

Public Perceptions
of Security and the Militar
in the Czech Republic

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Content:

1. Civil-military relations and the role of the public

- 1.1. The triangle of civil-military relations
- 1.2. Levels of the civilian and democratic control of the military
- 1.3. Players of the civilian control of the military
- 1.4. The public, politicians and the military: Is the public controlled or controlling

2. Attitudes toward security and the military

- 2.1. Attitudes toward national defence
- 2.2. Attitudes to the military
- 2.3. Assessment of the professional soldiers
- 2.4. Influence of the attitude toward NATO membership, and of the political orientation towards security, the military and the professional soldiers

2.5. A personal contribution to defence

2.6. Military: And why?

2.7. Changes in the military

2.8. Problems of the military

2.9. Influence of the selected military problems on confidence to the military, the Minister of Defence and on perception of changes in the military.

2.10. Threats in the new world

2.11. Feeling of threat

2.12. What generates the feeling of threat?

2.13. Feeling of the military threat

2.14. Who is considered to be the military threat

2.15. Acceptance of involvement in peacekeeping missions

2.16. Opinions on participation in peacekeeping missions

2.17. Attitudes to conscription

2.18. Opinions on conscription

2.19. Conscription or the professional military?

2.20. How long conscription should be?

2.21. Performance of Conscription Service

2.22. What is More Important for the Society – Military or Civil Service?

2.23. Who to decide on civil service?

3. The Czech public and professional soldiers on NATO membership

3.1. Support for admission to NATO

3.2. Readiness to join NATO

3.3. Knowledge about Admission of the Czech Republic to NATO

3.4. Consequences of Admission to NATO

3.5. Perception of NATO and the military of the Czech Republic by professional soldiers

3.6. Security risks and Admission of the Czech Republic to NATO

Conclusions

Appendix

1. Civil-military relations and the role of the public

1.1. The triangle of civil-military relations

Civil-military relations emerges from the interplay of a variety of forces. A very simplified approach describes them as the interplay among the public, the military and politicians. In this perception the military is always described as an institution charged with defence, but also as an interest group following its own goals which must be closely scrutinised. Politicians, especially those at the moment in power are represented as watchdogs of the military. The role of the public is described as watchdogs' watchdog.

In this model the main control function is carried out by the political leadership who are considered the main civil component of democratic control. The main deficiency of this approach lies in the restriction to an institutional analysis which does not incorporate additional elements of society

A more complicated approach mixes all civilian actors the public, media and politicians who participate in control of the military. Direct formal control is carried out by institutional actors but the other informal and non-institutional elements influence the whole process in many ways. They do not only watch the watchdogs but provide direct influence on the military as well¹ Both these actors are simultaneously controlling and guiding the military as well as influencing each other.

In reality there are more actors of civil-military relations and democratic control the military than only these three. A high number of civil-military relations' actors mirrors the fact that civil-military relations have many dimensions not only political but also economic, environmental, moral etc.

This situation reflects that in most of general definitions of the civilian control are rather vague and consider civilian control of the military as an instrument the society uses for management of its armed forces, for setting forth priorities for the military and ensuring the military and its means and equipment will not be misused for other than by society defined purposes as well as for ensuring that no economic wasting of resources allocated to the military will occur. Individual players through formal and non-formal channels both at nation-wide and regional levels exercise the civilian control

1.2. Levels of the civilian and democratic control of the military

The civilian control of the military has to be exercised simultaneously at the two levels:

1) *The formal level* applies to control defined within the legislative framework of the Constitution and laws. At this level the jurisdiction of the national institutions towards the military should be unambiguously and clearly defined. Measures taken at this formal level are the basis for existence of effective and transparent system of democratic control.

2) *The non-formal level* of civilian control reflects the fact the military and its members are "anchored" in a broad network of social interactions. The existence and working of

¹ See for instance Rebecca L. Shiff, *Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance* *Armed Forces and Society*, No. 1, 1995, pp. 7-24.

such non-formal relations can affect negatively (for instance insufficient or false information about situation within the military, communication blockade between career soldiers and civilian personnel), or positively (development of civil expertise, transfer of skills from military to civil profession, and the like) the performance of civilian and democratic control.

1.3. Players of the civilian control of the militar

The players of civilian control represent a wide conglomerate of controversial forces, which in relation to the military follow their specific interests, and they drive them at both levels. A part of players acts particularly at the formal level, the other part at the non-formal level. As major players of formal control of the military we can consider the subjects of political bureaucratic nature which role in relation to the military is explicitly defined in the Constitution and laws. It relates first of all to the President, Government, Minister of Defence, House of Deputies and the Senate and their committees for defence and security, political parties, but also the Supreme Control Office. The major players of non-formal control include subjects who have no specifically defined role in advance but they are able to furnish their influence. This is the case of the general public, journalists, academic public, non-governmental and non-profit organisations, but also civilian staff at the ministry of defence, conscripts and career officers.

Civilian and democratic control of the military must originate from appropriate legislative framework. The basic issues of existence of the military, its justification, division of rights, duties and management powers and responsibility in a peacetime, crisis situations and in case of war should be set forth by the Constitution or by other laws. From the formal point of view control of the military must come out from clear and explicit division of responsibility among individual players who form the national security system. And the rights and duties should be laid down in laws and legislative norms beginning with the Constitution and ending with the military rules and regulations.

The major players of the control exercised through the formal channels include:

President: The President, usually the supreme commander of armed forces, has a specific position in the control mechanisms. He represents primarily the symbolic and moral authority. He influences the military either personally or through his military office. The uniqueness of the Czech Republic system is the fact that even though Article 63 (c) of the Constitution sets the President is the supreme commander of armed forces he must, in some situation, to consult the Prime Minister (just as in case of appointment and promotion of generals).

Parliament (Senate or other legislative body): It is one of the most important players of democratic control. It decides over engagement of military in case of crisis or war as well as over foreign deployment of the military in peacetime. The Parliament supervises the government military-related activities and also directly supervises events inside the military, and it decides on allocation of funds for the military by means of passing the national budget. It is capable of affecting the size of the military budget or its structure as well as it can require solution of problems that may occur within the scope of the Minister of Defence.

Defence and Security Committee of the Parliament: It represent the parliamentary body which deals with security issues in all their width and deepness. This committee in particular should know best the challenges of security and military

related issues, and it should not only control but also promote the military build-up in accordance with the national interests. Through the defence and security committees the closest ties and interchange of information between the military and the Parliament is exercised.

Government: It represents the top executive power in the state. In a government declaration it formulates its security policy implemented by other government provisions. It is collectively held responsible to the Parliament what is extremely significant namely in the field of defence because the defence security policy is not only realised by the defence ministry but it is shared by a number of other departments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, economic ministries and others).

Minister of Defence: The common principles of democratic control of the military incline to opinion that the minister of defence should be a civilian who would together with his office represent a counterweight to the General Staff which is considered to be a military element. The Minister and the Ministry of Defence represent the political leadership of the department, the Minister being accountable to the Government and the Parliament for execution of governmental policy in the field of defence. The General Staff represents military, professional expertise; it is responsible for command and training of the military in peacetime. The General Staff works out professional experts' reports and recommendations and the minister decides on them. In order to be able to decide with full quality and was not only spokesperson of the General Staff the top management of the ministry must take part in a process of development of basic documents, of acquisition and re-location of units plans.

Supreme Control Office: It ensures that no inappropriate manipulation with public funds allocated for the military through the military budget occurs as well as through other instruments for financing the military and its activities (for instance, the costs of peacekeeping operations - IFOR, SFOR - are partly covered by other sources than from the military budget).

Simultaneously non-formal players significantly contribute to the control of armed forces and they can act either directly or by mediation:

Political Parties: Armed forces should be out of political parties, they should not be tied to any of them. To achieve this goal a number of measures were taken in the Czech armed forces. No political party is entitled to conduct a canvassing inside the armed forces; officers and conscripts (during their active service) cannot be members of any political party. Political parties can influence the armed forces only through the Government or Parliament. Governmental parties or coalition have of course the decisive influence to formulation and realisation of security policy and build-up of the armed forces. In spite of this fact, in shaping the security policy the long-term nature and importance should be considered, it should be formed on the consensus basis of both governmental and opposition parties. The political parties, including non-parliamentary ones, transform interests of individual groups of population into political interests - what stands good also in relation to the military and security in a broad approach - which are based on the definition of risks.

Non-governmental and Non-profit Organisations: Without deep understanding of complex military issues by the civil sphere it is impossible to conduct effective political control of the military. In forming independent viewpoints and in analytic judgement of strategic issues the irreplaceable role is played by non-governmental and non-profit organisations. Abroad, there are and are widely used independent "think-tanks", the organisations specialising in national security and

defence issues and which develop independent data and analyses for governmental bodies. These organisations together with the means of mass information significantly affect public opinion. A community of engaged civilian experts is systematically built in forming a strategic communities and groups of opinion leaders. Non-governmental and non-profit organisations assist in education and training of such civilian experts. These organisations at the same time balance the influence of the defence industry which invest huge sums into military research and production and often it is interested in affecting strategic decisions to be taken in its benefit. Non-governmental and non-profit organisations are by their substance highly controversial. In their relation to the military they include a wide spectrum of opinions from pacifism, anti-militarism, and anarchism, denying justification of the military existence, up to trends which form and cultivate relation of citizen to the state, security and the military.

Profit Organisations: These are the institutions competing in the economic market which interest is to come into economic relations with the military. In ideal case they closely observe the competition and adherence to the business ethics even in relation to the military acquisition orders for service or equipment. At present a perception has come up that ethical principles are not anytime the first ones what has brought negative influence to a capacity of the military in the society and enables the situation that military inviting for public tenders is put in doubts on lack of transparency.

Research Institutions: If decision-making process at ministerial, governmental or parliamentary levels is to be effective and accountable, it needs good information and a deep objective analysis. Professional, long-term analyses and predictions could be provided only by specialised research institutions. The informed media and independent research organisations can therefore, positively affect the decision-making process.

The media: The modern media exercise, without doubt, an extreme influence to forming the public opinion and political decision-making. Besides, they enable the public to form its own views on what are happening inside the armed forces and what their priorities are. They provide the public with tools enabling to influence conduct of the armed forces.

Conscripts: They represent a group of population that during their conscript service gains a direct image on the military, on spending the public funds. In their perception is considerably affected by low popularity of the conscription service and by its conditions.

Civilian Employees of the Ministry of Defence: They represent an important group which is capable of good orientation in security policy issues and in some other challenges of the military life (for instance economic and social aspects, challenges of communication with the public, recruitment). Their involvement in structures of the Ministry of Defence together with professional soldiers represents a joint of military and civilian expertise.

Professional Soldiers: It is a group of population that increasingly integrates into the society what applies especially to some highly specialised professions. Concurrently, due to the falling interest of the public in security and military issues, it, however, turns to marginalization of the Military as an institution. The career soldiers represent an important source of information that forms attitudes to the military and security issues. Very important is also acceptance of democratic and social norms by professional soldiers because it prevents the radical group of politicians from manipulation with the military. A conflict between social and communist values

emerged even in the former socialist military where - as some experts point to – there was evidently the lowest goodwill to engage in interest of objectives of the communist party if compared with units of the Ministry of Interior and the People's Militia. Also transformation of the military profession contributes to promoting importance of the career soldiers as a tool of the civil control. Charles Moskos speaks about a soldier-diplomat, a soldier-scientist, and the like, by which he expresses an idea that professional soldiers now more often act as experts in relation to politicians but also to academic institutions, non-governmental organisations and to the press, and that they more often contribute to the discussions on military-related and security issues. This trend shows that professional soldiers are capable of overcoming a symbolic blockade between the military terminology and political or scientific discourse. Charles Moskos emphasises that career soldiers must present themselves as equivalent partners in order to be able to defend frequently very reasonable proposals in a turbulent situation of the present world in their discussion with politicians (not in a sense of sharing power but in a sense of expertise). It means they must master a diplomatic way of negotiations and they must free themselves from bureaucratic restraints of the institution they work in. Some authors think that readiness of the military management in the mentioned field will provide against risks of a tendency of political elite to intervene into micro-management of military organisation, and it will legitimise professional autonomy of the military.

The public: The modern democratic military cannot exist without support of the public. The public must be convinced that the military serves the nation's interests, and in case of need the military is capable of defending these interests and that the public can rely on it. It must be also convinced that budget allocated to the military is adequate, and money is spent legitimately. Public opinion in democratic society has after all the decisive and final control function. Its influence to the military is exercised not only through elected representatives but also directly. The expression of civilian control from the side of the public is its confidence in the military, and among others, the prestige of military profession in society. At present trend of strengthening social ties of the military family prevails. Spouses of professional soldiers are being less dependent upon the military and they seek their jobs outside the military environment. The military profession is in stage of considerable changes and some specializations face disintegration of "esprit de corps"; the military experts identify themselves more to their civilian peers than to a group of professional soldiers. The higher importance is given to the possibility of the professional knowledge transfer into civilian positions. This trend will gain in relation to enlargement of category of professional non-commissioned officers who will serve in the military only during the relatively short time of their active life. Very important tool of the civilian control is the perception of risks, which distinctively limits the allocation of funds for the military and decision-making of the Parliament on the military budget. Within this meaning it is possible to speak about market environment in view of elimination of potential risks, or about a "market of security". Setting apart funds for the military is highly limited by perception of risks and their topical relevance transformed into public interest. This way defined the public interest (for instance, considerable worries about criminality and public support to efforts to its elimination) affects decision-making of the political subjects in the Parliament and it is also a considerable determinant of election support.

It is obvious that interconnection of actions of all democratic control players commonly occurs through a network of both formal and informal relations and

influence of the public can not be neglected. The public effect and is effected by a other actors of civil and democratic control of the military.

1.4. The public, politicians and the military: Is the public controlled or controlling?

As it has been shown civil-military relations create a web of relations between the military and society on both the formal and informal levels. Their ultimate objective is „the harmonisation of values and belief, consensus about the proper place of armed services in society and agreement on security policy and its cost to the state“.²

Restoration of distorted civil-military relations and establishing democratic control belonged among principal tasks of the transitional period in the area of security and military matters. From this point of view restoration of a new image of the military in society, improvement of its trustworthiness and accountability became an important task in the whole process of military transition.

The role of the public in civil-military relations and especially civilian and democratic control of the military earned a lot of attention in the ongoing discussions on post-communist militaries.³ The new impact these discussions gave when NATO enlargement became a real process and public support for entry into NATO became one of the most questioned issues of the whole process.

As a launching pod for further analysis the basic models of the role of the public in the process of civilian and democratic control relations should be considered. Generally, from the point of the role of the public there are four possible modes of the relationship between the public, politicians and the military. These interpretations are stem from estimation of power of the dominant actors of democratic control.

First, the public controls all other actors. Politicians obey the dictate of public opinion. These premise is often refused those who argue that the public is usually apathetic toward security and military policy. Other scholars acknowledge a degree of public interest and control but based on vast ignorance, only sporadic interest and control. In this interpretation the dictate of public opinion may not be very strong, but due to lack of interests as well as information very permeable and unstable.

Second, the public is not controlling but is controlled. Politicians as well as the military have instruments to shape public opinion and can persuade the population to support their policies. This situation is possible when the public show minimal interest in security and military matters.

Third, the public, on the one hand, and politicians and the military, on the other hand, are irrelevant. Politicians and the military do not react according to public opinion, but neither the public is manipulated by them. They go essentially separate ways.

² Martin Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*. Westview Press, Boulder & San Francisco, 1990, p. 132.

³ See for example Anton Bebler, The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, *NATO - review*, No.4, 1994, pp. 28-32. Rudolf Joo, The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Chaillot Papers*, no. 29. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion, *McNair Paper*, no. 39. Reka Szemerényi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk. *Adelphi Paper*, No.306, 1996. Regarding Czechoslovak and Czech or Slovak specifics see Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Stanislav Stach, Democratic Control over Security Policy and Armed Forces, In: Laurent F. Carrel, Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Andreas Schaer, Stanislav Stach, (eds.). *Demokratische und zivile Kontrolle von Sicherheitspolitik und Streikraften, Zurcher Beitrage zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung*, No. 41, 1997.

Fourth, the public, politicians and the military interact. They influence each other and the dominant force depends on social, economic and political context. This model implies a certain degree of public interest in military and security matters as well as a certain respect to public opinion among politicians and the military.⁴

Democratic society is characterised by high segmentation of the public. This matters also as far as security and military issues are concerned. Empirical data in the Czech Republic confirm this as well as that these affairs are not central to public opinion.

⁴ Concerning model of the role of the public in civilian and democratic controls
Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1990, pp. 87-88.

2. Attitudes toward security and the military

The public is logically segmented in its attitudes toward security and military issues. This segmentation is caused by many factors. In the following parts the stress is put on main tendencies in public perceptions of security and the military in the Czech Republic as well as identification of the main lines of the segmentation. All empirical findings presented in the study are drawn from representative pools carried out either among the Czech public or in the military.

2.1. Attitudes toward national defence

Unclear attitude of the Czech population to national defence is a notorious fact for a long time. On the one hand, we note a relatively high degree of conviction that the sovereignty of the state is necessary to be defended at all costs. On the other, hand there are doubts on feasibility of defence, there is considerable reluctance to spend money for it, and first of all the conviction that powers will decide over the fate of the Czech Republic anyway. In comparison with recent years we note a decline in emphasis to necessity of defence. At the same time another conviction takes more ground that it is futile to think about national defence because such a small country, as the Czech Republic is, will be decided over by Super powers. In this context it is logic that half inhabitants of the Czech Republic doubts the importance of spending money for defence, and more than half of respondents doubts defence feasibility.

Table No. 1 Attitudes toward country's defence - only approval with the statements (%)

	1992	1993	1994	II/1996	XII/1996	1997
states' sovereignty must be defended at all costs	86	89	80	87	82	77
defence expenditures are a burden for the state budget	53	55	45	52	50	50
in case of a military conflict we are not able to defence ourselves	62	65	48	67	57	55
it is futile to consider state's defence, because Super powers will decide over its fate anyway	59	58	53	62	57	63

Inconsistency of the Czech population attitudes is anchored in the conviction that each country must defend its identity, and moreover, the need of the state sovereignty is part of the common awareness when an alternative is thralldom and oppression. Each country puts preservation of the sovereignty as the highest objective,

and for its maintenance it builds and keeps the military up. Due to the reason that necessity to defend the sovereignty represents a premise which is historically linked with existence of any state formation is altogether logic that this opinion is accepted by considerable part of the Czech population. But at the same time the premise on the necessity of defence is put in doubts by several trends. The following aspects contribute to setting this necessity of defence into relativity:

1) historical – these sources of doubts on the necessity of defence were described many times. The fact is that the military was not used in 1938 or in 1968. The citizen is not interested in political or military consequences of decisions, which led to the loss of the sovereignty; he is interested first of all in the result. From the historical point of view we could go farther back to the past even till the battle on the White Mountain (Bílá hora) in 1621. Historical events, which formed historical awareness of the Czech nation, considerably put the conviction over feasibility of defence into relativity and create the national myth of impossibility of defence;

2) international – political - events, which led to the Munich dictate in 1938, to occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, they have their international and political circumstances that contribute to conviction that the fate of the Czech Republic has always been determined by the interest of a neighbour or a Super power. It is not necessary to remind recent experiences when the former Czechoslovakia was part of a pact which served to implementation of geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union. The feeling of a citizen of the “buffer zone” country which is somewhere between Germany and Russia, and therefore it is a toy in hands of these Powers, is deeply rooted in national consciousness. Perception of other powers role contributes to doubts on the need to preserve sovereignty, and it is also affected by international experience. As an example, the role of France and Great Britain in time of the Munich crisis can serve. We can often hear that even the occupation in 1968 in principle only reflected relations of the Soviet Union and the U. S. A and the division of their spheres of influence.

3) global – new trends of information, economic and technology globalization have brought about also new view on the issue of sovereignty. Opinions occur that at the present it is not important to lay stress on military aspects but more significant is to follow new trends in information science, technology and economy. From the viewpoint of the state role in global society it comes to a decrease of the military capability importance while importance of economic, technological and information potential grows. Some authors insist that current conflict among industrial countries is being transformed from the military level to the economic and technological one. They, for instance, argue by tension that chronically exists among the U. S.

A., Japan and the EU in the economic sphere. An argument on expenditure on intelligence and counter-intelligence is often used where some re-distribution of expenditure was noted recently in favour of economic and technological intelligence and counter-intelligence respectively to the detriment of the military expenditure. The other significant dimension is the globalization in area of culture. The Czech Republic is being more distinctly involved into "global networks", what is being reflected also in attitudes of the Czech public to the national security issues;

4) sociological – there are the trends that we are not sometimes conscious of, and we do not pay sufficient attention to. Sociological roots make attitudes of citizens to defence and sovereignty relative at the sub-national and international level. In several recent decades we have noted in the Czech Republic trends towards phenomenon which some authors identify as post-materialism or post-modernism. Trends to the growth of individualism and hedonism are more considerably felt. In their consequence these trends mean weakening of relation between the citizen and the state. The importance of traditional institutions, among which the military also ranks, is put in doubts.⁵ Also a distinct segmentation of the society into lots of relatively independent groups occurs, they interact, and do not feel any need for unifying element as the state is. At the international level there are sociologically identifiable trends that are closely tied with globalization. People identify themselves with social groups, which by their nature have a global character – music trends, relevance to international companies (Shell, Volkswagen), and the like. It seems that big international concerns produce their own culture and the relation to an international company seems to be more important than the relation to a particular citizenship. Many of the comparative sociological researches show that the Czech Republic and Hungary are countries of the former Eastern Block in which the sociological trends leading to weakening of relation between the citizen and the state are getting in strength together with doubts on importance of traditional institutions as, for instance, the military, parliament, church, and the like.

The illusive controversy of the Czech public attitudes corresponds with the nature of the human recognition in which we can find acceptance of the "common truth", that it is necessary to ensure sovereignty of the country which is put in doubts at several above mentioned levels. Thoughts appear whether the Czech Republic is capable of defending itself at all due to the limited economic and military potential. At the same time it is confronted with negative historical experience. The considerable role is played also by its

⁵ Viz Dalton R.J., *Citizens Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France*. Chatham, New Jersey, 1988.

increasing engagement into global economy and giving a priority to economic views in the Czech society. Probably even due to this reason especially in Prague, which is engaged into the global economy at the utmost, the greatest doubts on feasibility of national defence appear: 68% of inhabitants of Prague think that if anything happens we would not be able to defend ourselves anyway. In many cases the economic and military aspects are understood to be in opposition, and military expenditure is thought to have a negative impact on economic prosperity. We cannot leave out even historical and international political roots of negative attitudes to national defence. Especially personal experience play an important role what is manifested by more distinct approval with proposition that it is futile to think about defence because the fate of such a small country will anyway be determined by the powers, what is supported by people in age over 60. This age category supports the above-mentioned proposition by 74% of respondents. These attitudes are transferred also to younger age groups in a process of socialisation. Last but not least a clear sociological shift is felt especially among the youths, and this shift is characterised by low willingness to participate in national defence. Also higher acceptance of the civil service is put forth and preference of professional armed forces as well. It is logical that lower acceptance of an opinion that sovereignty of the country is necessary to be defended at all costs appears at the young people in age of 15 – 19, or 20 – 24. These both age categories support the above-mentioned proposition by 68% of the respondents.

2.2. Attitudes to the military

Civil-military relations are determined by two basic imperatives:

- 1) *functional imperative* – which expresses to which extend the military is ready to carry out its basic role; defence of the country, or defence of allies and participation in peacekeeping missions;
- 2) *societal imperative* – which expresses whether the military reflects and understands the social trends, whether it is capable of communication with the society and doesn't enclose itself into separated and socially peripheral institution.⁶

At the Czech public, we note for a long time already the critical attitudes to the military. Traditionally, the attitude of respondents is more positive in assessing functional readiness of the military, and more critical in assessing of civil-military relations.

Table No. 2 Assessment of the military - only approval with the statements (%)

The military	1991	1992	1993	1994	1996	1997
is skilful in mastering	59	50	43	39	35	39

⁶ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil - Military Relations*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957.

technique						
has support of citizens	46	38	41	22	27	35
has good morale	29	18	21	10	12	16

In comparison with 1996 we note the growth of positive ratings for the opinion that the military has won higher support of the population, and also a slight positive shift appeared in assessment of readiness, skilfulness of the military and its morale. In case of support of the population, the growth is being noted for longer time. As traditionally, the most distinct doubts exist in case of the morale within the military.

After comparing attitudes of particular demographic groups we find out that the social level seems to be more controversial. While at the functional level we do not note differences among different segments of the Czech populations. The evident differentiation appears in assessing support of the population and the morale of the military. People having more contacts with the current military are more critical to it. An age group of 20 – 25 assesses the lowest support of the public, when only 18% of them think that the public supports the military. In the 15 – 19 age group 21% of respondents identify themselves with this opinion, and at the same time this age group of the Czech population assesses also the morale aspect very critically when only 8% insist that the military has got high morale. The more critical assessment of the public support prevails also among people in age of 30 – 34 (23%), and at the age category of 25 – 29 (27%). It is similar also at men of whom only 27% think that the military has got support of the population while at women this opinion is shared by 41% of them. The morale of the military is more critically assessed also by people in Prague when positive assessment was obtained from only 9% of the Capital inhabitants. The relevancy of sociological trends we know from researches in the Czech Republic and abroad is verified also by the fact that the age category over 60 more distinctly thinks that the military has got support of the public (52% of them) and high morale as well (24% of them).

Attitudes to the military confirm some tendencies we indicated above, especially the relevancy of sociological but also historical roots of negative or positive attitudes to the military.

2.3. Assessment of the professional soldiers

The attitudes to the career soldiers are the area where some changes occurred in comparison with recent years. In spite of the outlasted critical attitudes we can state that the growth of the positive attitudes to professional soldiers is a trend that we can follow for several years, but nevertheless, except for assessment of relation of professional soldiers to the democratic development, their assessment is still more negative than at the beginning of the 90s.

Table No. 3 Assessment of professional soldiers - only approval with the statements (%)

Professional soldiers have good	1991	1992	1993	1994	1996	1997
professional skills	54	54	46	35	44	48
physical fitness	57	43	33	24	35	42
morale	X	X	29	15	29	32
a positive relation toward democratic development	24	33	33	22	34	39

Note: X - the question was not asked

Assessment of the career soldiers is not so controversial as a view on the military as a whole. Only inhabitants of Prague excluded themselves from the average when they more negatively assessed professional skills of the career soldiers (only 40% of them assess them positively), their physical fitness (positively assessed by 33% of the Prague inhabitants), and morale (24%). On the other hand inhabitants of the South Moravia see the career soldiers more positively what is manifested in better assessment of their physical fitness (50% of them assess it positively), morale (44%) and their relation to democracy (50%). The more positive attitudes on the South Moravia territory may reflect also assistance of the military during floods in those regions. In case of the physical fitness assessment we note more positive attitudes also at the young people in age of 15 – 19, when 56% of respondents in this age category insist that career soldiers are well physically trained and prepared.

2.4. Influence of the attitude toward NATO membership, and of the political orientation towards security, the military and the professional soldiers

In connection with attitudes of the Czech public to security issues, the military and the career soldiers, it is interesting to look at influence of attitudes towards NATO and political orientation for forming particular attitudes. By the use of correlation analysis we have found out that the major determinant in this case is the attitude toward NATO membership.

Table No.4 Influence of the attitude toward NATO membership, and of the political orientation towards security, the military and the professional soldiers.

Attitudes	attitude toward NATO membership	political orientation	political orientation with exclusion of the attitude toward NATO membership
states' sovereignty must be defended at all costs	0,07	-0,08	-0,05
defence expenditures are a burden for the state budget	-0,28	0,13	0,00
in case of a military conflict we are not able to defence ourselves	-0,09	0,03	0,00
it is worthless to consider state's defence, because powers will decide over its fate anyway	-0,16	0,14	0,07
is skilful in mastering technique	0,15	-0,05	0,03
has support of citizens	0,05	0,08	0,11
has good morale	0,06	0,02	0,05
professional skills	0,11	-0,08	-0,03
physical fitness	0,09	-0,07	-0,03
morale	0,06	0,07	0,03
a positive relation toward democratic development	0,08	-0,03	0,00

Note: The correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the relation. Positive correlation expresses positive attitude to admission of the Czech Republic to NATO and simultaneously higher preferences of the stated attitude or more distinct inclination to the left. The negative correlation represents negative attitude to admission of the Czech Republic to NATO as well as higher preferences of the stated attitude or more distinct inclination to the right-wing orientation. Statistically significant correlation data are printed in bold.

The part of the Czech population that agrees with admission of the Czech Republic to NATO takes up more positive attitudes toward security and military issues as well as national defence. This group of respondents is more willing to expend money on the Military and less accepts nihilistic attitudes expressed by opinions that if anything happens we would not be able to resist anyway, or that it is futile to think about national defence because the powers will decide over the Czech Republic's fate. These respondents express also more positive attitudes in their assessment of the career soldiers especially with regard to their relation to democratic

development and professional competencies. If assessing the whole military, there, nevertheless, were some difference in evaluation of its skills and preparedness. In spite of these positive tendencies even at a part of the Czech population that approves the admission to NATO, among nihilistic attitude to security issues prevails in a whole. Also among this part of the Czech population some critical attitudes to the military prevail, especially to its morale (see Appendix Table No. 1).

Regarding the political orientation there are interesting trend which shows that after comparison with the beginning of this decade a considerable decline from the political implication of attitudes to the military and to the career soldiers occurs. At the beginning of this decade people of the right-wing political orientation were traditionally more critical toward the military and professional soldiers while the left-wing oriented people shared more positive attitudes. Currently, with the only exception related to assessment of the public support, the attitudes to the military, career soldiers and the security issues are only slightly affected by the political orientation. The more distinct conviction of people of the left political orientation that the military has got the public support we can interpret as a “conservative element” when people in their minds did not accepted a shift that has happened in the society, and therefore the part of the population with the left-wing political orientation keeps still more distinct conviction that the military has the public support because this group had been expressing higher support for the military in the past. Similarly, people of the right-wing political orientation did not accept yet the change and they are more distinctly convinced of the low support for the military by the public because it is about the attitudes which were in fact more distinctly shared by the right-wing part of population in the past. Based on this development we can state that the military is constantly and more distinctly accepted as a national institution and a view on it is being freed from political backgrounds known at the beginning of the 90s.

2.5. A personal contribution to defence

A possible personal contribution to national defence is one of the factors that indicate the readiness to participation. At the present situation this problem is discussed predominantly by political scientists but also by sociologists and philosophers. On the one hand we find a conservative approach laying stress on the national defence as one of the foundation stones of national identity, and it is emphasised that participation in this activity is one of the most important values.⁷ The similar approaches might be found in neo-liberalism, which puts to the front the value of fairness.⁸ The liberal philosophers following Rawls understand the participation in

⁷ Morris Janowitz., *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1960 or Charles Moskos, John Chambers. (eds.), *The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1993.

⁸ Rawls J., *Political Liberalism*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.

defence as one of the tools forming common identity. On the other hand is the extreme liberalism, which emphasises an idea of absolute voluntariness.⁹

Although the **Czech population** lays the highest stress on active assistance in case of defence readiness of the state, it is evident that the less controversy activity, a least at the population, is knowledge what the government, parliament, the military, and the like, had done. The issues of professional career in the military and work for the military as civilian expert appear to be very controversial. In this respect it is interesting also a considerable share of “don’t know” answers in case of willingness to contribute to defence capability by paying taxes but also refusing possibility to work as a civilian expert in the military.

Among people working in **self-governments** there is higher emphasis to willingness to contribute to the national defence as taxpayers, and for the active participation in case of defence readiness of the state or to receive information on what is being done for defence. In other questions they do not differ much from other people of the same age group. It seems that people who work for the state administration and self-governments feel higher need to declare activities, which relate to their positions.

Table No. 5 Participation in defence (%)

	Population			Local self-governments		
	Yes	No	difference *	Yes	No	difference *
contribute as taxpayer	40	34	+6	56	23	+33
active participation in case of defence readiness	50	18	+32	60	11	+49
keep informed what is being done for defence by the government or parliament	45	9	+32	57	10	+47
serve compulsory military service and military training exercises	36	39	-3	40	37	+3
actively work in organisations contributing to defence	15	43	-28	19	44	-25
work in the military as a civil employee	13	57	-44	18	57	-39
become a professional soldier	9	65	-56	10	66	-56

*) Difference between the percentage of positive and negative answers.

Similarly as in all questions connected with the military and security issues, also here predominantly age and political differences are manifested. But also some other influences. In analysing people who take up particular attitudes it is evident that support for defence comes primarily from circles with university education and those who are better set up what is to a certain extent surprising because in many industrial countries just group of better educated people are bearers of anti-militaristic attitudes, although better situated people are more conservative in this issue. At the same time

⁹ Friedman L., *The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority, and Culture*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990.

we note an interesting development also in case of political orientation. It is a fact that people of the right-wing orientation identify themselves with positive attitude to defence capability in a sense that they support professionalization, and they are willing to pay for it, but they are not willing to serve in the military as professional soldiers. People of the left-wing orientation hold rather the so-called civic attitude when they are more willing to contribute to the security of the state by performance of conscription. Respondents with the centre-wing orientation hold a very reserved attitude to national defence what is being expressed also by a considerable size of individualistic liberalism.

Based on personal willingness to participate in defence and to ensure national security we can create a participation typology. Taking into account preferences of individual ways of activities we can say that the lowest support is given to those ways of participation, which require personal activity. First, it is about work within the military organisation as a career soldier or civilian. The attitude to activities resulting from the Czech laws is a bit better, for example conscription service, and the like. The most distinct is the preference of ways that do not need any participation and contact with the military organisation as taxpaying and being informed.

Based on this knowledge we can both logically and empirically create four types of respondents:

1. **active** – this group prefers active participation and expresses its willingness to contribute to at least five from seven ways of ensuring defence capability;
2. **legislatively active** – here are the people who are willing to share those activities which are required by the law. Even due to the reason that they are willing to undertake conscription service, or assist actively during defence readiness, we can speak about the active attitude although strictly determined by requirements of laws. This group prefers three up to four forms of participation in ensuring national defence;
3. **passive** – it is a group of people who are not willing to contribute actively to ensuring national defence but yet they would contribute by paying taxes or they would at least inquire about situation in the military
4. **refusing** – it is a group of people who refuse any form of participation in ensuring national defence.

Looking at the distribution of the types we find out that population prefers passive attitude and people working in self-governments prefer legislatively active attitude. In total, people from self-governments have more positive attitudes to ensuring security what is due to several factors that we were already talking about (age and share in functioning of the state apparatus). The representation of the refusing type is also distinct, not only among population where it forms less than a quarter but also among people working at self-governments where it forms less than a seventh.

Table No. 6 Typology of the public according to their view of personal contribution to defence (%)

Types	Population	Local self-governments
active	9	13
legislatively active	27	40
passive	41	35
refusing	23	13

The population tends to the fact that personally active attitude is more distinctly shared by university educated segments of the population (what applies also for legislatively active attitude), and inhabitants of Prague. Refusing attitude is more distinctly shared by the population with basic education, i.e. young people.

From a certain value and ideology orientation viewpoint it seems that people of particular orientation support more distinctly the following attitudes:

personally active – they lay higher stress on liberties of citizens but at the same time they emphasise a strong role of both central and self-governments,

legislatively active – they put stress on equality of citizens and they emphasise orientation to the future,

refusing – they hold very pragmatic attitude and they lay stress predominantly on what is beneficial today, and explicitly refuse any influence of strong institutions (government and self-governments).

Regarding the attitude of the Czech public as well as people working in self-governments to national defence the conclusion might be that they do not oppose the need for defence but they do not want to be personally involved in these activities. If yes, they prefer to reduce their participation to basic requirements of laws.

2.6. Military: Why for?

Doubts about the usefulness of military form a long-lasting part of Czech public opinion. On the one hand, the new international situation decidedly contributed to casting doubts upon some missions of the military, and initiated deliberations on significance of the military for society. The optimistic expectations at the beginning of the 90s went to rack and ruin, and conflicts at the Near East and the Balkans considerably contributed to putting the expectations on a “warless society”¹⁰ in doubt. On the other hand, the Military of the Czech Republic in time of floods in summer 1997 considerably contributed to reducing negative impact of the natural disaster.

From the analysis of attitudes of the Czech public, feeling of the usefulness of the military definitely prevails, and that is in both contexts: international – because nobody can guarantee the long-lasting peace development, and national – for use in case of natural disasters as, for instance, the floods are. Only slightly more than a tenth of the Czech population thinks that we do not need the military. The military is still perceived as an institution, which should be used in cases of natural disasters or a massive immigration, what is also confirmed by the finding that its engagement in these instances is refused only by less than a third of the Czech population, and almost two thirds of respondents do accept the similar exploitation. No doubt, also engagement of the military during floods in 1997 greatly contributed to this conviction.

In a moderate contrast to the above mentioned attitudes, we record that in spite of the general conviction of the usefulness of the military, more than a quarter of the Czech population cannot imagine which tasks should the Czech Military carry out. Only a bit more than half of citizens still keeps considering the military as a symbol of the Czech state independence.

Table No. 7 Usefulness of the military (%)


	Yes	No	I do not know
the use of the military during the 1997 floods proved that there is a need to have the military	85	9	8
the military is needed since nobody can guarantee the long-lasting peace	79	14	7
the military has always symbolised national sovereignty	58	28	14
the use of the military during the 1997 floods should be appreciated but in the future similar tasks (release in natural disasters, immigration etc.) should be carried out by other institutions	32	60	8
I have no idea about potential tasks for the military at the present time	28	48	24
the Czech Republic does not need an	13	80	7

¹⁰ Charles Moskos, *Armed Forces in a Warless Society*, In: Jürgen Kuhlmann, Christopher Dandeker, (eds.), *Armed Forces after the Cold War*, *SOWI Forum*, No. 13, 1992.

military			
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As only one controversy question seems the view on the military as a symbol of national independence where age differences are markedly felt. The elders perceive the military as a symbol of national independence more often than younger generation. In this case, the relevancy of some sociological conceptions is fully confirmed. In particular of those which stress out lower importance of sympathy with the national (one-nation) state and its definition in the “military context” by young people. Speaking about the national state, the young people define it rather in economic, international and political terms.

Chart No. 1 The military as a symbol of national sovereignty and age



There are the males (18% of them) who more markedly agree with the opinion that the Czech Republic needs no military as well as people living in Prague (19%). The role of the military during the floods is probably reflected also in lower support for opinion that it is necessary to reward the use of the military during the 1997 floods but similar tasks should be performed by somebody else in future by people from southern Moravia. They express their agreement with the above mentioned only in 23% while this statement is disapproved by 66% of respondents from that region.

The attitude of the Czech population could be defined as a pragmatic one. The reason is that even though there are some doubts whether the military represents a

symbol of national sovereignty, it is, nevertheless, necessary for defence of the territory and inhabitants of the Czech Republic in case of both military threat and natural disasters or environmental accidents.

2.7. Changes in the military.

The process of changes in the Czech military is a reflection of the two consequent trends:

1) *transformation from the totalitarian military to the democratic military.* This development characteristic for all post-communist countries is accompanied by depoliticization of the military, application of democratic control rules, and democratic civil-military relations;

2) *transformation from the traditional military to the post-traditional or post-modern military.* This is the trend characteristic for all democratic countries reflecting the fact that following the end of the Cold War the considerable changes of tasks of the military occurred what reflected itself in changes of organisational structures, tendency to full or a higher professionalization, transformation of military careers, and the like.

Both trends merge into one process in the Czech Republic. It is logical that at the beginning of the 90s the stronger stress was put on issues of transformation from the “socialist type” military to the democratic one. During last years we have noted that higher stress is put on structural changes, higher professionalization, capability of the military to be involved into peacekeeping missions, and so on. These tendencies characterise a process of transformation from the traditional military to post-traditional one, capable of carrying out new missions.

Table No. 8 Are you satisfied with progress of changes in the military (%)

	1996	1997
satisfied	6	6
partly satisfied, partly not	23	23
unsatisfied	35	32
I do not know	36	39

In case of views of the Czech public on changes in the military there have been for a long time already the two consequent tendencies. On the one hand there is a relatively high discontent with the process and outcome of changes within the military but in comparison with 1996 we have found out a slight downtrend of this group of respondents. On the other hand a relatively high and slightly increasing unconcern about the military is evident. These attitudes are reflected also in assessment of changes within the Czech military.

In attitudes to changes within the military no considerable changes appear. Respondents who identify themselves with the right expressed a slightly more positive attitude (12% of them is satisfied with changes within the military).

2.8. Problems of the military

Any change is a reaction to existing problems, and at the same time the change generates the new problems. What are internal military problems? The list comprises a broad spectrum of potential problems from corruption up to the low prestige of the military profession. In developing the list the mass media topicality was taken into account as the decisive factor and not a specification based on analysis of current situation in the military, or the court findings (in case of corruption).

Table No. 9 Problems of the military as perceived by the public (%)

	1996	1997	Difference 1996 - 1997
corruption in the military, deficiencies in running military tenders	73	71	-2
too extensive bureaucratic apparatus	71	70	-1
the low prestige of the military profession	74	66	-8
lack of morale and discipline	69	61	-8
exodus of young military professionals	51	61	+10
low competence of the politicians at the head of the Ministry of Defence	53	56	+3
out-dated military technique	X	46	X
the low level of training	57	43	-14
social insecurity in the military	40	43	+3
the authoritative style of management	45	42	-3
the low level of military education	27	26	-1

Note: X - the question was not asked in 1996

The aspects in which the mass media involve are by the citizens considered to be the most distinct problems. It is especially about potential corruption in the military and too extensive bureaucratic apparatus of defence ministry. The low prestige of the military profession follows which was understood as the most distinct problem in 1996. More than a half of respondents considers lack of morale and discipline, exodus of young professional soldiers and low competency of high-ranking politicians of defence ministry as the current problems of the military.

Very critical assessment of problems prevails but, nevertheless, in comparison with 1996 some positive judgements appear. They are the cases of improved level of training, prestige of the military profession and the discipline in the military. The only one case of more negative assessment is a problem of young career soldiers' exodus what confirms the influence of the media to perception of also other problems by the public. Just exodus of young professional soldiers and graduates from NATO schools has become a problem, which was extensively covered by the media in recent months, and consequently attracted more distinct reflection among the Czech public occurred.

2.9. Influence of the selected military problems on confidence to the military, the Minister of Defence and on perception of changes in the military.

In connection with judgement of problems within the military we can analyse in detail their influence on forming confidence to the Minister of Defence, the military and on assessment of military transformation. Detailed analysis reveals that even here some distinctions occur.

Table No. 10 Problems of the military and their impact on forming confidence to the military, the Defence Minister and the view of military transformation (1997)

Correlation		
confidence to the military	confidence to the Defence Minister	the view of military transformation
1) corruption in the military and problems with tenders (r=0,30)	1) low competence of the politicians at the head of the Ministry of Defence (r=0,25)	1) corruption in the military and problems with tenders (r=0,34)
2) the low level of training (r=0,28)	2) too extensive bureaucratic apparatus (r=0,21)	2) exodus of young military professionals (r=0,25)
3) lack of morale and discipline (r=0,26)	3) corruption in the military and problems with tenders (r=0,18)	3) lack of morale and discipline (r=0,23)
4) the low prestige of the military profession (r=0,25)	4) the low level of military education (r=0,16)	4) the authoritative style of management (r=0,21)
5) the low level of military education (r=0,25)	5) social insecurity in the military (r=0,15)	5) the low level of training (r=0,20)
6) the authoritative style of management (r=0,23)	6) the authoritative style of management (r=0,15)	6) the low prestige of the military profession (r=0,20)
7) too extensive military apparatus (r=0,18)	7) the low level of training (r=0,14)	7) too extensive bureaucratic apparatus (r=0,19)

Based on a correlation analysis we can state that confidence or no-confidence to the:

Defence minister – is being formed predominantly by aspects that we can broadly identify as political competencies. It is especially about competence of leading politicians of the ministry. As the second most important factor the size of administrative apparatus of the ministry comes up what is probably understood by the public in relation to both the ministry itself and the General Staff. Corruption issues relating to military tenders occupy the third place. Issues of the military educational system follow accompanied by social uncertainty and the authoritative style of management. Only as the seventh factor the only military aspect comes up, and that is the military training. In comparison with 1996, in case of defence minister, the influence of factors we can characterise as political ones has grown up while importance of the military aspects has declined;

Military – is being formed partly by different factors than the confidence of the minister. The emphasis is laid to functional and military aspects, first of all to corruption in connection with the military procurement, to training and discipline. Also prestige of the military profession has an influence on forming confidence to the military together with the level of military education, style of management and the size of administrative apparatus. In comparison with 1996 we note lower influence of the political aspects on forming credibility of the military;

Assessment of changes within the military – similar factors apply for assessment of changes within the military as in case of forming credibility of the military. There is one exception and that is the critical view of young professional soldiers' exodus, what is the factor, which gained the most distinct discontent, and which got proved as one of the most important criterion of the total assessment of changes within the military.

Comparing the problems that have affected confidence to the Minister of Defence, the military and the view on changes in the military, we find out their considerable stability (see Appendix Table No. 2). At the same time we can state that on the one hand the political dimension got deepened in attitudes towards defence minister, and on the other hand the military dimension has gained in strength in attitudes to the military and changes within it. Also the influence of the mass media is clearly felt as well as high reflection of problems that are mostly covered by the media.

2.10. Threats in the new world

The idea that industrial societies were evolving toward greater pacification has accompanied human thinking several centuries. The development at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s brought a revival of the notion of a future without war.

It was clear that no serious observer could exclude regional conflicts, internal wars within countries, ethnic strifes, and major powers interventions in spheres of influence. The ideal of a warless

society was based on an assumption that a major war between democratic and industrial countries is improbable.¹¹

The real development proved more complicated and brought many conflicts, but only few of them were inter-states. New military conflicts were mainly small-scale and of ethnic or religious origin. Although, the clash of civilisations became a largely discussed idea.¹²

The end of the Cold War accelerated several consequent tendencies. Several authors speak about a world in anarchy.¹³ It is evident that the world became multipolar and multicivilizational. The danger of a massive two-bloc confrontation has disappeared and new threats have come to the fore. It is possible to speak about diffusion of power and diffusion of threats. This tendency is valid not only for military threats, but also for those of social, economic and ecological origin. Another tendency is evident as far as time and space is concerned. The priority is flexibility and operationability. Managing threats is limited by diffusion of authority and responsibility. Another important aspect became de-militarization of security.¹⁴

The last tendency is worth describing more closely. While in the past security was defined in military terms, today the notion has acquired new mostly non-military dimensions. In military consequences deployment of troops is often not to win a war but prevent it. It is impossible to neglect the shift from military toward economic competition. Low profile of military threats and no evident enemy in democratic countries shifted attention toward economic, social and ecological threats.

This is also a case of the Czech Republic which „faces no concrete or visible enemy at present“.¹⁵ Non-existence of military menace is accompanied by amassing of economic and social threats. This logically leads to considerations that defence expenditures is a luxury, if not an outright and waste of money.

2.11. Feeling of threat

The concept of security is relatively broad and has got many aspects and meanings. In recent time, this term has been getting still broader dimension and has ceased to be identified only with the military security or criminality. Trends connected with the so-called new movements reveal ever-deeper contents of the “security” term which is being enlarged also to environmental issues, feminism, human rights as well as

¹¹ Charles Moskos, *Armed Forces in a Warless Society*. In: Jürgen Kuhlmann, Christopher Dandeker, (eds.), *Armed Forces after the Cold War*, *SOWI Forum*, No. 13, Munich, 1992.

¹² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York 1996.

¹³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century*, Scribner, New York, 1993. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.

¹⁴ Concerning these points see Jiri Sedivy, *The Nuclear Question in the Czech Republic*, *Perspectives*, no. 9, 1997/98, pp. 77 - 78.

¹⁵ Address by President Vaclav Havel on the Occasion of the National Day of the Czech Republic, Prague, October 28, 1996.

to social or economic matters and even to a family. These dimensions are understood as highly acute and sometimes they are of highly emotional nature.

Also from the reason that we can define the term of “security” broadly, we asked the citizens about the feeling of threat from the current social and political situation. From the time viewpoint we can see a considerable growth of the threat feeling in comparison with recent years. It is likely a reflection of economic, social and political problems that became ones of the central problems in the Czech Republic in 1997, while a period of 1994 – 1996 could be characterised as time of economic growth and political stability.

Table No. 11 When you consider the actual social and economic situation do you feel secure or not? (%)

	1994	1996	1997
secure	51	57	44
threatened	49	43	56

Higher feeling of security is for a long time evident among people with political orientation to the right centre (62%), younger people, primarily in age of (59%), or 20 – 29 (58%), and people with university education (58%). But also in these categories there was a considerable increase of threat feelings in comparison with 1996 or 1994.¹⁶

The more distinct feeling of threat is constantly found out at the left-wing political orientation supporters (79%) and the left centre (72%), people with a grammar-school education without GCE examination (62%), and people over 60 (70%). Probably due to floods in summer 1997 also people from the South Moravia express their higher feeling of threat (65%).

2.12. What generates the feeling of threat?

As it has already been indicated the feeling of threat has got lots of dimensions – social, economic, political, environmental, military, and the like. Some risks are of the long-term nature, the others of the short one. It is almost impossible to cover the total spectrum. Due to the development in recent decades a considerable changes in restructuring of risks occur, and in connection with them, also of subjectively perceived forms of personal threats. Military risks are being eliminated but economic, social and environmental and other risks gain more importance. At the same time, primarily threats against property and life as well as organised crime and new forms of criminality pose the most considerable and almost everyday security risks for an individual. Global risks can not be neglected as well.

It is almost impossible to cover the whole spectrum of risks but in spite of that we have striven to define at least the basic risks that we can identify in the society.

We can refer to the similar tendencies also according to our research where we find out high preference particularly of personal forms of threats as criminality and violence are, together with economic forms of threats and pollution of environment.

¹⁶ For instance, among people of the central-right political orientation the feeling of security had expressed 72% of them and among the young people in age of 15-19 it was 80 %.

Table No. 12 Sources of threats (%)

	1994	1997
violence in the society	90	85
criminality	91	83
the state of the Czech crown as a currency	33	71
environmental pollution	87	70
behaviour of politicians	41	64
housing expenditures	61	58
the market economy	42	54
the living standard, I can afford	40	54
the asylum right in the Czech Republic	43	39
foreigners	33	39
the situation in the former Soviet Union	60	35
my future in the Czech Republic	26	34
strong and powerful government	29	32
my job	21	23
the Czech military	19	17
my family and friends	5	3

In comparison with 1994 a considerable growth of fears of economic and political nature was recorded – the state of the Czech currency, market economy, living standard and behaviour of politicians. It is a logical reaction to development of the economic situation and extensive coverage of this problem by the media in 1997. The decline was marked in case of environmental pollution and situation in the former USSR. The military contributes to the feeling of threat only among less than a fifth of the Czech population.

In more detailed analysis we can identify the two basic differentiating factors in perceptions of risks. The first is the age and the second the political orientation. At level of the political orientation there is a clearly different view on economic and political risks what logically bears on each other. Respondents of the left-wing orientation feel to be more endangered from the economic point of view, and the blame politicians for that. At the age level a different view on the market economy appears because it is being more considerably accepted as a contribution to security by the young generation. The older generation expresses stronger fears of criminality and violence in society, and it has got stronger fears of foreigners.

Table No. 13 The correlation of the age and the political orientation with sources of threats

age	political orientation
1) violence in the society r=0,15	1) the market economy r=0,29
2) criminality r=0,14	2) the living standard r=0,26
3) the market economy r=0,12	3) housing expenditures r=0,21

4) foreigner r=0,12	4) my future r=0,15 5) behaviour of our politicians r=0,15 6) my job r=0,13
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A reaction of population to current risks of economic and social nature is evident. A more considerable unconcern can be then seen in relation to foreign policy issues, problems of the military and military security, or environmental risks.

2.13. Feeling of the military threat

The fall of communist regimes at the end of the 80s and the entire change of the international situation brought about also a different perception of the military threat. It resulted in a decline of fears of the military conflict. This attitude wasn't more significantly affected even by unpropitious development on the Balkans. With marginalization of the military threat the new, till that time neglected risks came to foreground. The society started to focus first of all on elimination of economic, social and environmental risks. The population at the same time expects also the payment of the so-called "peace dividend", that is the re-distribution of funds in favour of elimination of risks to which the population attaches a greater importance.

A possibility of the military threat in the future is supposed, similarly as in 1996, by only a third of the Czech population, while two-thirds this possibility refuse.

Table No. 14 Do you think that the Czech Republic might be endangered militarily in the future?

	1996	1997
probably yes	32	35
probably	68	65

The only one characteristic, which differentiates the attitude to a potential threat, is age when younger people consider the military threat to be less likely in the future.

Table No. 15 A possibility of the military threat according to age

Age	1996	1997
15 - 19	20	16
20 - 29	25	23
30 - 39	29	33
40 - 49	30	30

50 - 59	30	35
60 and more	42	56

Compared with 1996, there is a growth in generation differences in a view to possibility of the military threat. We recorded a decline of fears of the military threat in the future at people under 30. On the contrary the growth of fears occurred at people over 50.

Even in the Czech Republic we note the trend that prevails in the most of industrial countries which reads that the young generation doubts more significantly the possibility of the military threat. It is a problem that is considered by part of experts as a result of distinct life experiences while other part points out especially the influence of a social change which occurred following considerable technology development and cultural, and even environmental globalization.

2.14. Who is considered to be the military threat

The feeling of non-existence of the military threat is confirmed also by another question in reply to which 66% of the Czech population expressed the opinion that they are unable to imagine anybody who could endanger the Czech Republic, or they are unable to respond to the question. The most considerable fears are traditionally felt of Russia and Germany. Slovakia, Near East, and the Balkans including regions of the former Yugoslavia follow them. In comparison with 1996 we note a considerable growth in numbers of people who perceive Germany as a possible source of the military threat.

Table No. 16 Military threat and its sources (%)

	Czech population			people under 30 let			people over 30 let		
	1994	1996	1997	1994	1996	1997	1994	1996	1997
I do not know, it does not exist	69,4	62,6	66,3	69,0	61,5	65,5	69,6	63,0	66,8
Russia	23,0	19,1	24,9	23,2	22,6	25,5	22,9	17,9	24,7
Germany	7,8	4,3	13,6	8,0	2,7	12,4	8,2	4,9	14,0
Slovakia	2,8	3,3	4,5	4,1	3,0	5,8	2,1	3,4	4,1
the Near East and Arab countries	5,6	3,3	2,3	3,4	2,9	2,2	1,9	3,4	2,3
USA	0,3	1,3	2,4	0,2	2,0	2,2	0,4	1,1	2,5

former Yugoslavia and the Balkan	5,6	1,5	2,8	7,1	1,3	2,5	4,8	1,5	3,0
Ukraine	2,0	0,6	1,9	1,1	0,6	1,9	2,3	0,5	1,9

Note: The sum can exceed 100%, because the respondents could name at maximum 3 possible sources of the military threat for the Czech Republic.

At the younger part of the population we note for a longer time already some increased fears of Russia and Slovakia. The senior part of the population rather often thinks that Germany represents the threat. This slightly different generation view can be also a result of different personal experiences. "Fears of Germany" we record only at 9% of respondents in age of 15 – 19, while at people in age over 60 the percentage is 23%.

2.15. Acceptance of involvement in peacekeeping missions

Experts on security issues and civil-military relations expressed the view that never in the last fifty years the military had performed so many tasks as it has done at present. At the same time they emphasise that never in the past the performance of these tasks was so considerably financially limited. The fact that the military, in time of relative non-existence of direct military threat to the country, is very busy institution comes from unprecedented extent of international peace activities. The legitimacy of the so-called "new missions" is up to the three players. They are the politicians, the media and the public. Interrelations of these players are very complex, and we cannot acknowledge that the public accepts all arguments of the politicians and the media. In some cases the opposite is true and just even attitudes of the public determine the attitudes of politicians and approach of the media.¹⁷ The public support acts as important factor that limits involvement into peacekeeping operations or their termination. As an example can serve the withdrawal of the U. S. from Somalia or the "Srebrenica syndrome" which affects attitudes to peacekeeping missions in the Netherlands. The Czech participation in the peacekeeping missions was not so far confronted with the situation that could be characterised as a crisis of legitimacy (extreme casualties, not meeting expectations of the public in protection of civilians, and others), anyway it would be unhappy to underestimate influence of the public opinion. The new requirements for legitimacy of involvement into peacekeeping operations result also from transitions to the missions of the so-called "second generation" that lay higher stress on employment of the military force than it was in the past.¹⁸

¹⁷ John Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

¹⁸ Christopher Dandeker, James Gow, *The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success*, Armed Forces and Society, č. 3, 1997.

Involvement of the Czech soldiers in peacekeeping operations, as it is for instance participation in the former Yugoslavia, was supported by half of the Czech population. Almost two fifths of the respondents were against it. More than a tenth answered it did not know. In comparison with 1996 it did not come about to distinct changes but only to moderate decline of a group of respondents who refuse involvement of the Czech Republic into the peacekeeping activities. This downtrend is within the framework of a statistic error what holds also in case of moderate increase in a group of undecided respondents.

Table No. 17 Do you agree with involvement of Czech troops in peacekeeping operations, as it for instance our participation in the former Yugoslavia? (%)

	1996	1997
Yes	50	50
No	41	38
I do not know	9	12

After comparison of demographic and attitude characteristics of individual groups of respondents we found out that the group which agrees with involvement of the Czech units in peacekeeping missions is formed by part of population supporting admission to NATO (73% of them agree with participation in peacekeeping missions) what means that they are people with university education (64%), secondary school education (57%), in a group age between 15 and 19 (68%), or between 20 and 24 (62%). Respondents living in towns populated from 20 to 100 thousand (58%), supporting the political right centre (70%), or the right (65%), express more distinct acceptance. The higher rate of acceptance is registered at males (57%).

The group which does not agree with involvement of the Czech units in peacekeeping missions consists of older people over 60 (54% of them expressed their disagreement), living in towns populated over 100 thousand (52%). Respondents supporting the political left (65%), the left centre (49%), and the centre (47%) refuse involvement in particular.

The group which expresses undecided attitude is formed mostly people expressing undecided attitude to admission to NATO (24% responded "don't know"), women (17%), and people supporting political left centre (16%), and the left (21%).

Comparing with 1996 an interesting trend takes place. A more distinct polarisation occurred of the responding groups supporting and rejecting involvement of the Czech units in the peacekeeping operations. This polarisation is a consequence of the two consequent trends:

- 1) groups of population more considerably inclining to support our participation in peacekeeping activities express a little more explicit attitudes, that is, they manifest higher acceptance with involvement of our units in peacekeeping missions than in 1996¹⁹;
- 2) parts of population more distinctly refusing the Czech participation in the peacekeeping missions maintained similar attitudes as in the past but this group is a bit smaller because a part of them moved to the “camp of those undecided”. This movement was manifested by increase of people of leftist orientation in a group of those undecided²⁰.

This development indicates increase of attitude diversity between the groups of population accepting and refusing the Czech participation in the peacekeeping operations. The group, which abandoned the so-called „hard core“ rejecting involvement into peacekeeping missions, did not do it as a result of its conviction on correct positive attitudes, but more because it did not find sufficient arguments to convince the group about the correctness of refusing attitudes.

Finally, we can state that disunity of the Czech public maintains those attitudes to peacekeeping missions as in 1996. This trend can be also a result of insufficient emphasis put on domestic legitimacy of peacekeeping activities when priority is in the knowledge what our units in peacekeeping missions do, what is the importance for the international position of the Czech Republic while it is considered a matter of course that the public knows why they do it. A considerable part of the Czech public probably does not understand for the present the moral dimension of peacekeeping missions and participation in them is considered first of all as an issue of international prestige of the Czech Republic.

¹⁹ The growth of support for participation in the peacekeeping missions was notable especially among people with university education from 58% in 1996 to 64% in 1997, among people with grammar-school education from 52% to 57%, among the youth in age of 15 - 19 from 50% to 68%, and among an age category of 20 - 24 from 57% to 62%.

²⁰ Among people with political orientation to the left centre we have recorded a growth of “undecided” group from 8% in 1996 to 21% in 1997, and among people who identify themselves with the left the growth was from 7% to 15%.

2.16. Opinions on participation in peacekeeping missions

In speaking about peacekeeping missions their legitimacy should be emphasised. In this context we can consider the three basic dimensions of legitimacy:

- 1) *international dimension* - which expresses how the Czech Republic participation is accepted by foreign players, and to which extent it contributes to phenomenon that can be characterised as protection of national interests of the Czech Republic;
- 2) *functional dimension* - which reflects perception of multinational missions influence to remodelling the military to be able to carry out the three basic groups of tasks: defence of the own territory, or use of the military in natural and environmental disasters; defence of the territory of allies and participation in multinational peacekeeping missions;
- 3) *moral dimension* - which expresses the global responsibility of the democratic country for solving problems and conflicts in other parts of the world.

In analysing empirical data we can state that opinions on participation of the Czech Republic in peacekeeping operations acknowledge the assumption that legitimacy of the Czech participation in missions comes from the emphasis to the international dimension of legitimacy and lay stress on national interests of the Czech Republic. This dimension is manifested also by high approval with statements that participation in the peacekeeping missions promotes image of the Czech Republic and increases its chances for integration in EU and NATO. After comparing attitudes to peacekeeping operations during 1996 and 1997 we find out that the functional dimension grows what expresses conviction that peacekeeping activities are at present one of a few ways on how to test readiness of the military and at the same time to change it according to new requirements. This trend is manifested also by the growth of acceptance with statements that foreign missions provide opportunity in forming a new type of a soldier who will be needed more often in future. An issue of the moral legitimacy after comparison with the above stated ones seems to be the most problematic. Knowledge from other countries show that stable support to participation in peacekeeping activities is ensured only in case when the so-called moral imperative works together with conviction that "something must be done".²¹ This situation at least partially guarantees that no significant and sudden change of the public attitudes occurs due to unfavourable events - casualties, disability to protect civilians from massacres and the like. Just in case of the moral legitimacy factor we find out, even for the decline after comparison with 1996, considerable acceptance with a statement that our soldiers put their lives in risk

²¹ Christopher Dandeker, *Ozbrojene sily v nových casech - naroky na lidske zdroje*. In: *Armady po ukonceni studene valk*, Impuls, Praha 1995, p. 36.

during missions which goals are not quite clear. Only half of the Czech public agrees with the opinion that participation in solving problems in crisis areas is a duty of the democratic country. Probably also economic factor contributes to unclear moral legitimacy where disunity of the public is manifested towards spending money for deployment of our units to peacekeeping missions, and traditionally among the public prevails acceptance of the opinion that the only reason why soldiers enlist for missions is money.

Table No. 18 Attitudes toward peacekeeping missions (%)

	1996			1997		
	Yes	No	I do not know	Yes	No	I do not know
participation in peacekeeping missions promotes image of the Czech Republic	x	x	x	73	16	11
the only reason why soldiers enlist for missions is money	76	16	8	72	18	10
foreign missions provide opportunity to test quality of the Czech military	62	23	15	71	19	10
participation in peacekeeping missions increases chances for Czech Republic's integration in NATO and EU	x	x	x	66	15	19
it is a duty of a democratic state to participate in solving problems in crisis areas	x	x	x	52	31	17
missions provide opportunity in forming a new type of a soldier	44	30	26	52	23	25
Czech soldiers put their lives in risk during missions which goals are not quite clear	55	36	9	47	40	13
it is worthless spending taxpayers' money on sending our troops to peacekeeping	x	x	x	39	45	16

missions						
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Note.: x - the question was not asked in 1996.

In a detail analysis of a group of people who express acceptance with individual statements it is evident that especially the political orientation and attitudes to NATO membership are sources of differences. People inclining more to the political right and with the positive attitude to entry into NATO more prefer the statement that participation in peacekeeping missions increases chances of the Czech Republic for integration into EU and NATO as well as that these activities have positive influence to the image of the Czech Republic abroad. They prefer more distinctly the opinion that the peacekeeping activities are one of the duties of the democratic country, and they perceive more positively also the functional consequences, that is, that the peacekeeping missions represent a chance to form a new soldier and to check up the quality of our military. People refusing entry of the Czech Republic into NATO with inclination to the political left more often support opinions that spending money of taxpayers for sending our units into peacekeeping missions is futile and they more considerably point out the faintness of goals of these missions as well as that the sole reason the soldiers enlist for them is money.

Coming out from the above knowledge on attitudes of the Czech population to the peacekeeping missions we can create a typology of respondents in which we'll limit to definition of the three basic types:

- 1) *supporters* - they are the people who express explicit positive attitudes to the Czech participation in peacekeeping operations. They share opinion that it is a duty of the democratic country to participate in solving problems in crisis regions; goals of missions the Czech Republic participates in are clear and it is necessary to allocate money on deploying our units in these missions;
- 2) *opponents* - it is that part of the Czech population that explicitly refuses participation of the Czech Republic in peacekeeping missions. It points out that it is not the duty of the democratic country to participate in solving problems in crisis regions; goals of missions the Czech Republic participates in are unclear, and this part of population opposes spending money for these activities;
- 3) *neutrals* - people who have no definite attitudes to peacekeeping missions, and they are somewhere between supporters and opponents of the Czech involvement into these missions.

The following shows diversification of the population in relation to the above stated definition:

Table No. 19 Typology of the Czech population according to its attitudes toward peacekeeping missions (%)

supporters	24 %
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neutrals	59 %
opponents	17 %

A majority of the Czech population takes no explicit attitude to the peacekeeping operations. It is about the expected result because we can assume that it is a problem which is at the periphery of public interests. Neutral attitudes are taken especially by people of the centre political orientation (71% from them), respondents in age over 60 (69%), young people in age of 15 – 19 (69%). Only less than half respondents are quite clear about their attitude towards the peacekeeping operations while a quarter of the Czech population takes up explicit positive attitude which is expressed by their perception of the missions as legitimate activities²². They are primarily the people with university education (41%), with political orientation to the right centre (40%), or the right (36%). The Czech participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions is explicitly withheld by less than a fifth of the Czech population²³. They are the people with orientation to the left (48%), or the left centre (29%), and people in age of 50 – 59 (27%).

Legitimacy of Czech participation in peacekeeping missions is rather vague and stems from national interests, above all desires to enter Euro-Atlantic structures. Vague legitimacy reflects also the fact that Czech activities in these missions are at the bring of public interests and only a minority of the Czech population shares a clear attitude (supporting or opposing) toward them.

2.17. Attitudes to conscription

Conscription is a subject of discussion, and experiences that young men get by the service completion form their attitudes to the military in a considerable way.²⁴ In case of the attitude towards conscription, the Czech population splits into two groups. Less than

²² To illustrate attitudes consistency of this part of the Czech population we can state that 95% of them think that participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions improves image of the Czech Republic, 95% of them assert that foreign missions check up the quality of Czech military, 93% point out that participation in peacekeeping missions increases chances of the Czech Republic for integration into EU and NATO, 80% assert that missions are opportunity to form a new type of a soldier who will be useful more often in the future. At the same time even among them 50% think that the sole reason the soldiers enlist for missions is money.

²³ From this part of the population only 23% think that missions are an opportunity to form a new type of a soldier who will be useful more often in the future, 38% assert that participation in peacekeeping missions increases chances of the Czech Republic for integration into EU and NATO, 40% think that participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions improves image of the Czech Republic, 48% assert that foreign missions check up quality of our military and 96% think that the sole reason the soldiers enlist for missions is money.

²⁴ Jiri Hendrych, *Vojenska zakladni sluzba jako socializacni faktor*. In: Stefan Sarvas (ed.), *Armada v moderni spolecnosti*, Vesmir, Praha, 1997. pp.149-164.

half of respondents has positive attitude to it, and more than a third shares the negative attitude. Less than a fifth of respondents answered “I do not know”.

Table No. 20 Attitudes toward military service (%)

	1996	1997
positive	42	44
negative	43	37
I do not know	15	19

The age and sex have the most decisive impact on the attitude towards conscription. We can assert that the younger the respondent is the more often expresses negative attitude towards conscription, what applies to males in particular. This knowledge confirms that also in this country the trends known from developed industrial countries take advance in terms that conscription is perceived to be legitimate particularly by older people.

2.18. Opinions on conscription

In the past, conscription was perceived as a symbol of “entrance into maturity”. In modern society, nevertheless, this character is being gradually lost especially among the young people.²⁵ More than half of the Czech population approves the statement that conscription does make men from boys, and it is a matter of honour to undertake it. On the other hand, the two thirds of the Czech population agree with the statement that conscription poses the financial and time loss.

Table No. 21 Attitudes toward conscription (%)

	1996	1997
conscription makes men from boys	52	56
it is a matter of honour to undertake conscription	43	52
conscription poses the financial and time loss for young men	74	67

In comparison with 1996, some rehabilitation of conscription occurs. It is highly probable that this trend has a connection with overall positive perception of the military within society than in the past. Also in case of attitudes to conscription the most distinctive differences appear on the age basis. It has been confirmed again that older people and women more positively assess the conscription service.

²⁵ Janowitz M., Moskos Ch.C., *Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978. Armed Forces and Society*, 1979, No.2, s. 171-2.

2.19. Conscription or the professional military?

Currently, we witness a discussion on a future form of the military; in particular in developed industrial countries. The discussion comes from the idea of a “death of a mass military”,²⁶ and it is focused on two options: preservation of a conscription military with a high degree of professionalization – particularly of non-commissioned officers’ (NCO’s) positions, or establishment of a fully professional military. We register a considerable inclination to the full professionalization in many countries currently. In the 90s, the full professionalization was completed in Belgium and the Netherlands, and this step is being prepared in France. Similar trends can be found also in other countries, for instance in Argentina where a perspective establishment of a professional military is discussed. This idea has been worded also in a traditional bastion of a conscription type of military, as Germany is, and also Israel ruminates over higher professionalization of some NCO’s positions. Even here, in Israel, some voices have been raised calling for complete professionalization even though experts insist that due to the Near East security situation these opinions cannot be taken seriously. This development could not escape notice of the Czech public, especially of the youth.

In comparison with 1996, we recorded a moderate decline of support for preservation of the conscription conception with increase of an undecided group. This tendency can mean that the mentioned problem loses its interest for the public.

Table No. 19 Support for either conscription or the professional military (%)

	1994	1996	1997
to keep conscription	25	35	31
professional military	57	48	46
I do not know	18	17	23

Also in this case it has been manifested that the problem of preference of the conscription or professional military is a generation problem when transition to the professional military is distinctively preferred by younger people and men.

2.20. How long conscription should be?

Since 1989, conscription service time has been cut down several times to 12 months, and its duration is still under discussion among the youth. There are opinions that the Czech Republic should switch to the all-volunteer armed forces. As the most differentiating factor in

²⁶ See for instance, Harries-Jenkins, G., *From Conscription to Volunteer Armies*. *Adelphi Paper*, No.103, Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1973.

assessing the length of conscription seems age as shown in the following table.

Table No. 23 How long conscription should be (in months)?

	Czech population	Age					
		15 - 19	20 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 and more
average	11,1 (10,7)	8,2	9,0	10,5	11,4	12,7	13,4
average without those who stated that conscription should last 0 months (9,5 % interviewed)	12,3 (12,2)	10,0	10,5	11,8	11,9	13,2	14,4

Note: In brackets the average for 1996.

The most considerable depreciation of conscription can be found at a group of people who have fresh experiences with it. At the same time, we find out that all age groups consider the twelve-month service as the most ideal. The support for longer conscription service is being worded by older age groups while younger people think that this service should be shorter. These attitudes are logically a consequence of different life situation and experiences.

Also in case of opinions towards the length of conscription one hypothesis is confirmed, what is that even though the young generation perceives it as a burden and thinks that it should be as short as possible, we can consider it as a legitimate service in relation to relatively low depreciation of it. At the same time one fact is confirmed that the most distinctive source of doubts on the need of the conscription service are experiences from its undertaking.

2.21. Performance of Conscription Service

Both abroad and in the Czech republic, discussions take place in order to find out whether it is possible to deploy conscripts into foreign operations. In these discussions we find arguments which both support and reject this approach. In our case, the respondents were asked about their opinion where the young men should perform their military service and proposed several options ranging from foreign missions down to a location as close as possible to their domicile. Attitudes to this issue have been relatively stable, and no distinctive changes occurred.

Table No. 24 Opinions on performance of conscription serv
(%)

	1996	1997
to serve according to the needs of the country and the military, but on the Czech Republic's territory	42	40
serve as close as possible to the domicile	39	39
to serve according to the needs of the country and the military, including foreign missions	12	13
I do not know	7	8

Also in this case some differences occur in preference of individual options based on age in particular. The younger people prefer conscription to be as close as possible to the domicile – 47% at the age group of 15 – 19, and 50% at people of 20 – 29 years of age. Older population groups lay stress on performance of conscription according to needs of the country and military, but on the Czech Republic's territory only – 53% at people over 60 and 51% at people in age of 50 – 59 years.

The performance of conscription in accordance with needs of the country and military, including missions abroad, is more distinctively disapproved by people with left-centre-wing political orientation when only 5% agree with this alternative. The right wing and the right-centre-wing politically orientated people accept this alternative more distinctively by 29% and 19% respectively.

2.22. What is More Important for the Society – Military or Civil Service?

The civil service has a long tradition in many democratic countries and a considerably high social significance. In case of the Czech Republic, this problem is relatively new. It was introduced shortly after the 1989 „velvet revolution“ when students raised this issue among their main requirements. In the research we have focused on perception of civil service in comparison with military one from the viewpoint of their social significance. When monitoring development of the Czech public's attitudes to this problem, we find out a moderate increase of acceptance for significance of military service. Opposite trend was recorded in case of civil service.

Table No. 25 Importance of civil and military service (%)

	1994	1996	1997
military service is more important	29	30	33
civil service is more important	16	18	13
both are important	43	40	43
both are unimportant	12	12	11

In detailed analysis, we find out higher preference of the opinion that:

military service is more important – at people inclining to the left (70%) and people in age of 50 – 59 years (50%), or 60 and more years (39%);

civil service is more important – at young people in age of 15 – 19 years (20%), or 20 – 29 years (21%), as well as at respondents orientated to the right centre (19%);

both are not important – at people in age of 15 – 19 years (17%) in particular.

As the best solution is seen combination of both kind of service. Despite the fact that civil service is a novelty it has rather high legitimacy, however, evidently higher legitimacy is expressed by Czech youth.

2.23. Who to decide on civil service

The problem of checking up those interested in the civil service has been discussed several times both among experts and in the media, and therefore we have also paid attention to it in our poll. It goes to show that also here the attitudes are stable even though we record a moderate shift to a lack of interest in these issues. The opinion that the decision should be made by draftees shared half of the Czech public while only one third prefer a special commission.

Table No. 27 How to decide on civil service? (%)

	1996	1997
the reasons should be screened by a special commission	33	32
the decision should be made by draftees	53	50
I do not know	14	18

The age seems the sole differentiating criterion. People over 60 (by 47%) lay stress on decision made by a special commission. The decision to be made by a recruit is preferred in particular by younger people in age of 15 – 19 years (60%), 20 – 29 years (62%), and 30 – 39 years (57%).

3. The Czech public and professional soldiers on NATO membership

3.1. Support for admission to NATO

Public support for NATO membership became one of the most discussed issues in 1997. It attracted attention of politicians, journalists and experts. A very important role was played by foreign actors (politicians and experts) who criticised lack of public support. Simultaneously, this issue drawn attention of many Czech prominents who otherwise resisted from being involved in political discussions. It brought about a dramatic increase of activities of NGO's. The whole debate on NATO membership contributed to the development of democracy in the Czech Republic as well as to the increase of civilian expertise in security and military matters.

The long-term trends, gained from the public opinion polls, describing changes are sometimes more important than individual results. In case of our question, seeking consent with the admission to NATO, we have recorded, after comparison with previous poll, a decline of that consent. It is about a trend, which corresponds with the last findings of IVVM (the Czech Public Opinion Poll Institute).

In development of attitudes of the Czech public toward NATO membership several periods might be identified:

- 1) for a short period of neutrality after the collapse of communism, the option of neutrality as a mean of disengagement of the country from the Warsaw pact was overwhelming. Support for NATO was very low.
- 2) between 1991 and late 1994 there was an increase in support for NATO membership. It resulted from fears of new conflicts, the Gulf war, attempted coup in Moscow, collapse of the USSR, war in the former Yugoslavia. A threat of the Muslim fundamentalism began to be perceived.
- 3) In years 1994 the decrease of support was observed, It resulted from confluence of several factors: due to the lack of public discussion caused by low interests of the political elite, the crystallisation of opponent's opinion (mainly the extreme right Association for Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia or extreme left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia or Left Block), the negative propaganda (nuclear weapons and foreign troop on the Czech territory) etc.
- 4) In 1995 and 1996, the low informational activity of the government and political subject supporting NATO membership kept a very high level of those sharing the negative or undecided attitudes toward NATO membership.
- 5) In the spring 1997 a certain reversal of the trend of low support was identified. It happened due to a marked intensification of the pro-NATO activities. While the number of opponents remained more or

less same the camp of undecided has begun to shrink.²⁷ This trend was shortly interrupted in the autumn 1997 when due to political turbulence there was an evident decline of attention to NATO membership which ensued in a short-lasting slip in support for Czech entry into NATO, however, it was not combined with a rise of rejection. When the new Czech government was formed in January 1998 the slow but continuous growth proved durable.

Table No. 28 Positive attitudes toward NATO membership of the Czech Republic (%)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	IV/ 1997	V/ 1997	IX/ 1997	XI/ 1997	XII/ 1997	II/ 1998	III/ 1998
IVVM	47	34	39	38	42	45	47	43	53	54	54
USIA	---	59	59	51	---	---	59	---	--	---	---
Factu	---	---	---	40	40	50	---	---	54	55	54
STEM	52	56	54	46	44	--	51	---	--	59	56
Research Department	---	---	---	46	---	55	---	50	--	---	58

Note: There are only positive attitudes depending on questions used by different agencies. IVVM „Should the Czech Republic make effort to enter NATO?“, USIA - „Would you support entry into NATO, if your country would have such a chance“, when in September 1997 due to invitation the question was changed „Do you support entry of your country into NATO?“ Factum - „Would in the Czech Republic be a referendum on NATO membership would you vote for or against ?“, STEM - „Do you think that we should make effort to enter NATO?“, Research Department MOD - „Do you agree with entry of the Czech Republic to NATO?“

In November 1997, half of the Czech population over 15 years of age supported admission of the Czech Republic to NATO. Against the admission, there is a less than a quarter of respondents (24 %), and more than a quarter (26 %) of them answered it does not know whether it supports or refuses the admission to NATO.

The decline of consent with the admission was not accompanied by increase of disapproval. Similarly to IVVM results, we have also recorded a growth of an undecided group.

Table No. 29 Do you agree with Czech Republic's entry into NATO? (%)

	XII/1996	V/1997	X/1997	II/1998
I agree	46	55	50	58
I do not agree	30	28	24	37
I do not	24	17	26	5

²⁷ This trends identified on the base of the following sources: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, no. 7, 1997, *Postoje k clenstvi CR v EU a NATO, Factum, 1997*, Jiri Sedivy, *Security in Central and Eastern Europe: Problems - Perceptions - Policies in Czech Republic, Institute of International Relations, 1997*. Stefan Sarvas, *Postoj ceske verejnosti ke vstupu do NATO, Mezinarodni politik*, no. 3, 1997 and Stefan Sarvas, *Pohledy ceske verejnosti a vojaku z povolani na vstup CR do NATO, Vyber stati*, no. 8, 1997.

know				
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Higher support for NATO membership is expressed by the professional corps. Among the professional soldiers 72 % of them expressed support for NATO membership in May 1997. Among the Czech public it was 55 %. Simultaneously 66 % of the professional corps indicated that they would vote for NATO membership in case of a referendum. According to the agency Factum only 50 % of the public would do so.

The groups of opponents and backers of the admission of Czech Republic to NATO differ. The political orientation seems to be the most important identification factor when the right-wing respondents support the admission to NATO more distinctively in comparison with the left-wing ones. People with higher education express higher support for the admission to the Alliance, and it is similar at the youth and middle-age people. The group of undecided respondents is the most interesting one because it has grown up compared with the last findings. The fundamental characteristics of this group are that the press media pose lower impact on it. It relates especially to women, older people and the youth in age under 20 years, as well as to people with centrist political orientation, so it is about the groups with lower interest in political issues.

Table No. 30 Attitudes toward entry into NATO and demographic characteristic (November 1997)

I agree (50 %)	I do not agree (24 %)	I do not know (26 %)
centre-right political orientation - 74% university education - 73% right political orientation - 72 % age at 20 - 24 61 % age at 30 - 34 let 61 % age at 45 - 49 let 60 % the part of population being informed by professional soldiers - 59 % men 59 % age at 40 - 44 - 58 %	left political orientation - 53 % centre-left political orientation - 39 % age at 55 - 59 - 37 % age at 50 - 54 - 34 %	age at 15 - 19 - 37 % the part of population which does not read the press - 41 % age over 60 - 40 % centre political orientation - 39 % women - 37 % basic education - 34 %

age at 35 - 39 - 56 %	
secondary education - 56 %	
age at 25 - 29 - 55 %	

The characteristics mentioned above show that the group of undecided people is less susceptible to the influence of the press, and it is likely disinterested in any discussion over the admission of Czech Republic in NATO. The approach to this group requires specific forms of communication.

As in the past, it is re-confirmed now that the most important factor affecting a consent with the admission to NATO is the political orientation which then influences also other demographic characteristics as age and education are. Also other polls support this conclusion.

The correlation analysis confirms continuity in the dominant influence of the political orientation. After eliminating a factor of the political orientation, we find out that importance of age differences – higher support to the admission to NATO by the young people – and education – higher support from better-educated groups of society – loses its significance.

Table No. 31 Influence of political orientation on attitudes toward Czech entry into NATO (November 1997)

	Support for NATO membership	Support for NATO membership with exclusion of political orientation (partial correlation)
age	0,1990***	0,0599
education	0,0902*	0,0386
father's education	0,1511***	0,0460
religious affiliation	0,0077	0,0026
gender	0,0477	0,0290
place of living (number of inhabitants)	0,0258	0,0155
political orientation (right-left)	0,4974***	xxxxxxx

Note: p indicates the statistical significance when * $p < 0,05$, ** $p < 0,01$, *** $p = 0,00$. Higher correlation indicates higher support for NATO membership. The positive correlation shows higher support among people with lower age, higher education, higher religious affiliation, men, right political orientation and bigger place of living.

The growth of support for NATO membership is bound to several tendencies. First, politicians confronted with critical remarks of foreign officials and Czech journalists pointing to low public support started paying more attention to this issue. Second, low capacity of politicians to raise public support for NATO membership ensued in a dramatic increase of activities of many NGO's, prominents who otherwise would not like to be involved in politics and private companies (for instance TV stations) aimed at campaigning for Czech Republic's entry into NATO. The debate on NATO membership turned into a lesson on democracy.

3.2. Readiness to join NATO

The attitudes of the Czech public towards the military, its readiness, and towards the career soldiers can be characterised as constantly very critical. It is logical that it is reflected in a conviction that the military is not prepared for the admission to NATO. Yet still embarrassing is the considerable down turn of those who believe that the military is prepared enough for this step. The group of undecided people grows. The respondents express their critical attitude also to the readiness of the Czech Republic for the admission to NATO.

Table No. 32 Assessment of preparedness to join NATO (%)

Is prepared?	V/1997			XI/1997		
	Yes	No	I do not know	Yes	No	I do not know
Czech Republic	x	x	x	23	46	31
Czech military	27	48	25	18	50	32

Note: X - not asked

The attitude to the admission to the Alliance itself stands as the most distinctive determinant for assessment of the readiness for the admission. Among supporters of the admission, the readiness of the Czech Republic is assessed positively by 44% and readiness of the military by 33% of them, taking into account that in both cases the negative and undecided assessment prevails at more than half of supporters. As far as the opponents of the admission are concerned, in case of the Czech Republic it represents 3% and in case of the military 5%.

Although the professional soldiers are more keen to join NATO they are also more critical to the military's preparedness for membership. In May 1997 only 21 % of the professional corps accepted the opinion that the Czech military is well-prepared to join NATO. Among the Czech public it was 27 % of the interviewed.

3.3. Knowledge about Admission of the Czech Republic to NATO

Only 21% of the Czech population over 15 believe they are well informed what the admission to NATO will mean for the Czech Republic. Insufficient knowledge is returned by 59% of respondents, and 13% of them are unable to respond to this issue.

Particularly people with university education stand as they are more informed (48% asserts they are well informed about the admission to NATO), as well as part of the population which supports the admission (42%) followed by men (36%). It is worth taking into cognisance that also at the "best informed groups" of the society there is rather prevailing opinion that they are not sufficiently informed about the admission of the Czech Republic to NATO.

As the least informed people seem to be those who refuse the admission (67% insist they have insufficient information), women (63%), that is the part of population with distinctively undecided inclination, but surprisingly also people with a grammar-school education (66%), what is the part of population with above-average support for the admission to NATO.

3.4. Consequences of Admission to NAT

In assessment of consequences of the admission of Czech Republic to NATO the respondents agree that there will be increase of costs for armament, more rapid modernisation of military equipment, higher funds will be earmarked for the military, and that the professionalization of the military will be speeded up. Better security occupies only the third place, although among the supporters of the membership the first one, of the ladder in relation to the consequences of the admission to the Alliance. The public expects promotion of career soldiers' qualities and better order within the military. At the end of the ladder there are the loss of independence of the country together with possibility of deployment of nuclear weapons on our territory. Only half of the respondents believes that this will increase prestige of the military within the society.

Table No. 33 Consequences of Czech Republic's entry into NATO (%)

	Assessment of NATO membership's consequences			Attitudes toward consequences (only the yes answers) according to the attitude toward NATO membership		
	Yes	No	I do not know	Yes	No	I do not know
more money for the military	76	11	13	80	80	65
rapid modernisation of the military	74	12	14	90	59	57
better security for the country	70	16	14	94	37	55
better professional soldiers' qualities	68	17	15	84	49	55
better order within the military	67	15	18	84	49	51
rapid professionalization of the military	65	16	19	81	47	52
higher prestige of the Czech Republic abroad	63	22	15	84	36	46
higher risk that the Czech Republic could be drawn into some military conflict	57	25	18	47	79	54
higher prestige of the military in the Czech Republic	54	28	18	76	24	41
deployment of foreign troops on our territory	52	29	19	45	74	44
higher attention to the military	51	29	20	66	39	33

among politicians						
deployment of nuclear weapons on our territory	39	35	26	29	62	38
limitation of sovereignty of the Czech Republic	37	43	20	29	64	28
positive impact on Czech economy	25	44	31	44	7	5

Comparing the groups of supporters and opponents, the evident distinctions occur in expectation of the admission consequences. The group of respondents with undecided attitudes is characterised also by its indecisiveness towards assessment of consequences of the admission.

The supporters of the admission to NATO lay higher stress on more rapid modernisation of military equipment, higher security, promotion of prestige of the Military of the Czech Republic at the public, promotion of prestige of the Czech Republic abroad, better order within the military, higher quality of career soldiers, more rapid professionalization of the military, higher attention to be paid by politicians to the military, and a positive impact on the economy.

The opponents of the admission to NATO point out obviously rather negative effects of that step, first of all the loss of independence of our country, increase of risks that Czech Republic will be drawn into some military conflict, and a possibility of deployment of nuclear weapons on our territory, or possibility of deployment of foreign forces on our territory.

Also in this case, it is suitable to take into account the long-term development of the admission consequences assessment.

Table No. 34 Consequences of joining NATO (%)

	1996	VI/1997	XI/1997
more money for the military	xxxx	68	76
rapid modernisation of the military	70	66	74
better security for the countr	65	65	70
better professional soldiers's qualities	63	x	68
better order within the military	60	x	67
rapid professionalization of the militar	66	x	65
higher prestige of the Czech Republic abroad	x	60	63
higher risk that the Czech Republic could be drawn into some militar conflict	54	x	57

higher prestige of the military in the Czech Republic	x	60	54
deployment of foreign troops on our territor	49	43	52
higher attention to the military am politicians	57	x	51
deployment of nuclear weapons on our territor	42	30	39
limitation of sovereignty of the Czech Republic	x	29	37
positive impact on Czech economy	x	29	25

Note: x - the question was not aske

After comparison with the previous polls, we can specify several basic trends:

- 1) There is a growth of support for opinions that the admission to NATO will have a positive impact on the military performance, and will be reflected in more rapid modernisation, promotion of the career soldiers' quality, better order within the military, and it will mean more money from the State Budget for the military. In a whole, this trend is demonstrated by the growth of conviction that better security of the country will be ensured;
- 2) At the same time, the expectation declines that the admission to NATO will be positively reflected in a sphere of the civil-military relations. This trend is demonstrated by a decline of agreement with opinions that the admission to the Alliance will result in higher prestige of the military within the public, and that a higher attention will be paid to the military by politicians;
- 3) A conviction grows that the admission to NATO will impose limitation of sovereignty of the Czech Republic.

Based on evaluation of long-term trends, we have recorded an expectation that even though the quality of professional soldiers and readiness of the military will be enhanced, the gap between the military and society will, nevertheless, keep widening, and the trend to marginalization of the military will be reinforced.

3.5. Perception of NATO and the military of the Czech Republic by professional soldiers

Because it can be supposed the admission of the Czech Republic to NATO will be a great change for the Czech military attention must be paid also to psychological aspects - namely to perception of a picture of NATO and the Czech military by the professional soldiers. In order to reveal deeper expectations the psychological technique of the semantic differential tailored to our needs.

Table No. 35 Perceptions of the Czech military and NATO by the professional soldiers

	the Czech military	NATO	
bad	3,98	4,80	good
unseemly	3,94	3,89	nice
cold	3,83	3,89	warm
traditional	2,87	5,52	modern
sad	3,25	4,16	cheerful
undemocratic	4,42	4,97	democratic
unimportant	4,47	5,56	important
passive	4,11	5,50	active
aggressive	5,90	4,49	defensive
unstable	3,39	5,53	stable
unattractive	4,05	4,74	attractive
useless	4,09	5,34	useful
bureaucratic	2,27	3,87	unbureaucratic
unpleasant	3,97	4,47	pleasant
foxy	4,02	3,33	frank
non-perspective	3,73	5,31	perspective
wrong	4,35	4,99	right
stagnating	3,05	5,34	developing
no-assistance	3,93	5,11	assistance

Note: Measure at the scale from 1 to 7 when the mark 1 meant the identification of the institution with the left feeling and the mark 7 meant the identification with the right expression. The mark 4 was the expression of the central position. Statistically significant at the level $p < 0,01$ are all feelings having the mark lower than 3,4 or higher than 4,6.

After a more detailed analysis of attitudes we can say that perceptions of NATO and the Czech military by the professional soldiers differ significantly. While the Czech military evokes rather negative reaction, the echo to NATO is of more positive nature. The professional soldiers have in their minds the very consistent pictures of both institutions. They characterise them the following way:

- the Czech military according to professional soldiers represents unstable and bureaucratic institution that is in a period of stagnation. According to their opinion, the Czech military is defensive and traditional, that is, no changes are being made here and it does not adopt new trends in sphere of the military science nor in society. As a whole, it causes sorrow at minds of professional soldiers.

- professional soldiers describe NATO as the prominent, modern and active institution that keeps developing. They characterise NATO by stability, efficiency and with good prospects. The military professionals point out to NATO attractiveness. It is connected with democratic principles, assistance and solidarity respectively. Anyway, somewhere in the deepest corner of their mind are some suspicious toward NATO, probably being shared by the whole Czech population. They ascribed to NATO a foxy character. In sum, they characterise NATO as something what is right and good, and what produces rather positive psychological stimuli.

In case of perception of the Czech military and NATO we therefore found out a considerable homogeneity of professional soldiers' attitudes. But at the same time it shows the fact that military professionals are very pessimistic in their view on the Czech military and due to that reason they can see NATO as a "light at the end of a tunnel". It sometimes results even to idealisation of this organisation.

3.6. Security risks and Admission of the Czech Republic to NATO

Support for entry of the Czech Republic to NATO is significantly affected by the risks issues - what means the risks in a broad meaning.²⁸ For support of NATO membership of the Czech Republic some groups of risks have some positive and others on the contrary the negative influence.

First of all the risks of the military nature fostering support of NATO membership are international aspects and especially the situation on the territory of the former USSR and geopolitical ambitions of Russia, situation on the former Yugoslavia territory, and the like. As it has been describing in this study these are risks on decline.

Our expectation might be demonstrated by a considerable growth of support for the admission after the unsuccessful putsch in 1992. It is an expression of conviction that Russia and its ambitions can considerably affect the security situation in the Czech Republic, and elimination of this risk can be made first of all by entry into NATO. This fact is an expression of a conviction that elimination of this risk of military nature do require anchoring in the Alliance

Among risks which might foster support of NATO membership of the Czech Republic could be considered also increasing influence of intolerable religious or other ideologies - it has been spoken predominantly about the islamese fundamentalism.

The problem that keeps to be still more topical is the feeling of the Czech population that menace comes from Slovakia what is being supported by the political development in that country. Development in Slovakia can then be thought as a distinct stimuli for the growth of

²⁸ See *The Security Policy of the Czech Republic*. The Institute of International Relations, Prague 1996.

support for admission of the Czech Republic to NATO - especially in case Slovakia would change its declared foreign political orientation due to failure of its current aims for admission to EU and NATO and it would re-orient to Russia.

The economic risks, risks of social or ecological nature pose predominately negative influence to support of admission of the Czech Republic to NATO. These risks are perceived more acute and therefore greater importance is attached to them and their elimination gains in seriousness. Activities aimed at elimination of these „new“ risks are more understandable by the population what is reflected in its approval with allocation of public funds for their elimination.

These considerations support also empirical findings. From them it is evident that support for NATO membership is closely bound to fears of military nature. Simultaneously rejection of entry into the Alliance is linked to threats of economic, political and social nature.

Table No. 36 Perceptions of threats and their influence on the attitude toward NATO membership

higher support for NATO membership	higher rejection of NATO membership
* fears of development in the former Soviet Union (r=0,13)	* fears of the market economy (r=0,31)
* the perception of Slovakia as a possible military threat (r=0,09)*	* the low living standard (r=0,24)
* the perception of Islam as a possible military threat (r=0,09)*	* behaviour of politicians (r=0,24)
	* a strong government (r=0,19)
	* stability of the Czech crown as a currency (r=0,17)
	* foreigners (r=0,15)
	* criminality (r=0,11)

Note: * - due to a low percentage only for orientation

In these consequences it is possible to define mutual relations by the term the “market of security” where the need to eliminate individual risks compete for attention and allocation of economic sources. At the same time the judgement, support and expenditure of money (in this case we understand the admission of the Czech Republic to NATO as one of the ways of excluding the danger of the military threat) are conditioned by topicality of the risk, political and public support of its resolution, the present achievements in fighting against it, readiness of strategies for its elimination, readiness of the public, or also of politicians to enforce sometimes not popular solutions, and the like. If, from this point of view, it is about the admission of the Czech Republic to NATO, we note very low topicality of military risks in comparison with other risks, non-existence of strategies that would be presented to the public, non-existence of different options leading to the problem solution, insufficient volume of communication, lack of clarity in issues of costs, and the like. All this affects attitudes of the public and its preference for elimination of certain sorts of risks. In effect other kinds of risks attract lower attention and steps aimed at their elimination gain either lower support or higher rejection. This pertains to Czech entry into NATO as well.

Conclusions

Based on the above analysis and other available studies, we can make several general conclusions:

1. It is impossible to leave out the public and its impact on civil-military relations. Even though it is not the most important player of the whole process, attitudes of the public affect decision-making of politicians, and they have significant impact on a self-reflection process of the military;
2. Actions of politicians are determined by attitudes of the public to some extent. At the same time it is evident that for the sake of healthy civil-military relations it is necessary for the politicians not to become hostages of public opinion. Simultaneously, they should be able to carry out three basic tasks. First, to define the future vision of the military according to expected development of the security situation. Second, to ensure implementation of civil and democratic control principles. Third, to make the military and its missions legitimised among the public;
3. For achieving balanced relations between the military and society it is necessary for the military to learn how to communicate with the public with language, the public understands to. At the same time, due to marginalization of the military in society, it will likely be its task to conduct educational activities towards politicians and journalists as well;
4. The discussion over admission of the Czech Republic to NATO has become a significant factor, which affected civil-military relations. This discussion has focused attention of the society to the military and its problems. At the same time it has shown that responsibility for current, according to the public the critical, state is attributed to both politicians and career soldiers. The public differentiates between political and military responsibilities when responsibility for the morale and discipline within the army, training etc. is attributed to career soldiers while politicians are being made responsible for their professional qualities, structural changes in the army or legislative problems;
5. In a question of support for admission of the Czech Republic to NATO, it turns out that issue of military risk is inferior in comparison with issues of social, economic and environmental risks. A low feeling of military threat results in a pressure for downsizing the armed forces, higher professionalization, and shortening or abrogation of the conscription service.
6. Often criticised low support for admission into the Alliance by the Czech public seems to be a result of several factors. First, non-topicality of the military threat that leads to lack of interest in security itself. Second, the idea of political elite that admission to NATO poses a problem that is to be dealt by diplomats, and their unconcern to gaining public support. Third, explicit determination of a group of those who oppose admission to NATO that are associated around political parties like KSCM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia), and SPR-RSC (Republican Party), while political subjects that support the admission into Alliance rather discuss issues related to implementation of that step, for instance, a discussion over propriety of referendum to the issue in question;
7. Perception of security and the military related issues is burdened to some extent by political differentiation and even in spite of apolitical approach to the military it is impossible to avoid drawing politics into some problems, and to differentiation of the Czech public attitudes resulting from that;

8. Dissatisfaction with functioning of political institutions can lead to a growth credibility of the military or other state power institutions, for instance the police, as it happened in time of political crisis in the Czech Republic in 1997. No doubt, the credibility of the military is very important for ensuring sufficient legitimacy of its missions. On the other hand it is a question whether distrust in political solutions should be replaced by trust in solutions imposed by armed institutions that should not get in into politics;

9. In spite of more significant interest in issues of security and the military, and due to discussion over the admission of the Czech Republic to NATO, we note general trend towards marginalization of the military. The military security and military itself are becoming peripheral topics for politicians, journalists and the public as well, what brings a shift from actual control to a control through scandals;

10. The Czech public accepted new missions of the Czech military and highly appreciated its active participation during the floods in summer 1997. In case of engagement into peacekeeping operations an unclear view prevails that prefers interests of the Czech Republic and neglects the moral dimension of this problem;

11. The generation drift is evident. The younger generation is more in favour of Czech NATO membership and simultaneously it shares more critical attitudes to the military. NATO membership is perceived as a vehicle to the final integration in the West as well as to higher professionalization, the end of draft etc. In general, young people seem more liberal in attitudes toward security and the military. Although, the older generation is less enthusiastic about NATO membership it shares better attitudes toward security and the military. It is bound to its traditionalism and conservatism

Appendix

Table No. 1 Influence of the attitude toward NATO membership on attitudes toward security, the military and the professional soldiers (%)

Attitude	the Czec population	the part of the Czec population supporting Czech entry to NATO
states' sovereignty must be defended at all costs	77	84
defence expenditures are a burden for the state budget	50	42
in case of a military conflict we are not able to defence ourselves	55	49
it is worthless to consider state's defence, because powers will decide over its fate anyway	63	57
is skilful in mastering technique	39	47
has support of citizens	35	34
has good morale	16	17
professional skills	48	55
physical fitness	42	46
morale	32	36
a positive relation toward democratic development	39	48

Table No. 2 Problems of the military and their impact on forming confidence to the military, the Defence Minister and the view of military transformation (1996)

Correlation		
confidence to the military	confidence to the Defence Minister	the view of military transformation
1) lack of morale and discipline (r=0,28)	1) low competence of the politicians at the head of the Ministry of Defence (r=0,47)	1) the low level of training (r=0,34)
2) the low level of training (r=0,27)	2) too extensive bureaucratic apparatus (r=0,28)	2) lack of morale and discipline (r=0,33)
3) corruption in the military and problems with tenders (r=0,26)	3) lack of morale and discipline (r=0,23)	3) low competence of the politicians at the head of the Ministry of Defence (r=0,33)
4) too extensive bureaucratic apparatus (r=0,20)	4) the low level of training (r=0,25)	4) corruption in the military, problems with tenders (r=0,32)
5) the low level of military education (r=0,19)	5) corruption in the military, problems with tenders (r=0,19)	5) too extensive bureaucratic apparatus (r=0,27)
6) low competence of the politician at the head of the Ministry of Defence (r=0,17)	6) exodus of young professional soldiers (r=0,13)	6) the low prestige of the military profession (r=0,22)
7) the low prestige of the military profession (r=0,15)	7) social uncertainty in the military (r=0,11)	7) the authoritative style of management (r=0,21)