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**ALTERNATIVE SECURITY MODELS OF REPUBLIC OF
BULGARIA AND THE CHANGE IN THE CONCEPT FOR
DEFENCE SUFFICIENCY**

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INTRODUCTION

Nine years stand between us and the big change, called by the President of France F. Mitterrand - "Europe's return to its history and geography." Nine years is not a long period but it is long enough to try to draw some conclusions and lessons from the past.

Like more of the other East-European countries, Bulgaria regards the problem of its national security as a priority of vital importance. The new political map of Europe in the beginning of the 90's is not a basis of common security model for all East European countries. The situation in Central Europe is clearly different from the one in such countries situated in Southern Europe. For example, the Balkan environment generates more threats than the other regions of the continent.

Speaking of the security model of a country - Bulgaria in the case - we cannot omit the following:

- First, any kind of new security model formulated and vindicated by a country on a certain stage of its development, cannot be absolutely new, unconnected with the geopolitical context, where the country has existed for centuries. It is obligatory that in such a model existed elements, connected with the geographic situation, size, historically shaped neighbours, geopolitical predetermined relations.

- Second, any security model has its historic basis. It is a result of positive and negative historic background, aggregating of a positive elements from previous historical models and rejecting these, which had not passed the severe evaluation of the history.

Guided by the mentioned reasons, the authors have separated the analysis in four main parts. In the first part the attention is concentrated on basic geopolitical,

geostrategical and historic extents, defining the present security model of Bulgaria. The second part analysis the main possible models. Third and fourth part of the presentation are dedicated to basic foreign political and military parameters of the already formulated security model of Bulgaria.

PART I. CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL FRAMES OF THE SECURITY MODELS

1. Specifics of the Bulgarian security model as a small country

The specific of the Bulgarian security model is connected with the fact, concerning the security of a small country in a specific region with defined geopolitical and geostrategical characteristics.

A/. These specifics consist first of that its national security depends much more on foreign, than on internal factors. Its power (economic, political military) is not enough to be opposed in possible conflict to more of its neighbours and countries in the present world. In the mutual dependence between the states nowadays for the great powers the national security depends much more on their power, but in the small countries the most important are the foreign factors. To guarantee their security the small countries have to take into account:

- Powerful allies and protectors (paternalistic national security model)
- Balancing between the interests of different foreign powers by balancing of these interests (balanced model)

B/. These specifics depend both on the rate and on what sense Bulgaria is representing an interest for other countries and especially for the "great powers" and leading European countries:

- Economic interest -- owns important materials and power sources or has a high degree of economic development; is potentially important market, low price of labour.
- Geopolitical interest - it is mainly small countries, which serve as buffer between the big ones and thanks to their ability to balance between them, provide their

national security. The same was the situation with the neutrality and non-alignment of different countries after the World War 2.

- Geostrategical interest - even if Bulgaria is not of economic interest, it potentially owns geostrategical value for the big countries - like Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Israel, South Korea, etc.

C/. The Balkan and the Bulgarian territory during the last two centuries had been a field of conflict of geostrategical interests, connected mainly with possessing the Dardanelles and control over the road between Europe and Asia. In many aspects this conflict of geostrategical interests is tragic for the Bulgarian people's faith. It is very exact to mention the decisions of Berlin congress (1878), which divided territories with Bulgarians and created the "Bulgarian national problem." The geostrategical importance of the Bulgarian territory created paternalistic model of security, where the Balkan nations had guaranteed their security with the help of a powerful protector and an ally.

After the World War 2 Bulgaria became a part of the geostrategical and geopolitical configuration under USSR's control. However it should be mentioned that until the end of 40's the more valuable geostrategical partner was ex-Yugoslavia. This was the reason for the sacrifice of basic Bulgarian national interests according to the Yugoslavia's desires. This way was solved the Macedonian problem in favour of Yugoslavia. After the Yugoslavian exit from the Soviet Alliance, Bulgaria acquired geostrategical importance on the Balkans, which predetermined the support, used permanently by the Bulgarian political regime during four decades.

After the overcoming of the block separation, Bulgaria lost its geostrategical importance for the great powers. The Bulgarian geostrategical status fell under the shadow of Turkey. That creates the situation, where Bulgaria in some sense feels itself "abandoned" and "neglected."

In these conditions the problem of the Bulgarian policy of the national security is to convince Europe and the world of our independently and specific geostrategical importance.

Aggregated, the economic, geopolitical and geostrategic facts, shaping the national security model are the following:

- providing national security could be achieved only with national approaches, as far as the mechanisms of international security and the position of the international order are not on the necessary level;

- for a country like Bulgaria - with limited resources and potential - the security model must lie on flexible foreign and military policy,

- the searching of partners and allies is an important task of our national security policy, but predetermining of the state's interests paternalistic model should be avoided.

2 Bulgarian Security Models - historical background and lessons

In the Bulgarian idea of national security as any other country, on different stages of its development as an independent national state, can be seen both durable elements of historic continuity and facts, or dynamic elements of economical and social change. In different complicated extent, they permanently interact with the external factor -- changing external scope. As a result of this interaction the perception of national interests evolves, so do the approaches for its obtaining, and the evaluation of threats and risks.

In the Bulgarian history after the liberation from Turkish slavery (1878) until the end of the 80's, two models of assuring national security proved unsuccessful. The conventionality of the separation is forced by the circumstance that Bulgaria had never had complete concept of national security.

The first one during the period of the Third Bulgarian Kingdom (1878 - 1944) aimed at national unity of the territories separated by the Berlin Congress and the parts of Bulgarian ethnic groups.

The second model was applied during the so called period of "socialist development" and identified national security with the system security, keeping the system was the main task.

The close bounds of Bulgaria with the military structures of the Warsaw Pact set the military aspect of national security in dependence of the Soviet Union. These too close bounds led to a situation when important political decisions for Bulgari were taken elsewhere. This situation was shaped through the "doctrine for limited sovereignty" (The Brezhnev doctrine). The almost total subordination to the Soviet military machine increased the risks that Bulgaria might be involved in actions, which were in contradiction with its national interests.

Among the sequences with unfavourable nature can be mentioned isolation from the European political and economic structures. The lack of Balkan policy, adequate to the national interests caused the loss of the key and balancing role of Bulgaria on the Balkans, a position that could have been preserved after World War 2.

The results of using those models during different periods of Bulgarian history were wars and national disasters as well as isolation of the country

The two models have been completely contrary and rejecting each other. Their success could be provided by the support of one partner - Germany or the Soviet Union.

Both models are characterised by serious contradiction that undermines their efficiency. The security policy is not based on public consensus, on sound democratic institutions.

In conclusion, both historic security models, implemented for the last century turns to be equally unproductive both about their concrete results and to the national interests.

3 Formation and aggregation of the new security model elements

(1989- 1998)

In the beginning of the 90-s Bulgaria landed in an unexpected situation. Being always in an alliance with a great power, now suddenly got into the role of helpless actor in a stormy part of the world.

After its parcelling, the Warsaw pact concluded the block guarantees a this way made the country more free in her choice. But on other hand it made it more vulnerable. Like the rest East European countries Bulgaria fell into a conceptual and material vacuum in the field of security.

Acting as in the past, new Bulgarian leaders started searching for a powerful protector to reassure security over its territory. It is not easy to give up the illusions that being politically allied to a great power you could solve immediately and without problems the issues concerning the security and prosperity of the country. The security vacuum made Bulgaria's participation active in regional co-operation that was a second step towards a new model. The formation of sub-regional grouping is known in Europe. We remember the project for creation of federations and confederations in Europe - the little Entente (1920), the Balkans Entente (1934), etc. We could draw certain resemblance between the newly formed political and economic grouping and those created in the period between the wars. In both cases they are a result of the security vacuum. But that is only a common feature. The new political and militar unions in Europe do not concern the strategic interests of other countries and they have a constant nature.

The new political leadership in the 90's created the model of "world-wide guarantees." This model being contrary to block guarantees is not in fact a way to solve the problem of finding practicable means for ensuring defence. In the period o modern arms and "blitzkriegs" the friendship declarations could not exclude the material elements of power.

Gradually the philosophy of national security policy of Bulgaria got in more pragmatic way. The politicians realised that little Bulgaria, with its delicate geostrategic situation, would guarantee its unity no so much in common European and global, but in Balkan extents. Following an ancient Chinese tail "with water from far we can not extinct a fire." Political treaties and military agreements, diffusion and consolidation of measures for trust with Turkey, Greece, Romania, countries from former Yugoslavia - it is just a little part of what was achieved for the last five years. We would call this phenomenon "neighbour security." Its approach is overcoming the contradictions between the specific Bulgarian interests and interests of other countries in surrounding geopolitical scope in mid-term plan.

Of course, as a general direction of aggregate Bulgarian behaviour, faced to guaranteeing its security shapes its incorporation to the European security structures and first - incorporation to NATO. The Bulgarian society has achieved unique consensus on this question, even the critics of integration have their arguments. The apprehensions come mainly from the fair the initiative "Partnership for peace" to not become a "everlasting engagement" for the part of East Europe, including Bulgaria.

The last nine years underline other essential characteristic of the Bulgarian security policy too - vigorous turning back to paternalism. In this connection some notes for the past, present and future of the Bulgarian - Russian relations, are proper.

Nine years now Bulgarian - Russian political relations are in unsettled state. The political situation at one moment warms, at another freezes them.

The Bulgarian history from the Liberation until now in some aspect can be represented as a counteraction between the Russophiles and Russophobes. In two large periods /1917 - 1944 and 1944 - 1989/ the theory of Russophiles and Russophobes had obtained a range of state policy. In both cases it becomes fatal for the security of the country.

Despite the uncertainties Russia will overcome the crisis and will remain a factor in the international policy. That is why formulating the correct evaluation o

Russia's role for the faith of Bulgaria in the past and now is essential preposition for the success of our security policy. The pragmatism and the ethics are two equivalent approaches in the attitudes to this country.

Concerning the essence of the international security in the 90's, we have to confess, that completely new events in the combination with the traditional dangers create unknown until now too intensive background of insecurity for our country.

The first and extremely dangerous source of complications is the difficult transition to new economic system. Problems with permanent fights and successful solutions of the modern society - inflation, unemployment, ecological disasters, crime, terrorism, drugs - in a weak and devoid of defence mechanisms country, acquire explosive charge. Similar situation is well known from the history, when at the beginning of a new stage of development is possible to see soaring of trends to social and ideal retribution for the events from the past (counterreformation in Germany, restoration in France, post - Cromwell period in England). But analogies are small comfort, if the transition crashes threaten the survival of Bulgaria as a state.

Going worst situation on the Balkans arises a spectrum of dangers. Westward of Bulgaria was going the most bloody conflict after the World War 2. Its consequences are unpredictable, if diffuses to Macedonia .

On the East the processes of revival and enforcement of Islamic fundamentalism dangerously intensify.

There is a serious military imbalance between the armed forces of the Balkan countries. The storage of weapons by the countries, involved in CFE and out of this threat feeds up temptation for using them as an argument in international field.

The sources of this kind of threats have too small possibility to be influenced by the Bulgarian side, which can not count on any external guarantees for threats' restrictions.

In contradiction of ideologies of "cold war" for the countries - "enemies" and "friends," today we can stand on fact, that not so traditional enemies, but unpredictable and dynamic situations could involve the country in a conflict and threaten its national

security. These situations unfortunately, meet not rare on the Balkans and is possible to see without special analysis.

There are no surviving descriptions for similar situations. We odd to rely on our common sense and the responsibility of the leading European and Balkan political elite. It sounds reassuring in present days in Europe there is no a politician or governor, who had declared the availability to solve one or another problem by war.

4. The Internal Debate about the Political Orientation of Bulgaria

The problem about the choice of the model of security cannot be understood without analysing the deep changes that occurred after 1989 in Bulgarian society. The changed totally the inner and international policy of the country. The political “tabby” came out from such spheres of society as diplomacy and defence. The society was given an opportunity to ask questions and to demand answers - by the massmedia, public forums, parties, parliamentary mechanism - for the whole scale of military political, economic or other aspect of international relations.

The situation in which the international process was going in the 90's was not standard. The society had its discontent on the permanent and conflicting influence. It was disturbed by worse living conditions, the burning situation on the Balkans, the lack of guarantees for national security in the hard times of the changing period whose end cannot be seen yet. This is the reason why the question “Where is Bulgaria going to?” in the new situation quickly attracted attention of the politicians and the whole civil society.

This obstacle in the very beginning of the democratic changes has given the defined specification of the “Bulgarian case.” In the most east-European countries the question was decided only on the surface, soon it will be possible to go back to the West - where we all belong to. All the countries of this region want to break the connections with Asian East, but in Bulgaria it was obvious that the facts were far more different. Most of the population, including the intellectuals, and the active part of the population was not convinced that the sudden and total orientation from Russia

to America corresponds to the international interests of Bulgaria and is imposed from the necessities of the democratic development. Considering the not-easy Bulgarian historic fortune Russia has liberated us from the 500 year Turkish yoke, as well as the Slavonic and east-orthodox nature of the Bulgarian people, its conservatism to the changes - all this consists the truth but not the whole truth. This is not an easy phenomenon to explain. If we compare all hard times and periods of democratic development to the other countries and people, Bulgarians have their own geopolitical comprehension and psychological perceptions.

Such kind of discovery contains the explanation of the complex full of terms, unspoken words and emotional upset on the international choice of the country, which was made after November 10 1989. During the first years of the period of changes all political parts of the society were united around the idea for the "European choice" that means joining the European unity and taking the rights and the duties. Blocking division made by the Warsaw Pact ahead on which was the ex-USSR, has been thought as historic past, the liberation from it was the priority task for our country. This was the main message in the speech of ex-President Jeyko Jeleu in the hearing of the UN in 1990. Only one month later, on November 14, 1990 a group of Parliament members from different parties introduced into the Parliament draft agreement concerning the problem of the participation of Bulgaria in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It was spoken about the complex international situation accompanying the failure of the Warsaw Pact and the necessity of a system for collective defence in Europe, providing the guarantees for the sovereignty of the European countries.

On December 23 1993 the National Assembly took with consensus the declaration with which "is positive for the sovereign politics of the Republic of Bulgaria and the joining of our country to the European and Euroatlantic security structures." "Euroatlantism" is very suitable euphemism to get rid of the political caring abbreviator from 4 words. But all this was some kind of stumbling in the later clearing of the relations - for "euroatlantic" structure can be considered the peaceful OSCE, successor of the era of Helsinki.

Things suddenly got worse in the first half of 1994 when some events of inner and international character made more brutal the political polarisation in the country. When in 1994 Bulgaria was joined to the American initiative "Partnership for peace" the participation of the country in the Western military-defence system was pu

on a practical base. All this coincided with the common activation of the Russian diplomacy after the communists' victory in the elections for the "Duma" in December 1993. In the same period in the Bulgarian foreign policy already is formed change in the correlation of the powers - the support of or the BSP among the people rose (ex-Communist party), the authority of the UDF still got lower, president Jelev took the initiative to be the speaker for the pro-Western and pro-NATO orientation of Bulgaria. He had made some efforts to show his ambition as a scholar for the membership of Bulgaria in NATO as "immanent theology for Europe" (according Huserl), in the contrast of the military-mapped security of the Russian foreign minister and diploma Andrei Gromico. In the same time he set forth more political formula that consists - the participation of Sofia in NATO will be taken later as an obstacle to get easier into the European unity - the main goal and hope of the whole Bulgarian society. During the conferences, sponsored by the Presidency and other forms of forums, different scholars gave their different opinions on this question.

Encouraged by the negative tendency of Moscow about all this, the main parts of society protested against the participation of Bulgaria in the NATO.

On the political level as very often given argument contrast to our quick entrance to NATO is the Russian disagreement to this act. Actually, in 1995 and 1996 Moscow consistently was criticising the future expansion of the treaty, which was leading to a new "Cold war" and military opposition in continent. The real reason for the Russian opposition cannot be called in question - the unite of the whole Europe into one powerful military block that put Russia into full isolation is not a friendly act. In the same time Russian policy is transmitting and continues to give opposite signs that have doubted the opposites and friends. The member USD Philip Bokov (nowadays member of the "Euroleft") made his speech in 1995 at the conference "Bulgaria and the euro-atlantic structures of security," that Sofia, put into discussion, probably will remain only as a passive spectator of one negotiation between NATO and Russia.

There was even a lead in the argument for NATO: "Russian argument" is one and the only. To NATO was opposed the principle alternative of Bulgarian neutrality. This got different interpretation and ascents from the specialists and formations of the society.

As a whole the opponents of the Bulgarian participation in NATO are giving the following reasons:

* Bulgaria can be automatically involved in conflict according to the agreement obligations as an ally (*casus foederis*) because of the cause, understanding from Bulgarian people (the crises in Kavkas, Baltic region or somewhere on the ocean roads);

* In this connection the participation in NATO can turn into side of the object of nuclear attack, even if on our territory is not dislocated nuclear weapon;

* The relations with Russia can be distorted very bad, all this will lead to the economical troubles for Bulgaria and the serious geopolitical troubles will conflict it with the huge Slavonic country;

* In the case of the ethnical problem in Bulgaria, there will put on it the Nato's decision, considering with Western standards and more specially with the American position in which favourite is Turkey and which admit the "Macedonian nation." All this will mean end of the sovereign and united Bulgarian nation.

Not less more attractive is the resistance of the political and professional parts of society, pleading for the membership of Bulgaria in NATO. The huge apology of the participation of Bulgaria in Northatlantic treaty is in the platform of Mr. Solomon Passi, the Chairman of the Atlantic Club and one of the initiators of dialogue between Bulgaria and NATO in the beginning of 1990's. According to Mr. Passi, the policy of neutrality is very old-fashioned, and NATO is the base of the biggest in the world's history union of the liberated people. The expansion of NATO will be the new "Plan Marshal for Europe," which will lead to the growing of their economics and benefiting of the way of life of their people. The main idea in supporting the membership in NATO is made by the leading persons in the UDF that had won the elections for president in the autumn of 1996 and the elections for Parliament in 1997.

Euroleft took the thesis that was supported by several military officers, that the love towards Russia, Bulgaria as member of NATO will be useful for the treaty as we as to the Russian interests.

The supporters of the participation in NATO of Bulgaria are giving some advantages, which our country is going to get, nevertheless the modality of it participation in NATO.

First is given attention towards the importance of the membership of Bulgaria in NATO to the participation of our country in EU. There is hope, that the political key to the economic integration is this.

The supporters of NATO are giving hopes, that Bulgaria effectively will “trade” Balkan location of the country will consider for the financial interests of the Western powers.

Almost the all supporters of the participation of Bulgaria into NATO are claiming that this act is not against Russia.

Nevertheless the victory of the elections in 1994 the socialist government lead by Jan Videnov could not take effective and flexible policy of the eventually participation of Bulgaria into NATO. It became weak under the pressure of the economic crisis, even it twisted under the growth of the social pressure and from the urges of the opposition, massmedia. The cabinet of Jan Videnov was not supported by the large moods of the society and till its end of its governing kept its ambivalent opinion, covered under the word “increasing dialogue” with NATO. This not only convinced nobody, but even it took an impression for dragging out inner unclearness and lack of inspirations.

In the pro-election period and campaign for president for BSP did not answer to the question in essence. Instead clearly to announce if there is any need to become a member of NATO for Bulgaria, its candidates took the discussion to the more attractive themes - the eventual evolution of the treaty in the close and far future, the technologies of the eventual Bulgarian participation. The sharp political and social crises in January-February 1997 ended with the political failure of the socialists, which strengthened the common position of the forces, appealing for the totally acceptance and without any doubt the Western offers.

In parallel with the debates with and around the participation in NATO and very closely connected with it, there were arguments for the Balkan orientation of the country. The problem for the preferences to one or another Balkan country was put on the agenda earlier - in 1991-1992. When the country was governed by the cabinets o

Lukanov and Popov the attention was towards Athens, later it was towards Ankara. Very quick progress was made in the sphere of the military co-operation and the openness (from the Bulgarian side), there was signed very important agreement for the strengthening of the thrust. All this was a positive step to get away from the accumulated in the 1980's hostility and suspicion. In the same time the public opinion again was divided of the "Watershed Turkey," even the two countries of the two sides of the barricades have the same powers, as they had in the discussion for NATO.

But if in the arguments for the participation of our country in NATO there are as a whole reasonable cause, which was spoken from both sides, in the discussion for the Balkan orientation was regenerated emotions, which were inherited from the old times. On the Bulgarian political stage there was struggle of the supporters of the union with Serbia and Greece, positively having orientation to Russia, the supporters of the Turkish politics, supported most of all by the USA. The mass-media presented this struggle as hyperbolic fight between the Christianity and the Moslems, the main weapons of two super-powers.

The accusation in the "axethinking" was given often by the right-liberals, when the left forces and the nationalists' formations accused their opponents of collaborationism with the ex-oppressor.

Actually the things were not so much complex. Already in June 1990 after the first victory of the socialists in the democratic elections, the leader of the Turkish-ethnically party "Motions for Rights and Liberty" Ahmed Dogan brought in front of the public the "flying" phrase: "The way to Europe passes through the Bosfor." This was obviously nonsense from the point of view of the real politics, but as a slogan showed which powers were trying to bind Bulgaria with our strong and powerful neighbour. The General Secretary of NATO Vorner pointed out several times to his Bulgarian listeners that good Turkish-Bulgarian relations are conditions on which the future good relations Bulgaria will have with NATO.

The debate about the Bulgarian policy on the Balkans is going often into the argument for the balances of the weapons. With it is reasoned the major strategic

position of Bulgaria, which today's politics of NATO is not easy for Bulgaria and is still complex.

According to the facts in the annual magazine "SIPRI" for 1995 the correlation of the armament by the criteria "combats equivalent" are not positive for Bulgaria - Bulgaria-Turkey 1:7, Bulgaria-Greece 1:3, Bulgaria-Yugoslavia 1:4, Bulgaria-Romania 1:3. From the several social parts of Bulgarian political and non-political formations, most of all the Bulgarian officers were paying attention to this fact. The defence ex-minister Mr. Dimitar Pavlov leads this reason: "The new countries from the Black sea region will be separate subjects in the eventual future negotiations for regulation of the disbalances and prevention of the new mad rush in the armament."

The theses for the Bulgarian weakness about the military finances are de facto addressless, it could not bring so reason the potential opponent, even to take a pit from the international unity. It is some sort of resonance of the proclaimed from Jeli Jeleu hope first in global, then in the NATO's guarantee. It is the reason the president himself gave his worries to the meeting in Budapest in CSCE in December 1994.

Bulgarian protests had almost rhetorical character, because that unpleasant position of the things has its roots in the permanent geostrategical characterisation of the region. The decision lies in the political, but not in military and technical level. The decision of correction of this balance is a problem, leading to the heart of the relations between the Balkan countries. It can be decided only by themselves - as from the strategic choice of Bulgaria.

The discussion for the Balkan problems, is very clear the covered fight between the Russian and American interests. They are focusing the prospective of the Yugo-conflict, as well in competition between projects of trans. Balkan highways and oil-pipes and the selling of the modern weapons for the different contrasting Balkan countries (the most fresh example is a dealing with Russian anti-rackets' complexes S-300 for the Republic of Cyprus).

The restoration of the international political models, which characterised the period till the socialism came in the country - this period from the newest Bulgarian

history, was on the agenda so called "National idols." It was spoken about the rejoinment of the Bulgarian Lands, which were torn because of the agreement from the Berlin congress and during the wars. Nevertheless such kinds of slogans are risen from the small ultra-nationalist parties, these themes very often are in the debates for the international orientation of the country between the great political powers.

The main themes are - the Macedonian question and the contemporary attitude to the Republic of Macedonia, the so called the Western outskirts of Yugoslavia with the centre in Tzaribrod (Dimitrovgrad), where lives Bulgarian majority, White sea region of Trakia and rarely the Eastern Trakia (the region of Odrin) and Northern Dobrudja. Principally the ring forces accuse the BSP in the international nihilism and unresponsibility, because it did not pay attention to Bulgarian minorities there, especially in Serbia, Greece, Romania and Moldova. Almost every day the politics of Komintern from the 1930's for the "Macedonian," "Dobrudjainska" and so on nations is still to be remembered and together with all this "national betrayal" of Bulgarian Communist Party

The interesting brash of the debates according to Bulgarian policy of national security is the struggle of the choice between American and European way of democratic development. This discussion is lead discrete simplified. Its appearance is the correlation between the ascents NATO-European union.

In the discussion of the security model there are a lot different points of view, some of which can be pay attention to. Some of them must be announced, because they are very popular, in them there is very big dose of realism. On the scholars' forums and some articles in mass-media are presented more abstract variants. So, for example, there are different positions for the idea of Balkan's formation and region's security. Different scientists treat it as an annex to the programme "Partnership for peace" or towards NATO, as a part of OSCE, or a totally independent subject in co-operation with point 52 from the charter of the United Nations. There is closer circle of social workers and researches, which are fans of the double agreement for security with Russia, eventually with Germany, with Ukraine or with some other large

European country. The ex-military minister Mr. Valentin Alexandrov together with very argued theme for the strategic union with Turkey, as researcher and historian offered Danube's Alliance with Austro-German connection, which economic rational power can be argued upon.

On the discussion's table for the questions for the international politics not often appeared original of even exotic ideas - for entering of Bulgaria in the unity as UIC, for romanisation and catholisation of the country in EU, for becoming of the Bulgarian people as a part of Orient. Some are given other points of view for the strategic connections with China, with the closer relations with Japan or with the "Far East Dragons," which have the same mentalities as Bulgarians. And at the end, but not at the last again are made the ideas for "Great Bulgaria" but today with different ideological colouring. It must be based on its powers, to gain economic prosperity and to owe the powerless, including the newest nuclear weapons, in this way there will be respect from the peninsula and Europe as well.

All these hypotheses, some of which are presented very discretely, other are presented in "national programmes" of foundations, groups and separate individuals, are showing the real inclinations in the society. The opened stream of thoughts is looking for new and inadequate variants in the strategic decisions. It is leaning to the remembered episodes in the history of our country, which made a great deformation in the memory of time. At the public debates and other forums that are special dedicated to the Bulgarian relations with the world, often and not so much are looking for inspirited examples. Leaders, monarchs, chieftains, public persons, diplomats from the far past and the close past are appointed as models of moral and other great grades. Stambolov, Ferdinand, Stamboliiski, Ivan Mihailov, Boris III, Ivan Bagrjanov, Nikola Petkov, Simeon Coburgotski and his family are pointed out as the ideal politicians, who are capable to lead Bulgaria as a small country among the European peoples. In this way they are making new myths and legends, which are not leading into the future. They cannot be as recipes for modern democratic reforms, neither for progressive nor for successful international foreign policy. The naturalist emotions are not leading to

the increasing of the Bulgarian authority, they are not productive for the image of our weather-beaten country.

The collisions about the problems of our international debt between different political coalitions and even between party leaders often are very alike box match in a dark room. The participants in this dispute understand about what is going on in it, they are victims of informational darkening. Our international elite as a whole is not so clear with the complexity of the Euro-integration problems, as well with the processes that are going in the very North Atlantic treaty at the moment. All this makes them to do unreasonable conclusions about the important international problems. The theme is ideologically binged and personalised. The position "For" and "Against" NATO is taken as a sign of individuality, less than a clear formula for security in Bulgaria.

As one sign of the international discussion, doing it officially or on academically and political forums and levels, is capsulation the positions. While the experts in the Parliament committees easier can find compromise, from the tribune of the Parliament regularly is given attacks and critics. The political elite are not inclined to listen other side, except themselves. Very rarely there are conferences, meetings or other forums where specialists from the government and opposite parties discuss pragmatically and very efficiently their disagreements about the international policy. The permanent conflict is alive, it is defined characteristic of the international discussion, nevertheless if the subject is Balkan policy of Bulgaria or the membership in NATO.

Somehow or other, in 1990-1998 the struggle for the problems of Bulgarian international policy is reflecting in greater degree the emotions of our inner resistant, less than the essence of the real international challenges. Mainly for this is working the existing in the country "double" powering, which is in very big erosion and it makes stabling for the inner and the international policy of the country. From one side it is very painful for the formed structures of democratic governing, from the other - the living in full power mechanism of the "tender" revolution. They continue t

dictate their cannons for devotion, nevertheless they are not for the benefit for the made by itself ideal.

PART II. MAIN MODELS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE

1. Difficulties in formulating the Bulgarian National Security Strategy

After the end of the Cold War, in this period of radical changes in the system of international relations, Bulgaria looked towards new ways of guaranteeing her national security and following her new security policy. The country felt the necessity of a new security concept that would be able to create the best possible conditions for the survival, existence and developments of the Bulgarian nation as a whole.

The strategy of National Security unites the powers of a country in peace as well as in war, so that the national ideas and interests are achieved. To think in a strategic way is to always search for balance between the results wanted and resources available; discrepancies between the strategy and resources hides in itself serious risk for the state.

The strategy of national security is a political document, a reflection of the most important national purposes. It must be performed by political leaders who embody in themselves, according to the Constitution, the unity of society and nation. Thus is escaped the risk that politicians reckon national interests as their own perspective.

The strategy of national Security is a dynamic document, because the conditions can change or cause new purposes, as well as belittle existing purposes. One of the most important and most difficult problems of any country is to define and continue to discuss its national security strategy

The political documents, in which purposes are stated, as well as the means and resources of a country are pointed, bear different names - concepts, doctrines, strategy ... etc. The time span is also different - 1, 5 or more years. For example in USA the President prepares an annual report for the national security strategy.

In spite of the seeming discussion, noisily proclaimed in newspapers, the real problems for the strategic Bulgarian choice at the end of the 20th century are not in the spotlight of serious politics. Reasons are many, but only two of them are worth of attending to. Firsts, the formulation of a national security strategy will divert the hesitate elements in our foreign policy and stable instability, based upon selfish politica

and economic interests. Second, a society that fights for its survival could not concentrate enough political energy or attention upon this problem. If Bulgaria can drag itself out of the crisis for about 3,5 years a wrong strategy will give bitter fruits for ten of years on and on, just as it happened not only once in the newest history of the country.

At the present stage we have objective difficulties and discussible points in the national security policy. These difficulties come from the fact that a model of national security depends upon the autonomous foreign policy choice and upon the outer independent from our wishes factors as: international system structure, geopolitical and geostrategic interest of the great powers and ... etc. One short review of this changing conditions would not be unnecessary. The Balkans and territory of Bulgaria have been the purpose of collisions of political and geopolitical interests during the last two centuries, related mainly the control over the road between Asia and Europe. In many aspects these collisions have been fatal to our nation. It is just enough to mention the congress of Berlin that led to the so called "eastern problem." Every country on the Balkans guarantees its security by a powerful mentor and advocate - Russia, Great Britain, France ... etc. But at the beginning of the 90's of our century Bulgaria turned out to be in an unexpected situation. Always with great powers, she was then a lonely actor on an explosive stage. The Warsaw Pact broke down and guarantees for black security faded. This fact made Bulgaria more free to choose but also made it vulnerable in other aspects. Just as all other ex-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe Bulgaria fell down in the conceptual and material vacuum of its security.

The strategic situation on the Balkans and in Europe also changed a lot. In these conditions the political elite of Bulgarian reached the idea for preparing a national security concept, which based upon the modern principles in the area of security and science, should provide beneficial conditions for the survival and development of the nation. The more clearly defining geopolitical and geostrategic interests on the Balkans, Europe and the World helped that inside the country several strategic alternatives of a foreign policy choice be formulated. Each political force directly or indirectly took the side of one of these alternatives and at conceptual and practically political level fought to towards convincing the society in the rightness of its choice. Practically in the middle of the 90's, when the project for national security

strategy was in the way, in the socio-political area of the country we had three alternatives of long-term strategies in the sphere of national security.

The first and main alternative of the security model was integration in the European political and economic structures, as it is implicitly accepted that b enlargement to the East NATO will evaluate towards collective European security.

The second basic alternative is based upon the status of neutrality in the new European security architecture. This thing is being now embraced by more and more politicians and intellectuals, alternative, that lies upon real historical arguments.

The third possible alternative approved of by little parties with left-wing orientation, is including the country in a security system centred by Russia. This is based upon presumption that Russia will very soon come over the crisis and turn in a major factor of European and world policy. There is a strong political and ideologica connection between the second and the third alternative, based upon the unity of the final purpose.

Wrong impression might be created by the way the alternatives are presented, that a cultural and civilised dialogue is done for the future of the country. Alas for the last few years the key-problems of the country became the object of rough politica interpretations. Some political forces seen to be more interested to sustain differences in the society instead of approaching their views. Pluralism of opinions is one of the achievements of the liberal society. But in the field of national security it only has sense if the different views are based upon the Bulgarian interests and their serious interpretation. A time-bomb is set on if foreign interests are served in this aspect

2. The Integration of Bulgaria in the Euro-Atlantic Structures of Defence

The debate for Bulgaria joining NATO and about the formula for a would-be joining to the union is very often simpler to its military meanings or to the influence to other factors of the national security - Russia. In reality there is here a many-soiled problem, whose roots are in the political and military aspects, as well as in the political and military aspects, as well as in the economy, legislation, welfare system and even in the psychological mentality of the nation.

A very serious challenge will be the eventual joining to NATO for foreign and domestic life of Bulgaria. Definitely will change the international status of the countr

and the arising out of it obligations and rights. The system for taking political and military decisions shall be subject to serious transformations. The whole defence state system must be drastically modified; changes will occur in the area of command and government of defence/ in the structure of the armed forces/, as well as in different branches in defence industry. Great political results will come in several directions and aspects:

a/ The political choice of Bulgarian becomes final and unilateral. The movement of the political pendulum that seven years already discourages and disorients the nation, will hush down in the area with not big amplitude. Joining the union we shall receive a medium in which to develop our strategy for national security. This, of course will happen according to definite rules, in harmony with the interests of the union, but at the same time with the total recognition of our national purposes and priorities.

b/ Bulgaria joins an organisation that has enormous international prestige and potential. Of close importance to the national security is the image of NATO being different from the image of the enemy to the average Bulgarian citizen.

c/ We have premises created for new economic and military relations with the top countries of the world. The Participation in NATO would fortify our position for joining the European Union later on.

d/ The central role of Bulgarian in south-eastern Europe might be gained back again.

e/ Beneficial inside and outside tissue is created for international projects of national importance and the reverse is true.

The basic military-strategic result from the joining is the resolvment of the negative military balance problem with the other countries. The created by the treaty for conventional armed forces in Europe disproportion increase and deepen in harm to our country. Even if a revision of the treaty is order to ignore this disbalance. The problem does not only consist of in the iniquity of the forces with Greece and Turkey on the one hand, and Bulgaria on the other hand. We have here such a major factor like the military machine of Yugoslavia as well as the danger of the radical islamism coming from south-east. The Balkans are region subject to different ways of instability, a region in which stability will not be gained back soon. From this point of

view the response to the question that would guarantee our national security and the context of this disbalance is unilateral.

Here we reach the fake dilemma, created and propagandised for the last couple of years by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP); "since we want to join NATO this means that we are against Russia." Is the Bulgarian integration to NATO really a danger? In geopolitical aspect Bulgaria is so far away from Russia as is the Czech Republic. Unlike the other Central-European countries and the long dependence of Bulgaria upon Russia there is not such a psychological sentiment of hatred and alienation.

To Bulgaria NATO is the least instrument for protecting national interests from Russia. The alternative NATO membership and economic relations and the psychological closeness of the two people. Out of the propaganda and quick-emotional reactions of Bulgarian and Russian politicians there is only one correct option, which must be task for the president, parliament and executive power: Integration of Bulgaria into NATO and preserving the priority relations with Russia

3. Opportunities and perspectives of neutrality policy

The alternative for neutrality has its historical and emotional arguments. All main disasters of Bulgarian in the 20th century (First, Second and the "Cold" Wars) have ended diplomatically and politically with no success. It is a proved historical fact the Bulgarian diplomacy is much more unlucky than the Bulgarian army. It is also a historical fact that any coalition or political block in which way Bulgarian took part has lost the war. If there is a neutrality much positive aspects are pointed out: low neutrality disbursements; accent upon the economic development.

No one of the advocates of "Neutrality" gives response to the question "Besides that Neutrality is desired, is it possible? If a country wants to be neutral it must: (1) be recognised by the modern, great and influential states; (2) be element of the structure of the modern international relations. The classically neutral countries - Switzerland and Sweden are so from the 18th century and now. If Bulgaria wants to have such a neutrality it must live over a period of 50 years of neutral status.

In the period of the "Cold" War countries as Austria and Finland succeeded in taking a position equally far from the two conflicting sides. This position was respected

by Moscow as well as by Washington. Is such a position possible on the Balkans after the period of the "Cold" War? - Definitely NO. The evidence to this is the acceptance of three neutral countries in a union that is political as well as economic, and in future may be also military.

The attempt for making neutrality recognised only by one great power - US or Russia will be next national catastrophe. The only real result from imposing this alternative is the country becoming a grey buffer zone in a would-be renovation of the opposition in Europe.

4. New alliance with Russia: is it possible?

Very specific is the problem with Russia, which was nearly 50 years the main political partner, ally and guarantee for the international security of the country. After the events from 1989 – 1991 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in the place of the broken complex system of international relations between Bulgaria and Moscow and the unions' republics appeared "empty space," which put end on the natural supply for Bulgaria with raw materials, power-carriers, weapons and military technologies.

The disintegration of the USSR took out the Russian foreign politics from its normal side, drastically changed its main priorities, it made difficult to be presented in the neighborhoods' regions – it was one of the ambitions of Moscow, strategic presence in the region. "Today the main Russian interests in the region of the Balkans are made from the normal international demands" – pointed out Vladimir Volkov, the chief of the Institute for Slavonic and Balkan researches. "The interests of the Russia are manifested by her participation in the peaceful development of the Balkans region, in her contribution to make the conflicts in this region more peaceful, to turn this place into the land of permanent stability. Most of the Balkans' countries are connected with Russia historically, spiritually and culturally. In the Russian politics Balkans today have the same meaning, as it had in the second half of the 18th century." One attempt to be recorded this analogy leads to the conclusion, that contemporary Russia, alike the Ekaterinian's one will lead the fight to secure the security for the vulnerable places in the South and has an outlet on the warm seas. To be decided for the second time this difficult task is necessary instrumentarium, which connects in itself new approaches with clearness for the geopolitical and historic facts about the region.

The recent years were the period of painful internal changes as in Bulgaria as well in Russia. It put an unchanging imprint on the aspect and the contents of the relations between these two countries. The revision of these relations is inevitable in the new conditions – to begin to throw out the paternalism, the dependence of the weaker from the stronger, and the ideological traces. As in the most of the Eastern European countries, in Bulgaria the crash of the socialistic system put in front of events political forces, which are looking towards Europe. The debates in the parliament and the articles in the newspapers remained to the society the characteristic atmosphere after 1879 the struggle between the friends and enemies of Russia. The attack against the Russia reached even to present this country as “demon.”

The new tune in the Bulgarian public atmosphere naturally cannot run away from the Russia politics. The situation became more complex from the fact that the Russian diplomacy approached this delicate theme – the relation in historic point of view between the two Slavonic people with the conventional nihilism of the political situation. The attention of the both sides was put away towards the recent concerns and troubles and problems for Bulgaria – help from the West, bringing together with NATO and EU, for Russia – help from the West, mastering the situation and the central processes, normalization with the “closer abroad” – ex-Soviet republics.

After the changes in the Russian foreign policy in 1993 was taken for action more active tactic for the Balkans, in this situation including Bulgaria. The theme for the traditional friendship between two people is again in the political vocabulary. But the dialog is not making any positive move, neither less there is exchange of the political visits, on the official level.

From both sides were several times pointed out the need for Bulgaria to restore its markets in Russia. But even there was some subjective interest and desire shown on the state level, especially when on power in Bulgaria came Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) – in the beginning of 1995, new specific elements made it difficult all these intentions to become true.

In the conditions of severe economic failure, Bulgaria could not assure the necessary needs for Russia in its normal quality and with normal quantity. From the other side, the concept “Russian market” is very relative. All broke up in its old kind, lost its homogeneity and prediction. It is mixed with very big power, with new market factors and first of all the approach of the Russian private business. Nevertheless the Russian investments grew up mainly in 1994 – 1996 and all reached 11% from the internal capital investments, they could not stimulate the economic growing up. All this

happened because these investments, they could not stimulate the economic growing up. All this happened because these investments were concentrated mainly in the tourism and entertainment.

The problem of choosing the way on which Bulgarian-Russian relations will go on was put on the agenda during the time when the leader of the government was Jan Videnov (January 1995 – December 1996). The promises of the socialist to make the relations with Russia livelier, which they had made in front of their followers before they came on power stumbled over the new conditions. In fact, there were made several new steps in this direction – in 1995 and 1996 the government leaders of Bulgaria and Russia Videnov and Chernomirdin made several business visits and signed up some important agreements.

Bulgaria got as a present from Moscow very big package hard weapons – 100 tanks T-72, 100 combat machines for infantry, 12 combat helicopters “Mi-24.” But the turning point in the desired direction – this can be only big Russian help to overcome the crises in the transitional period – it was not made at all.

The reasons for this are complex, but the Bulgarian-Russian differences in opinion are shown on the first place in the economic level, which had very clear strategical implications.

The officious statements and reports about the negotiations for the oil-pipe highway Novorosiisk-Burgas-Aleksandropolis were not made at all, but the press published some information for the arguments between Russia, Greece and Bulgaria according the division of the future profit. According to some facts, to the Bulgarian side was given several times unsatisfactory number of divisions. Its refusal to get percentage in these limits is taken as one of the reasons not to exist any kind of agreement, even if there is very many fill with hope statements. Different scandals about the Bulgarian-Russian mixed concern “Topenergy,” in which are involved economic interests and different scandals between the political parties, which lead for the blocking of the bargain. To the difficulties are put as well the failure to co-operate lower export – duties for the Bulgarian export in Russia and the disagreements for the re-starting of the Jamburgsk’s agreement for giving natural oil, not giving on the right time to Bulgaria the Russian oil and nuclear fuel from the Ukrainians’ ports. I appeared “on the horizon” the problem with the Bulgarian-Russian armory business. The parentional stumbling over was around the wide-world known problem “NATO.” Nevertheless Videnov has shown many times sympathies towards Russia the cabinet o

ministers he was leader of could not find common language on this question with its Russian partners.

In such atmosphere of uncertainty and untrue influences, suddenly come a bit clumsy and revengeful “tease” of the Russian president – the jocular invitation for Bulgaria to enter CGR (Co-operation for governed republics). This tease becomes the start of new campaign. Many representatives of the Russian official administration, even the deputy-chairman of the Russian parliament Juiriev, the chief of the General Headquarters Kolesnikov, the Minister of Defense Radionov, ambassadors Avdeev and Keressejians – some of them clearly or by the other way of expression had statements that if eventually Sofia enters the North-Atlantic treaty it will have negative implications on the Bulgarian-Russian relations.

The publishing of the official Russian international and political conception in the autumn of 1996 added some disturbs amongst Bulgarian politicians and intellectuals, which are turned towards Russia. According to them region of the Balkans and Bulgaria are not in the interests of the serious Russian interests. Unsuccessful was the timing of the visit of the delegation of the Russian parliament (“Duma”) led by Baburin, which had taken with them more concrete offers. His promise for help from 400 million dollars in kind of technical credits for not taking part in NATO from the side of Bulgaria was not made in front of the suitable audience in the beginning of February 1997 – ruined parliament, resignation of the government, angry crowds who filled the streets.

On this way the incomprehensibility between Bulgaria and Russia had played its role to become worse as the international situation of Bulgaria as well the internal one. All this was not for the benefit of the Russian leaders. Bulgaria is one of the very few countries in Europe in which the people are still having very deep and emotional sympathy towards Russia. This very long historical fact was pointed to no other European country and could play great role for the stabilization of the whole European process as well for the conditions, which are very specific for the region of the Balkans. It is true that after 1989 the young and inexperienced Bulgarian government could not win the thrust of Moscow, on its way Moscow did not make any signal for its desires – only elementary to show that Russia rely on Bulgaria.

In the end of the 20 century Russia is in its lowest points of international influence. It lost its possibilities to influence on the European and world's activities. Its efforts to play leading role in the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia and to gather new (actually

historically old) strategic partner as Serbia that have failed. Less and less politics in the West are believing that the democratic model of the Russian government is final. More concrete is the type of restoration of the totalitarianism (with or without Communist party). According to one of the theories of the political cycle Russia will re-build its economic power and political influence in the 10 - 15 year time.

From this point of view the attitude of Russia towards Bulgaria is as to the strategic reserve zone of influence in short and long time. The choice of Bulgaria is not accidental, it is determined from historical, cultural, spiritual, economical and political considerations. But if we want all this to end well. It is necessary for Bulgaria to be hold in unstable condition of existing as long as Russia has enough time to gain back its previous power and influence. In getting all these are taking part conscientiously or unconscientiously power the different parties, very "left" politics. The achievement of the main goal will be possible only if it is taken into consideration, that there is no definite decision of Bulgaria to choice for the benefit of NATO.

The thesis for Bulgaria as the strategic reserve zone will sounds as cliché or propaganda for "the long hand of Moscow "if there are not enough evidence, that in contrast to ex-socialistic countries Bulgaria didn't anything for reducing of the economical and resourceful bind and dependence from the Russian raw materials and energy, to get rid of dependence from of Bulgarian army and its armament and technical level from the Russian military-industrial complex. On the surface is shown very big interest to dialogue between the two countries, insensitive visits of the foreign and military ministers in the countries-members of NATO, active membership in the program "Partnership for peace", the reality totally was decided Bulgaria not to take any aspiration for membership in NATO. Separately was given way to different Bulgarian initiatives for the international relations of the country. All this was made, because Russian had interests in this model of behaviour - neutral, security model for Bulgaria. Russia has plans to bind Bulgaria in long turn period and so on.

The recent events from the last year were examining the strategic intents of Russia in this region, as well as the attitude towards Bulgaria. There we put some economical and financial stabilisation in Bulgaria the decisions of the Bulgarian Parliament to rise its candidature to become a member of NATO - support was declared by the influenced countries in this trite as Germany, and especially the USA. There were seen some advantages in our country in contrast to the deeper crises in

Romania. All this couldn't worry the Russian leaders. Bulgaria was always considered in the region of the Balkans as the shape of living interests and in the last two decades, according to the historians, Russia lead 14 wars to govern the Straits - all these things were taken into consideration. The perspective Bulgaria to become a member of NATO, nevertheless on the stage is still unpure - all this is failure with great strategic consequences.

The effort to bring back Bulgarian economy and policy to the previous permanently destabilised condition is the main reason for dragging of the negotiations for the Russian oil, transport, military industry, steps to revision of the agreemen among coalitions, preparations for new parliamentary coalitions. To these acts we must take the political measures to bring into discredit representatives of the deput government, start of the campaign of discretion of the president (not performing the reached agreement between president Stojanov and the Russian prime-minister Victor Cherdomirdin for new negotiations, considered delay of Stojanov's visit in Moscow, belting of the reached results of the negotiations in Washington, speculations about the visit in Skopje and so on.

It must be taken into consideration that the economical, social pressure on our country on the level of the recent development in Bulgaria is still low and with middle intensity - there are declaring mainly political intentions, without making any serious acting.

All this gives reason to suppose that on this stage is taken into consideration only extensive, not intensive existence of the crises on our country. The particular political or economical crises can be overcome easily. This is the reason why it is possibly to suppose that in the recent months there will be reached temporary or half-and-half decision about the questions for the oil, in the suitable moment it can give opportunity to be denounced. The idea to gather pressure connected with the structural reform will continue, the pressure connected with the structural reform w continue, the privatisation, eventually wrong political or personal decisions of the governing coalition, the rehearsals for strikes in the very important industries. Separate political power will argued about the international choice of Bulgaria, in their effort to revised the idea of the neutral model of our country. There will be efforts to extensive development of the Convention for the majority groups, acceptors of the Conception for the national security and so on.

From the point of view of the strategic interests of Russia coming back of the Bulgarian economic and politic to the destabilisation and disballance will be profitabl to start in the late autumn of this year. The complex energy knot of contradictions together with the disannounce of the agreements from one side for the oil, all these w include as well crises with other energy resources and strategic raw-materials - gasoline electro-energy, military deliveries, nuclear materials' crises easy can be defined the social conflicts and contradictions which are now only rehearsing, as well as the embryonic political crises and failure of the coalitions. Surely can be foreseen the main place in the strategic to be given to the institution of the president - the activity o the president Stojanov in the negotiations in participation on NATO. His activities are danger for the Russian interests.

From the point of view of the Russian interests the most pleasant result is crises in the government and formatting of the coalition with temporary existence of government including many parties with unclear or double-faced orientation. The main goal is to the beginning of the 1999 - the year when there will be serious negotiations for the new enlargement of NATO - Bulgaria to be on the same level of economi existence and internal crises, as it was in the months before the meeting in Madrid in 1997. In this internal situation even if there will be any decision to new enlargement, even there will be support of Bulgaria from the countries-members of NATO the acceptance of Bulgaria in the trite to be impossible.

PART III. NATIONAL SECURITY MODEL OF REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA IN THE END OF 90s

1. Limitations of the Policy of National Security

1.1. External Factors of the Security

It is commonly accepted opinion that after the cataclysmic changes which began in 1989, the security situation and stability in Europe has changed essentially. First the political and geopolitical environment, where the built for decades structures, institutions and foreign relations used to function, changed. Moreover, destructive processes had impact not only on the products of "the Yalta System"- the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, but also on the political formations, established right after the WWI as the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. If the eastern part of Europe was shaken in the fundamentals, neither did the west avoid the processes of destruction (though of different type) - a recession swept the EU countries, the problems of united Germany turned out more wide and deep, than expected, discussions on the common policy Towards Russian and East Europe is still giving no result, the problem with American engagement with the European security arose, etc.

The influence of these factors and processes on the European stability and security is not synonymous and multiciphered. However, the essential is that in "post-cold war" conditions are that all the main elements, which support and provide the security in European political field is under pressure to change significantly, even essentially their functions, institutional relations and staff.

1.1.1. Alternatives for structuring a Common European Security System

In analysing the possibilities for formulating a "security system" we mean a generalised model, which range over both (1) the interstate relations and obligations i

the specific area of security, and (2) the system of institutional structures, intended for developing one or another aspect of collective security. However the security system in Europe is something much more than the simple political sum of these elements. Because of this the focus is not on the particular problems of states, regions or alliances but on the capabilities for interactions between the institutional structures and the models of bilateral and multilateral international relations on security problems and their effect on the European Security System. Nevertheless the process of the problem structuring in a few "models," the Common European Security System is considered as a mosaic of interweaving and interacting elements from different models; it is not realistic to expect transformation of the European-Atlantic-Eurasian historical facts into some "clean" and synonymous forms in the middle term perspective.

On the one hand it is already clear enough that in new Europe two organisations - WEU and NATO - will play fundamental role in shaping the limits of the security system, despite the variety of evaluations (often completely different) of their state and motivation for a future existing. Obviously the nature, philosophy and strategy of development and functioning of the system will depend on the character of the interactions between these two key elements. Of course, between the walls of this fundament will search its place and role a number of other organisations like WEU, OSCE, the European Council, The Central European Initiative, etc. But its importance definitely can be only as linking elements of the main processes.

In parallel with this however, the new security system of the continent will be dominated not only by the relations between the institutions but by the changing mode of the decisive bilateral and multilateral relations between the European countries. The political and economic dimensions, as well as the dynamics of these relations are already quite different from those in the time of the bilateral "cold" system.

The following relations can be pointed out as the most important for the European security:

* Internal West European relations - although the centre of these relations is EU, the main burden in the field of the security is carried by "the big three o

Europe"- France, Germany and Great Britain. It should be recognised that there are few important political fields in the middle 90's, in which between these countries a principle consensus has been achieved.

* between the USA and Western ("United") Europe - the establishment of transatlantic commonwealth was one of the most significant political results of WW2 and the development of the relations in it are not only important because of their structure defining, but also fatal nature to the global processes.

* between Russia and Western Europe - it is a whole net of bilateral and multilateral aspects where, however bilateral relations of Russia with the countries of "the big three" and especially with Germany will be decisive, particularly for the paces and the scope of the constructive processes;

* relations in the eastern part of Central Europe - obviously this will continue to be the theatre of the most essential structural remonstrations in the field of international security policy;

* Relations between Balkan countries - The Balkans tend to be a potential epicentre of conflicts of all types - political, military strategic, ethnic, religious, etc. However clearly the situation here is a smaller model of the complicated mosaic of European security problems. It is indisputable also that these problems did not generate themselves on the Balkans because of "political backwardness" of peoples here, but they are product either of doubtful political decisions (provoked or made many times outside the region), or because of shortage of true political acts with "local importance." Therefore the efficiency of any common European security system will be called in question if the Balkan political region is not stabilised.

The analysis of the system of the elements of the European security pointed out is a reason to interpret four basic models for building the new security system. Any of them, taken by itself, has a definite probability to come true, besides it varies both with time and with the geographic scope of the policy. But it must be stressed again that they are defined only for the needs of system analysis of the situation and are hardly applicable for practicable decisions in their "pure" type.

The Euro-Atlantic Model

The role and importance of NATO have never before been so high and indisputable. But also never before has the opinion that the Alliance should change its structure and functions been so unanimous.

The change should apparently cover the context, lie in the very idea for the North-Atlantic Treaty. As its first Secretary General Lord Ismay said, NATO is established to "keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." Therefore, NATO:

- Has to continue to provide the engagement of the USA to the affairs of the European security and
- Keep its administrative and organisational structures and procedures to remain the potentially successful instrument for maintaining the security policy through its operational military power.

But to turn into an "anchor of the European security" (M. Vorner), i. e. to transform from military-political alliance into a system for collective security, NATO apparently should change:

- the conceptual balance between the two columns;
- basic points in the allied military strategy both in the connected with it military structures and procedures for political decision making;
- its concept towards Russia;
- The ideas about its role in zones out of the territory mentioned in the Washington treaty (Article V).

Practical steps in this direction have already been initiated. The problem is how far - in depth and wide - they are going to reach and if they will eventually lead to NATO's adapting to the current conditions.

The pro-NATO model has, of course, serious critics. The main counter argument is that NATO is a "product" of the cold war and the bipolar Europe and in its current state only hampers building of "the common European home" (F.

Miterrand). Furthermore, NATO has no mechanisms for reaction to low intensity challenges (like ethnic ones), which will obviously be the main problem on the continent in the medium run.

It is this criticism towards NATO that gave birth to the model, which can be named "European Defence Identity"(Pelen), or "West European Defence Community" (A. Hide-Price).

European Defence Community

This model is built around the structures and the functions of the European Union and in particular around the decisions for common policy in the field foreign relations and security. In practice, it serves the goal to establish an independent military power and a procedure for co-ordinated military actions with defence or prevention nature for the needs of the European Union.

Supporters of this model claim that its realisation is a natural continuation of the federalist processes, which have conquered Western Europe in practically all fields. At the same time, through its implementation would be removed the abnormal conditions of the relations between NATO and the EU.

If the idea for "European defence community" is to turn into a vital and effective structure, attractive to the whole continent, at least three main preconditions should be fulfilled:

- a federal European Union with common foreign and defence policy should be built;
- integrated armed forces should be formed
- An independent European nuclear prevention potential should be created.

At the same time the idea for European defence community, connected to the so called "Small Europe" id criticised from all possible directions:

- it is highly probable that the relations in Western Europe on security and defence matters became dominated by Germany, France and Great Britain;

- it is assumed that in this way the US - West European links will weaken and this will decrease stability in the whole western world;

- it should be noted that closer West European co-operation in the field of security will inevitably contradict seriously with the processes of enlargement of the European Union itself;

- The problem also has a purely military-strategic aspect, related to the possible loss of especially important allies like Turkey and Norway (which are NATO members but not EU ones). It is difficult to imagine a variant of the European security in the future, which could reasonably exclude Turkey from the military strategy.

The "Helsinki "system for collective security

The Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) is one of the unique achievements of the modern diplomacy. The negotiations for its assembling, which started in 1973 turned into the so called "Helsinki process," which ended with the Final Act from 1975. While the act itself is some type of ersatz of the peace treaty from World War 2, the Helsinki process turned into a mechanism for managing the peace process between the East and the West (focused mainly on security and human rights).

It was expected that the end of the bipolar system in Europe would significantly increase the potential and the role of the CSCE. To turn it into a forum for Pan-European discussion and co-operation, into a real element of the new European order in the field of security. But the 1994 meeting in Budapest threw doubt over these possibilities, and according to some even "CSCE closed the circle of its development" (J. Fuentes). The transformation of the "Conference" into an "Organisation" is not a result "in essence" and cannot compensate lost expectations. Furthermore, the practical result of the hasty super enlargement of the organisation under preserved conceptual framework and administrative procedures hinted also the possible result of a similar NATO enlargement.

Anyway, the possibilities of the OSCE should not be excluded from the analysis, at least because this is the only real Euro-Atlantic structure. The role of OSCE is most often interpreted in two extremes: "maximum" and "minimum" (A. Hide-Price).

Supporters of the first would like to see OSCE swallow the responsibilities of the military-political alliances, place them in the scheme for Pan-European security. In this aspect it is designed to apply a range of sanctions against violators of agreed "Helsinki" standards and the rules for behaviour in the international relations.

"Minimalists" also would like to see OSCE under the "dome" of the common European security system, but in a rather marginal role, compared to that of the two "columns."

1.2 State and perspectives for development of military political situation in the South-Eastern Europe

The political situation in the south-eastern Europe in last nine years describes with two steady trends.

On one hand there is a process and occurrences, which remind the situation from the beginning of the age: systematic and total mistrust and suspicion, political crisis and military conflicts, interference and competition of out of region powers, including "great," etc.

The new situation in the region

The new situation in the south-eastern Europe is not a mechanic sum of mentioned two types of processes and occurrences. But a result of its complicated interweaving in the time and the space and in the context of present events. The

situation's essential characteristics, having the attitudes to the security in the region and in Bulgaria are:

- The change in the political map of Southeast Europe is going in a confrontational scheme - by military acts and violence in mass size. The logic in the process follows the formula of a "national state," but in fact it does not realise itself completely. It is difficult to restrict the territorial fragmentation and to create re-ethno-homogenic states. The conflict development of the processes in ex-Yugoslavia reflects and on relations between Balkan countries - any of them has had its own specific policy for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the problems in Kosovo and Macedonia, etc.

- "Europisation" of the region is definitely positive event, even already it is clear for everyone how continue and hard this process will be. This trend dramatically opposes on the antagonistic "re-Balkanisation" of the region.

- All Balkan countries without exceptions declare defined anxiety for their security and for the defence of their interests.

- All Balkan countries are in hard economic stagnation, and some of them - in terminal depreciation and economic catastrophe. The economic difficulties create strong social tensions, instabilysing the situation in the countries and in the region at all, create prepositions for establishment of dictatorial religious-fundamentalist form of govern.

- Become a process of changes in the balance of the interests, therefore - in the influence of out-of-region powers and first of USA, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain. Extremely arise the role of the Islamic factor and the direct invasion of powerful Islamic organisations.

Centres of tension and of conflict situations in the region

All the conflicts on the Balkans have in its basis national interests and claims, but have also a rather specific, depending of which they can be classified as:

- interstate conflict centres (fire points) on unsolved territorial questions;
- Internal national, ethnically, religious, etc. conflicts of populated on same territory people;
- double determined fire points of tension, where the internal contradictions create strained of the international relations;
- Religious conflicts, which, following the rules are connected with the national-ethnically, but in some cases play the independent role or cover state approaches;
- conflicts and tensions, connected with ecological, resource, etc. contradictions;

From the sum of these fire points with a key importance for the mutual security and the Bulgarian national security are:

- the civil, inter ethnically and religious tensions after the war in ex-Yugoslavia;
- existing potentia tension with epicentre in FYR Macedonia;
- Kosovo and the "Kosovisation" of some regions of former Yugoslavia;
- the mutual break up between the armed forces and the arms of Balkan countries and continuing flow in of heavy armament to the region;
- the strong discordance of the relations between Turkey and Greece;
- The non-developing of the "Cyprus question."

1. 3 Geopolitical interests and national security

In historical view the Bulgarian security policy has double dimension - Balkan and continental, meanwhile the accent has been putted on one or another, depending on the followed approaches, the relations with the "great powers" and compatibility of the national and their interests in the region, the coalition engagements and the total situation at the international field.

Geopolitical Areas and Interests in the Field of Security

Bulgaria lies at centre of the Balkan political region where almost all major aspects of international relations in South-Eastern Europe intersect. We are talking about axes with a positive effect on the balance of power and interests in the region, not about contending tendencies. Furthermore, establishment of any, be they geometrically plausible, relations of preferential selectivity run counter both to the general political interests and security priorities of Bulgaria.

This line of conduct in the international relations is emerging as a sustained positive tendency the pursuit of which has cast Bulgaria the role of primary factor of regional strategic stability. To play this role, one could expect that the country would get broader political and material support from the pillars of European security: NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU).

Another important geo-strategic fact is the one that Bulgaria is bordered on the Islamic world. For instance, if the problem for the coexistence between Christendom and Islam arose for the countries that emerged after the disintegration of Yugoslavia only at a given stage of the escalation of the conflict, in the case with Bulgaria its roots are deep into history. All the wars in the last 118 years and the national catastrophes that followed were linked to seeking solution to the national problem. It turned into a bleeding wound after the enforced "convalescence process" and the emigration campaign that followed it in 1989. Undoubtedly, the ruling circles in Bulgaria at that time are to be blamed for that, but we can not skip the campaign held then for advancing the Turkish nation and identifying Bulgarian Muslims with "external Turks" within a far going Turkish programme, to which the religious and ethnic moments gained legitimacy and support by the international community.

The above-mentioned objective political realities are the core of the reorientation in the quests for Bulgaria's new position and role in the restructuring European political scene. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON have triggered a process of formation of several tendencies which in a sense even have

conflicting orientation, but which are a natural product of the period of political transition.

The tendency oriented towards Europe as a whole, has been expanding as a priority *in the country's overall policy despite the rather slow (in Bulgaria's view) process of equitable integration with collective structures*. We realise, that our problem is part of the so-called "Eastern problem" and does not expect it to get a priority solution in our favour. However, if the process of Bulgaria's natural integration with the common European structures and mechanisms is to make progress, we prefer to see our partners formulate "rules of the game," that are clear and valid for all. The absence of such regulations has already propelled the differentiation of new geopolitical regions on the basis of entirely arbitrary interpretations of the "success in democratic reforms" theme (the Visegrad Four's possible admission to NATO reminds of awarding prizes for good behaviour).

The Eurasian tendency in national geopolitics is directly linked to continental political restructuring. Development in this sphere is currently extremely complicated and short term as relations with countries like Russia, Ukraine, Iraq, etc. objectively intersect here. Specific potentials, so far largely limited to the economic sphere, continue to build up. However, considering that economic integration is the core of the political one, collective security is not far away. How this tendency will develop depends foremost on the prospect of equitable and beneficial co-operation and prevention of hegemony in international relations. For Bulgaria it is important that its development into a sort of bridge to the East (not just with communication) does not distance the country from the European priority.

1.4. Influence of Russia and the USA over the National Security Model

The geopolitical analysis of the situation concerning security would be naturally incomplete if the interests of the great powers in the regions were passed by. Especially that aspect of them, which intersects with the interests of Bulgaria.

However, in the specific situation on the Balkans it is difficult to describe some lasting panels of foreign relations, which could serve as guidelines for the security policy. The relations between Bulgaria and Russia and the USA are of essential significance for the national security. Deideologization of these relations creates prerequisites for a pragmatic optimisation of different aspects of security policy, in favour for Bulgaria. Moreover, Russia and the US practically build up positive political potential in one or another Balkan country and in the region as a whole with the possible intention to pile more arguments for a forthcoming balance of regional influence.

It might be assumed that Russia has important interests in the Balkans, which all the states will inevitably have to consider.

The support column of its geopolitical interests in the region will probably be the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Through its territory can be secured maintenance of the Russian military and political presence in the Mediterranean and the control over the Middle East and Northern Africa. But the control over the space to the "support column" includes Bulgaria's territory. Therefore, Russia has interests in friendly governments of our country as well. In connection with that Russia decisively stand against a possible full membership in a political-military alliance, unacceptable for it, including NATO. In this context, Russia support the establishment of regional structures for security.

Not unexpectedly, the USA persistently enlarge the zone of their geopolitical interests in the Balkans, which apart from Turkey and Greece, already include Albania, the new Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. They are interested in assistance in "giving birth" to different regional institutions and forums, but concerning all but no the military aspect of security - ethnic and minority problems, organised international crime, refugees and mass migration, preserving the environment, etc. The US stimulated grouping of some Balkan states, including Bulgaria (for instance on the basis of the participation in the Partnership for Peace Programme) within which could be initiated a process of serious co-operation and integration with NATO members from the region, eventually reaching treaty relations with NATO. The fact that the

military-political and military co-operation with NATO surpasses the commercial and economic one, speaks for itself. Turkey is the support column of the US policy in the region and Bulgaria should take advantage of that to neutralise the potential contradictions with it and for a general stabilisation of the region.

1.5. Main Sources of Military Threats

Bulgaria faces a fundamental change in the nature and the scope of the danger and threats for the national security. Essentially they are of military, non-military and combined nature.

The military dangers are connected mainly with the serious and getting deeper disbalance between the Armed Forces of the Balkan states, with the possibility that the Yugoslav conflict could escalate to a Balkan one and with the danger that ethnic contradictions within and around the country could provoke the use of military force for their resolving.

Piling of arms and military potential both within the frames of CFE and outside it (Serbia) sets prerequisites for their use as an argument in international relations.

The possibility for a spill over of the Kosovo conflict to territories with direct relation to Bulgaria's security remains the most serious risk for the country's involvement in direct military operations. The assessments of international community attempt to prevent expanding of military actions deviate. While the presence of multinational forces in Macedonia is unanimously accepted as a positive step with a certain preventive effect. Especially in case a lift of the ban for arms imports in the conflict zone takes place.

The non-military threats come from unsolved minority, religious and economic problems of both domestic and international natures. Weakening of the government's set of instruments for preserving the stability in the social, economic and cultural

environment provoked ambitions for political blackmailing and dominance, with a dangerous blend of the influence of internal and international factors, aimed at specific party, minority, religious and economic benefits against the national interests.

The threats of mixed nature are a product of the potential escalation of significant and large scale non-military threats in ways, which suggest and provoke the use of armed force for their neutralisation. The most serious problem is with no doubt the minority one, especially when it is approached with decisions, which in their nature are globally motivated but are distant and even ignore the particularity of the Balkans region. And the particularities, which turn the question for the ethnic group on the Balkans into something different than it is for Belgium or Canada for instance are (1) that the mother-country, which might be asked for assistance and protection, even military one is always a neighbour state and (2) most of the problems are not bilateral, but involve a number of countries (the "Macedonian" one for example concerns the vital interests of at least six countries).

1.6. Conclusions: a positive and risk factors for the national security

The main **positive** factors of the external political environment, on which the strategy for national security is based on, are:

- the willingness of the USA and NATO to find a formula for strategic partnership in the field of security and the possibility Bulgaria to cooperate with the promoting its national security and stability in the region;

- the increasing role of the European Union in the European and global policy, shaping the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the possibility Bulgaria to proceed from associated to full membership in EU;

- the undergoing processes of transformation in the policy and the strategy of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the possibility for Bulgaria sovereignty to

sovereignty choose the aspects and forms of co-operation with NATO to promote its national security and defence, and maintaining of peace;

- the aspiration of Russia, Ukraine and other CIS-countries to associate with European processes in the field of security and the possibility Bulgaria to be a connecting unit between western and eastern European geopolitics and geoeconomic zone;

- The possibility for taking advantage of the assessment of Bulgaria as a factor of stability, and of our country's position on the conflict in the former SFR Yugoslavia both on regional and in European scale.

The main factors which directly or indirectly, eventually, cause or could cause **negative** influence on the state of national security are:

- In case of unfavourable confrontational development of the situation in the world and Europe, a danger arises for Bulgaria to remain in a "buffer zone," which might leave her isolated from the European processes of integration for a long time.

- the regional conflicts which are very close to the Bulgarian borders carry concomitant dangers: increased flow of arms, increased manifestation of extremal nationalism and ethnic intolerance, terrorism, flows of refugees, the resultant actions which will definitely lead to reducing the possibilities for the countries from the region to be integrated in the European processes and structures;

- the partialities and contradictions, piled along with regional conflicts may mutate in a new division of the peninsular, in mutual opposition and counteraction, in forming of configurations of interests and influence, aimed against Bulgaria's interest

- the continuing increase of the disproportion between the military potential of Bulgaria and most of its neighbour countries may, under certain circumstances provoke deployment of armed forces for achieving aggressive political goals against our country; nuclear weapons are still stored in the Balkans;

- the regime of sanctions against SR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Iraq and Libya led to considerable direct and indirect losses of the Bulgarian economy;

- the narrowing of a number of foreign markets and destruction of traditional economic contacts makes the problem for overcoming economic insecurity by diversifying economic relations into a fundamental one for the economic security and stability;

- the revival and intensifying of religious intolerance and especially its extreme forms already spread over our region; attempts for further isolation and closing of communities on the basis of differences in religion are especially dangerous;

- the political and economic instability in the region leads to frequent fluctuations and perturbations on ethnic and minorities issues, which provoke not only single manifestations, but state policies with extreme forms of persistent nationalism;

- the non-Bulgarian spiritual invasion, which attaches the spiritual grounds the Bulgarian nation;

- the danger for Bulgaria to become a crossroad for international organised crime;

- production and distribution of weapons and mass destruction technologies, the tendency for enlargement of the "nuclear club" and the number of states in possession of nuclear devices and systems; the occasions of violation of international law on security and human rights matters; the outburst of population and the economic disproportion's; the masses of refugees and economic emigrants; international terrorism, including this against important industrial units, especially those of nuclear power industry; increasing international organised crime, etc.

2. GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Bulgaria's national security policy should be capable of contending with difficulties both with the range of dangers and threats and with possibilities for their complex manifestation. It should be decisively reoriented towards building of potential for overcoming on behalf of the capability to "reflect." The meaning of this thesis is that the priority should be shifted from the purely military tools (e.g. the narrow

concept of "defence") to an efficient combining of the possibilities of political influence with the preventive potential of the armed forces.

Therefore, the following basic elements of Bulgaria's model for national security and guidelines of the national security policy can be pointed out:

2.1 . Strategic objective and main task

For the foreign policy element of the national security policy of Bulgaria is to aim the set of diplomatic, international legislative, information, economic and technological tools at achieving the following goals:

- first of all, achieving of full integration to the European and Europe-Atlantic political, economic and defence structures;
- assistance for enhancement of peace and stability in south-east Europe, for spreading the European processes of integration over the region for building a "community of security" in the region on the basis of the policy of good neighbourliness, mutual respect of interests and overruling of the use of armed force for solving international disputes;
- prevention of the forming of positions and policies, aimed against Bulgaria's interests, at settling of foreign political will and restricting the right of sovereign choice on all aspects of the foreign, security and defence policy;
- Enhancing Bulgaria's position as a credible international partner, as an active participant with equal rights in global political and economic processes.

The formula of Bulgaria's interest is "Security through co-operation and integration."

2.2 Strategic directions

- The formula "security through co-operation and integration" i **European and Europe-Atlantic scale** means clear and lasting policy of thorough integration in the leading and European and Europe-Atlantic structures and organisations for security and co-operation, development of bilateral relation on the grounds of equality, equal rights and mutual benefit in all spheres, especially for providing the economic, technological, ecological and military security of the country.

- The strategy for its implementation includes:

- consistent policy for realisation of the rights and obligations, concomitant to Bulgaria' association to the NATO, European Union and WE;

- enhanced adapting to the European standards, harmonising Bulgarian legislation with the one of the AEU countries, adopting of new laws and regulations and improvement of state administration, aimed at extended relations with AEU; liberalisation of trade, providing the possibility for free flow of goods, services, capita and people, preparation and carrying out of negotiations for Bulgaria's full membership in the European Union.

- continuing of the efforts to use the opportunities for co-operation, offered b NATO and WE, aimed at Bulgaria's joining to them in case of their enlargement in future; active participationation of Bulgaria in the existing forms of co-operation with these organisations in conditions of building of new, broad European security architecture, based on partnership and co-operation, aimed at increasing stability and security of all European states;

- developing the relations with the member states and the bodies of OSCE, the Council of Europe, which prove to become important upholders of the new European architecture of security and co-operation;

- undertaking consistent actions towards full joining to the Central European Initiative and the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

- enhanced modernisation of country's infrastructure, aimed at gradual joining to the infrastructure of EU member states;

- Decisive improvement of the conditions for attracting investment in the country and for implementing other forms of economic, financial, technological and scientific co-operation.

2.3 At regional scale,

The "security through co-operation and integration" formula is implemented through a system of foreign policy activities, aimed at joining the combined efforts for achieving a lasting stabilisation of the situation in the region, such as:

- promoting relations of good neighbourliness and co-operation with the Balkan countries, strengthening and activation of the positive processes taking place in the field of security;

- finding constructive solutions of controversial problems by peaceful means, through the establishment of lasting regional integration connections, improving the possibilities for Bulgaria or integrate to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures;

- preparation for solving within the European context of problems, concomitant to the stabilisation of the region, defending the principles of Helsinki and Paris, the revival of confidence among the countries and nations of south-east Europe, the restoration and stimulation of dialogue in the field of economy, ecology, fighting organised crime, drug traffic, etc.;

- Establishment of effective control of military activities in the whole region, applying a new approach for achieving regional balance of armed forces and arms, relevant to the new military-political situation.

- The strategy for achieving these goals is implemented through Bulgaria's consistent keeping to the following principles and directions of action:

- attach an non-debatable priority to diplomatic and political approaches for preventing and solvating of intrastate argues and conflicts;

- decline any territorial aspiration, non-disputable recognise of sovereignty and independence of the existing states on the Balkans and following all other principles grounded on the UN Charter, the Final Act of Helsinki, Paris Charter of New Europe;

- Equivalence and pragmatism in the relations between the south-eastern countries, oppose to creation of closed alliances in the region, directed against Bulgaria's interests.

2.4. At global scale

The formula "security through co-operation and integration" means that:

- The Republic of Bulgaria will fully co-operate to support the consolidation of the role of the UN and OSCE for approbation of peaceful forms and means for solving controversies in line with international law. The Republic of Bulgaria is ready to support with professionally trained military or other personnel and equipment the efforts of the UN and OSCE to stand against the use of arms for solving conflicts and crisis, but reserves its right to choose the events and the type of operations in which to participate;

- Bulgaria shall intensify its efforts for joining GATT/WTO, with active subsequent participation in the work of the World Trade Organisation, and shall develop relations of mutual economic benefit with the international financial organisations;

- Bulgaria shall take active support international effort to oppose global threats for security, is not in possession of, does not produce or develop mass destruction weapons, will not acquire such in no way and all cooperate with the international community for their non-distribution and annihilation.

PART IV. MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF THE SECURITY MODEL: PARAMETERS OF THE MILITARY POLICY AND STRATEGY

1. Defence sufficiency as military-political concept

The main function of the military-political concept tends to be defining the limits of the "sufficiency" in the political, economic and military fields, which can serve as guideline in decision making in the military aspect of national security.

From political prospective the limits of defence sufficiency are set by the nature of the uniform final military and political objective. The final objective itself is defined in time and space.

Along the SPACE extent, defence is limited to use of the military factor only to protect and preserve the ownership, the internationally acknowledged territory (status quo). This limitation automatically suggests not allowing any forms (direct or indirect) of use of the military power for achieving political goals, such as "uniting the nation together within its ethnic boundaries," "restoring the historic frontiers of the state", "guaranteeing vital sources of resources and communications", etc. The modern broader reading of security offers an arsenal of other means and approaches to allow a risky involvement of the military factor in the geopolitical sphere.

From the prospective of defence sufficiency, each political and military final goal, which includes some form of conquering foreign territory, which used to belong to the country before the conflict was initiated, should be excluded.

In line with the parameter "TIME" the limits of defence sufficiency should provide self limitation of the reaction to the first act of military action. In practice this means a unilateral acceptance of the obligation not to use any weaponry and not to undertake any actions with troops as preventive measures against aggression. This is

the only way to prevent the war before the first shot, especially for countries that do not have the preventing power of nuclear arms at their disposal.

Thus in the military-political concept self limitation of reaction at the initial stage of the conflict should be tied with readiness to stand and resist the first stroke of the aggressor. But after the start of combat actions the defending party has the right of free choice of the way of response.

In conclusion - in the political sphere "defence sufficiency" concerns the nature and contents of the political goals, but not the means by which they are achieved.

The ECONOMIC COMPONENT of the defence sufficiency concept naturally causes the most serious debates, concerning military construction. Under the conditions of deep national economic crisis the efforts are aimed at spending funds for improving the state of the economy and the welfare of the people at the expense of reducing spending in the non-producing sphere, with defence being a part of it. Under this approach defence spending usually heads towards their critical minimum to cut the overall budget deficit. The influence of this tendency over security policy (and defence policy in particular) can be synthesised in the "price - risk - result" scheme, i. e. restrictions of defence budgets are inevitable, which leads to increasing risks for the security and results, which does not serve political goals.

It should be stressed that apart from "the loss of security" this approach definitely does not lead to long term financial relief, since the military expenditures saved today will certainly have to be compensated with interest tomorrow to fill the technological lag.

On the other hand it is not reasonable to constantly insist for the highest possible (or as elegantly referred to - necessary) defence budget. This formula usually hides a simple sum, which results from annual military planning. Its main defect is that it ignores the system for security, in which defence is only one of the elements, the place and role of which varies significantly with time.

Therefore, in the context of defence sufficiency we should not talk about minimum or maximum military spending but for optimum ones, relevant to the place and role of the military component in the security policy at the specific political situation.

Such an approach means that planning of military budgets should be carried out through combining the real needs of the armed forces and the assessment for their current and future position in the security policy of the government. In relation with that may be expected reasonable fears of some instability in military planning, especially in the period of political transition.

The proposed foundations of a military-political concept lead defence sufficiency to the level of political decision.

Such an approach sets dual limitation concerning , first, the possible threats against the state (origin, level, neutralisation) and, second, the resistance it is capable of (contents of the military strategy, scale and scope of the military actions...)

2. Basics of the defence strategy

The new defence strategy of Bulgaria is defined by the state of the geostrategic factors. The directives of the national security policy and defence policy of the government, and by the changes in the international strategic situation. In relation with the tendencies mentioned above, in developing the military doctrine and the strategic concepts linked with it, the influence of a number of new factors is taken into account.

First of all, this is the new attitude towards military power as to a major and dominant factor for security. The military aspect of the guarantees is important and essential, but it is viewed only as last resort, aimed at hindering a real opponent and reacting to a possible attack. Co-operation, dialogue and control over the armed forces and arms substitute the thesis for "armed defence of the national interests."

The problem for "the zone of national interests" is a main one in formulating the goals of the military strategy. Concerning the narrow sense of defence, the concept is limited only to the national territory (this naturally does not exclude the participation

of contingents of military volunteers in UN or OSCE missions in other parts of the world). Bulgaria ardently and persistently supports the policy towards the lowest possible military balance in the region and towards assigning strictly defence nature to the structures, dislocation and system for operational training of the armed forces.

Second, this is the problem with the assessment of military threat. It is simply impossible to apply the old "black-and-white" model. Bulgaria treats no state or people as an enemy, does not threaten anybody, does not aim at unilateral military superiority and under no conditions will initiate military actions. The underlying thesis of the new military-doctrinal concept and strategic views is not the answer to the question "who are we defending from," but to the "what and how do we defend."

Third, this is the problem of the social price of defence. A problem, which in its essence, is one of the major characteristics of the transitional period. It has a number of first rate dimensions, among which the most important ones are the economic crisis, the break down of the relations with the traditional suppliers of military equipment, the collapse of the national defence industry, the demographic downfall, etc. Without opening a large bracket here, we should stress the relation of this factor to searching external guarantees for the national security. It is in this historical moment when the assistance for us is most valuable. When Bulgaria gets more stable, when it turns into a factor in the regional economy and the European policy, the problem for military co-operation will simply look otherwise.

The new national military strategy is motivated by the concept for defence sufficiency, viewed as permanent participation of the military component in state policy (the so called "defence of policy"), under which "defence" and "sufficiency" characterise political goals, social price, defence potential and armed forces and weaponry in particular. In relation with it, three main tasks before the armed forces and national defence can be formulated, concerning the nature of the sources of threats and dangers, the geographic scope and duration.

The first task is related to maintaining of state policy for establishing and strengthening peace in the region and to increasing military stability under decreasing

levels of military potentials. This is a constant and non-discrete function with the highest possibility for realisation, but is used for neutralising sources of threats and dangers of low intensity and scale. It includes participation in bilateral, regional and European initiatives and agreements for strengthening of confidence, control over arms and military activity and for increasing transparency of the military sphere; collecting information for the state of the sources of potential military danger; protection of the state frontiers, territorial sea and air space. This task is also about the problem for maintaining the prevention potential of the armed forces and their peace time military readiness.

The second task is related to the strategy for the use of the armed forces and defence potential of the county to prevent, block and solve military-political crises in the zone of the national interests of Bulgaria. This is a temporary function, carried out in peace time, the aim of which is to halt escalation of tension by undertaking measures to set-back the potential aggressor, adequate to the threat. Its implementation is designed for neutralising threats of variable nature, the intensity of which may be low in the starting period, but escalate rapidly after that.

The third task is directly linked with the defence of the national territory in case of military conflict. Its implementation is organised on the basis of the concept for defence operation, the main objective of which is not to allow large scale operations within the country, to block intrusion of the adversary and recovering the integrity of the national frontiers by active counter actions. The possibility for arising of this task is low and the level of the threat may vary, but taking into account the strategic extents of the national territory, the implementation will probably be of national scale and will engage the whole potential of the nation. In the process of its implementation, the defence strategy provides also the mass use of political means to block the conflict, in parallel with the actions of the armed forces.

3. The Reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and Defence Sufficiency

The integration of Bulgaria in the European Union and NATO, which was defined as the strategic priority of the government policy, assigned the objective to build armed forces characterized with defensive structure, greater combat readiness, capability for reliable protection of the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Bulgaria. Soon the armed forces should be able to meet NATO high requirements and should gradually increase their participation in joint operations of the Alliance targeting consolidation of the principles of freedom, democracy and observance of human rights in regions of crisis all over the world.

The reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces /BAF/ is being determined by the changed military and political and strategic situation in Europe and particularly on the Balkans, as well as by the economic state of the country and the related to it problems of financial and material and technical character. During the last years the demographic factor that consists in progressive decrease of the personal that are fit for service in the armed forces is having a negative effect on the reform.

As a result of the insufficient funding of the BAFs during the last years, the combat training and provision of the troops with modern armament and equipment was considerable limited and some deliveries were even stopped. The field, flight and naval training of the commanders, headquarters and troops were decreased to a considerable extent.

During the last years there is an increasing tendency towards a continuous decrease of the population growth. An essential number of young people has left the country and part of the young men that have to do their military service do not meet the health state requirements. Certain difficulties are being caused by the unsatisfactor educational qualification of the recruits for the needs of the modern armed forces. Replacement of the Military Duty with Alternative Service Law, which is going to be passed by the Parliament, will probably cause additional difficulties.

Certain difficulties were caused by the inherited from the time of the Cold War characteristics of the armed forces – level of combat and mobilization readiness, numerical and combat strength, disposition which is impossible to be maintained in terms of economy and as far as the military and political situation is concerned its maintenance is debatable and even groundless.

The general assessment of the factors that have an effect on the development of the BAFs determined the new ideological approach to their building an expression of

which is developed by the Concept for the Reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces for the period 1995 – 2010 as well as plan-schedule for its realization.

An expression of the idea that the armed forces should acquire a defensive structure and should be capable to protect the territorial integrity and independence of the country with reduced personnel without being directed against an enemy determined in advance, was the transformation of the Army and Division organization into Corps and Brigade one as well as the reduction of the troops garrisons and moving part of them in the interior of the country.

In 1996 and 1997 greater part of the planned structural and organizational changes in the troops were made in correspondence with the developed plan-schedule. The Commands of the services of the armed forces were reorganized into Headquarters of the respective services of the armed forces. Two territorial training centers with the rank of units were transformed into mechanized brigades. The training centers for recruits that have been established proved to be expeditious. We adopted the principle of four times call up of the recruits for military service. We started an experiment with recruiting professional soldiers.

Despite all these positive results the realization of the reform in full scope and according to the developed schedules came out to be beyond our abilities because of the economic state of the country. The budget could not provide the funds for it and this slowed down its progress. It became necessary to update the concept and develop a Plan for the Organizational Building of the Structure and Strength of the Bulgarian Armed Forces by 2010. Its realization will make the armed forces smaller as far as the number of the personnel is concerned but with modern armament, movable and with sufficient combat readiness. The reduction of the number of the garrisons will be used for the increase of the quality of the combat training.

With structure it is envisaged that the BAFs should have Rapid Reaction Forces, Defense Troops and Territorial Defense Troops.

Rapid Reaction Forces will have the greatest extent of manning and equipment (70% manning and 100% equipment) and will be intended for settling military conflicts of low intensity, for participation in joint exercises within Partnership for Peace Program and for liquidation of the consequences of natural disasters, catastrophes and large scale damages.

They will consist of three brigades – a mechanized one, a light infantry one, a rocket one and of supporting units. They could be augmented with units of the branches of forces and with aviation.

Rapid Reaction Forces will be ready:

- to demonstrate determination targeting a discouraging /detering/ effect on the aggressive country;
- to cover the state borders at the threatened direction and to provide the deployment of the basic defense forces;
- to defend in definite section or lines;
- to participate in NATO CJTF;

The disposition of Rapid Reaction Forces in the center of Bulgaria will make it possible to use them through the whole territory of the country and will give an opportunity to balance the assets against possible threats from different directions. Their high level of person and equipment will allow them to be combat ready and quickly move to the different theaters to stop an aggression and provide the deployment of the basic group at the threatened directions. Thus their use will contribute to provide the increase of the combat potential of the beginning of a possible conflict. The concentration of these forces in one formation will give an opportunity to train them following uniform specialized programs to participate in NATO CJTF peacekeeping operations under the aegis of UN/OSCE and under the command of the Alliance.

After their additional manning for the wartime organization Defense Troops will establish the defense groups at the theater in danger, will cover our borders with the states that do not participate in the conflict and together with Rapid Reaction Forces will provide the mobilization and operational deployment of the other troops and forces. They will consist of formations and units with different degree of manning and equipment called combat ready, consisting of officers only and wartime formations.

Territorial Defense Troops will perform tasks related to the covering of our borders with states that do not participate in the conflict as well as other tasks that have arisen and it is not advisable to assign Defense Troops such tasks. The basic Organization units are territorial defense regiments and battalions but they could include other troop units as well that are not included in the groups at the theater in danger.

Another important element of the reform is the establishment of a reserve of the BAFs, which will be organized and individual one.

The wartime formations are the organized reserve, which is being deployed in case of wartime situation or military situation. These are the so-called "reserves."

The individual reserve includes:

- part of the organized reserve /reserves contingent/ assigned to take basic command positions;
- Individual wartime and peacetime command and post position in Defense Troops.

The individual reserve is being staffed with highly trained officers, NCOs and soldiers of the reserve that have done their active military service. They must have knowledge and rich practical experience for the respective position. During the time of their being called up for training or alerting, the members of the reserve get money equal to the that the active military persons get for the respective position and rank.

The reform of the BAFs includes also reorganization of the logistic support system, modernization, rearmament and change of the personal training system. It aims at:

1. Achievement of greater compatibility of the structures and functions of the logistic bodies and units as well as of the system of supply, technical and medical support with their counterparts of the armed forces of NATO countries.

Cut to the highest degree of the quantity of the peacetime and wartime set of logistic formations, units and institutions in conformity with the reduced wartime and peacetime personal of the BAFs.

2. Reduction of the quantity of the wartime stores and optimization of their echelonment.
3. Cut of part of the available infrastructure of bases, depots, repair and medical institutions.
4. Reduction of the elements of the chain of operation and economy of the peacetime supply.

The modernization and rearmament of the BAFs will be done in three stages and at the end of the third stage its equipment with armament and equipment that have combat characteristics suiting the modern requirements will be completed. The basic thing about the first two stages is to restore and maintain the combat readiness of the available armament and equipment by our efforts mostly. The whole work in this field will be done following a Program for Restoration, Modernization and Rearmament of the BAFs with Armament, Equipment and Military and Technical Property for the Period 1997 – 2015 that has been ratified by the Ministry of Defense.

The reform of the BAFs personal training system will be done basically through changes of the military education and military research work to make them in conformity with the Higher Education Law, considering the specific character of the

military component. For the present there is an idea that the Military Academies that are with 4 and 5 year period of education should give mainly civilian education and the War College that is with 1 or 2 year period of education should give military qualification. Higher military education should be gotten in the General Staff Faculty of the War College or respective foreign War Colleges. Along with this it is envisaged that after a certain military training a wider circle of experts with the respective civilian education should join the armed forces.

As a whole the reform of the BAFs is being done in three stages:

The first stage which finished in 1997 consisted in predisposition of formations, reduction of the structures of the GS and services of the armed forces, passing of the necessary normative documents that regulate the rights and obligations of the military men, starting the reform of the military education and scientific research work.

Second stage – 1998 –2000

During the whole necessary predisposition of the formations and units will be done and the new structures will be ratified. The reform of the military education and scientific research work will be completed.

Third stage – 2001 – 2010

The structural reform of the services of the armed forces will be completed as well as the rearmament of the BAFs. The overall necessary manning of the services of the armed forces will be completed and the barracks will be improved as well as the training facilities. The troops will master their new functions according to the training plans.

According to the new plans the necessary funds for the reform of the BAFs are about 90 milliard levas and they are being allocated for the three stages as following:

First stage /1997/ – 862 million levas;

Second stage /1998-2000; this stage appears to be the stage of the greatest tension and it is basic for the reform/ – about 89 milliard levas;

Third stage /2001-2010/ – 22 million levas.

The funds are necessary mainly for the disposition of the armament, equipment and material means as well as for the repair and new constructions of barracks and training facilities.

To decrease the price of the reform it is envisaged to use to the maximum possible extent the already established storage, maintenance and training base in different regions of the country.

In conclusion I would like to say that the state and military leadership of the Republic of Bulgaria understand how important and significant for our country is the problem of guaranteeing the national security and the related to it reform of the BAFs. Despite the great difficulties of organizational and mostly of economic and financial character, we are convinced that in co-operation with the armed forces of NATO countries including the armed forces of the Kingdom of Denmark we will be successful in our efforts and in the near future we will be able to give our contribution to the building of a modern and reliable common security system in Europe and all over the world.

4. Bulgarian Army in the end of 90-s: Condition and Recommendations.

During the meeting of the NATO's ministers in December 1996 the Military Community of the NATO made investigation in 12 member-states, that took part in the so-called strengthened dialogue and expressed readiness for NATO membership. It is the purpose of this investigation to ascertain the conditions within the armies, the strengths and weaknesses of every country that applies for NATO membership. This study included a review of the state of the armed forces and fighting potential of 12 countries, that had expressed willingness for being members of the Union - these are Albania, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak, Bulgaria, Slovenia. They are estimated and evaluated strictly and individually and out of the context of any logical formations. At the same time additional criteria were applied to some countries having in mind their specific geographic situation.

In the period of February and May 1997 the military bodies of NATO came to the following conclusions for Bulgarian Armed Forces /BAF/. According to the standards of NATO for fighting readiness the following categorisation is now involved:

- Category A - fighting units - equipped with armoured not less than 80% from the wartime level needed. It is thought that around 25% from the Bulgarian Army, or 5 brigades are in this category.

- Category B - party fighting capability, equipped with armament 50%-80%.

In this category we have 2 divisions and 1 brigade or around 35% of the Bulgarian Army.

- Category B - incapability for fighting, peacetime equipment 30-50% from the wartime state. We have 35% of the Bulgarian Army in this category for 2 divisions and 2 brigades.

1. From the analysis made about the military consequences for the Union from the admission of the Bulgarian is obvious that:

- In the most common aspect the joining of our country will not enlarge the strategic frontiers of NATO, but it will create additional strategic depth. Between the territories of NATO and Bulgaria we can see territories with a lot of potential for local collisions and conflicts.

- The increase of the limit for the necessary minimum for collective defence of land forces is going on. The Armed Forces of Bulgaria, with their present state, make for the increased requirements. NATO does not need to make any additional efforts in case we have a small-size operation for collective defence. In the years to come we might expect a cut down of 30% for the fighting potential, according to the ambitions of the military leadership and according to the abilities of the defence budget. In this case recourse must be made towards the other NATO member-states for additional maintenance.

- Joining Bulgaria does not want or need more requirements to the air-fighting potential of the Union. The Bulgarian Air Forces could only contribute to the collective defence.

- Bulgaria being a member of NATO will put in front additional requirement to the marine-fighting potential of the Union. The military Heft of Bulgarian can meet the increased requirements. More measures must not be undertaken for the sake of small-size operations.

According to the plan the marine-fighting potential will decrease, which will present new requirements to the other member-states. The armed forces of Bulgaria are looked by fighting readiness, structure and size. The manpower of the armed forces is 78 000 from which 50 000 in the land units, 18 000 in the air forces, 7 000 in the marine forces. One more of 1 400 is in the general list of defence Ministry.

For the Air Forces and the Navy we do not have a deep analysis carried out. It is pointed out, that the Air Forces have 14 aviobases. Attention is paid to the helicopters - 46 ones. For the navy we have the basis classic and sizes pointed out the opportunities for fighting against submarines.

Of all Armed Forces we have estimated only 20-30% modern ones, according to the requirements. Modernisation is needed in all kinds and sorts of Armed Forces and remembering that this matter depends upon the drastically insufficient financial funds.

About 70-80% from basic armament is reckoned old and out-of-use. Presently Bulgaria is not able to produce ammunitions to the NATO standards. Also lacks compatibility in the field of Command, Control and Information.

The Bulgarian Air Forces have Russian plans that are middle sized and different of nature and origin. Last generation of modern planes (Mig-29, SU-25) exists only in limited numbers. The old models (Mig-23) make up most of the attacking and defensive potential. The rest of the Mig-21 are of warn-out resource. In the sphere of the "land-air" complexes we have "OSA" and "S-300," and at the same time pointing out that we have a very limited opportunities for providing limited defence on the war-theatre.

Most of the Navy is rather old especially the submarines, patrol boats and corvettes. They need either general repair or change. In case the problem with the compatibility is resolved, we have the basic fighting submarine vessels covering most of the operational requirements of NATO.

2. Military Evaluation of the Situation.

It is evaluated that there is no clear and definite external threats to Bulgaria. In spite of this, the worsening situation of the economy (1996 - the first half of 1997) created new conditions for the appearance of internal tensions.

The possible scenario for the potential risks to the country might be as follows:

- In case of the conflict in Yugoslavia, that will come into Kosovo and Macedonia, matters of national characters may involve Bulgaria in an expanding conflict, that will definitely willingness to introduce.

- In spite of the declared willingness to introduce the NATO standards, because of economic reasons our country will be forced to buy military equipmen from her traditional markets- Russia, Ukraine and Belarusse.

From military point of view will not deform the external strategic periphery of the Union, but will give more depth. We have strategic common priorities with the NATO member-states.

The fighting potential of NATO goes up by 4% only by having our territories joined to the Union. By the way, our fighting potential is 6 % from that of NATO. The Bulgarian fighting potential compensates the requirements for collective defence

It is proposed that Bulgaria can not be involved in a strategic conflict. For the needs of strategic planning are foreseen that the main forces can perform their task in case of a conflict, concerning Nato's security.

One possible scenario for involving the country in a conflict is looked upon as a result of transfer of tension from internal collision in a neighbouring country or a conflict between two neighbouring countries. The time for acceleration of the situation so defined to be 6 months and the preparations for reaction on the Bulgarian side will not be more than 30 days. Operations may only be limited to frontier side action or any raids off the frontierline. The situation will have a local character and will not give any serious results of military nature by partially breaking the totality and integrity of the frontierline.

In the field of air protection it is thought that NATO must increase the potential by 7 air-guard complexes and about 5 more attacking installations for responding to land-based threats. This will not seriously reflect upon Nato's potential because resources for air protection by rule do have attacking capabilities. Besides this it is supposed that the air forces of Bulgaria will be able to put into action 8 standard fighting wings and this would diminish the requirements for the other member-states. Additional infrastructure must be built for fortification of the air space above. At least 2 aerodromes must be prepared to the NATO standards in Bulgaria.

In the field of Navy it is thought that the Bulgarian fleet could meet all the requirements of the collective defence system by providing independence of the eastern frontier and partially of Danube.

The Bulgarian membership will increase the situations when mobile command points can be used, when hubs of communication, sensors and systems of in-advance warning can be installed. It will be necessary that Bulgaria is connected to the stationary of compatible nature that arise must be immediately resolved due to their extreme importance. A minimum level of readiness is chased in this area at national

level, but as a whole the main financial burden for providing this compatibility will fall upon NATO.

In the area of standardisation not very big results are achieved. Elaboration and application of Nato's standards present a serious problem. Different projects are worked upon in the sphere of communications.

In case serious steps are not undertaken for modernisation of existing armament and equipment, in perspective we may expect:

- In tank forces - up to the year 2004 tanks from T-55 type will be amortised and that means a cut down of 25% of the fighting potential.
- Ironclad machines - by the year 2004 1800 machines will be amortised which will decrease the potential by 15 %.
- By the year 2004 the present artillery equipment will be good to use.
- Helicopters by 2004 will cut down by 43 machines - 2 % from the fighting potential of the armed forces.

For the Air Defence we have estimated that only a limited number of Mig-29 may be used in the integrated system of NATO for air-space protection (equipped with gauges to work in any meteorological conditions). The Bulgarian system for control and report of air-space is not technically compatible to NATO, although there is an opportunity for switching into Nato's system for exchange of information.

- From the missile systems only "OSA" and "C-300" will remain
- As a whole the infrastructure of the Air Defence is in a very unfavourable and far away from Nato's requirements. For the needs of the Union modernisation of two airbases is needed.

• In the Navy, if new equipment is not to be bought we expect to remain only 1 frigate and 2 minesweepers. The conclusion is that Bulgaria will have problems to provide resources for meeting the requirements of collective defence.

CONCLUSION.

**SOME PERSPECTIVES FOR THE BULGARIAN SECURITY
POLICY AT THE END OF 90'S**

The new security policy and the relevant defence strategy are a product of two opposing, but objectively existing facts. On the one hand, this is the conclusion - apparent, historically proved and indisputable - that no state can guarantee its security by itself, even if it sets on total militarisation. This is even more valid for a country with Bulgaria's potential. On the other hand, the objective international situation gives no reason to rely in the foreseeable future on whatever including of our country in a collective security system that grants real guarantees to its members. This situation acutely raises the fundamental question for the military-political choice of Bulgaria - independent defence of the national territory (combined with the policy of "active neutrality"), or integrated defence in multinational aspect (combined with a policy of alliance and commitment).

The answers of this question are obviously included in the political-strategic perspectives lay above.

The first alternative objectively fits only the period of political transition and has a temporary nature, since in its essence it is not a carrier of the necessary lasting guarantees for security.

The second alternative answers best to both the national interests and the possible development of international relations. Apparently, the new model for security and defence should develop in harmony with that prospective. The motivation for Bulgaria's joining to the common European security systems is strong enough to turn into a leading tendency for the national security and defence policy.

With the ending of the government of BSP ended a hard stage of the Bulgarian security policy and started a new phase for the development of the country. The reasons for this unsuccess are international as well as domestic. Our estimation thoroughly true if we do not first start with the domestic reasons for the unlucky international policy of Bulgaria, we may start with the famous constitution that during the last nine years a vast international policy was done. Each of the six governments pretends for titanic achievements dramatically changed the international image o

Bulgaria. But the total result is desperate for the foreign affairs and the national security of the country.

One objective factor for the littler role of Bulgarian internationally is the tota international "boiling" in the world and around us, the not clarified foreign polic strategically purposes of the main players on the world stage. In this way Bulgaria was the object of international indifference - in the better case, and of exhaustive pressure and blows under the waist - in the worst case. Bulgaria was not applauded for her wish to be a decent and correct participant in the World order after the "Cold" War. Bulgarian faced enormous losses by the embargo against Iraqi and Yugoslavia. In the period of 1991-92 the Russian markets were lost and the connections with the Arabic world worsened because of the untaught, and passive attitude or the other, arrogant behaviour of the government and the ministers.

A weak moment in the policy of all Bulgarian governments was the aspiration to use popular formula-chinches, some of them inherited from the past and other taken from foreign dictionaries. Another wrong measure was the policy of equal distance away from each Balkan neighbour. Bulgaria must work together with those countries that have similar interests and give us real support. The equal distance policy is in fac a tactic approach for justifying the passive policy that avoids responsibilities and seemingly seeks for good relations with all. This topic was exploited by all democratic governments and the "success" is most obvious today, in the rather bilateral and vulnerable relation with most of the Balkan countries.

Another weakness of the Bulgarian security policy was its lack of strong internal front. The permanent conformation between BSP and other parties, the fight among the institutions, the "governmental" and the "presidential" policy inevitably imposed dual attitudes upon the international partners of Bulgaria. Naturally no one can take seriously a governmental act that the President and the opposition leaders pledge to annul by the court or once they come into power.

The direction in which decisions for the European security are sought for is so for the consolidation and adaptation of the only active system - The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

In connection to this Bulgarian political leaders and players of national security policy should think over its functions not on the basis of today's or yesterday's

ideological accounts, but on the basis of historic experience and discerning international perspectives.

The difficulties of security policy choice are known from the young and free Bulgarian country. The great Bulgarian politician Stefan Stambolov and his followers staked upon the misunderstandings between Russia and Western Europe. Their tactics of opposition to the Russian czarism won the admiration of the world.

The last big work of Henry Kissinger "Diplomacy" contains a deeply motivated confirmation of the laws of the historic process, propelled by the geopolitical realities and the modern development. It is about a model of behaviour, a psychological condition of the political elite. There are historic morals that will always be valid for Bulgaria, being at the "entrance" of Europe. One of them is that we must not build our security policy upon the contradictions between the great powers and upon opposition to our neighbours.

A useful role in this aspect can be played out by Germany. As a new centre of influence with increased weight in comparison to the 80's it will undertake new responsibilities in spite of its restraints now. Although the infallible atlantism of the ruling Christian - democrats Bona Fides a latent division from the US policy for enlargement of the Union. Besides a friendly circle of NATO member-states is welcome as a stability factor, it is also famous who rules over NATO. In this way the American plan tightens the freedom of the German Eastern policy. As it is laconically stated by "Die Welt" "to the belt of the European councils is put the belt of NATO." It is normal, in connection to this, that Germany pleads for a new order of the international relations into the light of the new times.

Germany, just like Russia, is a "medium land." She needs a hinterland and has vital interests in her continental surroundings. The historic joint Central Europe - Danube pool is under her political and economic influence. It is felt today and undoubtedly will rise in future. If there is not any real contradiction between the block in the future on this basis can be achieved a stable contact between Russia and Romanic Europe. The good Russian - German relations, started by the great European humanist and politician, Willi Brandt, could be beneficial to the implementation of the Bulgarian interests. Historically looked, when Bulgaria has been able to keep close connections with Moscow and Berlin it has also succeeded in resolving crucial matters of its national integrity (year 1908, year 1940).

That is why, when taking decisions under the indulgence of situation state of affairs and under the weight of circumstances, Sofia must not act in a way that should tolerate tendencies of conflicts. To Bulgaria it is of prime importance and to Europe it does make difference that Sofia takes part in the European and Euroatlantic structures not as an irritating factor but as a katalysator of security. It can only be achieved if the country is not an armed front sentry but a bridge for bringing closer together its natural partners from West to the East.

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APPENDIX:

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA**

Adopted by the National Assembly / Bulgarian Parliament/ on 16 April 1998

Introduction

1. The National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria represents formal adopted political views on protecting the Bulgarian citizens, society and state against external and internal threats of any nature, taking into account the available resources, and *conforming* to the level of borders which provide the global, Euro-Atlantic and European security system and steady development.

2. The Concept defines the goals and objectives in the period of the Republic of Bulgaria's accession into the efficient collective system of Euro-Atlantic and European security, and in view of the risk factors that threaten in a current way the security of this country. The basis of the Euro-Atlantic and European security are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The New Realities

3. World-wide, the threat of a global nuclear conflict caused by the ideological opposition has decreased. There is a trend towards promoting the role of law in settling disputable inter-state problems. The UN Security Council's mechanisms for crises management are being improved. The danger of a direct military aggression against Bulgaria has considerably decreased. Nevertheless, the importance of military and force factors in international relations is maintained.

4. A growing importance in Bulgaria's security is being played by the world economic, political, scientific and technological, environmental, and information processes as well as by the fierce competition for access to resources and infrastructures, to markets and modern technologies.

A global information society has emerged, a world economic integration is underway, which poses new challenges for Bulgaria.

5. Bulgaria's accession into the international financial and commercial structures is opening new prospects for ensuring our security. The isolation of this country from the world integration processes in itself is a threat to the Bulgarian citizens, society and state.

6. In Europe, the respect has been increased for European political and economic organisations as well as for the Euro-Atlantic military-political ones. This makes it very unlikely that unilateral decisions, including military ones, are imposed in regional or bilateral conflicts.

7. After the termination of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and overcoming the block opposition, there has been a tendency to promote confidence and cooperation. The European security architecture has been gaining greater importance.

8. The economic and social differences on the continent have deepened along with the emergence of a new insecurity and new risks. Conflicts of ethnic, religious and social nature have come into being. The contradictory transition in the states of Central and Eastern Europe represents a major challenge to their democratic institutions and to European structures.

9. On the continent, there is still no fully effective collective system for security and stability. Conflicts in former Yugoslavia have shown the insufficient effectiveness to implement peace agreements only through the means and mediation of existing European structures.

10. European states are in a different degree integrated into world and continental military-political and commercial unions. On the continent, there is a “grey” zone consisting of countries that are partially or totally excluded from the integration processes. This zone is characterised by social insecurity, decline in living standards and emergence of international criminal networks.

A real threat to the fragile democracies in Central and Eastern Europe as well as to the economic development of the entire continent are not any adversary armies but illegal criminal groupings specialised in organised violence, goods-smuggling, and trafficking of people, drugs and arms.

11. In South-eastern Europe, various religious and ethnic entities co-exist, some of which conflicting between each other. After the emergence of new states there has been a strive of some entities towards independence and closing themselves. This sharply increases the regional threats to our national security. The delayed pace of the democratic changes in the region leads to a deterioration of historically accumulated problems, and to an incapacity to settle them in line with the European democratic standards.

12. The states in this region differ considerably in the degree of ensuring their own security and membership in international alliances. The differences are political, institutional, cultural, in living standards and in public practices. The status of states in the region is different in military terms. Regional and ethnic extremism put an imprint on local societies which lack strong democratic traditions.

13. The Balkans are an area of conflict and tension in Europe. This poses serious risks to Bulgaria’s national security. This country suffered immense losses due to its isolation as a consequence of the imposed trade, economic and financial bans on former Yugoslavia. These bans created conditions for the development of organised crime and corruption, and for a long-lasting decline of the Bulgarian state institutions.

Thus, second after the regional wars, crime has become a major threat. The high degree of lawlessness is constantly threatening the security of individual citizens, undermining the economic prosperity and legitimacy of state institutions in the region.

14. Despite the fast technological changes, the Balkans have retained their important geo-political position. The significance of the region as a transport, infrastructure and energy cross-road is increasing with the future enlargement of the European Union and NATO as well as with the linking of Caucasus and Central Asian states to European markets.

15. Bulgaria now is overcoming the insecurity from the difficult economic situation of the country and the catastrophic decline in the living standards of the Bulgarian citizens. As a result of the grave economic crises, the interests of the people have been significantly deprived as well as their rights to good way of life, employment, social and health insurance.

16. Yet another insecurity concern, such as the citizens’ fear for their lives, the fear of unpunished crimes against the individual, and the encroachment against private property, has been gradually neutralised

Via legislative and administrative measures companies are alleviated from the tensions and hardships caused by blackmail and violence, by disloyal competition and corruption of the administration.

A tradition is being gradually established in the society to stand for the right and freedoms of the individual. The state is being placed in service of the people, and not the other way round - submitting the people to the state. The structures of the civil society are gaining strength. Experience is being acquired in democratic procedures for their functioning and development.

17. The internal stability of the country will be consolidating along with the greater ability of the executive and judicial powers to protect the citizens, the civil society and the state against lawlessness. This will determine the success of the transition to democracy and market economy. Internal order and security will prevent a crisis in the rule of law in Bulgaria.

18. For Bulgaria, the transition to democracy and market economy, to Euro-Atlantic and European integration, and thus towards the establishment of a new security and stability, was blocked in the past by an unwillingness and inability for radical reform which led to serious political conflicts. Economic crises were deteriorated and reinforced by inter-institutional wars. As a result, the renovation and reforms of the country were halted for quite a while.

This caused a grave demographic crisis reinforced by an unprecedented high degree of immigration. The average length of life decreased, and birth-rate dropped sharply, which creates dangers for the future survival and protection of the nation.

19. Bulgaria is not in a position to ensure its own security on its own or to seek security through neutrality, economic and military potentials. The new realities precondition the need of the country to join effective collective systems for security and economic development.

At the same time, new opportunities are emerging, and the importance of Bulgaria's own policies is enhanced in neutralising the adverse factors for the security of the country. Bulgaria has the potential to be a significant security and stability factor in South-eastern Europe.

General provisions

20. We can speak of national security when the major rights and liberties of Bulgarian citizens are protected as well as the state borders, the territorial integrity and independence of the country, when there is not any danger of armed attack, violated change in the constitutional order, political dictate or economic compulsion for the state and the democratic functioning of the state and civilian institutions is guaranteed in result of which the society and the nation preserve and increase their prosperity and develop.

21. The Bulgarian citizens, society and state have obligations included in the Constitution and the laws of the country namely to be creators and guarantors of their security. At the same time they are mutually connected users of security and the

violation of the security of any one of them violates the security of the rest. Together they constitute the unified security structure of Bulgaria.

22. The security is guaranteed when the country successfully realises the national interests, purposes and priorities and when necessary is in a position to defend them effectively from external and internal threats.

23. The level of security is defined by the degrees of protection and effective realisation of the interests of Bulgarian citizens, society and state which jointly comprise the national interests.

The interests of the Bulgarian citizens are expressed in the real guarantee of the constitutional rights and liberties, the personal safety, increase in the quality and level of living, of the social and the health insurance.

The interests of the civilian society are in the confirmation of democracy, the civilian control upon the institutions, and the freedom of associating, in the rights of the religious, ethnic and minority groups in the preservation of the national spiritual and cultural values and traditions.

The interests of the state require protection of the Constitution, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, achievement of political and financial stability of the economic and social development, strict keeping of legal order, equality and mutually useful international cooperation.

24. There are three major factors of the national security of Bulgaria:

1. the degree of development and the resources of the country
2. effectiveness of its foreign and internal policy, and
3. the participation of Bulgaria in the collective systems for security and economic development.

25. The national security is a priority for the Republic of Bulgaria. It defines the major purposes and programmes for its development. Forms the strategic purposes of the internal and foreign policy of the state.

26. The major pre-requisite for the realisation of the national interests is the preservation of the possibilities for Bulgaria to solve independently its internal political, economic and social problems, and arrange its relations with other states and communities despite the intentions, positions and interests of third countries.

Principles of National Security

27. The National Security is built by strictly keeping to the Constitution, the laws of the Republic of Bulgaria and the ratified by the National Assembly international agreements and conventions. Bulgaria draws into accordance with the EU and NATO standards its legislation in the field of security.

28. The Republic of Bulgaria does not have any territorial claims and does not recognise such. This principle destroys the old and does not create any new regional tensions. It confirms Bulgaria as a source of security.

The Republic of Bulgaria does not build its security at the expense of other states or societies. The will expressed by it for NATO membership is with the purpose

of guarantee of the security and is not aimed against third countries. The pre-requisite for the increase of security guarantees for the country is the increase in the security of all the countries in Europe and the world.

29. The priority policy for the Republic of Bulgaria are the loyalty and the mutual benefit in the relations with other countries and international unions. Today no one expresses openly hostility against Bulgaria.

30. The security of Bulgaria is guaranteed by the world's and Euro-Atlantic structures for collective security.

31. The National Security is based upon the defence Military Doctrine which specifies the elaboration and the use of the armed forces. Bulgaria seeks security on the Balkans and is against any military and political unions in the Balkans.

32. The Bulgarian intelligence and counter-intelligence bodies are acting on the base of special laws. They are acquiring information with own means and through the international organisations for the military-political state of the countries in the region and the accumulation of such military potential which can threaten the national security.

The specialised bodies are keeping the laws of the country and the international law by preserving the rights and liberties of the Bulgarian citizens.

33. By propaganda of the national historical and spiritual values, of the moral and cultural heritage of all Bulgarians is confirmed the national identity and ideal. Preserved is the territorial and national integrity of Bulgaria while considering the rights and liberties of the different ethnic and religious communities. Built is the image of Bulgaria as the Fatherland of all Bulgarians within and outside the boundaries of the country. Defended are their spiritual values and civilian rights.

Priorities and Factors of National Security

34. The process of integration into NATO and EU has its positive influence upon the security of Bulgaria. But only the full membership in them will lead to its complete guarantee.

The national priority for Bulgaria is the membership in NATO and EU which corresponds to the long-term interests of the country.

35. The successful integration of Bulgaria into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures for security and development depends on the progress in the peace process in South-eastern Europe and is slowed down by the military conflicts and destabilisation of the neighbour countries. This presupposes that the country leads very active foreign policy for the creation of peace in the Balkans. This policy is the most important element in the strategy for the preventive defence of Bulgarian interests.

Its own security is defined by the degree of which Bulgaria is the source of security for the neighbour countries. This is the reason why with its regional initiatives for the increase of the mutual confidence in the political-military field the country helps for the increase in the security and stability in the Balkans.

36. The policy of security distributes the national resources in such manner as to protect Bulgaria from the imposing of foreign political and economic will and to ensure its right to a sovereign choice in all aspects of domestic and foreign policy, the policy for security and defence.

37. It is necessary that the Bulgarian positions in the supra-national bodies and structures according to the Paris Charter for new Europe which are in a process of establishment are strengthened. In this way Bulgaria is confirmed as an active and full-fledged partner in the global political and economic processes.

38. The economic factor is decisive for the guarantee of national security. Only the stabilisation, re-establishment and growth of Bulgarian economy are in a position to satisfy the interests of the Bulgarian citizens, society and state, to solve the problem concerning the deficiency of resources, to improve the living standard and increase the degree of social protection.

The observation and development of Bulgarian scientific and technical potential for the mastering of the new and creation of own high technologies is a perspective factor for the protection of national security.

39. The positive influence of the economic factor for the national security is enhanced by the strategic participation of Bulgarian economy into the world, European and regional cooperation, when it is integrated into the unified European economic sphere.

40. The significance of the Bulgarian economy for national security and stable development depends on the capability for development of the own infrastructure as an important connecting link between the European countries and the new markets in the Black Sea- Caucasian region, the Middle East and Central Asia.

Through the Bulgarian territory pass the strategic inter-continental transport, communications and energy corridors from which depends the national and European security. From the establishment of these channels, and the transformation of the country into a Balkan communications and energy centre will depend the importance of Bulgaria for the world and European security.

41. The establishment of Bulgaria as an important component of the European and regional security depends on the re-establishment of the lost positions of Bulgarian producers and merchants on traditional markets and especially on the strategic market of the Commonwealth of Independent States, on the development of joint activities and cooperation with the leading European manufacturers, as well as the ensuring of the energy independence of the country.

42. The information factor for the guarantee of the national security is functioning by keeping the constitutional rights and liberties of the citizens in the field of preserving and exchange of reliable information through the development of modern Bulgarian communications and media.

43. The preservation of national security requires that the use of information should not be permitted for purposes of manipulation of public consciousness. It is also a priority to be guaranteed by special law the protection of the state information

resource from leakage of political, economic, scientific and technical and any other information important for the country.

44. The Armed Forces and the security bodies are the main guarantees for the national security of the country. Their effectiveness depends on the resources provided to them, the force and stability of the laws, upon which they are basing their activity, the motivation of the human factor and the availability and precise character of the information concerning the threats and dangers.

45. The Military Doctrine of Bulgaria is developed on the basis of this Concept and the Law on Defense and Armed Forces of the Bulgarian Army. On its basis the Program for the Reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and their modernization are done.

The guarantees for the security of the country are strengthened through realization of initiatives for increase of the military political confidence in the region and through the success of the pap Program for integration in the Europe-Atlantic structures.

46. The security organs prevent and neutralize the threats and risks in close cooperation with the investigation and prosecution and together with the international organizations for combating the criminality.

47. The juridical organs establish respect for the laws in the country by imposing effective and just sanctions to those violating them. The long term guarantee of the national interests requires development of the legislation and its harmonization with the norms of the European Union.

48. The effective functioning of the juridical organs presupposes reform and modernization of the juridical organs on the basis of a unified strategy for combating the criminality and corruption. The national interests require achieving a national consensus on the measures, politics and resources that should be allocated for this combat. The state strategy for combating criminality and corruption is a further development of this Concept in the field of internal security.

49. The environmental factor - protection, restoration and reproduction of the Bulgarian nature should provide a favorable living atmosphere for the Bulgarian citizens and society. The national interests are realized when there is an optimum balance between the protection of nature and waters and the needs to use the natural resources for a steady development of Bulgaria.

Organization And Functions of the National Security System

50. In compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria the President the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers have responsibilities as far as the national security is concerned.

51. The President chairs the National Security Advisory Council, the status of which is defined by Law.

52. The National Assembly carries out the legislative building of the national security system. Through its Permanent National Security Committee it controls the executive power and the special security organs as far as the compliance with the law and effectiveness of the actions are concerned as well as the efficient use of the resources, makes an assessment of the political risks. Through its permanent Committee on Foreign Integration Policy it controls the executive power in the field of the foreign aspects of the national security.

53. The Council of Ministers on the basis of this concept and in the pursue of the responsibilities in the area of security imposed by the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria through a report to the National Assembly annually points out the risks for the country and makes an assessment of the level of protection of national interests.

The Council of Ministers allocates the resources of the country for increase of the level of protection of the national interests. The ministries and institutions within the framework of their competence develop and realize strategies and programs for the most efficient use of the political, military and economic resources of the country.

54. The Council of Ministers when implementing its functions is assisted by a Security Council comprising of : Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, their deputies, the Chief of GS of BA, and the Chief of the intelligence and counter-intelligence organs. The President personally or through his representatives can always participate in the work of the Council and at any time can require information from it.

55. The Security Council:

- summarizes, analyzes and makes conclusions from the whole current information about the risks the national security faces and makes a professional assessment and prognosis for the dynamics of the threats;
- plans concrete measures for the neutralization of the threats and proposes solutions in a crisis;
- coordinates the plans of the special organs for acquiring of information and provides position on resources division;
- develops and proposes to the Council of Ministers an annual report on the national security.

56. The President, the Chairman of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister having in mind the main goals and tasks referring to the security of the country requires information in the Security Council

The Security Council provides an information equal in volume and contents to the President, the Chairman of the National Assembly, and the Prime-minister.

The civilian control upon the state policy for security and the bodies performing it is guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the country.