

**THE ROLE OF MILITARY
EDUCATION IN HARMONIZING
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
(THE BULGARIAN CASE)**

FINAL REPORT

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DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the interest of academic freedom, the advancement of national security concepts, and the development of democratic institutions in Bulgaria. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect an official policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Governments of its member countries.

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1989, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe undergo unprecedented transition from communism to democracy which impacts every aspect of the life of their citizens. Having many common features, the transformations in a separate country are shaped by its political, cultural, and technological characteristics and the potential of its people. But there is a prevalent endeavor to join democratic *Europe*. As a part of this process, they seek security guarantees in full-fledged integration within the North Atlantic Alliance.

However, the expectations are that at the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 1997, only a few Central and Eastern European countries will be invited to join the Alliance, and Bulgaria will not be in the first group. Among the reasons are the serious problems Bulgaria has with establishing effective democratic control over the armed forces.

Considerable part of the politicians, the military and Bulgarian society at large were surprised by this conclusion. Bulgaria has a new democratic Constitution, new Law on Defense and the Armed Forces and other normative acts stipulating the principle of civilian control, new organizational structures, civilians in key positions in Government and the Ministry of Defense. Nevertheless, the severe crisis did not circumvent the Bulgarian military. The focus of attention turned from military effectiveness to officer salaries, from combat readiness to how to feed the soldiers, from patriotism to cases of theft, corruption, drugs, and suicide. There is a considerable lag (bordering on lack) of reform of the armed forces. Bulgarian youth expects the time for service in the army as a necessary evil.

Therefore, no matter whether the integration in NATO or the democratic future of Bulgaria is under discussion, we have to have effective democratic control of the military. And although there are flaws in current legislature, the problem is not in the lack of laws or organizations. Practically all “players” in Bulgarian civil-military relations lack relevant knowledge. The very notion of civil control is generally not understood, both by political elites and the military. Reflecting societal culture, changes in their perceptions, attitudes, and behavior are slow and painful.

Solutions to these problems are not readily available. Moreover, it is not easy to structure the efforts to change societal culture. But clearly, military education may contribute in important ways to the establishment of effective democratic control over the armed forces. Educating officers, NCOs and conscripts, civilians, journalists and the public at large, it has the potential to turn into a major factor for harmonization of civil-military relations in Bulgaria.

I TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES (THE BULGARIAN CASE)

1.1 Democratic control over the military - a milestone of democratization

All Bulgarian Governments after 1989 invariably place the accession of Republic of Bulgaria to European political and economic organizations among their main goals. Although to a different degree, they seek national security guarantees in the cooperation with European and Euroatlantic security structures, including NATO. Both the declared goals and concrete political and diplomatic steps aim increased security and economic prosperity, but on a deeper level, they reflect the dominant endeavor of the Bulgarian people to join democratic Europe.

The countries in Western Europe and North America demonstrate a rich spectrum of historical traditions, forms of state government, and vast cultural diversity. Nevertheless, all they share in certain ways some signs - a multiparty political system, division of power and authority, market economy, respect for human rights, etc. In this respect, the integration of Bulgaria in Europe relates not so much to the introduction of a specific state model or the achievement of certain level of economic development, but to the acceptance of a relevant value system.

Among the basic principles of democracy is the principle of civil control over the military. In their strive for democratization, all post-communist countries confronted the problem of transforming one model of civilian control – the communist party control – with another – democratic control over the armed forces. As a whole, the necessity of this transformation was accepted positively. However, its implementation encountered a number of obstacles, created by lack of traditions, impossibility to implement directly models of civil-military relations, functioning successfully in the US and Western Europe, and lack of people, prepared to guide and lead the armed forces in conditions of political pluralism.

The establishment of effective civil control is crucial for the democratic development of Bulgaria, both in the sense of preventing excessive military involvement in politics and as a guarantee that no more than the necessary resources for the military security of the state will be allocated, and that these resources will be spent effectively. At the same time, the achievement of effective democratic control over the military turned into a requirement for integration of countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in international political, economic, and security organizations. For example, although NATO has not announced officially *criteria* for accession to the Alliance, the Study on NATO Enlargement postulates that “Prospective members will *have to have*:

- ◆ Demonstrated a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes ...;

- ◆ Shown a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility;
- ◆ *Established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defense forces; ...*^{xi}

However, a number of authors reason that the Study practically enacted *criteria* which new members must fulfill,ⁱⁱ encouraging harmonization of their security and defense policy with those of the Alliance and achievement of effective democratic civil-military relations. Illustrative in this respect is Jeffrey Simon's conclusion that if NATO adopts conditions for *effective* civilian oversight of the military, then "most of the Visegrad states would not currently qualify."ⁱⁱⁱ Furthermore, despite the purposeful efforts of these and other CEE countries, two years later Chris Donnelly declared that "no post-communist country has yet achieved a totally satisfactory degree of democratic control and good civil-military relations. In all cases, as societies transform, their armies lag behind."^{iv} Regarding Bulgaria in particular, the US Congressman Christopher Smith announced a similar conclusion in May 1997.^v

These conclusions surprised part of the Bulgarian political and military leadership. Bulgaria has a new democratic Constitution and new laws on defense, the armed forces, and other security organizations. Roles and responsibilities of Parliament, President, Government, and General Staff are specified according to the principle of civilian control. The Minister of Defense is civilian. But this is only the formal side of the issue. To illustrate the role of formal institutions in civil-military relations, we need to examine their theoretical foundations.

1.2 Theoretical approaches to the civil control over the military

Civil-military relations present a topic of significant interest at least since the beginning of the written history of the mankind. But the question the Romans asked in the 1st century "Who is to guard the guardians?" is still to receive its definite answer.

More often than not, in premodern times one person embodied the roles of the state leader and the supreme military commander. Among the examples are almost all Bulgarian Khans and Czars of the First and the Second Bulgarian states. But even in such cases the issue of the civilian control was not irrelevant. Dramatic is the example from the Bible of the relations between King David and his chief of staff Yoav and the way, in which the otherwise loyal military leader imposed his views on the state politics.^{vi}

Ancient thinkers examine the other side of the coin, too. More than 2,500 years ago, the Chinese general Sun Tzu focused the attention on the "ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army." When a ruler, ignorant of military affairs, participates in their administration, "this causes the officers to be perplexed. ... If one ignorant of military matters

is sent up to participate in the administration of the army, then in every movement there will be disagreement and mutual frustration and the entire army will be hamstrung.” The military strategist concludes that “he whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious. ... To make appointments is the province of the sovereign; to decide on battle, that of the general.”^{vii}

There is no universally accepted time period for the emergence of the modern civil-military relations. Scientists suggest that their beginning coincides with the rise of the modern nation state, the emergence of professional officer corps, or the advent of large-scale standing armies. However, the theory of the civil-military relations as a separate area of scientific research was established only after World War Two with the works of Huntington, Janowitz and Finer.

1.2.1 Theoretical Breakthroughs

In a book published for the first time in 1957, *Samuel Huntington* examines civil-military relations as a system of interrelated elements. Its major components are^{viii}:

- ◆ formal structural position of military institution in government;
 - ◆ informal role and influence of military groups in politics and society;
 - ◆ nature of military ethics and dominant ideologies of nonmilitary groups,
- and neither of these alters without causing changes in the other elements of the system.

The theory, proposed by Huntington, is based on the concept of professionalism. The main focus of civil-military relations is on the officer corps and the state. The author convincingly proves that the modern officers are professionals and form a particular type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.^{ix} The distinctive sphere of competency, characteristic for all officers independent on service or branch, is the management of violence. The responsibility is in guaranteeing the military security of the state. The corporate character of the officership is formed by complex procedures and requirements for access to the profession, an explicit system for promotion and appointments, the system of military education, a clear cut hierarchy and staff organization, esprit and competence of the officer corps. The behavior of the officer within the military structure is guided by a complex of regulations, norms, customs, and traditions. The professional behavior towards society is based on the understanding that his expertise may be applied only for purposes, approved by society through its political agent, the state.

Huntington examines three forms (military, internal and situational) and two levels (operative and institutional) of the national security policy and defines civil-military relations as the principal institutional component of the military security policy. Although the public debate is

usually focused on operative issues such as size, recruitment, organization, equipment, deployment, mobilization, etc., the long-term character of the decision-making process is based on the established (conscientiously or not) model of civil-military relations.

Any system of civil-military relations involves a complex equilibrium between authority, influence and ideologies of military and nonmilitary groups. The goal is to achieve an equilibrium which maximizes military security with the least sacrifice of other social values. Huntington identifies two main models of civil-military relations - *subjective* and *objective* civilian control. In the first model control is achieved through maximizing the power of particular civilian groups in relation to the military. The latter involves minimization of military power by professionalizing the military, thus guaranteeing their neutrality and political sterility. It is this abstract model - *the objective civilian control* - that maximizes military security of the state while minimizing danger to democratic values.

The second pillar in the fundament of the new theory was the work of *Morris Janowitz*, published in 1960.^x Studying in detail the professional character of the US officer corps, the author concludes that the armed forces have preserved their professional distinctiveness, integrity, and professional ethics, adequate to support civilian supremacy.

Thus, Huntington and Janowitz focused the attention on professional autonomy and introduced a sense of balance in the study of civil-military relations. For too long the problem of civilian control has been interpreted only in the sense of potential military intervention in civilian affairs. The introduction of the principle of professional autonomy brought in focus the other side of the coin - the overinvolvement of civilian political authorities in military affairs. Janowitz emphasizes that “civilian supremacy is effective because the professional soldier believes that his political superiors ... are prepared to weigh his professional advice with great care.” Furthermore, Janowitz develops the concept of common responsibility and introduces the term *unanticipated militarism*, which develops from “a lack of effective traditions and practices for controlling the military establishment, isolation between civil and military leadership, as well as failure of civilian political leaders to act relevantly and consistently. Under such circumstances, a vacuum is created which not only encourages an extension of the tasks and power of military leadership, but actually forces such trends.”^{xi}

Applying methods from sociology, Janowitz studies how the trends in the evolution of civil society influence military organizations, and how military leaders react to that evolution. He established research directions, set of categories and concepts, and even the terminology of civil-military relations. His fundamental thesis is that from the beginning of the 20th century the boundaries separating the military from civilian society had progressively weakened. Thus, military organizations are forced to participate more actively in the life of society and yet maintain its *relative* autonomy, competence, and cohesion.

While Huntington and Janowitz examined primarily Western experience in civil-military relations as a function of nature and character of the armed forces, *Samuel Finer* studied civil-military relations as a reflection of the nature and character of society.^{xii} He provides a conceptual and classification system with methodological tools for categorizing and evaluating military intervention. His central thesis is that the level of military intervention in a given country is a direct function of the political culture of that society and the level of development of civil organizations. The lower the level of political culture, the higher the level of military intervention in politics and public affairs.

1.2.2 Developments in civil-military relations theory

The three works established the theoretical fundament of civilian control. In the following years, the growing scientific field of civil-military relations attracted modern hypotheses and methods from sociology, political science, organizational theory, theory of communication, etc.

According to *Charles Moskos*, there are always forces unifying and dividing civil and military components of society.^{xiii} In some areas trends of increased integration between military and civilians are active, and in others the tendency is towards traditional isolation of the military. Therefore, Moskos prefers to examine *pluralistic* military, functioning in the spectrum between civilian and strictly military activities. The new military is segmented. Some organizational units are isolated from civilian society and others are more closely connected with it. Thus, Moskos introduced a more realistic concept of the corporateness of the military profession. His realism brought forward the division of motivations for military service. The reasons for selecting the military profession may be not only institutional, but also occupational, and their prevalent nature to a high degree defines the status of civil-military relations.^{xiv}

Amos Perlmutter offered a unified theory of civil-military relations valid for all countries in the world.^{xv} He rejects the view that a clear-cut division between civilian and military functions exists. The assumption “that professionalism removes military from politics” is based on classical traditions of administrative theory, that is built on the premise that policy making is distinguished from policy implementation. The modern administrative theory is fusionist, recognizing that bureaucracy and politics are symbiotically connected. Perlmutter agrees with Huntington that politics is beyond the scope of military competence in the sense that the military plays no active role in elections, but states that the military’s role in formation and implementation of the policy on national security forces it to accept and support a political attitude.

The concept of subjective and objective models of civilian control was further elaborated by *Peter Feaver*.^{xvi} He reasons that neither civilian nor military leadership has ever followed the

prescriptions of the classic theory of division of responsibilities and proposes instead the *assertive-delegative* framework. Feaver proves that although the delegative control is closely related to the Huntington's objective civilian control, civilians do not always unreservedly support its ideal division of labor. Instead, they prefer to exercise direct supervision over the military, including supervision over military operations. Without completely undermining the professionalization of the officer corps, the assertive control preserves the institutional basis for division of labor, but in the framework of a conflictual pattern of civil-military relations. Empirical evidence exists, that the assertive control is prevalent in Western democracies, and the U.S. in particular. Similar is the conclusion is made by *Stephen Cimbala* who reasons that during the Gulf War the American civil-military relations were characterized by a unusual combination of *assertive* and *permissive* control.^{xviii}




Figure 1. Systemic relationships ^{xviii}

Samuel Sarkesian expands Huntington's theoretical framework studying three areas of civil-military relations as systemic interaction between civilian elites, military, and political-social system (figure 1). Certain factors, i.e., the process of democratization, not only influence the separate elements of the systemic relationship, but may alter the balance among them. Furthermore, the military may play an enhanced role in national security decision-making and still maintain their political neutrality.

Focusing the attention on the role of culture in the social-political system, *Rebecca Schiff* proposes to reconsider the theory of civil-military relations. In an alternative approach, designated as *theory of concordance*, she accounts for the central role of culture in the interaction of three components - military institutions, political elites and citizenry.^{xix} The new theory encompasses the institutional division of civilian and military responsibilities as just one model of civil-military relations, typical mainly for the United States. Depending on cultural, historical, and political peculiarities, the pattern of civil-military relations in a certain country may be based on either division or integration of civilian and military responsibilities, and cultural factors exert paramount influence over the potential for military intervention in politics. Among those factors are value system, attitudes, perceptions, and symbols, shaping not only the national view on the role of the military, but also the military view on their own role. Concordance does not require a particular form of government, decision-making process or set of institutions. Concordance may take place in the context of increased dialogue, recognition of the views of the other side, and shared values among political elites, military,

and society. Whether based on law or lasting historical and cultural values, concordance is achieved in countries with a process of active debate on issues concerning the social composition of the officer corps, the process of political decision-making, recruitment method, and military style.

In another study of the role of cultural factors, *Kemp and Hudlin* reason that the nature of civil control and the limits in its implementation depend on the degree, to which soldiers accept the support for the civil supremacy as their moral obligation.^{xx} The rationale is partially based on the inherent *vagueness* in the relation “political ends-military means”, implicitly accepted as a basis for institutional civilian control. The authors pay special attention to the fact that civilian leadership not only defines the goals, but also decides where to draw the boundary between ends and means, policy and implementation.

The last theoretical development to be examined combines the previous two approaches in the principle of shared responsibility.^{xxi} According to *Douglas Bland*, problems in mature democracies appear not when the military seize civilian control, but when politicians, because of either incompetence or negligence, abandon their responsibilities. Politicians in democratic societies act as defenders of neutrality and integrity of the armed forces not only because democracy requires it, but also because otherwise the high command would be defenseless. Bland questions main points in the Huntington’s theory concluding that “mature democratic states guard against political abuse of the armed forces by dividing certain aspects of control over defense policy and the military between politicians and soldiers.”^{xxii} The acceptance of the shared responsibility encourages consensus-building on issues of underlying principles, national strategy, and defense resource spending. Even without being declared publicly, the consensus provides a stable basis for control of defense policy and clear directions for the work of lower command and administrative levels.

1.2.3 Conceptual framework of the current study

For the last seven years the CEE countries, including Bulgaria, are undergoing a unique transition from authoritarian one-party rule to democracy and from a command to a free-market economy. Main component of the process of democratization is the establishment of democratic civilian control over the armed forces. Democratizing civilian control has a paramount importance for the success of democratic transformation and, at the same time, presents a significant theoretical challenge.

Naturally, it is expected that scholars from the countries in transition will be active participants in the quest for deeper understanding of this unique process. Bulgarian scientists also contribute to the analysis of transformations in civil-military relations. The Bulgarian Institute for International Studies cooperated with the NATO Defense College in preparing

and conducting the NDC 1994 Seminar on “Democratic and Civil Control over the Armed Forces.”^{xxiii} In early 1996, the Institute for Security and International Studies, Sofia, published the first monograph on civil-military relations in Bulgarian.^{xxiv} It was quickly followed by two more books, published by non-governmental organizations.^{xxv}

These publications and the accompanying seminars acquainted Bulgarian politicians, officers, cadets, students and journalists with the concept of democratic civilian control over the military. However, they examine civil-military relations mainly in the framework of the institutional theory. This framework does not allow to detect and analyze the whole spectrum of current problems. Therefore, in order to evaluate the present situation in the area of civil-military relations and to identify directions and means for improvement, we examine a conceptual framework that partially combines the institutional and sociological approaches previously outlined.

An abstract scheme is proposed that separates the realization of civil-military relations in three areas within two layers (figure 2). The first layer covers the formal basis of civilian control encompassing accepted laws and other legislative documents, procedures, and organizational structures, as well as their institutionalization. The second layer is the “cultural” layer. It accounts for the value system of the actors in civil-military relations, their level of education and training, perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral patterns. The three main areas of interaction are “political elites-military” (military leadership in particular), “political elites-society”, and “military-society.”




Figure 2. Areas and layers of civil-military interaction

With the understanding that this representation is a simplification of reality, allowing for some overlap and disguising complex interactions, it provides a conceptual framework for identification and systemic examination of the principle components of current civil-military relations in Bulgaria.

1.3 Civil-military relations during transition from communism to democracy

1.3.1 A historical note

The Bulgarian state was founded in 681. After the Russian-Turkish war, 1877-1878, the Bulgarian statehood was restored. The Third Bulgarian state fought several wars for unification of the territories with predominantly Bulgarian population, and actively participated in both World Wars. Except for brief periods of time, the state maintained strong *army* (see Appendix I for terminological clarification). The officer corps had a distinct social composition and practically all officers were graduates of a single military school. The military profession and the army had high prestige. With no exceptions, the reasons for losing wars were attributed to political actors, whether the Monarch or the Government.

The Bulgarian military has a record of intervening in politics, summarized in Table 1. The original source lists one more event: With the advance of the Soviet army during World War Two, on September 9, 1944, Bulgarian army officers took part in the overthrow of the week-old West oriented Government of Muraviev. It is questionable whether the participation of Bulgarian military played a significant role in those events. Indisputable, however, is that 1944 brought an abrupt change in the model of civil-military relations.

In the following 45-year period, the development of civil-military relations in Bulgaria obeyed a completely different pattern. In conditions of strong Soviet influence, the Bulgarian Communist Party exercised effective political control over the Armed Forces. However, in decisions on doctrine, strategy, planning, composition, deployment, education and training, etc., essential was the role of the direct ties between Bulgarian military and the Soviet General Staff. The military had a monopoly over defense information and the word ‘transparency’ was practically unknown. Civilian expertise on defense issues was virtually unavailable, and the citizenry did not play any significant role in defense and national security decision-making. Nevertheless, at least in the last decades of the period, there were factors supporting the professionalization of the military, among them:

- ◆ A set of strictly observed educational requirements for officer commission and advancement;
- ◆ A system of promotion, based mostly on merit and experience^{xxvi};

- ◆ Well structured, and to a high degree closed, system of military education and training;
- ◆ The system of the General Staff.

There were also factors working against the professionalization of the military. Most important among them were the following:

- ◆ Through the “apparatus” of political officers, the communist party exercised both high-level and in-place control over the military;
- ◆ The structures of military counterintelligence were subordinated not to the military authority, but to the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- ◆ A trend of growing occupational motivations in choosing the military profession in the 70s and the 80s;
- ◆ Following the Soviet model, the army and the system of military education were highly compartmentalized, providing good promotion and advancement opportunities to officers from certain branches and substantially limiting other officers, thus lowering the cohesion of the officer corps.

Nevertheless, as a whole, the army had a high prestige. It was never used against the Bulgarian people. Moreover, military officers played an important part in the best known plot against the regime of the communist party under Todor Zhivkov.^{xxviii} All these factors influenced the process of establishing democratic civil control over the armed forces after 1989.

Table 1. Coup d'état in the history of the Third Bulgarian State^{xxvii}

Coup	Forces behind the Coup	Result	Relation to Monarchy
June 27, 1881	Kniaz (Prince) Alexander I, General Ernrot (Russian), Conservative Party	Abolition of the Constitution; Regime of extraordinary powers	Participant in the events
August 9, 1886	Russophile bourgeoisie and officers	Abdication of the kniaz (prince)	The coup is against the West oriented policy of the kniaz
August 1886 - Counter Coup	Pro western bourgeoisie and officers with Stambolov as a leader	The kniaz confirms the abdication; Establishment of Council of Regency	In “defense” of the policy of Alexander I
June 9, 1923	“Military Union” and pro fascist organizations	Overthrow of the legitimate government of Stamboliisky	Supported by the Monarch
May 19, 1934	Political circle “Zveno”, “Military Union”	Abolition of the Constitution; Dissolution of all political parties	Against the Monarchy

1.3.2 Establishing civil control (institutional layer)

The first step towards institutionalization of the democratic changes in Bulgaria after November 10, 1989, involved the abolition of Article 1 of the 1971 Constitution on the leading role of the Bulgarian Communist Party in all state and public affairs. This step was followed by the so called “depolitization” of the military, when all officers and NCOs were asked to leave either the communist party or the military.

The new Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, adopted in 1991,^{xxix} set a firm basis for the establishment of civil control over national security and defense policy, as well as over the armed forces. It is also fundamental for the interaction between society and the political elites, thus guaranteeing indirect influence of the citizenry over the military. Although with some delay, other laws followed, most important for the civil control being the Law on Defense and the Armed Forces (LDAF).^{xxx} This Law preserved the obligatory military service for all healthy men, which is the most important formal component of the interaction between military and society.

The detailed analysis of the legislative documents shows that they provide a solid basis for the institutionalization of democratic civil control.^{xxxi} The Constitution and LDAF delineate roles and responsibilities of the People’s Assembly (the Parliament), the generally elected President, the Council of Ministers, the civilian Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, and the judicial branch. Moreover, the comparative analysis shows that in the development of the normative base of civilian control Bulgaria is ahead of most countries in CEE, including the Visegrad countries.^{xxxii} The process of building organizational structures and developing procedures for civilian control is also nearing completion.

However, some provisions of the operative legislature do not support the establishment of effective democratic control over the armed forces:

- ◆ The approach to defining roles and responsibilities of Parliament and President (Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces) is inconsistent and somewhat contradictory.^{xxxiii} Situations when the President and the majority in Parliament are from different political parties create conditions for subjective civilian control, and such attempts were already made;
- ◆ In the instituted interaction between President and Government, the President may effectively block the moves of the Government,^{xxxiv}
- ◆ A number of parallel structures were created,^{xxxv}
- ◆ Article 8 of the LDAF states that “Civilian control over the Armed Forces is exercised by the bodies, envisioned in the Constitution and this Law.” Thus, LDAF recognizes *only* the

institutional form of civilian control and, potentially, may create obstacles to civil control by media, non-governmental organizations, and citizens;

- ◆ LDAF reintroduced the *Inspectorate* as an instrument of the civilian Minister of Defense for exercising civilian control. It has seven Inspections, including separate inspections for “Civil Control of the Land Forces,” “Civil Control of the Air Force,” and “Civil Control of the Navy.”^{xxxvi} However, the three Inspections are lead by senior military officers, and most of the “civilians” at the Inspectorate (one third of its personnel) are recently retired officers.^{xxxvii} Thus, the overreliance on military expertise and the corporate spirit of the officership may jeopardize the idea of using the Inspectorate as an agency for civilian control over the military putting instead additional weight on the side of the General Staff in its conflictual relationship with the civilian Minister of Defense;^{xxxviii}
- ◆ As a whole, the LDAF was developed and adopted under very strong influence of the military leadership while the Bulgarian Socialist Party had absolute majority in Parliament. As a result, provisions were included which increased retirement age and gave the military substantial benefits at the time they leave active duty. Although such benefits may be well deserved, in the current financial situation these provisions pose significant limitations on the options, available to the new civilian leadership in its efforts to reform the military establishment;
- ◆ A law regulating rights, responsibilities, educational requirements, and career opportunities of the state employee (civil servant) is still in the making. Hence, civilian experts at all levels, who are subject to frequent reshuffling and political caprice, have no incentives to specialize in the field of defense and security.

Although there are imperfections in operative legislature, established procedures, and relevant organizations, the changes in the last six years created conditions for institutionalization of effective democratic control over the armed forces. However, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions. Therefore, the effective functioning of democratic control requires deeper changes in the second—cultural—layer of civil-military interaction.

1.3.3 Building civil control (cultural layer)

Bulgarian society almost anonymously welcomed the democratic changes launched on November 10, 1989. The military, being used to work under civilian (political) control, accepted the principle of civilian control of defense and national security. Problems appeared mainly because of:

- ◆ Lack of relevant political culture and modest (during the first couple of years even missing) civilian and military expertise in democratic procedures in formulation and administration

of national security policy, military and defense policy, and oversight of modern armed forces;

- ◆ Lack of a defense community, able to provide the political leadership with alternative solutions to national security and defense problems. Political decision-making depends to a very high degree on military advise;
- ◆ Insufficient number of civilian experts in defense and national security issues both on political and administrative level. Thus, even the civilian Minister of Defense almost completely depends on the advise and technical assistance of the military;
- ◆ The military's understanding of the concept of boundaries between rights and responsibilities of political authority and military (predominantly dichotomous). Even though they accept the principle of civilian control, most senior military leaders consider the responsibility for the formulation of military doctrine, force structure, planning and conduct of operations, promotions, military education and training, as entirely theirs and examine civilian participation as unacceptable. This fact should not be surprising, because historically that has been the case in Bulgaria since regaining independence in 1878;
- ◆ Lack of traditions in citizen participation in discussions on issues of state importance, and in particular in the national security decision-making process and in overseeing state expenditures. Low level of societal awareness and misunderstanding of the real problems of defense and the military. As a rule, low level of competency of mass media in covering the problems of the armed forces.

Therefore, no matter what the normative base,^{xxxix} it allows for different expectations, interpretations, and actions of the players in the civil-military interaction. The current pattern of civil-military relations depends mostly of the cultural level, and has the following manifestations:

Interaction “political elites - military”

During the first years of democratization events typical for the Huntington’s abstract model of subjective civilian control were witnessed,^{xl} most important being the politically inspired confrontation in the early 90s between the Chief of the General Staff General Petrov and the Chief of Staff of Land Forces Lieutenant-General Liutskanov. This confrontation culminated in the 1992 Plovdiv meeting of commanders from the Land Forces, organized by General Liutskanov. The then Chief of the General Staff, General Petrov appeared announced, and whatever the plan was, it did not succeed. Soon after that General Liutskanov retired from the army and became advisor to the Union of Democratic Forces. Years later, the former President’s Adviser on National Security Lieutenant-General Stoyan Andreev declared that

General Petrov's visit prevented a coup d'état, planned to keep the then Prime Minister Philip Dimitrov in power.^{xli}

In the fall of 1994, the contradictions between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (having the support of different political parties) aggravated, and this time General Petrov was the one to leave the army.

The two-year cycle in spreading rumors for coup d'état was confirmed in late 1996 after the assassination of the former Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov. In conditions of very high inflation, skyrocketing prices and extreme devaluation of the Bulgarian currency, rumors for a coup in the making found support in the news of a meeting between the Prime Minister Videnov and the members of the Military Council of the General Staff.

The latest plan for a coup was "unveiled" by mass media in April 1997.^{xlii} This time, the "plan" relied heavily on Retired General Liutskanov's participation. However, the information was published only a week before the parliamentary elections, and it should be evaluated respectively.

Another source of tension is the peculiar understanding of the principle of civilian control by part of the political elites. In February 1997, a politician was appointed as a Head of the National Intelligence Agency, and he was promoted directly to the rank of Colonel. Another example is the promotion of a journalist—Head of the Press Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—to the rank of Major, and then to Colonel.^{xliii} Such decisions not only demonstrate misunderstanding of the principle of civilian control, but pose a direct threat to the professionalization of the officer corps.

A third sign of subjective control is the use of mass media to solve organizational, mostly personnel, issues.^{xliv} The leakage of information to mass media is turning into a pattern, and judging by the character of information it is most probably provided by officers. This pattern contradicts major principles of military ethics, acts against the unity of the officer corps and the corporateness of the military profession.

Finally, the strong dependence of the political elite on the military for expert advice still continues. Recently retired officers form the main source of advice to all major political parties. Furthermore, they fill in key positions for exercising civilian control. A typical example is the appointment of recently retired flag officers as "civilian" ministers. Not contradicting operative legislature, but descriptive of the level of political culture is also the fact, that three of the five candidatures for the post of Minister of Defense in the new Government, discussed by media in the spring of 1997, were those of very recently retired generals.^{xlv}

Interaction “political elites - society”

So far, the indirect role of the relations between society and political elites over civil-military relations is quite limited. Public scrutiny of the military leads to parliamentary oversight only in extreme cases, such as the 1994 tragic road accident in which fourteen soldiers were killed. Mechanisms for access of citizens to the executive branch on issues of national security and defense are almost nonexistent. However, the undeveloped political culture of society is but one of the reasons. Ineffective state-owned economy, lost markets, high unemployment rates, rising crime, and spreading corruption are in the focus of public attention. The percentage of the GDP for defense purposes and the ineffective use of resources by the military account for a very small part of the state expenditures, and were never mentioned among the reasons for the current severe economic crisis.

In such conditions, expertise in defense and security would barely improve the chances of a politician for reelection. As a result, politicians rarely put the effort to improve their knowledge and understanding of defense and security issues. Instead, they often are content with formal declarations for good relations with the military and “respect for their difficult mission,” participation in military parades, and show of presence at military facilities and exercises.

Interaction “military - society”

Since November 10, 1989, conflict and splitting of Bulgarian political parties, trade unions, sport organizations, etc., became the norm rather than an exception. The pervert culmination came with the first ever split of the eleven-hundred-year-old Bulgarian Orthodox Church. In such conditions, society as a whole, and Bulgarian military as its integral part, do not examine previously mentioned conflicts between senior military leaders as extraordinary events.

Secondly, Bulgarian society in general does not understand the concept of civil *control* over the armed forces. The reasons are partially linguistic. The word “control” exists in the Bulgarian language but the meaning is more one-sided than in English. It means rather to “check”, “supervise”, or “oversee” and the meaning to “regulate”, “direct”, or “guide” is simply missing. The immediate consequence of using the word “control” is misleading public opinion. It creates confusion even among political elites and the military.^{xlvi}

Military traditions in regard to secrecy and isolation combined with the barely developed civil society prevent even humble citizen attempts to question decisions on doctrine, structure, and deployment, as well as military effectiveness in utilizing societal resources.

Finally, both media and the public eagerly discuss the potential for and spread rumors related to a military regime. Experts in social psychology reason that although people respect the

army, they “would not support any dictatorship, independent of whose interests it serves. ... As a really extreme measure, though unpopular, the people would accept an ‘enlightened’ marshal law if convinced that it will improve and not aggravate the situation.”^{xlvii}

From the brief examination of the problems we may conclude that, as a whole, the legal base of the democratic civilian control in Bulgaria is established. Nevertheless, it is possible to further develop the legislature, in particular regarding the role of society in exercising civil control, as well as to improve some of the operative laws and regulations. However, the main problems are in the second–cultural–layer of civil-military interaction. Even though the normative base and the organizational structures are well developed, they do not suffice. Deep transformation in perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral patterns of political elites, the military and society is required to ensure effective and democratic civil-military relations. The Bulgarian system of military education may contribute in important ways to the acceleration of this transformation. But first, let’s examine the current challenges to military education in Bulgaria.

II BULGARIAN MILITARY EDUCATION: TRADITIONS AND CHALLENGES

The Bulgarian system of military education is the most important source of officers for the Armed Forces. More than ninety percents of Bulgarian army officers are graduates of one of the four service academies.^{xlviii} Furthermore, the graduation of the “G.S. Rakovski” Military College of the General Staff is a prerequisite for an appointment at commanding positions above battalion level, and the completion of the newly established “General Staff” course at the “Rakovski” college - a requirement for command positions above brigade level. Therefore, we examine the quality of military education as a factor determining the future of the Armed Forces.

Since the 1960s, the service academies award *higher educational degrees* to their graduates. Combining education and training, solid academic background with the study of specific weapon systems and practice in combat units, they prepare extensively future officers for their first assignments. Shaped after the Soviet style, the five-year long education at the academies is highly specialized with a strong emphasis on engineering sciences. This specialization reflects the compartmentalization of the Armed Forces, and continues during the officer education at “Rakovski” Military College. Although such specialization might have been rationalized in the years of the Cold War, it does not meet security, technological, and organizational demands of the post-Cold War era.

The current requirements to military education are shaped by the new world political order, economic, technological, and legal factors, and the development of Bulgarian democratic institutions. Some of these factors are general for military educators worldwide, while others are specific for the present situation in Bulgaria. Of a particular importance is the role of military education for the development of democratic civil-military relations in Bulgaria which will be analyzed in the last section of this report. The most important single factor demanding change, however, is the Information Revolution and the corresponding Revolution in Military Affairs. More than ever, military must be educated to anticipate change, cope with ambiguity, question traditional boundaries, and lead organizational transformation. To be effective, Bulgarian military needs a rapid transformation. The Bulgarian system of military education and the people responsible for it have the unique opportunity to lead in this transformation. They will either lead it or military colleges and academies will become anachronisms.

2.1 Educational Environment

The environment in which the Bulgarian system of military education functions can be characterized by several main factors. Some of them are general for any society at the end of this century, and others are specific for the transition in Bulgaria. The first group encompasses changing international political situation, corresponding changes in doctrine and mission, and the impact of the Information Revolution. The second group stems from the specifics of the Bulgarian transition towards democracy, the severe financial constraints, and the abrupt change of the legal framework.

Changes in *international politics* brought the end of the ‘simple and stable’ opposition of the Cold War. Answers to questions concerning players, capabilities, intentions, and perceptions are not readily available anymore. Military students may not presume who their opponent or coalition partner would be and how they would act. New threats appeared and threat perception is changing. Terrorism, and especially international terrorism, international drug trafficking and organized crime are becoming targets of the military worldwide.

Respective *doctrinal changes* are taking place. New *missions* appear, i.e., international peacekeeping missions under the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the emphasis is shifting towards participation in international missions, coalition warfare, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, thus requiring from the military student a qualitatively new level of ethnic, religious, cultural, ecological, and human rights awareness.

The influence of technology, and *information technology* in particular, is overwhelming. It impacts the process of planning and conducting military operations, organization, communication, command and control, intelligence, procurement, education and training. A new kind of warfare emerged - Information Warfare.

The domestic political situation influences the military in two main directions: orientation of Republic of Bulgaria toward integration in European and Euroatlantic security structures and building democratic institutions. The first requires education and training of the military for cooperation with new partners through participation in the Partnership for Peace program, leading the way to future *interoperability of military forces*. The latter is primarily concerned with building *democratic civil-military relations* in Bulgaria. Both demand a stronger emphasis on leadership and cultural awareness of the military.

Preparation for such missions is taking place in a declining economic situation, financial limitations, and *force reduction*. Furthermore, democratic transformations are paralleled by changes in attitudes of the population. Armed forces are faced by changing patterns of

behavior and changing motivations of society at large. Changes in the value system of Bulgarian society reflect in an emphasis on 'occupational' versus 'institutional' trend in attitudes toward military profession.

Finally, part of the process of democratization are the corresponding changes in the legal basis of the society. The new Bulgarian Constitution places the military under a generally elected civilian as a Supreme Commander. The new *Law on Defense and the Armed Forces* further elaborates the implementation of the democratic principle of civilian control over the military, including civilian control over military education. For the first time, LDAF introduced a requirement that, at the time of commission, the officer should have a higher educational degree. Of particular importance for the military education is the new *Law on Higher Education*, introducing new (for Bulgaria) academic degrees and a system of accreditation of institutions for higher education, including the service academies and the "G.S. Rakovski" Military College. In respect to military education, priority have the laws regulating higher education.

Some of the factors outlined place short-term, and others - long-term requirements to military education, examined in the following two sections.

2.2 Requirements to Military Education

To cope with the factors of change or to use them to our own advantage, we need military who are critical thinkers, officers who can anticipate the change and deal with ambiguity and uncertainty, leaders who can promote organizational change in the face of traditional attitudes and adverse economic situation.

Bulgaria and Bulgarian military do not need **an** educational system. Reaction, and even more so - the delayed reaction, of the educational system to demands of time will doom our military to low effectiveness, futile resource spending, and loss of the brightest and most able young people. We need a proactive system for military education, leading doctrinal and organizational changes in the Armed Forces - a system which will provide the people for the Armed Forces of the next century.

2.2.1 Mission requirements

After the end of the Cold War the possibility for a large scale conflict has decreased significantly. The new missions require an increase in international, interagency, and interservice cooperation. The Bulgarian participation in a limited or a low-intensity conflict as a coalition partner requires from the officers, at least from the higher ranking commanders, more diplomatic skills and unconventional decisions than specific military skills. This is even

more important when troops are used in the relatively new and broadening tasks of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations under the UN flag. These new missions demand from the officers, often even on a platoon level, deeper knowledge of psychology and social behavior, languages, history of the conflict, cultural and religious peculiarities of the fighting factions. Communication skills on every level become critical.^{xlix} A proper attitude of an educated officer can speed up conflict resolution and lower the casualties among both soldiers and civilian population.

So far, another dimension of the use of military force—the ecological impact—has been largely unaddressed by the Bulgarian military. However, the ecological dimension of a military operation could affect both the circumstances under which the Armed Forces are used and the way they are used.^l The area of ecology is still to receive attention from our military educators.^{li}

2.2.2 Preparing for twenty-first century warfare

Perhaps no single factor has as much potential as the *information explosion* for changing the way in which military organizations function during peace and war. Breakthroughs in sensors, information processing, communications, and visualization will make huge amounts of information available to the individual soldier, sailor, and airman. Time will shrink, and space will expand. Furthermore, emerging technologies will allow knowledge-level information to become largely the responsibility of computers rather than responsibility of individuals.^{lii} To effectively implement these technological developments, military needs unprecedented delegation of decision-making authority, decentralization, and flatter organizational structures.

However, the current organization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is characterized by strict hierarchical command structure with very detailed planning, combined with an absence of sound procedures and adequate means for consultation, situation assessment, decision-making and operational control. To overcome these problems, the emphasis in education and training of military personnel should be put on critical thinking; value orientation towards professionalism, ethics, and cooperation; solid academic background in the field of operations research, system analysis, artificial intelligence, networking; command of foreign languages, law and economics competence, as well as development of research experience and strive for quality.

2.2.3 Personnel challenges

Challenges such as new warfare forms, combined with the technical environment, will mean that officers have to be more comprehensively trained, less specialized and will have to cycle

back through school often during their careers. They will need a broader range of skills in order to be more flexible. Secondly, from a point of view of career, retirement from the military is not really a retirement but merely a change of careers. Therefore, to respond to personnel challenges, to contribute to recruitment and retention of the best-qualified personnel, professional military education must tailor its education to individual needs.

The need to have a better educated and trained force requires continuous education that involves every military member, allowing individuals to broaden their experience and become educated in areas outside their primary career fields. For a commercial environment, Tom Peters outlined the following principles^{liii}: (1) invest in human capital as much as in hardware; (2) train entry-level people and then retrain them as necessary; (3) train everyone in problem-solving techniques to contribute to quality improvement; (4) train extensively following promotion to the first managerial job, then train managers every time they advance; and (5) use training as a vehicle for instilling strategic trust. Military education can and must apply these principles to provide quality people for the armed forces.

2.2.4 Education in a shrinking military

The system of military education has to cope both with the problem of force reduction (examined quantitatively) and with its impact on attitudes and behavior of military members.

In the author's opinion, the attempts to preserve the system of highly specialized education at the new force levels are doomed to fail. Among the reasons for such a grim forecast are changing personnel characteristics, lower incentives to retain highly qualified faculty members, and nearing problems with accreditation of institutions and specialties.

The impact of downsizing is further aggravated by the severe financial limitations not only for the combat training, but in the everyday functioning of the military. When there is a perception that the military has broken its "psychological contract" to care for its people, loyalty to the organization is reduced.^{liv} This has a detrimental effect on the military, and leads to more occupational as opposed to institutional motivations among military members.^{lv} Even a more serious possibility exists - the survivors of downsizing may feel that they have been abandoned by a society, which in its pursuit of new values sacrificed the job security, career progression, combat readiness, and the quality of life of its military. Such changes in attitudes may result in a widening of the gap between the military institution and the society it serves and raises the serious potential for what Janowitz described as 'unanticipated militarism.'

Hence, transformations in society's value system change the expectations of the young candidates for the military academies. Many expect to receive quality higher education that

will guarantee not only successful military career but will prepare them for a smooth transition into civilian life after they leave the military.

2.2.5 Legal requirements

Currently, the reaction of military educational institutions and the bodies for their control (both civilian and military) is aimed at restructuring according to the new educational degrees and requirements stemming from the Law on Higher Education. The new Law envisages three-level educational degrees - 'bachelor', 'master', and 'doctor'. Traditionally, by the time of their commissioning, the Bulgarian officers have higher education, and this is already fixed as legal requirement.^{lvi} Most probably, the new Bulgarian system of military education will combine initial military training with an accredited academic program for a 'bachelor' or 'master' degree.

Secondly, the Law introduced the principle of accreditation of all Bulgarian institutions of higher education, including the military academies. Higher educational institutions that have not participated in, or have not applied for, accreditation until December 1998 will receive no financing from the state budget. So far, it is not announced whether the service academies will try to accredit 'civilian' or 'military' degrees. The new State Registry does not specify degrees in the area of military science and art.^{lvii} The respective Government Decree directs the Minister of Defense to submit by September 1, 1997, a proposal for specialties and degrees to be awarded by service academies and "Rakovski" Military College. The coming proposal and the process of accreditation will have a crucial importance for the development of the military educational system, its integration within the Bulgarian academic community, and the very existence of the military academies as institutions of higher education. Hence, they will have both short- and long-term influence on the military profession and the pattern of civil-military relations in Bulgaria.

The fulfillment of the legal requirements will be hindered by problems previously outlined. The situation is aggravated because of the reactive posture of the leaders of the military educational system and the ineffective civilian control.

2.3 Civil Control over the System of Military Education

The analysis of civil control over military education in Bulgaria is not a direct part of the theme of the current study. However, it is illustrative as an example of current civil-military relations in Bulgaria and will serve to clarify the discussion in the final section of the report. Moreover, it has its own significance since the Bulgarian military educational system has a paramount influence over the formation of the military profession and its relation to society.

As an integral part of the armed forces, the system of military education is subordinated to the principle of civilian control. Under the civilian Minister of Defense was created a “Personnel Policy” section with responsibilities both in preparation of the normative base of military education, including formulation of state requirements, specialties, degrees, and qualification characteristics, and its control. In this activity, the section cooperates with the partner body of the General Staff - section “Military Educational Establishments” at the “Personnel Division.” In practice, however, the influence of the civilian leadership is minimal. Among the main reasons are short-term appointments of civilians at the Ministry of Defense, lack of civilians competent in military education, long-term appointments of competent military experts, and traditional strong influence of the General Staff over defense decision-making.

As a result, the General Staff (in conjunction with the officers from the “Personnel Policy” section of the Ministry of Defense) essentially decides issues of the normative base and practically directs and oversees the system of military education.^{lviii} This is just another confirmation that the current pattern of civil-military relations in Bulgaria, defined by Johnson and Metz as dominant even for countries with solid democratic traditions, is for the military to accept or attempt to seize functions that it perceives as not being performed, or not being performed adequately, by civilian leaders or agencies.^{lix} In the case under consideration, the military do their best to preserve the traditions and to develop further the military educational system. It is not clear, however, if the defense of their corporate interests is relevant to the broader societal interest.

At academy level, the ratio between civilian and military lecturers is still low. Their curricula lag behind societal transformation and changing character of military missions. Paradoxically, the process of opening of armed services and military academies to exchange of ideas and experience with international partners is paralleled by isolation from, and in some cases even confrontation with, prestigious civilian universities.

The influence of the public over military education is negligible. There is no informed and competent analysis in mass media. The citizens have no self-confidence that their opinion may influence the formulation of military educational policy. It is not clear whether the forthcoming accreditation will contribute to the solution of these problems. Given the notorious lack of civilian expertise and reliance on military advice, we should not be too optimistic.

The problem of civilian control of the Bulgarian military education in its wider understanding as control over the effective utilization of societal resources has not been studied. Illustrative in this respect is the recent heated debate in the US regarding the eventual close-down of the service academies.^{lx} There is no similar public debate in Bulgaria. Moreover, to the author’s

knowledge, this is not even an issue in the current discussion on the reform of military education.

Group interests within the military and the ineffective civilian control allowed more than six years of discussions on the reform without any tangible changes in military education. The crisis in Bulgarian military education is deepening. It is officially acknowledged, that the number of applicants to the service academies and, respectively, the opportunity to select 'quality' young people are dangerously low. Academy graduates leave the army even before the start of their officer careers. The number of faculty with a doctoral degree and tenure is close to the critical minimum. Traditional spheres of influence, such as education of personnel for commercial air and merchant fleet, are being lost. Specialists are unanimous that an urgent reform of military education is of vital importance. Without such reform Bulgarian military education will become anachronism.

The obstacles are not insurmountable. The people in the military educational system have the necessary potential. The Bulgarian political leadership recognizes the importance of military educational institutions for the successful democratic development of the country. A sign, supporting this statement, is the participation of the President and the Prime Minister in the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Bulgarian Air Force Academy. This credit of confidence should be fully utilized. Furthermore, the system of military education may turn into an agent for change in the armed forces. Finally, it may play the most significant part in institutionalizing the democratic pillar of civilian control of the military.

III THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY EDUCATION: FACTOR FOR HARMONIZING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In the last section of the report we examine potential roles of military education for building effective democratic control over the armed forces. In the adopted conceptual framework, the major impact of the system of military education is on the second—cultural—layer of civil-military interaction. First, through an adequate reform and substantial changes in curricula, the Bulgarian system of military education may contribute to the professionalization of the military. As a part of this professionalization, it should teach the military to understand and function effectively under democratic civilian leadership and oversight. Secondly, given the lack of traditions in educating civilian experts in defense and security in Bulgaria, it may serve as a basis for institutionalization of their education and training. Thirdly, the system of military education has a great, and largely unused, potential to ‘educate’ Bulgarian society. In all three areas it may benefit by implementation of modern information and communication technologies.

3.1 Preparing military professionals for the Twenty First century: a shifting focus of military education

The military of the twenty-first century, more than ever, will need *leaders* able to anticipate change, to deal with uncertainty, to present ideas, to communicate vision, and to lead organizational change. There are no ready solutions. Some changes in the emphasis of the curriculum of military academies and colleges, however, cannot be postponed.

3.1.1 Ambiguity and unpredictability

In the Information Age security environment, the first requirement for the curricula is to ensure that military students do not presume to know who their future opponents or coalition partners will be. This appreciation for uncertainty is the beginning of wisdom in the post-Cold War era.^{lxi} Students must understand more than their predecessors about economics, technologies, and diverse cultures to make sound judgments.

The emphasis of military curricula is shifting from preparing managers to preparing leaders. While managers function in the lower cognitive domain of knowledge, comprehension, and application, leaders function in the higher cognitive domain of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Managers are people who do things right and leaders are people who do the right thing. The difference may be summarized as activities of vision and judgment – *effectiveness* versus activities of mastering routines – *efficiency*.^{lxii}

A new balance between academic and specialized education, as well as between humanitarian and technical education is needed. The dilemma is not new. In the Information Age, however,

the initial educational phase of preparation of a specialist is quickly rendered obsolete by the rate of progress. It is not only special skills and knowledge we should be seeking but a higher level of abstract thinking which can be acquired from a higher academic education and a system of life-long learning. Further insight in the problem is provided by Herold and Radbruch^{lxiii}:

“Leadership curricula for the military profession have to stipulate specific learning objectives as precisely as possible, but they also have to state interdisciplinary, general learning objectives. Whereas specific objectives may vary, the general objectives will ensure that the corporate unity of the military profession remains intact irrespective of changes in modern society, modern warfare and modern defense policy. These objectives are: participation; creativity; flexibility; critical reasoning; the ability to obtain information and organize it; the ability to communicate and exchange information; social awareness; endurance in conflicts; readiness to accept responsibility and criticism, and the ability to inspire corporate unity.”

3.1.2 Cultural awareness and human rights

The transition of Bulgarian society toward democracy, the new international realities, and the cultural changes of the Information Age require military, well versed in human rights issues. Officers should be aware of problems concerning rights of own individual military members; rules of engagement and respective international legislation; and rights of the civilian population, especially in peace-keeping and humanitarian missions. According to McCaffrey “A great challenge for those of us who serve in uniform is addressing human rights training without suggesting that respect for an enemy, its soldiers, and civilians detracts from the central objective of winning the war. ... such respect actually contributes to military effectiveness.”^{lxiv} Furthermore, disrespect for human rights may lead to the case of winning the war and losing the peace.

The respective shift of military curricula should also address the importance of culture in conflict, in peacekeeping, in everyday military life. We should remember that the main failure of culture is imagination. As Alvin Toffler put it, it's very hard to think outside the boxes—cultural box, institutional box, political box, religious box—that we are all, everyone of us, imprisoned in. Cultural unawareness will keep us imprisoned in our own traditional attitudes and will prevent adaptation of the military to demands of time.

3.1.3 Information revolution

Advances in technology are hardly new phenomena. Recently, however, breakthroughs related to warfare have occurred with greater frequency, more substantial impact on quality versus quantity tradeoffs, and increased organizational implications. The information explosion and the changing way in which military organizations function, both during peace and war, must be reflected in military curricula.

The military of the future must be able to acquire, process and transmit unprecedented amounts of information quickly and precisely. Information navigation (searching) skills will be critical for all who expect to navigate the rapidly increasing sea of information. The ability of the military student to 'navigate' Internet is becoming a prerequisite for effective use of information resources.

The military student needs an understanding and appreciation of the blurred boundaries among military, diplomatic, economics, media, and psychological tools for influencing an opponent, as well as the specific requirements of interagency and international cooperation. New dimensions of information and knowledge impact all aspects of defense and security.^{lxv}

3.2 Effective military under democratic control

One of the principle requirements to military education is to prepare officers, understanding and accepting civilian control in all its aspects. It cannot be fulfilled without relevant changes in curricula. Three considerations influence the development of new curricula in this respect.

First, in the process of education and training, the service academies build qualities such as courage, audacity, determination, comradeship, honesty, physical and psychological endurance, critical thinking, readiness for self-sacrifice, loyalty, etc. The last two deserve special attention. The military prepare themselves to sacrifice their lives not for material reasons, but for defense of symbols and ideas. Western experts point out that after more than forty five years of successful development of NATO, no military of a member country prepare themselves for sacrifice in the name of NATO or European security. The readiness for sacrifice is in the name of national ideals and in defense of a value system.

Second, although the military is subordinated to the democratically elected political authority, its loyalty is to more stable institutions and symbols. Bulgarian soldiers, airmen, and sailors take an oath "in the name of the Republic of Bulgaria" to serve honestly to their people, courageously to defend the integrity and the independence of their Motherland, and, if that is necessary, to sacrifice their lives "for It, the soldierly honor, and the glory of the combat banner."^{lxvi} Understandable from point of view of their preparation to accomplish an extremely complex and important assignment for the military defense of the Motherland, the build-up of these qualities creates in the military the sense of a special mission. In many cases they tend to examine themselves as the last bulwark of the state, the statehood, and the national ideals, and often look on the politicians as persons corrupt, following individual of narrow partisan interests. Unfortunately, Bulgarian experience in the first years of democratization to a certain degree validated this attitude.

Third, it is necessary to prepare the military for new missions, some of which require increased interaction with civilians, as well as foreign military and civilians. Some of the new tasks, i.e., participation in peace-keeping and humanitarian operations, lead to an increase in the political role of the military.

To answer these requirements, the military educational system has to prepare officers who understand their place in the complex democratic transformation, as well as in the intricate civil-military relations with fuzzy boundaries and changing responsibilities. Developing new curricula, it is important to remember that although the principle of civilian control over the armed forces is accepted by Bulgarian military, problems arise because of the military's understanding of the concept of boundaries between rights and responsibilities of political and military authority.

Furthermore, main objective of education, and the military education in particular, in societies where the military is subordinate to political power is “to harmonize professional efficiency and democratic values which are determining factor in the civil-military interrelationship.”^{lxvii} Traditionally, professional men and women tend to stress their special technical expertise which in many cases may lead to alienation from society. To provide professional efficiency without such an alienation, the education of officers (and future officers) should never be confined purely to the technical aspects. The general academic aspects, and the humanitarian education in particular, are equally as vital.

Finally, an important effect on Bulgarian civil-military relations has the continuing compartmentalization of military education. It feeds on and supports the compartmentalization of the military profession, goes against the corporateness of the officer corps, and creates conditions for subjective civilian control. Therefore, a main objective of the reform of Bulgarian military education should be the elimination of the narrow specialization, especially in the early stage of military education at the service academies.

3.3 Education of civilian defense and security Experts

It is not important how good theoretically are the democratic mechanisms for civilian control if there are no competent parliamentarians and civilians to fill governmental positions, if there are no civilians who might speak on an equal footing with the military and do not understand the justifiable needs of the army.^{lxviii} The lack of civilian experts turned out to be the main obstacle in the establishment of effective civilian control in Bulgaria. Practically all defense experts in Parliament and Government are military or recently retired officers. As a rule, the politicians do not understand the real world of the military.^{lxix} Their incompetent intrusion creates negative reactions among the military, generates animosity, and prevents the attainment of adequate solutions to delicate problems.

Furthermore, Bulgaria needs not only civilian experts but institutional guarantees that the civilians in Government, and in the Ministry of Defense in particular, will be adequately qualified. Currently, there are no such guarantees, and the potential of existing educational structures is not fully utilized.

The study of the foreign experience in education of civilian defense and security experts showed that there is no standard 'Western system.'^{lxx} Every country approaches the problem in its unique way. However, there are some prevailing features: civilians ought to get through two-to-eleven-month courses; they are not awarded an educational degree (in some cases they receive academic credit); civilians and officers study together; the faculty composition is also mixed; through lectures by active politicians and state officials and visits to different organizations and military facilities civilian and military students are exposed to 'real world' problems, as well as to each other's views, perceptions, values, and way of thinking; curricula are focused on strategy and policy; etc.

In the last several years, several educational institutions in NATO countries invited students from CEE countries to go through their regular courses. However, this practice is considered much less effective than it should be "because the Western course organizers are unable to tailor them to the psychology, mentality and value system of the audiences."^{lxxi} Therefore, the establishment of a national institution to educate civilians, specializing in defense and national security, has no real alternative. This conclusion is widely shared, but the related discussion just recently started.^{lxxii} The main questions are how to ensure quality education and how much that would cost. The discussions inevitably touch on issues of traditions,^{lxxiii} administrative subordination and location of the educational institution, available faculty and its experience in teaching civilians, motivation of the students (positive or restrictive), character and structure of curriculum, etc.

The following alternatives were examined:

Center for Training National Security Cadre at the Ministry of Defense. For the last four years, the Center conducts a seven-week regular course. It has the following advantages: civilians and officers study together; established contacts with similar educational institutions in Western Europe and the US; regular visits by lecturers from WEU, NATO, and its member countries; close contacts with Government, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, "Rakovski" Military College, university lecturers, and experts from non-governmental organizations; proper mix of lectures and specialized seminars; combination of teaching and research; publication of a journal in English; small flexible group of civilians and military on the faculty; although the course is full-time, it is structured in separate one-week modules, and in the meantime the 'students' perform their regular duties. The course has the following disadvantages: few organizations outside the Ministry of defense are willing to send students

to the course; so far, the number of civilians in the course is less than one fourth; the structure of the Center and the course curriculum do not allow accreditation of an educational degree.

Strategic Course at the “G.S. Rakovski” Military College. The first six-month Strategic Course started in the spring of 1997. The group of students includes senior officers, which traditionally are not considered as belonging to the ‘main command cadre.’ Among them are medical officers, finance experts, jurists, etc. Although education of civilians is envisioned, this opportunity is not currently used. The Course uses facilities of the “Rakovski” College and its experienced faculty. Its status was ascertained in advance: the graduates of the Strategic Course will have the right (at least from educational point of view) to fill positions for the rank of General. The Course will not award an accredited degree. The main shortcoming in its creation is that it contributes to the compartmentalization of the officer corps and, thus, creates another obstacle to the professionalization of the Bulgarian military.

Course “Management and Economics of Security and Defense” at the University of National and International Economics. In this three-year distant learning course approximately 25 students from the Ministry of Defense (mainly military officers) receive a Master degree in Business administration. The course is conducted in a prestigious academic environment, it provides an in-depth education in defense economics, and most probably will be accredited. However, it covers a specific and relatively narrow field of defense and security and is too long to allow for effective rotation of civilian experts.

National Security Academy (project). The Working Group on Preparation of National Cadre for Integration of Republic of Bulgaria in NATO studies a concept for the creation of National Security Academy within the structure of “Rakovski” Military College. Advantages of the project are the use of facilities and experience of the Military College and the potential accreditation of an educational degree.^{lxxiv} The subordination of the Academy to the Ministry of Defense may be examined as a drawback of the concept. Currently, there is no mechanism to induce other Government agencies to send their employees to study at the Academy.

Institute for National Security (project). A second concept, examined by the Working Group, envisions creation of an Institute for National Security as part of “St. Kliment Ohridski” Sofia University. Advantages of the project are the high prestige of the oldest Bulgarian institution for higher education, the opportunity to accredit a degree, and its neutral position among Government agencies. A drawback is the lack of own experience and faculty, working in defense and security issues.

As of this moment, there is no convincing evidence as to which of the alternatives will best answer questions, previously outlined. Existing facilities and experience provide advantages to an educational structure at the Ministry of Defense. Such an institution will naturally bring

civilians and military together, will promote existing contacts with partner institutions in NATO countries, and has a good chance to receive infrastructural support from international partners.

Integrated efforts within Government and an active stance of the Ministry of Defense may turn this institution into a unified 'Academy' where civil servants from various governmental agencies will receive proper education in modern defense and national security. Their motivation may be either positive, i.e., to receive an educational degree from a prestigious educational establishment, or negative, i.e., to answer specific educational prerequisites of the future Law on civil service or a Governmental Decree. A combination of the two types of motivation is also possible.

The proposal to institute a new structure to educate civilians within the system of military education may seem as a contradiction to the principle of civilian control of the military. But even NATO experts reason that "Democratic control brings a responsibility for the military to educate civilians in the government, parliament and media on military affairs, and it is incumbent on civilian officials to be prepared to learn, so that civilian and military can collaborate effectively."^{lxxv} But even if the future system is completely within the Bulgarian system of military education, it will not mimic all its components. It will be managed by both civilians and military. The faculty will bring together civilian and military experts in civil-military relations, national security, international relations, strategy, military doctrine, operational issues, organization and structure of the Armed Forces, planning, programming, and budgeting, human resource management, etc. Its effectiveness will increase if civilians and military officers study together. And finally, it should be widely open towards both national and international academic community.

3.4 Military educational system and societal awareness

Of particular importance for the establishment of democratic and effective civil-military relations is the level of societal comprehension of defense and security problems, the transparency of military and governmental defense decisions and actions, and the level of development of civil society in Bulgaria. Efforts in this direction have a long-term effect, but cannot be easily structured. However, beyond doubt is the potential role of Bulgarian military education.

Therefore, the system of military education should be open not only to military and academic partners, but to the general public as well. Seminars with journalists, patriotic education of the youth, 'open gate' days, publication and dissemination of information bulletins are just a few of the available options.

The opportunities to educate the public are strengthened by advanced information technology. Information processing and communications advances—for which Internet is an excellent example—allow for the education, i.e., organized by the service academies, of not only military but everyone interested in defense and security. As a first step, we expect development of World Wide Web homepages of all military academies, colleges, and institutes. Thus, telecommunications and open system aspects could contribute to increased understanding and support for the military, giving the future system of military education the capability to reach larger audiences such as the media, parliament, and the public at large.^{lxxvi}

Finally, this is not the only area of advantageous ‘technological’ contributions. Information technology may have a powerful impact on military education, easing both life-long learning and interaction between military and society.

3.5 Information technology and new educational opportunities

The Information Age technology and its all-encompassing influence not only demand changes, but also provide tools to facilitate harmonization of civil-military relations. Today's distance learning, multimedia, virtual reality, and telepresence concept allow to develop a new philosophy of education of officers and civilians and call for a relevant restructuring of the military educational system.

Technology enables us to facilitate learning in new and innovative ways and to provide access to the wealth of information available. Schools, academies, and colleges can serve as the catalyst for these changes. Technology cannot substitute for good teachers but can allow a teacher to facilitate and tailor learning for individual students. The emerging concept requires redefining the way military schools are organized and what occurs within the school, as well as rethinking how teachers teach and students learn. Both formal and informal learning opportunities can be fostered. Technology enables this restructuring of the military educational system by providing new and more powerful ways for students to receive, understand, and manipulate information; enabling students to become active learners; escaping the boundaries of a fixed location school to facilitate interaction with people and events in faraway places; encouraging international, multi-disciplinary project-oriented education; promoting cooperative learning; allowing both independent and distance learning opportunities; matching teaching methodologies to student's learning styles and preferences; developing new ways of assessing student performance.^{lxxvii}

3.5.1 Virtual learning environment and distance learning

One can easily imagine a virtual high school, technical school, or university, which provides access to information and expertise that is anywhere in the world. Even difficult concepts,

skills, and attitudes might be taught using vivid, three-dimensional and tactile representations of real world objects and issues.^{lxxviii} Multimedia and virtual reality provide effective ways for the military student to acquire technical skills, ‘combat’ experience, practice in planning and ‘conducting’ conventional, as well as non-conventional, i.e., peace-keeping, military operations.

Furthermore, this kind of learning environment can be embedded in the work environment, even when the latter is a non-virtual one. In such way, a ‘virtual residency’ education may provide a system for distance learning. This Information Age education is [not transportation but] communications intensive. The learner can access educational resources produced and distributed anywhere in the world. The application of this concept to the military education has the potential to train more military officers and civilians, more effectively, for less.

A positive example is provided by the experience of the US Air Command and Staff College in teaching operational art combining multimedia, the college World Wide Web homepage, and dedication of enthusiastic faculty members.^{lxxix}

3.5.2 Continuous education

In the Information Age, formal schooling provides only the first step in a lifelong process of learning and utilizing technology. Learning is truly becoming a life-long endeavor rather than an activity that ends with formal schooling. Thus, students must learn ‘how to learn’ which means being able to collect, organize, analyze, evaluate, and communicate all types of information. Military students must become active problem solvers and collaborative learners. They must also learn to become effective users of information technology.

Their education must be continuous, combined with training, coherent with the whole process of professional development and career planning. A long educational process or training apart from a real practice is not the remedy. The Information Age technology provides means for everyone to learn what they need, at a time they find convenient, from the place they are, in the way they prefer. Furthermore, the new technologies will greatly facilitate comparison shopping for education and will contribute to the emergence of a reliable education assessment system.

A prerequisite is the openness of military academies and colleges to each other, toward civilian universities, as well as toward foreign and international military and civilian colleges.

3.5.3 Openness of military educational institutions

The telecommunications aspect of military education will have a positive impact not only on the student but on the faculty as well. The strength of an academic department today depends

on the extent to which each faculty member is interconnected with other professionals—worldwide—pursuing similar interests.

Furthermore, to efficiently use military resources, information should be shared with other military colleges and services, as well as with civilian institutions, especially in research and curriculum development. For example, for a small country like Bulgaria, and especially in this early stage of democratic development, integration and support in the field of education, training and professional development may be achieved through the development of a network of situation centers.^{lxxx} It is vital to use foreign and build own testbeds as centers for investigations of military needs and capabilities, as well as to increase the effectiveness of military education. The development of open systems, integrated with international facilities, does not have any real alternative.

Such projects can solve the problems of the integration between military and civil structures. Civilians and military will use identical products and services in a large area. Thus, specialists will transfer experience from one field to another which will speed up their professional development. On the other hand, we will witness an increase of technology transfer, students' experience in adapting commercial-off-the-shelf and state-of-the-art technologies to specific military requirements, and the following improvement in effectiveness.

Finally, the system of military education can and should be widely open to foreign counterparts. The integration of the Bulgarian military within European and Euroatlantic security structures can be achieved after substantial reform in the system of Bulgarian educational institutions and their curricula. The freedom of students to choose and their engagement in real projects at upper educational levels, the increase of their contacts with outstanding specialists in and outside the organization, will support the reform and assist the prevention of serious mistakes.

To conclude this section, policies for communication and education will together comprise the main distribution components of any overall knowledge strategy.^{lxxxii} The equipment to implement the concept for continuous distance learning is getting more affordable and user-friendly. The lack of expertise and training is becoming less significant. The American experience shows that management resistance seems to be the most significant factor hindering the development of educational opportunities.^{lxxxii} The first step is to fully understand the dimensions of the problem. Until then, the promise of technology in education will never be fulfilled. And the first step in understanding is to formulate and discuss the problems, which was one of the objectives of this study.

CONCLUSION

The Bulgarian system of military education has a long and successful tradition of preparing cadets and officers for continuous service in the Armed Forces. In this world of unprecedented change, however, traditions are often questioned, and new opportunities arise. Currently, Bulgarian military education is evolving slowly within rigid traditional attitudes. This is not surprising, considering the lack of effective civilian control and the importance of fulfilling the requirements of the *Law on Higher Education* for the very existence of the service academies and “G.S. Rakovski” Military College as institutions of higher education. But exactly this reactive mode may turn against military education.

The question how to change the military educational system has no clear answers. In the study of different systems for military education we reached the conclusion that neither a ‘standard’ nor a ‘best’ system exists. However, under conditions of rapid social and technological changes we should be looking not for a reactive educational system, but for an educational process which is proactive and preemptive. To avoid being placed in a reactive catch-up mode, military educational institutions must take steps now to lead the way, instead of being dragged, into the next century.

Preparing the professional officer corps of the Twenty First century, military education should focus on ambiguity and unpredictability, cultural and human rights awareness, information revolution and the revolution in military affairs. To support democratic transformations, it has to educate officers who accept civilian control as natural and have elaborate understanding of civil-military interactions in a pluralistic political system. Opening themselves to the public, military educational institutions may “educate” the youth, journalists, and every citizen interested in defense and national security, thus contributing to the development of Bulgarian civil society, the transparency of the military and, hopefully, the increase of their prestige.

Of particular importance for establishment of effective civilian control in Bulgaria is the education of civilian defense and security experts. Urgently, we need a new educational organization and institutionalization of the process of educating civilians. Most effective solution is the creation of a unified national institution within the system of military education where civilians and military will study together. The NATO Defense College in Rome may serve as a model. Such institution will effectively use existing facilities, faculty experience, and opportunities for methodological and infrastructural support from international partners.

Only enlightened people may transform the Bulgarian defense establishment according to democratic ideas and principles. The system of military education, in cooperation with national and international partners, may educate these people and transform itself at the same time. The issue is straightforward: either the military academies and colleges become agents for change within the Armed Forces or they become anachronisms.

NOTES

I TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES (THE BULGARIAN CASE)

1.1 Democratic control over the military - a milestone of democratization

- ¹ Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, September 1995, Chapter 5B, Article 72. (author's italics)
- ² Bolkestein, F. (1996). NATO: Deepening and Broadening? *NATO Review*, vol. 44, no. 4, 20-24.
- ³ Simon, J. (1995). *Central-European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*. McNair Paper 39, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, pp. 15-16.
- ⁴ Donnelly, C. (1997). Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem. *NATO Review*, vol. 45, no. 1, 15-19.
- ⁵ USA: Bulgaria is not ready for NATO. *Continent*, 22 May 1997.

1.2 Theoretical approaches to the civil control over the military

- ⁶ The example is examined in detail in Ben Meir, Y. (1995). *Civil-Military Relations in Israel*. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 185-186. The same author identifies the works of Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer as classics of civil-military relations theory.
- ⁷ Sun Tzu (1963). *The Art of War*. Translated and Introduction by S.B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 81-84.
- ⁸ Huntington, S.P. (1985). *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. p. viii.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-18.
- ¹⁰ Janowitz, M. (1960). *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois.
- ¹¹ Unpublished work of Janowitz, 1957. The quote is from Burk, J. (1993). Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society. *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 19, no. 2, 167-185.
- ¹² Finer, S.E. (1975). *The Man on Horseback: Military Intervention into Politics*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- ¹³ Moskos, C.C., ed. (1971). *Public Opinion and the Military*. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA.
- ¹⁴ Moskos, C.C. and F.R. Wood, eds. (1988). *The Military: More than Just a Job*. Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington.
- ¹⁵ Perlmutter, A. (1977). *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- ¹⁶ Feaver, P.D. (1995). Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force. In: Snider, D.M. and M.A. Carlton-Carew, eds. *U.S. Civil-Military Relations. In Crisis or in Transition?* The Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, 1995, pp. 113-144.

- ¹⁷ Cimbala, S.J. (1995). The Role of Military Advice: Civil-Military Relations and Bush Security Strategy. In: Snider and Carlton-Carew, pp. 88-112.
- ¹⁸ The model is developed by Sam C. Sarkesian (Snider and Carlton-Carew, 1995, p. 5).
- ¹⁹ Schiff, R.L. (1995). Civil-Military Relations Reconcidered: A Theory of Concordance. *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 22, no. 1, 7-24.
- ²⁰ Kemp, K.W. and C. Hudlin (1992). Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits. *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 19, no. 1, 7-26.
- ²¹ Bland, D. (1995). Protecting the Military from Civilian Control: A Neglected Dimension of Civil-Military Relations. In: Gilman, E. and D. Herold, eds. (1995). *Democratic and Civil Control over Military Forces - Case Studies and Perspectives*. NATO Defense College, Monograph Series, No. 3, Rome, pp. 107-125.
- ²² Ibid., p. 109.
- ²³ See Gilman and Herold, 1995.
- ²⁴ Pantev, P.I., V.R. Ratchev and T.D. Tagarev (1996). *Specific Problems of the Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria during the Transitional Political Period*. Sofia, ISIS. - 96 pp. (in Bulgarian)
- ²⁵ Ratchev, V., O. Avramov and I. Krastev (1996). *National Security and Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria*. Albatros, Sofia; and Genov, G., ed. (1997). *Security Policy and Civil-Military Relations in Countries in Transition to Democracy*. Albatros, Sofia.

1.3 Civil-military relations during transition from communism to democracy

- ²⁶ Since membership in the communist party was required for all positions above company level, and more than ninety percent of the Bulgarian officers were party members, this requirement by itself did not significantly influence the corporateness of the officer corps.
- ²⁷ The table is prepared by Sonya Borissova, historian at the National Museum of Military History, Goranov, P. (1997). For the Military Coup: The Officers Are Always the Last to Find Out. *Army & Society*, no. 1, pp. 8-9.
- ²⁸ The plot lead by Ivan Todorov (Gorunya) involved ten high-ranking officials, including five military officers on active duty. However, the binding bond was not the military background, but the common anti-fascist guerrilla experience of the conspirators in World War Two. See, for example, Ivan Folgyes. Military Politics of the Warsaw Pact Armies, In: Janowitz, M., ed. (1981). *Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives*, SAGE Publications, Beverly Hills, p. 195.
- ²⁹ Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, *State Newspaper*, no. 56, 1991.
- ³⁰ Law on Defense and the Armed Forces of Republic of Bulgaria, *State Newspaper*, no. 112, 1995. Other legal documents, related to the establishment of civil control and the functioning of the system of military education are listed in appendix III.
- ³¹ The normative base of civilian control is analyzed in detail by Rangelov, A. (1995). Civil Control Over the Military: The Situation in Bulgaria, In: Gilman and Herold, 1995, pp. 137-142; Pantev *et. al.*, 1996; Ratchev *et. al.*, 1996 (the last two books are published in Bulgarian).

- ³² The comparison is based on information provided in Simon, 1995, and *Behind Declarations: Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe*. Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest, 1996.
- ³³ Ratchev *et. al.*, 1996, p. 79; Mae Johnson, M. Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 37-38, In: Gilman and Herold, 1995, pp. 9-43.
- ³⁴ This and the previous consideration do not necessarily impede the establishment of effective democratic control. They may be examined as encouraging consensus seeking and building. Whether *concordance* is attainable in Bulgaria depends on the second—cultural—layer, examined in the next section.
- ³⁵ In many cases the Military Cabinet of the President, the Inspectorate and other structures in the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff perform quite similar functions. For an example see figure 4 in Appendix II.
- ³⁶ Regulations for Organization and Activity of the Inspectorate in the System of the Ministry of Defense, Government Decree 77 of April 8, 1996, *State Newspaper*, no. 32, 1996.
- ³⁷ The Inspectorate: Overseeing Legality. *Bulgarian Soldier*, vol. 57, no. 785, 1997, 2-9.
- ³⁸ Illustrative are the words of General Prokopiev, Head of the Inspectorate, that the inspectors “started to study and analyze the operative orders of the Minister of Defense from the point of view of their relevance with the Law on Defense and the Armed Forces, the Regulations for Regular Military Service, and other new normative documents.” *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
- ³⁹ In the framework of theory of concordance, Rebeca Schiff reasons that legislature is but one (not the most important, and even not necessarily articulating civil control in detail) of the mechanisms to ensure effective democratic control over the military (Schiff, 1995).
- ⁴⁰ A similar conclusion was made, although on different reasons, for the current pattern of civil control in Russia and Poland: Kaminski, A. and A. Gogolewska (1996). Civilian Control of the Russian Military Since 1991. *European Security*, vol. 5, no. 4, 588-603.
- ⁴¹ Goranov, P. (1997). For the Military Coup: The Officers Are Always the Last to Find Out. *Army & Society*, no. 1, 8-9.
- ⁴² General Liutzkanov is a Coup-maker, *Duma*, 12 April 1996.
- ⁴³ The Ordered Bomb, *24 hours*, 5 May 1997.
- ⁴⁴ See, i.e., Stoyanov, P. A Blue Broomstick is Wiping the Ministry of Defense, *Duma*, 2 May 1997.
- ⁴⁵ Petrov, K. Who is lobbying for Five Candidate Ministers of Defense, *24 hours*, 11 February 1997.
- ⁴⁶ The linguistic problem is discussed also by Ratchev *et. al.*, 1996, pp. 56-57. Similar is the linguistic problem in other CEE countries, see Talas, P. and R. Szemerkenyi, eds. (1996). *Behind Declarations: Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe*. Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest, p. 91.
- ⁴⁷ Semov, M. (1997). People are afraid of a dictatorship, not of the army. *Army & Society*, no. 1, pp. 4-5. (in Bulgarian)

II BULGARIAN MILITARY EDUCATION: TRADITIONS AND CHALLENGES

- ⁴⁸ The structure of the Bulgarian system of military education is depicted on figure 4 in Appendix II.

- ⁴⁹ Gray, A. and T.D. Tagarev (1995). A Transformational Model for Transcultural Leadership. In: Brown, J.M. and K. Tomervik, eds., *Diversity in Organizational Transformation*, University of Minnesota, pp. 17-44.
- ⁵⁰ Rokke, E.J. (1995). Military Education for the New Age. *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 9, 18-23.
- ⁵¹ The necessity to study and teach the ecological impact was addressed for the first time by Angelov, T. (1997). Military Activity and Environmental Preservation. *Military Journal*, vol. 104, no. 1, 73-78. (in Bulgarian)
- ⁵² Shalamanov, V.M. and T.D. Tagarev (1996). *Information Aspects of Security*. ProCon, Sofia.
- ⁵³ Peters, T. (1991). *Thriving on Chaos*. Harper Perennial, New York.
- ⁵⁴ Wong, L. and J. McNally (1994). Downsizing the Army: Some Policy Applications Affecting Survivors. *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 20, no. 2, 199-216.
- ⁵⁵ Williams, J.A. (1995). Demobilizing the Postmodern Military: Some Implications for Civil-Military Relations, *IUS Newsletter*, no. 26, 8-10.
- ⁵⁶ Law on Defense and the Armed Forces, Article 116 (1) 2.
- ⁵⁷ State Registry of Educational-Qualification Degrees According to Specialties in the Schools of Higher Education in Republic of Bulgaria, Government Decree 86 of 12 March, 1997, *State Newspaper*, no. 24, 1997.
- ⁵⁸ In contradiction with the principle of civilian control, a recently adopted *Instruction for Postgraduate Qualification of the Officers from the Bulgarian Armed Forces* (1995) gave exclusive rights for planning and control to the General Staff.
- ⁵⁹ Johnson, D. and S. Metz (1995). American Civil-Military Relations: A Review of Recent Literature. In: Snider and Carlton-Carew, 1995, pp. 201-224.
- ⁶⁰ Among the publications against the existence of military academies are: Military Education Must be Overhauled (1994). *USA Today*, vol. 123, no. 2591, 12; Shuger, S. (1994). The Case against the Military Academies. *The Washington Monthly*, vol. 26, no. 10, 20-22; Thompson, M. (1994). Academies Out of Line. *TIME*, vol. 143, no. 16, 37-38.

III THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY EDUCATION: FACTOR FOR HARMONIZING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

- ⁶¹ Rokke, 1995, p. 19.
- ⁶² Capozzoli, T.K. (1995). Managers and Leaders: A Matter of Cognitive Difference. *The Journal of Leadership Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, 20-29.
- ⁶³ In: Gilman, E. and D.E. Herold, eds. (1993). *The Role of Military Education in the Restructuring of Armed Forces*. NATO Defense College, Rome, p. 2.
- ⁶⁴ McCaffrey, B.R. (1995). Human Rights and the Commander. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 9, 10-13.
- ⁶⁵ Shalamanov and Tagarev, 1996.
- ⁶⁶ Law on Defense and the Armed Forces, Article 89 (2).
- ⁶⁷ Gilman and Herold, 1993, p. 1.
- ⁶⁸ Donnelly, 1997, p. 18.

- ⁶⁹ This problem is not uniquely Bulgarian. Examining the countries in transition from communism to democracy, Chris Donnelly concludes that there is no CEE country “that has the effective army it needs and no government that can evaluate what kind of defence it requires, nor what size, nor evaluate the proposals of its generals” (Donnelly, 1997, p. 19).
- ⁷⁰ Details of the study are described in Tagarev, T.D. (1997). Educated Civil Control of the Armed Forces - Sign for European Identity. In: *Bulgarian Academic Community and Bulgaria's Euroatlantic Identity*, Proceedings of a Conference at the Sofia University, 29 May 1997. (to appear in Bulgarian and English)
- ⁷¹ Donnelly, 1997, p. 18.
- ⁷² The development of a detailed concept is among the tasks of the Working group on Preparation of National Cadre for Integration of Republic of Bulgaria in NATO, constituted in the spring of 1997.
- ⁷³ Practically, Bulgaria has no tradition in educating civilian defense experts. Before 1989, few courses have been taught at the Academy of Social Science and Public Management (AONSU) to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Higher level party and administrative leaders took courses in the former Soviet Union.
- ⁷⁴ In case the length of study is at least one year. There is an alternative proposal for a five-month course.
- ⁷⁵ Donnelly, 1997, p. 17.
- ⁷⁶ Spacecast 2020: Professional Military Education in 2020. *Airpower Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 27-41, p. 33.
- ⁷⁷ Houston, N. (1995). The Role of Technology in Education and Training. In: *Proceedings of the 1995 AFCEA-Europe Sofia Seminar*, 89-92.
- ⁷⁸ Jacobsen, L. (1993). Homebrew Virtual Reality. *Wired*, *Premier issue*, 84.
- ⁷⁹ Kinner, J., Maj., US Air Force (1996). Personal communication, February 1996.
- ⁸⁰ Shalamanov and Tagarev, 1996, pp. 143-150.
- ⁸¹ Toffler and Toffler, 1993, p. 147.
- ⁸² Snider, J.H. (1996). Education Wars. The Battle over Information-Age Technology. *The Futurist*, May-June 1996, 24-28.

APPENDIXES

Appendix I

Bulgarian Armed Forces: Structure and Terminological Clarification

1. According to Article 7 (2) of the Law on Defense and the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria include:
 - Bulgarian Army and other Units and Establishments in the Ministry of Defense
 - Border Troops (Granichni Voiski) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs
 - Interior Troops (Vytreshni Voiski) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs
 - Troops of the Ministry of Transportation
 - Troops of the Committee of Posts and Telecommunications
 - Engineering Troops (Stroitelni Voiski) at the Ministry of Construction and Territorial Development
 - National Security Service (Natsionalna Slujba za Sigurnost) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs
 - National Intelligence Service (Natsionalna Razuznavatelna Slujba)
 - National Service for Protection (of high-ranking state officials) (Natsionalna Slujba za Ohrana)
2. According to LDAF, Article 71 (3), the Bulgarian Army incorporates:
 - General Staff (in war becoming General Staff of the Armed Forces)
 - Land Forces
 - Air Force
 - Navy
 - Military Intelligence
 - Military Counterintelligence
 - Military Police
 - Military academies, schools, institutes, and training centers
 - Units and establishments subordination directly to the General Staff, i.e., Communications Brigade

Currently, the National Intelligence Service and the National Service for Protection are subordinated to the President of the Republic of Bulgaria.

3. The term *Armed Forces* in Bulgarian has a broader meaning. Therefore, the term *army* is used to designate land, air, and naval forces, and other units under the General Staff. Other than that, US military terminology is used throughout the report.

Appendix II

Major Components of the Bulgarian System of Military Education

The structure of the Bulgarian system of military education is depicted on figure 4. US military terminology is used both on the figure and throughout the report. Otherwise, the direct translation for a [service] academy would be ... Military School of Higher Education (Vishe Voenna Uchiliste), and the direct translation of "G.S. Rakovski" Military College would be Military Academy (Voenna Akademia) "G.S. Rakovski".

Appendix III

Official Documents Currently Regulating Civilian Control of the Armed Forces and Military Education in Bulgaria

- Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, *State Newspaper*, no. 56, 1991.
- Law on Consultative Council on National Security, *State Newspaper*, no. 13, 1994.
- Law on Defense and the Armed Forces of Republic of Bulgaria, *State Newspaper*, no. 112, 1995.
- Law on Changing the Law on Defense and the Armed Forces of Republic of Bulgaria, *State Newspaper*, no. 67, 1996.
- Law on the Higher Education, *State Newspaper*, no. 112, 1995.
- Regulations for Organization and Activity of the Inspectorate in the System of the Ministry of Defense, Government Decree 77 of April 8, 1996, *State Newspaper*, no. 32, 1996.
- Regulations for the Regular Military Service, Government Decree 136 of 17 June, 1996, *State Newspaper*, no. 54, 1996.
- Regulations of the Activity of the National Agency for Evaluation and Accreditation, Government Decree 189 of 1 August, 1996, *State Newspaper*, no. 69, 1996.
- State Registry of Educational-Qualification Degrees According to Specialties in the Schools of Higher Education in Republic of Bulgaria, Government Decree 86 of 12 March, 1997, *State Newspaper*, no. 24, 1997.
- Concept for the Reform of the Military Educational System in the Bulgarian Army, *Information Bulletin of the Ministry of Defense*, no. 6, 1994, pp. 51-63.
- Instruction for Postgraduate Qualification of the Officers from the Bulgarian Army. Order of the Minister of Defense K-OX-199, 8 June 1995.

Appendix IV

Selected Author's Publications

The author is a member of the *Working Group on Preparation of National Cadre for Integration of Republic of Bulgaria in NATO*. This Group is part of the Interagency Committee for Integration in NATO (Governmental Decree 99 of 17 March 1997).

At the request of the Deputy Minister of Defense the author developed outlines of a new *Concept for the Reform of Military Education*. They are based on results of the current study, described in greater detail in the following publications on the project:

- Tagarev, T.D. (1997). On the Way to Europe: Role of the Effective Democratic Control of the Military. *Military Journal*, vol. 104, no. 3. (in Bulgarian)
- Tagarev, T.D. (1997). System Approach to the Reform of Military Education. *Military Journal*, vol. 104, no. 3. (in Bulgarian)
- Tagarev, T.D. (1997). Educated Civil Control of the Armed Forces - Sign for European Identity. Bulgarian Academic Community and Bulgaria's Euroatlantic Identity, Conference at the Sofia University, 29 May 1997. (to appear in Bulgarian and English)

Tagarev, T.D. (1997). The Military Educational System as a Factor for Building Democratic Civil-Military Relations. Scientific Conference at the "G.A. Rakovsky" Military College, Sofia, 10 April 1997. (in Bulgarian)

Tagarev T.D. (1996). Military Education for the Information Age: Challenges During Transition. AFCEA Sofia Seminar, Ministry of Defense, 11-13 September 1996. pp. 56-66.

Other relevant publications:

Tagarev, T.D. (1996) *The Bulgarian Military Education at a Crossroads*. Sofia, Institute for Security and International Studies, Research Report 4, - 29 pp. Available also at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/>

Pantev, P.I., V.R. Ratchev and T.D. Tagarev (1996). *Specific Problems of the Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria during the Transitional Political Period*. Sofia, ISIS. - 96 pp. (in Bulgarian)

Tagarev T.D. and V.M. Shalamanov (1997). Information War and War in the Information Age: Terminology or Differences in the Essence. *Military Journal*, vol. 104, no. 1. pp. 84-93. (in Bulgarian)

Tagarev T.D. (1997). Media Roles in the Information War. *Military Journal*, vol. 104, 1997 (in Bulgarian, forthcoming).

Shalamanov, V.M. and T.D. Tagarev (1996). *Information Aspects of Security*. Sofia, ProCon. - 202 p.

Gray, A. and T.D. Tagarev (1995). "A Transformational Model for Transcultural Leadership." In: Brown, J.M. and K. Tomervik, eds., *Diversity in Organizational Transformation*, University of Minnesota, 1995, pp. 17-44.

Tagarev, T.D. and A. Gray (1995). "Organizational Effectiveness in a Rapidly Changing Environment." *Proc. of a Scientific Conference of the Air Force Academy*, 22-23 May 1995, Pleven, Bulgaria, 96-108. (in Bulgarian)


Gray, A. and T.D. Tagarev (1995). "Modern Information Technology and Shifts in the Military Culture". *Proc. 1995 AFCEA-Europe Sofia Seminar*, Ministry of Defense, 28-34.

Tagarev, T.D. and V.M. Shalamanov (1995). "Information Societies and Effective Security". *Proc. 1995 AFCEA-Europe Sofia Seminar*, Ministry of Defense, 17-22.

Tagarev, T.D. (1994). Challenges to the Operational Art Study: Looking for Answers. *Military Journal*, vol. 57, no. 5, 72-83 (in Bulgarian).

Shalamanov, V.M. and T.D. Tagarev (1994). The Role of Education and Training in the Field of C4I. *Proc. of 1994 AFCEA-Europe Budapest Seminar*, 13-17.

Tagarev, T.D. (1992). Principles of Education and Training of US Air Force Officers. *Military Journal*, vol. 55, no.5-6, pp. 78-86 (in Bulgarian).



Republic of Bulgaria

Fig. 3. Armed Forces of the




Fig. 4. Major components of the Bulgarian system of military education

- ⁱ Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, September 1995, Chapter 5B, Article 72. (author's italics)
- ⁱⁱ Bolkestein, F. (1996). NATO: Deepening and Broadening? *NATO Review*, vol. 44, no. 4, 20-24.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Simon, J. (1995). *Central-European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*. McNair Paper 39, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, pp. 15-16.
- ^{iv} Donnelly, C. (1997). Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem. *NATO Review*, vol. 45, no. 1, 15-19.
- ^v USA: Bulgaria is not ready for NATO. *Continent*, 22 May 1997.

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- ^{vi} The example is examined in detail in Ben Meir, Y. (1995). *Civil-Military Relations in Israel*. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 185-186. The same author identifies the works of Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer as classics of civil-military relations theory.
- ^{vii} Sun Tzu (1963). *The Art of War*. Translated and Introduction by S.B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 81-84.
- ^{viii} Huntington, S.P. (1985). *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. p. viii.
- ^{ix} *Ibid.*, pp. 8-18.
- ^x Janowitz, M. (1960). *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois.
- ^{xi} Unpublished work of Janowitz, 1957. The quote is from Burk, J. (1993). Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society. *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 19, no. 2, 167-185.
- ^{xii} Finer, S.E. (1975). *The Man on Horseback: Military Intervention into Politics*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- ^{xiii} Moskos, C.C., ed. (1971). *Public Opinion and the Military*. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA.
- ^{xiv} Moskos, C.C. and F.R. Wood, eds. (1988). *The Military: More than Just a Job*. Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington.
- ^{xv} Perlmutter, A. (1977). *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- ^{xvi} Feaver, P.D. (1995). Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force. In: Snider, D.M. and M.A. Carlton-Carew, eds. *U.S. Civil-Military Relations. In Crisis or in Transition?* The Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, 1995, pp. 113-144.
- ^{xvii} Cimballa, S.J. (1995). The Role of Military Advice: Civil-Military Relations and Bush Security Strategy. In: Snider and Carlton-Carew, pp. 88-112.
- ^{xviii} The model is developed by Sam C. Sarkesian (Snider and Carlton-Carew, 1995, p. 5).
- ^{xix} Schiff, R.L. (1995). Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance. *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 22, no. 1, 7-24.
- ^{xx} Kemp, K.W. and C. Hudlin (1992). Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits. *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 19, no. 1, 7-26.
- ^{xxi} Bland, D. (1995). Protecting the Military from Civilian Control: A Neglected Dimension of Civil-Military Relations. In: Gilman, E. and D. Herold, eds. (1995). *Democratic and Civil Control over Military Forces - Case Studies and Perspectives*. NATO Defense College, Monograph Series, No. 3, Rome, pp. 107-125.
- ^{xxii} *Ibid.*, p. 109.
- ^{xxiii} See Gilman and Herold, 1995.
- ^{xxiv} Pantev, P.I., V.R. Ratchev and T.D. Tagarev (1996). *Specific Problems of the Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria during the Transitional Political Period*. Sofia, ISIS. - 96 pp. (in Bulgarian)
- ^{xxv} Ratchev, V., O. Avramov and I. Krastev (1996). *National Security and Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria*. Albatros, Sofia; and Genov, G., ed. (1997). *Security Policy and Civil-Military Relations in Countries in Transition to Democracy*. Albatros, Sofia.
- ^{xxvi} Since membership in the communist party was required for all positions above company level, and more than ninety percent of the Bulgarian officers were party members,

this requirement by itself did not significantly influence the corporateness of the officer corps.

^{xxvii} The table is prepared by Sonya Borissova, historian at the National Museum of Military History, Goranov, P. (1997). For the Military Coup: The Officers Are Always the Last to Find Out. *Army & Society*, no. 1, pp. 8-9.

^{xxviii} The plot lead by Ivan Todorov (Gorunya) involved ten high-ranking officials, including five military officers on active duty. However, the binding bond was not the military background, but the common anti-fascist guerrilla experience of the conspirators in World War Two. See, for example, Ivan Folgyes. Military Politics of the Warsaw Pact Armies, In: Janowitz, M., ed. (1981). *Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives*, SAGE Publications, Beverly Hills, p. 195.

^{xxix} Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, *State Newspaper*, no. 56, 1991.

^{xxx} Law on Defense and the Armed Forces of Republic of Bulgaria, *State Newspaper*, no. 112, 1995. Other legal documents, related to the establishment of civil control and the functioning of the system of military education are listed in appendix III.

^{xxxi} The normative base of civilian control is analyzed in detail by Rangelov, A. (1995). Civil Control Over the Military: The Situation in Bulgaria, In: Gilman and Herold, 1995, pp. 137-142; Pantev *et. al.*, 1996; Ratchev *et. al.*, 1996 (the last two books are published in Bulgarian).

^{xxxii} The comparison is based on information provided in Simon, 1995, and *Behind Declarations: Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe*. Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest, 1996.

^{xxxiii} Ratchev *et. al.*, 1996, p. 79; Mae Johnson, M. Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 37-38, In: Gilman and Herold, 1995, pp. 9-43.

^{xxxiv} This and the previous consideration do not necessarily impede the establishment of effective democratic control. They may be examined as encouraging consensus seeking and building. Whether *concordance* is attainable in Bulgaria depends on the second—cultural—layer, examined in the next section.

^{xxxv} In many cases the Military Cabinet of the President, the Inspectorate and other structures in the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff perform quite similar functions. For an example see figure 4 in Appendix II.

^{xxxvi} Regulations for Organization and Activity of the Inspectorate in the System of the Ministry of Defense, Government Decree 77 of April 8, 1996, *State Newspaper*, no. 32, 1996.

^{xxxvii} The Inspectorate: Overseeing Legality. *Bulgarian Soldier*, vol. 57, no. 785, 1997, 2-9.

^{xxxviii} Illustrative are the words of General Prokopiev, Head of the Inspectorate, that the inspectors “started to study and analyze the operative orders of the Minister of Defense from the point of view of their relevance with the Law on Defense and the Armed Forces, the Regulations for Regular Military Service, and other new normative documents.” *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

^{xxxix} In the framework of theory of concordance, Rebeca Schiff reasons that legislature is but one (not the most important, and even not necessarily articulating civil control in detail) of the mechanisms to ensure effective democratic control over the military (Schiff, 1995).

^{xl} A similar conclusion was made, although on different reasons, for the current pattern of civil control in Russia and Poland: Kaminski, A. and A. Gogolewska (1996). Civilian Control of the Russian Military Since 1991. *European Security*, vol. 5, no. 4, 588-603.

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- ^{xli} Goranov, P. (1997). For the Military Coup: The Officers Are Always the Last to Find Out. *Army & Society*, no. 1, 8-9.
- ^{xlii} General Liutzkanov is a Coup-maker, *Duma*, 12 April 1996.
- ^{xliii} The Ordered Bomb, *24 hours*, 5 May 1997.
- ^{xliv} See, i.e., Stoyanov, P. A Blue Broomstick is Wiping the Ministry of Defense, *Duma*, 2 May 1997.
- ^{xlv} Petrov, K. Who is lobbying for Five Candidate Ministers of Defense, *24 hours*, 11 February 1997.
- ^{xlvi} The linguistic problem is discussed also by Ratchev *et. al.*, 1996, pp. 56-57. Similar is the linguistic problem in other CEE countries, see Talas, P. and R. Szemerkenyi, eds. (1996). *Behind Declarations: Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe*. Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest, p. 91.
- ^{xlvii} Semov, M. (1997). People are afraid of a dictatorship, not of the army. *Army & Society*, no. 1, pp. 4-5. (in Bulgarian)
- ^{xlviii} The structure of the Bulgarian system of military education is depicted on figure 4 in Appendix II.
- ^{xlix} Gray, A. and T.D. Tagarev (1995). A Transformational Model for Transcultural Leadership. In: Brown, J.M. and K. Tomervik, eds., *Diversity in Organizational Transformation*, University of Minnesota, pp. 17-44.
- ¹ Rokke, E.J. (1995). Military Education for the New Age. *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 9, 18-23.
- ^{li} The necessity to study and teach the ecological impact was addressed for the first time by Angelov, T. (1997). Military Activity and Environmental Preservation. *Military Journal*, vol. 104, no. 1, 73-78. (in Bulgarian)
- ^{lii} Shalamanov, V.M. and T.D. Tagarev (1996). *Information Aspects of Security*. ProCon, Sofia.
- ^{liii} Peters, T. (1991). *Thriving on Chaos*. Harper Perennial, New York.
- ^{liv} Wong, L. and J. McNally (1994). Downsizing the Army: Some Policy Applications Affecting Survivors. *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 20, no. 2, 199-216.
- ^{lv} Williams, J.A. (1995). Demobilizing the Postmodern Military: Some Implications for Civil-Military Relations, *IUS Newsletter*, no. 26, 8-10.
- ^{lvi} Law on Defense and the Armed Forces, Article 116 (1) 2.
- ^{lvii} State Registry of Educational-Qualification Degrees According to Specialties in the Schools of Higher Education in Republic of Bulgaria, Government Decree 86 of 12 March, 1997, *State Newspaper*, no. 24, 1997.
- ^{lviii} In contradiction with the principle of civilian control, a recently adopted *Instruction for Postgraduate Qualification of the Officers from the Bulgarian Armed Forces* (1995) gave exclusive rights for planning and control to the General Staff.
- ^{lix} Johnson, D. and S. Metz (1995). American Civil-Military Relations: A Review of Recent Literature. In: Snider and Carlton-Carew, 1995, pp. 201-224.
- ^{lx} Among the publications against the existence of military academies are: Military Education Must be Overhauled (1994). *USA Today*, vol. 123, no. 2591, 12; Shuger, S. (1994). The Case against the Military Academies. *The Washington Monthly*, vol. 26, no. 10, 20-22; Thompson, M. (1994). Academies Out of Line. *TIME*, vol. 143, no. 16, 37-38.
- ^{lxi} Rokke, 1995, p. 19.

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- ^{lxii} Capozzoli, T.K. (1995). Managers and Leaders: A Matter of Cognitive Difference. *The Journal of Leadership Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, 20-29.
- ^{lxiii} In: Gilman, E. and D.E. Herold, eds. (1993). *The Role of Military Education in the Restructuring of Armed Forces*. NATO Defense College, Rome, p. 2.
- ^{lxiv} McCaffrey, B.R. (1995). Human Rights and the Commander. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 9, 10-13.
- ^{lxv} Shalamanov and Tagarev, 1996.
- ^{lxvi} Law on Defense and the Armed Forces, Article 89 (2).
- ^{lxvii} Gilman and Herold, 1993, p. 1.
- ^{lxviii} Donnelly, 1997, p. 18.
- ^{lxix} This problem is not uniquely Bulgarian. Examining the countries in transition from communism to democracy, Chris Donnelly concludes that there is no CEE country “that has the effective army it needs and no government that can evaluate what kind of defence it requires, nor what size, nor evaluate the proposals of its generals” (Donnelly, 1997, p. 19).
- ^{lxx} Details of the study are described in Tagarev, T.D. (1997). Educated Civil Control of the Armed Forces - Sign for European Identity. In: *Bulgarian Academic Community and Bulgaria’s Euroatlantic Identity*, Proceedings of a Conference at the Sofia University, 29 May 1997. (to appear in Bulgarian and English)
- ^{lxxi} Donnelly, 1997, p. 18.
- ^{lxxii} The development of a detailed concept is among the tasks of the Working group on Preparation of National Cadre for Integration of Republic of Bulgaria in NATO, constituted in the spring of 1997.
- ^{lxxiii} Practically, Bulgaria has no tradition in educating civilian defense experts. Before 1989, few courses have been taught at the Academy of Social Science and Public Management (AONSU) to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Higher level party and administrative leaders took courses in the former Soviet Union.
- ^{lxxiv} In case the length of study is at least one year. There is an alternative proposal for a five-month course.
- ^{lxxv} Donnelly, 1997, p. 17.
- ^{lxxvi} Spacecast 2020: Professional Military Education in 2020. *Airpower Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 27-41, p. 33.
- ^{lxxvii} Houston, N. (1995). The Role of Technology in Education and Training. In: *Proceedings of the 1995 AFCEA-Europe Sofia Seminar*, 89-92.
- ^{lxxviii} Jacobsen, L. (1993). Homebrew Virtual Reality. *Wired*, *Premier issue*, 84.
- ^{lxxix} Kinner, J., Maj., US Air Force (1996). Personal communication, February 1996.
- ^{lxxx} Shalamanov and Tagarev, 1996, pp. 143-150.
- ^{lxxxi} Toffler and Toffler, 1993, p. 147.
- ^{lxxxii} Snider, J.H. (1996). Education Wars. The Battle over Information-Age Technology. *The Futurist*, May-June 1996, 24-28.