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***THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND  
INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL RELATIONS:  
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY ISSUES AND NATO***

**BY**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The basic purpose of this project is to examine the effects of the end of the Cold War, the effects on both the international system in general and on the security issues and thus NATO in particular. While examining the effects of the end of the Cold War, it concentrates on a particular element, namely civilization. The Cold War did not only disguised or suppressed the particular regional conflicts behind the ubiquitous preeminence of the East-West confrontation, but also consolidated the national identity as it had been basically carried out by the nation-states, the primary actors in international relations which are mainly defined in political and military terms. Although the 'war' was basically waged between the two formidable blocs they were basically inter-state alliances. The end of the Cold War therefore resulted in the beginning of regional conflicts increasing the risk of small wars on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the emergence of new identifications, of sub-national and supra-national character, besides the national identity.

The collapse of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which led to emergence of the newly independent states in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Caucasia and Central Asia, have not only revived old rivalries and created new conflicts, but also rendered the traditionally employed concepts and policies inefficient in the analysis of relations and issues of security among states. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the virtual monopoly of military threat in considerations for security matters has been eliminated. It could be said that the stability and order in the post-Cold War world depend largely on the development of the new concepts, techniques and approaches to understand the problems that have emerged. International relations scholars have already noticed this and suggested new insights.<sup>1</sup>

The project attempts to introduce the concept of civilization and takes the view that there are multiple civilizations in the world. Though not cohesive wholes like nation states as we know them, civilizations, being the culmination of common linguistic, cultural and religious characteristics and shared historical inheritance and experiences of peoples, are great creations of humanity and useful categories for us to understand the international life. The point from which this project has been envisaged to start is the view that civilizational elements and civilizational identifications of individuals and societies have been significant factors in their attitudes and behaviours, and the observation that the importance of the civilizational element has been increasing as the existing and

emerging countries within and around the European hinterland, indeed all over the world, are struggling to form new identities or to fortify the old ones after the Cold War. It has taken the view that there are multiple civilizations in the world and we could detect at least three civilizations within NATO, though one of them -Western civilization- is dominant in comparison to the other two, namely Orthodox and Islamic civilizations.

For an adequate examination of the implications of civilizational elements and inter-civilizational relations for NATO, the research has been carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the research has basically concentrated on a comprehensive analysis of the concept of civilization. In the second stage, the increasing relevancy of the concept of civilization to international relations after the Cold War and the questions of the civilizational identifications of the member states of NATO and of how effective civilizational elements upon their behaviours have been examined. Although the project aims at the elucidation of the concept of civilization and thus has basically been theory-dominated, limited empirical findings have been collected through questionnaires which were selectively conducted by personal interviews with various peoples.<sup>2</sup>

In what follows, first is a comprehensive elucidation of the idea of civilization in both etymological and historical points of view. It has been suggested that there can be discerned three different, but related, meanings of the concept of civilization: civilization being a condition of human society, civilization being a process through which human society has been going, and civilization being a particular type of society or a unit of collective social identification. Second comes an examination of the emergence of the cultural or civilizational element into the surface of world politics in the aftermath of the Cold War. To this end, besides a general observation of international system, the case of Turkey has been taken as an example. Finally, what all this means to NATO has been discussed.

## II. THE IDEA OF CIVILIZATION

Etymologically, the meaning of a word can be found in its usage. To understand what is meant by the concept of 'civilization' we first need to see how it is used. The root word of 'civilization' is *civis* (citizen) or *civitas* (city) in Latin. Among other things, the term, in its Latin root, basically refers to the state of being related to, of pertaining to, of belonging to a collectivity of people, an organized collectivity, a body politic which we may call a state or commonwealth. It refers to the city-life or 'citification' or process of 'civilization' in social life of the human beings.<sup>3</sup>

The word 'civilization' in French and English first appeared in the eighteenth century. It was born after its verb, 'to civilise', and participle, 'civilized'. A couple of works or authors have been cited as the first literary evidence of the appearance of the word civilization. Braudel says it first appeared 'in a printed work in 1766' and notes that it was current in speech earlier. L. Febvre and Elias agree with Braudel. For the former, the earliest printed use of the word civilization is by Boulanger in his *L'Antiquité Devoilée par ses Usages*, printed in Amsterdam in 1766. The latter, Elias, finds the first literary evidence of the evolution of the verb *civilizer* into the concept *civilization* -referring to softening of manner, urbanity and politeness- in the work of Mirabeau in the 1760s. Another author using the word about the same time is said to be Baudeau in his *Ephémérides du Citoyen* (1767). The word entered into the *Academy's Dictionary* in 1798. Contrary to this agreement upon the eighteenth century as the birth date of the word civilization, a much earlier date has been suggested. According to Wundt, it was Bodin who first used the word in its modern sense in the sixteenth century. The *Oxford English Dictionary*, too, gives first citations of civilization from the eighteenth century onwards. The word is defined in three senses. The first, and the earliest, is a technical sense in law: 'A law, act of justice, or judgement, which renders a criminal process civil; which is performed by turning an information into an inquest, or vice versa.' In this sense, it is cited from 1704 onwards. Secondly, the word means 'the action or process of civilizing or of being civilized' and it is cited from 1775 onwards. In its third sense, civilization denotes, more usually, 'civilized condition or state; a developed or advanced state of human society; a particular stage or a particular type of this.' In this sense, it is first cited in 1772.<sup>4</sup>

Connected words, 'civility', 'civilize', and 'civilized', were used earlier than the word 'civilization'. The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives four senses of 'civility'

‘connected with civilization, culture.’ 1) ‘The state of being civilized; freedom from barbarity.’ Cited from 1549 onwards. 2) ‘Polite or liberal education; training in the ‘humanities’, good breeding; culture, refinement.’ Cited from 1533 onwards. 3) ‘Behavior proper to the intercourse of civilized people; ordinary courtesy or politeness, as opposed to rudeness of behavior; decent respect, consideration.’ Cited from 1561 onwards. 4) ‘Decency, seemliness.’ First cited in 1612.<sup>5</sup> Six senses of the verb ‘to civilise’, from which ‘civilization’ is derived, are listed as follows, with citation dates in parenthesis: 1) to bring out of a state of barbarism, to instruct in the arts of life, and thus elevate in the scale of humanity; to enlighten, refine, and polish (1601); 2) ‘to make ‘civil’ or moral; to subject to the law of civil or social propriety’ (1640); 3) ‘to make lawful or proper in a civil community’ (1643); 4) ‘to turn a criminal into a civil cause’; 5) ‘to become civilized or elevated’ (1868); 6) ‘to conform to the requirements of civil life, to behave decently’ (1605). The participle ‘civilized’ is defined in two senses. The first one refers to being ‘made civil; in a state of civilization’ and is cited from 1611 onwards. The second one is defined as ‘of or pertaining to civilized men’ and cited from 1654 onwards.

The term civilization is very often accompanied by the term culture, even though they were not synonymous. Sometimes, they have been used interchangeably as it is in ‘Western civilization’ and ‘Western culture.’ It would therefore be helpful to go on to the word ‘culture’. Compared to civilization, the word ‘culture’ has a longer history. Braudel says that even Cicero speaks of ‘*cultura mentis*’. ‘Culture’ is derived from Latin *cultuae*, from the verb *colere*, with the meaning of tending or cultivation. In Christian authors, *cultura* has the meaning of worship. The Old French form was *couture*, later replaced by *culture*. In English, the following usages can be noted: ‘the action or practice of cultivating the soil; tillage, husbandry’ (1420); ‘worship; reverential homage’ (1483); ‘the cultivating or development (of mind, faculties, manners, etc.); improvement or refinement by education’ (1510 More, 1651 Hobbes, 1752 Johnson, 1848 Macaulay); ‘the training of the human body’ (1628); ‘the training, development and refinement of mind, tastes and manners; the condition of being thus trained and refined; the intellectual side of civilization’ (1805 Wordsworth, 1837 Emerson, 1869 Arnold); ‘a particular form or type of intellectual development. Also, the civilization, customs, artistic achievements, etc, of a people, especially at a certain stage of its development or history’ (1867 Freeman, 1871 Tylor).<sup>6</sup>

From this summary of the various senses of civilization and culture what we derive, at first instance, is that the two words have had a close association, and sometimes referred

to the same thing. By the mid-nineteenth century, the two terms came to be used interchangeably in the literature of anthropology and ethnology. It became common after G. Klemm's (1843) use of the German word '*kultur*' as to include the French term '*civilization*', for there was no word for 'civilization' in German. Especially, with the adaptation of Klemm's usage by Tylor (1871), the two words became, in a sense, inseparable in anthropology, even though most anthropologists preferred to use 'culture'. Yet, by 'culture', anthropologists mean also what may be included in 'civilization'. The earliest treatises of culture (civilization) are said to be C. Meiner's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1785) and G. Klemm's *Allgemeine Cultur-Geschichte der Menschheit* (1843), though each recognized predecessors going back to Voltaire.<sup>7</sup>

It was not only the anthropologist or ethnologist who included what is meant by 'culture' and 'civilization' in one word - either 'culture' or 'civilization'. Many scholars did the same so that it would not make a considerable difference if the words are replaced by each other. In fact, it could be said that both words fairly established themselves by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Guizot, in 1828, confidently proclaimed that 'civilization is a fact like any other.' It was a fact susceptible of being studied, described and narrated. It constituted a fact *par excellence*, 'the sum, the expression of the whole life of nations.' Civilization as a fact was equated with progress and development. 'The idea of progress, of development,' says Guizot, 'appears to me the fundamental idea contained in the word, **civilization**.' Civilization denotes, on the one hand, the development of society in terms of an increasing production of the social strength and happiness and also in terms of a more equitable distribution, among individuals, of the strength and happiness produced. On the other hand, civilization means the development of the individual, of his faculties, his sentiments, and his ideas.<sup>8</sup> Guizot's bold statements, confidently expressed, show that the concept civilization has been well-established. They can also be taken as the reflection of the self-confidence of a rising Europe. Guizot thinks that civilization, is *ipso facto* valued. He never questions if it is something good. However, Mill, only eight years after Guizot, asks whether civilization is a good. By 'civilization', he too means 'human improvement'. According to Mill, there are two basic characters of a state of high civilization: the diffusion of property and intelligence, and the power of cooperation. Civilization is, on the whole, a good; though he speaks of some negative effects coming from civilization.<sup>9</sup> Mill is not as sure as Guizot. The English cautiousness? Perhaps, yes. De Gobineau (1853-1855) kept the value-loaded meaning of the concept. He defined civilization as 'a state of relative stability,

where the mass of men try to satisfy their wants by peaceful means, and are refined in their conduct and intelligence.’<sup>10</sup>

In all these treatments of civilization, what comes out is that civilization is taken to be both a process and a condition, or property, of man and society. Generally, it is ascribed with a positive qualification, perhaps, since its inception. The positive connotation of the concept has by no means been commonly accepted. Mill hesitated about it. By mid-nineteenth century, it was openly questioned. Marx and Engels wrote in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848): ‘There is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.’<sup>11</sup> Later, in *Origin of Family, Private Property and State* (1884), Engels spoke in sharper words: ‘Naked greed has been the moving spirit of civilization from the first day of its existence to the present time; wealth, more wealth and wealth again... was its sole and determining aim.... The exploitation of one class by another is the basis of civilization,’ so, ‘its whole development moves in a continuous contradiction.’<sup>12</sup> Marx and Engels’ remarks could be seen as an expression of, or attention to, the likely side-effects of technical progress or industrialization which has been regarded to be a major component of civilization. The qualification of civilization to show disapproval, as made by Marx and Engels, or others for that matter, may be taken, according to Braudel, as an expression of the duality between spirit and nature -a duality which has been tenaciously persistent in German thought. Culture in the German language, from Herder on, meant scientific and intellectual progress freely removed from any social context. By civilization, the German language simply intended the material aspect of man’s existence. In this dichotomy, Braudel argues, one word is devalued, the other is exalted.<sup>13</sup> The qualification of civilization and culture according to some sort of dichotomy is not just something peculiar to the German thought. The traces of that duality may be found in the works of many scholars, from Arnold’s *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) to Snow’s *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (1959). Devaluation or exaltation, the concept has usually been value-laden.

Of course, there have been those who defined the concept of civilization, united with culture, in a ‘technical’ sense without an association with a value. Tylor’s definition which became established in the mainstream literature of anthropology might be regarded as an example in this direction. ‘Culture or Civilization,’ wrote Tylor in 1871, ‘taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of

society.’<sup>14</sup> Tylor, as seen, took the terms ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ as identical and, indeed, used them interchangeably throughout his work. It seems hardly feasible to expect Tylor’s, or anybody else’s, attempt to be successful in making civilization completely devoid of any value. In technicalizing the word, Tylor did not render it free from any valuation, positive or negative. What he did was to include within the concept both valuations. Tylor’s definition could be viewed in line with that of Ibn Khaldun who seems to define it to be what man, as a member of society, has done and been doing. Ibn Khaldun considers the *bedouin* life (nomadic life) to be the ground for settled life and *sedentary* culture in which civilization grows longer.<sup>15</sup> The ‘technical’ definition, as provided by Ibn Khaldun and later Tylor, could be taken as an adequate definition in practical terms. As I have already said it is not free from valuations, but at least, it makes the concept free from reifications as it is in such phrases as ‘civilization is progressing’, ‘civilization penetrated’, and so on.<sup>16</sup>

Just as there have been attempts to dissociate civilization from a value-laden content, we have witnessed the attempts to distinguish the concepts of culture and civilization. A distinction appears to have been prevalent, expressed in one of the definition of the word ‘culture’ by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as ‘the intellectual side of civilization.’ By this distinction, attributed to the persistent duality in the German thought by Braudel, culture refers to ‘intellectual’ advancements and achievements and civilization denotes ‘material’ advancements and achievements. Needless to say that such a distinction depends upon the separation of the intellectual and material, which is ultimately untenable.

A second prevalent distinction is to treat one concept to be a general and inclusive category and the other in terms of the subcategories of the former. This distinction is a distinction, as the saying goes, in degree not in kind. Most of the writers have taken civilization as a larger category and culture as the component of civilization. Braudel wrote: ‘A civilization... is a collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena.’<sup>17</sup> Elias, in similar fashion, makes the point that the concept of *kultur* delimits, whereas the concept of civilization plays down the national differences between peoples.<sup>18</sup> Melko expresses straight forwardly and considers civilization to be ‘large and complex cultures, usually distinguished from simpler cultures by a greater control of environment’, including the practice of agriculture and the domestication of animal. Civilization incorporates a multiplicity of cultures.<sup>19</sup> A civilization is, according to Hodgson, a compound culture, ‘a relatively extensive grouping of interrelated cultures in so far as they have shared in cumulative traditions in the form of high culture, on the urban, literate level.’<sup>20</sup> What we see here is

that, on the one hand, civilization is a collectivity of multiple cultures; on the other hand, culture is seen as constitutive of civilization. Culture could therefore be more inclusive as well. Bagby suggests a distinction on this ground. He defines culture as ‘regularities in the behavior, internal and external, of members of a society, excluding those regularities which are clearly hereditary in origin.’ Civilization is, he says, ‘the kind of culture found in the cities.’ Cities are in turn defined as the agglomerations of dwellings many of whose inhabitants are not engaged in producing food.<sup>21</sup> Such attempts to distinguish the terms ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’, though they seem more tenable than the ‘intellectual’ vs ‘material’ distinction and could serve pragmatically, can hardly be maintained for each word can safely be replaced by other without losing the meaning of both and causing any confusion.<sup>22</sup> The distinction as such could be useful for pragmatical purposes, but no more. Besides, civilization and culture, however they may be distinguished, refers to what man has produced and inherited from the others.

To sum up so far, three distinct, but interrelated, meanings of the concept of ‘civilization’ can be said to exist in common use, though their contents may vary. The first meaning is the adjectival form. Here, civilization qualifies men and society. It refers to the state of being civilized, to the possession of good-manners and self control. When we say phrases like ‘a thoroughly civilized man’ or ‘in a civilized country’, it is in this sense that we use the term civilization. This was, as we have outlined, the original meaning of the concept when it was first introduced in the eighteenth century. In this sense, it is implied that there are ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ ways of doing things, or patterns of behavior. Strictly speaking, this sense can hardly be maintained. As Elias noted, ‘there is almost nothing which cannot be done in a ‘civilized’ or an ‘uncivilized’ way.’<sup>23</sup> In this adjectival meaning of the concept civilization, the ‘civilizedness’ and ‘uncivilizedness’ persist. They do not eliminate each other, though one of them (the civilizedness) is exalted. If there is a ‘civilized’ way of doing something, it necessitates that there is an ‘uncivilized’ way of doing it.

The second meaning of the concept civilization refers to a particular condition of men and societies, and also to a process the result of which is that particular condition, called civilization. In this sense, the term denotes a name for a process and condition or state of society. It is interrelated with the first meaning because it is the condition of civilization, or the result of the process of civilization, that allow men to attain ‘civilized’ behavior, or the quality of being ‘civilized’. Civilization as a condition implies that the

society or men attained a particular condition at a particular point in time, a condition which men had not had before. Civilization as a process implicates that the condition of civilization, which is itself a result of a process, is not finite. In other words the civilizing process is continuous. In this sense, civilization is conceived to be communal, that is, it is something which happens to a community.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, as a process, it assumes the existence of a further condition, sometimes thought to be 'better' than the present one. It is in this view that Collingwood treats civilization as a process of approximation to an ideal state.<sup>25</sup> Civilization as a state or process is understood to be a general feature, applicable to, and attainable by, human societies, in fact all human societies. Civilization thus becomes a phase in the course of the life of human beings or societies, it was achieved throughout the history of mankind. Here, we speak of civilization, not of civilizations. The word is understood in singular form.

The third meaning of the concept of civilization refers to its plural form. By this meaning, we speak of civilizations, denoting that there are separate, distinct societies of human beings which have their own identifiable civilizations, as expressed when we say of 'Western civilization', 'Chinese civilization', 'Islamic civilization', and so on. Braudel tells us that civilization (and culture) moved from the singular to the plural towards 1850. Civilizations in the plural form imply the renunciation of a civilization defined as an ideal, or as the ideal.<sup>26</sup> The plural conception of civilization does not only imply the existence of different, distinct societies in the state of civilization, but also different understandings of civilization as a state or property of society and men. One should therefore speak not of the progress of civilization in general, but of the progress or development of separate European, Chinese, Egyptian, or Muslim civilizations. With this meaning, civilization becomes a social entity with which a collectivity of people identify themselves or could be associated. The third meaning of the term may be interrelated to the second and first ones. Firstly, we label each social entity or collectivity as civilization assuming that something common enable us to speak of it, however they may have different conceptions of being civilized. Secondly, there have been some common traits which are historically traceable. Taken in this sense, of course, the question is the delineation of civilizations. This is where we come to civilization being a social entity and a unit of analysis.

When considered to be a unit or entity, civilization denotes a social collectivity. It is one of the collective identifications of human beings, and, as I said, the word is in its plural form. Viewed this way, of course, the question is how to distinguish or delimit multiple

civilizations. Unlike its meaning as a state of society, in this meaning it can be taken as a unit of analysis and some historians such as Spengler, Toynbee, Barraclough and McNeill argue that civilizations are 'proper' units of analysis in history. Saying that civilizations are the proper units of analysis for historical study is not the same as saying that other collective (social) entities and identifications are improper units as the multi-faceted nature of social phenomena does not allow only one unit to be taken in expense of the others. Civilizations are, as already said, one form of social identifications. Then, what is a social (collective) identity? And first of all, what is meant by identity?

First and foremost, identity and existence are co-attributes or processes of something. Identity can then be said to be a definition, by which we come to know or we describe something. Someone or something that we can describe by identity, or with which identity is associated may be named as the identifier; and in turn the thing which defines and describes the identifier could be said as the identified. For example, individuals are identifiers and 'society' is the identified, and the result is what we call 'social identity'. It can fairly be argued that, despite the seemingly opposed connotations, identity and distinction are closely interdependent. Any identification therefore requires a distinction just as any distinction necessitates some identification. If nothing is identified, then, no distinction can be achieved and vice versa. The identity of something depends upon the existence of something else.

Man identifies himself with something else -e.g. family, sex, group, nation, and so on- in order to become what he is. It has been argued that at the most fundamental level, identity results from the human vulnerability. In order to have psychological security, every individual is said to possess 'an inherent drive to internalize' -i.e. to identify with- the behaviour, mores, values and attitudes of those in his or her social environment. Moreover, so it is held, every human being possesses 'an inherent drive to enhance and to protect the identifications he or she has made.'<sup>27</sup> The lengthy and vulnerable infancy and childhood of human beings may be taken as the basis of the 'inherent drive' for identification with others to achieve psychological security and, perhaps, physical security. Whether the drive for identification is inherent or not, identity and identification are a concomitant part of human existence. There are two processes of identification. On the one hand, we see that the identifier internalizes or associates with the values, behaviours, attitudes, symbols and myths of the identified and on the other hand, an externalization of, or disassociation from, the values, myths, symbols, attitudes and mores of the non-identified.

Identification is an on-going process. This means both the enhancement of the existing identifications and the establishment of new identifications. In other words, human beings have multiple identities. It may be possible to advance a triple categorization of the identifications of human beings. Everyone has different traits and characteristics, yet people have similar features as well. Thus, separate and common identifications are possible. First, there is a common identification of everybody, for all persons share some traits with all others, i.e. the universal characteristics of the specie. This could be regarded as the identification of all human beings as distinct from non-humans. Secondly, as all persons share some characteristics with some others, those characteristics define those persons as members of a particular group, leading to what may be called group identifications. Any group identification accordingly involves the existence or establishment of commonalities to form the group and of differences to distinguish it from the others. Thirdly, a person has some traits which he or she shares with no one else, constituting his individual personality or idiosyncratic characteristics, making the personal or individual identity.

If the identification basically arises from the human infant's need for physical and psychological security, this means that, as already stated, the security need, i.e. survival, forms the basis of identity. Behind this need for security lies the vulnerable character of human beings. As human beings may have various characteristics and needs, or they may develop and obtain them in time, then it could be asserted that human beings may have, or may achieve in time, multiple identities. They can identify themselves with various groups according to their characteristics and needs. The scope, intensity and number of these identifications will vary with the degree and strength of these needs and traits, and with time and place as well. As Smith rightly makes it, there is nothing to prevent individuals from identifying with Flanders, Belgium, and Europe simultaneously, and displaying each allegiance in the appropriate context; or from feeling they are Yoruba, Nigerian, and African in concentric circles of loyalty and belonging.<sup>28</sup>

It follows that personal identity of an individual is formed by his collective identifications. Personal identity is indeed social. When the child internalizes the patterns of behaviour of, say, his parents, he internalizes a behavioral pattern on which the social environment has already made an impact. Even the idiosyncratic characteristics of an individual do not just emerge from a biological or an intra-psychological process, independent from the social milieu in which he or she is socialized. Moreover, it has been said that for most psychologists, from Freud to Mead, personality is a social construct and

the result of social interaction. Bloom, I think rightly, adds that to a lesser or greater degree, all identifications are social and shared. The identifier might be an individual, but the identified is always social.<sup>29</sup> What one is can only be intelligible in the social network in which one is an element. The individual self is not something detachable from one's relationship with the others. What one is may depend upon what one feels and thinks and what one feels and thinks is not independent of the prevailing feeling and thought in the society of which one is a member.

Having said that identity emerges out of the needs and common traits and characteristics of human beings, it could further be proposed that societal (or group) identification is evoked and enhanced if a) the group provides individuals with security in the face of external threat, and/or b) the group is beneficent towards the (would-be-) members. The existence of an external threat causes human beings to make identifications with the others around, just as the vulnerability of the human infant against the environment leads him/her to make identification with the parents. For example, according to Thucydides, before the Trojan War (an external threat) there was no identification of being 'Hellas' or 'Hellenes' in Greece. Homer did not call them by the name of 'Hellenes'. He did not even use the term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes had not yet been marked off from the rest of the world by one distinctive appellation.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, it has been a generally agreed view that in the formation of the English and French national identities, Hundred Years War was one of the most significant factors. It was this continuous conflict, Trevelyan wrote, which supplied England with 'strong national self-consciousness; great memories and traditions; a belief in the island qualities.'<sup>31</sup> It would not be wrong to say that the Ottoman power in the East had been a prominent factor in the shaping of the modern European identity.<sup>32</sup> Through the existence of external groups, a group is distinguished and identified, when external groups are perceived as a threat, it is highly likely that the distinction increases and the group identification is enhanced.

The social identifications which an individual could have range from the smallest collective unit, for instance, family, to the all-embracing one, for example, humanity. There may be discerned some important points about these social identifications. First, as I have already hinted, all collective identifications are social in the sense that man is *per se* a social creature. Parallel to this, they are historical in the sense that they are formed in the course of time. Identifications, being social, involves a collectivity of human beings. As already stated, even the individual identity takes place in, and is shaped by, a collectivity. A social identity

is the internalization of some elements by some individuals. Man, being a social being, as far as we know him, has always had a kind of feeling for collectivity or group consciousness, as emphasized by Kohn.<sup>33</sup> The extent of this feeling and the size of the collectivity it covers vary. The collectivity of a social identification may even grow to the extent that it can gain an all-embracing character as it is in gender identification. A family, a simple group such as a camping group of 3-4 people are small collectivities of social identifications. Communities, nations, ethnies are what we take as normal collectivities. Large collectivities may form social identifications, for instance, religions and civilizations. The historicalness of a social identity involves not only the case that it takes place in the historical process, but also it means that the extent and degree of their collectivity, their cohesiveness and impact upon human beings can change throughout history. At a particular period in time, for example, a particular form of identity may have a greater cohesiveness and consequently influence on the individuals, as it is the case with religion before the modern period in Europe. In another age, another form of identity may gain strength and exert control upon individuals as in the case of national identity with the modern age in Europe. A form of identity in time may even get near-universal. The point has been made that the national identity has been so predominant in the contemporary world that 'to be without nationality is to be perceived as almost without identity.'<sup>34</sup>

The second point to be noted about social identifications is that there may be defined two classes of them on the basis of how human beings achieve their identity. One is the identity chosen by individuals with their own will and the second one denotes those into which individuals are born. Examples of the first are interest groups, political parties, clubs and associations; of the second are family, ethnie, society, nationality and civilization. Those identifications which are not chosen by individuals are in the beginning exclusive as they are born into by individuals. One can only be born into a family, a society and a civilization and thus excluded from the others. However, this involuntary and exclusive character of some social identifications is not absolute and continuous in the life span of individuals. The very sociality and historicalness of social identity allows men to change their identificational collectivity. In time, man could change his family, his nationality, his religion and so forth. Paradoxically, it is that very sociality of the social identity that, via the progress of socialization, makes it extremely difficult for individuals to change their social identifications such as religion, culture, civilization.

A third point is the extent and degree of social identifications in making cohesive units and mobilizing individuals for common action. As I have already stated this could vary in the course of historical process. Yet, some propositions may be advanced. First, the wider an identity is the less likely it is to be a ground for a cohesive identification and mobilization for a common action. That is why civilizations are less cohesive and potent than, say, nation states. Second, the need from which a social identity emerges may be a determinant of its cohesion and capacity for collective action. It may increase according to the urgency and necessity. Another factor, already mentioned, can be given as the existence of an external threat. One other may be recalled. The degree of cohesion and mobilization of a collectivity may depend upon how beneficial the identification is towards individuals.

As a last point, it could be recorded that a social identity, once established, may lead to, or enhance, other identifications. This is a result of the dynamic and ongoing nature of the process of identification. It is a commonplace that territorial identity largely determines one's societal or national identifications. Conversion to a particular religion may lead to a change of communal identity. Similarly, identifications of class, nation, ethnîe, religion could increase or decrease the cohesiveness of each other. Having made these observations on identity, I shall examine civilizational identity as a particular form of social identity

Civilizations as social identifications are said to be large-scale collectivities. They are large-scale entities in two senses: in their spatial coverage and temporal extensions. Civilizations are wider and broader and more durable and long-lived than other collective identifications in human history. This view is best expressed by Braudel. 'Civilizations are,' wrote Braudel, 'realities of the extreme *longue dureé*.' Civilizations are not 'mortal', at least, in comparison to human lives. They exceed in longevity any other collective reality and, in space, go beyond the frontiers of the specific societies.<sup>35</sup> Huntington has defined a civilization as 'the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.'<sup>36</sup> Being large-scale entities, civilizations thus incorporate a multiplicity of other social collectivities or group identifications. Of course, it makes them to have a low degree of cohesion and potency. It should here be pointed out that large-scale characterization of civilization is just the result of historical observation. It entails no logical necessity.

Closely related to the view that civilizations are large-scale and long-lived collectivities is the idea that they are self-sufficient and self-comprehending societies. The

most ardent proponent of this idea is Spengler. One can add Toynbee. Yet, the idea is implicitly expressed by many writers. For Spengler, civilizations or, in his terms, great cultures are the prime phenomena of all past and future world history. They have their own ideas, lives and death, their own possibilities of self-expression. Each civilization possesses its own sculpture, painting, physics, number and mathematics.<sup>37</sup> Toynbee considers civilization to be an 'intelligible field of historical study' and as institutions that 'comprehend without being comprehended by others.'<sup>38</sup> The basic idea behind this view is that a small or individual society can hardly be understood and comprehended by remaining within its boundaries because it is not self-sufficient and free from external influences and impulses. Accordingly, so it is held, a larger entity comprises more possibilities for self-sufficiency and self-comprehension. Ranke, who did not have a conception of separate civilizations, seems to have in mind this idea when taking Latin and Germanic peoples as a unit.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Collingwood, when explicating 'the idea of history', relied on 'the modern European idea of history,'<sup>40</sup> implying that 'Europe' could be a more 'intelligible' unit than, say, 'England'. As could be seen, the self-sufficiency and self-comprehension of civilizations are relative. The Spenglerian idea, according to which civilizations are conceived to be self-sufficient in terms of being free from external impulses and interactions, can hardly be maintained. Civilizations encounter each other and make exchanges with each other. Historically, we see that, for instance, at least three civilizational societies interacted in the Mediterranean region, namely Western Christendom, Eastern Christendom and Islamic Civilization. If civilizations are to be taken as self-sufficient, self-comprehending, we need to ask self-sufficient in what respects and self-comprehending in which aspects and limits. Civilizations can then be regarded as relatively self-sufficient and self-comprehending. The same relativity goes for large-scale and long-lived characterization. Now, we can sum up that civilizations are long-lived, large-scale, self-sufficient and intelligible collectivities in comparison to other collectivities.

Having examined the basic nature of civilizations, the questions comes to the delineation of different civilizations. What could be the distinguishing elements? What would be the criterion for the delimitation of civilizational identities? As a working criterion, it may be advanced that a civilization could be defined, first by common 'objective' elements shared by some people such as common descent, language, history, customs, institutions, religion, style... etc; and, secondly, by the subjective self-identification of people in concern, meaning that people are conscious of their commonalities and that

they consciously identify themselves with the said civilization.<sup>41</sup> Let us see those ‘objective’ elements:

**a) Common descent.** It might be argued that a civilization is formed by a collectivity of people who are supposed to come from a common descent or claim that they have a common ancestry. Though this view seems, to us, so obvious to be unsustainable, when united with racial ideology, it goes as far as to assert that only those coming from a certain ancestor can form a civilization. Alas, it is so obvious that a common descent or ethnic stock cannot be taken as a basis for a civilization. Isocrates knew it. In his *Panegyricus*, he wrote: ‘And so far has our city distanced the rest of the world in thought and in speech that her pupils have become the teachers of the rest of the world; and she has brought it about that the cause ‘Hellenes’ is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those a common blood.’<sup>42</sup> It suffices to add to those remarks by Isocrates that historical research demonstrates peoples, having a supposed common descent, scattered in more than one civilization (Indo-European peoples being the identifiers of, at least, two or three distinct civilizations -Western, Indian and Islamic civilizations); and it also demonstrates civilizations with more than one ethnic stocks (Islamic civilization comprising Arabs, Turks, Persians, to name but a few). It might be argued that the fact of your being born into a family from a particular ethnic stock could influence your social identities. However, this is not equal to saying that people from a common ancestry could constitute a civilization. Yet, the myth of a common descent, if sustained, could enhance civilizational identifications.

**b) Language.** It is said that separate civilizations possess distinct languages.<sup>43</sup> Language does not, however, form a significantly distinctive element of civilizations as it changes with time and place. Moreover, civilizations are usually bilingual or multilingual. For example, Sumerian and Semitic in earlier Mesopotamia, Greek and Latin in Hellenism, Western Europe and Islam with many languages. Yet, each civilization may have a sort of ‘superlanguage’ throughout its geographical extensions -a ‘civilizational’ language or a language of power and élité. Kroeber gives some examples: Mandarin, Sanskrit, the Greek Koine, Latin in Western Christendom, Arabic in Islam, Great Russian in Soviet Civilization.<sup>44</sup> The existence of a superlanguage may enhance civilizational identity. This is not disputable. Nevertheless, the changing nature of language and multilingual characteristic of civilizations hamper language to be the distinctive element.

c) **Religion.** Religion is taken as a distinguishing element of a civilization on the ground that civilizations are accompanied by religions or some kind of worship.<sup>45</sup> Some civilizations have institutionalized religions such as Christianity in both its Catholic and Orthodox versions, Islam, Brahmanism and Confucianism, whereas some civilizations (e.g., the early Near Eastern civilizations) do not have organized religions, but local forms of worship. Some civilizations are distinctively defined or established by its religion as it is with the Islamic civilization.

d) **Territory and Geography.** I have earlier said that a territorial region, or geography in general, constitutes one of the major factors in the emergence of civilization as a state of society. Hence, it would seem reasonable to expect that differences in territory and geography could lead to civilizational differences. It is true in the sense that geographical conditions affect the way human beings do things. It has even been argued that civilizations can be generalized to their geographical locations such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, Turkey, Persia, Central Asia, Europe, Africa and America. Thus, it is suggested that only relatively large empires be considered as subjects of civilizational analysis.<sup>46</sup> Even if territory and geography could provide civilizations with distinctive features, it can hardly be taken as a significantly distinctive element of civilization for civilizations in time becomes non-territorial. This remark in no way denies the impact of territory and geography on civilizations which, just like all social identities, take place in a territory or geography. Yet, a civilization does not only extend into remote territories but into territories with quite different conditions.

e) **Style.** Kroeber argues that style is one of the most important elements which distinguish civilizations. Style refers to the manner as against content and to form as against substance. Kroeber contends that style, primarily thought to be denoting aesthetic qualities and the fine arts, can be traced in those activities such as food (cuisine) and dress. In East Asia, for example, the food is prepared soft; meat and vegetables cut into bits in the kitchen, not at the table or by the eater. The food is served mixed in one dish. We see bowls and chopsticks; not plates, knives and forks. Eating habits distinguishes Indian and Chinese civilizations. The fact that Viet Nam eats with chopsticks, Siam and Burma without shows that the former country lies in the orbit of the influence of the Chinese civilization, the two latter of the Indian. Similarly, the Indian Subcontinent and the Middle East differ from Europe in their eating habits, as the former eats directly from its fingers and the latter

instead uses knives and forks. Dress is, for Kroeber, another example of the distinguishing styles of civilizations. Western women's dress, dominated by a skirt and either emphasizing or deemphasizing the anatomy of waist and legs, differs markedly from the ancient Mediterranean dress (Egyptian, Greek, Roman) in which there was no skirt as such and both waist and legs were neither emphasized nor de-emphasized. In the Far Eastern dress styles, there was no modulation of bosom, waist and pelvis and the Western skirt was replaced by long sleeved coats or draped garments hung from shoulders.<sup>47</sup> Kroeber argues that style is the best indicator of civilizational delimitations.<sup>48</sup> McNeill agrees with Kroeber: 'The only real guide historians have for assigning spatial and temporal limits to 'civilizations' is a... sense of social style.'<sup>49</sup> Both authors include arts and literature in style. It seems fairly evident that most civilizations develop a set of characteristic basic styles manifested in a variety of activities ranging from what are called intellectual creativities such as philosophy and literature to what may be called the daily trivialities such as fashion and cuisine.

**f) History.** A common historical experience shared, or an historical process gone through, by peoples of a civilization can be said to create the constitutive and distinctive traditions, customs, institutions and characteristics. A common history could also make peoples to achieve a 'civilizational consciousness' so that they identify themselves with the said civilization. A particular rule experienced throughout a period of history, or a particular threat felt for some time or a particular movement undergone in history could lead to the distinctive characteristics. Shared Roman rule, for example, brings Western and Islamic civilizations closer in comparison to Indian and Chinese civilizations. As noted earlier, the Islamic threat felt by Europeans has been an important ingredients of their civilizational identification. The Reformation movement which Western Christendom has undergone, but Eastern Christendom has not formed one of the distinctions between these two civilizations. Similarly, the fact that 'the Eastern Church remained permanently antipathetic to the idea of the Crusades'<sup>50</sup> may be seen as another distinctive historical experience. It can fairly be said that a common history makes a difference.

We can add this list of elements others such as customs, institutions, traditions, systems of government, military techniques, ways of production, myths,... and so on. Civilizations are distinguished or delimited from one another by not just one criterion or element. They are differentiated in some degree by all of the elements outlined above. This remark is not just a reflection of an eclectic attitude. It is very easy to dismiss it as

eclecticism. Yet, civilizations are social entities which stem from the sociality of human beings and human social identification. As social identities, they have all social products. In other words, it looks quite natural for civilizations, being what men have produced and inherited, to comprise a variety of elements or human activities from language to myths. The multi-faceted character of human phenomena can hardly be explained and distinguished by one aspect or element. A civilization is, like all social entities, simply a result of the institutionalization of human activities which form human life, and which are done by some people in a particular way. The differentiation of civilizations is no easy matter. Social phenomena and social identity are ongoing processes, implying that the composition and boundaries of civilizations could change in time. Kroeber is aware of the difficulty and submits to the authority of common sense which 'demands that we accept civilizations as units naturally given in history.'<sup>51</sup> Therefore, only by historical analysis, we can see what have been (are) those civilizations with which human beings have identified (are identifying) themselves.

Appealing to history is no absolute or final remedy due to known reasons. Not only do different historians delineate different civilizations -and different number of civilizations- but the same historian may present different delineations at different times. A list of civilizations by a particular historian is, just like all lists, bound to be arbitrary. Nonetheless, history is the only solution we have. Moreover, we can find some agreements by the community of historians. Then, it would be better to see what has been proposed.

We do not know who was the first author distinguishing separate civilizations. We do, however, know that societal differentiations have always existed. According to McNeill, the historical evidence in hand at the present time allows us to say that distinct civilizations have emerged -by diffusion from Mesopotamia- in the main regional centers of the Old World such as Mesopotamia, Egypt, Minoa and Indus Valley between about 4000 and 1700 B. C. By 1000 AD, the local civilized societies began to have inter-civilizational exchanges all over the Old World and from 1500 AD the Amerindian peoples were subjugated and incorporated into the Eurasian world system.<sup>52</sup> As separate societies (and civilizations) encounter each other, men naturally see the differences between them. In the fifth century B.C., for example, Herodotus knew who were Greeks and who were not. Yet, those who were not Greeks were not, for Herodotus, the peoples of another civilization, but barbarians. The attitude to regard others as the barbarians was not, of course,

something peculiar to Herodotus. It went on till the modern age and still exists, at least, in its adjectival form.

In the twentieth century, many authors have delineated different numbers of civilizations. While some gave fewer numbers, others gave as many as twenty-one or so. Spengler and Toynbee have been the most passionate authors claiming that only civilizations could be taken as meaningful units of historical study. For Spengler, who argues that civilizations are exclusive and impenetrable, there have been eight civilizations, or in his terms 'great cultures': Egyptian, Babylonian, Indian, Chinese, Classical or Apollinian (Graeco-Roman), Arabian or Magian, Mexican, and Western or Faustian (which emerged around A.D. 1000). He mentions the Russian as the next possibility. Of these nine cultures, the Mexican died by violent death, the Magian and the Russian underwent a 'pseudomorphosis'.<sup>53</sup> Toynbee, who perhaps counted more civilizations than any other writer, has first identified twenty-one: the Egyptian, the Andean, the Sinic, the Minoan, the Sumeric, the Mayan, the Indic, the Hittite, the Hellenic, the Western, the Orthodox Christian (in Russia), the Far Eastern (in Korea and Japan), the Orthodox Christian (main body), the Far Eastern (main body), the Iranic, the Arabic, the Hindu, the Mexic, the Yucatec, the Babylonian. Secondly, four 'abortive civilizations' have been delineated: the Abortive Far Western Christian, Abortive Far Eastern Christian, Abortive Scandinavian, and Abortive Syriac. Then, he adds five 'arrested civilizations': the Polynesian, the Eskimos, the Nomadic, the Ottoman, the Spartan.<sup>54</sup> As seen, Toynbee has a list of thirty civilizational units altogether. McNeill builds his *World History* on four major Eurasian civilizational centres from each of which a distinctive style of civilization is derived, namely those of the Middle Eastern, the Greek or European, the Indian, and the Chinese.<sup>55</sup> Despite the dominance of the European or Western style of civilization at present, others are still living. Lately, Huntington has counted seven or eight existing civilizations among which 'the clash' will be taking place in the post-cold war era: the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and, possibly, African civilizations.<sup>56</sup> One may cite other authors with still different lists.

The reason why we find different delineations with different authors can, of course, be explained in terms of their conceptions and assumptions. Perhaps, we can find a more fundamental reason. I have earlier made the point that civilizations, being a dynamic process as all social entities of social identifications, could change in composition and boundary. The same dynamic process holds for the emergence of separate, and new, civilizations

throughout history, and thus for the emergence of different lists. A civilization may be divided into two parts due to such factors as the withering of communication between the respective parts and the rise of different interpretations with regard to the identificational elements. When such a development takes place what is seen is not a commonality forming a civilization, but two (or more) commonalities forming two (or more) civilizations. For example, McNeill tells us that such a break happened between Orthodox and Latin Christendom in the early medieval centuries, and between China and Japan at about the same time.<sup>57</sup> It is therefore right to endorse the view that rejects the restricted lists of civilizations, and that there is nothing final about the listing of civilizations.<sup>58</sup>

No final list of civilizations and no final agreement among historians on the number and boundaries of civilizations. If so, then, does it mean that we fall back into the ‘anything goes’ anarchy of relativism or a mere intellectual sophistry? Not exactly so. Even if it is not possible to make a final demarcation lines between civilizations (between and of what can it be made?), it is possible to find some agreements by the community of scholars. There may be disagreements about the boundaries and compositions of the ‘Western civilization’, or ‘European civilization’, as some extend it to cover Americas and some ex-colonial territories, or the Balkans and Russia. Yet, almost everyone agrees that there is a distinct Western or European or Christian civilization (whatever name that may be called), distinct from, say, an Islamic, or Indian, or Chinese civilization. Similarly, today, the distinctiveness of Islamic, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese civilizations have been recognized by many scholars, though the nature, boundary, characteristics of each civilization could be contested. It has already been noted that there have been those arguing for the emergence of distinct Orthodox-Russian, African, and Latin American civilizations.<sup>59</sup> Drawing upon the works of a variety of authors from Spengler and Toynbee to Kroeber and Bagby, Melko tells us that a good measure of consensus has been reached on the following areas in which separate civilizations have been distinguished in history:

the Far East between 2000 B.C. and the present

India between 2500 B.C. and the present

Egypt between 4000 B.C. and 300 B.C.

the Middle East between 4000 B.C. and the present

the Mediterranean between 3000 B.C. and 1500 A.D.

Western Europe between 700 A.D. and the present

Central America between 1 A.D. and 1600 A.D.

## Western South America between 1 A.D. and 1600 A.D.

Melko finds a pronounced tendency to distinguish an Islamic civilization round the Southern Mediterranean between 500 A.D. and the present, an Orthodox civilization in Eastern Europe at roughly the same period and a civilization in Japan, since possibly 400 B.C. distinct from China.<sup>60</sup> Melko's comprehensive survey shows us that the degree of agreements among historians is not negligible. It is quite significant to the extent that it allows us to say historically and for certain that distinct civilizational units have existed and do exist in history, even though there is no absolute 'objective' element for delineation.

It has already been stated that a civilization could be defined both by common 'objective' elements and by the 'subjective' identification of people in concern. Having examined the 'objective' elements which constitute commonalities for a civilization, the question is now if there may be found a civilizational consciousness in human beings who are said to be the members of the civilization in question. To formulate it another way, we need to see if human beings identify themselves with a social entity which we call civilization. Apparently, this is an empirical question. However, it must be stated that the distinction between criteria of 'objective' elements and 'subjective' identification, put as a working definition, does not mean that the two criteria are independent of each other. In other words, the existence of 'objective' common elements reveals that there is a self-identification of human beings with each other and consequently with all the others having the same elements or characteristics. If people have nothing in common, how could they be expected to identify with each other? The question is not, then, whether there can be a civilizational consciousness, but how cohesive or how strong it is. The question of degree is in turn something which depends upon the specific civilizations and historical conditions. It has already been suggested that, since civilizations are large-scale social entities majority of which contain multiple sub-identifications in themselves, civilizational consciousness or identity tends to be less cohesive and weaker than, say, smaller identificational units such as states, local societies, ethnies, and so on. The existence of an external threat is, it has been stated, an enhancing factor of civilizational consciousness as it was in the case of struggle between Islamic civilization and Western Civilization in history. Accordingly, the existence of a high measure of homogeneity in terms of the 'objective' elements is expected to heighten the degree of cohesiveness and strength of civilizational identity. This can easily be exemplified by the Japanese civilization, which is virtually unicultural and highly homogenous, as against the Western or Islamic civilizations, each being multi-national and

highly heterogeneous. The history of Western civilization provides another exemplification. In medieval period, when the cultural unity of Western civilization was quite high, it was possible for the Europeans to mobilize for the Crusades. Now, in the modern period, given that there is much less cultural unity than it used to be, it is very unlikely that such a mobilization of peoples could be achieved in Europe.

Perhaps one of the most typical expression of civilizational consciousness or identity is the self-regard or self-image of each civilization. Each civilization regarded itself as the civilization and others as inferior to its own or as mere barbarians. Almost every civilization considered itself as the centre of the world and had its own, to use Gong's term, 'standard of civilization.'<sup>61</sup> The Greeks had it. In the words of Plato:

When Greeks and Barbarians fight, we shall say that they are natural enemies, warring against one another, and this enmity is to be called war; but when Greeks fight with Greeks, we shall declare that naturally they are friends, and when anything of this kind occurs, Greek is sick and attacked by sedition, and this kind of enmity is to be called sedition.<sup>62</sup>

And in Aristotle's:

'Right it is that Hellenes rule barbarians...The Greeks accordingly reject the term 'slave' as applicable to Greeks, and confine it to barbarians... The barbarians are more servile in character than Greeks, and are therefore prepared to tolerate despotic government.'<sup>63</sup>

It was not only the Greeks who had a sense of superiority and self-righteousness. As Gong has shown us, the Europeans articulated a 'standard of civilization' to which the others, with whom the Europeans established contacts, have been subjected.<sup>64</sup> Nor was it only the Europeans. Muslims saw themselves as the soldiers of the God, truly civilized, in charge with bringing the infidels, certainly uncivilized, into the civilization, -the way of the God. The classical Chinese literature had it that China was the centre of the world in geographical, cultural, political terms and it was self-sufficient in all aspects without needing anything of the others.<sup>65</sup> A letter from the Emperor of China to the King George III of Great Britain boldly expresses it: 'Our celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no products within our borders. There was, therefore, no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our produce.'<sup>66</sup> In sum, every civilization had (has) its own image as an expression of its identity, derived from its

common elements and its encounters and interactions with the other societies, and very often articulated in opposition to the external 'barbarians'.<sup>67</sup>

Having explicated the concept of civilization, the question is now how meaningful or 'intelligible' civilizations are as units in historical and social studies. They are intelligible units of analysis like the other more familiar or immediate units such as nation-states. It is not because civilizations are more inclusive and thus relatively self-explanatory, but just because man is a social and creative being to establish relations and identifications of different types at different levels. Civilizations are not the only identification of men as there are others -e.g. nation-states, ethnies, localities, various kinds of groups. How effective or directing is a civilization upon the behaviours and actions of human beings? To what extent is individual identity determined by civilizational identity? It could be asserted that the impact of civilizational identity upon the identity and actions of the individual is not institutionalized to the degree of being exclusive as it is in the case of political or organized social identifications. If you do not have an identification with the Chinese civilization, it does not prevent you from having your meal by using chopsticks. However, if you do not have an identification with the People's Republic of China, you can not bear a Chinese passport. Even if you do not have the identity of Western civilization, you may dress and eat like a European. Yet, you may not possess a right to permanent residence and work in the United Kingdom, if you are not of British nationality. Nevertheless, civilizations do influence individual or collective actions. First, civilizations being social entities affect the socialization of individuals and individuals are partly moulded and shaped by civilizations. It is true that it is not forbidden to use chopsticks, but it is also true that not having been raised in the Chinese civilization makes it difficult for you to use chopsticks. Secondly, individuals take into consideration their civilizational identity like all other collective identifications when they act according to specific cases. We can but say that the influence of civilizational identity on the actions of human beings is less than that of smaller, organized and more immediate collective identities. Civilizations are not, as already emphasized, integrated social entities as some other social identifications (e.g. states, local communities, groups...etc.) are. They have been multi-dimensional, just like all collective social identifications, and multi-organizational unlike many units of identity. Historically, most civilizations have never been embraced within one social entity. That they are multi-organizational makes them less effective upon men compared to uni-organizational social identifications such as nationality in our day. Yet it has been already stated that the impact

of civilizational identity is increasing with the end of the Cold War. This is the next issue we will be dealing with.

### III. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND REVIVAL OF CIVILIZATIONS

First, we need to answer the question whether there are still multiple civilizations or a single cosmopolitan civilization. Historically, interactions between civilizations have not always been even. Sometimes, one or more civilization(s) has (have) predominated others in terms of its power, organization, vitality, cohesiveness, potency and so forth, and of being the main attraction centre of the world. It was the Middle Eastern civilizations in the third and second millennia B.C., later it was Graeco-Roman, than Islam and now it has been the European/Western civilization. The Western civilization has far outstripped the others that it has a global or world-wide impact. Other civilizations such as the Islamic, Indian, Chinese and Japanese having been subjugated, McNeill speaks of 'the establishment for the first time in world history of a genuinely global cosmopolitan civilization, centered upon the West but embracing all the other varieties and cultural traditions of mankind as well.' He adds that interaction between the heirs of Western, Islamic, Hindu, Chinese, and Japanese civilizations' has been and in the foreseeable future promises to remain, a central axis, and perhaps **the** central axis,' of world history.<sup>68</sup> Then, according to McNeill, with the global impact of Western civilization there occurred a possibility of forming a global cosmopolitan civilization. Yet, other civilizations have been only 'subjugated', they have not been eliminated.

On the other hand we all know that the modern world has been articulated into nation-states. In other words, nation-state or nationality has been the principal focus of collective social identification. Indeed, it can confidently be argued that there is now a single international system which is widely called as modern international system. The modern international system is said to have emerged in Europe from sixteenth century onwards. First, we see that Western civilization was articulated into separate sovereign nation-states and, then, the emerging European states-system expanded and became worldwide.<sup>69</sup> Since the civilizational identifications have not yet disappeared, then, the modern international system is both inter-civilizational and trans-civilizational. Because it is inter-civilizational, different civilizational elements and values have not been eliminated and they might be still effective. On the other hand, because it is trans-civilizational, the effects of civilizational elements have been lessened. Furthermore, since it has been basically Western-centred, elements and values of one civilization have prevailed. However, the nation-state as the principal focus of social identity in the modern period can hardly be said to have eliminated

the civilizational identity as the multi-faceted nature of social phenomena does not allow one unit to monopolize human social identification. As nation-state does not encapsulate all social identifications and the pre-dominance of Western civilization did not eliminate all other civilizations, civilizational elements and different civilizational values have existed in the modern international system. Gong, for instance, notes that Japan has always had (and still has) difficulties in confirming to a standard of 'civilization'.<sup>70</sup> Yet, no one thinks that Japan is outside the modern international system. Now, we therefore have one international system with multiple civilizations.

The prevalence of the nation-state and the dominance of the Western civilization have, to some extent, suppressed the civilizational differences in the modern world. Accordingly, the Cold War in the second half of the twentieth century, as already expressed, disguised the particular regional conflicts and divisions behind the ubiquitous preeminence of the East-West confrontation. It also disguised the civilizational differences and conflicts. The end of the Cold War has led to a greater awareness of civilizational elements as significant factors within the modern international system as the existing and emerging countries within and around the European hinterland are struggling to form new identities or to fortify the old ones. Today we see a considerable number of peoples and movements which put emphasis on civilizational identity such as Islamic fundamentalism and European integration. We also witness a greater number of individuals in many societies stressing the importance of once forgotten civilizational identities.

The civilizational element in world politics and in the modern international system has recently been prompted by Huntington in his provocative article. Arguing that after the Cold War the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will be primarily cultural rather than ideological and economic and that the conflict will occur along the lines of civilizations, Huntington describes the basic reasons and factors of 'the clash of civilizations' as follows: First, civilizational differences are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Second, as the world becomes smaller the interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing and thus enhancing civilization-consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. Third, as a result of economic modernization and social change, local identities are getting weaker and religious identity is strengthening, providing a basis for civilizational identity. Fourth, the confrontation between the powerful West and non-Westerners leads the latter to return to their roots. Fifth, cultural characteristics are less

mutable and less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. Finally, economic regionalism is increasing and hence reinforcing civilization-consciousness.<sup>71</sup>

These observations have no doubt some truth, though perhaps not entirely in the way Huntington envisages. Nor was he the first scholar emphasizing the role of civilizational differences. Toynbee and writers of the British School such as Wight and Bull have always been conscious of the fact that the modern international system, originally emerged within a civilization, comprised civilizational differences. Gong predicted that the realm of cultural sovereignty might become the next major arena in the struggle for sphere of influence.<sup>72</sup> Nor could the impact of religion, especially Islam, a major component of civilizational identity, be said to have come before the eyes of the students of international relations after the Cold War. From the late 1970s onwards we see the talk about the 'revival of Islam'.<sup>73</sup> These studies, however, largely considered religion as a matter of influence on policies, issues and respective governments. When we come to 1990s, before Huntington, some began to talk of a civilizational conflict, in a sense, a tendency to shift from international relations to inter-civilizational relations. According to Bernard Lewis, the Muslim rage over the West in general and Islamic fundamentalism in particular reflect nothing less than 'a clash of civilizations'.<sup>74</sup> Gilpin sees the signs of civilizational conflict not only between the West and Islam, but among others as well. 'Today the revival of Islamic, Chinese and Hindu civilizations, as well as the emergence of potentially powerful new or previously isolated civilizations, in particular Japan, Brazil, and Mexico, suggest that a new era is opening.'<sup>75</sup> It seems fair to speak of a return to cultural or civilizational roots in many countries.<sup>76</sup>

Of all the 'revivals' which have been said to be taking place in the contemporary world, the revival of Islam has been the most widely-spoken one. And this is not without understandable reason. It could be said that Islam, as a religion, is the most politically-oriented one. There is no distinction in Islam between 'the things of God' and 'the things of Caesar', no separation of the church from the state. Moreover, the idea of a single Islamic polity transcending particular states and nations has always been very strong in Islamic history, though it has, except perhaps the first centuries of Islamic history, never been realized. On the other hand, historically, Islam and Christianity, and thus Western civilization and Islamic civilization, have always been strong rivals and in fierce opposition. These characteristic differences and historical competition do not only account for much of

the talk about Islamic revival or Islamic fundamentalism that we witness nowadays, but also for the recent events which are described as the examples of Islamic revival, from the Iranian revolution to the victory of Islamist parties in the Algerian popular elections. According to Lewis, the fact that radical and popular movements, inaccurately called 'fundamentalist', have won mass support in Muslim countries demonstrates that the ideal of a single Islamic polity still has considerable appeal for Muslims. Islam provides the most effective form of consensus in and among Muslim countries and constitutes the basic group identity among the masses. 'Islam is', argues Lewis, 'a powerful but still undirected force in politics.'<sup>77</sup>

That there is an increasing identification of the masses and some elites in Muslim countries with a wider entity which is basically defined by Islam and Islamic civilization and that a degree of collective rallying on the basis of religious (civilizational) identity in Muslim countries is possible have been starkly demonstrated by the Gulf War of 1991 and the Bosnian War after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, as many observers admit.<sup>78</sup> As well-known, even Iran, the fiercest enemy of the secularist regime of Iraq, gave indirect support to Iraq in the name of Islam and against the United States. In Turkey, the majority of public opinion including a considerable number of the traditional Westernized-elite opposed the governmental policy of providing the allied forces with facilities which were to be used against Iraq. No need to extend this list, as I have already made the point that an external threat (the American-led operation in this case) breeds the identity in concern. The process of the formation of a wider identity based upon Islamic civilization is not something limited to the historical Middle East. It has been pointed out that the process is beginning to be effective in ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia.<sup>79</sup> Upon this basis, we are justified to say that the established national identities in countries with predominantly Muslim populations are increasingly being questioned as the sole group identification and Islam, as a religion and a civilization, is beginning to come into surface as a proper identity. This process can be demonstrated in Turkey, a country with a predominantly Muslim population and a strong secular commitment and Western-orientation.

Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, was officially declared to be a secular state from early on. The new administrative and intellectual elites of Turkey defined the new state as a 'modern' state committed to the values of Western civilization. The role of Islam in the government has totally been denied and it has been relegated to a body of beliefs and rituals observed by the majority of population. Some sort of Turkish national identity, based

upon the acceptance of 'Turkishness' of everyone within the established boundaries, was envisaged. The new state renounced any interest in the Ottoman legacy and made a strong commitment to the West. In other words, a civilizational identity based on Islam, or any wider identity of the sort, has been denied. The values of the Western civilization have been perceived not just the values of a civilization but those of the civilization of a universal character.<sup>80</sup> In line with these orientations, Turkey has taken place in, or applied for membership to, alignments of Western origin such as NATO, European Council, European Community and so on.

The strong Western orientation has by no means been adopted by the majority of population still conforming to the elements of Islamic civilization. From 1970s onwards, groups questioning the Republican national identity and Western orientation and arguing for a more Islamic-oriented identity and policies began to emerge. Moreover, the Western orientation has increasingly been questioned by some elites, the Ottoman legacy has no longer been overtly renounced. It has been noted that when we come to the 1990s, after the downfall of Soviet Union, there is an effort among the Turkish elites to try to revise their group identity and enlarge the definition of Turkey's region, leading to a search for a wider identity. On the one hand, the identity is considered as Islamic and on the other hand to be Turkic so as to include Turkic republics of Central Asia.<sup>81</sup> It should be noted that Turkey's new orientation towards Central Asian states cannot solely be attributed to common linguistic and ethnic characteristics, but the shared religion, Islam, as well. For example, Tajikistan, which is not Turkic but Persian-speaking was invited to the Turkic summit held in Ankara, October 1992. The search for new identities or orientations in Turkey is making its impact upon the policies pursued by Turkish statesmen. Turkish policy toward the Bosnian War is a striking example. Not only the Turkish public opinion unanimously supports the Bosnians, but the Turkish governmental policies have very often come to be at odds with its Western allies. Such a policy was not seen in 1950s and 1960s. The Turkish government, for example, sided with France in the issue of the Algerian independence. Both Bosnians and Algerians are Muslims and both countries are ex-Ottoman territories, but both of them are not Turks and Turkish-speaking peoples. It is due to the increasing influence of Turkey's historically held identity of Islam and Islamic civilization or due to the decreasing role of Western orientation which was the basis of Republican national identity.

These brief accounts of Islam in general and Turkey in particular could be taken as the concrete examples of, on the one hand, the existence of civilizational differences and, on

the other hand, the effect of civilizational elements. However, upon these observations, it can hardly be argued that a full civilizational clash is on the way to replace political, ideological and economic conflicts as Huntington predicts. First of all, civilizational differences have always been there in the modern international system for it is, as stated, a multi-civilizational system. Yet, the differences in civilizations are not as acute as some doom theorist argue. Even the two historical rivals, Islam and Christendom have much in common compared to their differences from others.<sup>82</sup> Perhaps, that is why they dispute very often. Secondly, civilizations, and not least those movements arguing for an Islamic unity,<sup>83</sup> are not organized entities as nations or other social identities so as to make an inter-civilizational conflict permanent and world-wide. There are neither a unified Islamic bloc nor a Western bloc. The point has already been made that civilizations being large-scale entities, are not tightly organized as small identity groups. Thirdly, the process of globalization, the shrinking of the world, the world-wide communication networks make the world a smaller place. Huntington assumes that it reinforces civilizational differences between distinct civilizations and commonalities within each civilization. It could do it. Yet, it could do just the opposite as well. Many argue that a cosmopolitan international society comprising different elements and features from different cultures is possible and in the process of being created.<sup>84</sup> Finally, civilizations, just like nation-states could co-exist. One should not underestimate the adaptability of cultures and civilizations.

In the closing decades of the twentieth century we may note two paradoxical tendencies among and within societies. On the one hand, we see human beings increasingly identifying themselves with small units, whether it be an established unit like nation-state or small local communities. Despite all the talk about the demise of the nation-state and world interdependence, people do not seem to give up the state. Even those who struggle against an existing nation-state wage it in order to create another nation-state. The disintegration of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia increased the number of nation-states. The state and national identity built upon it, though striven for by many, have been under attack because of its restrictiveness and exclusiveness. We are only too familiar with the demands for greater say upon their own affairs by regions, cities, even neighbourhoods. In short, it would not be wrong to assert that there is a general trend of localism. That the most ambitious and perhaps the most accomplished integration movement of the century has adopted a form of 'union' (i.e, European Union) instead of its previous form of 'community' (i.e., European Community) could be taken as an indication of the appeal of 'localism'. Today the nation-

state, though being a particularist identity compared to its predecessor, do not seem to have the hold it used to have on more particularist units of identity.

On the other hand, although we note a trend of localism and efforts to form small identity units, paradoxically we observe an orientation towards wider and larger unions with which people equally wish to identify themselves. It is true some large states have collapsed and some others are being questioned. It is, however, equally true that the existing international and general units still survive and there is an increasing demand upon them. The authority of the 'Brussel' has been decreasing as stated, but there is a long queue at the door of 'Brussel'. Those who want to have a smaller identity want to have it together with a greater one. The Scottish nationalists aim at establishing an independent state of Scotland, a smaller identity than United Kingdom, yet they think of not just an 'independent Scotland', but an 'independent Scotland within Europe', a greater identity than United Kingdom. An independent Scotland is thought within European Union, not within African Union or within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Absurd this may seem, alas it shows the effects of what may conveniently be called civilizational identity. Of course, the trend towards greater and general unions and associations can also be accounted by the process of globalization, the shrinking of the world, world-wide networks of communication, increasing world interdependence in economy and global problems of poverty, environment, population and so on.

In spite of all this talk about globalization, why do we speak of civilizations? Surely there is no *a priori* and forever case for any social unit of identification. However, any identification is socio-historical. The point has already been made that socio-historicity of men is multiple. In other words, people are capable of holding several different identities. They could at the same time be Scottish, British, European and Western. Here, it has been shown that one of these layers of identity is civilization which has been in association with international system and it still has relevance not just as a group feeling but as a unit for international relations. The basic conclusion derived from this conceptual and historical analysis may be expressed as the need for the modern international system or the international community to constitute a framework in which interactions between multiple units of states, nations, societies, communities, unions and civilizations could be mediated and different values of national, social, ethnical, cosmopolitan and civilizational character can be articulated. At this point, we now come to the final part of this project: NATO and its relation to civilizational element.



#### IV. NATO AND CIVILIZATION

NATO has never been a conventional alliance. It has never been a typical collective defense organization. Saying that NATO has never been a typical alliance for collective defense in no way underestimates its defense function. Its chief aim is indeed defined to be the collective defense of member states as it has been envisaged in Articles 3-5 of the Atlantic Treaty. Yet the Treaty involves some purposes and aims which go beyond resisting an actual or potential attack. In the Preamble, it has been clearly expressed that the Parties

are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Similarly, Article 2 of the Treaty reads as follows:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.'

These statements are enough to show that NATO is more than a collective defense organization. Here we do not only see political aims such as the development of peaceful and friendly international relations and promoting conditions of stability and well-being. Nor is it only aimed at economic collaboration. The statements comprise goals and aims in such phrases which properly refers to civilizational element.

The Preamble expresses the aim of safeguarding 'freedom, common heritage and civilization...founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.' Article 2 expresses the need for 'strengthening their free institutions'. What is meant by these principles and institutions is no doubt those institutions and principles which developed within the framework of the European or Western civilization. Democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and free institutions are values of the Western civilization.<sup>85</sup> It would not be wrong then if we say that NATO has from the very beginning been united with the Western civilization. In the beginning, we have indeed stated that NATO has been established within the framework of a single civilization. However, we also

made the point that some member states of NATO have come from civilizations which are not Western, namely Greece and Turkey.

How did these states which are not of the Western civilization become members of an organization which has been predominantly a creation of the Western civilization? There may be three explanations: First, in examining the civilizational identity it has been shown that it does not constitute a cohesive whole so that a state's civilizational identity does not hinder it from becoming a member of an alliance based upon a different civilizational identity. In other words, the loose nature of civilizational identity allows Turkey and Greece to become NATO members. Secondly, there was the expressed commitment of these states which are of non-western stock to the values of the Western civilization. Indeed, both in Turkey and Greece there has been an ongoing process of Westernization since the nineteenth century.<sup>86</sup> Thirdly, the values upon which NATO is said to have been established are relatively of universal character so that others could easily adopt them. NATO has therefore been an organization established within the Western civilization and with members which have non-Western civilizational identities.

Although NATO envisaged civilizational values from its inception, its defense function was dominant throughout the Cold War period and the bulk of the efforts have been devoted to the military activities. Indeed, we may even say that throughout the Cold War era it has in practice a collective defense organization. Furthermore, as already been said, the rigid positioning resulted from the Cold War was not apt to express civilizational identity. Yet, even during the Cold War years, the Organization has been perceived to have, or to have realized, significant functions of non-military or defense character. It has widely been stressed that, true to its goals described in the Preamble and Article 2, NATO was not only effective in bringing stability to Europe, especially by being the chief instrument of solution for the age-old Franco-German problem, it was also instrumental in promoting and stabilizing free institutions. It has been pointed out that NATO played an important role in stabilizing German democracy.<sup>87</sup> In other words, NATO is not only a guarantee of security, but also a stabilizer of democracy.

With the end of the Cold War, now that the threat against which it was established has disappeared, there seems to be a tendency that NATO is perceived as a less military and collective defense organization than it used to be. At present, NATO is increasingly considered as an organization for cooperation in security and political issues, even in economic and cultural affairs. It is considered as such not only by its current members but

also by the prospective members as the discussions about the issue of enlargement has clearly revealed. That NATO is not anymore a collective defense organization, but rather a collective security organization involving political purposes such as stability, can be seen in President Clinton's speech declaring that NATO expansion 'is no longer a question of whether, but when and how. And that expansion **will not depend on the appearance of a new threat** in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance **security and stability** for the entire region.'<sup>88</sup> Indeed, the officials I talked to at NATO headquarters, Brussel, in March 1997 stressed that NATO cannot be confined to a defense alliance against an actual or potential attack and the issue of expansion should be considered within a broader perspective than assuring defense and security of prospective members. Similarly, when I inquired if there was to be any military reason for the expansion of the Alliance, the officers at SHAPE straightforwardly said that there was no military reason and it was basically a political decision.

The prospective members, which are most likely to be Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary,<sup>89</sup> also see NATO as an Organization which comprise more than simple defense and security ends. For them, it is an avenue leading to full integration with the 'Western' world.. The former Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz has, for example, made the point that it is not to defend against a Russian attack that Poland seeks NATO membership: 'We see that as a virtual impossibility. The key reason we want to be in NATO is **to secure our own democracies.**'<sup>90</sup> The members of Parliament and military experts I talked to in Budapest expressed the view that NATO membership would enable Hungary to achieve greater integration with the Western Europe. Given the fact that European Union membership is not likely in the short run, one member of Parliament has said, NATO would be a step for EU membership. I think the same thinking goes for the Czech Republic. They too see NATO membership as a way of integration with the West. Indeed, when explaining that the Chechs were part of the NATO family, Vaclav Havel said: 'We have always belonged to the Western sphere of European civilization.'<sup>91</sup> We see that NATO has been associated with the European civilization in Havel's statement. NATO membership is thus considered a way of integration with this civilization. Similarly, the traditional Republican elite of Turkey, from the beginning, considered NATO membership of Turkey as a sign of integration with the Western world. Here, we come to identificational dimension and civilizational or cultural element of NATO.

It is fair to say that NATO has been perceived to provide its members with an identity which is linked to Europe or Western world. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, an expanding NATO will help a reunited Germany continuing to become an increasingly **European Germany** instead of seeking for a German Europe.<sup>92</sup> The cultural dimension of NATO expansion is also stressed by French Defense Minister François Le’otard: ‘The possibility that the new democracies will join the Atlantic Alliance must not be viewed on the basis of solely military considerations, but should also be viewed globally, combining the various political, military, economic and even **cultural dimensions** of their integration with the West.’<sup>93</sup> Of course, thinking NATO as linked to European/Western identity and finding cultural dimensions of NATO expansion do not mean that NATO represents a civilizational or cultural unit in terms of an integrated social whole and actually takes action for it. However, there have been statements which would seem to imply such an understanding. In addressing the 40th General Assembly of NATO, Secretary-General Willy Claes described the new dangers to the Alliance. Among others was ‘the situation across the Mediterranean.’<sup>94</sup> What is meant by this ‘situation across the Mediterranean became clear in February 1995 when Mr. Claes, echoing Huntington, told a German newspaper, *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, that Islam posed a threat to the West in much the same way communism had in previous decades.’<sup>95</sup> Of course, these statements by Mr. Claes have not been shared by many members. However, they are important not only because it points out the civilizational or cultural element of NATO, but also because of the way and wording of their expression. That the cultural or civilizational element which has existed within NATO from the very beginning has been expressed this way is surely something to do with the end of the Cold War. And it also shows that NATO need to take into account the element of culture and civilization and must develop a clear attitude.

To this end, this project has taken up to elucidate the concept of civilization as it has been described in the previous sections. In the remaining part of this section, the summary of my personal interviews, selectively conducted at the elite level comprising academics, journalist and officials from United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, has been presented.

First, if NATO has anything to do with civilization and civilizational values as it has been envisaged in the Preamble and Article 2 and as it has been accepted by the authorities of the existing and prospective member states. There seems to be a general agreement

among the people I talked to on the fact that NATO is an organization of the Western civilization however that may be defined. Basically, it is considered as an organization to protect and promote the values and interests of the Western world. Yet, there are some divergences from this general agreement. For people from the United Kingdom, mostly academics, though admitting that NATO has something to do with civilization, it is only in a vague and general sense. NATO, for them, is more political than civilizational and we should not put too much in this civilizational thing. Majority of the people from Greece and almost all of the traditional Republican elite of Turkey consider NATO as part of the Western civilization which is true and universalized civilization and they approve it. The elite coming from traditionally conservative segments of Turkish society agree with the former group that NATO is a part of the Western civilization, but differs from them by showing strong disapproval. Some people from Greece and Turkey, a minor group, think that NATO has nothing to do with civilization, it is just an instrument of American hegemony.

Secondly, how strong this civilizational element in NATO is. To what extent NATO is civilizationally motivated in its policies. As it could be guessed from responses to the first question, there appear again differences of opinion. The British think that the civilizational element in NATO is no more than its vague and general sense. No civilizational or culturally motivated policy. Some academics think that the phrases in the Preamble is just a legacy of the institutions which formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as we see in the United Nations Charter and the Statue of the International Court of Justice, especially in its Article 38. The Greeks and Turks do not consider that there is much strong civilizational motivation in NATO policies, though they attribute the civilizational element a greater significance than the British. Those from traditionally conservative segments of Turkey think that NATO policies are designed to protect the values and interests of the Western civilization against the others.

Given the agreement that NATO has something to do with civilization, the next question is if it is uni-civilizational in the sense that all members belong to one civilization, namely the Western civilization, or it is multi-civilizational implying that there are civilizational identifications other than the Western one. Some of the British say that it is uni-civilizational as all members have long been expressing their commitment to the values and principles of the Western civilization. Others think that, since the civilizational element exist vaguely and generally, though it implies oneness of civilizational identification, it does

not eliminate 'cultural differences' which lead to some degree of multiplicity of civilizational identification. The majority of the Greeks and Turks too seem to take upon the latter view, but with some more emphasis. While a minor group of Turks think that it is uni-civilizational as it represents universalized Western civilization, majority of the conservative segments of Turkish society are in the view that NATO members have multiple civilizational identities.

If there are multiple civilizational identifications among NATO members, how about the relations among them? For the British, differences in civilizational identifications of the member states do not have much influence on the mutual relations of those states. As the civilizational element is a vaguely existing and general element, its impact upon international relations is rather negligible. The influence can only be seen in style. The real element which is effective upon international relations is the national element or national identity. People from Turkey and Greece too agrees with this view in general. Yet, some of them argue that what they call 'cultural' differences sometimes influence the relations as in the case of, for instance, the ratio of the American military aid. Some people from the traditionally conservative segments of Turkish society attribute the reluctance of NATO in interfering the Bosnian conflict to civilizational differences in terms of religion.

Finally, what could they make of all this talk about 'clash of civilizations' and the 'Islamic threat' of which the former Secretary-General Willy Claes spoke? The British consider the talk about the clash of civilizations is rather superficial. For them, if anything clashes it is the interests of nations. Though they admit the existence and to some extent rise of civilizational identities after the Cold War, for them, it is no where near to civilizational clash. Furthermore, they think that the level of cosmopolitanism is significant enough not to expect a civilizational clash. The statement of Mr. Claes was rather careless and very unfortunate. Majority of the Greeks and Turkish elite seem to agree with the view expressed by the British, but again there are differences. A minor group of the Greeks agree with the 'Islamic threat', though they did not comment from where this threat is coming. The Greeks seem to take the civilizational differences more seriously than the British. For the diplomatists and academics, Mr. Claes's remarks were quite undiplomatic. Coming to Turkey, the majority of the traditional Republican elite do not see anything like a clash of civilizations and the statement by Mr. Claes was very unfortunate and not acceptable. Those coming from the liberal segments of society admit the existence of civilizational differences but not the clash and, for them, the issue of the 'Islamic threat' is not to be

taken seriously. Moderate Islamists put more emphasis upon different civilizational identities, yet they too see no clash between civilizations for the time being and they argue that the remarks by Mr. Claes reflect nothing but his lack of knowledge. The radical Islamists argue that it has always been a clash of civilization and now all this talk about the clash of civilization and the Islamic threat reveal what has always existed in the subconsciousness of the Westerners.

As seen, majority of the people I talked to admit the civilizational element in NATO and different civilizational identifications of NATO countries. Yet, though they understand it differently, they do not see a civilizational clash and almost everybody but the extreme Islamists consider Mr. Claes's remarks not acceptable and unfortunate. A common point expressed is that NATO should pay more attention to civilizational identities than it used to be. As different civilizational identities do exist and there seems to be a more and more awareness of them among people then it seems that NATO cannot keep it out of its agenda.

## V. CONCLUSION

This project has begun by pointing out the need for the analysis of new concepts and units in international relations in order to understand the developments after the Cold War. In doing so, it has suggested that civilizations as a unit of analysis and as a form of collective social identifications of human beings should be taken into account. To this end it has basically concentrated on a conceptual and historical examination of the idea of civilization. In the course of the research, interviews on the elite level have been conducted in order to find out the significance of the civilizational element generally in international relations and particularly within NATO.

First, it has been pointed out that social identity of human beings are multiple and multi-dimensional. Multiple, because men simultaneously identify themselves with a variety of social collectivities. Multi-dimensional, because collective social identities are formed and shaped through the impact of various elements, thus they cannot be defined solely on the basis of a single dimension. Multiplicity and multi-dimensionality of collective social identification therefore means that the cohesion, potency, and mobilizing capacity of any unit of social identity can only be understood case by case and according to specific historical circumstances.

Secondly, civilizations are defined as units of social identity just like other forms of social identity such as nation, ethnicity, tribe, clan,... etc. It has been shown that civilizations as units are large-scale social identifications or large-scale collectivities in terms of spatial and temporal extensions. They are relatively long-lived and self-sufficient intelligible collectivities in comparison to other collectivities. Being large-scale, civilizations have a multiplicity of other social identities. Historically, most civilizations have never been embraced within one social entity. This is why civilizations present a low degree of cohesion and potency and are less likely to be the ground for collective mobilization. It is observed that the impact of civilizational identity upon the identity and actions of individuals is not institutionalized to the degree of being exclusive in contrast to the case of political or organized social identifications.

Thirdly, it has been argued that, contrary to the view of civilizations being self-sufficient isolated entities, incapable of understanding and interacting with each other, civilizational encounters and exchanges may lead to the formation of commonalities among civilizations and thus to peaceful co-existence of civilizations. It means that unions or

collectivities which comprise more than one civilizational identification could emerge, that is, unions or collectivities which are multi-civilizational. This is not only because of relatively low degree of cohesion, potency and mobilizing capacity which we observe in civilizations, but also due to the nature of social identity in general, that is to say, its being a historical, changing, multiple and multi-dimensional phenomenon. NATO has been considered as an example of an organization which involves multiple civilizational identifications, though it largely takes place within the framework of one civilization, that is, the Western civilization.

Fourthly, as it has been said, NATO has mainly been an organization for defense and security of some countries among which we find at least three civilizational identifications according to the prevalent historical analysis. Yet, we also said that, though it is multi-civilizational, NATO has been basically established and operated within the framework of the Western civilization. Moreover, we have seen an expressed commitment by those countries of non-Western civilizational identification, that is, Turkey and Greece, to the principles and values of the Western civilization as they have been envisaged in NATO. However, we have also seen that, despite the obvious commitment by the respective countries to the Western civilization, the civilizational identification of those non-Western stock have not been eliminated, but rather preserved in the society at large and to some extent at the elite level as well. Our research has shown that preservation of those multi-civilizational identities have not been in mutual antagonism as expressed by the majority of people interviewed. Yet, we have seen a rise in civilizational consciousness of some minor segments in a rather antagonistic way. We may therefore conclude that it might be necessary for NATO to have more concern for civilizational identities. The concern for civilizational identities may lead to, on the one hand, a better understanding and solution of those practical problems among the member states and, on the other hand, the ground for the emergence of a cosmopolitan civilization on the global level. As a Turkish commentator, who is known to be a moderate Islamist, said, 'the acceptance and recognition of multiple civilizational identities by NATO does not only enriches it but also makes the first step for a peaceful co-existence of these different civilizations in the whole world.'

Finally, we have stressed that NATO has from the very beginning never been a typical military defense or even security organization, though it was basically established and understood by many as such. Besides military cooperation, it had something to do with

cooperation in political, economic, cultural and civilizational aspects. We have observed that after the Cold War and with the issue of the enlargement it has been less and less perceived as a collective military defense and security organization, on the contrary, it has now been considered more and more as an organization for political, economic and even cultural cooperation. If NATO is to be a more politically and economically oriented organization for cooperation, then, it may be necessary to analyze and handle those new problems and challenges rather within a civilizational paradigm than a nationality paradigm. Because, the new problems and challenges which result from such cases as migration, ethnic resurgence, environmentalism, gender and rise of radical and universalistic movements transcend the established limits of national identity.

The basic conclusion of this research may be expressed as such: Despite the overwhelming appeal of nationality in the modern period, civilizational identifications have not disappeared in the world and to some extent they are getting increasingly influential upon the behaviours of individual men and women. However, given the complexity and nature of civilizational identity, it is rather simplistic to expect a civilizational clash among societies. On the other hand, this is the very reason why we should take civilizational identity more seriously than we used to do.

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## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Huntington, for example, in his thought-provoking article argued that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world would be cultural and it would take place along the lines of civilizations, thus introducing the cultural element to international conflicts besides political and ideological elements, and the civilizational identity in international relations besides national identity. See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* (Vol.72, No.3, Summer 1993), 22-49. As early as 1983, Buzan proposed that, besides the military threat, there were four other categories of security: political, economic, societal and environmental threats and pressures. See Barry Buzan, *Peoples, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983). Recently, Constantinou has added three 'new' dimensions of security: cultural and ethnic security, environmental security and gender security. See Costas Constantinou, 'NATO's Caps: European Security and the Future of the North Atlantic Alliance', *Alternatives* (Vol.20, No.2, 1995), 147-164.
- <sup>2</sup> In the course of this research, in order to make an extensive literature survey on the idea of civilization, I have made researches at Middle East Technical University Library and Bilkent University Library in Ankara, Turkey, and Leicester University Library in Leicester, England, which I visited in late January and February 1996. My visits to London in October 1996, to Brussels where I was able to interview with NATO officials at SHAPE and NATO Headquarters in March 1997, to Budapest in March 1997 and to Istanbul in May 1997 enabled me to have interviews with various people. Of course, I have been the recipient of the help of many people during my research. However, I must here express my thanks to Professor G.R. Berridge of Leicester University, Professor Jack E. Spence of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, Ms. Emel Uresin, Liaison Officer Turkey, NATO, Dr. Charalampos Tsardanidis of Pantheon University in Athens, Colonel Laszlo Nagy of Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies in Budapest, Miss Kate M. Byrnes and Bahar Gunal of the American Embassy in Ankara and Retd. Ambassador Ismail Soysal of Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies in Istanbul. Last, but not least, I am indebted to my wife, Esin, who has always been with me during the research and shared its joy and difficulties.
- <sup>3</sup> The association of the word 'civilization' with 'city' can be found in other languages as well. The Turkish word for 'civilization', '*medeniyet*', in its Arabic root, too has an association with 'city'. The word for city in Arabic, '*medina*', has the same root as *medeniyet*, that is, *mdn*. The other word in Arabic for civilization, '*umran*', used by Ibn Khaldun, is derived from a root which means 'to build up, to cultivate'. Ibn Khaldun uses it to designate any settlement. See 'Translator's Introduction', in Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. by F. Rosenthal, second edition (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), xxvi. The association of the word 'civilization' with 'city' is by no means common to all languages. For example, the Chinese word *wen* (for civilization and culture) does not implicate city or city-life. See A.F.Wright, 'The Study of Chinese Civilization', *Journal of the History of Ideas* (Vol. xxi, 1960), 234-235.
- <sup>4</sup> This summary of the early usages is based upon F. Braudel, 'The History of Civilizations: The Past Explains the Present', in his *On History*, trans. by S. Matthews (London: Wedenfield and Nicolson, 1980), 180; N. Elias, *The History of Manners*, trans. by E. Jephcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 38; A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Pleabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, 1952), 1,37. *Oxford English Dictionary*, second edition (1989).
- <sup>5</sup> For Elias, the concept of *civilité* received the specific stamp and function in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. It owes the specific meaning to a short treatise by Erasmus of Rotterdam, *De civilitate morum puerilium* (On civility in children), which appeared in 1530. Elias, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 53- 54.
- <sup>6</sup> Based on the *Oxford English Dictionary* and Kroeber and Kluckhohn, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 33. Kroeber and Kluckhohn note that the word 'culture', almost in its all usages, retains 'the primary notion of cultivation or becoming cultured', derived from its Latin root. *Ibid.*, 35. Yet, based upon their survey of anthropological, sociological, psychological, and other relevant (historical, educational, etc.) literature, the authors cite 164 senses of the word 'culture'. *Ibid.*, 43-72.

- <sup>7</sup> R. H. Lowie, *The History of Ethnological Theory* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1937), 10. The recognition of Voltaire as the first historian of culture (or civilization) is a commonplace. It is held that he was the first scholar who examined the whole life of societies, not only the dynasties, kings and their battles. See, for instance, G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, second edition (London: Longmans, 1952), 523. If someone is to father the study of civilization (culture), it is not easy to trace who he is. Nonetheless, we could assert that it was not Voltaire, as Ibn Khaldun precedes him.
- <sup>8</sup> F. Guizot, *The History of Civilization in Europe* (London: Cassell and Company, 1911), 5-8, 11-15.
- <sup>9</sup> J. S. Mill, 'Civilization', *The London and Westminster Review* (Vol. 28, No. 1, 1836), 1, 3-6, 14-17.
- <sup>10</sup> J. Arthur de Gobineau, *The Inequality of Human Races*, trans. A. Collins (London: William Heinemann, 1915), 91.
- <sup>11</sup> K. Marx and F. Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party', in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), 40.
- <sup>12</sup> F. Engels, 'Origins of Family, Private Property and State', in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* (1968), 582.
- <sup>13</sup> Braudel, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 181-182. See also Elias, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 4. Cf. Spengler on the devaluation of civilization: 'The civilization is the inevitable destiny of the Culture.' Civilization signifies the death of a culture. O. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, 2 vols, trans. by C. F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, vol. I 1926 and vol. II 1928), 31, 106.
- <sup>14</sup> E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom* (New York: Brentanos Publishers, 1903), 1. Cf. Kroeber and Kluckhohn, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 9-10.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibn Khaldun, *op.cit.*, in note 3, Vol. I, 89; Vol. II, 270-71, 291.
- <sup>16</sup> Perhaps, it should be noted here that the value-laden content of the concept of civilization is not a practice of the past centuries. It suffices to read the following sentence in a recent article: 'We associate civilization with, among other things, a feeling for moderation, for a happy medium between excess and shortage.' F. R. Ankersmit, 'Historiography and Postmodernism', *History and Theory* (Vol. 28, 1989), 138.
- <sup>17</sup> Braudel, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 177.
- <sup>18</sup> Elias, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 5.
- <sup>19</sup> M. Melko, *The Nature of Civilizations* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1969), 8.
- <sup>20</sup> M. G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, 3 vols. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), Vol. I, 91.
- <sup>21</sup> P. Bagby, *Culture and History: Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations* (London: Longmans, 1958), 84, 162-163.
- <sup>22</sup> The difficulty and artificiality of the distinction between the meanings of culture and civilization has been noted by Kroeber and Kluckhohn, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 13-17; and T. S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), 13.
- <sup>23</sup> Elias, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 3.
- <sup>24</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. J. Warrington (London: Heron Books in arrangement with J. M Dent, date of publication not given), bk. 1, 5-8; Ibn Khaldun, *op.cit.*, in note 3, Vol. I, 89, Vol. II, 270-71; R. G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism*, Revised ed. by D. Boucher (1992), 283.
- <sup>25</sup> Collingwood, *op.cit.*, in note 24, 283-284.
- <sup>26</sup> Braudel, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 180-81. The idea of the plurality of civilizations can, of course, be traced further back. Herder has been credited for implying it with his emphasis on the uniqueness and individuality of each people (volk) and on diversity as opposed to unity towards which everyone was heading in the age of the Enlightenment. See H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), 429; and W. H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 164. One can find textual support to these accreditations in Herder emphasizing the uniqueness of each culture. See J.G. Herder, *Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 159. It has been said that the view of plurality was, already implicit when Volney in his *Eclaircissements Sur Les Etats-Unis* (before 1814) spoke of 'La civilization les Sauvages'. See Kroeber and Kluckhohn, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 37.
- <sup>27</sup> W. Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 23.

- <sup>28</sup> A. D. Smith, *National Identity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), 175.
- <sup>29</sup> Bloom, *op. cit.*, in note 27, 39.
- <sup>30</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. by R. Crawley, Everyman edition, (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1910), 3.
- <sup>31</sup> G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England* (London: Longmans, 1943), 232. Bloom makes a concise analysis of the formation of French and English national identities in the medieval period. See Bloom, *op.cit.*, in note 27, 62-71.
- <sup>32</sup> Cf. J. Acton, *Lectures on Modern History* (London: Macmillan, 1950), 34. 'Modern history begins under stress of the Ottoman conquest.'
- <sup>33</sup> H. Kohn, *op. cit.*, in note 26, 5-6.
- <sup>34</sup> Bloom, *op.cit.*, in note 27, 74.
- <sup>35</sup> Braudel, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 209-210.
- <sup>36</sup> Huntington, *op. cit.*, in note 1, 24.
- <sup>37</sup> Spengler, *op.cit.*, in note 13, 21-22, 59-60, 104.
- <sup>38</sup> A.J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 Vols. (London: Oxford University Press, vols. I-III 1934, vols. IV-VI 1939, vols. VII-X 1954, vol. XI-*Historical Atlas and Gazetteer*- 1959, vol. XII-*Reconsiderations*- 1961), Vol. I, 22-26, 455.
- <sup>39</sup> See, L. von Ranke, his Introduction to the *History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations*, in *The Secret of World History: Selected Writings on the Art and Science of History* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1981), 56.
- <sup>40</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 14.
- <sup>41</sup> Cf. Smith on nation and ethnité, *op.cit.*, in note 28, 14, 20; Kohn on nation and nationalism, *op.cit.*, in note 26, 3-24; Huntington on civilization, *op.cit.*, in note 1, 24; Bull on 'society of states', H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Mcmillan, 1977), 13-16; and Vincent on race, R. J. Vincent, 'Race in International Relations', *International Affairs* (Vol. 58, No. 4, 1982), 661.
- <sup>42</sup> Quoted in A. Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (1982), 21-22.
- <sup>43</sup> A. L. Kroeber, 'The Delimitation of Civilizations', *Journal of the History of Ideas* (Vol. 14, No. 2, 1953), 269.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 270.
- <sup>45</sup> Some even go further and assert that no civilization could come into being without a religion. See, for instance, Eliot, *op.cit.*, in note 22. cited in note 47. Northrop considers the characteristic of religion to be one of the distinguishing elements of what he calls the 'Eastern Civilization' and 'Western Civilization'. See, F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946), 401.
- <sup>46</sup> W. Eckhardt, *Civilizations, Empires and Wars: A Quantitative History of War* (Jefferson, N. C. and London: McFarland and Company, 1992), 43.
- <sup>47</sup> A. L. Kroeber, *Styles and Civilizations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), 4-6, 19-20.
- <sup>48</sup> Kroeber, *op.cit.*, in note 43, 273-275.
- <sup>49</sup> W.H. McNeill, 'Civilization', *The Encyclopedia Americana*, international edition (Danbury: Grolier Incorporated, 1982), 2.
- <sup>50</sup> R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1953), 50.
- <sup>51</sup> Kroeber, *op.cit.*, in note 47, 134.
- <sup>52</sup> W.H. McNeill, *A World History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 19-42; and 'Organizing Concepts for World History', *Review* (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1986), 223-225.
- <sup>53</sup> Spengler, *op.cit.*, in note 13, Vol. I, 18; and Vol. II, 38-46, 189-196.
- <sup>54</sup> Toynbee, *op.cit.*, in note 38, Vol. I, 133; Vol. II, 322-324; Vol. III, 1-79.
- <sup>55</sup> McNeill, *op.cit.*, in note 52, *A World History*, 1-4.
- <sup>56</sup> Huntington, *op.cit.*, in note 1, 25.
- <sup>57</sup> McNeill, *op.cit.*, in note 52, 'Organizing Concepts for...', 225.
- <sup>58</sup> See Braudel, *op.cit.*, in note 4, 201; Eckhardt, *op.cit.*, in note 46, 35; and Melko, *op.cit.*, in note 19, 17.
- <sup>59</sup> See, for instance, Huntington, *op.cit.*, in note 1, 25; N. Berdyaev, *The Meaning of History* (London: Geoffrey Bless, the Centenary Press, 1936), 124; and M. Ginsberg, 'The Unity of Mankind', in *Hobhouse Memorial Lectures, 1930-1940* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), 17-18.
- <sup>60</sup> Melko, *op.cit.*, in note 19, 15-16.
- <sup>61</sup> G. W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)

- <sup>62</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, trans. by A. D. Lindsay, (London: Heron Books, in arrangement with J.M.Dent and Sons, date of publication not given), 162.
- <sup>63</sup> Aristotle, *op. cit.*, in note 24, 6, 13, 92.
- <sup>64</sup> Gong, *op.cit.*, in note 61, 3-53.
- <sup>65</sup> Wright, *op.cit.*, in note 1, 236-237.
- <sup>66</sup> Quoted in A.B.Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 145. See also, A.F.Whyte, *China and Foreign Powers* (London: Milford, 1927), 41.
- <sup>67</sup> The fact that the self-image of a civilization is usually defined in opposition to the others in no way implicates that civilizations are in a constant conflictual state. For example , Toynbee notes that in the thirteenth century, in Uiguria, Nestorianism and Buddhism, two universal religions, were actually living cheek by jowl on a *modus vivendi* of mutual toleration. Toynbee, *op.cit.*, in note 38, Vol. II, 378.
- <sup>68</sup> McNeill, *op.cit.*, in note 52, *A World History*, 417,421.
- <sup>69</sup> Notable examples analyzing the historical development of the modern international system as such include Bull, *op. cit.*, in note 41; H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Gong, *op. cit.*, in note 61; G. Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1987); F. S. Northedge, *The International Political System* (London: Faber and Faber, 1976); I.Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and M. Wight, *Systems of States*, ed. with an Introduction by H. Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977).
- <sup>70</sup> Gong, *op. cit.*, in note 61, 200.
- <sup>71</sup> Huntington, *op. cit.*, in note 1, 25-28.
- <sup>72</sup> Gong, *op. cit.*, in note 61, 247.
- <sup>73</sup> See for instance, M.Ayob (ed.), *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); M. Curtis (ed.), *Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); A. Dawisha (ed.), *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); A. E. Dessouki (ed.), *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Preager, 1982); G. H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); B. Lewis, 'The Return of Islam', in his *Islam and the West* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) [originally published in *Commentary* (January 1976), 39-49]; E. Mortimer, *Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam* (London: Faber and Faber, 1982); and D. Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
- <sup>74</sup> B. Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 1990), 60.
- <sup>75</sup> R. Gilpin, 'The Global Political System', in J. D. B. Miller and R. J. Vincent (eds.), *Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 139.
- <sup>76</sup> While Huntington notes trends in 'Asianization' in Japan, 'Hinduization' in India, 're-Islamization' in the Middle East and 'Russianization' in Russia; Gong observes a resurgent culturalism in Indonesia. See respectively, Huntington, *op.cit.*, in note 1, 26; and Gong, *op.cit.*, in note 61, 245.
- <sup>77</sup> Lewis, *op.cit.*, in note 73, 153-4. For an analysis of the pros and cons of Islam being a political force in contemporary international politics, see B. Beeley, 'Islam as a Global Political Force', in A.G.McGrew and P.G.Lewis et al., *Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation-State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
- <sup>78</sup> 10. See, for instance, Huntington, *op.cit.*, in note 1, R.D.Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', *The Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994), 44-76; and Lewis, *op.cit.*, in note 74.
- <sup>79</sup> See, for example, G. E Fuller 'The Emergence of Central Asia', *Foreign Policy* (No. 78, Spring 1990), 49-67; and B. Lewis, 'Rethinking the Middle East', *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 71, No. 4, 1992), 99-119.
- <sup>80</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of the emergence of the modern Turkish state, see B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
- <sup>81</sup> 13. See Kaplan, *op.cit.*, in note 78, 62, observing that Turks are increasingly defining themselves as muslims; G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser, with P. B. Henze and J. F. Brown, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) for an account of Turkey's new regional orientations. See also G. Winrow, *Where East Meets West: Turkey and The Balkans* (London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1993); and P. Robins, 'Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States', *Middle East Journal* (Vol. 47, No. 4, 1993), 593-610.
- <sup>82</sup> Cf. Lewis, *op.cit.*, in note 73, 6.
- <sup>83</sup> See B. A. Roberson, 'Islam and Europe: An Enigma or Myth?', *Middle East Journal* (Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994), 288-308.

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- <sup>84</sup>. See, for instance, R. Shapcott, 'Conversation and Coexistence...', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1994), 81; B. Buzan, 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School', *International Organization* (Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993), 349; and K. Mahbubani, 'The West and the Rest', *The National Interest* (No. 28, Summer 1992), 5.
- <sup>85</sup>. The literature on these principles and institutions which are said to have developed within the Western civilization are vast. For an early example see, Guizot, *op. cit.*, in note 8; and for a present account see, M. Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966).
- <sup>86</sup>. For a comprehensive account of Westernization process in Greece and Turkey, see A.J.Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1922).
- <sup>87</sup>. See R.D.Asmus, R.L.Kugler and F.S.Larrabee, 'NATO Expansion the Next Steps', *Survival* (Vol.37, No.1, Spring 1995), 9.
- <sup>88</sup>. Warsaw, July 1994, emphases added.
- <sup>89</sup>. These three states were repeatedly described as the most likely candidates. When I asked the case of Romania and Slovenia, the American officials at NATO Headquarters were hesitant. I got the impression that, for the Americans, the first round of the enlargement must be confined to Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.
- <sup>90</sup>. See M. Kramer, 'The Case for a Bigger NATO', *Time*, 20 January 1994, 21. Emphases added.
- <sup>91</sup>. V.Havel, 'We Really are Part of the NATO Family', *International Herald Tribune*, 20 October 1993.
- <sup>92</sup>. See Z.Brzezinski, 'A Plan for Europe', *Foreign Affairs* (Vol.74, No.1, January/February 1995), 30.
- <sup>93</sup>. *Le Figaro*, September 30, 1994. Empases added.
- <sup>94</sup>. The Hague, October 28, 1994.
- <sup>95</sup>. *Turkish Daily News*, February 16, 1995. See also *Newsweek*, May 29, 1995, 13.