

Final Report

*Practice of Foreign Policy Making:
Formation of Post-Soviet Politics of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan*

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1998

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of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan**

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work became possible due to support from the NATO research fellowship. It was provided for developing the survey study, conducting the research and writing

the final report of the study. A number of people, whom the author would like to convey his appreciation, helped to carry out the research up to its final stage.

First of all, I would like to express my heartiest gratitude to Prof. Shirin Akiner of the *School of Oriental and African Studies* (SOAS) of London University who supported this research and was also so kind to spare her precious time on my work in spite of being busy with the *Central Asia Research Forum*.

I would also like to express my deepest appreciation to a person who encouraged my interests to research in the area of international relations since the very beginning. Mr. Evgenii Kablukov of the *Kyrgyz National University* gave me an impulse for this and other researches. My gratitude is also extended to Dr. Nurbek Omuraliev, Mira Karabaeva and to a number of my colleagues in Central Asia whose friendly and helpful attitudes and invaluable advice played a big role in completing the survey study.

I would also like to thank staff members of *the University of Malaya* and personally Prof. Dato Osman Bakar for providing me all the support and granting me the use of the university facilities for my research.

Obviously the author is responsible for all the errors and imperfections which may remain. The views expressed in this research report do not necessarily reflect either opinion of the NATO research office or positions of the governments of the Central Asian Republics.

ABBREVIATIONS

CAEU – Central Asian Economic Uni

CAR - Central Asian Republics

CAU - Central Asian Union

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States

CMEA (Comecon) - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

ECO - Economic Co-operation Organisation

EU - European Union

FSU - Former Soviet Uni

OSCE - Organisation for Security and Co-operation of Europe

IR - International Relations

IMF - International Monetary Found

MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NAS - National Academy Of Science

OIC - Organisation of Islamic Conference

OPEC - Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WB - World Bank

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Introduction

In December 1991, Alma-Ata — the capital city of Kazakhstan — hosted a meeting of eleven leaders of the Soviet republics who signed an historical declaration. The so-called *Alma-Ata Declaration* formally ended the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics¹. This event signified the beginning of independence for all members of the Soviet Union including five Central Asian republics (CARs). From this moment, newly independent Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan started the formation of their independent policies and sovereign state institutions and began to define their foreign policy orientation. Establishment of their foreign policy institutions, shaping foreign policy and searching for a place in the contemporary system of international relations became a top-priority task for the republics.

Successful formation of post-Soviet sovereign political institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and coherent international politics appeared to be one of the most important tests for the Central Asian elite. However, the CARs faced uncertain future because of a number of reasons, including the unexpected quickness of the Soviet Union's collapse and unreadiness of the national elite to live in an independent state. All Central Asian republics confronted numerous challenging internal and external problems that should have been resolved by their leaders immediately after the collapse.

Internal factors. For the CARs, one of the immediate issues was stabilisation of the political environment, especially neutralisation of extremist political groups, and resolving of inter-ethnic tensions in the region. Bloody ethnic clashes of pre-independence years (1989-1991) destabilised life in different parts of the region. Continuous escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts threatened to slip out of the republics' government control. Furthermore, the situation was worsened by emergence of separatist tendencies that spread widely in these multinational and multicultural republics. Meanwhile, the CARs' state institutions, almost paralysed by Gorbachev's inconsistent reforms and the power struggle between the Centre and peripheries in the

late 1980s, vitally needed reinforcement. Maintenance of stability in the rapidly changing political environment was impossible without a strong government policy. The status of the ruling elite and the very existence of the entire political system were challenged by the rising strength of numerous opposition groups that embraced a wide spectrum of views - from extreme nationalism to Islamic radicalism. The last but not least issue was a need for creation of the national economic system and transformation of the former Soviet administrative-command management mechanism into sound and stable market-driven institutions.

External factors. Gaining the independence radically changed positions of the CARs in the international arena. As independent entities they entered the difficult international environment of that time. The Gulf War affected not only the Arab world but also the Muslim community of the former Soviet Union and led to a rise of some anti-Western sentiments. The Civil war in Afghanistan not only unbalanced the regional security environment but also undermined prospects of the CARs' economic co-operation with South Asia by blocking almost all trade routes to the south. Additionally, it was expected that the Islamic Republic of Iran would compete with Turkey, India, and Pakistan for influence in the region because of the so-called 'power vacuum' and destabilisation of the regional security system created by Russia's military and political departure from the region².

The next crucial problem was a need for preservation of the countries' territorial integrity. The existence of mutual territorial claims over artificial boundaries of the Central Asian republics and territorial disputes between the People's Republic of China and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan made this problem quite complicated³. Russia's foreign policy also proved to be extremely unsustainable, greatly affected by the personalities in the Kremlin's circle of power and it experienced several radical changes within the 1990s. Moreover, the Russian radical nationalists claimed a secession of a large part of Kazakhstan's northern territories (between 30% to 40% of the republic's territory), which were mainly populated by the Russians.

Finally, creation of cohesive foreign economic relations was a matter of survival for the countries that previously had been deeply integrated into the SMEA and had produced goods competitive enough only in the rapidly deteriorated Soviet market. The

CARs had heavily depended on an external supply (mainly from the Russian Federation) of almost all goods including petroleum, grains, machinery, medicaments, etc.

Uncertainty of the internal and external factors of Central Asian development demanded the immediate reaction. What measures were needed to be implemented in Central Asia for stabilisation of the internal and external challenges? What are the trends in the formation of the CARs' post-independence foreign policy? And last but not least, what are the future perspectives of the independent development for the Central Asian republics?

In this study, the author assesses the formation of the CARs' foreign policy in the post-Soviet era and the CARs' foreign policy specialists' evaluation of different factors that largely contributed to the formation of the independent international politics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

The first section provides a brief introduction to the political history of the region in general and to the cultural heritage of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek people. A special focus is made on some important features of these countries' development. The second section assesses the post-Soviet political development in the CARs. It also identifies the political background of the rising modern Central Asian elite and the consequences of the USSR's sudden disintegration on the post-Soviet development of the CARs. The third section briefly reviews post-Soviet intellectual debates on the place of the CARs in the international arena. It also briefly analyses the public debate on possible 'models of development', regional economic and political co-operation and collaboration with other countries. The fourth section discusses the perception of several crucial issues of foreign policy making and international development by the CARs' leading academics and policy makers. This includes the perception of security balance in the region and the perception of external threats to the regional security. The integration processes in the region are analysed in the fifth section. Section six focuses on the establishment of the foreign policy institutions in the CARs and also deals with some important results of a survey study conducted among the CARs' experts in 1997. The last section summarises the findings and discusses important internal factors in the formation of the CARs' foreign policy. The author also tries to follow up some important shifts in the foreign policy priorities and possible implications of these changes in the future of international relations within and outside of the region.

The empirical part of this research was based on the survey study conducted in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in January-February 1997 (See the Questionnaire: Appendix 2)⁴ and field studies of 1995-1997 that provided incredible useful information and the opportunity to meet the CARs' scholars and foreign policy specialists during formal and informal interviews. Although the author focuses mainly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, he extends his discussion to the political events in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and their implications for the region. The reason for the exclusion of these two republics from the focus of the research is explained in Appendix 1.

1. Central Asian Republics: Geography, Culture and People

Historically, Central Asia was a gateway between China and the Mediterranean, between East Europe and Persia. For almost fourteen centuries, the region had been serving as a major staging post for the ancient *Silk Road*. The latter brought prosperity to the city-states situated along the route and largely contributed to the unique mixture of cultures, traditions, languages, tribes and nations. The importance of the *Silk Road* significantly diminished with the establishment of sea-routes from Europe to India. Moreover, the creation of the 'iron curtain' during the Soviet era finally detached the region from the rest of Asia.

In their present boundaries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan appeared on the political map of the world around 60 years ago. Nowadays, these countries are usually referred to as the former Soviet Muslim republics of Central Asia, although historically and culturally the term 'Central Asian region' included Afghanistan and some parts of the Western provinces of China. Central Asia is a landlocked region with total population 52 million people (1995). Its territory, which is around 4 million square km., shares borders with China, Afghanistan, Iran, and Russia. The biggest by territory republic is Kazakhstan, which composes almost two thirds of Central Asia. The most populated and second biggest by territory republic, Uzbekistan,

is a dwelling place for almost 40 per cent of the CARs' entire population. The region's main ethnic groups are the Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Turkmen, and Uzbeks who are culturally, religiously and linguistically close to each other. All together, Turkic speaking people are 60 per cent of the region's population, and thus this part of the Russian Empire was often referred to as 'Turkistan'. The Persian speaking Tajiks, who are culturally and religiously, but not linguistically, close to these ethnic groups, live as a compact group in the mountainous southern part of Central Asia and represent no more than 8 per cent of the region's population. The Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians and others) constitute around 20 per cent of the region's population. Their distribution varies from country to country. The highest concentration of the Slavs is in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the lowest is in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In Uzbekistan, 1.6 million Russians comprise less than 8 per cent of the republic's population. It is important to note that this ethnic pattern formed during last fifty years and the proportion of the Slavs (rapidly increased in the 1940s-1960s) is steadily decreasing, especially since the 1980s. This trend is the result of recent emigration of the Slavic population to Russia and a high birth rate among some of the local ethnic groups⁵.

Several features of development make the CARs different from the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries as well as from immediate neighbours, such as Afghanistan and Iran. Thus, a brief excursus to the history and analysis of some important social and political milestones will assist in better understanding of the CARs' modern political development.

Legacy of nation-state formation. During the first millennium of AD, the Great Steppe (territory from Mongolia through Central Asia to Caspian Sea and the Volga River) was an arena where numerous tribes built up their huge, but amorphous empires, and people were moving from East to West. In the 3rd-5th century AD (possibly even earlier) Turkic tribes appeared in Central Asia. Gradually, they increased their presence and consolidated in the vast steppe-land near sedentary oases and city-states of Maverannahr (presently, the territory of Uzbekistan). The Turks introduced their language, some features of their nomadic life and tribal relations. Several times, the Turkic tribes united in various military confederations, established huge but unsteady empires. In the 13th-14th century, the region experienced devastating Mongol interventions, which almost ruined its economy and culture. Eventually, the Mongols

were assimilated, however, for many centuries onwards the descendants of the Chingiz Khan dynasty (real and false) remained the ruling force in all states of the region. The Mongols also introduced some peculiarities of tribal democracy to the region's political tradition, a unique pattern of kinship, patronage and intricate tribal structures of social relations, which to a certain extent exist until now.

In their primary pattern, the state (in the modern meaning), the administrative system, and the territorial borders of Central Asia started their formation in the 15th-18th centuries⁶. At that time, Kazakh *Zhuses* (*Zhus* is a unit of a tribal confederation) became consolidated in more or less permanent social and territorial entities and such city-states as Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand were established in their boundaries that largely remained unchanged until Russia's arrival. In the middle of the 19th century, during its advance to the region, the Russian Empire continuously collided with the *Zhuses* and later with the Central Asian city-states and competed there with the advance of the British Empire's to the region. This competition is also known as the 'Great Game'. After annexation of a significant part of the region to Russia, the Tsarist government conducted its first territorial and administrative reform in Central Asia in 1867. A sizeable part of the newly annexed land became a part of the *Turkistan Governor-Generalship* that existed until 1917. Meanwhile, Khiva and Bukhara became vassals of the Russian Emperor and preserved a formal independence. The Turkistanese were granted some political rights in the late Russian Imperial era and even obtained seats in the Russian Parliament, i.e. III and IV State Dumas in 1907-1914.

The year 1917 was the end point of the Great Russian Empire. However, the fu establishment of the Communist regime in the region became possible only several years later, after the end of the devastating Civil war in 1922. Stalin, by his directive, significantly redrew the map of Central Asia during 1924-1926: the region was subdivided into the Union republics. The territorial borders were slightly corrected in 1929 and 1936, and the areas occupied by each of the five Central Asian republics remained unchanged until the disintegration of the USSR. It was quite an artificial division of the region into the nation states, and it preceded their national consolidation and, in fact, that division was built on the basis of the traditional system of tribal and communal relations. Consequently, the CARs did not have their national political

institutions or strong political organisations, which could have become a basis for an independent development after the disintegration of the USSR.

Islamic heritage. Muslim Arabs first appeared in Maverannahr (Arabic name for the southern part of Central Asia) in the middle of the 7th century. However, only in the 9th century were they able to expel the Persian dynasties and to establish Islam as one of the major religions in the region. Despite gradual penetration of the pagan Turkic tribes in the 9th and 10th centuries and the devastating Shamanist Mongol invasion in the 13th century, Islam retained and strengthened its position in the region. Eventually the Turks and Mongols, who remained in Central Asia, absorbed some features of the Arabian and Persian culture and embraced Islam. In the southern settled territories of the region, Islam has the deep historical tradition of more than 1000 years. However, the penetration of Islam lasted until the 17th-18th centuries among the nomadic tribes, such as the Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Karakalpaks. The Muslim clergy (Ulema) played an important role in the political affairs along with the representatives of very influential Sufi orders (Nakshbandia, Bektashia, etc.) and their leaders (sheikhs). Both the clergy and Sufis significantly contributed to the balance among competing groups within the ruling elite in Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand Khaganates. By the 18th century, the Central Asian clergy and some representatives of the *Sufi Tarikats* (orders) were incorporated into the state system and they became a part of the state bureaucratic establishment.

The situation changed with the advance of the Russian Empire into Central Asia and annexation of most parts of the region to the Empire at the second half of the 19th century. During the initial period (1860-1890) the Imperial government faced multiple riots in the region. Changes in the ruling policy in the following period included liberalisation of relations with the religious and intellectual elite of Central Asia. This policy was the government's attempt to integrate the most liberal representatives of the Islamic clergy into the state administrative system of Russia through the system of special privileges.

The new Soviet regime did not have a consistent policy towards Islam and Islamic civilisation throughout the Soviet era. After the Civil war of 1918-1922, the *Commissars*, who had to fight and suppress *Basmachi* movement often led by the Muslim authorities, considered integration of the Muslim clergy and the most influential

part of the local liberal intellectuals reformers (Jadidists) into the state political and administrative structures. However, during the 'great leap' in 1928-1937 the political pendulum moved to rejection of this policy. The Soviet government expanded an anti-religious campaign that was accompanied by severe state terror. However, the next stage brought up reconstruction of the institute of official clergy in 1943 as SADUM (the Russian abbreviation for the Central Asian Religious Board of Muslims). Prominent and authoritative Muslim Ulama Sheikh Abdulmajid Babakhan (1861-1957) was appointed as the Mufti (a spiritual leader) symbolising the legalisation of the official clergy. So, finally the Soviet government returned to the long lasting tradition of using the clergy as a part of the state bureaucratic establishment. Although the former Soviet leaders claimed that the USSR was an atheistic state, they silently accepted efforts of local CARs' authorities to maintain their Islamic cultural heritage as a part of the Central Asians everyday life.

A new break through happened after the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979. The Moscow's and CARs' officials expected with an obvious fear that the Iranian type of Islamic resurgence was imminent in Central Asia. Thus, on the eve of independence, Islamic resurgence or Islamic fundamentalism, as some preferred to call it, became one of the important issues for the CARs policy-makers. Debates on this issue were intensified in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan after the beginning of the Civil War in Tajikistan and again after the unprecedented success of the Taliban Islamic movement in Afghanistan⁷.

The legacy of Soviet social engineering. A significant gap between traditionally settled and nomadic people of Central Asia has remained considerable throughout the history of their co-existence. Numerous Turkic speaking nomadic tribes constantly penetrated the oases of the region from the Eurasian steppe land and largely affected the social groupings of the settled people by bringing in their tribal social organisation and a peculiar pattern of 'patron-client relations'. This is one of the reasons for a social stratification in modern Central Asia that is characterised by a strong heterogeneous structure. Even powerful and authoritative Medieval Turkestani Khans were always obliged to balance among the militant tribal leaders, rich mercantile families, and skilful administrators of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, who mastered intrigues for generations.

The Soviet leaders believed that they could not implement their policy of development in the region unless the natives of the CARs were involved in the Soviet political administration. Therefore, one of the most important features of the Soviet social formation in this region was rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, the development of mass education and creation of new westernised (Russified) and secular national intelligentsia. The Soviet social engineering quite succeeded here. One of the main Soviet achievements in the CARs was a very rapid positive change in the literacy rate, which rose up to 96% per cent by the 1970-1980s. There was a well-developed network of universities and research institutions that existed under an umbrella of the Republics' National Academies of Science, although these institutions could not always provide qualitative expertise in some fields such as international relations, market economy, law, finance, management, etc. Under the Soviet system of education, there was a special quota for the 'Central Asian natives' within the CARs and USSR universities, which promoted training of highly professional westernised (Russified) *nomenklature*. In fact by the 1980s, the CARs were in a better position regarding the Human Development Indicators (HDI), than such countries as India, Pakistan and China. According to the UNDP, in 1991 the republics were on the 31st place in the HDI ranking (ahead of such countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and just behind Malta (29th place) and Hungary (30th place))⁸.

The Kremlin tried to undermine the power of the clan and tribal structures by intervening into the *cadre* policy and by regular injections of non-indigenous Party and state bureaucrats into the CARs' state institutions. Nevertheless, the political configuration in the region largely remained the odd mixture of the consequences of the Soviet social engineering and traditional 'clientele' network even during last years of the Soviet rule.

However, it seems that the change of the identity of the ruling elite, especially their identity in the international arena was one of the most important legacies of the Soviet era. The CARs ruling elite has been well educated even according to the Western standards, technocratic oriented in their approach to politics and economics, well-spoken Russian (after the independence they learn to speak English) and has had little devotion to pan-nationalist or pan-Islamic ideological motions. Although the Central Asians have preserved their cultural (Islamic), ethnic and even tribal vs. 'Soviet internationalist' identity, they lost their 'Asianness' in their self-identity in the international arena.

By and large, Central Asia had a very rich history before the Russia's arrival and a very complicated development during 130 years of the Moscow's domination. The Soviet nation-state building created formal national institutions, shaped boundaries of the republics and created national identities of the people. However, these institutions have been not created as independent entities, and in general, they were not constituted for independent existence, since the collapse of the USSR was never assumed. To a certain extent, the Central Asians succeeded in preserving their cultural heritage, but at the same time turmoil of the 20th century and the Soviet modernisation radically changed everyone's life in the region. It was a peculiar mix of the traditionalism and modernity complicated by social and cultural polarisation, in which the ruling elite has become quite westernised (Russified), and a large portion of the society (especially the rural people who amounted almost 60 per cent of the population) has preserved their devotion to the traditional values.

2. Central Asian Republics: 'Catapult to Independence'

The Soviet Central Asians were always taught about the failure of the 'capitalist modernisation' in the Third World countries and they were quite proud to be a part of the so-called 'Second world', although they were aware of some shortcomings of the Soviet regime. This was one of the reasons why the CARs elite did not fight for independence unlike the Baltic republics or the Ukraine. As a part of the Soviet Union, the CARs elite only to a certain and a very limited extent identified themselves with Asia, and they prefer to distinguish their identity from Asia even now. The leaders of the Central Asian states consider the region as a link between the East and West, between the Asia Pacific and Europe. They continually promote the concept of the *Eurasian Bridge* or *the Great Silk Road*. Presently this idea is the key element in the process of self-identification of the Central Asian region in the international arena. "Historically Central Asia played a special role in the mutual relationships of the East and West, being a sort of link between them. All major trade roads went through Central Asia and were a

source of interaction and the mutual spread of European and Asian culture”, said President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev⁹.

The circumstances of gaining independence also contributed to the unique way the CARs' post independent nation states are being formed. The republics became independent not because of a long lasting national liberation struggle or a mass political movement, as happened in the Baltic republics, but due to a political occurrence, a short lasting political struggle between the centre and Republics, and an unexpected decision of the three Slavic States to dissolve the USSR.

Naturally, building up the CARs' post-Soviet relations with Russia were the matter of vital importance for the region's political leaders. However, since the Soviet disintegration the Russian Federation has had no constant and coherent policy towards the CARs¹⁰. A number of Russia's political players, from military and corporate business, federal government, and regional authorities declared, pushed, and implemented contradictory policies towards Central Asia.

So the regions relations with its major partner experienced a great fluctuation. First, the region's economic and financial ties with the Russian Federation underwent steep changes, although 1992-1993 were the years of political and economic uncertainty. However, after the Kremlin's decision to pull the CARs out of the Rouble currency zone in 1993, the Central Asian leaders decided to change their approach in dealing with the Russian Federation and began to implement more independent policies, introduced their own currencies, national banking and financial institutions. Abandoning the Rouble zone also made a sizeable impact on reorientation of the CARs' foreign trade, investment and technological flows. In fact, economic needs have been one of the most important driving forces behind the CARs' active search for partners in the international arena. The issue of the Russian speaking population in the CARs has frequently been in the focus of the Russia's leaders¹¹. Some Moscow's foreign policy makers, especially the former Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Kozyrev and some representatives of the military establishment, tried to focus on this issue in developing Russia's foreign policy in the region (the so-called Kozyrev-Grachev's 'Monroviski Doctrine').

Kazakhstan

During the Soviet era, the Kazakh ruling elite was deeply incorporated into the highest echelon of the Soviet hierarchy. In fact, the former Kazakh leader Dinmuhamed

Kunayev was the only representative of the CARs, who was a long serving full member of the *Politburo* (the Kremlin's inner political circle) and a close associate of the former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The relations between Almaty and Moscow worsened only during Gorbachev's campaign against corruption, the so-called 'Kazakhstan Affairs'. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan's leaders played a prominent role in Moscow's political life during the second stage of the Gorbachev's reign and supported Gorbachev's attempt to preserve the integrity of the USSR¹². They were caught totally surprised when three Slavic republics (Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine) excluded them from a talk on the Soviet Union's fate and even did not consult with them on the decision of the USSR's unconditional dissolution.

After gaining the independence, the former Soviet *nomenclature* of Kazakhstan has played a crucial role in managing a stable political and economic transition, in which the president's personality played the central role. President Nazarbaev came to power in 1989 (he was the Prime Minister during 1984-1989) and represented the pragmatically oriented and moderately nationalistic Kazakh elite. His generation was a pure product of the Soviet social engineering, which grew up in specific circumstances of Kazakhstan. The President and members of his team were mainly from the industrial managerial part of the Soviet *nomenklatura*. Unlike the professional Party bureaucrats, the President and his high ranked appointees have been well trained and experienced in managing the economy, although it was the Soviet command economy. Nazarbaev inherited from his predecessor reasonably good relations with the Russian conservative elite and personally with President Yeltsin. However, the relationship with Russia's nationalist's circle and young reformers has been extremely negative.

As Kazakhstan shares the longest part of its borders with Russia, the countries' controversial relations were in the centre of the intellectual discourse in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan. On the one hand, the Kazakh ruling elite was debating the opportunities of integration with Russia in the political and economic fields. President Nazarbaev was one of the most consistent supporters of the post-Soviet re-integration and tried to play an active role in revitalising the CIS throughout the 1990s¹³. On the other hand, the Kazakh elite were suspicious of Russian nationalists, whose extreme right wing called to seize the northern, mainly Russian populated provinces of Kazakhstan (Solzhenitsyn, 1990). Therefore, the political and economic ambitions of the Moscow's nationalistic ruling elite quite regularly provoked crises in relations between the two countries. Kazakhstan has

been facing a particularly difficult political and social situation due to complicated political environment in the republic. The Kazakh government was particularly concerned about the inter-ethnic relations. One of the main issues was the rise of separatist tendencies in the Kazakhstan's northern *oblasts*, where the ethnic Russians were in the majority. The problem was complicated by an intense public debate on the status of the Kazakh and Russian languages.

Apart from being an ethnically diverse country, Kazakhstan inherited an extremely complex economy that had been highly integrated into the All-Union market and had been plunging into the free fall since the independence. During the first stage of independence, Kazakhstan experienced severe economic crisis and consequently the rise of social and political tensions, despite having the most diversified economy among the CARs and being one of the richest in natural resources countries of the former USSR. The country tried to halt difficulties by joining the Customs Union with Russia and other CIS members. For sometime, Kazakhstan was in the focus of the world's superpowers' political attention (mainly because of the republic's short-lived status as a nuclear power), but anticipated economic assistance and financial investments did not follow. As an attempt to resolve economic problems, Kazakhstan started to offer its natural resources, especially oil and gas in the international market (it pretends to be among the top 10 oil-rich countries) and invited major TNCs (Chevron, Mobil, BP, etc) to invest in the development of the republic's oil extracting sector. The search for possible alternative transport routes has led to the emergence of the numerous oil and gas pipeline projects. Throughout the 1990s, international actors, like Russia, China, the USA, Japan and some others have been heavily involved in competing over future routes of oil and gas outflow from the republic. The Russia's monopoly on the transport infrastructure, raised a concern in Kazakhstan, because of the Russia's political and economic chaos in the transportation system and some other factors. The Kazakhstan frequently clashed with powerful Russia's economic barons over various economic deals so creation of alternative routes (including the oil and gas pipelines) has become a priority for the Kazakhstan's leaders.

In his internal politics, President Nazarbaev pioneered the idea of 'social stability first'¹⁴. He managed to set up an inter-ethnic dialogue and a round-table with the political opposition and to promote a public discourse on the economic reforms. In his economic policy the President enunciated the 'strategy of a rapid development' based on the

principles of 'equal opportunity' and 'progressive structural *Perestroika* of the economy'¹⁵. In terms of international relations, he promoted the idea of Kazakhstan as a "Eurasian country that would play an important role in the East-West and North-South co-operation"¹⁶.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is a small republic with population of 4.5 million that consists of Kyrgyzs (58%), Russians (18%), Uzbeks (14%) and others. It borders with China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but does not have common borders with the Russian Federation. The Kyrgyzstan's economy heavily depends on its agricultural sector, where almost 64% of the population is employed. The country's small industrial sector (agricultural machinery, mining, electrical power, etc) was traditionally oriented to the Russian and CIS market. The republic faced a severe crisis, as bloody conflicts between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities occurred in the summer of 1990 and caused a rise of serious inter-ethnic tensions.

In December of 1990, the conservative Communist leaders lost the elections and Mr. Akaev was elected as the president, representing a new generation of Kyrgyzstan's intellectuals. He challenged the power of the conservative Communist Party leaders, whose misconduct and incompetence led to the inter-ethnic strife in Kyrgyzstan in 1990. It was the only case in the former Soviet Union (FSU) when the former academic, who had no strong experience in the Party apparatus, came to power. He brought into the state apparatus his personal political style, which remains one of the most dynamic and open in the region. The members of his team were young reformers and intellectuals, including representatives of the political opposition. His alliance with the republic's experienced administrative bureaucrats created an energetic and extremely pragmatic ruling elite that was capable of carrying out a wide range of political, economic, and social changes. This helped maintain quite a stable political environment and begin democratic reforms. In fact, Mr. Akaev was the first among the CARs leaders who realised that democratic reforms were the only way to promote the republic's credibility in the international arena¹⁷.

During the first stage of independence, Kyrgyzstan experienced a serious economic crisis and rise of social unrest. One of the most crucial issues was a need to halt the economic decline of this mountainous republic that lacked significant reserves of natural

resources. In his economic policy, the President steadily followed prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in reforming the country's economic system. Although Kyrgyzstan received the highest financial assistance per capita than any other former Soviet republics¹⁸, it could not stop the tremendous decline in standard of living (in 1992-1994 wages were falling around 30% annually as low as US \$ 40 a month)¹⁹.

Kyrgyzstan has been very active in international diplomatic frontier, especially in the CIS arena throughout the 1990s. The Kyrgyz ruling elite has been able to maintain positive relations with a new wave of young reformers and democratic circles in Moscow. The elite has been constantly trying to revive to some extent the economic and political integration with the post-Soviet Russia and approached Moscow as one of the pillars of the post-Soviet security system in the region. Later, the Kyrgyz diplomats has joined activity of the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan governments in attempt to create the Central Asian economic confederation (the so-called 'Central Asian Union – CAU). These three countries also united their efforts when the political unrest and the Civil war in the neighbouring Tajikistan went out of control in 1992-1997 and threatened the regional stability by a flow of thousands of refugees, weapons and drugs.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is one of the most densely populated republics of the region whose population was the third only to the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. The country is potentially rich in various natural resources (oil, gas, gold, etc), but it is hampered by the large non-competitive agriculture and for a long time was narrowly oriented towards the shrinking Russian market. Throughout the 1980s, the country's leaders had very uneasy relationship with the Kremlin politicians because of the Moscow's massive intervention into the republics' affairs and *cadre* politics. The so-called 'Uzbek affairs' affected the entire administrative system of the country. In fact the 'mini-purge' of 1986-1989 sent to prisons almost one-third of the country's officials. These events strongly consolidated the republic's ruling elite and led to the rise of strong national feelings and mistrust to the Kremlin's politicians. Therefore, since the late 1980s the Republic's leaders have been suspicious about any Moscow's interference in the country's affairs.

Karimov became the leader of Uzbekistan in 1989 (the President since 1990) and represented the conservative technocratic elite (he was the Finance Minister in 1983-1986). President Karimov was the first among the CARs leaders who widely applied the

idea of 'political stability at any cost'²⁰. He rejected any radical political or economic reforms and declared his "own way of renovation and progress" targeted at establishment of a "socially oriented market economy through gradual changes" ²¹. In terms of international relations, he promoted the idea of Uzbekistan as a strong regional power²² and he promised that under his leadership the country would become a 'new economic tiger'. Uzbekistan leaders were quite reluctant to be involved in any kind of re-integration with Moscow. They actively tried to diversify their international relations and establish special relations with the Western countries, particularly with the USA. However, Uzbekistan welcomed the idea of the Central Asian regional integration and together with Kazakhstan actively promoted the Central Asian Economic Union since the early 1990s.

The country's leaders made great efforts to bring the political environment in the republic to a balance after intensive inter-ethnic clashes in Ferghana valley in the late 1980s, that were believed to be a result of Gorbachev's poorly managed ethnic policy. The political opposition, which included democratic parties as well as radical Islami groups, seriously challenged the position of Uzbek ruling elite on the eve of independence. Moreover, the political unrest in neighbouring Tajikistan and Afghanistan were threatening the very base of the Uzbekistan's stability and security throughout the 1990s²³.

Therefore, the ruling elite was very careful in implementing any political or economic changes. In the post-Soviet era, the only way to get credibility for Karimov was to halt the social unrest and to preserve standard of living among the rapidly growing population. During the first stage of independence, Uzbekistan leaders focussed their efforts on maintaining economic stability and preventing the economic decline without implementing radical economic and political transformation. They preferred to keep everything in the old order and move very slowly, rather than to face any unpredictable consequences of the reforms. Their old fashioned conservative policy and the Party authoritarian style of ruling confronted crucial critics from democratically oriented local intellectuals and especially from the Russian democratic circles. However, even the critics gave credit to the Uzbek leadership that maintained stability in this potentially explosive environment.

In general, the CARs confronted a complex of intractable environmental, ethnic and political issues that appeared and strengthened after the unexpected 'catapult to independence'²⁴. But, after 1991 the Central Asian states did not perform in the regional arena equally. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan became the region's major actors, while Tajikistan and Turkmenistan acquired a lower profile because of a number of reasons that were determined mainly by internal factors in these two republics. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continuously thought to resolve their economic problems by establishing closer relations with Russia and through deeper involvement into the CIS integrational processes, while Uzbekistan has been reluctant to do so and tried to pursue more independent foreign policy. Although these republics obtained their independence in 1991, they still continued to be linked by thousands threads with other CIS countries especially with the Russian Federation. The CARs' ruling elite quite quickly consolidated their political power, but the creation of sustainable economic systems appeared to be an uneasy task that could not be resolved overnight. Another important issue for all Central Asian republics was a necessity to make a choice of their strategy for political and economic development and for integration into the international community.

3. Public Discourse on Developmental Issues in Central Asia

After the collapse of the 'iron curtain', the public debate on the directions and priorities of the post-Soviet foreign policy was quite intensive in the CARs as well as in the other parts of the former USSR. There were a number of issues to debate: from priorities of bilateral and multilateral relations to issues of external and internal threats to stability and independence of these states. However, a phenomenon of the so-called 'model of development' discourse, which emerged in the CARs added some important difference in the foreign policy debate there.

On the eve of independence, the CARs' leaders suddenly discovered that the modern world is divided not only into two large competing camps of socialism and capitalism as they were used to believe. There were multiple choices of different approaches to reforms, political development and economic transformation. The international community was also debating the economic development of East Asian and Southeast Asian countries as other phenomena of the late 20th century. Almost 70 years of the

Soviet type of modernisation made the CARs' leaders to believe strongly in positive prospects of the social and political engineering. Their intellectual search was deeply interrelated with the Russia's long-lasting debate between the Western oriented elite, who believed that Russia should have become the part of the Western world at any cost, and *Russofils*, who emphasised importance of the traditional values for the Russian society. The CARs' intellectual heritage also included the early 19th century debates between conservatives and reformers (Jadidists), who debated a way of transformation of the *Turkistan's* traditional society

In this particular environment, the Central Asian leaders were often urged to response to various speculations about their future prospects and come out with simple and clear explanation of their vision of the future (for the foreign policy makers and for their own society). On the eve of the political crisis of the Soviet political system, there were speculations among international experts and the Russia's intellectuals that either 'fundamentalist' Iranian or the 'secular' Turkish 'models' could have been a choice for the CARs' post-Soviet development²⁵.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the discussions on the prospectus of development and foreign policy issues within the CARs were often shaped around possible 'Models of Development' for these republics. These debates were intense in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan during the first stage of the independence. There were no single opinion among public or state officials and a number of the developmental models were debated - from the Turkish secular political model vis-à-vis Iranian theocratic model, to the Chinese model of gradual economic reforms vis-à-vis Russia's *shock therapy* and political and economic liberalisation. In every republic of the region, the discussion had its own peculiarity and implications. In this respect, the CARs' leaders during their first fact finding trips to the East and South East Asia, provided them with one of the anchors for the answer.

Kazakhstan leaders turned out as admirers of the so-called East Asian Economic miracle, especially those of South Korea and Japan. President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan was one of the first Central Asian high ranked politicians who started talking about a 'model of development'. In fact, one of his first overseas trips was a visit to South Korea in 1990. An important outcome of this visit was the appearance of the Korean-American professor Chan Young Bang as the special adviser to the President and the vice-chairman of the National Committee of Economic Expert²⁶. Nazarbaev was the only

leader in the region who invited foreign experts such as Chang Young Bang (South Korea) and the former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore) to be his personal advisers. It was widely believed in Kazakhstan that it was possible to replicate the Korean and South East Asian economic miracle in the republic. That is why the 'Models of Development' were intensively debated in this republic. Moreover, Mr. Nazarbaev mentioned Japan, South Korea and Singapore as the models, in one of the first comprehensive outlooks for the post-independence 'strategy of rapid development'²⁷. In 1997, a group of high ranked Kazakhstan's administrators and experts spent several months in Malaysia studying the so-called 'Malaysian economic miracle' and trying to re-approach the 'Malaysian Model' in Kazakhstan. Finally, in October 1997 it came out as Kazakhstan's long term strategic vision 'Kazakhstan: 2030: Prosperity, Security and Welfare improvements for all Kazakhstanese'²⁸.

In this respect, the survey study conducted in Kazakhstan in 1997²⁹, indicated that there was no uniform approach to the issue of 'Models of development'³⁰. The study found that the 'Turkish model of development' was considered the most attractive mode (see Figure 1): thirty four point eight percent of those questioned in Kazakhstan chose it. The next was the 'Newly Industrialised States' model of development' (such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, etc.): 28.3% of the respondents marked this option. The 'Russian model of development', according to the received data, was in the third place - 21.7%. It was followed by the 'South Korean model of development' - 15.2%. The 'Japanese model of development' was in the fifth place with 13.0%. The 'German model of development' was the next: 10.9% of the respondents marked this option. None of the Kazakhstan's experts recognised the importance of the 'Iranian model of development'. And 13.0% of the respondents pointed out 'own model of development'.

President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan showed his strong devotion to the political and economic reforms since his first days in the president's office. International organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, EBRD, etc, supported this strong devotion to reforms providing wide financial and technical assistance. The Kyrgyzstan officials who visited South Korea in 1990 were very impressed by what they named 'Korean model of economic development' and called to explore opportunities for joint co-operation with Korean companies in developing Kyrgyzstan as another 'economic tiger'. Kyrgyzstan's leaders, who proclaimed their adherence to South Korean and Japan economic models,

finally came up with an idea of Kyrgyzstan as the 'Switzerland of Asia'. It arrived as the President Akaev's vision of a small, peaceful mountainous country that would gradually become one of the world's tourist attractions and a financial and economic bridge between the East and West. It apparently became one of the most popular references to the country in the international media³¹. On the other hand, the Kyrgyz elite often referred to the Turkish model in order to underline their strong devotion to the secular development.

The survey study conducted in Kyrgyzstan in 1997, indicated that there was a wide spectrum of views. The study found that the 'Newly Industrialised States' model of development' was considered as the most attractive model (see Figure 1): forty eight point six percent of those questioned in Kyrgyzstan chose this model. The 'Japanese model of development' was the next: 30.6% of the respondents marked this option. The 'Turkish model of development', according to the received data, was in third place - 22.2%. It was followed by the 'Russian model of development' - 19.4%. The 'German model of development' was in the fifth place with 11.1%. The 'South Korean model of development' was the next: 9.7% of the respondents marked this option. Two point eight per cent of the Kyrgyzstan's experts recognised importance of the 'Iranian model of development'. And 1.4% of the respondents pointed out their 'own model of development'.

President Karimov of Uzbekistan frequently replied to the opponents that a need for "stability at any cost" was necessary and occasionally referred to the Chinese and other experiences of limited political freedom. He called for the "study and apply" approach for a successful transition of his country to prosperity and strong development after his well-publicised trips to South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia in 1992³². The Uzbekistan's "own way of renovation and progress"³³ has been always supplemented by a call to learn from Chinese experience of the 'gradual reforms'³⁴, to study and apply Indonesian model of 'guided democracy'³⁵ and some other models. Researchers from Russia and other countries also intensively discussed the model of development for the republic. Their debates centred on the discourse on Turkish secular model vs. Iranian theological model, because of the strong position of Islam in Uzbekistan. Thus, one of the most important tasks for the Uzbekistan foreign policy makers became an attempt to show the country's devotion to developing the modern and secular state through

references to the 'model of development'. The discussion on the 'model development' was not particularly intensive in the republic, but still it was carefully considered. Although, President Karimov finally came up with the formula 'Uzbekistan follows the Uzbek model'³⁶, some discussions about the 'model of development' for Uzbekistan still continued in the country.

In this instance, the survey study conducted in Uzbekistan in 1997, indicated a wide spectrum of views. The study found that the 'Newly Industrialised States' model of development' was considered as the most attractive model (see Figure 1): thirty seven point five per cent of those questioned in Uzbekistan chose this model. The 'German model of development' was the next: 36.7% of the respondents marked this option. The 'South Korean model of development', according to the received data, was in the third place - 28.3%. It was followed by the 'Japanese model of development' - 20.8%. The 'Turkish model of development' was in the fifth place with 13.3%. The 'Russian model of development' was next: 5.8% of the respondents marked this option. Zero point eight per cent of the Uzbekistan's experts recognised the importance of the 'Iranian model of development'. A significantly large group of the respondents pointed out 'own model of development': 27.5%.

By and large, the reference to the model of development became the important component of the CARs' political lexicon, and dedication to one or another 'model' became one of the attributes of belonging to a political grouping. But it is quite clear that the 'model of development' debate was not simply demagogy of the CARs' elite and it was a complex phenomenon. On the one hand it was a simple, yet convincing manifestation of their technocratic and secular approach to the development and their distancing from the 'Iranian theocratic model'. On the other hand it was the part of the search for an identity in the international arena. Apparently, all these discussions and calls for the 'model of development' did not mean a direct duplication and implication of the 'role model' in the domestic and foreign policies of the CARs, rather it was the part of the ongoing public debate about the future of the republics. Still, the 'model of development' debate has some influence on the CARs' current policies.

Within the region the discussion focused mainly on the 'model of development' with implication in the area of the CARs' economic transformation, especially at the first stage of the economic reforms (1992-1994). At this period, the CARs' policy makers

were hardly pushed to reform their economies in the line with the Russia's radical economic policy³⁷ and they often justified their unpopular decisions by referring to the macroeconomic 'model' of transformation.

Occasionally, the CARs leaders pointed out that in those 'model' countries the economic reforms came first and the political changes started later, therefore in many Southeast and East Asian countries democracy was quite limited and political process often was 'guided' by the state.³⁸ The reference to the limitation of democracy and adherence to the South Korean, South East Asian, Turkish models of development became one of the powerful arguments in the hands of the ruling elite in their dealing with the political opposition.

The 'model of development' debate also became a useful tool in changing the self-identity of the Central Asians in the international arena and in preserving self-confidence in their painful dilemma of choosing between the Asia and Europe (within the Soviet Union they perceived themselves as the part of Europe). Most probably the nearest case with the same problem is Turkey with its historical dilemma of living between Europe and Asia. One of the apparent manifestations of this dilemma is the President Nazarbaev's call for the *Eurasian Union* that would define the CARs as the *bridge* between Europe and Asia with a landmark towards Europe. Here a continuous paradox is that the significant part of the local political elite rather correlates themselves with Europe and the CIS than with Asia, but references to the so-called 'Asian models of development' slowly narrowing down the gap in their self-identification and creating their recognition of their 'Asianess'.

4. 0. Central Asian Experts' Evaluation of the Security and Developmental Issues

After Belorussia, Russia, and the Ukraine had signed the agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991, establishing the system of the regional and national security became a priority for the CARs³⁹. This

factor was the main driving force of their decision to join the CIS and sign the *Alma Ata Declaration*. Since that moment Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan started their search for a new security system in the region. This included the conceptualisation of the national security agenda, the development of the entire system of national institutions, and the search for international partners for co-operation in the security issues.

For the Central Asians, who have made their very first steps in the international arena, the identification of the priorities for the national and regional security agenda appeared to be the most challenging task. In this sense, the *Alma Ata Declaration* became the cornerstone of the post-Soviet security system. It highlighted five major principles: 'assuring the territorial integrity and inviolability of the national boundaries; creation of the system of political security; creation of a military system of security, and last but not least, stabilisation of inter-ethnic relations within the former USSR'⁴⁰.

In general, local and international observers believed that the CARs' security had the very shaky ground. There were fears that transformation from the Soviet political practice to an independent policy making would follow the line of growing conflicts and violence similar to disastrous events in the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. Indeed, various problems gathered momentum because of complicated international environment, deteriorating local economy, rising social tensions among the peoples of the former Soviet Union and 'cultural clashes' between various ethnic groups. Thus, Boris Rumer of the RAND Foundation predicted a terrible 'storm' in the political arena of Central Asia and the inexorable explosion of bloody conflicts between different political factions of the CARs society⁴¹. Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke about an ethnic cleansing that might have expelled several millions people from the republics, and unstoppable border conflicts in the region⁴². Samuel Huntington extended his line of 'the Clash of Civilisations' from Bosnia to Caucasus and Central Asia⁴³, pointing out an escalation of conflicts between the Orthodox Russian Civilisation and Muslims of Central Asia⁴⁴. Due to numerous conflicts that occurred in the region and hazardous circumstances of the Soviet disintegration, such apocalyptic scenarios looked highly possible.

Historically, Central Asia has had a number of conflicting issues. Some of the existed for centuries and were arbitrary solved or temporary suppressed by the Soviet presence (e.g. rivalry between different clans). The other issues have been the legacy of

the Soviet experiment (e.g. the national boundaries, which divided once culturally homogenous region into the nation-states in 1924-1936 by Stalin's order). According to experts⁴⁵, in the post-Soviet era nineteen territorial problem-zones were upsetting the region. After the independence of 1991, the old suspicions to such neighbours as China, Russia, Iran, and even to each other have re-grown among the leaders of the region. On the top of that, it was widely expected that some countries would try to establish their influence in the Central Asian region.

Presence of the Islamic component in the political life of the post-Soviet CARs has been the most mystified factor that has provoked a lot of fears and speculations within and outside the region. The threat of export of the Islamic revolution from Iran and the growing power of radical fundamentalist parties have been perceived quite seriously. Worse predictions have been seemingly realised with the collapse of Tajikistan's secular government under pressure of the united opposition led by the Islamic Party of Resurgence during the Tajik Civil war of 1992-1997. The establishment of the Taliban government in neighbouring Afghanistan has also made some of the CARs' leaders nervous.

Another factor was the region's economic development, particularly in the industrial sector. The entire state economic and financial system in some of the CARs was virtually at the stage of collapse in 1993-1994. The introduction of local currencies in the CARs partially solved some issues, such as hyperinflation (previously run up to 1400% a year in 1993 and around 800% in 1994), but it caused some other difficulties. Economic ties with other parts of the former USSR, which were established and functioned for many decades and were vital for all sectors of the republics' economies, have been practically ceased to exist. It created mass unemployment that reached, according to some estimates, as high as 20 per cent in some parts of the region.

Existence of the large Russian minority and other ethnic groups raised fears that there would be an outbreak of uncontrollable and unstoppable ethnic conflicts within the republics and among them, which could include the Russia's military intervention in order to protect the Russian speaking population.

There was no uniform perception of the external and internal threats to the republics' security. Some specialists considered that Central Asia would be able to solve their political, social and economic problems together with Russia if the Russia's reforms would be a success⁴⁶. Others believed in reorientation towards the liberal-democrati

model of the Western type⁴⁷. There also was some ideas of reviving the pan-Turkic tradition and reorientation towards Turkey. Uncertainty in Central Asia's internal and external aspects of development demanded an immediate response to the important challenges in the international environment. Security concerns of the CARs and establishment of the international co-operation's priorities in the CARs' foreign polic became the key issues for the region's foreign policy makers.

In this sense, it is important and necessary to assess how local experts evaluated these threats to the security and alternatives of international co-operation for their respective republics. The survey conducted in 1997 had two questions that dealt with perception of the threats to the security and stability of the region and priorities in international co-operation with the world and region's leading powers.⁴⁸ With regards to international co-operation, a list of countries was given to chose those co-operation wit whom would be the most desirable for the republics. Also a list of threats was offered to the respondents to choose the most possible threats to the security of their republics. The following is the analysis of the responses. Means for the first question (where 4 is the highest level of interest in co-operation and 1 is the lowest level) and frequencies for the second question were calculated to get a clearer illustration of the situation.

Kazakhstan

The survey found that 'internal social and political problems' were considered the major threat to regional security and stability (See Figure 2). Eighty-seven per cent of those questioned in Kazakhstan pointed out this issue. The 'economic crisis and economic problems' was next: 80.4 per cent of the respondents marked this problem. 'Ecological crisis', according to the received data, was in the third place - 26.1 per cent, it was followed by 'external military threat' - 13.0 per cent of the respondents. The Kazakhstan experts in a very reserved manner evaluated the threat of 'religious fundamentalism': only 8.7 per cent of the respondents marked this option in the questionnaire.

The 'possibility of complication of relations with Russia' as a threat to the regiona security and stability was identified by 39.1 per cent of the questioned experts. This was followed by the 'possibility of complication of relations with China': 26.1 per cent. The threat to the regional security and stability as a result of 'complication of relations with Iran' perceived at a very low level - only 4.3 per cent pointed out this factor that was

similar to the perception of the threat from 'complication of relations with Afghanistan'. None of the Kazakhstan's experts recognised the threat to security and stability in the region as a result of complication of relations with the USA or Turkey.

In terms of international relations, for the Kazakhstan's specialists co-operation with Russia was in the first place (mean 3.73) (See Table 1). Next was China (mean 3.14). The third was the USA (mean 3.09). This was followed by Germany (mean 2.93) and Turkey (mean 2.89). Next position was taken by Japan (mean 2.87) Importance of co-operation with Iran and India was perceived equally (mean 2.07), and Afghanistan was on the last place (mean 1.81).

Kyrgyzstan

The survey found that 'economic crisis and economic problems' was in the first place among threats to the regional security and stability (See Table 2). Eighty-seven point five per cent of the questioned experts in Kyrgyzstan pointed out this issue as the main threat. The 'internal social and political problems' were the next: 75.0 per cent of the respondents marked this problem. 'Religious fundamentalism', according to the analysed data, was in the third place - 34.7 per cent, which was followed by 'external military threat' - 19.4 per cent. The Kyrgyzstan experts in a quite reserved manner evaluated the threat of 'environmental issues': only 18.1 per cent of the respondents marked this option.

With regards to international security, the 'possibility of complication of relations with China' as a threat to the regional security and stability was considered by 19.4 per cent of the questioned experts. This was followed by the 'possibility of complication of relations with Russia': 16.7 per cent. The threat to the regional security and stability as a result of 'complication of relations with Afghanistan' perceived at a relatively low level - only 11.1 per cent indicated this factor, which was far ahead of the perception of the threat from 'complication of relations with Iran'. None of the Kyrgyzstan experts recognised the threat to the security and stability in the region as a result of complication of relations with the USA or Turkey

In terms of international relations, for the Kyrgyzstan specialists co-operation with Russia was in the first place (means 3.68) (See Table 1). Next was the USA (mean 3.24). Japan was on the third place (means 3.10). This was followed by China (mean 2.94) and Germany (mean 2.84). Next positions were taken by Turkey (mean 2.72), and

India (mean 2.11). The perception of the importance of co-operation with Pakistan and India was the same (means 2.04), and Afghanistan was on the last place (means 1.65).

Uzbekistan

The survey found that on the first place among threats to the regional security and stability was 'economic crisis and economic problems' (See Figure 2). Fifty-four point two per cent of the questioned experts in Uzbekistan considered this issue important. The 'internal social and political problems' were the next: 49.2 per cent of the respondents marked this problem. 'External military threat', according to the data, was on the third place, 40.8 per cent. This was followed by 'religious fundamentalism' - 30.8 per cent of respondents. The Uzbekistan experts quite seriously evaluated the threat of 'environmental issues': 27.5 per cent of the respondents marked this option.

Regarding international security, the 'possibility of complication of relations with Afghanistan' as a threat to the regional security and stability was marked by 34.2 per cent of the questioned experts. This was followed by the 'possibility of complication of relations with Russia': 25.8 per cent. The threat to the regional security and stability as a result of complication of the relations with USA perceived at a relatively low level - only 8.3 per cent of Uzbekistan respondents pointed out this factor. This was far ahead of the perception of the threat from 'complication of relations with China' - 3.3 per cent or Iran - 0.8 per cent. None of the Uzbekistan's experts recognised the threat to security and stability in the region as a result of 'complication of relations with Turkey'.

In terms of international relations, for Uzbekistan's specialists co-operation with Russia was in the first place (mean 3.34) (See Table 1). Next was Germany (mean 3.30). The third was the USA (mean 3.29). This was followed by Japan (mean 3.06) and China (mean 2.68). Next position was taken by Turkey (mean 2.45) The perception of the importance of co-operation with India was next (mean 2.24), and Afghanistan was following that (mean 2.17). Pakistan was on the last place (mean 2.06).

The survey results illustrated that the CARs experts differently evaluated the development of international co-operation and the threats to the country's security. Moreover, the three republics covered by the survey, which from the outset were committed to regional integration, were quite different in their foreign policy orientation.

It indicates that we need to be very careful in considering the region as an entity without underlining significant differences between these republics⁴⁹.

Analysis of the experts' evaluation demonstrated that the external threat to the security and stability of the region was quite unlikely. The major threat to the stability and security in the region was originated internally. The stable development of Central Asia very much depended firstly on the success of large-scale economic changes, and secondly on the success in maintaining the internal political balance between different political, social and ethnic groups. Despite a view widely supported by the Western and Russian scholars that Central Asians faced almost similar problems, this survey found that there were significant differences. Kazakhstan experts considered the threat from the 'internal social and political factors' the most important, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan experts emphasised the threat from 'economic crisis and economic problems'. It is important that the foreign policy specialists realistically evaluated the Islamic factor in the international politics of Central Asia and did not consider it as a serious threat.

Also, despite many predictions about the CARs' deeper involvement in the south and south-west regional politics and grouping, the CARs' leaders did not show any movement to emphasise this direction in their foreign policy. The survey analysis revealed that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan experts considered co-operation with Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan an issue of secondary importance. The CARs' experts surprisingly did not show their interest in co-operation with Iran, despite the diplomatic and economic activity of the Iranian government and the fact that geographically Iran represents the natural and the shortest pass-way to the world market. It seemed that Iran remained on the periphery of the republics' foreign policy interest.

It is noteworthy that the cultural and linguistic closeness with Turkey did not outweigh pragmatic considerations of the CARs' experts. They placed importance of co-operation with Turkey far behind the major Western countries. Most probably, it reflected disappointment of the CARs' elite by the economic potential of Turkey.

Finally, the co-operation with Russia in the field of maintaining the regional security and stability seemed to be still one of the highest priorities in the opinion of the regional experts. However, the respondents in all three republics differently approached even this issue (See Figure 2). This finding was particularly interesting because it precisely indicates the place of the Kremlin as a guarantor of the security and stability in evaluation of the

CARs foreign policy experts. The importance of Kazakhstan's relations with China has started to counterweight the importance of relations with Russia. Apparently, the Russian Federation did not occupy the exclusive position as an international partner for Uzbekistan and the importance of Germany, the USA and Japan counterweighted the importance of relations with Russia. In this sense, the relations with Russia were much more important for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than for Uzbekistan⁵⁰.

It is interesting to note that a new tendency could be observed in the foreign policy priorities of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. These republics are becoming increasingly different in their foreign policy priorities although this tendency still remains at its early stage. However, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are apparently moving in quite a different from Uzbekistan way, but all together they are slowly leaving the Moscow's orbit.

5.0. Integration Processes in the Central Asia

Since 1991, the newly independent states of Central Asia have faced contradictor challenges.⁵¹ On the one hand, they have been engaged in reshaping their national economic systems, and in the nation-state formation. On the other hand, they have been increasingly involved in various regional and international co-operation programs, including projects for political and economic reintegration within the framework of the former Soviet Union and the region itself. There are a number of reasons for their growing international involvement in various organisations and co-operation with each other. These include a need to reduce the negative side-effects of their unexpected independence; a need to co-ordinate their economic transformation and to overcome the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet economic co-operation, and last but not least a need to join their efforts and resources to overcome common problems.

From the very first months after the collapse of the USSR, the CARs had different approaches to integration. The 1992-1997 Tajikistan's devastating Civil War rendered it unable to participate in the process. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were reluctant to take

part in any regional or supra-regional political integration for fear it would undermine their sovereignty, or would force them to share their power with regional or supra-regional organisations⁵². Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan quite actively promoted inter-republic integration with a special focus on economic co-operation, and were persistently supporting regionalisation and political and economic reintegration. It was Kazakhstan, which came with an idea of the *Eurasian Union* that was a comprehensive plan of reintegration within the former socialist countries.

Meanwhile, there is a need to distinguish two dominant components of the existing ideas on developing the regional organisations and integration, which are different from the economic issues, i.e. cultural and political. Historically, the Central Asians maintained strong relations with South Asia and Middle East and for centuries they shared common religious, cultural and intellectual traditions. However, since the middle of the 19th century, Central Asia has been increasingly integrating into political and macro-economic system of Russia and East Europe, while culturally it still belongs to the Middle Eastern civilisation. Decades of Russia's and Soviet dominance changed the CARs' political and economic orientation and minimised cultural relations with their southern neighbours, but could not totally shift the cultural legacy of the civilisation ties with the Muslim Asia. After the independence, the CARs elite began to highlight the existence of strong supranational ties with Turkey (historical origins, related languages, common culture and religion). The strong emphasis on the ties with this country was a result of the elite's attempt to justify their Europe-centric orientation and 'Eurasian' self-identity, since Turkey was the member of NATO and a potential member of the EC. However, the CARs' leaders recognised that their economic relations with Russia and other members of the CIS have still been important for their survival. They were particularly concerned with the states' uncertain economic political future and the security arrangements, because of the Kremlin's unexpected and quick withdrawal from the region (the Russia's foreign policy makers almost totally excluded the CARs from their foreign policy priorities at the first stage). Therefore, within a short period after gaining the independence, the CARs started joining various international and regional organisations. They have even become exotic members of the OSCE and the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and called for establishing special multilateral security relations with the USA in order to get as many international players into the region as possible.

Eventually the CARs became involved in three major tiers of the regional and supra-regional integration: (a) the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); (b) the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO); (c) the Central Asian Union (CAU).

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been a temporary compromise between two major political camps: conservative Soviet politicians (who tried to preserve the Soviet integrity) and Russian radical democrats (who pressed for unconditional disintegration of the USSR). Neither side has managed to win this long-lasting struggle for power in the Kremlin, while the Russian government has been too weak economically to provide any leadership for the former Soviet countries. Therefore, Russia has never formed a definitive attitude towards the CIS, and the decision to expel the CARs from the Russia's rouble zone in 1993 ruined the economic basis of possible integration. The organisation has remained largely a ceremonial compromise establishment, neither fulfilling the hopes of those members of the Central Asian elite who favoured a closer economic integration, nor confirming the apprehensions of those who feared resurgence of the *Muscovite* dominance and the Russian imperial pressure. Nevertheless, the CIS has played an important role in assuring security and maintaining the status quo in Central Asia, at least during the first post-Soviet years. For several years the Commonwealth has been the only most important supra-regional institution, which guaranteed fragile co-operation in the FSU, although the Kremlin's leaders frequently exercised supremacy and dominance strategies.⁵³ Under the CIS umbrella, the CARs and Russia also managed to co-operate on some military issues, such as joint border patrols, which were most notable at Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan.

The absence of strong leadership and clear goals has been a source of dissatisfaction and disappointment for many CIS leaders. In the early 1997, even the most active advocates of integration within the CIS gave up. One of them, Kazakhstan's President Nazarbaev, noted that the "CIS countries' reorientation towards different geopolitical centres of gravity would continue unless Russia accepted a positive leadership and changed its foreign policy towards the former Soviet states".⁵⁴ During the CIS meeting in October 1997 Yeltsin remarked that "lack of mutual trust still exists among us despite of everything".⁵⁵

The Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) invited the newly-independent Central Asian states and Azerbaijan to join it in 1992. Almost immediately the Central Asian states joined four existing members of ECO, i.e. Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. Although this organisation was formed in 1964, it had rarely attracted international attention before the 1990s, but with accession of the former Soviet states it has become quite a visible group on the world's political map. With a population of about 300 million and a territory covering over 6 million square km. (twice that of India), the organisation may become an important international player if the economic integration is successful.⁵⁶

Initially, the CARs' leaders perceived a membership in the organisation with enthusiasm as another chance to diversify their relations with the outside world, to open a possible market for their industrial production and to obtain another source of additional investments, credits and assistance. Another important consideration for the CARs was that the territories of the ECO partners could provide alternative routes to international market for their goods and commodities, the shortest access to commercial sea-routes and possible routes for new gas and oil pipe-lines from the region.

Almost immediately after its membership grew to ten, the ECO declared that it was 'directed against no country or group of countries'.⁵⁷ In fact, the ambitious *Quetta Plan of Action*, which was announced in 1993, called for the greater economic integration among the 10 members of the organisation and quietly tried to avoid political issues. Nevertheless, the Russian experts began to worry about political implications of this integration.⁵⁸ The Kremlin's foreign policy makers believed that it undermined the Russia's geopolitical interests in Central Asia.⁵⁹

Russia has exerted some pressure on the CARs not to take any steps towards political integration with the other ECO countries. Probably this was the main reason that the ECO kept a relatively low political profile in the middle of 1990s, avoiding political issues⁶⁰. Despite initial disappointments and disillusion, the CARs' leaders have chosen to continue their participation in various ECO projects, especially those related to development of the regional infrastructure. The ECO members declared that further integration of its members was important and signed several agreements on economic development and promotion of supra-regional transport infrastructure.⁶¹

The Central Asian Union (CAU) was created in 1990 as a consultative body for the CARs' leaders, with the general objective to co-ordinate their political efforts, first within the USSR and later in the CIS political arena. There also was an idea of reintroducing political and economic integration among those people who shared cultural, historical and linguistic traditions⁶². The Union's starting point was the informal meeting of the CARs' leaders in Alma Ata in June 1990, resulting in their decision to join their appeal for greater co-operation and co-ordination within the region. Very soon the civil war in Tajikistan proved that the country practically abandoned the organisation. Later Turkmenistan formally left it, after the government's decision to oppose any integration within the FSU. By 1994 the CAU was on the brink of collapse.⁶³ However, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and later Kyrgyzstan formalised some common principles of the integration⁶⁴ and re-launched it as the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU)⁶⁵ in April 1994. In the early 1998 Tajikistan formally applied for the membership in CAEU and later the country was accepted as a full member of the organisation.

The CAEU members founded several regional institutions, including the Central Asian Bank, various co-ordination and consultative bodies, which targeted specifically co-operation in the economic and financial fields⁶⁶. Important issues for all Central Asian republics in the post-Soviet era was the problem of emerging custom war, which was blocking free movement of people and goods between the republics; solving out the difference in their approach to economic reforms and legislative system; and developing mutual co-operation and mutual supply of some commodities. Ideally, the CARs' leaders thought to form a custom union within the CAEU and to establish common economic space to promote free move of goods and capitals throughout the entire region. The institutionalisation of the CAEU has been often perceived as an important part of the republics' attempt to stabilise economic and political environment and security in the region.

In general, participation in the integration process has been a part of the international strategy of all CARs' governments. Although they continued to hope of reintegration within the former USSR, they have never changed their policy of strengthening their states integrity and institutions. Such a policy had some

disadvantages and negative effects, especially on economic co-operation in Central Asia. Nevertheless, at this stage the nation-state was the only entity around which the political and economic institutions could have been shaped.

Certainly, the co-operation within the CARs, between CARs and the CIS and ECO did not fulfil all expectations and hopes of the Central Asian leaders. Nevertheless, despite all the shortcomings of the integration schemes, the Central Asian governments have also benefited from all three of them. The benefits become more obvious with comparison of the impact of the disintegration on the former Yugoslavia. Central Asia has generally managed to keep the political and security status quo with all its neighbours, despite the artificial nature of some boundaries, the existing ethnic conflict (and the civil war in Tajikistan), political vulnerability and other complex problems.

The integration and co-operation perspectives of the CARs seemed to be one of the important questions for the researcher to assess. The respondents were asked "What do you think, how important is regional integration of the Central Asian Republics?" The respondents had several options to choose (highly important; important; integration if possible but not so important; not important and others) (see Table 2). The respondents were also asked: "In your opinion, co-operation with what international organisations does mostly reflect interests of your republic?" The respondents had a list of choices (see Table 3).

Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan, 30.4 per cent of the respondents thought that integration within the CARs was 'very important'. 52.2 per cent of the respondents believed that the integration was 'important'. Only 15.2 per cent of those questioned said that the integration was 'possible but not so important' and a tiny fraction of the respondents (1.7 per cent marked that the integration was 'not important'.

The survey found that 89.1 per cent of Kazakhstan experts believed that co-operation with the CIS mostly reflected interests of their republic. On the second position was the OSCE with 52.2 per cent of the respondents marking this organisation. On the third place was the CAU: 50.0 per cent of the respondents thought that co-operation with this organisation mostly reflected interests of their republic. This was followed by the ECO with 30.4 per cent of those questioned pointing out this organisation. The perception that co-operation with 'Turkic (People) Union' reflected

interests of Kazakhstan was marked by 23.9 per cent of the questioned foreign policy specialists. And the OIC was on the last place with 10.9 per cent of the experts marked the organisation.

Kyrgyzstan

In Kyrgyzstan, 41.7 per cent of the respondents thought that integration within the CARs was 'very important'. 50.0 per cent of the respondents believed that the integration was 'important'. Only 5.5 per cent of those questioned said that the integration was 'possible but not so important' and a small group of the respondents (1.4 per cent marked that the integration was 'not important'.

The survey found that 87.5 per cent of the Kyrgyzstan experts believed that co-operation with the CIS mostly reflected interests of their republic. On the second position was the CAU with 70.8 per cent of the respondents marking this organisation. On the third place was the OSCE: 52.8 per cent of the respondents thought that co-operation with this organisation mostly reflected interests of their republic. This was followed by the ECO with 29.2 per cent of those questioned pointed out this organisation. The perception that co-operation with the 'Turkic (People) Union' reflected interests of Kyrgyzstan was marked by 13.9 per cent of the questioned foreign policy specialists. And the OIC was on the last place with 9.7 per cent of the experts marked the organisation.

Uzbekistan

In Uzbekistan, 28.8 per cent of the respondents thought that integration within the CARs was 'very important'. 50.0 per cent of the respondents believe that the integration was 'important'. Only 18.6 per cent of those questioned said that the integration was 'possible but not so important' and a tiny group of the respondents (1.8 per cent) marked that the integration was 'not important'.

The survey found that 80.0 per cent of the Uzbekistan experts believed that co-operation with the CIS mostly reflected interests of their republic. On the second position was the OSCE with 71.7 per cent of the respondents marking this organisation. The CAU was on the third place: 54.2 per cent of the respondents thought that co-operation with this organisation mostly reflected interests of their republic. This was followed by the ECO with 26.7 per cent of those questioned pointed out this organisation. The perception that co-operation with the 'Turkic (People) Union' reflected

interests of Uzbekistan was marked by 18.3 per cent of the questioned foreign policy specialists. And the OIC was on the last place with 11.7 per cent of the experts marked the organisation.

Regionalisation and integration is a complex issue for the Central Asian elite, which includes emotional, political, cultural and a number of other components. It also is apparent that the attempts of integration with such different geopolitical and geoeconomic entities as the ECO and the CIS, create a contradiction between the legacy of the cultural traditions and the legacy of the economic development. During decades of the Soviet policy of isolation, the Central Asian elite formed feelings of belonging to the second special world that is somewhere between the West and the Third World. Presently, none of the five states of Central Asia proclaimed that they belong to the Third World. "As an Eurasian state we should carry out such foreign politics that suit geopolitical position of the Republic,"⁶⁷ asserts President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev. That is why the Central Asian elite's perception of the *New World order* and international relations still remains uncertain and it will take time to crystallise a balance between those conflicting legacies. Nevertheless, it seems that no integration is possible within the CIS in the near future. Instead, only certain level of multilateral and bilatera co-operation will be possible in this political environment.

Nevertheless, because CARs' relations with the outside world has for a long time been undermined by the phenomenon of the *iron curtain* and its consequences are still perceptible, there is a large room for developing economic, cultural and other relations with different regional and supra-regional organisations.

However, there is a very important dimension of the regionalisation which is development of the post-Cold war security system in the region. Although these three major organisations have played an important role in establishing international relations of the Central Asian states, and have assisted in promoting transparency in the CARs' foreign policy, none of them has provided a satisfactory security dialogue to the region.⁶⁸ The CARs have turned quite suspicious to their neighbours, including Russia (with its extravagant nationalists) and even to each other,⁶⁹ and started to search for rearrangement of the security system in the region with the maximum number of external participants. The area of their searching includes the European organisations such as NATO, OSCE, etc. Nevertheless, military and economic presence of Russia is the reality

and the leaders of the region simultaneously demand the Kremlin to become a guarantor of the security in Central Asia⁷⁰. One clear indication of this is the CARs' appeal to join the Organisation for Security and Co-operation of Europe (OSCE) and the NATO Partnership for Peace programme. The USA has also become increasingly involved in strengthening the security in the region. The CENTRASBAT-97 peacekeeping exercise involved servicemen from six countries, including the US⁷¹.

6. Formation of Foreign Policy Institutions in Central Asia

Modern foreign policy institutions in the CARs were created quite recently and they are still at their formative stage. Development of the foreign policy institutions in the post-Soviet CARs has not only been influenced by internal determinations such as circumstances of the Soviet disintegration, political orientation of the elite and the power balance within the region. It has also been affected by some cultural and political traditions of the pre-Soviet and Soviet era.

Historically, the Central Asian states never had a diplomatic service in the modern meaning of the notion. When the Western European countries entered their industrial stage of development, and international trade and international relations became an important feature of their development, the Central Asia experienced economic, political and cultural stagnation. The *Great Geographic Discoveries* introduced new sea trade routes between the West and East. This led to the death of the *Great Silk Road* that went through Central Asia for centuries and was an important source of enriching the local economies and cultures. Thus, since the 17th century the landlocked states of Central Asia, surrounded by the powerful Russian, Chinese and Persian Empires, were able to maintain neither full-scale diplomatic service nor active foreign policy. Inclusion of the Central Asian region into the Russian Empire did not radically change this situation. According to the agreements between the Russian Empire and nominally independent Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand Khaganates, the former got exclusive rights to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the latter. Nevertheless, the ruling elite of these three states,

who had kinship, clan and other relations with many noble families in South Asia and Middle East, continued to maintain some cultural, trade and other relations with neighbouring countries, mainly Afghanistan, Iran and India. These relations were quite independent from the Russia's political intervention.

During the first period after establishing the Soviet system in the CARs, one of the major objectives of the new Soviet authorities was strengthening their political system. The Soviet leaders justified the imposition of 'iron curtain' and blockage of almost all region's relations with the outside world by propagandising that the foreign missions (the US, British, French, Turkish) offered substantial financial and other assistance to the anti-Soviet opposition. Thus, the foreign policy of the Central Asian states was fully delegated to the Centre. With establishment of the USSR in 1924, the newly created Soviet republics of Central Asia received rights to participate in the formation of the Soviet foreign policy through the system of 'Postpredstva' (a Russian abbreviation for 'Representative office') set up in Moscow⁷². However, the rights were quite nominal and practically were never realised.

The situation changed only during and after World War Two. In 1944 *Narkomindels* (renamed into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1946) was established in all Union republics. Although, each of the new Foreign Ministries participated in various international events and hosted some foreign delegations, they have never made significant contributions to the formation of the Soviet foreign policy, neither they accumulated significant international experience.

However, the most radical changes happened after 1985, when Michael Gorbachev had come to power and especially after Eduard Shevardnadze had been appointed as Foreign Minister in 1987. He replaced old-fashioned Soviet diplomat Anatolei Gromyko. These cadre changes coincided with an introduction of a new law (1986) that substantially liberalised the USSR's foreign economic relations. The changes provoked a significant increase in the CARs' international contacts and boosted their diplomatic experience. Shevardnadze, following a new cadre policy, invited a number of the Central Asians to work in the central Soviet MFA and in the Soviet missions abroad. Previously those positions were exclusively reserved for ethnic Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians. Furthermore, the MFAs in Central Asian republics received more freedom in establishing new and expanding existing international contacts.

Other significant changes in the CARs' foreign political and economic relations occurred in 1990-1991 with some amendments in constitutional provision and with introduction of deregulation of the foreign economic and political activities. The Union republics got rights to directly access the international arena. For instance, in the early 1990s, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan for the first time had independent official overseas visits and hosted foreign delegations. During these years, a kind of division of labour in the CARs' foreign policy was formed. The president's administration usually directly controlled official parts of these visits. The MFAs, being limited in their financial resources and staff members, were responsible for the technical part of the activity (protocol, public relations, etc). The Soviet MFA in Moscow controlled and co-ordinated these actions in general. It is important to note that the experience of these years positively influenced the establishing and functioning of the independent foreign policy institutions of the CARs and accumulating the expertise.

Immediately after the independence, the CARs did not have any clear picture on the way of organising their foreign policy in the new international environment. The CARs did not have enough financial resources and experience for establishing their independent diplomatic services around the world. According to the initial arrangements with Moscow, the CARs should have inherited some part of the former Soviet MFA property in foreign countries. The diplomatic experience was supposed to be accumulated through a direct participation of the representatives of the CARs in the Russian diplomatic and other missions overseas. However, neither of arrangements worked. Very soon the CARs started to form their own diplomatic and other missions independently or with assistance of international organisations.

All Central Asian Republics faced difficulties in obtaining expertise in formation of their foreign policies. Their government institutions did not have enough specialists in the international affairs. The *cadre* problem has been solved mainly by two ways. The first was recruitment of those representatives of the CARs who worked in the Russian MFA and the Russian foreign missions. The second was recruitment of the locals from various academic and research institutions⁷³. The academic circle plays a very important role in the formation of the CARs' foreign policy by providing both important guidelines for the foreign policy making and the professionals for the Central Asian government institutions. This practice is quite unique and different from the Soviet and Russia's experience⁷⁴. From the very beginning the leaders of the region, who did not possess any

experience in international relations, widely used the local academic expertise, although sometimes they recruited foreign experts as we ⁷⁵.

In 1991, the CARs started to develop their own foreign policy. In general, the republics formed their foreign policy institutional structures, which were similar to the Russian. Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for realisation of foreign policy, everyday activity and they controlled functioning of their foreign missions. The CARs' presidents established their own foreign policy bodies within their own administrations (International Department of the President administration). Parliamentary Commissions on International Affairs undertook the parliamentary control of the republics' foreign policy. However, practically these commissions played a minimal role in the foreign policy formation. Unlike the Third World countries and Russia, the CARs did not have large and influential army or the private business sector during the first stage of the independence. Thus, those institutions never played any important role in the formation of the foreign policy of the CARs at that stage. From the beginning three major institutions have largely contributed to the formation of the CARs' foreign policy. One was the Republics' Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Another was the international department within the Presidents' administrations. These two, often competing with each other, were responsible for the formation of the national foreign policy in their respective republics. In fact, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan even encouraged this informal competition. The CARs' academic circle and universities became the third institution that extensively provided its expertise for the other two institutions because at least at this stage the foreign policy expertise could have been rarely generated within the MFAs.

This movement of specialists and expertise created a relatively dynamic and democratic environment in the CARs' foreign policy making during the 1990s. The policy specialists moved in and out of the state institutions. There was quite an intensive exchange between the foreign policy experts from academic institutions and the government and the president's foreign policy making institutions. It became quite apparent that the specialists' assessments and perception of the foreign policy issues had a powerful impact on the foreign policy making in the CARs.

Perception of Influence of Different Groups on the Foreign Policy

In general, the CARs were able to mobilise all their human resources and existing expertise and create working foreign policy institutions within a short period of time. Formation of foreign policy is a complex process, which involves a number of political institutions and individual or group actors. One of the questions of the survey study intended to elucidate how the CARs experts evaluated inputs of the different institutions and actors in the foreign policy formation in their respective countries. The CARs' experts were asked 'In your opinion, which of the following groups have the greatest influence on the formation of foreign policy in your republic?' There were several choices with marks ranging from one to four (1 = does not influence; 2 = influence insignificantly; 3 = influence significantly; and 4 = influence greatly).

Kazakhstan. The survey found (see Table 4) the Kazakhstan experts believed that in their republic the president had the greatest influence on the foreign policy formation (mean 3.39). It was followed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mean 2.93). On the third position was the parliament (mean 2.18). Next position was reserved for the mass media (mean 2.00). The academicians were on the next place (mean 1.56). The public opinion was considered as one of the less influential factors in the foreign policy formation (mean 1.49).

Kyrgyzstan. The survey found that the Kyrgyzstan experts believed that in their republic the president had the greatest influence on the foreign policy formation (mean 3.29). It was followed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mean 3.04). On the third position was the parliament (mean 2.40). The experts perceived that the mass media also had significant influence (mean 2.27). The academicians were on the next position (mean 1.64). The public opinion was considered having the same level of influence on the foreign policy formation (mean 1.64).

Uzbekistan. The survey found that the Uzbekistan experts believed that in their republic the president had the greatest influence on the foreign policy formation (mean 3.70). It was followed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mean 3.33). On the third position was the parliament (mean 2.63). The experts perceived that the mass media also

had significant influence (mean 2.06). The academicians were on the next position (mean 1.98). The public opinion was put on the last place (mean 1.83).

It is interesting to note that in all three republics the level of influence of the various institutions follows the same pattern. However, in Uzbekistan, the level of influence of the President of the republic on the formation of the foreign policy is much higher than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Parliament and mass media also significantly influenced the formation of foreign policy. Such results were quite unexpected because initially there was an assumption that the president and to a lesser extent the MFA in the republic monopolised the foreign policy making in their respective republics.

Perception of information influx about foreign policy in the CAR

Information flow is important for the foreign policy formation. However, during the Soviet era all sources of information had been toughly controlled by Moscow officials and the people of the Soviet Union remained behind the informational 'iron curtain'. Needless to say that the Soviet people were receiving quite a distorted picture of the world affairs and international relations in general and a wall of secrecy was effectively build up even around activity of the Soviet state institutions and especially of the Soviet foreign policy institutions. The situation started changing only during last period of the Gorbachev's reign with introducing freedom of expression and information inflow. The situation remained complicated in the post-Soviet era, because of Russia's domination in information dissemination and in formation the public opinion in the CARs. Eventually, the CARs' leaders recognised the need for changes and gradually reduced the presence of the Russia's mass media in their republics by increasing their own activity, inviting foreign media or simply limiting access of the Russian media to the Central Asian audience. For example, the monopoly of Russia's TV broadcasting was removed, and local channels significantly reduced the amount of time allocated for the Russian TV broadcasting.

The survey study had a question where the respondents were also asked "What are the main sources of information on the foreign policy formation of your republic and the Central Asian region in general?" Several options were offered and the respondents were asked to choose three of them. The received data were crosstabulated with the place of living of the respondents (Figure 3).

The survey found that 'Local Mass Media' was a source of information for 80.4% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 84.7% of respondents in Kyrgyzstan and 85.0% of respondents in Uzbekistan.

'Foreign Mass Media' was a source of information on the republics' foreign policy formation for 69.8% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 51.4% in Kyrgyzstan and 46.7% in Uzbekistan.

'Presidential speeches' was a source of the information for 58.7% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 54.2% in Kyrgyzstan and 85.0% in Uzbekistan.

'Speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs' was a source of the information for 17.4% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 33.3% in Kyrgyzstan and 8.8% in Uzbekistan.

'Parliamentary hearings' were a source of the information for 10.9% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 12.5% in Kyrgyzstan and 17.5% in Uzbekistan.

'Friends and colleagues' was a source of the information for 26.1% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 27.8% in Kyrgyzstan and 24.2% in Uzbekistan.

The diversification of the sources of information on the outside world has been one of the important features in the formation of the CARs foreign policy. If during the Soviet era and the first years after the Soviet disintegration the CARs received the information exclusively from the Moscow, later the picture has been gradually changed. Another important thing is that, according to the respondents, the foreign policy makers have become one of the important sources of information.

Perception of Formation, Realisation of Foreign Policy

Evaluation by the CARs' experts of their success in the foreign policy implementation was considered a constituent part of assessment of the region's foreign policy. The experts were asked 'What do you think, how successfully foreign policy is formed and is realised in the following republics/regions?' There were several choices with marks ranging from one to four (1 = bad; 2 = moderate; 3 = good; and 4 = successful) and a list of the CIS countries to assess (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Central Asian Region and the CIS in general).

The survey found (see Table 5) that the foreign policy formation and realisation in Kazakhstan was considered 'successful' only by 9.3 per cent of the CARs respondents. Forty-six point four per cent of those questioned marked 'good'; 37.2% of the

respondents believed that it was 'moderate', and 4.2% replied that it was 'badly' implemented.

The foreign policy formation and realisation in Kyrgyzstan was considered 'successful' only by 6.7 per cent of the CARs respondents. Thirty-two point two per cent of those questioned marked 'good'; 43.5% of the respondents believed that it was 'moderate', and 13.2% replied that it was 'badly' implemented.

The foreign policy formation and realisation in Uzbekistan was considered 'successful' by 31.0 per cent of the CARs respondents. Forty-two point three per cent of those questioned marked 'good'; 17.5% of the respondents believed that it was 'moderate', and 4.6% replied that it was 'badly' implemented.

The experts were also asked to evaluate success in foreign policy of the Russian Federation, Central Asia as a region and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Table 5). The foreign policy formation and realisation in Russia was considered 'successful' by 18.0 per cent of the CARs respondents. Thirty-eight point nine per cent of those questioned marked 'good'; 28.4% of the respondents believed that it was 'moderate', and 10.8% replied that it was 'badly' implemented. The foreign policy formation and realisation in Central Asia was considered 'successful' only by 2.9 per cent of the CARs respondents. Thirty-six point four per cent of those questioned marked 'good'; 44.4% of the respondents believed that it was 'moderate', and 7.9% replied that it was 'badly' implemented. The foreign policy formation and realisation in the CIS was considered 'successful' only by 2.5 per cent of the CARs respondents. Twenty five point one per cent of those questioned marked 'good'; 43.1% of the respondents believed that it was 'moderate', and 22.2% replied that it was 'badly' implemented.

The above data revealed that the Uzbekistan's foreign policy has been perceived more successful than the foreign policies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Also success of the CIS' foreign policy has been the least.

It is remarkable that the former Soviet Central Asian states could establish their workable foreign policy institutions within so short period of time. All these republics have created quite a dynamic and democratic environment for the foreign policy making and established a strong tradition of involving the academic expertise in their foreign policy making. Additionally, we can note that the CARs' foreign policy has been quite

well balanced and it has been free from impulsiveness and unpredictable moves of the Russia's foreign policy. Certainly, personal characters of the CARs' leaders have made an important impact and contribution to functioning of the foreign policy institutions and to their style of the foreign policy making. In this sense, although the foreign policy making in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan has been described as bureaucratic and elitist, the respondents did not think that the foreign policy making was monopolised by one particular institution. The CARs' experts considered that a hierarchy of influence of the foreign policy institutions was quite similar in every republic of the region.

Conclusion

After the collapse of the USSR, only a few scholars strongly believed that the CARs would be capable of developing stable social and economic policies and maintain the regional security without intervention of the major world actors. However, the Central Asian leaders demonstrated their ability to take the challenge of independence despite the difficult internal and external situations. Practically all of the Central Asian republics, with the exception of Tajikistan, stabilised the political situation and conducted a relatively steady transformation of their national institutions. Despite the peculiarities of the social and economic heritage, the CARs implemented a wide range of positive changes and maintained stable relations within the region and with the outside world.

Two factors largely contributed to the formation of stable post-Soviet foreign policy during the 1990s: the legacy of the Soviet era and circumstances of the Soviet disintegration. On the one hand, the Soviet system achieved a very high level of education among the population of the region and created a large highly qualified stratum of specialists in various fields of science, technology, etc. Also the former Soviet system could be credited for creating the viable system of state administration and the system of local institutions, that were not always perfect but could generate a wide range

of expertise locally. On the other hand, the former Soviet system of administration and management was quite inefficient and unwieldy, economic systems of the Central Asian Republics were created for functioning within the former All-Union system and were practically unworkable as independent entities. The CARs' leaders faced challenging problems after the unexpected disintegration of the USSR. They had to find an acceptable formulation for peaceful and sustainable economic, political and social transition, create a new formula for their relations with the Russian Federation, the international community and even among each other.

The CARs' relations with Russia experienced steep shifts and unexpected twists, and showed their vulnerability to objective factors (economic and others) and subjective causes (such as power struggle in the Kremlin, etc). Continuous economic crisis and economic decline in Russia limited Moscow's influence in the region. However, presence of almost 10 million ethnic Russians in Central Asia became one of the important factors that compelled the Russia's politicians again and again to return to the issue of the Russian-CARs relations. In this sense, different players and institutions made their often contradictory contributions to the dynamic of those relations: territorial claims and imperial ambitions (Zhirinovski); security arrangements and dialogue on the border guarding issues; economic co-operation and competition in oil and gas exploitation, etc. For instance, notorious Kozyrev-Grachev's approach postulated implementation of the so-called 'Monroviski Doctrine' that claimed the region as a zone of the Russia's sphere of economic and political interests. This caused some tensions in the relations between the CARs and Russia and mistrust among the CARs' elite to their northern neighbour. Nevertheless, despite non-constructive intervention of the Russian nationalists and all odds of the Kozyrev-Grachev's foreign policy towards the region, Russia and Central Asia managed to maintain quite sustainable relations. There were no mass expelling of the ethnic Russians from the CARs or significant Russia's military intervention into the CARs affairs (with exception of Tajikistan).

Changes in international environment and especially shifts in the nature of relations with Russia affected the intensity of the public debate on the CARs' foreign policy formation and the CARs' identities in the international arena. In this sense, the debate on the 'Model of development' appeared as one of the interesting phenomena. Indeed, the unexpected disintegration of the USSR raised challenging issues before the CARs' ruling elite and one of the issues was the urgent need to search for a dynamic and technocratic

identity of the region, which could challenge the opinion of the international community about the region as another place associated with Islamic fundamentalism and potential Balkan-like interethnic conflicts. In this sense, the declaration of the 'Model of development' approach was one of the good findings to create a positive image of the region before the international community as well as before the republics' multiethnic communities.

Reshaping the security system in Central Asia has become the important issue for the CARs. Vulnerability of the Kremlin's foreign policy and the rise of the extremes of the Russian nationalism (especially, phenomenon of Zhirinovski) made it clear, that the new security regime should have preferably relied not only on the security guarantees of the Russian Federation alone, but on the neighbouring and other countries as well. The CARs' search for the new security regime also reflects the growing shift in the region's security orientation, which characterised by diminishing economic and political role of the Russian Federation and increasing economic and financial influence of the USA, France, Japan, UK, Germany, China and South Korea. By the mid 1990s, the CARs developed the initial framework for a multilateral security system⁷⁶ that reflects the multilateral approach of the Central Asia's co-operation with the OSCE, NATO Partnership for Peace and the USA. The 1997 and 1998's military exercise, involving military personnel from the USA, Russia, Turkey and the CARs may be considered the first step towards creation of such a system, pointing out the way to future development of the security and military co-operation in Central Asia.

In this sense, a basis for the emerging dialogue has been formed within three integration concepts, namely the CIS, ECO and CAU. The activities of these organisations provided the CARs' leaders with excellent opportunities for the indirect test of all integration issues in the region, even though the organisations failed to fulfil their objectives. Thus, within these three levels of co-operation a control and balance mechanism has began to emerge. The CARs' elite showed themselves as extremely pragmatically oriented. They developed their own 'neo-pragmatic' approach to integrational and co-operation processes. In this sense, economic and political factors have been the main driving force for the CARs in the regional and supra-regional grouping, although the Central Asian states demonstrated different levels of interest in grouping within and outside the region. However, the realities of the post-Soviet development proved that there were no integrational processes at the regional and

supra-regional level despite a number of talks and until now the CARs have preferred to co-operate with, rather than integrate even with their close neighbours.

The formation of the foreign policy institutions in the CARs after gaining the independence was an uneasy task for all countries in the region. Almost half a century of the existence of the republics' Ministries of Foreign Affairs did little to accumulate foreign policy expertise, yet, it was a very important foundation for creation of appropriate foreign policy institutions in the post-Soviet era. From the beginning all the CARs introduced quite a similar concept of the foreign policy decision making, which avoided monopolisation of the foreign policy making in the hands of individuals or isolated groups of politicians. In fact, the process of the foreign policy making included competition between at least two foreign policy institutions. Also it included development of a dynamic and democratic environment in the decision making and relatively free circulation of the *cadres* and ideas between academic world and foreign policy institutions. Most probably, the wide use of the academic expertise was one of the most important features that made the CARs foreign policy more sustainable and productive (unlike the Russia's one). However, because of the shortage of *cadre*, expertise and diplomatic experience, the functioning of the foreign policy institutions still largely depends on personalities of their heads and on the personalities of the presidents, who often directly control the work of the Ministry of the Foreign affairs in their respective republics.

By and large, the foreign policy of the CARs was free from unexpected actions and twists in the international arena during the first transitional period of the independence era, but it is still undergoing its formative stage. The Soviet trained elite continue to firmly grip the power and their technocratic and pragmatic approach still overwhelmingly influence the foreign policy formation. It is important to notice that the CARs' foreign policy, at least at this stage, was relatively free from internal political and economic turmoil and the power struggle within the ruling elite (unlike some other CIS countries). On the other hand, the relations with the Russian Federation remain the cornerstone of the CARs' foreign policy. However, we could observe that the importance of Russia continues to decline steadily long with the decline of the economic and cultural relations and, at the same time, the role of other international actors is apparently growing. However, the prognosis that the cultural and other factors would dominate the CARs' foreign policy orientation was not realised and neither Turkey, nor

Iran and Pakistan became exclusive partners of the CARs. In this sense, relations with China and with leading Western powers became the matter of priority for the CARs' elite⁷⁷, although their expectation about the level of foreign economic and humanitarian assistance and foreign capital investments was far from the reality. In general, the CARs came up with the foreign policy that accommodated both the role of Russia and necessity for diversification of their international relations. However, because of the strong personal influence of the leaders on the formation of the CARs' foreign policy, the CARs have to undergo a further transformation and strengthen their foreign policy institutions in order to continue sustainable foreign policies in the future.

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¹ *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, (December 24, 1991).

² See analysis and forecasting by Russian and Central Asian experts in 1992-1993 in: *Tsentral'no-aziatski Makroregion i Rossia*, (Moscow: IVRAN, 1993).

³ Martha B. Olcott mentioned eleven dispute border cases between Kyrgyzstan and China. See: Olcott, Martha, *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security*, (Washington, DC: USIPP, 1996). P.108-110.

⁴ Presentation of results of the survey study not necessarily follows the order in which the questions were organised in the questionnaire.

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⁶ Asfandiyarov, S., *Istoria Kazakhstana (s drevneishih vremen)*, (Alma-Ata: Kazakh Universeti, 1993).

⁷ See: Radyuhin, Vladimir, "Growing Fundamentalism Worries CIS leaders," *The Hindu (India)*, (08 June 1998).

⁸ *Human Development under Transition: Europe and CIS*, (UNDP, May 1997). Pp. 115-122.

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- ⁹ Akaev Askar, "Kyrgyzstan v Tsentralnoi Asii i CNG: problemy i perspektivy," in: *God Planety, Vypusk 1994*, (Moscow: Respublika, 1994). Pp. 29-30.
- ¹⁰ See for evaluation: Valkenier, E., "Russian Policies in Central Asia: Changes or Continuity," *SAIS Review*, (Summer-Fall 1994):15-28.
- ¹¹ See for example: Zvigelskaia, I., *The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia* . (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).
- ¹² Nazarbaev, N., "Stroit' Novie Otnoshenia" (To build new Relations), *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, (04 July, 1991). Pp. 1-2.
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- ¹⁴ Nazarbaev N. A, "Strategiya stanovleniya i razvitiya Kazakhstana kak suverennogo gosudarstva," *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, (May 16, 1992). Pp. 2-12.
- ¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 8-9.
- ¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 11-12.
- ¹⁷ Akaev, A. A., "Kyrgyzstan v Tsentralnoi Azii i SNG: problemy i perspektivy," in: *God Planety, Vypusk 1994*, (Moscow: Respublika, 1994). Pp. 29-30.
- ¹⁸ Interview with Askar Akaev, *Los Angeles Times*, (September 07, 1997).
- ¹⁹ *Human Development under Transition: Europe and CIS*, (UNDP, May 1997). Pp. 115-122.
- ²⁰ Karimov, I. A., *Uzbekistan - svoi put' obnovleniya i progressa* , (Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1992).
- ²¹ Ibid, Pp. 38-57.
- ²² See: speech by the President Islam Karimov, in: *Tashkentskaya Pravda*, (July 09, 1994).
- ²³ Uzbekistan shares almost 1,161 km of common borders with Tajikistan and 137 km With Afghanistan that makes the republic particularly vulnerable to any political disturbance in those countries.
- ²⁴ Olcott, M., "Central Asia's catapult to independence," *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer 1992):108-130.
- ²⁵ See: Rotar', I., "Neokommunis ili Islam," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, (24.09.1991).
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- ²⁶ Brown, Bess, "Central Asia and the East Asian Model," *Report on the USSR* 3, no. 6, (February 08, 1991):18-19.
- ²⁷ Nazarbaev, N. A., "Strategia stanovleniya i razvitiya Kazakhstana kak suverennogo gosudarstva," *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, (16.05.1992):8-9.

²⁸ See some details in: “Kazakhstan to Become the First Central Asian ‘Leopard’?” *Central Asian Post* 39, (30 October 1997).

²⁹ The population of the study covered 1669 staff members of different organisations and institutions, whose work was related to the field of international relations. They were from three Central Asian newly independent countries: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The stratified-random proportional sampling technique was used to generate random samples. A sample size of 19 percent was selected with the help of a computer programme capable of generating random samples. This percentage was taken from the *Table for Determining Sample Size from a Given Population* designed by *Krejcie and Morgan*. The organisations participated in the study were strata of the sample. In total, 317 individuals were selected randomly for the study.

The questionnaire consisted of 22 questions and was translated into Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek languages.

A total of 223 questionnaires (70.35%) were received back as at 12 February 1997 and 28 were received through the mail later. All together 251 questionnaires were received, of which 239 (75.4%) were considered valid for analysis.

The collected data was analysed by using SPSS for Windows for descriptive statistics like frequencies, means, and cross tabulations.

³⁰ These models of development were included in the questionnaire because there were frequent references to these particular ‘models’ in the mass media and academic publications in the CARs. The basic difference between the NIS and the South Korean models is that the NISs were rich in natural resources and emphasised on wise use of it, while South Korea being poor in natural resources emphasised on developing technologies and export oriented high-tech sectors of economy.

³¹ See: *The Economist*, (October 29, 1994):38-40.

Los Angeles Times, (September 07, 1997) and others.

³² Cavanaugh, Cassandra, “Uzbekistan Looks South and East for Role Model,” *RFE/RL Research report*. 1, no. 40, (October 09, 1992):12-13.

³³ Karimov, I. A., *Uzbekistan - svoi put' obnovlenia i progressa*, (Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1992).

³⁴ *Izvestia*, (13.09.1991).

³⁵ Cavanaugh, Cassandra, “Uzbekistan Looks South and East for Role Model,” *RFE/RL Research report*. 1, no. 40, (October 09, 1992):12-13.

³⁶ *The Central Asian Post* 43, (27 November 1997).

³⁷ Pomfret, Richard, *The Economies of Central Asia*, (Princeton: Princeton Uni. Press, 1995). Pp.131-151.

³⁸ During the official visit to Indonesia in 1992, President of Uzbekistan Karimov was excited by the political experience of Indonesia and especially by Indonesia's concept of 'guided democracy' and state ideology called 'panchasila'. So Karimov called

to 'study and apply' the experience of Indonesia. See: Cavanaugh, Cassandra, "Uzbekistan looks South and East for Role Model," *RFE/RL Research report*, Vol. 1, No. 40. (October 1992):12-13.

³⁹. Kasenov, U., "Tsentralnaia Azia: Natsionalnye i Regionalnye Aspekty Bezopasnosti," *Kazakhshtan i Mirovoye Soobshchestvo* 1 (1996):21-35.

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⁴² Bzezinski, Zb., *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21 Century*, (New York: Scribners, 1993). Pp. 158-159.

⁴³ Huntington, S., "The Clash of Civilisations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, (Summer 1993).

⁴⁴ Huntington, S., "If not Civilisations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Fall 1993):186-194.

⁴⁵. *Moskovskie Novosti*, (17 March 1991): 8.

⁴⁶. *Megapolis-Express*, (24 November 1993):10.

⁴⁷. Koichuev, T. and Brudniy A, *Nezavisimiy Kyrghyzstan: Tretii put*, (Bishkek: Ilim 1993). Pp. 30-36.

⁴⁸ a) What do you think, which of the following problems may threaten the stability and security of your region *Please check only 3 options*:

b) In your opinion, how important is collaboration with the following countries to the interests of your republic *Please check each country according to the following scale: 1 - not important; 2 - moderately important; 3 - important; 4 - very important* .

⁴⁹ Olcott, M., "The Asian Interior: The Myth of "Tsentral'naia Azia"," *Orbis* 38, no. 4, (Fall 1994).

⁵⁰ Uzbekistan does not have geographical borders with Russia. However, the country borders Afghanistan. Kazakhstan does not have borders with Afghanistan and Iran, but the country shares the longest part of the borders with the Russian Federation.

⁵¹ Olcott, M., "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer, 1992):108-130.

⁵² For President of Turkmenistan's view on integration see his interview: Niayzov, S., "Nashe Otnoshenie k SNG" (Our Attitudes Towards the CIS), *Izvestia*, (04 September 1992).

⁵³ See evaluation by President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan in: *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, (24 April 1997).

⁵⁴ Nazarbaev Nursultan, "Interview," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, (16 January 1997).

⁵⁵ "Russia: CIS Countries Criticize Leadership," *RFE/RL* (24 October 1997). (See also *Turkestan Newsletter*, Vol. 97:1-76).

⁵⁶ Bruno De Cordier, "The Economic Co-operation Organisation: Toward a new Silk Road on the Ruins of the Cold War?" *Central Asian Survey* 15, no. 1, (1996):47-58.

⁵⁷ Rizvi, Ali Abbas, "ECO: From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics," *Asian Defence Journal*, no. 2, (1996):24.

⁵⁸ See: Evsenkin N. V., in: *Tsentralno-Aziatskii Makroregion i Rossia*, (Moscow: IVRAN, 1993):82-92.

⁵⁹ Hunter, Shireen, *Central Asia Since Independence*, (Wesport, Connecticut: PRAEGER, 1996). Pp. 148-149.

⁶⁰ See: Article by Ahmad Shamshid, in: *Kazakhstan i Mirovoe Soobchestvo*, no. 2, (1996). Pp. 91-94.

⁶¹ See for example, the text of Almaty Plan on Transportation and Islamabad Declaration. *Kazakhstan I Mirovoe Soobchestvo*, no. 2, (1996):101-103, 104-105.

⁶² Historically, the peoples of Central Asia were brought together in the time of the Empire of Timur (the 14th-15th centuries). The idea of the 'united Turkestan' was reborn at the beginning of the 20th century, and received strong support from the local intellectual elite (see Critchlow, James, "Will There Be a Turkestan?" *RLE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 28, (10 July 1992):47-50). For a short time the entire territory of the region was incorporated into the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1918-1924), but Stalin's delimitation of 1924 divided it into what became the five Central Asian republics. For almost a half a century the Soviet leaders strongly opposed any kind of political unity within the region. However, Soviet centralised economic planning revitalised the idea of economic integration in the form of the Central Asian Territorial and Industrial Complex, which included four out of the five republics. The idea of re-creating Turkestan returned to the political agenda only on the eve of the USSR's disintegration in the late 1980s.

⁶³ Olcott, M., "The Asian Interior: The Myth of 'Tsentralnaia Azia'," *ORBIS* 38, no. 4, (1994).

⁶⁴ See: *Sbornik Dokumentov i Materialov po Voprosam Ekonomicheskoi Integratsii Respublik Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, i Uzbekistan*, (Almaty, 1995).

⁶⁵ Brown, Bess, "Three Central Asian States Form Economic Union," *RLE/RL Research Report* 3, no. 13, (1 April 1994):33-35.

⁶⁶ See for details: Primbetov, S., "Central Asia: Prospects for regional Integration," in: *Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed by Bartłomiej Kaminski, (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994). Pp. 159-170.

⁶⁷ *Aziya* 51 (December 1993).

⁶⁸ In 1992, there were unsuccessful attempts to develop 'New Asian collective security agreement', which would include the CARs, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. See: Olcott, M., *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security*, (Washington, DC.: USIPP, 1996). P. 73.

⁶⁹ Olcott, M., *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, Regional Security*, (Washington D.C.: USIPP, 1996). Pp. 161-179.

⁷⁰ Karimov I. A. *Uzbekistan - svo' I put' obnovenia i progressa*.

⁷¹ For a Russian evaluation of the exercise see: Korbut, A., "US Paratroopers in Central Asia and Kazakhstan," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, (13 September 1997).

⁷² See for detailed description: Nichol P., James, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republic*, (Westport: PRAEGER, 1995). Pp.11-20.

⁷³ There were three major sources of the foreign policy professionals. The first was the former Soviet MFA and other foreign policy institutions. The CARs' leaders invited the natives who served in the former USSR's Ministry of the Foreign Affairs to return to their republics. It became a relatively small, but a very important source of the foreign policy professionals. Let us mention one of the most apparent examples of the Kyrgyzstan's leading foreign policy expert Roza Otunbaeva. She served at the senior positions in the Soviet MFA from 1989 until 1992 and had a strong international experience. She was the Kyrgyz Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1992 and in 1994-1997. In 1992-1994, she was Kyrgyz ambassador to the USA and Canada.

The second source of the foreign policy professionals was the local academic circle and foreign policy specialists from the local universities. In 1992-1995, the representatives of this group were actively recruited by the MFAs and other foreign policy institutions. During this stage the foreign policy specialists from various academic institutions have been frequently invited to provide expertise for local foreign policy institutions or to join a team of foreign policy professionals in the government bodies and thinking tanks.

The third source of the foreign policy specialists emerged in the middle of 1990s. They were representatives of a relatively young and the numerous cohorts of the specialists, who were trained and retrained in some foreign countries. Many of them studied diplomacy and other disciplines in the USA and Western Europe, however some of them were trained in such countries like Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey.

⁷⁴ See for evaluation: Tiulin, Ivan, "International Relations and the Lessons of Dependency from the Soviet Union to Russia," in: *Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy Making: National Perspectives on Academics and Professionals in International Relations*, ed. by Michel Girard, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Keith Webb, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994).

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**PRACTICE OF FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN CENTRAL ASIA:
FORMATION OF THE POST-SOVIET INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
OF KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, AND UZBEKISTAN**

Description of the Research Project

Catapult to independence brought five Central Asian Republics (CARs) of the former USSR in to the international arena. They faced numerous problems from the shortage of professionals to the lack of experience in international issues. However, after several years of the CARs' independent travel in the world arena, the base of their own style and practice in foreign policy making has started to take the shape. The latest studies (Anderson, 1997) illustrated that this practice may vary from country to country and was characterised as a complicated interaction of many factors. Formation of the CARs' foreign policy-making meets influences of the past, historical and cultural experience and the heritage of the former Soviet legacy along with present internal determinations such as the economic development, social and civilisational peculiarities, nationalism, differences in political behaviour and perceptions, traditional values.

This research was based on a survey study. Population of the study consisted of (1) academics, scientists and researchers, (2) members of the parliament, political parties and mass media, and (3) the personnel of the CARs' Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Proportional random sampling was used to select a sample. The questionnaire was designed to investigate: (a) opinion of the local experts on developing the foreign policy making process in Central Asia; (b) perception of the security issues and international development; (c) opinion on the role of the CARs' leaders in the formation of post Soviet foreign policy. Mostly structured questions, Likert and semantic-differential scales were designed to collect the data.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Until 1991, the Central Asian republics were under Moscow's political and economic patronage. This arrangement included delegation of the foreign policy formation from the republics to the Kremlin's leaders. However, since the collapse of the Moscow political dominance in the region in 1991, the CARs leaders faced the challenge of difficulties in transforming their countries from the Soviet type of the total dependency to the sovereign nation-statehood. A number of researchers have focused their efforts on studying internal and external politics of the post-Soviet Central Asia. Many individual researchers and think tanks analysed different aspects of the CARs' current foreign policy. Although the facts about internal, domestic politics of the CARs were known, the systematic analysis of international aspects of the Central Asian politics was not done and some interpretations were even misleading. Considerably little attention was paid to study of the practice in the public policy making including the formation of the CARs foreign policy. Therefore, the main research problem of this study was the formation of foreign policy decision making process in the Central Asian republics and the main factors that influenced the formation of the CARs foreign policy in the post-Soviet era.

It was anticipated that the research would assess the following aspects of the CARs foreign policy making: (1) the evaluation of CARs' foreign policy priorities by the local academic and foreign policy experts; (2) the role of the academic expertise in the CARs foreign policy making; (3) the evaluation by the CARs experts of the internal and external factors in the formation of the cohesive foreign policy.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following questions on CARs' foreign policy formation were answered through this study:

- 1) How was the process of the foreign policy formation in the CARs developed and what were the major influencing factors (both positive and negative) in each republic and the region as a whole?
- 2) What personal impact have the leaders of the republics had on the process of the foreign policy formation in their countries?
- 3) What were the perceptions of external and internal threats to the stability and security of the region and what was the perception of the need for co-operation within and outside the region?
- 4) What was the relationship between the academic experts (CARs' scholars in international relations) and the practitioners in the formation of the CARs' foreign policy making process

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

The following assumptions were made:

1) Strong interrelations existed between the academic (research) institutions and the foreign policy institutions in the CARs.

2) There were two levels of academic expertise in the CARs: firstly, the foreign policy research institutions, and, secondly, universities and other academic institutions that provided training and retraining.

3) Perception of the foreign policy making in the CARs by public and academic circles' and their perception of the relations with other members of the international community influenced the formation of the foreign policy priorities and directions during the first years of independence.

4) The representatives of the academic circles (experts, scholars, etc) were quite widely involved in the formation of the foreign policy priorities after the CARs' independence.

DEFINITIONS

The following definitions were operationalised for the study:

Academicians, scholars, scientists and researchers - people who work and teach in various research, teaching, and training organisations.

Central Asian region - the area occupied by five Central Asian republics, which are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

Central Asian Republics (CARs) - the term refers to the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Central Asian Union – organisation established in 1991, which united three republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

Commonwealth of Independent States – union of countries-successors of the USSR.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The importance of the research on current changes and trends in the CARs' foreign policy originated in the need to evaluate their effects on the climate of the international relations and security balance within and outside the region. The strategic magnitude of the Central Asian region derived from several factors. The first, its size and geographical location in the pivotal areas of the Eurasian continent (Mackinder, 1949); the second, geopolitical importance as a frontier line between Muslim, Confucian and Christian worlds (Huntington, 1992); and the third, its huge reserves of the natural resources, especially of oil and gas (Akiner, 1990; Zhoulamanov, 1995).

The results of this study are **significant** both in the theoretical and practical terms. Firstly, it was anticipated that the results would assist in further understanding of the peculiarities of the foreign policy-making. Secondly, they would assess the perceptions of the perspective of international relations by the local experts. Thirdly they would provide the practical guidelines for developing cooperation with the CARs (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan).

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

1. The study was limited to three Central Asian newly independent states: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The selection of the three republics out of the five Central Asian countries was grounded on the following reasons:

- 1.1 these republics were integrated into Central Asian Union;
- 1.2 these republics promoted the most active foreign policy in the region;
- 1.3 these republics were the biggest countries of the region;

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were excluded from the survey because of the following reasons:

- 1.4 Tajikistan was engaged in the civil war;
- 1.5 Turkmenistan's government pursued the isolationist policy.

2. The survey was also limited to the following organisations:

- 2.1 State executive institutions (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, etc.);
- 2.2 Universities (only the faculties of international relations, international economic relations, international law, etc.);
- 2.3 Research institutes (the Institutes of Strategic Studies, etc.);
- 2.4 State legislative institutions (Parliament);
- 2.5 Mass media.

Although the research covers the majority of the most established institutions, not all research and training organisations were included in the list.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Population of the Study

The population of the study was selected through three stages. At the first stage the researcher conducted a survey of the CARs mass media and he selected several institutions, which were the most important and influential in the CARs' foreign policy formation. Also the researcher analysed the current foreign policy debates in the region through the assessing local mass media and academic publications and then he selected the most important issues for the CARs foreign policy making.

During the second stage, the researcher conducted qualitative interviews with the CARs experts on foreign policy formation. During this stage the researcher clarified the structure and size of the analysed institutions, obtained information on their research and other activities and clarified important issues in CARs' foreign policy formation. Additionally at this stage, the questionnaire was pretested with a Centre for Social research of the Kyrgyz National Academy of Science.

During the third stage the researcher selected CARs institutions for the survey study, improved the questionnaire and conducted the survey. The population of the study covered 1669 staff members of different organisations and institutions whose work was related to the field of international relations. They were from three Central Asian newly independent countries: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The list was generated with the help of respective organisations who provided necessary information on their staff members.

Sampling

The stratified-random proportional sampling technique was used to generate random samples. A sample size of 19 per cent was selected with the help of a computer programme capable of generating random samples. This percentage was taken from the *Table for Determining Sample Size from a Given Population* designed by Krejcie and

*Morgan*¹. The organisations, which participated in the study were the strata of sample (Tables 1-3). In total 317 individuals were selected randomly for the study (Table 4).

Table 1
Population of Kazakhstan

Organisation	Number
1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs	180
2) Kazakh National University (faculties of International Relations, International Economic Relations. etc.)	170
3) Kazakh National Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan	26
4) Institute for Development of Kazakhstan	40
5) Representatives of executive power	14
6) National High School of Public Administration under the President of Kazakhstan	14
7) <i>Kainar</i> University (faculties of International Relations International Economic Relations)	60
8) Kazakh State University of Law (International Law)	70

Table 2
Population of Kyrgyzstan

Organisation	Number
1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs	105
2) International University of Kyrgyzstan	80
3) Institute of Integration of International Programmes of Kyrgyz State National University	80
4) Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of Kyrgyzstan	23
5) Representatives of executive power	12
6) Bishkek Humanitarian University	80
7) Russian Kyrgyz (Slavonic) University (International Relations, International Scientific and Technological Centre)	60

¹ Powel, R.R., *Basic Research Methodology for Librarians*. Norwood: N.J.: Ablex Pub., 1991, p. 75

Table 3
Population of Uzbekistan

Organisation	Number
1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs	190
2) Tashkent State Economy University (International Economic Relations, MBA, etc.)	85
3) University of World Economy and Diplomacy	100
4) Institute of Oriental Studies	80
5) Academy of Public and State Development under the President of Uzbekistan	90
6) Institute of Regional and Strategic Studies under the President of Uzbekistan	90
7) Parliament members	20

Table 4
Sample generation

N=1669 n=317

i*	Kazakhstan		Kyrgyzstan		Uzbekistan	
	N**	n***	N	n	N	n
1)	180	35	105	20	190	36
2)	170	32	80	15	85	16
3)	26	5	80	15	100	19
4)	40	7	23	5	80	15
5)	14	3	12	3	90	17
6)	14	3	80	15	90	17
7)	60	11	60	11	20	4
8)	70	13	—	—	—	—
Total:	574	109	440	84	655	124

* . Numbering of strata is according to Tables 1-3.

** . N here is a population of stud

*** . n here is a sample of study

Questionnaire

The questionnaire based survey method was chosen for the collection of data. The questionnaire was aimed at providing answers to all research questions, which were grouped as following:

- 1) developing a comparative analysis of the foreign policy making process in the Central Asian Republics (CARs)
- 2) analysing the personal input of the countries' leaders to the international politics of the respective republics (with a special focus on the decision making procedure in Central Asia);
- 3) evaluating the internal social and political perspective and consequences of the CARs' international politics;
- 4) finding out objections and difficulties in developing the democratic control mechanism of the CARs' foreign policy-making process.

The questionnaire consisted of 22 questions. The first question was aimed at the personal input of the respondents into formation of foreign policy of their respective countries.

The next two questions sought information on the process of formation and realisation of foreign policy and what groups have mostly influenced the process.

Two other questions were designed with a purpose to learn how well were the respondents informed about the process of foreign policy making in their countries and in Central Asian region as a whole and what were the main sources of such information. Two more questions were helpful in:

- 1) revealing the respondents' opinion about what qualities of the country's leader could have mostly affected the process of the foreign policy formation;
- 2) determining the degree at which the foreign policy of the republic's depended on the leader.

Another question was on problems that could endanger the stability and security of the region.

The next four questions were designed to obtain information on the possible ways of development: models of development, regional economic integration, and collaboration with other countries.

Another question revealed the opinion of the respondents on measures that were needed in improvement of the foreign policy process in their countries.

Two questions were developed to learn how frequently the respondents were communicating with different professional groups in their professional activity and how they assessed these relations.

The last segment of the questionnaire was devoted to the personal profile of the respondents when they were asked to indicate their age, race, gender, level of education, and profession/occupation.

The instrument mostly consisted of structured questions. The Likert and semantic-differential scales were used for most of the questions to get meaningful responses. **(Appendix 3)**.

The questionnaire was translated into Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek languages.

Data Collectio

The questionnaire, designed to collect data on the process of foreign policy formation in three Central Asian republics, was pretested in Kyrgyzstan in the National Academy of Science of Kyrgyz Republic in December 1996 when five respondents filled in the questionnaire. Most of the responses collected during the pretesting were according to expectation. Some good suggestions were received for improving the questionnaire.

The questionnaire was distributed and collected personally by the researcher in the offices of the respondents and with the help of staff members of Centre for Social Research in Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan questionnaires were personally distributed by the researcher and staff members of the National Academy of Science of these republics.

A covering letter from the researcher, highlighting the significance of the study and instructions on how to fill in the questionnaire, accompanied it (**Appendix 2**).

In Kyrgyzstan, the questionnaire was distributed during 20-29 January 1997 and 60 questionnaires were received back immediately. Twenty-five questionnaires were sent to the researcher by mail. In Kazakhstan, the questionnaires were distributed from 27 January until 2 February 1997 and 40 of them were received back immediately.

Twenty-six questionnaires were sent by mail. In Uzbekistan, the questionnaires were distributed between 3-9 February 1997 and 123 of them were received immediately.

Two hundred and twenty-three questionnaires (70.35%) were received back as at 12 February 1997 and 28 came by the mail, which made the total of 251 questionnaires.

Twelve of the received questionnaires were incomplete and, therefore, considered invalid so that finally 239 (75.4%) questionnaires were prepared for analysis.

The collected data was analysed by using SPSS for Windows for descriptive statistics like frequencies, means, and cross tabulations.

Respondents' Profile

Population of the study covered three Central Asian Republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Forty-six valid questionnaires were received from Kazakhstan respondents, 71 from Kyrgyzstan, and 120 from Uzbekistan with 2 cases missing. This makes a total of 239 respondents. The republics were represented in the sample in the proportion shown in **Figure 1.1**.

The sample of the study consisted of 156 (66.1%) male and 78 (33.1%) female respondents with 3 cases missing.

Figure 1.1
Respondents' Profile by Republics
N=239



The study covered the following age groups (**Table 1.1**):

Table 1.1
Age Groups of the Respondents
N=239

Age Groups	Frequency	Percent
up to 20 years old	31	13.0
21-30 years old	85	35.7
31-40 years old	67	28.2
41-50 years old	37	15.5
above 51 years old	18	7.5
Missing	1	0.4
Total	239	100

Ethnically the sample was represented by different groups that mainly included the following (**Table 1.2**):

Table 1.2
Ethnic Representation
N=239

Ethnic Group	Frequency	Percent
Kazakhs	42	17.6
Kyrgyzs	53	22.3
Russians	25	10.5
Tajiks	6	2.5
Uzbeks	98	41.2
Missing	1	0.4
Other	14	5.9
Total	239	100

Respondents were asked to reveal their level of education. According to received data the following results were calculated (**Table 1.3**):

Table 1.3
Educational Level of the Respondents
N=239

Level of Education	Frequency	Percent
Not completed high education	60	25.1
Institute, university	65	27.2
Aspirantura	53	22.1
Doktorantura	24	10.1
High education in foreign relations	5	2.1
Continuing or professional courses	11	4.6
Continuing or professional courses	18	7.5
Missing	3	1.3
Total	239	100

Also the question about the respondents' occupation considered being useful for the study. The collected data revealed the following picture (**Table 1.4**):

Table 1.4
Occupation of the Respondents
N=239

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
journalists	5	2.1
Staff of Ministry of Foreign Affairs	27	11.3
Scientist / Researcher	103	43.1
Member of the Parliament	12	5.0
Student	63	26.4
Other	28	11.7
Missing	1	0.4
Total	239	100

Research Project:
Formation of Foreign Policy in
Central Asia

This questionnaire is administered as a part of a study conducted within the framework of a research on foreign policy formation in the Central Asia republics. The main purpose of the project is to analyse the problems of the foreign policy formation in three republics of Central Asia. The questionnaire is administered in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Respondents were selected randomly. Since the questionnaire is anonymous, there is no need to indicate your surname, name and patronymic. Results of the questionnaire will be analysed with the help of a statistical computer programme. The questions were translated into Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek languages. Please, select a language that most convenient for you.

We will appreciate if you answer all of the questions.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. In your opinion, at what extent your abilities and professionalism are utilised in the formation of foreign policy of your republic?

- highly
- significantly
- moderately
- insignificantly
- not utilised

2. What do you think, how successfully foreign policy was formed and is realised in the following regions? *Please check all the options according to the following scale:*

1 bad; 2 moderately; 3 good; 4 excellent

Region	1	2	3	4
Kazakhstan				
Kyrgyzstan				
Uzbekistan				
Russia				
Central Asia				
CIS				

3. In your opinion, which of the following groups have the greatest influence on the formation of foreign policy in your republic? *Please check each group according to the following scale:*

1 does not influence; 2 influences insignificantly; 3 influences significantly; 4 influences greatly

group	1	2	3	4
Mass media				
Presidential office				
Ministry of Foreign Affairs				
Parliament				
Academy of science, universities (scientists and researchers)				
Public opinion				
Other (<i>Please indicate</i>)				

4. Do you receive enough information on the foreign policy of your republic and Central Asian region as a whole?

Region	enough	moderately enough	not enough	do not know
in your republic				
in Central Asia				

5. What are the main sources of information on the foreign policy of your republic and Central Asian region as a whole? *Please check only three options for each column.*

Source	in your republic	in Central Asia
Mass media		
Parliament's hearings		
Presidential speeches		
Speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs		
Foreign mass media		
Friends/colleagues		
Other (<i>please indicate</i>)		

6. In your opinion, how the following qualities of the leader of the republic affect the formation of foreign policy of your republic? *Please check all the options according to the following scale:*

1 does not affect; 2 affects insignificantly; 3 affects significantly; 4 affects greatly

Quality	1	2	3	4
Leadership abilities				
Theoretical knowledge of foreign relations				
Long experience in international relations				
Ability to synthesise theory and practice				
Ability to logically analyse a situation and find the only true solution				
Intuitio				
Other (<i>please indicate</i>)				

7. In your opinion, at what degree the formation of foreign policy depends on the republic's leader?

- depends completely on 100%
- depends on 75%
- depends on 50%
- depends on 25%
- does not depend
- other (*please indicate*)

8. Which of the following obstacles do you regard the most influential in the process of foreign policy formation? *Please check only 3 options for each column:*

Obstacle	in republic	in Central Asia
Lack of theoretical knowledge of international relations		
Too many theory and lack of practical deeds		
Lack of information on foreign policy		
Lack of coordination among the Central Asian republics		
Lack of professionals in the field of international relations		
Absence of experience in international arena		
Scientists and experts do not involved enough		
Other (<i>Please indicate</i>)		

9. What do you think, which of the following problems may threat stability and security in your region? *Please check only 3 options:*

- internal social and political problems
- economic crisis and economic problems
- environmental issues
- threat of the war
- possibility of complications of relations with the USA
- possibility of complications of relations with Russia
- possibility of complications of relations with China
- possibility of complications of relations with Iran
- possibility of complications of relations with Afghanistan
- possibility of complications of relations with Turkey
- religious fundamentalism
- other (*please indicate*)

10. What models of development mostly appropriate for your republic? *Please indicate only 2 options:*

- Turkish
- Japanese
- South Korean
- Russia
- German
- Newly Industrialised States (NISs) (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, etc.)
- Iranian
- Other (*please indicate*)

11. What do you think, how important is regional integration of the Central Asian republics? *Please check only 1 option.*

- highly important
- important
- integration is possible but not so important
- not important
- other (*please indicate*)

12. In your opinion, cooperation with which international organisations does mostly reflect interests of your republics? *Please indicate only 3 options.*

- Commonwealth of Independent States
- Organisation Islamic Conferenc
- European Security Organisation
- Economic Cooperation Organisation
- Union of Turkish Nations
- Central Asian Union
- Other (*please indicate*)

13. In your opinion, how important is collaboration with the following countries for the interests of your republic? *Please check each country according to the following scale:*

1 - not important; 2 - moderately important; 3 -important; 4 - very important

Country	1	2	3	4
Germany				
Russia				
The USA				
Japan				
Turkey				
China				
Iran				
Pakistan				
India				
Afghanistan				
Other (<i>please indicate</i>)				

14. In your opinion, what measures are needed for improvement of the process of the foreign policy formation in your republic? *Please check only 3 options:*

- improve education and training of personnel involved in the field of international relations
- intensify control from the Parliament
- increase *glasnost*
- involve more scientists and experts
- increase number of publications on international relations issues in mass media
- conduct more studies on foreign policy
- increase coordination between theorists and practitioners
- involve foreign consultants

15. How frequently do you communicate with the following groups during your professional activity? Please check all options according to the following scale:

1 - never; 2 - once in 6 -12 months; 3 - once in 3-5 months; 4 - once in 1-2 months; 5 - each week and more frequently

Groups	1	2	3	4	5
Mass media					
Ministry of Foreign Affairs					
International Department of the Presidential Office					
Scientists and researchers					
Parliament					
Public					
The Military and Security					
Other (please indicate)					

16. How do you assess your relations with the following groups during your professional activity? Please check only 3 options according to the following scale:

1 - unsatisfactory; 2 -satisfactory; 3 - good; 4 - excellent

Groups	1	2	3	4
Mass media				
Ministry of Foreign Affairs				
International Department of the Presidential Office				
Scientists and researchers				
Parliament				
Public				
The Military and Security				

Now please tell us about yourself:

17. Where do you leave:

- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Uzbekistan

18. Gender:

- Male
- Female

19. Age:

- 20 and below

- 21-30
- 31-40
- 41-50
- 51 and above

20. Your ethnic origin:

- Kazakh
- Kyrgyz
- Russia
- Tadjik
- Uzbek
- Other (*please indicate*)

21. Your highest education:

- secondary / secondary special
- incomplete high
- undergraduate (institute/university)
- graduate (aspirantura)
- postgraduate (doktorantura)
- high special (in the field of international relations)
- high special (continuing education courses)
- high special (overseas continuing education courses)
- other (*please indicate*)

22. Your occupation/profession:

- journalist (mass media)
- personnel of the Foreign Affairs Ministry
- personnel of International department of the Presidential Office
- scientist/researcher
- member of the Parliament
- other (*please indicate*)

Thank you for your help and cooperation.

Table 1

**Means of importance of co-operation with the following countries for Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (N = 239)**

Cooperation with	Kazakhsta N = 46	Kyrgyzstan N = 72	Uzbekista N = 120
Germany	2.93	2.84	3.30
Russia	3.73	3.68	3.34
USA	3.09	3.24	3.29
Japan	2.87	3.10	3.06
Turkey	2.89	2.72	2.45
China	3.14	2.94	2.68
Iran	2.07	2.04	2.11
Pakistan	1.90	2.04	2.06
India	2.07	2.11	2.24
Afghanistan	1.81	1.65	2.17
Others	--	--	--

'Others' included the CIS, the neighbouring Central Asian republics, the Arab countries, Korea, UK, and "Tigers" of East and Southeast Asia.

Table 2
Frequency of Importance of Integration for Central Asian Republics (%)
 (N = 239)

Importance	Entire Region	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan
Very importan	32.2	30.4	41.7	28.8
Important	50.2	52.2	50.0	50.0
Not so importan	13.8	15.2	5.5	18.6
No need	1.7	2.2	1.4	1.8
Other	2.1	0.0	1.4	0.8
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 3
Crosstabulations of Necessity of International Co-operation for Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (%)

Co-operation with	Kazakhstan N = 46	Kyrgyzstan N = 72	Uzbekistan N = 120
CIS	89.1	87.5	80.0
OIC	10.9	9.7	11.7
OSCE	52.2	52.8	71.7
Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO)	30.4	29.2	26.7
Union of Turk People	23.9	13.9	18.3
Central Asian Union	50.0	70.8	54.2
Others	0.0	5.6	5.8

'Others' included the United Nations, WTO, the European Union, IMF, and Green Peace.

Table 4

Means for Levels of Influence of Different Groups on the Foreign Policy Formati

<i>Source of Influence</i>	<i>Mean</i>		
	<i>Kazakhstan</i>	<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	<i>Uzbekistan</i>
President	3.39	3.29	3.70
MFA	2.93	3.04	3.33
Parliament	2.18	2.40	2.63
Media	2.00	2.27	2.06
Academicians	1.56	1.64	1.98
Public Opinion	1.49	1.64	1.83
Others	4.3	1.4	5

The respondents who marked option 'Others' indicated as sources of influence the President, the Tajik war, shadow economy, multiparty system and presence of international organisations in the republics.

Table 5
Frequency of the Respondents' Opinion on Success of
Foreign Policy Realisation (%)

<i>Country or Region</i>	<i>Badly</i>	<i>Moderately</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Successfully</i>	<i>Missing</i>	<i>Total</i>
Kazakhstan	4.2	37.2	46.4	9.3	2.9	100
Kyrgyzstan	13.0	43.5	32.2	6.7	4.6	100
Uzbekistan	4.6	17.5	42.3	31.0	4.6	100
Russia	10.9	28.4	38.9	18.0	3.8	100
Central Asia	7.9	44.4	36.4	2.9	8.4	100
CIS	22.2	43.1	25.1	2.5	7.1	100

The respondents' assessment of realisation of foreign policy in different parts of the CIS was also analysed through comparison of the means , where 1 is 'realised badly' and 4 is 'realisation is successful'.

Means for Assessment of Realisation of Foreign Policy in
Different Parts of the CIS

<i>Country or Region</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Uzbekistan	3.05	0.84
Russia	2.67	0.91
Kazakhstan	2.63	0.71
Central Asia	2.38	0.69
Kyrgyzstan	2.34	0.80
CIS	2.09	0.78

Figure 1
Models of Development (%)




Figure 2
Threats to Stability and Security in the Region by the Republics (%)




Figure 3
Crosstabulations of Sources of Information on Foreign Policy Formation in the
Republics

