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***Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Share of the Civilians
in the Management of the Department of Defence, including their
Preparation for the Exercising of their Functions in Stabilised
Democratic States in Europe (Germany, UK, Norway, Austria) and in
the Czech Republic***

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Introduction

The democratic control of security policy and the armed forces and the related problem of the participation of the civilians and civil organs in the administration of the Ministry of Defence and their preparation to perform their functions are questions which are being discussed and also necessary both in the stabilised democratic states and the transforming states.

Witness of the importance of this question is the attention devoted to it by the NATO organs (the annual brainstormings and workshops), the individual NATO countries (especially the USA), but also neutral states of Western Europe (Austria) and states which have an interest in joining the NATO alliance.

The aim of my research is to define the problem of the democratic control of the armed forces, especially the activities of the formal actors concerned in this process, i.e. the executive, legislative and judicial organs - Head of State, Government, Minister of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Parliament and some its committees and judicial organs, respectively other independent organs. The informal actors were excluded from my research, among whom belong non-government and non-profit organisations, the academic sector, the newspapers and other media, the public and the members of the armed forces.

In connection with the democratic control of the armed forces I examined the share of civilians in the administration of the Ministry of Defence and their preparation to perform functions, which I consider to be an integral part of the solution to the problem.

For the objects of my research I chose the stabilised West European states with certain general, but also specific characteristics. The FRG with a developed system for the democratic control of the armed forces, characterised by the model of the citizen in uniform and the method of inner control, United Kingdom with a professional army, constitutional monarchy, Norway and the neutral state of Austria. Obviously also the Czech Republic which I hope is on the threshold of entry into the

NATO and needs to solve questions connected with this move, among whom the democratic control of the armed forces obviously belongs, which is based on quite a number of NATO documents, for instance the PfP Program or the Study for the Expansion of NATO.

For the method of research I chose detailed analysis of the problems in the individual countries and a comparative method to determine the level of this problem in the Czech Republic in comparison to selected stabilised European states.

During my research I used bibliographical materials, visited the concerned countries (repeatedly in some cases) and practically investigated, especially through the ministries of defence, the state and tendencies characteristic of this problem. In the conditions of the Czech Republic I consulted the matter with the leaders involved in the process of the democratic control of the armed forces, among others, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security, the Advisor to the President for Security Affairs, the Executive Director of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Ministry of Defence and others.

During the course of my research I confirmed that the process of democratic control is, as Chris Donnelly, NATO's special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs puts it, a two-way process between the army and the society and that it cannot be considered as the one-way dictation of policy to the soldiers. It is up to the individual capabilities of the actors of democratic control to utilise their abilities.

In terms of evaluation of this rule and further moments of democratic control and the share of the civilians in the administration of the Ministry of Defence, including their preparation, it can be maintained that the Czech Republic will not be a problem country of the NATO alliance, when she becomes a full member.

1. Federal Republic of Germany

The democratic control of the armed forces in the FRG, especially after the end of the second world war, played an important role permeating the wide spectrum of the internal life of German society. This phenomenon at the same time was strongly formed by external relations, respectively the efforts of the European powers to eliminate any eventual ambitions of the so called Great Germany, instituted by it by military force.

Given Germany's historical experience and the desire to avoid any abuse of military power, the decision of the Government in 1955 to build the German Army under a system of rigorous democratic control of the relevant organs and mechanisms seems to be very wise.

1.1. Democratic control of the armed forces

To institute democratic control of the armed forces in Germany two special control institutions were established in 1957 which were at the same time anchored in the Constitution of the FRG. These are the Defence Committee of the German Federal Parliament and the Defence Commissioner in the German Federal Parliament ^{1/}.

German Federal Parliament and Defence Committee

The Defence Committee has powers to investigate specific affairs, concerning the Bundeswehr, i.e. it acts as a commission of enquiry. This is done in instances where the committee judges that this is of immediate interest or importance. The defence and armed forces of the FRG fall exclusively under federal legislation, i.e. the German Federal Parliament. The German Federal Council, the upper house of parliament, in which are represented the individual members of parliament for the individual federal states, has only limited control over the armed forces. The Defence Committee has the authority to express an opinion on matters which directly concern the individual federal states, for instance, the construction of selected types of infrastructure and military facilities.

German Federal Council and Defence Commissioner

A further instrument of the German Federal Parliament to control the armed forces is the Defence Commissioner, whose work is targeted at institutions in the government and the state administration which are involved in matters of the military defence of the country. The key addressee of this control is the Federal Ministry of Defence and the scope of its powers. This is comprised of the armed forces, the Bundeswehr administration, military spiritual care in the same manner as legal protection, including military courts. If legal exceptions such as judicial independence or military spiritual care are a specific of the church, military control is everywhere, respectively, parliamentary control of the activities of the armed forces finds its substantiation and place. The Bundeswehr Administration also falls into this category together with all its activities, as well as matters concerning the welfare of the military and civilian personnel in the military administration and a number of questions related to life in the armed forces. It can be said that generally the scope of parliamentary control through the Defence Commissioner informally applies to all areas of the activities of the Federal Minister of Defence and the material security of the country's defence. The Defence Commissioner prepares an annual report in which he analyses the situation in the military administration and command, as well as between the members of the armed forces. The document is approved in the German Federal Parliament and subsequently published.

Federal Court of Audit

An important element of the democratic control of the armed forces is the Federal Court of Audit. On one hand it presents a full picture of the federal budget expenses and also determines the size of the resources and where such shall be utilised. The military budget has its permanent place in the national budget. The Federal Court of Audit does not have the right of intervention. The Federal Court of Audit submits an annual report to the Government as well as to the Parliament, in which it will present its findings, provides advice and recommendations to the legislative organs for intervention against, so-called, wrong Government decision-making. The annual report is, like in the case of the Defence Commissioner, publicised and thus subjected to public opinion.

Minister of Defence

The function of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is performed by the Minister of Defence, who must be a civilian. The Defence Act stipulates that this function upon the promulgation of a state of defence passes to the Federal Chancellor. Minister of Defence is liable for his activity to the Federal Government and German Federal Parliament.

Military Administration of Justice

Within the scope of the democratic control of the armed forces the Military Administration of Justice has found its place as an independent civil institution. The Military Administration of Justice provides protection to the members of the armed forces against abuse of state powers. It takes due care that the individual soldiers behave in an adequate manner. The relevant regulations for the function of the Military Administration of Justice are stipulated in the Military Code of Criminal Procedure and the Military Disciplinary Code.

The democratic control of the armed forces in Germany is considered to be an extremely difficult task. The complexity of the armed forces and the interwoven nature of their problems, certain degree of secrecy, practical monopoly in the solution of national defence questions, their integration into the international structures - all this reduces the transparency of the activities of the armed forces.

The reliability of control of the armed forces to a larger extent depends upon their being well-informed, responsibility and systematic approach of those civilians who are involved in such control. Obviously it is also necessary that such control be accepted by the soldiers so as for them to be protected by an effective mechanism against the dilettantism and “despotism” of the democratic civil control.

Conception of „inner leadership“ and the model „citizen in uniform“

In the FRG great emphasis is placed on the concept of “inner leadership” ^{2/}, in German “Innere Führung”, a model of the “citizen in uniform”, which sets forth the base for the role of a member of the Bundeswehr in the whole society.

The realisation of these objectives in turn requires that soldiers be receptive to social, political and technical developments taking place in society. "inner leadership" at all command levels should respect the individual soldier's personal character, dignity and fundamental rights together with the maintenance of credibility in the realisation of the concept. "inner leadership" apart from general obligations to secure the well-being of the soldier also includes mainly concrete care for the subordinates. This requirement is very sensitive and at the same time important to reach an understanding with the soldiers. One of the basic elements of the concept of "inner leadership" is political education, which must however not be confused with ideological indoctrination.

An important premise for the adequate operational capability of the armed forces is military discipline. This in the Bundeswehr is targeted at the understanding of basic legal duties and responsibility of all military personnel. The concept of "inner leadership" is supported by the Military Service Act and the Military Penal Code.

A soldier in the Bundeswehr is in fact enjoying the same civil rights as the rest of the citizens. Military legislation however during the course of duty restricts him in a certain way. If the members of the armed forces feel that their rights have been infringed upon, they can address their problems to the Defence Commissioner, the Petition Committee of the Federal Parliament of Germany or resolve such matter in front of an appropriate civil court.

The concept of inner leadership must be understood as an ongoing educational process. It includes a whole spectrum from military personnel, through military leaders at all command levels to national service conscripts.

The German armed forces is founded on the principle of general defence duty. Due to the frequent rotation of national service conscripts all tendencies and changes in the development of civil society are quickly transferred to the military community. Seen in this light, the conscripts are a necessary link between the military and the civilian sector. This fact in itself constitutes a certain type of "control", if the society is open and the activities of the armed forces are transparent.

The informal control activities of the armed forces are also performed through their members. The officers, junior officers and the ordinary soldiers every year elect, the so-called intermediaries, from amongst themselves. Though these do not have the

right to participate in the decision-making process of the command organs, but they are in spite of this individually ad hoc invited to participate in consultations at various decision levels. The intermediaries later, for instance, participate in discussions about the amendment of legislation, codes, decrees and other regulation instruments concerning military service.

It is possible to more strongly exercise control influence through the Federal Defence Administration, which is mainly concerned with the conditions and course of the military service of junior officers and ordinary soldiers.

1.2. Share of civilians in the management of the armed forces

The Federal Ministry of Defence is the highest authority in the control of the armed forces. Organisationally, it is divided into the administrative (civil) and military sections (see annex 1).

The administrative part comprises the Office of the Minister of Defence, Planning Staff, Information Staff, Organisational Staff and six departments: Personnel, Budget, Administration and Legal, Accommodation, Realities and Building, Social, Central Armaments Department ^{3/}.

The civil part of the Ministry of Defence is controlled by the Minister of Defence through two Parliamentary Secretaries of State and two Secretaries of State, who at the same time secure the link with the rest of the organs and institutions of state administration ^{4/}.

The army is controlled by the Minister of Defence through the military section of the Federal Ministry of Defence, comprising the Inspector General of the Armed Forces and Inspectors of the ground forces, air force, navy, medical corps and the subordinate organs. The control staff at the individual inspectorates at the same time constitute departments of the Ministry of Defence.

From the view of the organisation of the Federal Ministry of Defence it is clear that the civil part is very much involved in its administration which in a way can be considered as some form of civil control. It is however correct to sound the reminder that the acceptance of this share of the civilian population in the administration and control of the Ministry of Defence by means of military organs and institutions has

not always been obvious. In the conditions of the Bundeswehr this reminds us of the concept of “inner leadership” and the “citizen in uniform”.

In the Bundeswehr a model is therefore applied whereby the civil administration of the armed forces and the part responsible for the administration of the soldiers are linked. The advantages of this system are resilience and operative efficiency, especially in instances of need for a quick solution to a crisis or its prevention. While the administrative part of the Federal Ministry of Defence is mostly occupied by civilians, no serious problems have thus far appeared with regard to the purely military sector. The ministry through the utilisation of qualified civil employees also saves large financial and other contributions which it would have to make to professional soldiers.

On 28 February 1997 there were 152,748 civil employees. The work as clerks (28,151), staff (51,527), and workers (68,282). The rest is going through preparatory stage for one of such category. Particularly on the Ministry of Defence and on its lower levels there 1,662 clerks, judges and professors, 1,042 personal staff and 231 workers employed.

1.3. Preparation of civilians, participating on the control and management of the Defence Department

Exactly defined powers and elaborated system of education and training in the German armed forces have a favourable reflection on the preparedness of non-military officials and authorities, participating in the control and management of the armed forces.

Their preparedness to successfully participate in the control and management of the general security and especially of the Bundeswehr results from a well elaborated information system, provided to the competent authorities. Goodwill of the military academies, high schools, various authorities, and the conducting of the seminars on the security policy^{1/}, results in the creation of a favourable security clima in the country in the new military-political conditions. Frequent themes of the instruction are the defence policy, Bundeswehr and society, general issues of the control and management of troops, aspects of the national and international military defence, contemporary risks and menaces, defence budget etc.

The Ministry of Defence also secures the preparedness of the relevant officials through their taking part in the international seminars on the security policy, to which are in a wide scale invited also civilians, participating in the control and management of the armed forces.

Members of government, parliament and other decision-making authorities are invited to the military exercises, shooting ranges, in order to make themselves acquainted practically with the problems of the contemporary armed forces, which had recently to solve such complex problem, as the integration of the former National People`s Army of the German Democratic Republic.

The professional training of the leading officials of the Ministry of Defence is completed according to the necessity at the expense of the Ministry of Defence. For their performance of their work and career have been exactly elaborate the rules, settling all issues, connected with it.

Remarks:

^{1/} The Basic Act, art.45a, 45b

^{2/} The concept of "inner leadership" should achieve three basic objectives: a) the legal, political and ethical justification of the existence of the armed forces and the citizens' obligation to do military service, b) integration of the armed forces as a whole and the individual soldier into the state and society, into NATO and the Western European Union, c) the willingness of the soldier to serve by conviction and fulfil duties to the best of his ability and readiness to accept the restriction of his basic rights by special legislation concerning military service.

^{3/} The Personnel Department is responsible for the personnel leadership and the work of the officers and civil personnel in the Bundeswehr. Apart from this department also prepares and decides on fundamental personnel matters concerning the members of the armed forces. The Budget Department takes due care that the resources allocated by the Parliament to defence are used economically and in a transparent manner. The Administrative and Legal Department is concerned with the rights of the soldiers, spiritual care, the qualifications of the soldiers and civil personnel and also takes care of catering and equipment for the soldiers. The Accommodation, Real Estate and Building Affairs Department secures the construction and operation of land-based, air force and marine bases, boarding houses, stores, administrative buildings, shooting ranges and training areas. It also takes care that the Bundeswehr and the NATO forces have the necessary infrastructure available. The Social Department is concerned with all-round care for the soldiers and the civilian employees of the Bundeswehr. The roles of this department range from the provision of accommodation through cultural and sports facilities to the problem of selection of employment after

completion of active national service and also ecology. The Central Armaments Department plans, manages and controls everything which is related to the arming of the armed forces.

^{4/} The Parliamentary State Secretary supports the Minister of Defence in the performance of his Government duties in Parliament, especially in the Defence and Budget Committee, in the Government and in public the State Secretary on his behalf performs the duty of Head of the Ministry of Defence and represents him also in the appropriate areas of competence.

2. United Kingdom

United Kingdom has full professional armed forces for more than 30 years. During that period it has been developing British model of democratic control armed forces and management of defence.

2.1. Democratic control of the armed forces

The Government

The basis for civil administration in defence matters in the United Kingdom is formed de iure and de facto by the Cabinet ^{1/}, which is responsible for the adoption of conceptual and strategic decisions, concerning defence and the armed forces. The Cabinet also decides about the deployment of British contingents out of area, i.e. outside the territory of the UK or to relevant political-military groupings, in which the UK is active. The British Government at the same time also decides about the allocation of tenders for military, but also civil supplies to the armed forces. Any doubts in this aspect have the consequence of an exhaustive investigation and can even be a reason for the resignation of a member of the cabinet ^{2/}.

Minister of Defence

Even if the fundamental decision-making powers in matters of defence in United Kingdom rest with the Government, direct responsibility for the realisation of Cabinet policy in defence matters including purely military affairs, rests fully with the Minister of Defence - the State Secretary of Defence

Minister of Defence, who is in charge of the Ministry of Defence (the Queen is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) and fully answerable for its operation to the Government and Parliament. Together with him further civilians - Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Minister of State for Armaments and the Permanent Under-secretary. He unlike the cited ministers of defence representing a concrete political party (members of the lower house) performs his functions regardless of

election results. He is the supreme state officer in the Ministry of Defence who secures continuity in the realisation of already adopted Government measures concerning the defence of the monarchy at a time when the ministry of defence changes political parties.

In United Kingdom a strict prohibition of whatever activity in any political party applies to members of the armed forces regardless of whether they are professional soldiers or civilian employees, in exception of the three appointed ministers. If any one of them decides to stand as a candidate for any one of the political parties he must resign from his job upon nomination and does not wait for election results, respectively, if he will be elected. A public statement issued about disputable political matters by a military or civilian member of the armed forces is, for instance, considered to be a serious breach of ethics. It is however necessary to mention that in such matters United Kingdom is more conservative than any other Atlantic countries.

The Minister of Defence is the Chairman of the Defence Council ^{3/}, which however in British conditions has a somewhat different conception than is the usual understanding, i.e. as an inter-ministerial organ.

Parliament

The final powers of the British Parliament rest with the House of Commons ^{4/}. Its members discuss matters of defence at the regular annual plenary sessions, and case by case solve other serious matters concerning the security of the monarchy and the alliance obligations and activities. The Ministry of Defence, Parliament delegates the duty to answer the questions of the public concerning defence, security, but also service in the armed forces, addressed to Parliament. An independent department has been established to this purpose at the Ministry of Defence.

In concrete terms the British Parliament controls defence matters through two committees:

The Defence Committee comprising MPs from all political parties (excluding ministers). This committee monitors the defence policies of the Government and

through the mass-media addresses the relevant ministers and high-ranking state and government officials. Of importance is that the committee publishes its findings regularly.

The Budget Committee on the other hand performs the, so-called, monetary control and can at times substantially influence the structure and usage of the military budget.

In relation to the budget committee it is interesting that Parliament over the past few decades has never refused nor reduced the defence expenses proposed by the Government. It is obviously in its power, similarly as for instance, in the issue of the future of the British resources of nuclear attack.

It is only him who can propose and decide about the fundamental security and defence concepts and their realisation.

2.2. Share of civilians in the management of the armed forces

The Ministry of Defence is the supreme authority for the defence sector. In practice this means that it is performing three functions: as a strategic, conceptual and budgetary organ, as an administrative staff for all sections of the armed forces (personnel affairs, logistics, infrastructure), as a central operations staff.

United Kingdom for this system puts forward, in the same manner as in the FRG, the argument of foremost more resilient and efficient political control, which means faster transition from political decision-making to military realisation. According to the leadership of the British Defence Ministry this system actually guarantees the more rapid deployment of military units in international operations, as was the case in Kuwait or in the Balkan within the scope of the IFOR and SFOR.

The cited functions of the Ministry of Defence also implicitly influence its structure and distribution of roles as a political administration organ and command organ. In the first case the key positions of leadership are usually occupied by civilians, in the second logically soldiers or functionaries with a military education. It is however not an exception that a civilian is a superior to high-ranking officers or generals. Of course he should accomplish a generally strict and specific career, as is the case

with high-ranking military functionaries. Civilians with a relevant education and experience) are usually appointed to the position of Deputy Under-secretary of State for Civil Affairs, Press Secretary, Chief Scientific Advisor, Chief of Material Supplies.

Typical for the British model of armed forces administration is the balanced ratio of civilian and military personnel in key ministerial positions. The main advisers to the Defence Minister - State Secretary of Defence are again military personnel - the Commander of the Defence Staff and civil - Permanent Under-secretary of State. Both are at the same level, the scope of the powers of the commander is professional military, technical and operative, the Under-secretary of State is responsible for affairs of a political, administrative and financial nature. The interest barriers are not defined by area responsibility, on the contrary they overlap and in most instances tightly intertwined.

The executive organ of the Commander of the Defence Staff is the Defence Staff, the Permanent Under-secretary of State again has at disposal the Office for Administration and Budget, which is under the control of the Second Permanent Under-secretary of State. A large number of civilians work at the Office for Administration and Budget. Highly qualified civilian personnel is mainly involved in financial administration, personnel and educational management, procurement of military supplies, but also in the political presentation of the ministry, at the level of international military negotiations, but also solution of fundamental conceptual questions, maybe also in the amendment and adjustment of certain defence strategy affairs. The British Ministry of Defence effectively uses the so-called defence communities inside the ministry. The ministry supports joint efforts between employees, especially civilians, who are involved in defence matters through the whole scope of arising problems. From concrete restructuralisation and strategic changes through to, for instance, the armed forces - society relationship. The Ministry of Defence also spends huge amounts to support non-ministerial organs and institutions, involved in defence affairs.

Civilians in the British Ministry of Defence are preferred to equivalent functions due to lesser financial costs and also the fact that most of them have been working in a given field and given function far much longer than the floating soldiers and thus

have higher professional theoretical and practical experience and habits than their military colleagues.

Parallel to the reduction of the numbers in the armed forces^{5/} currently the civilian employees are also in line. At the same time transfers are also being made, at times whole administrative wholes are moved out of London, with the aim of retaining only the conceptual and strategic institutions and organs. More detailed executive facilities are located outside the capital city.

Worth of emphasis is a fact which plays a key role in the problem in question. That is to say if the armed forces are fully professional or whether they are supplemented on the basis of general defence obligation - conscription. This fact influences foremost horizontally, but also vertically, the share of the civilian population in the administration of defence and realisation of appropriate decisions. It is clear that with growth of professionalism in the armed forces the share of civilians is also increasing. It is also clear that the voluntary British army is legislatively better cared for than if it were supplemented in a mixed fashion, and at the same time better understood by the public than where a large number of recruits is conscripted by force for compulsory national service as stipulated by an Act of law, which though respected is not accepted not only by the conscripts themselves but also their family and social environment.

2.3. Preparation of the civilians, participating in the democratic control of the armed forces

In United Kingdom there exist a number of renowned institutions, occupying themselves on a level of experts with their strategic issues of security, defence and also armed forces^{6/}.

In this way i.a. also a certain handicap , caused by a constantly decreasing number of persons, having direct military experience, is being balanced. This „deficiency“ has objectively arisen by the fact, that in United Kingdom the compulsory military service has not been existing for several decades.

Research centres, academies and universities create the necessary information base, which is being made use of by the members of the government, parliament,

and other persons, participating in the democratic control and management of the armed forces. In this way informal channels take an effective part in this activity.

A good knowledge of strategic military issues and military budgeting is especially essential for the government officials, to be able to react professionally to relevant groundworks, obtained from the Ministry of Defence and other elements of the armed forces and to be at the same time sufficiently prepared to present a documentation to the parliament.

On a very good level is the preparedness of the civil representatives of the army, who make decisions on the concept and operation issues of the armed forces. They gain the necessary knowledge in the course of their, in many cases more than decades long function in the Ministry of Defence, as members of research teams for security policy as well as external collaborators of the institutions, engaged with the security and defence problems on a national and international level.

The proceedings in the taking the civilians on the staff in the armed forces are directed by fixed rules, which undoubtedly has a favourable influence on their working motivation.

Remarks:

^{1/} The government is formed by the political party, which gains a majority of the seats in the House of Commons. The number of the members of the government fluctuates around twenty ministers.

^{2/} In the second half of the 80s, the then Minister of Defence Heseltine resigned from his ministerial position as a result of the scandal surrounding the supply of helicopters by Sikorsky, an American firm.

^{3/} The British Defence Council is in addition to the Minister of Defence - State Secretary of Defence, constituted by the minister of the armed forces, minister of procurement, standing under-secretary of state, chief of the defence staff, his first deputy, chiefs of staffs of the elements of the armed forces, chief of the materiel support, scientific adviser-in-chief and second standing secretary of state. Besides the „great“ Defence Council operate in Britain further the Navy Council or the Admiralty Council, Army Council, also the General Staff Council, Air Force Council and Procurement Council. This diversification is probably a relict from the time before the year 1964, when in Britain in the framework of defence a number of ministries existed, e.g according to the kinds of the armed forces.

^{4/} The House of Commons has 635 deputies, elected by the population by a simple majority of votes, for a 5 years´term. The House of Lords is constituted by secular, juristical and clerical lords. It has about 1000 members. The House of Lords is not authorised to throw out a bill, it can only delay it for one year.

^{5/} Towards 1.9.1996 Britain had a total number of 231 800 soldiers and 129 200 civilian employees.

^{6/} Among them belongs IISS, Centre of Defence Studies at King´s College, Chatham House, Royal United Services Institute etc.

3. The Royal Kingdom of Norway

Norway is a developed democratic country with rich experience in the building of armed forces and application of defence policy among the population. The relationship between the army and the rest of the society are at a very good level. Clearly the systematic and widely applied policy of democratic control of the armed forces and the large share of civilian personnel involved in the military administration and who perform a number of military activities.

3.1. Democratic control of the armed forces

Parliament in Norway like in other developed democratic countries plays a major role in the process of democratic control of the armed forces. Due to the character of the form of Government, the Norwegian Constitution^{1/} contains some special provisions, which are intended to secure political and parliamentary control of the executive, thus also the army.

The King

According to the Constitution the King is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He disposes military command authority which he can delegate to other organs and institutions. The larger share of these powers is delegated to the Council of State, i.e. the Government. For practical reasons these powers are during the time of peace exercised by the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Norwegian armed forces. The powers of the King as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces are also limited in that some military orders can only be realised with the approval of the Storting^{2/}. Parliament according to the Constitution cannot foreclose the powers of the King in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, neither can Parliament transfer such powers to another organ of state.

On the other hand matters which strictly concern military command, e.g. mobilisation and deployment can be, to an extent determined by the King, be excluded from the discussions of the Council of State. The Minister of Defence shall report directly to the King, in the presence of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is however necessary to mention that this is very rarely used in practice.

The King has the right, as stipulated by the Constitution, to declare a state of mobilisation which in Norway is of great importance to the concept of total defence of the country^{3/}. To the King, respectively, Government also passes - according to the State of Emergency Act - the right to take all necessary measures in the interest of the kingdom, if as a consequence of war the Parliament cannot perform normal functions. The Storting must be notified of whatever legislative measures taken by the King, which body (Storting) can at any time declare such measures void.

The Government

In general terms, the organisation and activities of the Norwegian armed forces are not restricted by special regulations. The army is an integral part of the society and is subject to the same legislative and legal procedures, applicable to other administrative organs and institutions of state. Some areas of military activity are however subject to special or partial legislation^{4/}. In Norwegian legislation, the principle that all important decisions concerning security and the armed forces are passed by political organs responsible to Parliament and which are subject to democratic Parliamentary control.

The democratic control of the armed forces in the Norwegian Parliament is performed mainly by the Committee on Defence^{5/}, Committee on Finance, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Of special interest is the so-called "General Committee on Foreign Affairs", which is appointed by the Election Committee. The task of this Committee is to discuss important matters of foreign policy, trade policy and national security with the Government.

The Committee on Defence monitors, discusses and expresses its opinion on all matters concerning the military defence of the country. The subject of its interest are

also matters, which are addressed by the relevant Committee on Ombudsman for the armed forces. The committee monitors civil defence, especially from the point of view of coherence between the performance of its activities with designated powers.

The Committee on Defence plays a key role in the creation of the Defence White Paper, which in Norway is considered to be a fundamental defence policy document. Its term of office is the same as the election period and to a larger extent is one of the convincing expressions and proof of the role of Parliament as an instrument of democratic control of the armed forces and the two-sided process between the society and the armed forces. The creation of the Defence White Paper is a long-term process, which is participated in by the Government, Ministry of Defence, Parliament and its committees, other civilian organs and the Headquarters Defence Command Norway, for which the Defence White Paper is a binding document for other major planning documents of the armed forces.

The Defence White Paper is also of extraordinary importance to the Committee on Finance and the creation of the defence budget in all in its parts. The defence budget, apart from the Defence White Paper also takes into consideration other defence planning documents in a perspective of up to 18 years. The defence budget as a part of the state budget (national budget) is a result of the activities of civil, legal military and military organs and institutions. Even its creation, use and eventual adjustment of the defence budget are a transparent expression of the democratic control of security policy and the armed forces as an a specific instrument for its application.

3.2. The Ministry of Defence and the share of civilians in its administration

Norway is a country in which the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command as the organ controlling the soldiers are relatively separate.

Ministry of Defence

The Ministry of Defence which is headed by the Minister of Defence (see Annex No. 2), within the scope of the Ministry of Defence and civil protection secures constitutional, political, control and administrative tasks. The ministry formulates

security and defence policy and at the same time also the major aspects of the activities of the armed forces. He is the initiator in the field of defence planning, administration and control, which are intertwined and mutually influence one another. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the creation and realisation of the main principles of organisation, personnel affairs, financial management and effective use of resources. The Ministry of Defence as a conceptual organ exclusively employs civilians ^{6/}. Under the Ministry of Defence are the Defence Research Institute, which is concerned with matters of political and military management in the armed forces, the Defence Construction Service, responsible for the management of building and housing material and the Defence Communications and Data Services Administration, which manages the communications networks and computer technology both at national level and within NATO. Management positions in these institutions are occupied by civilians.

Defence Command and General Staff

The Defence Command and General Staff (see Annex No.3) are responsible for long-term planning and preparation of the military budget proposals within the scope of their powers. They further secure and handle operational and tactical matters, organise training and exercise, they are also involved in the preparation of proposals for the modernisation of the armed forces and building of infrastructure.

From the total number of about 1000 employees at the Defence Command and General Staff, 47% are civilians, i.e. about 470 persons ^{7/}. Management positions are to a larger extent occupied by professional soldiers. Civilians, among other things, are entitled to occupy the position of Deputy General Manager Personnel, which is responsible for the civilian employees.

All civilians in the armed forces serve under the Civil Service Act. This Act regulates the creation and allocation of positions occupied by civilians in the same way as in other sectors of state administration.

3.3. Preparation of civilians to perform functions in organs involved in the control of the armed forces

All men in Norway are conscripted for national military service as stipulated by law. Such conscription is considered to be a basic education and training, in most cases, sufficient to the performance of a civil function concerning defence policy and the armed forces. Outside the scope of this training these people are not given any extra systematic training. The civilian employees at the Ministry of Defence, are given specialist training based on the performance of their functions. The members of the Committee on Defence, with the aim of obtaining military knowledge and thus be able to give proper advice, decide and control, systematically collect information on matters of defence, take part in military exercises, visit military units. They attach extraordinary importance to the problem of firing ranges and training areas, whose operation clearly influences the life of the civilian population. They ad hoc address questions of restructuralisation and modernisation of the armed forces.

The cited practical and theoretical preparation of persons, involved in the control and management of the armed forces, is together with the acquired and deepened civil general, respectively, professional education, in Norway considered as sufficient.

Remarks:

^{1/} The Norwegian Constitution in Europe, in terms of its period of existence, is one of the oldest. It is in force, obviously with a number of relevant amendments, since 1814.

^{2/} Such order is, for instance, the determination of the number of military personnel, deployment of combat forces outside the country or dislocation (military exercises) of foreign military contingents in Norway.

^{3/} The concept of total defence of the country means that all sections of the society by law have the duty to contribute to the defence of the country. The greater share of the tasks, for which in most countries the armed forces are responsible are in Norway performed by civilian institutions. This mainly concerns logistics support and transport. In case of war the armed forces can requisition civilian motor vehicles, aircraft, marine vessels (ships), etc. Readiness to defend the country is among other things submitted to Parliament in every election period in the form of the Defence White Paper. Within the frame of the concept of total defence, the Home Guard plays a major role, which after mobilisation should number 83 000 persons.

^{4/} Parliament, for instance, passed the Military Penal Code. In existence are also the Military Requisitions Act, Military Disciplinary Code, Military Police Act. Some decision concerning the army also require the formal approval of the Storting. E.g. Section 10 of the Military Conscription Act, which stipulates the duration of ordinary military service for the various sections of the armed forces and soldiers must be approved by Parliament.

^{5/} The Committee on Defence - in 1997 had 11 members. It comprised the representatives of 6 political parties.

^{6/} 186 persons work for the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, of whom 184 are civilians. The rest, i.e. 4 professional soldiers with the rank of lieutenant-colonel do not perform any control functions.

^{7/} The Norwegian armed forces has a total of 9000 civilian employees, about 43% of the total number of persons employed by the armed forces, but excluding conscripts.

4. Austria

Austria belongs among the highly stable democratic countries in Europe. Unlike the NATO countries - FRG, United Kingdom and Norway, the country is neutral. The neutral status of this country was guaranteed by the victorious powers of the 2nd World War. Neutral Austria has for the duration of its existence devoted extraordinary attention to the strict application of its Constitution and all other legislation, used to control the life of the society and also defines relations with foreign countries and international organisations. This applies in full measure to defence, the activities of the armed forces and their administration and control.

4.1. Democratic control of the armed forces

The legal base for the activities of the Austrian armed forces and at the same time also their democratic control is stipulated in Article 79 of the Federal Constitution, amended by the Defence Act from 1990 and specified by other defence legislation.

The Austrian Constitution divides the power of state between the legislature (Federal Parliament) ^{1/} and the executive organs (the courts, administrative institutions). The Constitution at the same time stipulates the duty of others to realise the results of the activities of the legislature.

The military defence of the country falls under federal administration. From this also arises the control subordination of the Federal Ministry of Defence and the army (Bundesheer) to the National Council and the Federal Council.

This civilian, i.e. democratic control of the armed forces in Austria can be methodologically divided into political, legal and financial control.

Political control

Political control is understood to be the right to interpellation, resolution and investigation.

The right of interpellation means a concrete right of the National Council and Federal Parliament to demand from the Government and its members, in this case

the Federal minister of Defence, information about all matters concerning the administration and activities of the armed forces. This right is in Austria realised in the form of oral questions, i.e. urgent queries (a written query is followed immediately by an oral reply) or classical right of interpellation which binds the addressee to reply within a time-limit of two months ^{2/}.

The National Council and the Federal Council can express their opinion on state administration, i.e. also to the Ministry of Defence, by means of resolutions which are not legally binding. After the resolution of the National Council has not been heeded, this body can in accordance with the appropriate provisions express a vote of no confidence in the Federal Government or its individual members, thus also the Federal Minister of Defence. This is followed by removal from office by the Federal President.

Within the scope of political control the National Council can authorise commissions of enquiry to obtain information about the execution of the activities of the Ministry of Defence and the Bundesheer. While it is the duty of all the courts and other organs of state administration approached to provide maximum co-operation during the course of such enquiry.

The National Council also based on the Defence Act, shall establish a Commission to handle complaints. This commission shall examine complaints concerning defence and submit recommendations for their solution. After which the Federal Minister of Defence expresses his opinion; full reports are submitted to the National Council every two years.

Legal control

Within the system of democratic control of the armed forces legal control has its specific place, to which special emphasis is attached in Austria. This is executed by the Administrative Court and Constitutional Court. This is subject to the control of the supreme executive organs. It is in its powers to remove the Federal Minister of Defence, if a decision to file charges against him is arrived at. From the date that the Federal Constitutional Act came into effect, the Constitutional Court did not have any cause for such decision.

Financial control

Financial control plays an important role in the Austrian model of democratic control of the armed forces. This is performed by the Accounts Court, independent of the Government. In terms of functions it is an auxiliary organ to the National Council, to which it is directly subordinated. The Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Army are subject to control by the Accounts Court with regard to legal validity, purpose and economy. The Federal Minister of Defence obviously has own internal control organs, among which belongs the control of the financial operations of the army.

Parliamentary instruments for the democratic control of the armed forces

Among the main instruments of democratic control of the Austrian armed forces belong the following parliamentary committees: Main Committee, Permanent Subcommittee of the Main Committee, Defence Committee, Accounts Court Committee, Financial Committee, Budget Committee and the Permanent "Intelligence" Committee.

Main Committee

It is the most important committee of the National Council. Its existence, like that of the Accounts Court Committee is stipulated by the Austrian Constitution ^{3/}. Its powers transcend all forms of control. The Main Committee is the final authority in all important matters concerning federal matters, thus also the armed forces. This was, for instance, obvious in the decision to dispatch forces abroad ^{4/}. The structure and composition of the Main Committee reflects the parliamentary election results.

Permanent Subcommittee of the Main Committee

Elected by the Main Committee, its structure and composition is similar. Performs special tasks in case of the dissolution of the National Council. It ensures its

performance. In terms of defence the committee works closely with the Federal President - the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

Defence Committee

The committees of the National Council are created in accordance with the individual ministries. The Federal Ministry of Defence establishes the Defence Committee ^{5/}. This belongs among the so-called other committees. It performs functions similar to those performed by the other committees, takes part in discussions about submitted materials, proposals and proposals and acts. It acts as adviser to the rest of the committees matters which concern the armed forces.

The Defence Committee can establish an own subcommittee to control specific military affairs. In such instance the committee has assembly and advisory rights, the powers of decision remain with the Defence Committee and the Main Committee.

The Accounts and Budget (Financial) Committee

Both committees work in close co-operation. Among their activities are control of the whole economy, logically also the activities of the Federal Ministry of Defence and the armed forces. Concrete affairs are examined by the appropriate permanent committees. Similarly as in other stable democratic countries the income and expenditure of the defence budget plays a key role in the control of the armed forces. The publicity and open discussion of this question is in the National Council considered to be one of the main criteria for the success of the democratic control of the armed forces.

President

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is the Federal President, whose powers during peace time are performed by the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President within the scope of his function does not have any special organ to provide him with programme information and prepare solutions to questions of national defence. An Adjutant works at the Federal Ministry of Defence as an expert on

defence and who provides the Federal President with necessary “military” information. To explain fundamental defence questions the Federal President invites the Federal Minister of Defence and other competent functionaries can attend the meeting of the National Council ^{6/}.

The Defence Council

The Defence Council has the right to make recommendations in matters of national defence. As per requirement the council utilises the services of experts. It expresses its opinion on the planning and realisation of major military orders, including the modernisation of the armaments of the various sections of the armed forces. The National Council is a very important organ of democratic control of the armed forces.

Minister of Defence

This is a political function, subject to party allegiance and is exclusively performed by a civilian. He is head of the Federal Ministry of Defence. In the administration and control of the ministry, he is assisted by the Ministerial Cabinet and the Information Service, the Office for Military Policy and the Control Office with special review departments, which perform internal army control activities. The Federal Minister of Defence according to the Constitution carries political and legal responsibility also for the activities of the armed forces. He is authorised to issue orders to the Inspector General of the Army (see below).

4.2. Share of civilians in the management of the armed forces

In the organisational structure of the country’s defence, the Federal Ministry of Defence comprises five sections. One of these sections is the General Inspectorate of the Army, which performs the function of the General Staff. The spectrum of tasks therefore also includes all military affairs, among which mainly belong operational and tactical command, armaments and equipment, air force command and the organisational services of military attaché.

The concentration of political and administrative and military sections of the Ministry of Defence into a single whole was realised on the basis of historical experience with the aim of eliminating the potential abuse of an independent general staff to further the interests of some element of society.

The presidium is headed by a civilian, in the same manner as the human resources section which is responsible for personnel affairs, recruitment of soldiers and disciplinary affairs. The soldiers (generals) control the training and service section and the section responsible for armaments, purchases and supplies. The highest military leader is the General Inspector of the Army who is in command of the armed forces.

A total of 453 soldiers and 1168 civilians work for the Federal Ministry of Defence, which tells us quite a lot about the civilian character of the ministry. At the General Inspectorate the ratio of soldiers to civilians is 61:39 ^{7/}. The individual job appointments are made in accordance with the character of the work to be performed. Functions which are to a greater extent military in nature are occupied by soldiers, those with a dominant civilian character by civilian employees. There however do exist instances where soldiers are also replaced. The primary requirement for the performance of any job function are qualifications.

4.3. Preparation of civilians and civilian organs to perform functions within the scope of the administration and control of the armed forces

According to the Decree of the Federal Government civilian employees in the so-called Group A - academicians, but also lower ranking officials, attend a half year course at the State Administration Academy. This basic preparation course is targeted at Austrian Constitutional and Administrative Law, Service and Wages Law, Economic Policy. The course culminates in a service examination.

The civilian employees - men, in most cases make efforts to build a career in the Austrian Militia ^{8/}. To this purpose they accomplish suitable courses and military training, among other things necessary to the attainment of an officer's rank in the Militia.

Compulsory or voluntary special military training for members of parliament or state and government officials involved in the administration and control of the armed forces is not prescribed and is not performed organising in practice. It depends upon the initiative of concrete individuals, their qualifications and willingness to learn and build a foundation for a substantial share on the control activities of the armed forces.

Within the scope of the political parties, members of parliament are often appointed to perform parliamentary functions in the individual committees in accordance with their qualifications and education. This is however not a rule. This is especially difficult in the case of members of parliament in the Defence Committee, who are not recruited from the ranks of the professional soldiers who have an appropriate military education.

Most of the political parties use their own, so-called, Political Academies to prepare members of parliament and party functionaries (not only at federal, but also regional level). Part of the education are also military affairs, especially of a strategic character.

The party and political activities of the soldiers and civilian employees are restricted by the Defence Act to areas outside the barracks and military facilities. Within the military areas all activities which uphold the interests of any one of the political parties are forbidden, e.g. in the pre-election period. Professional soldiers and reserves are forbidden to take part in public assemblies, meetings and demonstrations.

Remarks:

^{1/} The Austrian Parliament comprises the National Council (183 directly elected representatives) and the Federal Council (64 representatives elected by the Provincial Councils in the 8 Federal States).

^{2/} The right of interpellation was in 1995 used in 68 instances against the Federal Minister of Defence, in the majority of the instances by the members of the National Council.

^{3/} The establishment of other committees is not stipulated by the Constitution. They are established ad hoc, in a larger number of cases they are permanent.

^{4/} On the request of the UNO Austria in 1965 dispatched forces to the Cyprus and the Golan Heights, later on request from the Red Cross to Italy and Abkhasia to liquidate the consequences of disaster, on request from NATO to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

^{5/} The Defence Committee as at 30.4.1997 had 21 members, the largest portfolios were held by the SPO and the OVP, the Chairman was from the Freedom Party.

^{6/} The Defence Council of Austria is made up of the Federal Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, Federal Minister of Defence, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, a further Federal Minister, an employee of the Ministry of Defence appointed by the Federal Minister of Defence, Inspector General of the Army and the members of the National Council and the Federal Council.

^{7/} As at 1.4.1997 15 568 professional soldiers, 8 111 civilian employees, 3423 reserve soldiers, 16 592 conscripts worked for the armed forces.

^{8/} The current legislation does not permit the participation of women in the armed forces. For some time now discussions have been in progress concerning the amendment of the relevant provisions.

5. Summaries to the democratic control of the armed forces, share of the civilians in the management of the defence department and their preparation for the exercising of their functions in Germany, United Kingdom, Norway and Austria.

1. In the surveyed European stable democratic states, whether in the FRG with a specific model of a citizen in a uniform and the concept of inner leadership, or in United Kingdom with a professional army, in the Norwegian constitution monarchy or in neutral Austria, the democratic control is understood as a complex process of leading, determining the objectives and control, which is exercised by general and specific control means. From the analysis follow two levels of control. The first one is the management, representing the determination of the objectives for the army, defining its position in the society, its task, which it is due to perform, as well as the definition of the conditions and ways to achieve the tasks. One of the basic prerequisites of the management is an ability of the politic elite to assume the responsibility, to think out the vision of the army and to put it through in practice. This responsibility ensues also from the fact, that the army is in reality a bureaucratic institution and its ability of change is sometimes limited by a small flexibility of the army structures. The second level is the control, i.e. the supervision on the means available for the army for fulfilling the tasks, and on the proceeding of the realisation of the fixed objectives. An important part of the control is the securing of the transparency of the army, the flow of financial means and securing its non-political character. With the development of democracy grows the importance of the management function, it becomes a priority level.

2. The priority of the politics in relation to the armed forces is understood so, that the armed elements should be subordinated to the social objectives, in the present time

increasingly more to the super-national interests, which are more or less in compliance with the foreign policy of individual countries. Democratic control together with it secures, that the army could not be misused for particular political interests. As an example may be quoted the model of democratic control of the armed forces in Germany, which tends to the goal, that the army should not be only a guarantee of ensuring the security of the society, but should also actively strengthen the democracy. Both principles envisage the priority of the political leadership, full integration of the armed forces in the constitutional framework and the civil statute of the servicemen. It is not only the German armed forces, who should be secured against two extremes. On one side it is a preoccupation from a creation of a „state in the state“, on the other side it is necessary to prevent the army from being transformed to a kind of a liberal organisation, without military discipline and appropriate operational effectiveness. Substantially, it is a matter of a minimalization of the military might, and also of a principle of not using the army for a settlement of problems of domestic political situation. In this respect only a few exceptions exist. E.g. in Norway the law permits an intervention against meetings, which would infringe with public order, same as in case of a rebellion.

3. The most characteristic formal means of a democratic control over the armed forces are the parliaments with their committees, especially those for defence, budget and economy. Further it is the government and the Minister of Defence, who have a great authority in United Kingdom, the head of the state as a supreme commander of the armed forces., Defence Councils and the instruments of the judicial authority, that have been emphasised especially in Germany and Austria. A prerequisite of their successful functioning and their interoperability is a legislative coverage of all relevant activities.

4. An extraordinary attention is in the states under survey paid to the forming of the military budget, its structure and utilisation. In addition to the Ministry of Defence, other relevant ministries and competent parliamentary committees are these problems treated also by special authorities, which are e.g. in Germany the Federal Auditing Office and in Austria The Accounting Court.

5. In applying a democratic control of the armed forces is of a considerable importance, besides the military budget, also the working out and realisation of principal long- and medium term planning documents. Among them are the s.c. White Papers on the Defence, which have special importance from this point of view in the Kingdom of Norway. The working out of a White Paper may be also a good means for confidence building between the civilians and soldiers, participating in the management of the armed forces. In such case the soldiers have a possibility to point out the shortcomings, or to present their own solution for the completing of defence issues of a strategic importance, which are a domain of the civilians. During the working out of long term conception tasks can be also deepened the communication among the Ministry of Defence, government and parliament, which is necessary for an effective exercise of the democratic control over the armed forces.

6. From the results of the research is also evident, that the state takes over the strategic responsibility for the security and defence and that its executive body, the army, can be responsible only for the degree of the fulfilment of the imposed tasks. In this respect is also important a permanent depolitization of the armed forces and a consensus of opinions in the state security policy, applied among the ruling parties and the opposition.

7. The issues of defence in Germany, United Kingdom, Norway and Austria are managed by the Ministries of Defence, a part of which are the General Staffs and analogical authorities. Relatively separated are the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff in Norway. The decision-making authority for the whole sphere has , however, also the Norwegian Minister of Defence. In this way is considerably limited a possibility of breaking away of a military element (General Staff, which commands the troops) and its eventual becoming independent with the purpose of carrying out an independent military policy. This model is supported by negative experiences from the history. The General Staff and the high-ranking military commanders are subjected to the governmental control through the civil minister of defence.

8. The administration and conception part of the Ministry of Defence is manned mostly by civil employees. Especially remarkable it is in Norway, where all management functions in this part of the ministry are occupied by the civilians. A balanced share of the civilians and soldiers in top managing posts, particularly well worked out and applied in Great Britain, also ensures a necessary civil control of the armed forces and a continuity of the military policy.

9. The example of United Kingdom demonstrates, that the share of civilians, especially from the quality point of view, is being increased by a gradual professionalization of the armed forces.

10. An important element of promoting the effectiveness of the share of the civilians in the management of the defence sector is their stabilisation in the crucial posts, including that of the Minister of Defence, same as in the posts of experts.

11. A sufficient military preparedness (especially in the level of knowledge) is a successful prerequisite for an effective engagement of the civilians and non-military authorities in the democratic control of the armed forces and their participation in the management of defence. Preferred are those, who had finished the national service.

12. In the West countries under survey there are no complex systems of the preparations of the civilians on a central and regional level. Members of parliament, government officials and others make use mostly personally of possibilities of preparation in the military sphere both on an international education level (in the framework of the NATO, WEU and OSCE activities), and in the national scale. Especially the ministries of defence prepare individual or long-term actions for non-military officials. They also organise for them visits of military facilities, shooting ranges and training areas, that are often an object of discussions among the soldiers and civilians.

13. A positive role in the conception and strategic military preparedness of the civilians in the West countries is played by the activities, performed within the framework of the defence communities and in independent institutes, dealing with the security problems. In the framework of major political parties, which is typical for Austria, academies have been established, which can provide their members with necessary knowledge, when required.

14. Professional training (economic, financial, administrative etc.) , provided to the civilians, working in the Ministry of Defence and its subordinated elements, is on a sufficient level.

6. The Czech Republic

6.1. Genesis of transformation of the armed forces in terms of democratic control

The November revolution in the Czech Republic in 1989 brought a fundamental turn in the field of security, defence and armed forces too.

In the period of the First Republic ^{1/} the Czechoslovak army was relatively well trained. However, it was never used for defending the republic against Nazism for political reasons. During World War II, our citizens fought on the Eastern and Western fronts and contributed to the defeat of the Nazi Germany.

The building of a new army started after the communist putsch in 1948. Like the whole society, the army was completely controlled by the Soviet Union. The Communist Party controlled the army technically and politically. The attempt to liberate the republic from the bondage of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty in 1968 was unsuccessful, being suppressed by the invasion of Kremlin and its satellites. The armed forces got, to an increased extent, controlled politically and technically by generals and top officers from the Soviet Union ^{2/}. The reason was, among others, a strategic military position of our country. The army got isolated in the society, or was just tolerated by the citizens for some decades. It did not exercise political or executive power. The Czechoslovak People's Army just served the Communist Party, which enforced decisive powers both in the army and the whole society.

After the November revolution, the fear of a potential intervention of the army in the social development diminished gradually. In this respect, the Czech public was afraid of police and secret police rather than the army. Therefore, police and secret police depolitisation was the most significant post-revolutionary step related to the armed forces taken by the then strongest political party, the Civic Forum. The removal of the leading role of the Communist Party from the Constitution was the legislative precondition for the depolitisation. The Main Political Administration body

and all political departments and political functions were abolished and the activities of the Communist Party were prohibited in the army. All political activities of regular soldiers and compulsory military service soldiers were prohibited too ^{3/}. Step by step, all army control powers were transferred to democratic control instruments, i.e. to the President, the Parliament, the Government, and the civil Minister of Defence.

A new Constitution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic had been adopted before the split of the federation. According to the provisions thereof, the President of the Republic is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces ^{4/}. The President is entitled to allow, in case of threat, military operations unless this can be done by the Parliament. The Parliament is obliged to approve the President's decisions subsequently. The Parliament has all legislative powers with respect to the army.

A civil person was appointed Minister of Defence ^{5/}, which signalled the process of a gradual implementation of standard democratic control of the army. Simultaneously, the percentage of civil managers and employees in the Defence Ministry and the General Headquarters started to rise.

The re-distribution of competence between the Defence Ministry and the General Headquarters with the aim to transform the former in a political body and the latter in a purely military body was a significant step of the civil army control in the process of the transformation of the armed forces. All relevant political powers were transferred to the Defence Ministry after the revolution.

A peaceful removal of the Soviet Union troops from the territory of our state and a serious split of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (ČSFR) and of the federal army in 1993 represented a positive feature of the entire process of transition of the armed forces from totalitarian and single-party government principles to a democratic and apolitical army. Democratisation and civil control processes continued without interruption in the Czech Republic and the Czech army. Respecting political dimensions of the implementation of democratic and civil control of security policy and the armed forces, i.e the awareness of the political responsibility for decisions to be adopted and for the entire development of the army, was a substantial element of the successful implementation.

The fact that the Czechoslovak Republic used to be an advanced democratic country with stable democratic principles between the two world wars was of great importance in the process of building of civil armed forces control in the ĚSFR and the Czech Republic. The inter-war and 1945-1948 democratic traditions pertained in the minds of a number of officers of the Czechoslovak People's Army (ĚSLA) and manifested themselves in responses to the events of 1968 and, particularly, 1989. A part of army members, especially those dismissed after 1968 and re-activated, initiated the civil control steps ^{6/}.

6.2. Democratic control of armed forces

The democratic and civil control of the armed forces in the Czech Republic is considered one of the significant relations between the society and defence. It is evaluated as one of the criteria for the admission of our country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The legitimacy and necessity of the civil army control are based on the fact that the army is the biggest and best armed power organisation in the state, has a specific directive control methodology and has to keep secret some activities in order to maintain its function. Therefore, there is a danger of inappropriate changes in the development or misuse of the mission of the army in case of absence of civil control ^{7/}. Democratic control is defined as a „subordination of the armed forces to elected political authorities“, i.e. all defence decisions have to be made by those who have been elected responsible for the affairs of the country ^{8/}. As mentioned in the introduction, the research focuses on the formal level of the democratic armed forces control, which, in our context, means the position and tasks of the President of the Republic, the Parliament (primarily of the Committee for Defence and Security of the House of Parliament), the Government, the Defence Minister, and the Supreme Checking Authority. Taken together, these civil control bodies represent the legal and executive powers. What remains to be solved in the democratic and civil armed forces control is the role of the judicial power.

The President

The President of the Czech Republic is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. However, it is stipulated in the Constitution ^{9/} that the Prime Minister has to approve the decisions of the President. The President represents a symbolic and moral authority. He affects the army personally or through the Military Office. The President is assisted by the Security Issues Advisor ^{10/}. Until 1993, the President could act through the Defence Council (being its head) ^{11/}, whose task was to put in practice some decisions of the President's related to defence. At present, the Council is a mere consulting body, whose activities and powers are being discussed.

The Parliament

Parliamentary supervision is the most significant component of the democratic army control ^{12/}. The House of Parliament enforces this control during its plenary meetings (by approving the State Closing Account, e.g.) through discussions in Committees or activities of individual Members of the Parliament. The Parliament is entitled to decide upon the use of the army in case of crisis or war, and any military actions abroad in the period of peace (participation in IFOR, SFOR actions, e.g.). The Parliament supervises over the work of the Government related to the army and all events in the army, and approves any army fund allocation by approving the state budget. It can affect the amount and the structure of the military budget and require solutions to problems coming under the competence of the Ministry of Defence. To investigate serious events, the House of Parliament establishes investigation commissions. Parliamentary bodies adopt resolutions on the conclusions of the control. The control is executed primarily by the Committee for Defence and Security, the Budget Committee, and the Foreign Committee. The Committee for Defence and Security deals with the widest and deepest aspects of security issues. In close co-operation with the Defence Ministry and the Government, the Committee solves all legislative aspects of security and military issues. It mediates information exchange between the armed forces and the Parliament.

The Government

The Government represents the supreme executive state power. It participates in the civil control of the Army of the Czech Republic through the Defence Ministry management. The Prime Minister and the Defence Minister execute control either personally or through state administration bodies, which are entitled to do so by law. The Government formulates its security policy in governmental statements ^{13/} and puts it in practice using governmental decrees on the basis of its supervisory activities. The decrees take into account our efforts and liabilities with respect to international political and security organisations (such as UNO, OESC, NATO, WEU). The Government has collective responsibility with respect to the Parliament, which is highly important in the field of defence in particular, because ministries other than the Defence Ministry also take part in the implementation of the defence policy - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and others.

Minister of Defence

The Defence Minister is a civil person ^{14/}. This, to a considerable extent, secures the democratic control of defence. The Defence Minister is responsible to the Government and the Parliament for the implementation of the governmental defence policy. The Minister and the Ministry of Defence represent a counterbalance to the General Headquarters of the Army of the Czech Republic, which is considered a purely military body.

The Supreme Checking Authority

The Supreme Checking Authority prevents any misuse of public means included in the military budget or other army financing tools. In the Czech Republic, for example, IFOR and SFOR mission costs were drawn for funds other than the military budget.

Justice

Military judicial bodies have been abolished in the Czech Republic. Judicial bodies in the Czech Republic have no special supervision power with respect to the armed forces. The right of appeal is treated in a way usual in civil bodies.

6.3. Participation of civil persons in the management of armed forces

The field of defence is treated by the Ministry of Defence, the General Headquarters as part thereof, and military bodies subordinated to the said bodies.

Ministry of Defence

The Ministry of Defence is considered a political and administration body in the field of defence. Some of its assignments are directed outside the army. The Minister is assisted by four Vice-Ministers - civil persons ^{15/} - and the top military representative - the Head of the General Headquarters, who manages the activities of the military forces through the General Headquarters.

The Vice-Minister charged with legislative issues is responsible for the activities of the Defence Policy, Legislative and Legal Sections, the Economic Vice-Minister is responsible for the Financial and Assets Sections. The other two Vice-Ministers are charged with foreign relations, and personnel and social policy respectively. The Ministry of Defence further includes the Inspection of the Ministry of Defence, whose head is a soldier, the Military News Service Management (soldier), the Main Authority of Military Defence News Service (soldier), and the Main Authority of Civil Protection (soldier). The head of the Cabinet of the Defence Minister is a civil person. Heads of departments are civil persons or soldiers depending on the prevailing character of their activities.

There are 283 soldiers and 163 civil persons ^{16/} altogether employed at the Ministry of Defence, excluding the General Staff.

General Staff

As a specific component of the Ministry of Defence, the General Headquarters are responsible for the management, development and building of the Army of the Czech Republic, for co-ordinating and securing peaceful and mobilisation replenishment of

the army, and for logistic support, health care and military police control. It plans, organises and manages the preparation of defence activities of the army. At this stage of the transformation of the armed forces in accordance with the Army Building Concept until the Year 2000 with the Outlook to the Year 2005 ^{17/}, a significant task of the General Staff is to build a new army with a purposeful organisational structure, an adequate commanding and managing system, and a top-quality and economically effective training of troops. This army shall be managed by professionally skilled and stable army corps. An extraordinary attention will be paid to the possibility of a universal professional career of the corps members. The general conscription shall remain in force.

There are 512 persons altogether employed at the General Staff, including 408 soldiers and 104 civil persons ^{18/}.

6.4. Training of civil persons participating in the democratic control of armed forces and defence management

There is no general systematic professional and military training for civil persons that exercise or will exercise offices related to the democratic control of the armed forces or the defence management.

These officers, no matter whether members of the Parliament, Government, or the Ministry of Defence, have to gain experience during the execution of the office. A rather high personnel turnover in some positions due to professional incapability is a negative fact in this respect, since each new employee has to gain new experience. A stable and effective personnel policy, however, is not founded by adequate laws - the State Service Act, for example.

The Members of the Committee for Defence and Security of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the members of the Senate can attend training courses and seminars devoted to security policy, which are held by the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the bodies thereof, the International Relationship Institute, for example. To gain experience, the MP's take part in foreign stays and attend short-term security and defence policy courses, often organised within NATO

activities. They are also invited to participate in military drills, workshops, and other military activities.

At the transitory stage of the army transformation, very good work was and is done in the field of control of the armed forces by skilled former regular soldiers and academy officers, dismissed from the army as unreliable elements after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the Warsaw Treaty in 1968.

Now, in the field of defence activity there is an irreplaceable sorts of civil persons training for democratic control. First of all it is the help of NATO in its training facilities and help of neutral countries, Austria to be mentioned first and even experience transfer from the previous countries of the so called real socialism.

Necessary professional training courses - financial, personnel, and technical - are held regularly for civil persons employed in defence. However, there are fewer language courses.

The inter-ministry approach to security and defence issues, the establishing of security communities and the building of a relevant independent security study centres are required for the security and military training of civil persons participating in the control and management of the armed forces.

Remarks

- 1/ The First Republic means the period between the rise of the Czechoslovak Republic on November 28, 1918 and the occupation of the Czechoslovak Republic by Nazis on March 13.1939.
- 2/ In late 1980's, there were 75 thousand Soviet soldiers, 1270 tanks, 2505 armoured vehicles, 180 fighting helicopters, and 93 fighting airplanes on the territory of the former Czechoslovakia.
- 3/ Pursuant to Par. 2b of Act No. 361/1992 of Statute Book, soldiers are prohibited to conduct any political activities and become members of any political parties. They are not allowed to make any political propaganda in their jobs. The right to express political attitudes verbally is not restricted. Soldiers have active and passive voting rights. During their mandates they are not allowed to do their jobs.
- 4/ Refer to the Constitution of the Czech Republic, Act No. 1/1993 of Statute Book and Act No. 331/1992 of Statute Book, Par. 47.

- 5/ In October 1991, the Defence Minister, the army general M. Vacek was replaced by a representative of the Civic Forum, Luboš Dobrovský.
- 6/ For further details see Rašek A., Krátký i.: Civil Army Management and Supervision, *Mezinárodní politika* No. 10, pp. 26-27, Prague 1996.
- 7/ Refer to the White Book on Defence, pp. 54-55.
- 8/ Rose Ch.: Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Parliamentary Role in Partnership for Peace, NATO Review No. 5, 1994, p.14.
- 9/ Refer to the Constitution of the Czech Republic, Art. 63, Par. 1, letter c.
- 10/ Since 1993, this office has been occupied by the army general, Ing. K. Pezl, the ex-head of the General Headquarters of the Army of the ĚSFR.
- 11/ Further Defence Council members are as follows: the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Economy Minister, the Minister of the Interior, and military experts from the President's Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the General Headquarters.
- 12/ The Parliament of the Czech Republic consists of the House of Parliament and the Senate. The House of Parliament has the supervisory function, co-operating with the Senate in the field of legislative. The Committee for Defence and Security of the House of Parliament has 20 members. The strongest governmental party, ODS (Civic Democratic Party), has the majority (8 members + the Chairman), followed by the strongest opposition party, ĚSSD (Czech Social-Democratic Party), with 6 members.
- 13/ Statement of the Government of the Czech Republic 1996, Chapter IV, Defence: The Government finds the external security of the state, including adequate defence costs, one of its priorities. Defence of the state is the matter both of the army and the whole society and each citizen. The Government finds it necessary to do its best to achieve the most effective arrangement of the armed forces. The achievement of the compatibility of the Army of the Czech Republic with NATO troops is a significant aspect of these efforts. The army will be based on a general conscription, yet with an ever increasing extent of professionalism. The army has to become a modern and economical organisation, capable of action, defending the sovereignty of the Czech Republic, and ready to assume its portion of international liabilities in military operations outside the territory of our state.
- 14/ On the basis of coalition agreements, a representative of the second strongest coalition party, KDU-ĚSL (Christian Democratic Union - Czech People's Party) is Minister of Defence.
- 15/ The offices of Vice-Ministers are occupied in accordance with coalition agreements. Two offices are occupied by ĚSL, one by ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance), and one by ODS.

- 16/ At December 31, 1996, the planned peaceful number of soldiers (regular and compulsory military service) was 66,379, and the number of civil employees was 26,694. The occupation percentage was 84.5% in soldiers and 91.30% in civil employees.
- 17/ The Concept was acknowledged by the Government in March 1997.
- 18/ A considerable number of civil employees occupying lower positions at the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters are recruited from the former regular soldiers.

7. Summaries to the democratic control of the armed forces and the share of the civilians in the management of the sector of defence, including their preparation for the exercising of functions, in the Czech Republic

1. The military defence of the Czech Republic is based on the universal civic principle. This principle issues from the tenet, that the state guarantees the values and interests of a majority of its citizens, and these in turn are ready to participate in its military defence. The Czech Republic counts on a personal engagement and an adequate participation of its citizens in the military defence of the state and considers this participation as an expression of the civic responsibility.

On the other side it has entrusted with the responsibility for the military defence of the Czech Republic the constitutional authorities, their bodies (Parliament, President of the Republic, government, Ministry of Defence) and the Army of the Czech Republic, that ensure thus its further aspects. This double responsibility, that of the state and of the citizen, must be, however, accompanied with a sufficient will to the military defence, i.e. the personal will of the citizens and the political will of the state.

2. The role of the parliament towards the security of the state, the citizen and the armed forces is focused in the present time on the legislation. In the constitutional and other laws must be clearly and unambiguously distributed the powers of the President, government, individual ministers, determined the mutual subordination and management procedures, defined the role of the army in peacetime and the power to declare war in case of an aggression against the country or when it is necessary for the fulfilment of the international commitments. It is necessary to define the role and status of the police corps. New measures in the legislation, which will in many cases change the laws in the sphere of the security and the armed forces from the sixties and seventies, i.e. genuine Socialist laws, were started by the adoption of the national defence concept in March 1997. With the purpose to harmonise the relevant laws with new political and economic conditions and the NATO legislation will be before the end of the current year elaborated e.g. the law on safeguarding the defence of the Czech Republic, the national service law, the law on the army of the Czech republic, the law on the armed forces of foreign states on the territory of the Czech republic and a number of other laws. It is true, that a more timely passing of some of them would in many respects advance the issues of the security of the state and of the citizen, and the issues of the armed forces in the right direction.

3. Parliamentary control of the activity of the armed forces is increasingly realised through a consistent check-up and approval of the amount of the budget chapters of the departments, involved in the realisation of the security policy. The House of Deputies Defence and Security Committee takes an active part not only on the working out of the defence- and security budget, but it intervenes already in the shaping and realisation of the concept of the security policy of the Czech republic. In this respect the legality of the activity of all subjects, engaged e.g. in the issues of the updating of the armament, will be enforced.

4. An important turning point for the activity of the CR armed forces was the evacuation of the Soviet troops from the state territory. Under the control of the already civilian minister of defence gradually took place a rationalisation of the army

structures and a realisation of international agreements. e.g. the CFE Treaty. The army was depolitized. The top posts in the army have been occupied by civilians. A merit of some of them was a service in the army, from which they had been sacked during the purges following the year 1968. A majority of them, however, has already retired. For some „genuine“ civil workers was the job in the army temporal, a great job-changing took place among them. A stabilisation of civil workers is a prerequisite for a more competent decision making and for the exercising of specialised jobs.

5. An important element of a democratic control is a clear and explicit charging with tasks and management of the Ministry of Defence. We can call it a complex analysis of the positive fulfilment of the set tasks. A role is played by the interoperability of the parliament committees, especially the foreign policy committee with the allocation and economic committees, a co-operation of the House of Deputies with the Senate, government and President. Interested members show a greater responsibility for a further development of the security of the state. A positive phenomenon is the fact, that the government coalition and the major opposition party, the Social Democratic Party, are substantially united in the efforts for a full membership of the republic in NATO. As a shortcoming in some stages of the realisation of the democratic control makes itself felt the non-existence of the State Defence Council in an earlier conception, which existed in the period shortly after the velvet revolution.

6. An important place in the system of the democratic control of the armed forces has the Supreme Audit Office in the framework of checking-up of administering the state-property and the control controlling the observation of the state budget.

7. An increasingly rising share of the civilians, employed in the Ministry of Defence (see the Annex No.4) and in the General Staff (see the Annex No.5) is an evidence of an effort of the decision-making authorities to strengthen the civil control and management of the defence sector. Passing the law on the state service and awarding the s.c. tenure, ie. something similar, what has been awarded to the regulars, would be helpful for a greater stabilisation of the civilian workers.

8. The General Staff and high-rank military commanders are subjected to the governmental control through the civil Minister of Defence. The ministerial authorities take part in the working out of the defence budget, must have an access to the intelligence informations, must participate in the strategic control and in the long-term planning, the preparation of the army structure, the working out of the procurement plan, and first of all in the conceptional management of the development of the defence sector and of the army of the Czech Republic.

9. In the conditions of the Czech Republic as far as now has not been created a system of a preparation of non-military officials, participating in the democratic control and management of the armed forces. In the past , their military preparedness was ensured with a various degree of success by the defence authorities, dealing with the strategic defence issues. In the present time these bodies do not exist in the army. Their tasks are substantially performed only by the Foreign Relations Institute, a body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which employs renowned experts for the security issues and ensures inter-ministerial co-operation in solving the tasks of the security of the state and the citizen.

10. Especially the members of the present House of Deputies Defence and Security Committee, but also other officials, entering the process of the democratic control and management of the armed forces, make increasingly use of the possibilities of gaining the necessary military qualities, especially in the courses and seminars, organised in the framework of the PfP, NACC or NAA or other Atlantic activities or actions of the WEU, OSCE and other groupings and organisations.

11. The Ministry of Defence organises in co-operation with the Military Academy professional and language schooling for the civilians, which, however, does not cover the needs. A natural prerequisite of the democratic control of the security policy and armed forces is a professional and skilled competence of those responsible for it.

8. Comparison of the democratic control of the armed forces and the share of civilians in the administration of the Ministry of Defence, including preparation for performance of functions, in the FRG, United Kingdom, Norway, Austria to the situation in the Czech Republic.

1. The general model for the democratic control of the security and armed forces in the Czech Republic is similar to the realisation of this process in stabilised democratic states. Currently it is supported by the concerned leaders and organs. The official actors involved in the survey (see Annex No.6 - consulted with Mgr. Štefan Sarvaš - Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic) are the same - The Head of State, in the Czech Republic, The President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Government (Prime Minister), Minister of Defence a civilian), Ministry of Defence as the executive organ, Parliament (legislature), judicial organs, the Supreme Control Authority. Their activities were analysed. If they differ then this is only in the quality and efficiency levels. In the conditions of the Czech Republic it is necessary to solve the position and role of the judiciary, in the same manner as the State Council of Defence.
2. The actors in the field of unofficial control are also behaving in the same manner. In recent years in the Czech Republic, positions of decision have not shown much

interest in the establishment of institutions and organs which would systematically address the questions concerning the security of the state and the citizen, this is also a reason as to why a campaign targeted at acceptance to the NATO, but also EU was not organised in good time and quality.

3. In the Czech Republic the pre-eminence of politics is unreservedly accepted, the participation of the armed forces in the executive is minimal. The armed forces are subordinate to social goals, more often supranational which is confirmed by our participation in the IFOR, SFOR missions and finally also the new concept plan for the building of the Czech Army up to the year 2000 in perspective up to the year 2005. Emphasis in the concept plan is placed on the building of task forces, communications and information systems compatible to those of NATO.
4. Like in the surveyed western states, the process of democratic control of the armed forces is more markedly expressed in Parliament, more precisely its House of Representatives, which unlike the Senate disposes control authority. The current composition of the Parliament Committee for Defence and Security (whose Chairman is a former Deputy to the Minister of Defence) offers solid guarantees for efficient and qualified democratic control. The Committee for Defence and Security is also successfully working in co-operation with the Parliamentary Committee for Budget, especially in the solution of military budget affairs, with the Committee for Economy on defence infrastructure and obviously also with the Committee for Foreign Affairs.
5. The military budget is to a greater extent becoming a real instrument for the democratic control of the armed forces and an element for the correction of security policy.
6. Besides Parliament, recently the Government is also beginning to devote more attention to matters of defence and the armed forces, which organ (Government) has given preference to the monitoring of economic policy. For the moment due attention is not being devoted to the creation of the supraministerial white paper, which in many western countries has the character of a long-term planning document. At the same time the precise and clear allocation of duties to the armed forces must also be given permanent and systematic attention. In the

process it is necessary to intensify the utilisation of the capacity of the Ministry of Defence, and its General Staff.

7. The Minister of Defence in the Czech Republic like in other democratic countries is a civilian. The Ministry of Defence would benefit a lot from the stabilisation of this position, in the same manner as from the stabilisation of other control functions occupied by civilians. At the same time it is beneficial to eliminate eventual mass application of political interests in the appointment of persons to bureaucratic positions at the Ministry of Defence. The members of the armed forces - soldiers must by law not be members of any political party, neither should they engage in political activities in military areas.
8. At the Ministry of Defence an integral part of which is the general staff, the civilian element is continuously being strengthened. Its military, language and professional preparation must be adjusted to suit the situation. It will also be necessary to legislatively highlight the career system for civilians in the service of the Ministry of Defence.
9. In the Czech Republic like in other western countries a complete system for the preparation of civilians participating in the democratic control and administration of the armed forces does not exist. Western countries however to a far greater extent utilise the existing possibilities for military preparation in the appropriate strategic institutions and defence communities which are lacking in our country. At the same time in the Czech Republic we lack a similar training centre for use by Parliament. In the preparation for performance of functions the functionaries utilise the services provided within the framework of NATO, PfP, NACC, ZEU and other institutions in the individual countries.
10. The Czech Republic will not in terms of application of the democratic control of security policy and the armed forces be a problem country of the NATO alliance, if she becomes a full member.

Conclusion


I would like to extend my thanks to the appropriate organs of the NATO, that they are making it possible for me to research the problem of the democratic control of the armed forces and share of the civilians in the administration of the Ministry of Defence, including their preparation for such function.

I would be glad if my research will partly contribute to the collection of the relevant materials and the highlighting of the general and specific characteristics of this problem in the stabilised countries of democratic Europe, even in those which are making efforts to attain it.


In the Czech Republic and in the conditions of the Ministry of Defence my project is devoted attention, and is gaining support especially due to the part results which have been published in theoretical military magazines and at professional meetings and gatherings.

I appreciate the assistance afforded me by foreign partners in the research. From among them I would like to name Chris Donnelly, Colonel Schiebold, employees of the defence ministries, especially the defence ministries of FRG, Austria and Norway, the leaders and workers of the military academies and schools. For the organisational assistance, I would like to extend special thanks to the military attaches of the FRG, United Kingdom and Austria, accredited in the Czech Republic.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE FRG




THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE




182 civilians
4 soldiers


HEADQUARTERS DEFENCE COMMAND NORWAY



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC



163 civilians
283 soldiers


GENERAL STAFF OF THE CZECH ARMY

104 civilians
408 soldiers

CIVIL CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Official Control

Non-official Control



—————> OFFICIAL LINKS

.....> NON OFFICIAL LINKS

Annex 7

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