

Final Report

The Prospects of Democratization of Russia: Between Slavophilism and Westernization

Contents:

Introduction.....	1
Russian road to democracy.....	4
Democracy and democratization in the conscience of Russian people.....	13
The cultural and civilization context of Russian democratization.....	19
Between Slavophilism and Westernization.....	23
Which model of democracy?.....	32
Bibliography.....	35
Abstract of the report.....	38

Introduction

It is generally admitted that Russia is not a democratic nation and will remain as such for ever. But, the Russia is not accused of being an undemocratic polity. The Kremlin`s efforts are appreciated in favor of achieving the democratization of the country. However nobody believe that this will done. It is regretted over the impotence of Russians to build a democracy and a citizens society and it is expressed a hope that the political developments there will be not like the Bielorussian ones. In the mid of the ninties, one of the Russian theorist wrote: „Today, it is obvious almost for all that the Russia is undergoing the transition period, aimed at the transformation of totalitarianism with his whole set of institutions, stuctures and relations into the new political system. It is not clear however, which road will be chosen effectivelly by the Russia: an authoritarianism or a liberal democracy, a fűrerianism or a parliamentarism, a neo-totalitarianism or a republicanism (in the form of presidentialism or parliamentarism)?” (Gadziyev, 1994, p.106)

The same sceptic views are uttered by the Western politologists steeped in the Central and Eastern European countries. As was stated by Ch. Royen „the Russian is conceived, in the West unfortunately a bit illusively. This point of view started with Gorbatschow, when a lot of people...lapped it all up as to new democratic look of the former USSR. I was deceived quickly, but a great deal of persons continued to trust Jeltsin, who is treated as a guarantor of democracy in Russia. That is why the politicians are abstaining from stiff criticism of the Moscow`s stance, although they understand that the Russian democracy is deprived of any objective foundations” (Royen, 1995, p.83).

At the question put in 1995 to the former Russian Foreign Affairs minister S. Krylov if the Russia is already such a democratic country that it would be impossible to suspect him of malice prepense, he replied that the „point is that the democracy should be more real and true, but not a chaotic one. Still, we don`t know what a democracy is. We never lived under democratic conditions. That is why, we are coming to it also in the imperial manner” (Krylov, 1995, p. 70).. Leaving out of account the soundness of the question (a democratic nation cannot be ill-intentioned?), a doubt is arising if a democracy can be build on an injustice and the threatening of other countries. S. Krylov had even suggested that the speed of reaching a democracy in Russia will depend, among other things, on the Poland`s stubbornness to enter the NATO (ibidem).

Since that time, the four years had elapsed. During this period the Russian (constitutional) political system did not changed. In that span, the fair parliamentary, presidential and local general elections took place, the constitutional review was highend, there is no sign of restricting the political freedoms, the access of individuals to the competitive sources of informations was widen, etc. Despite all this, a judgment is cast that Russia is not a democratic polity and what is worse, has any chance to become a one. This was emphatically said by an adviser to the president B. Clinton, the prof. B. Barber: „In Moscow, we have a free market without a democracy and a civil society, but tied to the criminal politics (...) In Eastern Europe and in the countries which had emerged on the ruins of the Soviet Union, a capitalism had appeared at the beginnings and at the same time a hope that it will found a democracy and a citizen`s society. This is impossible” (Barber, 1999, p. 19).

According to the experts from the Eastern Studies Center in Poland, the year 1998 has put an end to the illusions that the reforms will bring the Russia to the western model of market economy and democracy, because: 1) the more and more spheres of life are returning to the natural ways of production; 2) the money is decaying; 3) the public authorities are declining; 4) the criminal groups are assuming the state`s functions, including the administration of justice (Karp, Sienkiewicz, 1999).

At the same time, the following opinion is advanced: „If a drama of nationals of the former Imperium is not transforming into an European drama, that is why they preserve – the longest time in his history – a democracy and a free speech (...) Meanwhile, since the start of the European Springtide of nations, the Russia is defending his initial democracy. It is bad, it could be yet worse. But there is any dreams” (Bielecky, 1999, p. 17).

From these statements is stemming an opinion that the value judgments on the Russia are unpractical. That view is nourished first of all through the lack of genuine analysis of the processes occuring there, the ill way of making the generalizations on the grounds of pointless observations, the absolutization of the phenomena of doubtful weight for the regime transformation, the examining always the Russia as a special case, as a country in which the emotions and the wonderment is caused by what in many other lands is lasting, although not much-desired element of the social life.

Chapter I

Russian road to democracy

The passage from the undemocratic to democratic states - a relatively often phenomenon of the second part of our century - had prompted to the reflection on the specific features or the laws characterizing the duration's span of the so-called „transition to democracy”. My thesis on this score are also related to the examination of the road to democracy in Portugal, Spain, Greece and in some Latin American nations all over the last three decades. Due to the diversity of the collapsing undemocratic systems of governments, the reasons of their crisis and the ways of stepping aside and emerging of new regimes, there are different ideas of „transition”. The aim of this chapter is a testing of statements referred to the political transformation in Russia. It appears that the democratic restructuring in that country fall short of schemes elaborated as regards to the similar processes in other countries. According to the prevailing theoretical models of democratic passage, the Russia of the second part of our decade should be defined as a democratic nation: there are the democratically elected organs of state power, the general elections are held regularly and the institutions and procedures protecting the individual freedoms and the rights exists. Meanwhile, the general opinion is that in Russia we have only with the formal aspects of democracy. The president of the republic is seen as an autocratic man, he is frequently named after as the Czar Boris, the disequilibrium between the executive, legislative and judicial branches are sharp, the dictatorial and arbitrary tendencies in the exercise of power by the provincial governors are also keen and the declaratory character of many constitutional norms is generally underlined. The Russia appears then as an unforeseeable and incalculable country. There are fears that this possible democracy in Russia can be put an end, at any time.

One of the problems accompanying the chances of democracy is contained in a question if this can exist in any or only in the given conditions? Amongst the Western scholars the theoretical answers are not the same. According to the one current, the „emergence and the institutionalization of the democratic system of government are depending on the availability of certain social and economic resources” (Jablonski, 1994, p.

10). The development of this spheres is connected with the political one, which means that „the durable democracy requires the fulfilment of the previous and necessary conditions” while the cultural and material backwardness and the social desintegration lead to the collapse of the democratic regimes (Antoszewski, 1993, p. 8). These authors, as the main prerequisites of any democracy, are underlying: a high economic development, the social affluence, the high standards of culture, education, urbanization and the medias. The critics of that school of thinking - called **functional** - are blamed of excessive determinism. They are saying that the appropriate level of civilization is not only necessary to the establishment of democracy, but is its unavoidable result.

Not all theoreticians of this functional current were the representatives of these radical views. The model of equilibrium introduced by P. Curtrigh at the beginning of the sixties and confirmed by R. Marsh almost 30 years after „does not contain the deterministic relations between the economy and the politics; it indicates only the existence of interdependence of trends of economic and political development” (Jablonski, 1994, p.11).

At the same time, the others theorists have been resolutely against the thesis about the existence of the causality between the level of civilization and the type of political regime. According to the R. Rustow`s **genetic** paradigm of transformation – the process of democratization is conditioned, first of all, by the views, strategies and the behavior of their actors. The shaping of democracy is not reduced to mutual adaptation and functional dependence of all elements of the social system, but consist in the coming out into the open of every now and again new conflicts and in the working out of methods of their resolving. In this connection it is believed that there are a lot of roads to democracy and that the „civilization`s delays” must not exclude the possibilities of creating a stable system (Rustow, 1970, pp. 342-344).

In spite of a profusion of data on the democratic systems, we are still lacking a good theory explainig their emergence and durability. It is a little convincing the functional paradigm to be use in order to analyse the political transformation in Russia, because an attempt to establish a base for that research – a civilization`s level – can prove to be unserviceable. At the same time, one should not deny a fact that within the Russian civilization, there are a great deal of factors, even connected with the transformation processes

capable of bringing down the whole evolution. While supporting the genetic approach regarding the transition to democracy, we cannot ignore these factors.

On the authority of comparative studies, we are able to point out a number of circumstances, which are forming a specific contextual „confining circle” of transformational options. O. Kirchheimer – the 1965 author of that conception – says that the politicians are searching for the decisional variants only within this limited field and that a measure of a „revolutionary” political change is for him a capability of a new system to „get out of control” of the fetters of the previous regime (Kirchheimer, 1969, pp. 385 and 390). In the Soviet Union, an effort was made to democratize the polity, while taking into account the „confining ring”, i.e. the communist remnants. As we know, the process towards the liberalization of political life was initiated by the communist party plenary meeting of January 1987, when the so-called acceleration started with Mr. Gorbatshev in 1985 resulted in a complete failure. For that reason, instead of the slogan „a just more of socialism”, has appeared the new one: „a little more of democracy”. The political liberalization was aimed at waking up the public activities of the people and at the overcoming the Stalinist commanding administrative system. According to Gorbatshev, this system was major obstacle to the Perestrojka (reconstruction of the entire society), especially in the field of the economic reforms.

However, the communist power, while stimulating the liberalization of the political system was against his own nature. The failed coup d`État in August 1991 proved that the democracy introduced by the communist, had led to the insolvable contradictions inside the governing élite without increasing their reform capabilities. On the contrary, these measures have revealed the futility of the reformer`s drive. It appeared that the democracy and the communism were at odds with each other and the only think that resulted from that attempted reconciliation was a contradictory hybrid doomed to die, what happened indeed in August 1991 (Klamkin, 1993, p.6).

The Perestrojka turned out to be an unhappy attempt to democratize the Soviet system: for that reason, we are inclined to adopt the functional standpoint, which subordinates the success of such a transformation to the series of conditions. „However, instead of an expected return to a new communist dictatorship, the process of decommunization just started” (Kozarzewski, 1994, p. 22). The fact that the bad plight of national economy –

requiring the reforms – forced the democratic changes, puts in question the functional theory, for it shows that these transformations had begun without the premises important to that and in addition, have brought about the collapse of communism. We can note therefore that the democracy was able to escape the „confining circle”, and that this was done in defiance of the very „democracy makers”. According to the Kirchheimer`s views, all that testifies to the high degree of „revolutionary character” of political change in Russia. Yet, by force of events, only the formal obstacles were removed. The majority of set-backs inherent to the Soviet society, his structure and his past were not touched upon. Moreover, the new hindrances just appeared, caused by the reforms in progress, which in place of stopping the recession, have deepened it and extended to the many spheres of life.

4. The available theories on transition to democracy have not any generalizing character. There are lots of definitions about the transition, many of them are very opposite each to other: different periodizations of an individual transition, divergence of opinions on the kind of democratizing turning-point and on the moment when a polity can be considered to be a democratic one.

The regular definitions of „transition” are saying that this is an intermediate period which separates one type of a political regime from an another, when some features of the old, undemocratic system are rejected, but the new ones are not already replaced them (Morlino, 1987, pp. 54-55) or a span between that is just ended and what is not yet fully shaped up (O`Donnel, Schmitter, 1986, p. 3 and 65). We can easily notice the differences between these definitions. According to the first definition, the transition means a span of time in which still exist a part of elements pertaining to the ancient regime. According to the second understanding of the transition, we have to do with a period in which there are not still the relics of the old regime, because he ceased to subsist, but the forming up of a new one continues. The transition is also defined as a process of political changes triggered off the crisis of undemocratic system (Baloyra, 1987, p. 10). With that assumption, one would say that the beginning of a transformation are the attempts of reforms made within the system with the use of typical of it methods and institutions. D. Fadyeyev, adhering to these views, maintains that the transition period „is limited, on the one side, by the start of the authoritarian regime crisis and from the other side by the introducing and opening of stable operation of

one form of democratic system” (Fadyeyev, 1992, p. 118). In an effort to precise this concept, the transition is defined as a time of institutional fluctuations, uncertainties and big conflicts – the period in which the final result of all changes is a great puzzle. The one group of researchers are saying that the transition send-off is effected when the political and civil rights are freed and respected, while the others are of the opinion that it begins during the drawing up of a declaration on the organizing the competitive general elections and ends when the new regime is „installed”. However, for instance, Morlino thinks that the completion of democratization process is already occurring in the course of the first competitive elections (1987, p. 54), or Share who believes that this moment happens with the first exchange of political office holders chosen pursuant to the new rules of conduct (1987, p. 527). Some others write enigmatically that the transition to democracy finishes on the instant of the whole break-up of undemocratic system, of the introducing the political pluralism, when the uncertainty accompanying the transition disappeared, the new regime was institutionalized, the participants of the democratic game have adopted their rules and the serious political threat was surmounted. The others are giving more precision on this score, while saying that the starting-point is the inauguration of the truly representative national legislative body, the putting into operation of the democratically appointed council of ministers or the passing of a new national constitution.

The „transition” can be also substantiated through the analysis of its structure. For that reasons, the transition is divided into some subperiods. The most popular periodization was suggested by D. Rustow. He distinguishes the three stages of transition: 1) the preparatory one (the preparadness); 2) the taking of decisions concerning the democracy; 3) the democratic accommodation (political normalization) (Rustow, 1970, p. 352). A part of scholars are applying the other terminology and are singling out the following stages: initial, interim and consolidatory. The two proposed classifications are fundamentally - as to the content - the same. On these grounds, some authors are using these categories interchangeably, at one's pleasure, without paying any attention to them. At the same time, the same is not the same for all. For instance, the Polish professor A. Antoszewski, while adopting the Rustow's standpoint, puts the consolidation of democracy out of period of transformation – considering

that towards it is leading, the „positive test”, made during the normalization stage (1993, p. 17).

Some scholars, when are studying with more details the transition structure, are marking off the concrete measures and events delimitating their appropriate stages. Any of the widespread models, let us say, of E. Baloyra (1985, p. 10-11), of A. Rodriguez Diaz (1989, p. 76) or of D. Rustow it is impossible to apply to the transformation in Russia. There are also the considerable differences of views as to the transition structure in the individual states, which is confirmed by a large number of period`s proposition concerning the transition to democracy in Spain. The disputes are not only over the limits, but also over his structure. J. Maravall and J. Santamaria with reference to the Rostow`s proposition, have sigled out the preparatory stage encompassing the span between the F. Franco`s death in November 1975 and the June of 1976, that is, up to the dismissal of the C. Navarro`s cabinet. The decision-making stage runs from the July 1976 that is, from the appointment of the A. Suarez government, to the municipal and parliamentary elections in Spring of 1979. Within that span, the two subperiods were marked off: from July 1976 to the general elections of June 1977 and from June 1977 to the Spring of 1979. The consolidation`s stage lasts from March 1979 to the general elections of October 1982 (Dobek-Ostrowska, 1996, pp. 63-64).

A totally another history of democratization in that country had proposed J. Ibanez. That Spanish author is dividing this span into four periods: 1) from the Franco`s death to the general elections of June 1977; 2) from June 1977 to the turn of January and February 1981, i.e. up to the military putsch; 3) from February 1981 to the general elections of October 1982; 4) from October 1982 to May 1986. On the other hand, P. Preston, while applying the same periodization as Marvall and Santamaria includes into the preparatory stage the administration of Navarro (January 1974 – June 1976). It is noteworthy to underline that these authors have omitted such threshold on the road to democracy, as was the approving in December of 1978 of the Constitution. This fact was took into account by an another Spanish scholar J. Ortega Díaz-Ambroña, which had valued it greatly (*ibidem*, p. 64-65).

The differences of views regarding the manner to initiate the democratization process in individual states are the same as just described with refreence to the limits and to the structure of transition. After the study of the past of various countries, the scholars had

singled out several types of turning points on the way to the democracy: 1) rupture; 2) rupture through understanding; 3) self-rupture; 4) reform; 5) continuation. In the above-mentioned case of Spain, some researchers are seeing the beginning of transition in the self-rupture, while the others are maintaining that it happened in the form of a rupture through understanding and the Spanish politologist J. Ortega Díaz-Ambrona is of the opinion that all that is stemming from the continuation. He claims that the continuation was later superseded by the rupture through understanding, which in turn was replaced by the reforms (ibidem, p. 65).

5. Despite of the lack of a theory generalizing the democratic transformation, the models of democratic process elaborated up to now, are a good basis for a comparative analysis, and an indispensable reference tool to examine the new cases of states that just started their regime`s transformations.

The beginnings of the Russian transition to the democracy, one could find in various stages of history and relates to the different events. This sends us back to the question of kind of the transformation`s theory of political regimes that can be applied in a concrete case. If we adhere to the transition idea proposed by Morlino, we should show, in order to determine their time`s limits what elements of the old order were rejected and yet not replaced by the new ones? This could be for instance the plebiscitary way of creation of the so-called people`s councils of deputies, in which these organs were a window-dressing body for the monopolistic power of the Marxist-leninist oriented burocracy, opposed to the natural human rights of the individuals. We should also reply at the question what means the word „rejection”? It is tantamount to a turning-point towards democracy through rupture, rupture through understanding, self-rupture, reform or a continuation? It seems important also to know if when we are initiating a „rejection”, we are conscious that we are departing thereby from one, several or every pillars of the former system? These doubts are justified in the case of Russia, because one of first events, which had shaken the old communist political order was the Mr. Gorbatshev`s proposal – put at the plenary meeting of the CPSU in January 1987 – to admit the free elections at all levels of people`s councils: for every representative post stood two or more challengers - nominated without a communist party apparatus interference – and placed on unique common list. The elections of the local people`s councils took place,

according to the new rules, on 21st June 1987. However, neither these elections, nor the other of the Congress of People`s Deputies in March 1989 have purported to undermine of what obstinately continued to be called socialist democracy, which ought only to be „improved”. Nobody had claimed at that time that the aim of the new electoral system was a liberal democracy. The then objective was exclusively to reform the existing polity.

The same finality had been behind the policy of transparency (glasnost) proclaimed by Gorbatschow, with his practical effect of suppressing the state`s censorship over the media. All this was intended to assist the development of public criticism in order to denounce the obstacles on the way to carrying out the policy of acceleration (uskorenie). The first step in that direction was a resolution of the Central Committee of CPSU of 28th January 1986 on the „facts of rough managing and the suppression of criticism in relation to the journals *Air transport* and *Water transport*”. Independently of stigmatizing the campaign of the boards of directors of industrial holdings against the journalists for the „justified critique”, this party document had stressed that such a practice did not corresponded with the line of policy adopted at the April 1985 plenary meeting of the CC of the CPSU having the purpose, inter alia, an „open and true debate on the urgent societal problems..., the increasing of the impact of press, radio and television broadcasting, the intransigent struggle against whatever attempts to quelling or setting aside the criticism” (Kuleshov, Volobuyew, Pivovar, 1991, pp. 562-563). Though in the past these kinds of sharp criticism was familiar to the CC of the CPSU`s resolutions and have served the manipulation of the mass media, now, the party`s decision „had marked the thorny road of press, radio and television from the permitted transparency to the statute on the press approved in 1990 (ibidem).

The considering of these initiatives as the origins of the democratization`s process of Russia answers the Baloyra`s theory, who the beginning of any transition sees in the political changes produced by the crisis of the undemocratic system and which can be find in the reforms carried out already in the frame-work of the former regime. However, it is beyond any doubt that the first, unequivocal repudiation of the old political system was the striking off – at the Third Extraordinary meeting of the Congress of People`s Deputies in March 1990 - the constitutional article about the so-called leading role of the CPSU. In that time, in Russia there was no one other political party, which could threaten the monopolistic position in the

society of the communist party. The emergent party system was on the long way to its consolidation. The election in March 1990 of the Congress of People's Deputies, was convened under the terms of the electoral law of 1988. One can say that from the Morlino's point of view, the beginning of the transition to democracy dates back from March 1990, when some elements of the old system was repealed, but the new ones were not yet created and introduced.

On the other hand, when we adopt the O'Donnell and Schmitter approaches, we must consider as the turning point on the way towards the democracy the events of Autumn of 1993, the armed shut-down of the parliament of Russian Federation, the competitive elections of the national representative organs (the Duma of V term) and the approving of the Basic Law of the country in December of that year. According to these authors, just in that time the old regime was up and the new one was not yet fully established. However, there is a great deal of rationality in the thesis that the old regime had ended with the competitive presidential general election in the yet „socialist” Russian Federation in June 1991 or with the outlawing of the communist party (CPSU) after the August 1991 attempted hardline coup.

When approaching the case of Russia, where the circumstances of the transition to democracy were extremely specific, we shall determine differently the kind, the time and the circumstances of the transformation. When we adhere to the standpoint that the start of the Russian democracy were the happenings which took place in that country up to March 1990, we can foundly say that this occurrence was precisely the reform. If we consider an inception of transition the resolution of the III Congress of People's Deputies, the turning point should be called the self-rupture. When we, on the other hand, treat the events in Summer of 1991 or in Fall 1993, as the „breakthroughs”, we should adopt a stance that the democratization process started with the rupture.

The use of any of these scholarly propositions, predetermines the concrete periodization of the transition adequate to the considered span of time. At the first glance, it is easy to note that any of the hipotetic periods cannot be divided according to the Baylora's or Rodriguez Diaz's propositions. It is impossible also to apply the suggested models to the transition in some states like Spain or Poland. For the purpose of this study, we shall make use of the general, schematic division of democratic transformation, specifying the following

stages: the preliminary – covering the period from January 1987 to March-July 1990; the decisional, spanning from March-July 1990 to October-December 1993 and the consolidation one – since December 1993.

Chapter II

Democracy and democratization in the conscience of Russian people

One factor conditioning the regime's change is the attitude of the Russian public opinion to the democratic ideas, values, institutions and procedures.

The notion of democracy was broadly spread up in the public opinion in 1990, in connection with the activities of electoral coalition „Democratic Russia”. The democracy was opposed to the then communist power and was understood as an opposition to the authoritarian system. The liberal slogans of liberty and human rights had united in the anticommunist bloc, the supporters of different bearings: liberal-communists, socialdemocrats, national-patriots, clerical-monarchists, etc. The „democrats” and the „democracy” were almost exclusively the political and ideological categories. Accordingly, for the considerable number of people tied to the toppling of soviet system, they became the synonyms of something harmful. The negative attitude towards the democracy is also characteristic to the people not having, in the past, the ties with the communists, who in the first restructuring period had supported the „democrats”. It is said that after the Yanayev's August coup attempts and the coming to power of anticommunist opposition, had revealed themselves quickly the „appearances” of many „democratic” institutions and procedures. „The democratic power had started to degenerate in the struggle for the control of the narrow group at the top...” and the lack of competence of new bureaucracy prevailed over the expected efficiency: every liberal tenet in the Russian conditions received a denaturalized form (Pugaczov, 1993, pp. 18-19). These negative phenomena in the first stage of postcommunist government had resulted in the treatment of democracy by the most population, as a symbol of disappointments, shattered hopes, chaos, of the collapse of state power etc. It was said even that the „idea of democracy had perished in Russia” (Shczekoczihin, Lukin, 1992, p. 12).

The attitude of population to the democratic values became the object of the sociological surveys. One of the first was effected in 1990, with the assistance of the American sociologists, in the Moscow district. They revealed that the majority of the polled peoples was in favor of the democratic principles presented in abstract form, appreciating especially the freedom, the competitive elections, the independence of media, pluralism, with the simultaneous little political tolerance (Gibson, Duch, Tedin, 1992, pp. 352 and 353). The further surveys made in the mid of 1992, only by the Russians have confirmed fundamentally the results of the previous American inquiries. These new polls were supplemented by the questions about the people`s stance towards the mechanisms guaranteeing the democratic values. On the first place were put the principles of the freedom of conscience and of equality of religions – 74%. The human rights in general – 72%; the free speech – 68%; the rule of law – 59%; the precedence of the democracy over the order – 31% and the 30% yes to the parliamentarism. As the responsables for these surveys underlined „it is not difficult to notice that the majority of population is in favor of the fundamental freedoms. At the same time, the principles and the mechanisms of democracy defending their values are gathering a considerable less number of persons. As a result, we have to do with a paradoxe: the preference of the order to the democracy with the simultaneous general support of the human rights” (Vorocova, Filatov, 1993, p. 141).

We should note that the similar situation occured in Spain in the middle of 1970s. „Almost every second inhabitants considered as the best for country the regime of liberal democracy, but at the same time the four out five insisted that the most important thing is to preserve the order and law” (ibidem).

Precisely, the fears of the Russian against the anarchy, which may, as a consequence, impose the dictatorship is a main source of scepticism towards the democracy. „The unchecked reign of impulsive process (...) and their destructive character is realized yet not only the scholars and the politicians, but by the majority of the Russian society” (Romanienko, 1994, p. 15). On this grounds, one can conclude that the notable part of the population would be able to approve the authoritarian rule for the sake of restoring the order. In 1993, almost 70% of the polled people was of the opinion that the government was not in the control of the country. In this connection, more than 40% of the inhabitants was aware of

the dangers of the advent of „total anarchy” and above 15% of the establishment of a dictatorship (*Zerkalo...*, 1993, p. 22).

In the spring of 1995, the 43% of the polled persons believed in the possibility of the accession to power of the fascist groupings (36% did not shared that opinion and 21% had mined nothing on this score). Among the principal reasons of the danger, one should point out the following: 1) the inefficacy of the public authorities in the holding back of the Nazi organizations – 41%; 2) the high level of the crime – 40%; 3) the using by the state representatives of the violent means when solving the political conflicts – 32%; 4) the growing unemployment – 31%; 5) the inflation – 30%; 6) the peril of the break-up of the Russia – 23%. However, 19% of those who sees the menace of coming to power of the fascists was unable to justify his view (*Opros...*, 1995, p. 17).

Table 1

The ideas of the State enterprise`s directors, military service men and workers declaring themselves for the „regime by force” about that system of government (in percentage)

What means the coercion?	Managers			Workers			Military men		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Dissolution of the Parliament or dramatic abridgement of his power	52	25	23	36	25	39	46	31	23
Introduction of State censorship-constraint on the press	29	52	19	23	45	32	30	51	19
Ban or suspension of political party activities	33	47	20	26	36	38	38	41	21
Mass protest actions prohibition	48	31	21	36	31	33	52	30	18
Harsh legal acts against the corruption	74	9	17	67	6	27	74	8	18
Strict law enforcement`s control	75	9	16	66	5	29	76	8	16
Application of force in order to counteract the disintegration of Russia	35	40	25	34	29	37	44	33	24
Restoration of State economic planning system	40	36	24	42	20	38	46	28	26
Introduction of rationing card system	30	51	19	31	36	33	31	48	21
Rigorous measures against the work discipline violators	58	18	24	57	10	33	65	15	20
I do not know what is it	17			27			15		

Source: I. Klamkin, *Politiczeskaya sociologiya perehodnogo obshtczestva* [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya* 1993, n° 4, p. 53.

The disappointments regarding the reforms, the fears against the anarchy, the longing for the rule with „a rod of iron”, were the principal cause that at the beginning of 1995 only 5% of Russian society believed that the democracy was necessary in that land. The 25% of the polled people was of the contrary opinion and 20% have nothing to say on this score. At the same time the 59% of the nationals have asserted that the democracy in his country was

passing through a crisis, the 18% of the polled did not shared this opinion, whereas the 23% of the persons inquired did not any answer at that question. In this connection, the authors are usually indicating the following: 1) the rulers call themselves the democrats, but they have not that virtue – 31%; 2) the state leadership executes incompetently the democratic transformations – 26%; 3) the democrats did not succeeded in securing the order in the country – 20%; 4) the Russian Federation may be a democratic state, but until now, it is not, for the time being ready to it – 18%; 5) the Russia cannot be at all a democratic nation – 5%. The 17% of polled people was unable to justify his opinion on this issue (ibidem).

The attitude of the society to the democracy was expressed also in their opinion on the „coercion”. In addition, a great part of the supporters of the authoritarian state power was in favor of its employment also in the economy. This kind of economic authoritarianism was especially popular among the managing directors of the State enterprises. In 1993, they made up the 55% of the „coercionists”. This quantity was one and a half more than amongst the workers, the military officers, the chiefs of the state farms and the unemployed (36%) and twice more than among the kolkhoz members and the retired employees (26%). The table 1 present the ways of thinking of the followers of the government by force on how this type of wielding authority should be. It follows from that such a regime is rather associated with the dissolution of the Parliament or with the diminishment of his activity and with the ban on the mass protest actions, but less with the introduction of the censorship, the possibility of an interdiction of the political parties or the application of force in order to counteract the breakup of the Russia.

The democracy is not a value generally appreciated. This system has a lot of outspoken enemies. Even amongst the peoples who consider themselves as the democrats, one can find the person that for various reasons lean to some „enlightend totalitarianism” (Gadziyev, 1994, p. 107). They think that the Russian society is not matured to democracy, because the bad state of economy, the social and national desintegration, the corrupted public civil servants and the absence of traditions of general adherence to civil liberties might only produce the lawlessness and the destruction of the state. This view is shared by the many inhabitants of Russia accustomed, in the past, to the deterministic theses of historical

materialism, with his well-known phrasing the objective circumstances as a condition for any revolution and reform.

We can find, many adversaries of the democracy among the liberals. The opposition between the liberalism and the democracy has its roots in the second half of the XIX century, when the peasants were granted land to and the modernization's reforms of capitalist type were started off. In that period, the freedom's demands of the liberals were separated from the equality slogans of the democrats (the Narodniks and later the Bolsheviks up to 1917). The liberals were not capable to overcome the aversion to and the fright at the populace, from which the democrats were willing to make the citizens with full rights. The tragedy of the Russian political history... lies in that the democratic and liberal tenets instead of becoming complementary, as in the USA or in the Western Europe, have clashed sharply together. The impossibility of uniting or at least, accommodating these opposite trends in Russia had deformed the democratic and the liberal ideologies: the democrats did not relax in their efforts to demonstrate the superfluousness (and even the harmfulness) of liberal freedoms. On the other hand, the liberals of the „highly educated milieu” were keeping off the ideals of democratism, seeing in these the main danger for the individual freedoms and rights. As a result, the democratism in Russia has had more and more, the plebeian and subversive character and the liberalism was compelled to draw near „to the tendency prevailing in the then ruling elite. This was fatal for the democracy as well as for the liberalism” (Pantin, 1994, p. 80).

At the same time, the opinion is gaining in the popularity that the Russia was always familiar with the democratic traditions and ideas going back to the early Middle Age and felt at the various stages of history of that Nation. In this respect is remembered the records of the Novgorod's Republic, the large powers of the boyar's Duma in relation to the Czar, a number of successes in the struggle for the establishment of the constitutional monarchy between 1905 and 1914, the events of 1917 (Yegorov, 1997, pp. 102-109) Although, the October Revolution had stopped the democratization process, paradoxically, we can say even that the Russian society is attached, in a way, to the democratic values. For many years the official propaganda carried conviction that the Soviet Union was the most democratic state in the world and the people was incited, according to what was induced by the Leninist theory of

the people's self-government, to participate in public life. When in the second part of the 1980s, became evident that this democracy was a fiction, the Russian society was quickly able to pass, without major interferences, from the „apparent to the real political games”. This was revealed in the large competent public discussions, the setting up of political groups alternatives to the communist party, in the regular course of electoral campaigns, in the competition between the newly-formed groupings, etc. The sudden disclosure, by the Russian citizens, of the huge cheap in which they lived for many years, caused an embarrassment, shame and a feeling of complex towards himself and the Western civilization and at the same time, a desire to demonstrate that a liberal law-governed state is possible in Russia.

The opponents to the democracy are saying almost exclusively about their faults, whilst the supporters of it are underlining their merits. However, the contending parties are united by the „not at all correct... one-dimensional dealing with the democracy. Thus, when analysing the possibility of his forming up and institutionalization under the Russian conditions, the ones as the others, as a matter of fact, are confounding and swaping the democracy for liberalism and vice versa and correspondingly giving to these phenomena the plus and minus signs” (Gadziyev, 1994, p. 108).

That mixing up of the notions was, to a certain degree, justified, when the „democracy” functioned only as a battle-cry uniting the anticommunist elements. Under the new conditions, the democracy became the object of rivalry between the unfolding interest group. The attaching to it of different meanings by the contending political forces makes that the obvious ambiguity of that category in the period in which a great deal of things are depending from the social attitudes, can delay the transformation at stake.

Chapter III

The cultural and civilization context of Russian democratization

In Russia had appeared a gap between the transformations of the socio-economic regime and of the political culture which „cannot be erased” (and only in this sense they are formed up) and the „underdevelopment of the conditions, forces and of the reformist ideology”. These changes should solve the problems, which in the Western Europe required some hundreds years (Pantin, 1994, p. 75). Meanwhile, the necessity of bringing about the reforms in a short time produce a number of tensions threatening with the existence of the democracy. The reformers are compelled to take the unpopular actions, which separate the people from the very idea of the democracy, provoking the disappointment and leading to the search for the alternatives to it. The „post-communist democracy does comprise a mighty antidemocratic potentials, which by a coincidence might turn against it”. This paradox results from the assumption that the passage to the market economy, in the first moment, takes place „at the expenses of the majority`s interests and in this sense it is undemocratic...At the same time, it is democratic, because in it are manifesting the interests of the majority”. Professor I. Klamkin notes that during the pass from the traditional mediaeval society to the contemporary market relations, this contradiction was put away by setting restrictions especially on the electoral laws. The post-communist democracy differs from the post-feudal one in this that the „universal franchise is at once introduced”, which in our time, cannot be limited, because even „from the formal point of view, it would be a step back as compared to the communist

constitutions". But, this precisely is a source of the sharp contradiction inside the democracy" (Klamkin, 1993, p. 12).

It is a widespread view, sometimes regreted, that the factor restricting the development of the democracy, of the civil society and the free market economy is the crisis of Russian civilization and his decline after the collapse of the communist system. In this connection, we should to answer the question in which lies the crisis or the civilization down-fall of the Russia? According to M. Berdiayev, the Russia civilization cannot be treated as a phenomenon characterized by a certain historical continuity, but one must isolate in the past of that country several cultures succeeding each others. Referring to the scheme proposed by that philosopher of the Christiannity, Z. Madej individuates the micro-model of the oriental civilization (Byzantine) and opposes it, in a certain sense, to the macro-model „covered by the Western civilization". The first is a sort of a buckle clamping the three civilization models: the Ruthenia of Kiev; the Tartarian and Mongolian period; the Russia of Moscow. The second encompasses the Russia of Peter and the communist „closed society". The collapse of that last civilization opens the way to the sixth, post-communist model (Madej, 1993, p. 24).

To this concept of the „successive cultures" adheres also the Polish expert P. Sztompka, which the transformation of the countries of real-life socialism interpretes „not only as an economic or political change, but also as the fundamental civilization breakthrough". It consist in the throwing away of the one model and in the planting the other. It will give as a result – according to that scholar – the overcoming of the „civilization`s incompetence" being symptomatic of the real-life socialism and the forming up of the „civilization`s competence", which features the Western Europe and North America societies. Thus, the decay of the labour ethos and of the identification with his firm, the lack of discipline and the carefulness of the production quality will replac the enterprise, the resposability, the legalistic behaviour and the active participation in the civic affairs, etc. (Sztompka, 1994, p. 9) From that point of view, it would be very difficult to call the civilization crisis the failure of the socialist values.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the former socialist community – ranked once for the political and economic reasons as the so-called second World, a sort of an equivalent of the second civilization`s class of nations are now becoming rapidly a member of

the ever developing polities family. The Russia in this context belongs to that category under the comparable terms with the others nations, not on the specific grounds. The existing there, the negative phenomena such as: a decrease of the production, the technological retardations, the devastation of the natural environment, the low standard of living of the population, the sharp political and national conflicts, the growing social pathology, all this influences obviously on the level of civilization evolution, especially in his material spheres. However, that state of affairs is not identical to the civilizatory crisis, which is expressed to a certain degree, in the undecided struggle between the Slavophilists and the Occidentalists, waged since already three ages ago and intensified recently after the collapse of the USSR.

One of the major features defining the character of the Russian civilization is the collectivistic model of society and the very strong subordination of the individuals to the will of the general community: „me” is in the captivity of „we”. In the Soviet culture, the key word is not a man as an individuality, but a society. Whereas in the West the individual was highlightend and continually freed, in the Russian civilization – despite of criticism since a long time of the occidental egoism – the inhabitants of that country had opposed always to the selfish „I” the traditional „we”: We-*proto-Slavs*, We-*community*, We-*nation*, We-*working class*, etc. All this lead to the whole conquer of the individual in the We-Soviet-national State. The exalting of the collectivistic „we” finally conduct to the totalitarianism (Lazari, 1994, p. 1).

The Russian collectivism is not a synonym of the social life, of the being in a group, of the playing in it a number of mutually roles, depending. It consists in the unilateral dependence of an individual from the group. As a result, the sources of the individual activity (motives, initiatives) are outside of the man. That is the reason of the passivity and of the morbid pleasure derived from the recollection of the national past sufferings of the Russians, who are the „object of the social influences, a product of the development of the society and only to a little degree his actor” – as A. Brushlinsky wrote about (Pantin, 1994, p. 78).

The prevalence of such a pattern of culture expresses not so a dictate of the society, his specific paternalism, but also the reckoning of the primacy of all what is collective, the less or greater subordination of the personal to the social interests. This model of relations was determined by a number of reasons, inter alia, the inability of the Russians – ruled by many

centuries in a despotic manner – to live under the conditions of liberty. The unskilfulness with the self-afterthought, the self-control and the self-limitation had lead to the peril of anarchy, which could be avoided only with the help of the dictatorship. The individual nature of the human being was especially weekend after the civil war, in the years of 1920s and 1930s. This was embodied, for instance in the W. Mayakowsky`s famous saying in his poetry that „an individual is nothing, an individual is zero”. This stance found even his reflection in some popular joke like that: if the Britishmen are addressing somebody indistictly by his Christian name or by the second person of the plural you, it is possible to expurgate the word „I” from the Russian grammar book.

The collectivism in Russia is an obstacle to the development of the liberalism. It affects also negatively the sense of law while absolutizing the national State embodied through the public authorities as a „higer good” with no precise content. It favors also the nationnalism and the jingoism of all sorts underlining excessively the interests of a given social group.

This phenomenon is linked in Russia with the so-called ideological outfit. Although, one can hear there voices favoring the repudiation of all kinds of „isms” and builing up of the non-ideological pragmatic society, governed by the market`s laws, it is not linked with the Western European aversion to every possible ideologies, but with the indisposition to the over-ideological communist past. It was yet replaced by a lot of new ideologies. According to Z. Madej, the Russian people needs it, for without them „would occured the social atomization and desintegration ended with an anarchy and a war each with other”. The Russians even „nowhere had trooped along under the banners of nihilism. In an advance to the market economy and to the open society they will go under the national flags armed with different constructivist conceptions” (Madej, 1993, p. 198).

With this in mind, it was ultered an opinion at the threshold of the regime`s transformation in Russia that – at present - the establishment of the market economy is not possible spontaneously, independently and by evolution. This kind of transformation cannot take place there and „for that reason, the liberalism is at a loss”. The Russian ruling élites „are being aware behind their backs the redoutable grumble of the masses and are not bound by the liberal doctrine”. When whosoever would like to implement it in the real life, „will be toppled

in a short time by the anarchy or the oppositionist dictatorship, which will not miss the occasion in order to take back the influences of the *sloppy liberals*, without waiting for the slow and spontaneous development being in danger of an explosion” (ibidem, pp 196-198).

Chapter IV

Between Slavophilism and Westernization

The effect of the struggles between the civilizations cause the ideological, spiritual disarray of many Russians placed between the expansive Russophile nationalism – just get rid of the communist internationalism and the equally offensive occidentophilism, subjugated for many decades by the nationalistic Bolshevism. The civilization`s crisis connected mainly with the breakdown of a certain system of cultural values – was not triggered off according to B.G. Kapustin, by the „fall of the previous dominant ideology and by the competition of a plurality of present-day quasi-ideologies, but by the upsetting of that field of creation of manners of thinking, on which all these seemingly ideologies could be a something more than the mental trainings of isolated groups”. The value`s crisis was produced as a result of the accumulation of causes, which had undermined the „legacy of the social consciousness development and the possibilities of identification of individuals with the aims and the values of social life” (Kapustin, 1992, p. 76).

The breakdown of the values system - perceived at the various levels of life - is not always considered as a pernicious phenomenon. This refers, for instance to the scarcity of the clearly formulated idea of statehood, or to the want of any constructive, convincing and having the chances to be implemented political theories. In Russia, every „ism” had served as the attempts to shake and to „destroy the whole social organism from below to the top” (Gadziyev, 1994, p. 106). For that reason, the lack of the broad ideological and political visions „and even of the charismatic leaders called to his realization cannot be evaluated as a

negative factor of the development of Russian state, but as an asset, a sort of guarantee against a new *epoch-making social engineering*" (ibidem, p. 107) .

The social consciousness of the inhabitants of Russia is not at a standstill. It is subject, inter alia, to the influence of the colliding civilisatory currents. For the democratization process is not indifferent which of two cultural trends – pro-Western or traditional-nationalistic - will prevail. The public opinion investigation`s results of April 1995 show that the Russian society in his majority is not pro-Western. At the question at which values and standards should be oriented the today Russia? – the 13% of the polled had answered that on the western ones; the 60% on the Russian traditional; the 16% on the Soviet and the 11% did not assumed any attitude to that score. At the same time, the 47% of the surveyed persons were of the opinion that the perestrojka and the subsequent events was the result of the conspiracy of the Western countries against Russia and the 51% shared the saying by A. Solzenitsin that the Russia became a Western colony. The opposite views were expressed by 31% and 28% respectively and 21% of the polled people did not expressed any opinion on this issue (*Opros....*, n° 15, p. 16).

One can ask whether the hostility displayed against the „West” testifies on the absence of approval for the values comming from that part of the World? It seems that the xenophobic attitudes of Russians have some emotional grounds, what can result from the injured proud of a great power, from the instructing them by the Western advisers (especially by the American pfessor of economy J. Sachs) how they should reform the national economy, from the humiliating accusing then of building up of the „evil`s empire”, the submerging the internal market with the luxurious goods out of reach for the majority of people, from the conviction that his homeland is robbed of the raw materials, etc. The inability to cope with the many challenges, which were had imposed by the new country`s plight is provoking a frustrtion and favours the isolationist moods. That emotional state of the considerable part of the society can influence meaningly on the outcome of parliamentary and presidential elections, in favor of the antidemocratic groups and groupings?

Table 2

Values in favor of which stood the followers of the Russian presidential candidates before the general elections in June 1996 (in percentage)

The supporters of the following presidential	The values on which the Russia should be oriented
--	---

candidates:								
	Only Western-type	Only Russian	Only Soviet	Western and Russian	Western and Soviet	Russian and Soviet	Western-Russian-Soviet	Without reply
B. Yeltsin	4	59	10	7	1	7	4	8
W. Zyrinowsky	7	55	15	4	0	7	4	8
G. Zuganov	0	40	28	2	0	21	2	6
A. Lebed	4	54	11	7	1	9	8	6
G. Yawlinsky	6	48	10	13	0	11	3	9
Other politicians	5	52	11	8	0	11	4	7
The persons not willing participate in the elections	6	43	17	6	0	11	2	15
The undecided persons	2	48	10	7	1	12	4	16
The Russians amongst the total population	4	49	13	7	0	11	4	11

Source: I.M. Klamkin, V.V. Lapkin, *Russkij vopros v Rossiji*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, 1996, n^o 1, p. 84.

An attempt of a reply at that question, gives an analysis of the attitude of the main Russian presidential runners towards the cultural values, as investigated in Autumn 1995 (table 2). The major part of the polled persons favoring the traditional Russian and Soviet values was from the communist devotees of G. Zuganov – 80%, followed by the adherents of W. Zyrinowsky – 77%, of B. Yeltsin – 76%, of A. Lebed – 74% and G. Yawlinsky – 69%. Thus, the difference between the most „pro-Western” and the most „pro-Russian” electorates was only 20%, what - when we are taking into account the small support given to Yawlinsky and in general, the high percentage of the defenders of the traditionalism - presents the picture of the pro-occidental society. At the same time, we should remember that the followers of Yeltsin, Zyrinowsky and Lebed were mainly „pro-Russian, of Zuganov „pro-Russian” and „pro-Soviet” and of Yawlinsky „pro-Russian” and „pro-Western”.

A more precise stance of the surveyed people is expressed by their attitudes to a number of civilization`s patterns. At the question how they behave towards the Western-style democracy, the replies of the partisans of individual politicians were as follows: Yeltsin – 27% with sympathy, 19% with antypathy; Zyrinowsky – 15% and 18%; Zuganov – 7% and 47%; Lebed – 21% and 20%; Yawlinsky – 26% and 9%, respectively. As to the market economy – the 43% of Yeltsin`s devotees were in favor and 7% against. Amongst of the other presidential candidates, these proportions were as follows: Zyrinowsky – 25% and 20%; Zuganov – 15% and 33%, Lebed – 23% and 27%; Yawlinsky – 51% and 6%, respectively. The data concerning the attitude of the Russian to the others determinants of the Western

civilization (their ways of life, movies, etc.) displayed the similar tendencies. From these facts it appears that the only group which had consistently repudiated the values and the patterns of the Western societies were the pro-communist electors of Zuzanov.

A more favourable approval of the Western values are the results of the investigation of the attitudes of Russians to the type of the statehood. The survey on that score, was conducted in May of 1996 among the 1519 persons all over the land. The polled could choose three answers from the following:

- The Russia should be the State of Russian nation (the Russian nationalists),
- The Russia should be the mighty power capable of waging the wars (the Advocates of power politics),
- The Russia should be the multiethnic State of the equal nations (the Internationalists),
- The Russia should return to the communist system (the Communist-restorers),
- The Russia should be the State creating a voluntary association of the former Soviet republics (the Unionists),
- The Russia should „reborn” as a mighty military empire within the borders of the former USSR (the Imperialists),
- The Russia should become the State, in which the strength and the power will assure the growth of the citizen`s well-being (the Post-Soviet individualists),
- The Russia should be the State with the market economy, the democratic freedoms and with the observance of the human rights (the Occidentalists-Democrats),
- The Russia should be the Christian Orthodox State (the Christian Orthodox).

Table 3

The followers of individual types of statehood (in percentage in the whole population and in each group)

	The population altogether	The post-Soviet Individualists	The Occidentalists-Democrats	The Internationalists	The Advocates of the power politics	The Unionists	The Russian nationalists	The Christian Orthodox	The Communist-restorers	The Imperialists
The post-Soviet Individualists	52	100	50	37	18	18	12	11	5	3
The Occidentalists-Democrats	41	63	100	36	16	16	10	13	2	4
The Internationalists	35	55	42	100	17	19	5	8	14	5

The Advocates of the power politics	21	43	31	29	100	15	29	9	18	8
The Unionists	19	47	33	33	17	100	12	8	18	5
The Russian nationalists	16	36	26	10	37	14	100	16	9	9
The Christian Orthodox	13	45	42	23	15	12	20	100	8	10
The Communist-restorers	12	20	5	40	31	29	12	8	100	15
The Imperialists	7	19	23	25	25	15	20	19	26	100

Source: T.I. Kutkovec, I.M. Klamkin, *Ruskiye idei*, [in:] Politicheskiye issledovaniya, 1997, n° 2, pp. 1-3.

The table 3 shows the percentage of support for each of these ideas. It also takes into account the question how the remaining types of the Statehood are popular among the adherents of the main of them. For instance, amongst the 21% advocates of the power politics were 43% post-Soviet individualists, the 29% Russian nationalists, the 18% communist-restorers, etc. From this surveys, one might conclude that before the presidential elections of 1996, the majority of population wanted to live in a land in which the polity is strong owing to the growth of the prosperity of their inhabitants, in the country with the market economy and with the democratic freedoms based on the community of the equal nations. The nationalistic, restorer`s communist, imperial sentiments of great power were less expanded.

In addition, it was established a number of principles, which did not separated, but united the Russians, embracing in every group from 67 to 98% of supporters. Here are these principles:

- The life of an individual man above any other values,
- The statute-book binding all the citizens from the President of the Republic to every common man,
- The sacred and inviolable right of ownership,
- The measure of the State`s might should be the welfare of their inhabitants,
- The measure of the State`s might should be the rigorous observance of law and of human freedom,

- The fundamental rights of Man are the right to life and of the protection of honour and personal dignity.

The attitudes of the Russian people to the Western models of civilization is the subject-matter of the more and more often sociological surveys. These polls are concerned with such values as the personal dignity, the justice, the laboriousness, the sense of responsibility, the level of instruction, the hospitality, the knowledge of a job, the enterprise drive, the religiosity, the tolerance, the spirit of sacrifice, the respect for the law, the equality before the law, the freedom of convictions, the wealth, the people's power, the work discipline, the precedence of the State interests over the individual ones, etc. As the traditional Russian (but not Soviet) values – expressly opposed to the Western ones are perceived the justice, the hospitality, the desinterestedness, the patience, the sacrifice. The most accentuated Western values are the enterprise drive, the practicalness, the professional skill, the tolerance. As the most Soviet values are mentioned the atheism, the enthusiasm, the fighting readiness. One should ask here why when the majority of the people are in favor of the traditional Russian patterns it repudiates automatically such value as the expertness? This is not a true. Though for the 30% of the polled persons, the professional competence is characteristic of the Western culture, for the 16% to the traditional Russian one and for the 11% to the Soviet mentality, it is at the same time the 30% of the inquired considered the knowledge of a trade as an important value for them oneself. On the other hand, whilst the 55% surveyed people perceive the faith in God as the traditional Russian value, it is only for the 21% of them a personally essential thing (Klamkin, 1994, p. 76).

The data of the surveys here presented are the first results of large scale's empirical studies on the Russian society's attitudes to the cultural patterns of behaviour. His analysis is rich in many interesting ascertainments of the facts, the examination of which exceeds the limits of this chapter.

When the Russia's future is discussed, the chances of the triumph of the Occidentalism are questioned. One can point out several causes which, according to the Russian philosophers, specialists in culture, politologists, economists, are the barriers in the Europeanization of that country. It is believed that one of the principal causes are the „hard-set structures of the fundamentally anti-Western propriety”, the unbroken Asiatism. The

scholars think that the Russia unlike the West, which subdue objectively the world and amass the material values (the so-called first reality), it is especially characterized by the „second reality”, which reproduces the sacral, mythological and spiritual ratios, with a relative forgetfulness and a conscious suppression of the „first reality”. The Asiatic features are expressed not only in the existence of the given social structures, but also in the specific „human carnality”, as shaped by the peculiar type of public authorities operation (Kara-Murza, 1993, p. 90).

The radically opposite views are held on this score, by a group of experts, according to which the Russian modernization's obstacles are not the fossilized structures of traditionalism or totalitarianism, but the lack of any structures, the complete amorphism of the „material subject to the reform”, the perpetual dissolving of traditions. If the first group of authors is of the opinion that the reforms encounter something what resist the modernization, the other scholars are defending the thesis that they have nothing to come up against. „Without denying that the traditionalism is difficult to reform, this group of researchers assumes that the effective modernization may be realized only along the path of the traditionalism under transformation. From the other countries – not only those in which the modernization had succeeded, but also in these, which had experienced, in a certain degree, of the totalitarianism (for instance China) – Russia is not distinguished by the retrograde and inert basis, but by the absence of it at all” (ibidem).

The still another group of views are voiced by those for whom the main hindrance to the Russian reforms are not neither the persistent Asian structure nor the lack of any structure, but the ruins of totalitarianism. These relics of the past – so to say – „hypnotize” the society and block through his „massiveness” the reform's efforts.

Finally, it is also believed that the configuration of the Western and Eastern intentions had led to their mutual stimulation and then to the overgrowth of each of them. This „race” between the Westernization and the Asiatism had produced a situation in which the two orientations have lost their „cultural-defensive shields” and remind the electricity's wire without any „insulating tape” (A. Rubcow's opinion). The sharp and thoroughgoing competition between the Occidentalism and the Slavophilism (the Russian unique character), as the two durable and inseparable components of the Russian civilization threatens the

„barbarizing” of the land and the adherents of these two currents are accusing each other of the causing such a danger (ibidem).

According to some authors, the Russia – in order to overcome the civilization crisis – will make his way towards West-european patterns, in an evolutionary manner. However, this shall be a long, lasting process that can be accompanied by the social outbursts and even the recurrences of certain forms of the authoritarian rule are possible, although not in such a scale that occurred in 1917 (Pastuhov, 1992, pp. 74-75). It is also said that the relationship between the civilization and the democracy is mutual and the just begun democratization processes will favor the pro-Western tendencies, although some scholars are uttering the doubts. The Polish professor Z. Madej is considering whether the „Russia with their neighbours shall climb easier the civilization`s heights on the democratic manner than under the czardom or the proletariat dictate and dictatorship conditions, respectively?” It would seem that so, because – as he replies – „already the democratization is at least, a pass to Europe, but it can be also the de facto return ticket. The march towards the democracy was initiated, for the people had ceased to tolerate the old order and had accepted it in advance, without tasting it, according to his manicheistic outlook. The people feels a yearning for it since the time of Perycles and what is more, the democracy was made a worth in itself. He wants it without thinking on the manner how that system will solve their difficulties. In the nations of the former Soviet Union, the authoritarian governments may still return to power, but they will not give up their democratic ideals” (Madej, 1993, pp. 213-214).

It is generally admitted that the Western industrial civilization is undergoing a crisis, which is measured by the by-effects of its successes. Some of these side effects hit also Russia. This is furnishing the arguments to the opponents of the Occidentalism. The Europeanization alone does not guarantee too the expected development. Suffice to mention here - unlike the Japan – the examples of Turkey or India. It is impossible to forecast how many positive consequences and also the negative ones will bring to the Russia the progressing rapprochement to the Western civilization and how this will influence on his political system. It is generally accepted, amongst the Russian scholars the idea that the main obstacle on the road to modernization is the very Europeanization. The Occidentalism flourishes then when in the interior of the Russian tradition is occurring the dissonance and

appear the liberal outlook. However, it reveals himself as a „state of the mind unable to adopt to the pluralistic perception of the world and which is trying to find a new orthodox and uniform tradition, a new basis and a new faith, but at present of Western-type” (A. Panarin`s opinion – Kara Murza, 1993, p. 92).

It is also said that in the past, the Russian rulers had turned many times to the West, not in order to Europeanize the Russia, but in order to run away from the real-life problems of the social development into the sacral and mythological spheres, „allowing the State to maintain the control over the society...And until now, the similar „occidentalism” remains the artificial conglomerate of varied elements (separated from the real-life Western context) being a means of manipulation of the Russian society by the ruling élite” (J. Grunin`s and B. Kagarlicky`s opinion – ibidem).

This selective perception of the West is producing a wrong picture of the West in which is not accentuated the „productive ascetism”, but the „civilization rest”. This hightens the „distributive dominant of Russian post-Soviet culture, which still more obstruct the emergence...of the productive capitalism and bring alongside the powerfull load of authoritarianism as the most effective regulative factor of the normative distribution system” (A. Panarin`s opinion – ibidem).

Thus, the possible ascendancy of the occidentalists shall not mean that the initiated by them the political reforms will be efficient. There is a number of reasons, which might distort them.

Chapter V

Which model of democracy?

The consolidation of the democracy in Russia had begun in Autumn 1993 altogether with the electoral campaign to the Popular Chamber of State Duma of the Vth legislature. For the first time in this general election of 12th December 1993 stood the parties and the committees registered with the Central Electoral Commission. At the same day was held the referendum in order to approve the draft of the constitution proposed by B. Yeltsin. While accepting this project, the majority of Russians „had absolved him from sin” against the bloody disbandment of the Supreme Soviet of Russian Federation. The people had reaffirmed his attitude to the course of the change of regime, during the presidential election of 1996, in which the ailing incumbent had won over his communist-nationalistic opponent with the 13% margin.

The positive democratic outcomes have to be seen in the parliamentary election of 1995 and of governors in the Autumn of 1996. At present, we are witness the preparations for the parliamentary election in December 1999. Despite of the dramatic and even tragic economic situation of the country the impossibility of realization by the State of many responsibilities towards the citizens, one cannot note the strengthening of the populist and nationalistic feelings. According to a recent public survey if the election to the State Duma

took place in last April, the 5% electoral barrier might cross only the Communist Party of Russia, (25% of the votes), the Y. Luzkov patriotic movement Otechestvo – 15% and the group „Yabloko” – 14%. This information is based on the poll of the Center of Political Investigations, circulated on 7th April 1999 by the Press Agency Interfax. In the estimation of that Center there is no – at present - in Russia a fourth political force which might be sure of entering into the State Duma. However, one can see as the prospective parliamentary seats holders the Movement in Support of the Army, the Lebed Russian National-Republican Party, the „Our House – Russia” of V. Chernomyrdin and the block „Just Cause” of Y. Gaydar, B. Nemcov and of B. Fedor.

The Russian political regime at the end of the XX century comply with the minimum of conditions, which characterize the democracy, such as: the regular competitive general elections, the political pluralism, the institutions and the procedures protecting the individual liberties and rights, the freedom of speech, press, association, the unlimited acces of the public to the alternative sources of information. These elements of democracy are relatively measurable and it is easy to determine them. The additional less precise criteria of a democratic political system are: the conformity of the representative bodies „with the preferences of the electors as expressed in the general voting and in the other forms of political activity” (according to R. Dahl, 1973, p. 38) or the relatively accurate correspondence of the „actions taken by the political regime to the wishes of the relatively great number of citizens over a long span of time” (according to A. Lijphart, 1984, p. 2) as well as the taking into account of the opinions of the minorities. However, it is very difficult to ascertain in the Russia of today the degree of implementing of these democratic requirements. It is beyond any doubt that the State organs are fulfilling in a small degree the preferences of the electorate. The end consequence of that is the growing political apathy of the Russian society, whose broad strata do not identified their interests with the interests and expectations of any political groupings and do not participate in the general elections.

The important standard of judgment on the democratic character is also the system of State power organs. The Russia are modelled upon the Fifth French Republic: the president is selected in the general elections, it has the right to issue the legislative acts (decrees) excluded from the parliamentary and executive branches supervision – they are put only under the

Constitutional Court's control. The Head of State appoints and dismisses the cabinet, the members of which do not depend on the political composition of the legislative chambers. The President of the Republic has the right of veto the statutes approved by the parliament and can dissolve it in cases stated by the Constitution. The national representative chambers have not the powers that might counterbalance the strong position of the Head of State, although they can influence the governmental policies through their laws. The violation of the democratic principles were the refusals of signing by the president B. Yeltsin of some legislative acts – the moves which were not the exercise of the veto. In these cases, the Head of State had based their decisions only on minor procedural transgressions in the work of the popular elected Duma.

The Russian Constitution guarantees the observance of the freedoms and rights of man. For the first time in the history of that country, the Constitution has the direct binding effect. This means that the Basic Law can be applied by all organs of the State authority immediately without the necessity of being approved the corresponding statutes by the parliament. This new role of the Russian Constitution is, however until now, of little use. The major part of the population is not aware of the possibilities resulting from the „Supreme Law of the Land”. It seems even that the public authorities are not very familiar with that new idea. In this respect, the great responsibilities belong to the mass media, the Supreme Court of Justice and especially to the constitutional review. At present, in Russia, every citizen has the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court for its judgment on the encroachment of their fundamental freedoms and rights. This so-called constitutional complain is more and more employed by the ordinary men and shall contribute to a better application of the national basic statute.

In Russia, the individual freedoms and rights are - as testify the reports by the Amnesty International – offended recurrently. This is not an effect of the purposeful State policy, but a result of the cultural heritage, according to which a man is not in high esteem. The facts of violation of the human rights are nowadays very highlighted by the Russian mass media as well as the organs and the institutions responsible for their protection are taking the steps aimed at the preventing them.

In Russian legal culture, the law-governed state is slowly progressing. The public authorities are still promulgating often the legal acts and administrative decisions obviously contradictory with the constitution and the superior regulations. At times, these acts are canceled or modified as a result of the media criticism. The important role in raising the legal national culture is played by the decisions and the interpretation made by the Constitutional Court, which activity is frequently the subject-matter of the press reports.

All this demonstrates that the young Russian democracy is evolving, although under the big economic crisis must go through an ordeal. The democracy of this kind, despite of the open aversion of Russians to the West is in line with the patterns of the occidental civilization. The Russians hold the main tenets of that democracy as the universal achievements of the whole mankind and do not questioning them. It is very difficult to argue that they would wanted to give up of democracy in favor of some form of dictatorship or authoritarianism hoping that this might help them to go out of the crisis. It is a little chance to win the support of the major electorate by the forces fundamentally antidemocratic. Any of these forces has an idea that may seize the masses.

Bibliography

- Antoszewski A., (1993), *Przejsie ku demokracji (tranzycja demokratyczna) jako proces polityczny*, [in:] A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, W. Jednaka, (eds.), *Partie i system partyjny w Polsce - pierwsza faza przejścia ku demokracji*, Wrocław.
- Baloyra, E.A., (1987), *Democratic Transition in Comparative Perspective*, [in:] *Comparing New Democracies. Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and Southern Cone*, London.
- Barber, B., (1999), *Rzady wiedzy* (interview), [in:] *Wprost*, 2 May, Poznan.
- Berdiayev, M. (1987), *Rosyjska idea*, Warszawa.
- Bielecki, Cz., (1999), *Zadnych złudzen*, [in:] *Wprost*, 23 May, Poznan.
- Birukov, N.I, Sergiyevev, V.M., (1997), „*Sobornost*” *kak paradigma polityczeskogo soznaniya*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n° [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n° 3, Moscow.
- Dahl, R., (1973), *Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance*, Chicago.
- Dobek-Ostrowska, B., (1995), *Hiszpania i Polska: elity polityczne w okresie przejścia do demokracji (analiza porównawcza)*, Wrocław.
- Dobroczyńska, A., (1993) *Uwarunkowania transformacji ustrojowej Rosji*, [in:] *Studia Wschodnie*, n° 1.
- Fadyeyev, D.A., (1992), *Ot avtoritarisma k democratii: zakonomernosti perehodnogo perioda*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n° 1-2, Moscow.
- Gadziyev, K.S., (1994), *O perspektivach demokratitczeskoy gosudarstvennosti w Rossii*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n° 3, Moscow.

- Gibson, J.L., Duch, R.M., Tedin, K.L., (1992) *Democratic Values and Transformation of the Soviet Union*, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 2, s. 352-353.
- Jab³onski, A.W., (1994), *Komparatystyka systemow politycznych. Tendencje i kierunki analizy makroteoretycznej*, [in:] A. Antoszewski, (ed.), *Ewolucja polskiego systemu politycznego po 1989 roku w swietle komparatystycznej teorii polityki*, Wroclaw 1994.
- Kapustin, B.G., (1992), *Krizys cennostej i shansy rossijskogo liberalisma*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 5-6, Moscow.
- Kara-Murza, A.A., (1993), *Czto takoye rossijskoje zapadnichestvo? (Razmyszlaniya uczastrnika konferiencyi)*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 2, Moscow.
- Karp, M., Sienkiewicz, B., (1999), *Rok 1998 – koniec iluzji?*, Report of Center Research of East, Warszawa.
- Klamkin, I.M., (1993), *Politiczeskaya sociologiya perehodnogo obshczestva*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 4, Moscow.
- Klamkin, I.M., (1993), *Postkommunisticheskaya demokratiya i yeyo istoricheskoye osobennosti w Rossii*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, 1993, nr 2, s. 6, Moscow.
- Klamkin, I.M., (1994), *Sovietskoye i zapadnoye: wozmozen li sintiez?*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 5, Moscow.
- Klamkin, I.M., Lapkin, V.V., (1996), *Russkij vopros v Rossii*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 1, Moscow.
- Kozarzewski, P., (1994), *Polityczne uwarunkowania funkcjonowania wladzy wykonawczej*, [in:] P. Kozarzewski, (ed.), *Zmiany ustrojowe w Rosji postradzieckiej - aspekty polityczne*, Instytut Studiow Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa.
- Krasilshczikov, V.A., (1993), *Modernizacya i Rossiya na porogie XXI wieka*, [in:] *Voprosy filosofii*, n^o 7.
- Krylov, S., (1995) *Nauka demokracji* (interview), [in:] *Wprost*, n^o 42, Poznan.
- Kutkovec, T.I., Klamkin, I.M., (1997), *Russkije idei*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 2, Moscow.
- Lapkin, V.V., Pantin, V.I., (1997), *Russkij poriadok*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 3, Moscow.
- Lazari, A. (1994), *Zagrozenia rosyjskie*, [in:] *Transformacja w krajach Europy Srodkowej i Wschodniej (ze szczegolnym uwzglednieniem przypadku Polski)*, materialy konferencji naukowej na Wydziale Zarzadzania i Administracji Wyzszej Szko³y Pedagogicznej w Kielcach.
- Lijphart, A., (1984), *Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty One Countries*, Yale UP, New Haven.
- Madej, Z., (1993), *Rosyjskie zmagania cywilizacyjne*, Warszawa 1993.
- Morlino, L., (1987), *Democratic Establishments: A Dimensional Analysis*, [in:] *Comparing New Democracies. Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and Southern Cone*, London.
- Mostovaya, I.W., Skorik, A.P., (1995), *Arhetypy i orientiry rossijskoj mentalnosti*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 4, Moscow.
- Mushinsky, V.O., (1992), *Sumierki totalitarnogo soznaniya*, [in:] *Gosudarstvo i pravo*, n^o 3, Moscow.
- O. Kirchheimer, (1969), *Confining of Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthrough*, [in:] *Politics, Law and Social Change. Selected Essays of Otto Kirchheimer*, F.S. Burin, K. Shell, (eds.), Columbia UP.
- Opros Fonda "Obshczestvennoye mnieniye"*, [in:] *Ogoniok* 1995, n^o 15, Moscow.
- Opros Fonda "Obszczestwiennoye mnieniye"* [w:] *Ogoniok* 1995, n^o 12, Moscow.
- Pantin, I.K., (1994), *Drama protivostoyaniya demokratiya-liberalism v staroj i novej Rossiji (sudba liberalisma v Rossiji)*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 3, Moscow.

- Pastuhov, V.B., (1992), *Budushczeye Rossiji vyrastayet iz prosh³ogo - Postkommunizm kak logiczeskaya faza razvitiya jevrazijskoy civilizicji*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 5-6, Moscow.
- Polakov, L.W., (1997), *Metodologiya issledovaniya rossijskoj modernizacii*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 3, Moscow.
- Przeworski, A., (1986), *Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy*, [in:] G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, L. Whitehead, (eds.), t. III.
- Pugaczov, B.M., (1993), *Crisis demokratii v Rossiji*, [in:] *Postkommunisticzeskoye razvitiye Rossiji (sbornik naucznych trudov)*, Rossijskaja Akademiya Nauk, Institut miedzunarodnyh ekonomiczeskich i politiczeskich issledowanij, Moscow .
- Rodriguez, Diaz, A., (1989), *Transocion politica y cocnsolidacion constitucional de los partidos politicos*. Ed. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid.
- Romanienko, L.M., (1994), *Grazdanskoye obshczestvo v Rossiji uze yest, no...*, [in:] *Sociologiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 4, Moscow.
- Royen, Ch., (1995) *Spawanie kontynentu* (interview), [in:] *Wprost*, n^o 46, Poznan.
- Rustow, D., (1970), *Transition to Democracy. Toward a Dynamic Model*, CP, vol. 2 (3).
- Saharov, A.N., (1991), *Demokratiya i vola v nashem oteczestwie*, [in:] *Svobodnaya mysl*, n^o 17, Moscow.
- Serfaty, M., (1981), *Spanish Democracy: The End of Transition*, CH, vol. 80 (466), s.215).
- Shapovalov, V.F., (1996), *Liberalism i rossijskaya idea*, [in] *Sociologiczskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 2, Moscow.
- Share, D., (1987), *Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction*, CPS, vol. 19 (4).
- Shczekoczhin, Y., Lukin, B., (1992), *Pogibla li v Rosiiji demokratiya?*, [in:] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, n^o 47, Moscow.
- Shczerbina, N.G., (1997), *Arhaika v rossijskoj politiczeskoj kulturie*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 5, Moscow.
- Sztompka, P., (1994), *Teorie zmian spo³ecznych a doswiadczenia polskiej transformacji*, [in] *Studia Socjologiczne*, n^o 1.
- Volodin, A., (1994) *Problema zapadniczestva*, [in:] *Svobodnaya mysl*, n^o 7-8, Moscow.
- Voroncowa, L.M, Filatov, S.B., (1993), *Religioznost- diemokracicznost- avtoritarnost*, [in:] *Politiczeskiye issledovaniya*, n^o 3, Moscow.
- Yegorov, S.A., (1997), *Biedna li Rossija democraticzeskimi trdicyami?* [in:] *Gosudarstvo i pravo*, n^o 6, Moscow.
- Zerkalo mnenij. Rezultaty sociologiczeskogo oprosa nasieleniya Rossiji za ijun 1993. M.*; IS RAN, 1993, Moscow..

Abstract of the report

This report on the Russian democratic prospect in the context of civilization struggles presents the cultural factors of the regime transformation in that country. It is generally estimated that the democracy in Russia will fail, because there are too many obstacles to it. To them belong, first of all, the perplexity of many the Russians, being in an awkward position between the expansive Slavophilism and the equally active Westernization.

1. The transformation in Russia might be studied by referring to the general concepts and patterns of transition to democracy, as elaborated in relation to the similar processes taking place in other countries. For example, according to the D. Rustov's thesis, the transition might be divided into the preliminary (1987-1990), decisional (1990-1993) and consolidation stages, while the last started in 1993 without being finished to that date.

2. In Russia, there are not a tradition of liberal democracy, but it is a wide spread opinion that their other models are familiar to the Russians and that they are very tied to some democratic values. The Russians have in high esteem more the liberal freedoms and rights than the democratic institutions and procedures. Above any democratic system, they prefer the order. There are many adversaries of the democracy, also among the liberals. Contrary to the plight in this respect in the West, the liberal and democratic tendencies did separated in Russia yet before 1917.

3. The main obstacle to the Russian democratization is the civilization crisis which had hit this country after the collapse of the communist-soviet regime. That crisis is embodied not exactly in the dramatic economic plight, but in the not resolved fight between the Slavophilists and the Occidentalists – waged for more than three centuries and which is now going momentum after the 70 years old interruption. The most essential barrier of the Russian culture to the liberal democracy is the collectivistic spirit of its people.

4. There are considerable differences between the values and the patterns of life in Russia and in the Western countries. The majority of the population are favor of the traditional Russian way of life and are demonstranting often the anti-Western stance. This is caused, in a large measure, by the low spirits resulting from the economic crisis, for which is mostly blamed the West. The sociological research reveals too that the basic values and institutions of the liberal democracy are however accepted, for they are considered as the achievements of all mankind.

5. The started in 1993 democratic consolidation proceeds up to the middle of 1999 without visible disturbances, although it is implemented only with the minimum of the democratic requirements. To a large extent, it is guaranteed by the president B. Yeltsin imitating the French Fifth Republic. The electoral pre-election public polls of the spring of 1999 did not denoted the danger of any stopping of the democratic move in Russia.