement, low-intensity conflicts.

Afterly, the National Defense Panel reviewed the QDR and issued a report titled "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21th century", which specified the geopolitical trends that may lead to future challenges for US statecraft. But the report offers a partial attempt to address the problems; it focus on policies, institutions and capabilities of the US national security apparatus, not the ways in which the US might

use that framework to establish the American place in the world⁵¹. The problem is that the asymmetries between foreign policy and defense policy, and the budget and forces reductions made in terms of planning and budget and not following strategic necessities, produce the upsetting in the implementation of security policy. This issues beside the role of Congress and the conceptions of Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the implementation of a Limited War approach, as Kosovo crisis showed, are producing more tensions between both Atlantic sides innecessarily.

The "Responsability Sharing" is a serious concept for the US political establishment and included not only the classical concept of burden-sharing but also alliance support, foreign aid, peacekeeping and anti-proliferation measures. This concept exists in the Joint US-EU Action Plan within the Objective I "Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development around the World": the point third is "Sharing responsibility in other regions of the world". In fact, both concepts are related to joint action in global affairs and not limited to burden-sharing associated with host-nation support for forward-deployed US forces during the Cold War in Europe. Responsibility Sharing is a concept for extra-European security although is also related to intra-European security through military burden-sharing and no and anti-proliferation policies within NATO⁵². NATO is Washington's preferred vehicle for Responsibility Sharing. At the end of the Cold War, overall during the negotiations of the German reunification, the Bush Administration manoubrered to preserve NATO as the transatlantic institutional link, the center of the European security and the vehicle of influence in Europe. And the Clinton Administrations have maintained this posture: even a little eurocentric official as former Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in his memories that the heart of the US European policy is the strengthening of NATO⁵³. Since the end of the Cold War, the US objective in Europe was to avoid the erosion of the NATO central role in the European security, supporting the European efforts on the CFSP and WEU but avoiding to undermine the role of NATO and the US in the European security; Central and Eastern Europe countries would be integrated in the Western institutions (Democratic Enlargement principle). This is consistent with two situations: first, the US Policy in order to the spread and enlargement of Stability: this process have not only to be the result of the instalation of military forces but also because of the complete integration into the Euro-atlantic sphere; second, the US-Germany relations and agreements after the Reunification. The German interest in this area is logic and natural. Germany seeks Eastern European stability through economic stability and the enlargement of his economic influency thanks to the membership in the EU of these countries, but at the same time, Germany reassures his neighbours keeping the US military

presence, and supporting their membership in NATO. But besides these two situations, the US beared in mind the possibility of a Germany looking for this expansion out of these institutions: former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that "the German would be too strong for the confort and safety of our European allies;....the Germans can be brought into the West if the West includes the United States. They cannot safely be brought into the West if the West does not include the United States"⁵⁴. Thus, although it seems an overextension of the Atlantic Alliance commitments, the enlargement of NATO is consistent with the US strategy of maintaining the stability and avoiding a independent German foreign policy in order to get a more or less hegemonic position in Europe out of EU and NATO. The regional dimension of this strategy is as clear as in the Middle East. There, the US sustains a different presence as extraregional power with support from his bases in Europe but the regional aspect is consistent with a global conception: avoiding the rise of a regional challenger help to avoid the rise of a global challenger.

From this point of view, the US strategy in order to maintain this presence in Europe is to build a consensus on the principles and objetives with the major powers to projet it on a defined institutional security structure/framework: this means the use of a co-optive power in the sense of setting the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express⁵⁵. This kind of power, a indirect power, along the US military presence compensate the relative lost of power of US due to the diffusion of power to the world markets. Following this pattern, a priority objetive is to maintain the international stability throughout political stability and security and a crisis prevention system have to be establish, adopting characters of the Cooperative Security concept⁵⁶. This approach established that the peace and security are indivisible in order to avoid a threat to stability: it exists an strategic interdependence and thus the international institutions, as NATO, are a central mechanism to face this task since a collective security system can not achieve alone. But all this approach have to contradictories ways: first, this can produce a real overextension in NATO commitments since his area of action, functional and geographical, expands, and at the same time, it creates a whole series of policies toward the security risks from a point of view of strategic flexibility, above all, the non proliferation measures and arms control: these mechanisms depends on collective action and this may strengthen international organizations. Taking in account these factors, NATO would accomplish these objetives: the expansion to East Europe satysfices the Cooperative Security concept as the indivisibility of Security as well as the Primacy concept as the expansion of stability. But it would seem dangerous to establish the bedrock of the security system only under the premises of arms control and international institutions: the system could finally have the same problems that of a collective security system regarding free-raiders and rogue states, and in the democratic states exists a public opinion which have to give its

approval to intervene in a very wide set of possible scenarios or conflicts⁵⁷.

The rationale for NATO expansion presented by the DOD is established in the report from the Pentagon "Report to the Congress on Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications"⁵⁸. This rationale is not military but political. Since the period of the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon and the JCS made its own assessments on the impact of the Soviet threat demise, taking advantage of the slowness of administration in answering the question of a new strategy for Post Cold War United States. CJCS General Powell and the JCS created the Base Force and the Regional Strategy not only with a military rationale, restructuring of armed forces, but with a political one as to avoid an excessive reduction postCold War taking in mind his own political analysis of the future security environment⁵⁹. The strengthening of the CJCS as the principal military counselor of the President of the United States, his membership in the National Security Council, the use of the Joint Staff for the JCS own assessments and guidances, thanks to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, means an important voice from military in policy-making at the political highest level. In fact, the JCS anticipated the rest of the administration in establishing a strategy, establishing the path of the US defensive posture after the Cold War. But this posture included certain political and strategic considerations. Any political objectives of the administration would be better fulfilled for a political and economic organization in nature as the EU but the Pentagon has said that it would be unwise to delay NATO enlargement until EU expands: if we accept a point of view on intra-European security, the delay "would unnecessarily postpone measures that are worthwhile and *possible today*, and it would diminish America's voice in current efforts to build the security of the Euro-Atlantic region"⁶⁰. This would mean to lost the period of strategic opportunity stated in the QDR. But if we see the whole picture, taking in account the Euroasian perspective which we see before, then the measure of enlargement is a logic consequence. The final proof is the 1999 New Strategic Concept and its creation of an "Euro-Atlantic area of security".

The 1996 announcement that, by 1999, in the NATO's 50th anniversary, the first group of countries would be invited to join NATO has been exactly and in time accomplished. Yet, there were some points take in account but with no possibilities of avoiding the enlargement: alienation of Russia; inter-state frictions between new members and the countries that will be left out; and fueling the defense budgets and introducing advanced weapons to new and potential members, in a moment of shrinking military spending and economic restructuration in the whole Europe. The issue of Russia has been widely studied and established a set of reasons against the enlargement⁶¹. Instead, NATO and Russia signed on May 27, 1997 the Founding Act on

Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. The act established a joint council for consultation on security issues and NATO assured Russia that it had no intention of deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of any of its new members. the joint council can discuss anything from drug trafficking to nuclear defense strategy, but neither Russia nor NATO will have any right of veto over the actions of the other. The Pentagon has estimated that NATO expansion would cost \$27 to \$35 billion over the next 10 years and has assumed that Washington's share would be about \$200 millions a year. The RAND Corporation estimated the probable cost at \$30 to 52 billion. and the Congressional Budget Office CBO, has predicted the cost as high as \$125 billion⁶²: Hungary announced a 22% increase in defense expenditure for 1997; Poland and Czech Republic stated that by 2002 should double its defense expending. Other problems come from a possible perception of a renewed nuclearisation in NATO from Russia. Despite the Study on NATO Enlargement states that there is a no a priori requirement for a change in the Alliance posture and the statement of Secretary General Javier Solana on "we see no need and have no plans to change our current nuclear deployment", new members as the Czech Republic altered its constitution to allow for nuclear deployment on its territory.

But the debate on the enlargement of NATO goes along with the problem of proliferation, the NATO Mediterranean Initiative, and the Mediterranean Dialogue which have a 16 (19) +1 framework with a selection of six countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This initiative improves the relations between both shores of the Mediterranean, and the creation of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group in the Madrid Summit in 1997, places at a higher lever the importance of cooperation and dialogue with these countries, but it is limited in scope and framework Still, it exists a difference of perceptions in the problems in both shores, and a difference on the way of facing this relations within NATO allies: even in the creation of EUROMARFOR and EUROFOR as forces assigned to WEU, there were perceptions in North African countries of seeing these forces as a measure against their countries, but not as a mean to strenghten the European military cooperation and capacities without the concurse of the US means. Thus, it exists an asymmetry in the definition of risks and priorities in both sides and even within the NATO side⁶³. However, from the US point of view, an iniciative toward the Mediterranean has to be seen in the context of a wider area inside this new Euroasian approach: it exists a new line of strategic importance from Gibraltar (West Mediterranean) to Central Asia (Turkey, Caucasus, Transcaucasus, Capian Sea, Kazakhstan and other Central Asia's republics). The factors of interdependence from Southern Europe to Caspian Sea area increase in regard to the communications and the importance of Mediterranean ports and pipelines as routes of energy transport. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in November 1995 covers the problem of stability through the economic relations and cooperation, overall in North Africa, including a non-military

approach toward EuroMediterranean security. The EU approach to the problem of security and stability in the Mediterranean is focused in cooperation because the perceptions and the risks for the European countries, overall the Southern European countries, are centered on migration flows, cultural misperception and rising of fundamentalism, and economic destabilization, but it has also criticized as insufficient in some aspects, including the necessity of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Confidence Building Security Measures (CBSM's) and a Stability Pact in the Mediterranean⁶⁴. However, from a European point of view and the necessities of the relations with the Mediterranean's South shore countries, the focus of Barcelona Declaration on an enlarged security concept is a solid base to face the North-South risks and challenges. This created an asymmetry between this approach and that of NATO.

The 1991 New Strategic Concept established a distorted image of existing risks and challenges in the Mediterranean, overall Western and Central Mediterranean (except Libya). The NATO agenda and the missions of AFSOUTH is a big one in regard to risks and challenges but also in extra-Mediterranean countries but with capacity of destabilization in the Mediterranean. From this wide scope, the role of AFSOUTH and the US VI Fleet is very important. For US military, the Mediterranean is one of the "Hottest Spots" in the world. Strategic and military, in the Greater Mediterranean-Middle East, the US Navy has a key role. The European Allies, overall France, have discussed the maintenance of the AFSOUTH under US command in the discussions on the NATO new command structure. From the point of view of a greater role of Europeans in the new structure as a new balance between European and American participation, a strengthened European pillar and an important step in the creation of a ESDI, this posture was very important for intra-European considerations. But the wider focus of US position, the formidable VI Fleet resources are paramount in this strategy. The AFSOUTH commander, Admiral Joseph Lopez stated that the Southern Region of Europe and *its periphery* have emerged from the Cold War as the area of NATO's most serious challenges. For him, this "periphery" means to expand the AFSOUTH AOR to the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia), Caspian Sea Region and even Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan⁶⁵. This means that Southern Region is NATO's bottom line from south to east as a whole, and the US point of view support a forward presence and forward engagement as influence, prevention and deterrence. From this point of view, a wider scope of the NATO Mediterranean Initiative respond to a Greater Mediterranean-Middle East area context, and this vision include hard security aspects in a wider sense than a Mediterranean North-South relation: the expansion of lines for gas and oil could create new opportunities of cooperation as well as potential conflicts, and the WMD proliferation⁶⁶. This lines across Cascasus to Eastern Mediterranean, from Irak to Turkish coast area make this zone a key point for energy trade and energy security concern. Futher, this possibilities offer new links

of transport from Central Asia, Iran and Turkey to Europe. But the greater Mediterranean periphery of Europe, from Morocco to Pakistan, contains a major concentration of proliferation risks. The RAND study on NATO Mediterranean Initiative acknowledges this fact, introducing a transregional dimension in its focus and linking it with the problem of the spread of WMD and delivery means proliferation, albeit this problem contains risks in a South-South relations as well as in a North-South scope. This situation makes difficult to deal with this problem in the context of NATO Mediterranean Initiative. A different situation would be the existence of effective WMD delivery systems in some countries of this area in the case of an Persian Gulf War-style intervention. But it is true the conclusion that the future security challenges will come from the periphery and especially from the Greater Mediterranean-Middle East, especially as Europe and this area become more interdependent⁶⁷.

IV. THE EU AFTER AMSTERDAM AND THE 1999 NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT*

*this point was updated and modified for the crisis in Kosovo.

- The EU Amsterdam Summit of 1997.

The EU is not ahead along US in *hard* and *soft* powers, and in this way is difficult to establish a Partnership in Leadership. The EU needs to improve these areas and to get European comparative advantages to offer. To strengthen the European Union's Common foreign and Security policy (CFSP) was one of the fundamental aims of the 1996 IGC. The Treaty on European Union has been extremely tentative in its approach. In article B: "in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy". This position was exacerbated in 1995 by the accession of three new members with a strong "neutral" posture as Austria, Finland and Sweden. Moreover, the progress made in the area of Foreign Policy and the second pillar of Maastricht were the product of ad hoc arrangements during the Bosnia war under the NATO control. One of the purposes of a CFSP should be to assure that NATO will not again sign a agreement that ignores in many cases the EU: this tendency of the US is inherited from Cold War and has its most important proof in the Founding Act between Russia and NATO signed in Paris the 27th May 1997. The necessity to link the widening and enlargement of the two organizations has never been so important, but, however, the lack of the necessary means in the Amsterdam Treaty and political will among some EU member states did not provide the tools to create a joint strategy.

The IGC had spent too much time dealing with how to articulate an European identity in international affairs and this probably frustrated to focus on the purpose of a EU common foreign policy: in the new Article

J.1 of the Amsterdam Treaty the only new goal is to safeguard the territorial integrity of the EU. The lack of an external challenge, as the Gulf War in 1990, to push harder on CFSP in the IGC made that the discussion was driven by domestic positions rather than by international pressures. The conclusion was to devote the negotiation more to procedures than to substance of the CFSP. The new Article J.2 establish important differences in decision-making between defining principles, deciding common strategies and adopting common positions and joint actions: unanimity in the European Council for common strategies and qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers for joint actions. The most significant change is the invitation to the Commission to join the discussion on joint actions (Article J.4(4)) but if the Commission cannot break a deal, the arbitration or final decisions will be taken at European Council level. But in order to facilitate decisions, constructive abstention has been enhanced in the treaty, and probably in the future it will be used with a wide range of possibilities and issues. The Article J. 13 permits a great flexibility to Member States to opt out of a majority decision and to a group of states commanding a third of the votes in the Council to stop a common policy initiative. However, although possible, it will be very difficult this "defection" by one of the small countries. The joint action also are under uncertainty because of the ad hoc funding arrangements which will be provided for participating members in the joint action but not for the EU budget.

The Amsterdam Summit of June 1997 has been designed in part to improve the security mechanism created in Maastricht. France and Germany, with the support from Spain, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece, put forward a proposal for a timetable for gradual merger of the EU and WEU. The project was stopped by Great Britain and the neutral states. All that could be agreed instead was an unspecified commitment: to enhance cooperation between the two organizations, EU members that are not members of the WEU could participate in some WEU activities, and that an EU-WEU merger could take place "should the European Council so decide". Thus, the right of member states to continue to block a WEU-EU merger was preserved. The essentially civilian character of the EU is preserved although a compromise was achieved in certain points: an analysis and planning framework has been created; the WEU Declaration of Petersberg tasks -crisis management, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations- have been written in the Treaty but the own WEU is not subsumed and there were a compromise solution to satisfied the position of the U.K toward the reaffirmation of the EU commitment to NATO; the Petersberg Tasks were written on terms acceptable to neutrals as Sweden, Austria, Finland and Ireland; and France maintained the eventual merger of the two organizations in the future (Article J.7(1)). This situation put European efforts to enhance military cooperation and leverage around WEU and a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. The creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), a multinational actualization of the US Task Forces concept and

Joint Doctrine consequence, would allow coalitions and European military actions without the participation of the rest of the Alliance. The rapprochement of France to NATO after the prospects of a ESDI seemed to give to Europeans a greater role within the Alliance. The 1996 Berlin NAC meeting established the basic principles of CJTF: the Alliance accepted the possibility of creating CJTF led by the WEU, even drawing on NATO and US assets. But the EU ability to back its diplomacy with force remains limited. Moreover, as the conceptions and NATO role expands, the defense budgets in Europe shrink as well as in the US case. The reduction of troops and professionalization are very important, but these efforts lack a set of policies in order to build necessary capacities as air/sealift, and a continuing improvement of intelligence means: a European military capacity to conduct medium-scale out of area operations means a cost of \$18-49 billions besides the creation of a satellite intelligence systems (\$9-25 billions)⁶⁸. Looking at the possible scenarios for European military use, we can see three major situations: a European contingency, and Afro-Arab case, and Asian scenario, and the capacity to carry out operations would acceptable in a case of Afro-Arab contingency but in case of an Asian scenario the problems to project power globally limited the operations to a capacity to support UN peacekeeping operations⁶⁹. The lack of global projection and the capacity to back European diplomacy with force also lies in the unwillingness of European governments in supporting its costs and the development of each country's own interests. This condemns Europe to a parochianism very dangerous in an international scene under processes of globalization and interdependence, and Europe must define its identity, not in opposition to the US but projecting externally what is. The weight of Europe and what Europe is will be most important in a long-term than it does in the policy realm due to its potential global power: EU/Europe is in a situation analogous to that of the United States in the late 1800s⁷⁰. The problem with this dichotomy is that it exists a perception of EU squizophrenia: the US looks to the actions of the EU, not to its search of identity. With the end of the Cold War, European states will have to reflect anew on their goals, their internal organization, and the role they see for themselves in a world increasingly concerned with global problems, also facing the value change in Western society during this ideological struggle, the perception of the public after Maastricht of the consequences that the EU has in their own lives, and the Samuel Huntington's approach to civilizations clash creates a context for the search of Europe's position in the world.

The EU articulates this situation through three conducting issues: the Economic and Monetary Union, the institutional reform and the future enlargement, and with reform and political will, the EU could develop into a more substantial global military actor. The admitted failure in Bosnia pushed to EU countries to further EU integration in foreign policy. Yet the outcome of the IGC and the Amsterdam treaty seems extremely limited, plagued by the same divisions among the members states present at Maastricht and before. The EU

Commission assessment was that the aim of a substantial improvement had not been achieved in spite of the establishment of 25 common positions and joint actions: From Libya to Yugoslavia in economic relations; common policies toward Ukraine, Rwanda, Angola and East Timor; and joint actions on South African and Russian elections, aid plan for Palestinian Authority, Bosnia and the administration of Mostar; supporting a indefinite extension of NPT, the biological and chemical weapons convention, and negotiating and implementing the Balladur Plan or Stability Pact in Eastern Europe⁷¹. In fact, a priority areas exist for the EU since the European Council of Lisbon in 1992: first, Central and Eastern Europe, particularly former Soviet Union and the Balkans; secondly, the Mediterranean, particularly the Maghreb and the Middle East. These priority zones were determined by factors of important common interests: geographic proximity, political and economic stability, and threats to the EU security interests. For these zones, the EU should define specific objectives in order to determinate the issues in which could carry out common actions. These common actions must be considered a mean to carry out the EU objectives establish in Maastricht Treaty's article B. The problem in a short and medium term is the inward orientation and lacks the external approach that have characterized the US (even British and French) approaches to foreign policy, although this situation is not surprising in view of Germany's experiences. The focus of Germany toward Central and Eastern Europe is logic, as France, Spain and Italy approach to North Africa. But in the medium-long term, the periphery to this areas will rise as the main concern for the EU foreign policy: the Greater Mediterranean-Middle East. The problem is the lack of a vision of the area as a whole, but with different necessities and approaches as the Barcelona Conference process, the EU role in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, the strategy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia, and finally the new approach to China. Certainly, the Caucasus is not a strategic priority per se for the EU, but it recognise the importance of the Caspian Sea Basin⁷² and even the EU issued joint statements with the US in the 1998 US-EU Summit in London on the Caspian energy issues, supporting the INOGATE and TRACECA EU programs and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. In regard to Asia, the EU has develop a new strategy toward China from 1994. The EU's main objective is for China to be integrated rapidly and fully into international community, both politically and economically, supporting the process of reform underway in China. The bilateral relations and multilateral meetings as the ASEM (Asia-Europa Meeting) are supported by a set of agreements with China in a wide range of issues, but two seem very important in a bilateral sense: the energy issue and the technology and investment. The 1994 European Council of Essen endorsed a new Asian Strategy in order to enhance the profile of the EU in Asia⁷³. In terms of cooperation the EU and China have created in November 1996, a EC-China Energy working group to strenghten and co-ordinate the co-operation between the two sides. This group is established in order to

creating the conditions to facilitating the presence of EU energy companies in China which will allow developed and diversificate its sources of oil and gas without a dependence from US and British companies. At the same time there is a great EU investment in China and permits the flows of technology. Despite this, the trade deficit with China in 1998 was of Eur 23 billion⁷⁴.

However, the internal tendencies in the European governments and in Brussels are isolationism and disengagement. Despite the declaratory policy in 1997 and 1998 and their multilateral decisions, there is a gap between this declaratory policy and behaviour, and the policies and carried out actions engage close areas with vital relevance to European security and economic interest, but not some traditional areas of action and interests: for instance, future free trade agreements with Mercosur has been put in risk for French presidential electoral problems; even the ASEM summit had not a great importance, including to the media in this perception. The internal problems and the process of EMU creation push toward an introspective focus: Germany and France have to deal with the structural unemployment and the immigration; the adaptation of the EU members to the Maastricht criteria in order to achieve a place in the monetarian union and the creation of the Euro; and the perspective of the EU enlargement intensifies the necessity of reforming the CAP and the discussion of the Agenda 2000.

The European Union, as the United States, has a set of possibilities to focus its strategic aims in the future, and the necessity of a strategic approach to global affairs in medium-long term. This election would not be an elimination of possibilities but a continuum, a process from a more inward posture to an internationalist approach. In a short-term, the EU is involve in structural changes in a wide range of economic and political issues. This does not mean a short of isolationism but it can contribute to the US perception of withdrawal of common tasks and common interests areas with the United States: it can exists partial withdrawal or less interests in certain areas and issues but keeping engage in global affairs. The most dangerous perception and current process is the tendency to rise the trade flows among EU members and EU's partners to the detriment of international trade. This posture is similar to a Selective Engagement-minus approach. The Selective Engagement-plus would be a stronger commitment with certain contiguous areas of the EU as the Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, but avoiding enlargement to the Greater Middle East-Central Asia. This means a conditioning to functional issues in certain security issues as non-proliferation and other military matters, favouring approaches as Barcelona Conference process or agreements and process of EU membership in Eastern Europe: in this vein it would be problematic a Cooperative Security approach to security issues. However, if in a medium-long term, the EU is able to achieve its aims in regard to deepen the integration and enlarge the EU, and an internal agreement of global positions and the role of the EU in

world affairs, it will be able to develop a regional strategy to approach global issues. This strategy has the same limitations than in the US case: globalization and the rise of other major powers. Nevertheless, a regional approach supported by interdependence among states could lessen the effects of globalization, and it would facilitate a US perception of EU responsibility, responsibility sharing and a joint approach to common strategic problems and interests. But the premise in this latter approach is the conviction that neither the US nor even an enlarged EU can face alone the world issues and the cooperation is more necessary than ever. The problem is that this possibility is always weakened by the lack of political will in crisis as Kosovo, and the US wider approach and the Selective Primacy of the US in security affairs.

2. The NATO Washington Summit of 1999.

This advantage has created a NATO almost-global role with the 1999 New Strategic Concept. Neither the global necessities of the US will wait to the slow development of EU internal affairs nor the quick development of world affairs will permit a halt to take breath. The New Strategic Concept is a *de facto* use of Article IV of the Treaty of Washington to change the role of the Atlantic Alliance: in fact, in spite of that NATO maintains the collective defense role, the most important objective for NATO will be to defend the interests of its members: in the point 4 of the Introduction says that "The Alliance has an indispensable role in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges..... It must safeguard common security interests"⁷⁵. Afterly, it establishes the two other main objectives of the Alliance: collective defense and to reinforce the transatlantic link. This is a logic evolution of the Alliance nature and role in the new international environment. In the 1991 Strategic Concept the juridical problem was the extension of the NATO role, but instead of using Article V, the base would be Article III and the Preamble, that is, taking in account the UN Charter regarding the defense of common values and interests (Article IV). The 1999 Concept establishes that the purpose of the Alliance is safeguard freedom and security of its members, and the task then is to secure a peaceful order in Europe but this order can be threatened by crisis and conflicts the Euro-Atlantic area which the 1999 Concept does not define. But also the task is to maintain the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic Area: in fact, the US Senate Resolution on the NATO Enlargement establish that the main purpose is collective defense and not "stability", because the Senate see this concept as a key to any kind of intervention. This use of "stability of the Euro-Atlantic area" respond to the enhancement of the political role of the Alliance and the wider focus of the US strategy: in paragraph 20, the 1999 Concept talks about the risks and instability around Euro-Atlantic area and regional crisis at the periphery of the Alliance, from economic, political and social difficulties to ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes, abuse of human rights and dissolution of states that can lead to local and regional instability. The

expansion is also functional in consequence with the Cooperative Security approach: the indivisibility of Security, enhancing the role of NATO in conflict prevention, crisis management, arms control and measures to control the spread of high technology of military use and the non(counter) proliferation policy through the START, CTBT, NPT, the CBWC and the Ottawa Convention, including ATM systems and response capabilities. The expansion of NATO role and the creation of a Euroatlantic area of security make that, in operational terms, Europeans still depends on US capabilities in order to project force.

The first performance of the new strategic concept has been in Kosovo but with a asymmetric political and military approach. The action responds to the terms establishes in the strategic concept on the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, overall in the Balkans (paragraph.3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 24, 48) but the problem is the implementation of this decision with a limited war approach and certain conceptions of the Weinberger- Powell doctrine. This action and the problems of public support, the absence of the UN Security Council resolution and the opposition of Russia, China and other countries, including the perception of lack in the political will and dissensions in the Alliance, shows the necessity of the correction of this approach. The limited war conception define a situation where the resources and objectives are limited for policy, not for capabilities. Now, and since Somalia and Bosnia, the discussion could be whether these means are too limited or not. If the subject of the military action is a political objective, obtained by bargaining, then it is not military. This latter allows the fisical destrucction of the foe, and the problem would be to combine military power and diplomacy and the economic and psicological instruments of power. The Kosovo case shows a political focus with clear objectives but this approach ignores others elements as military problems and its own dynamic and the information to the public. Moreover, the more the war departed from its natural transcendency, the more the difference will be between the political objective from the purpose of ideal war, and the perception of a political war will be greater to the public. As diplomatic instrument the limited war is a mean of bargaining with the enemy. From this point of view, domestic policy is not important, only international policy is. But in the Kososvo case the US domestic policy and the EU members different visions are very important in the situation. If the limited war is directed by political leadership, being no vital the military necessities for the direction of the war, it would not be necessary to armonize this policy and militaty policy: the strategy of conflic in this case is to negotiate through a mechanism of gradual military responses in order to achieve a agreement. This includes a policy of incrementalism: no more troops will be sent if the situation does not worsened; more forces will only be authorized under the presure of the crisis; and the strategy will be determinated as a response to the facts. This approach clearly fits with the reactive

approach in the Clinton Administration, as we see before. This seems the end of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. The limited war approach has been used following the manual⁷⁶, and at the end, it worked but that is the problem. Should the serbs not withdraw, it would have been the necessity of escalation, incrementalism and a ground operation, and, in the beginning, this was not a objective of the operation. The nature of intervention must depend on the political objectives: if the objectives are broad, large scale force will be required; if the objectives are narrow less force can be used. The most important is that the objectives are clear and that the force allocated is sufficient to achieve them. This latter is the correct version of the Powell Doctrine, and not the use of all-out intervention in any case⁷⁷. Yet, the intervention seems to accomplish the problems in the future role of NATO but shows the continuing dependence of European Allies on US assets. For instance, the most of the assets for the operation were US systems: only in strike aircraft, the US planes were 323 and the planes from all European allies were 212⁷⁸. The role of NATO as political institution push forward the Alliance to situations as Kosovo crisis, and paradoxically, this crisis has resolve many doubts of the NATO future that the governments took to Washington Summit. European allies need to afford more weight and power, overall if the intervention is farther from Europe and in the periphery, within the Euro-Atlantic area of security. NATO must be for the European allies the vehicle of European internationalist and regional-plus approach. The Clinton Administration was eager to shed some of the defense cost but keeping its influence: the European allies needs the US assets and the US needs the legitimacy of the western democracies.

V. CONCLUSIONS: SELECTIVE PRIMACY VERSUS TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP?

The Alliance problems at the end of the Cold War on future strategy and role not to make but highlighted the dilemma of US strategy. Moreover, the problem with the nature of the Alliance in regard to the pillars of its creation is very important after the end of the Cold War: these pillars were shared economic and political values, economic interests and the Soviet threat. Without the latter, however, it seems possible that the Alliance would have not existed, and today it also exists a competition in the common economic interests. The shared values are the only pillar remaining⁷⁹. Nevertheless, the post-Cold War World offered the possibility of building a new visions and agreements on security policy and military forces role. But in spite of the demise of the blocks, certain practices, strategic conceptions and inertia from the Cold War were maintained and they are more persistants to restructure than what seemed possible. From these points of

view, the problem now is to analyze what could mean the maintainment of Primacy as US strategy for Europe-EU and the transatlantic relations as an international fact as well as a voluntary manifestation of US power. Huntington and others authors as Edward Lutwark and Fred Bergsten defend the Primacy in economics⁸⁰, because in the future the most of the conflicts will be economic, although this does not mean a Zero-Sum Game. For others "Economics is the continuation of war by other means"⁸¹.

The conclusion of all these developments analyzed in the report is that the tendency of the United States is to keep some kind of Primacy strategy up, probably a Selective Primacy approach. This strategy is the outcome of the evolution of the Bush Administration's maintainance of a Primacy approach for the US Strategy in the Post-Cold War World. The process has also introduced the Cooperative Security and Selective Engagement approaches which were the first elections for the Assertive Multilateralism of the Clinton Administration's first year. But the focus on a wide vision of Primacy was maintained: the invocation to the US leadership in world affairs in the Bush's new world order was adopted by Clinton, including the unilateral military capacities, and it maintains the concept of Democratic enlargement or enlargement of democratic states. This creates the Engagement and Enlargement approach, including a whole list of measures of Cooperative Security⁸². This situation creates a diarchy between principles and means, focused in multilateral solutions but keeping the capacity to act unilaterally although under certain conditions⁸³. This situation on principles and means also seems to appear in the restructuring of the Base Force through the Bottom-Up Review and the QDR.

But we also can find others problems to be added to the landscape as the strengthened position of the US Congress on Foreign Policy. From the end of the Cold War, the Congress is more assertive with these issues, but now it is controlled further than during the Cold War by domestic and electoral interests. Although the Congress has also address its powers in case of crisis and deployment of US forces, through the establishment of concrete terms to the end of these deployments thanks to the authorization of funds for the operations, the US President is the Commander in Chief of Armed Services according the US Constitution. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 also increased the role of military in security and defense decision-making, including the CJCS as principal military adviser of the President; and a further autonomy to CINCs with a CINC-President direct communication if necessary, being this situation reaffirmed by the PDD-25: it exists an inertia inherited from the Cold War in the excessive influence of the military in the US strategic conception as we see for the role of JCS, the Act of 1986, the QDR, and the 1998 NSSD. But the evolution of the US posture has produced new situations for the future. In the US Senate approvement of NATO enlargement, exist a provision dedicate to the powers of the NAC: Section 2 (3) (A)

(B)(C). Overall importance of point (B):

The NAC "does not require the consent of UN, OSCE, or any other international organization in order to take any action pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty in defense of the North Atlantic area, including the deployment, operation or stationing forces".

It could mean a significant departure from the meaning of collective security and the regime created by the UN Charter. The 1999 NATO New Strategic Concept and the 1998 NSSD confirm this point⁸⁴.

In the problem of the strategic conception of stability: the internal stability of Europe is the paramount interest but from different points of view: for the US is a vital area but not the main focus. For the EU means an inward vision. What is then the NATO function? It exists a conflict between the American and European pillars in the Alliance. The IGC did not decide the merger between WEU and EU, but the current situation could still produce political-military problems (US logistics, communications, surveillance and intelligence assets under European operational use). It also exists a special strategic significance of the limitations to the European Allies' force projection. ESDI needs an operational capacity of WEU to achieve CJTF (non-article 5 operations). It is still needed a strategic concept for the CSFP although the IGC has established some principles, and goals, and it also defined the priority areas for the EU. But they still depends on the US capability to sustain its military effort if various major conflicts nearly simultaneous occur in a short period of time according the Regional Strategy and Operational Crisis Scenarios; Major Regional Conflicts, MRCs. But the Quadrennial Defense Review change the US force posture and some principles although maintained the core of the 1993 DOD Bottom-Up Review. In this sense, the reorganization, reduction and modernization of US Forces has been achieved lacking a defense policy in strategic questions on the use of force's role and the relationship defense-foreign policy: it exists a greater interest on the aspects of budget design and management, and forces level. Assertive Multilateralism tried to develop a coherent strategy but produce internal contradictions between its conception and the military structure that have to endorse it, and at the same time, upset foreign policy: Bottom-Up Review structure on force level versus security interests ratio. Selective, Linear and regional frameworks and approaches as Bottom-Up Review, QDR and Regional Defense Strategy have major drawbacks: they do not allow for the inherent interdependence among ends, ways and means in Strategy or Grand Strategy, impede continuing reevaluation and creating self-imposed constraints in a moment when the classical limits and boundaries to intervention have or are dissipated. Moreover, regional approaches that create scenario-driven, threat-driven, mission driven and risk-minimizing approaches, identify a part of strategy as primary area of concern limiting the range of strategic options. These contradictions

affects European security not only because of the role of U.S in European affairs but because the NATO military reform adopts a joint strategy, military doctrine, forces structure and budget considerations according to the Regional Strategy planning and Forward Presence concept developed by JCS from 1989.

The NATO Integrated Military Structure still suffers from certain Cold War inflexibility, the struggle for the commands among the allies and the Senate Ratification of the Enlargement: maintenance of a NATO command structure still depended of territorial considerations On the issue of multinational political control over the military structure, some European Allies sense that the US exerts the sole real political control due to the direct authority of the US President over the SACEUR and SACLANT as USCINCEURCOM and USCINACOM. To avoid this situation, above all because the situation does not respond to a threat of generalized conflict in Europe anymore, the authority and autonomy of MNCs would have to be reduced whereas the control and authority of the NAC and Military Committee is increased. The new structure decided in the 1997 Madrid Summit still maintain some old conceptions, and have produced problems because of the different postures of France and the US on NATO Southern Command issue, AFSOUTH, but we saw before the importance of this command for the US Euroasian approach. The future evolution of NATO needs some others changes. The US will need the European Allies in the world security as global security, and the NATO forces, structure and budget will have to consider this new challenges. This Euroatlantic approach is needed like an international strategy at global level. US will also need support from NATO-EU in operations like Shield-Desert Storm or in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), not only in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, but in Africa and Asia. The major institution for this global vision is NATO, but its current structure does not allow the necessary projection of forces; The Command Structure is still geographically created, although some important changes has been made in order to adapt NATO to the new European security environment throughtout the CJTF concept. But in the future, NATO should defend the US-EU common interests, and the US-EU Partnership is itself a major interest too.

The creation of the New Transatlantic Agenda and the Action Plan reaffirms the institutionalization of the EU-US relations, and provide a vital mean to intensify cooperation and the Transatlantic Link which lost "glue" after the end of the Cold War. But the NTA is not a treaty but a roadmap. The creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area is still far but it is totally necessary to work on it, strengthening the economic dealing, and increasing the power of political cooperation through Objective I. The economic harmonizing of every European states will achieve stability (Internal European stability), but avoiding as possible trading crisis that could destroy the efforts to reach the NTA goals. From an European point of view, the priority areas in Foreign and Security policy are, in some cases, different from those of the U.S. The problem is that Western

interests are now different from Western values, or, at least, the priority of their defense. This vision disturbs any joint cooperative strategy between the EU and the U.S. The problem of stability in Europe can be achieved through integrative measures and lessened and reduced risks. But the problems of major threats as proliferation and long term risks as immigration, primary resources as water or food in the Northern Africa, cannot face using military measures or even through crisis prevention, but thanks to economic cooperation and CBMs and CBSMs. It exists a problem or conception and perception on the diversity in geographical zone of priority: the diversity between the US priority zone of interest in the Mediterranean is different from the priority area that means the Mediterranean for the EU (overall for the EU Mediterranean countries); for the United States the Middle East, the Gulf and Russia are strategic priorities in global security. Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean are important as parts of the Euroasian approach and in regard to their impact in the Atlantic Alliance and Europe. However, for NATO European Allies, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean littoral are the strategic priorities.

It also exists a functional diversity with the use of the NATO enlargement and the EU enlargement: stability for Europe and Germany and "American control" of the enlargement. The enlargement and reform in NATO and the European Union Intergovernmental Conference (I.G.C) are means to resolve the security of Europe and/or problems to develop the I Objective of the NTA and the Action Plan's first objective in order to build a joint strategy for the world peace, stability and security as Partners in Leadership. The multilateralism is deepened in economic and democratic aspects but also with a selective focus because there are areas more important than others. Nevertheless, it does not mean a non-cooperative use of economic policy per se but it exists the danger that economic frictions contaminate the security relations and common principles and values. An important danger is the disruption between the interests from Europe and America.

It is important to maintain the coincident interests. Is it in the American interest for Europe to unite? It is not surprising that US encouraged European integration during the Cold War in order to strengthen the containment of the Soviet Union but also to avoid a renaissance of a threatening Germany. However, the end of the Cold War would have then mean the end of this support from a competitive point of view: an increasing European power would be dangerous for US interests because throughout the Cold War sometimes West European countries were willingnessless to sacrifice economic or trade gains for generally common political objectives, but now the larger role of EU in world affairs now place a bigger burden on its shoulders. This means growing power for the EU but the problems can rise from differences in values or interests rather than relative positions in the structure of international system because the EU and the US shared common values, principles and, the most of the times, interests⁸⁵. The problems and troubles between the EU and the US about

different perceptions on the policies on Middle East, Bosnia or CAP and trade negotiations have not to affect core values and principles because these differences do not seek to weaken the other. As Robert Jervis says, although each side will want to have significant bargaining resources and leverage over others in order to protect its interests, the stakes and the intensity of competition is much lower than the case when international politics was infused with deep concerns for survival and security. The establishment of common objectives as open economic order, the non-proliferation of WMD, defense and protection of human rights and democracy mean if Europe will be ready to pay the costs, with a relative gain of power vis-a-vis the U.S. but not achieving the superpower status. But from the US point of view a position of primacy also means to act multilaterally, self-limiting its capacity, allowing a perception of cooperative posture and non-competitive. Thus, in case of disagreement, the US judgement may be no better than the judgement of Europeans.

Now, in the new International environment, there are separate interests for the US and the EU, but there are common values as democracy, human rights, free trade and others. These **common values are also vital interests** because we both seek enlarging them to others areas in order to facilitate the relations with others regions and countries. If we do not enlarge the community of democracies, we will lose the opportunity to achieve the enlargement and engagement objectives of US Administration and the EU (the EU requires democratic rules on commercial agreements). These common values-interests contain also security interests. One of the first questions to answer must be what are the security interests. Secondly, what are the security interests for the EU and if these interests coincide with the American interests. These interests are defined in very different ways: as objectives or priority areas for the CFSP. As operational component we have the crisis prevention, crisis management (risks), arms control and deterrence of major threats. From this point of view, it exists a functionalist strategy in order to build a stable cooperative order and the establishment and consolidation of universal political and economic norms, as President Bush's New World Order first indicated and the President Clinton's Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement established. But this strategy is not enough for some risks and for major threats. The definition of security as multidimensional give us the problematic of external and internal, military and no-military, risks and threats. But the most disruptive aspect is the transition from State Foreign Policy to Strategic Interaction in the EU to achieve a truly common foreign and security policy, and avoiding situations which affect EU strategic objectives and policies as the EU-Mercosur agreement for internal and electoral necessities of some countries (for instance, France). Finally, the unwillingness of European governments in supporting its costs and the development of each country's own interests. This condemns Europe to a parochianism very dangerous in an international scene under processes of globalization and interdependence, and Europe must define its identity, not in

opposition to the US but projecting externally what is. The weight of Europe and what Europe is will be most important in a long-term than it does in the policy realm due to its potential global power: EU/Europe is in a situation analogous to that of the United States in the late 1800s. Europe lost the primacy in world affairs because its internal wars in order to define the hegemony in Europe. This blindness was very expensive in lives and recourses. The lack of political will and courage in explaining to the public the true necessities, interests of Europe and the necessary sacrifices could be expensive again, and in the future maybe the US will not come to save us from ourselves again.

-Recommendations.

It is necessary a **NEW CONSENSUS** and harmonizing the interests of both sides. A common vision in the approach to global affairs is necessary for the future. The problems of globalization and the future rising of China are two possible pillars. The change in Chinese defense strategy shows a siege mentality and a perception of containment after the NATO enlargement and the Kosovo crisis. This is fueling the hard-liner military to press in order to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy⁸⁶. The globalization means an emergent structure, a complex articulation of institutions, rules and actors which is achieving independent course from the control of the states. The EU-US alliance may influence in this course through interdependence. In the practice the Transatlantic Partnership have to create a set of projects intersects with globalization. In order to face these challenges the Transatlantic alliance must adopt a set of objectives:

- The Transatlantic Partnership as a vital interest for the US and the EU.
- The restructuration of EU-US relations is critical. There are differences and problems: **changes** of European architecture, end of soviet threat, enlargement of the EU, rising of EU as a **Global Economic** power, globalization. The future objectives, strategic objectives, have to change: EU still weak in foreign affairs issues but a link of economy, policy and security exists.

- Broader security concept. Continuum: various levels working at the same time: economic, political and military. A labour division is necessary within the Euroasian approach: the EU approach + US approach are parts of a common strategic focus; harmonizing interests. The emphasis in one or other approach will be in regard to the area or necessities.

- Creation of a New Strategy: EU have to be a effective partner for the common purposes of the Atlantic community; characters: rapid expansion of common interests, expanded definition of interests(economic and political security).

- + Closer EU-US partnership: the Transatlantic cooperation have to be the main way to build policy. The New Transatlantic Agenda have to became Transatlantic

Partnership Agreement.

+ Avoiding weakness of Transatlantic Partnership: this is less important for EU, EU is not a full partner for US. Europe is a vital interest of the US but not the top concern in its global strategic policy.

+ Avoiding Risks: Failure in establishing a transatlantic partnership, in rebalancing burdens and responsibilities; creation of a gap between transatlantic interests. Russia interests: NATO enlargement can maybe not respect its national interest but it does not need to veto it.

+ Excessive focus on military approaches: Mediterranean problems needs other solutions.

- Globalization: it is different of interdependence. Globalization means broader economic interests around the world; then the interests, as part of the foundations of the new NATO, are going to be defended around the world and that's means a larger engagement in global security, that is, a necessary power projection for European allies.

Initiatives as the Transatlantic Policy Framework and the New Atlantic Initiative try to establish a new Transatlantic Partnership⁸⁷. But the Atlantism needs to approach to a Euro-Atlantism that respond a global vision which may creates a EU-US leadership in the new international order. The parrochialism and narrow visions means confrontation. The expansion of liberty, democracy, human rights and economic development are not only defended from a political agenda with a security planning. The political agenda means the action and strategic development in a common project of civilization.

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