

**CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-
MAKING PROSESS IN UKRAINE**

**by
Oleg Strekal**

**A research paper prepared in the framework of NATO Democratic
Institutions Fellowship (1995-1997)**

Kyiv, Ukraine 1997

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive summary	3
1. Issues of civil-military relationship in the post-communist states	7
2. Primed with power: Ukraine's move from the Soviet to ist own army	12
3. Civil control: legal and institutional aspects	18
4. Obstacles for the implementation of policy of civil control over the military	22
5. Conclusions / Proposals	41
6. Bibliography	47

Executive summary

The reform of civil-military relations in Ukraine had a task to transform the grouping of the former Soviet troops located on country's soil into an army which ought to be relevant to the principles of a democratic state and society. In addition, the reform was aimed at the following specific goals: to enhance the international status of Ukraine; to develop armed forces as a pillar during the process of state-building; to use army as a significant unifying element of nation-building in the country.

The problems of building of Ukraine's military have always attracted the considerable attention of country's government and the different political forces. Moreover, the process of the establishing of armed forces, as a key-stone of the concept of state-building, was developing more actively, than the creation of another elements (political, social, psychological) of Ukrainian statehood.

One can define three basic dimensions of the Ukrainian military reform:

- political (protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity);
- military-organisational and military-technical (re-construction of the command system and force structure, armament and disarmament policies);
- social (army's adaptation to the new social environment as well as development of basic understanding and acceptance of army's role within the society).

Since Ukraine has gained its independent status all these aspects of reform have been actively implemented. The principal concepts of reform were adopted and the first steps toward a re-organisation of the military have been attempted. The political leadership managed to keep control over the military as well as to make sure that armed forces serve as country's defender. Both military and society demonstrated a high level of mutual tolerance during the transitional period in country's life.

Parallel to this, however, negative tendencies both within the army and around it have been strengthening. Military-organisational and military-technical innovations have led to the weakening of combat readiness and combat capabilities of the Ukrainian military. A manageability of military units was lowered. A drastic economic recession has deepened the crisis of army's ability to defend the state, while putting military at the verge of survival. Political disputes concerning the future of the armed forces have been strengthened. A prestige of the army and its authority have been significantly damaged both within the society and within the army itself. Under these circumstances a less and less controlled army became a transformation into a „state within state“, especially in such realms as weapons production and arms trade, political contacts with foreign states, operations with state property etc.

The goal of Ukraine's military reform, i.e. to create a modern army for democratic state, has not been achieved yet. A character of changes within the armed forces puts in doubt country's ability to achieve this goal in a more or less distant future.

Although in military sense army could be seen as a doubtful defender of national security, the military plays more and more decisive role in socio-political realm. This means that in a degrading society army seems to be almost the only institution which is capable of insuring interstate stability. Keeping the remnants of manageability, obeying the orders of the highest political leadership, and controlling arms arsenals, the army serves as a guarantee for the politicians who are trying to start economic and social reforms in the country.

However, question remains open, for how long will army carry out this specific mission? For how long would it respect a principle of non-involvement into political conflicts? Moreover, would the weakness of the army put in doubt a very existence of the state? Until these questions remain unanswered, neither military reform nor establishment of democratic civil-military relations could be considered as finished.

The undertaken research consists of the following parts:

1. Issues of civil-military relationship in the post-communist states.

It will be argued that in the post-communist countries civil control over the military is basically understood as loyalty of the army to the ruling political regime. The broader concepts of civil control which involve participation of all branches of state power as well as of society are often treated as second-rank issues. Politicians are rather preoccupied with securing their own positions by all means, including military power than with development of the army as democratic institution aimed at defending the state from external aggression.

2. Primed with power: Ukraine's move from the Soviet to its own army

In this part of the analysis will be shown how did Ukrainian leadership manage to take under its own control the former Soviet troops, located on country's territory. The research concentrates on the initial steps of Ukraine's military reform, for the main task of this reform was to establish a system of political control over the army that did not belong to the state before.

3. Civil control: legal and institutional aspects

This chapter deals primarily with development of legal norms and institutional system for conduct of the military and security policies. The division of competencies with regard to the military between executive and legislative branches of state power will be analyzed on the basis of the new Ukrainian Constitution.

4. Obstacles for the implementation of policy of civil control over the military

On the various examples it will be demonstrated that political, social, and military-organisational specifics of Ukraine's internal developments complicate the implementation of a concept of democratic control over the military. It will be argued that both political rivalries between the branches of state power and the lack of societal control over the army might lead to concentration of enormous powers in presidential hands including usurpation of control over the military by the President. On the other hand, it will be shown that degradation of military structure and decrease of morale of servicemen damage not only the combat readiness of troops, but also might put the army out of political and societal control.

5. Conclusions / Proposals

At the end of the research several proposals are made which could help to avoid the military getting out of control. One of the effective instruments to deal with negative developments within the military is implementation of broader concepts for civil control over the military and law enforcing agencies (Police, Security Service etc.). Preservance of political loyalty of the military leadership should be supplemented by such policies as independent monitoring of human rights issues, effective public control over the military budget, independent expertise of the official political-military doctrines, public access to the information on crimes in the military etc.

1. Issues of civil-military relationship in the post-communist states

National armed forces in the transitional societies are attracting the attention of politicians primarily as instruments for defense and crucial national security pillars under conditions of social instability. Consequently, the issues of political control over the military are often limited mainly to preservice of loyalty of the army to the state's political leadership. The instability and narrow social basis of new ruling groupings also contributes to the facts that political leadership is preoccupied with securing its own power position by all means, including military instruments.

This tendency was predicted (although indirectly) by Samuel Huntington and called "subjective civilian control".¹ According to Huntington's argument, under the conditions of "subjective civilian control" different civilian groupings compete over the control over the military. As a result, military is becoming a tool of the more powerful political/civilian grouping.

Once political control (often personal and not institutional) over the military is established the ruling elite loses its interest in both full-scaled reform of the army and transformation of the narrow political control over the armed forces into the civilian, public control. In this case basic interests of political and military establishment coincide. On the one hand, politicians regard the army as closed elitarian institution aimed at securing their personal powers. On the other hand, the military officers (especially on the highest levels of command) appreciate the privilege to be „a state within the state“, to be unreachable for any public critique.

In this way only the formal loyalty of the armed forces is achieved. The disadvantages of such a development are obvious: army is isolated from societal control, corruption within the military grows, combat readiness of military units decreases, politicization of the military affairs takes root, for political forces having no access to the military policy-making are trying to get direct influence on military institutions. The role of the army as a protector of the state against

¹ Huntington, S.P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. - Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. 80 - 83.

military attack degrades to the role of an ally of one or another power-grouping in an internal political disputes/confrontation.

Moreover, ruling regimes are creating special „internal armies“ (often called as National Guards or Protection Services) which are supposed to protect a few highest leaders of the state. Usually these forces are better financed, equipped and manned than a regular army. In addition, „regime protection units“ have constitutional right to intervene into country's internal affairs.²

The factor of personal loyalty of military commander-in-chief to country's leadership becomes the most decisive element in political-military relations. This loyalty is packed in such patriotic wording as „protection of motherland“ which under the conditions of post-communism and post-totalitarianism might either lead to support of emerging authoritarian regime or may cause a military coup aimed at „motherland's salvation“.

Under conditions of isolationism and political protectorate the probability of army's intervention in state politics constantly grows. This intention to intervene appears partially on the basis of a strong anti-politics outlooked, developed by professional soldiers. Morris Janowitz argued that “Interest in politics goes hand in hand with a negative outlook and even hostility to politicians and political groups. In fact it could be said that, if the military of the new nations has an ideology, it is distaste for party politics”.³

There is one more specific of the post-totalitarian states which makes army's involvement in politics more probable. In post-communist societies a discussion on army's „internal role“ is taking place.⁴ This internal role is understood first of all as political one. The majority of servicemen supports an idea of army's intervention into the state politics in order to prevent non-constitutional

² See for example: Kudrjashov Sergiy (et. al.). The way of the head of state towards the nation's arbitre. - Kyiv, 1997, pp. 10 - 13.

³ Janowitz M. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis. - Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 65.

⁴ It could be argued, however, that military intervention in politics is a basic characteristic of civil-military relations in any society. See for example: Finer, Samuel. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988.

paramilitary actions of political opposition, to calm conflicts and mass disobedience, to pacify conflicting parties etc. It is also generally recognized that depolitization of the armed forces is impossible and in best-case-scenario one could speak of only departization of the military.⁵

Although by one-sided policies of „regime-protection“ one can prevent the emergence of a military coup, it is less possible to meet some new challenges coming from the military sphere. It is also problematic to guarantee security and stability for the society as a whole.⁶

Among the new risks coming from the military sphere one can mention the following ones:

- lack of openness in activities of the military leading to corruption, decrease in combat readiness of the troops as well as to public distrust in the army;⁷
- inadequate militarization of national security policy causing overburdening of the state budget;
- defense capabilities of the state are being questioned;
- political-military cooperation with developed democratic states is difficult;
- army's personal is divided along political and nationalistic lines;
- servicemen's involvement in criminal activities including illegal arms trade;
- violation of human rights in the armed forces;
- society's inconfidence in the military etc.

The above mentioned features of post-communist militaries as well as those of political-military relations could be summarized in the following table:

⁵ Demchenko, Mychailo. Army. Power. Politics. - In: *Nova Polityka* (Kyiv), Vol. 2, Nr. 2, 1996, pp. 32 - 33.

⁶ Bezchasny Leonid, Kyrylenko Volodymyr. The conditions of defensive sufficiency. - In: *Polityka i chas* (Kyiv), Vol. 3, Nr. 3, 1997, pp. 32 - 35.

⁷ Skypalsky Olexandr. Threats to Ukraine and our salvation. - In: *Ukrainska Gazeta* (Kyiv), March 20, 1997, p. 7.

Table 1: Military Professionalism in Democratic and Post-Soviet Militaries⁸

<i>Democratic Features</i>	<i>Features of Post-Soviet Militaries</i>
Cross-societal recruitment. Entry based on merit.	Conscript-based system avoided By much of the population. Serious retention and recruitment problems due to hazards and hardship of service.
Merit-based promotion system. Performance and seniority balanced. Officer promotion dependent on support of democratic principles.	Merit-based system compromised by political influence. Bureaucratic norms of promotion compromised By patronage networks.
Principles of democracy taught throughout military system. Consistence between military and civilian approaches to teaching democracy.	Professional knowledge stressed. No ideological commitment to democratic institutions.
Public accountability high. Full disclosure of information. Responsive to outside inquiries. Media has full access. Military actively fosters a positive relationship with society.	Low public accountability. Controlled release of all information to outside inquiries. Limited media access. Military does not actively foster Relationship with society.
Accepts legitimacy of democratic institutions. Conceptualization of democracy is similar to society's. Adapts internal operations to reflect democratic societal values.	Military and social values increasingly coming into conflict as military rejects democratic values. Military's adjustment to democracy lags behind That of all other institutions.
Styles of officership and leadership reflect democratic principles and respect for individual human rights. Preference for nonauthoritarian style of leadership.	Individual rights sacrificed beyond the constraints necessary for military competence. Preference for authoritarian style of leadership. Abuse of soldiers common.
Recognition of necessity of some limited degree of political interaction with oversight institutions. Direct participation in politics not accepted. Nonpartisan attempts to influence political process. Some capacity to lobby for resources.	Former apolitical behavior overshadowed by direct involvement in elections and the political Process. Inexperience in playing appropriate political role vis-a-vis oversight bodies.

⁸ With minor changes taken from: Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson. Democracy and Russian military professionalism. Why full NATO partnership is still a long way off. - In: AirPower Journal (Colorado Springs, CO), Special Eddition 1996. - p. 81.

Considering the non-traditional challenges mentioned above one can argue that in transitional societies armed forces represent a permanent source of danger damaging both political-military and social-military relations. As Uri Bar-Joseph argues that “military professionalism in politically underdeveloped nations contribute to the tendency of soldiers to intervene in politics. This is so because, owing to the lack of highly professional and able civilian organs (which is a principal weakness of societies with a low level of political culture), the military perceives itself, and is perceived by large segments of the society, as the only body capable of governing the country.”⁹

One of the effective instruments to deal with negative developments connected to the military is implementation of broader concepts for civil control over the military and law enforcing agencies (Police, Security Service etc.). Preservance of political loyalty of the military leadership should be supplemented by such policies as independent monitoring of human rights issues, effective public control over the military budget, independent expertise of the official political-military doctrines, public access to the information on crimes in the military etc.¹⁰

This broader concept of civil control could be successfully implemented with the assistance of the international organizations and especially with NATO. Indeed, establishing democratic control over the militaries is one of the crucial conditions for the potential new members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as for other states participating in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” program.¹¹

The democratic control over the armed forces might be established along the following lines:¹²

⁹ Bar-Joseph, Uri. *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States*. - University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 45.

¹⁰ For the detailed concept of “advanced” civilian control see: Strelak Oleg. *The civilian control over the armed forces* (Unpublished manuscript). - Kyiv: Foundation for National Security Support, Fall 1996.

¹¹ See: Bonvicini Gianni, Gremasco Mauricio, Rummel Reinhardt, Schmidt Peter (Eds.): *A Renewed Partnership for Europe*. - Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995/1996, pp. 222-225. One can also mention in this regard the “Study on NATO Enlargement” (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, 1995).

¹² Simon, Jeffrey. *Central European Civil-Military relations and NATO Expansion*. - Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995. - McNair Paper 39, April 1995. - pp. 153 - 154.

- Clear constitutional division of authority between all branches of state power with regard to the military should be developed;
- Parliamentarian control over the military policy-making and policy-implementation should be increased;
- In the peacetime civilian Ministry of Defence executes control over the military institutions;
- Society through independent analysis and research controls the developments within the army.

2. Primed with power: Ukraine's move from Soviet to its own army

Ukrainian officials discussed the ideas of the creation of Ukraine's own army even before the state became independent. The Declaration on State Sovereignty, which was adopted by the Parliament of Ukrainian SSR on July 16, 1990 defined the building of the army as a major task and a natural right of the Ukrainian to-be independent state.¹³ Such a declaration was aimed not so much at the real process of the army creation, but rather at the very legitimization of Ukraine's intentions to have the armed forces, which are going to be separate from those of the Soviet Union. Moreover, one can argue, that by the announcing of the right to have its own army, Ukraine made a significant step forward on the way to its independence from the USSR.

The military coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the fears that the Soviet troops on Ukraine's territory could move out of the political control and would act as an aggressive force against the Ukrainian state, forced official leadership in Kiev to re-subordinate these troops to the control of the Ukrainian authorities. The Soviet military property on Ukraine's soil was announced the property of the newly independent state.

In order to diminish tensions within the army and to limit the possibilities of using the military against the civil population, the Ukrainian Parliament guaranteed equal rights and social protection to all servicemen, despite of their

¹³ See the full text of the Declaration in: *Golos Ukrainy*, 2.11.1993, page 2.

nationalities. To provide the effective control over the military, the Ukrainian government officials urged the units of the former Soviet Army to start taking Ukrainian oath in early January 1992.¹⁴ The central government has been also aware of the citizenship of the servicemen and forced the adoption of the Ukrainian citizenship by the officers of the Ukrainian army. Those militarymen, who rejected to do so, were dismissed.

The establishing of the control over the military units has been supplemented with another positive achievements. The idea to create the Ukrainian army appeared to be the basis for the political compromises and cooperation between the official Ukrainian leadership (communists-turned-nationalists) and the national-democratic opposition. Both the state officials and the oppositional leaders agreed upon the army's role as a main factor for the restraining of the probable „Russian imperial claims“ toward Ukraine.¹⁵ Both President Kravchuk and the national-democratic leaders called not to forget the lessons of history, which confirm that Ukraine, weak in military terms, always gave up its independence to Russia.¹⁶

In the summer of 1992 the former soviet military districts on Ukraine's territory were transformed into three Operational Commands, including Western, Southern and Central ones. These commands should have under control at the end of 1995 the ground forces consisting of 3 army corpses, 7 motorized infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions, 5 motorized infantry and 2 tank brigades. An artillery potential of the army should consist of 9 brigades, air defence system - of 4 brigades (approximately 26.000 soldiers and officers).

¹⁴ Kuzio, Taras. "Nuclear weapons and military policy in independent Ukraine". *The Harriman Institute FORUM*, Vol. 6, #9, May 1993, pages 3-5.

¹⁵ Later on, however, the problem of the Ukrainian army caused the deep division between the national-democrats and the government of President Kuchma. The major point of dispute has been the prospects for the military cooperation with Russia.

¹⁶ The creation of the Ukrainian army has been interpreted by the leaders of the national-democratic camp also in the psychological terms as a process which will force the Ukrainian public to better recognize Ukraine's independence. On the other hand, those leaders interpreted the Ukrainian statehood primarily in the terms of army's existence. They did not see any prospect for the developing of the country's independence without having a powerful army. They used to say: "The Ukrainian army means independence for Ukraine". But, unfortunately, the implementation of such a principle brought many Ukrainians in the situation, when, under the conditions of independence, they face the disproportion between a huge army and the low living standards.

The former airborne troops should be reorganised into 2 aero-mobile brigades. The Ukrainian military officials planned to create 3 military-engineering brigades and 3 brigades of defence against chemical weapons. A men-power of the ground forces ought to be reduced to the level of 180.000 serviceman. The air force should be reorganized into 3 air groupings and one grouping of navy aviation with approximately 25.000 serviceman and 590 military jets of various types.¹⁷ The Ukrainian navy at the Black Sea was supposed to have about 40.000 sailors and officers. Because of the unsolved dispute over the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet, a quantity and types of combat vessels within Ukraine's navy are far from being defined.

The parliamentary hearings on the national security in October 1993 seem to be the first attempt to discuss the military issues in their complexity. The analysis of the Ukrainian security policies has been presented by President Kravchuk.¹⁸ He defined the political, economic, military, and international aspects of the Ukrainian national security and stressed growing interdependence between these dimensions. *Military aspects* of security have been concentrated on the problem of development of the Ukrainian armed forces. The Ukrainian leadership wanted country's army to be capable of responding to any kind of military threat from any possible direction. The specific emphasis has been made on elaboration of the Ukrainian programs for weapons production. In the background of the Ukrainian military policies in terms of military reforms has been the strong political will to protect Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity from any kind of aggression.¹⁹

The country's leadership has tried to make it sure that the army as an element of society is built on a legal basis as well as is fully integrated into the process of societal reforms. Non-confrontational relations between various

¹⁷ The official figures by the Ukrainian Parliament, published in: *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 31, 1994, p. 3.

¹⁸ See: *Golos Ukrainy*, October 23, 1993, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹ For the political dimension of military reform, see: Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas. „Durch Atomwaffen zur Nation? Ukrainische Sicherheitspolitik auf der Suche nach einem historischen Ort“. - In: Gießmann, Hans-Joachim und Rödiger, Frank S. (Hrsg.): „Militärische Neuordnung in Mittel-Ost-Europa“. Edition Temmen (Bremen), 1994, 227 S. Here p.p. 136-140.

political forces with a non-involvement of the military into any political disputes were defined as a major condition for Ukraine's peaceful transition towards democracy.²⁰

The existence of a direct military threat to Ukraine was recognized both by the central government in Kiev and by the political opposition.²¹ The differences between the state officials' and the opposition's view concerned only the degree of probability of military intervention and the scale of military conflict. Official estimates dealt primarily with local clashes, whereas oppositional leaders considered the possibility of a full-scale military conflict.

It was also because of the fear of military attack that Ukraine started to build its own army on the second day of independence. This army continues to be the second-largest in Europe. Moreover, in addition to the armed forces, Ukraine also keeps the Border Guard Troops, the National Guard, the Troops of Civil Defence and the Special Police Forces, trained to act as paratroopers.²² Ukraine started to create its own Black Sea navy, the combat capabilities of which are supposed to be comparable to those of the Russian fleet in this region.

The Kiev leadership saw the potential for a military threat to Ukraine in:

- the political instability „in some neighbouring regions“;
- the existence of territorial claims (especially from Russia and Romania) towards Ukraine;

²⁰ For the role of militaries in building democracies in the East, see: Rahr, Alexander. „Die Rolle der Streitkräfte in der Innen- und Aussenpolitik der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten (GUS). - In: Kaiser, Karl und Schwarz, Hans-Peter (Hrsg.): Die Aussenpolitik der neuen Republiken im östlichen Europa. Europa Union Verlag (Bonn), 1994, 250 S. Here p.p. 65-82.

²¹ One can argue that the government started to speak about military threats to Ukraine under the prodding of the opposition.

²² Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union a powerful military grouping: 19 military divisions with about 6.500 tanks, 7.500 armoured vehicles, 3.300 artillery systems, 1080 combat aircraft. In addition to the regular army, Ukraine planned to have at the beginning of 1996 60.000 servicemen in the National Guard and 40.000 servicemen in the Border Guard troops. See: "Die Ukraine im Spannungsfeld zwischen nationaler Selbstbestimmung und sicherheitspolitischem Risiko", *Amt für Studien und Übungen der Bundeswehr*, Bergisch Gladbach, 1992, p. 22.

- the powerful armed forces „in some states which have enormous offensive potential;
- ethnic, social and religious conflicts which might result in military clashes.

The most real scenario for armed conflict was seen as an outside provocation of ethnic conflicts in some Ukrainian regions and the following attempt of a foreign state to protect the interests of minority groups. The military aspect of the national security as well as the attempts to respond to the probable challenges first of all by the means of force were treated at the expense of the attention given to the economic and social aspects of security. Thus, the Ukrainian politicians were preoccupied with military problems and missed the target of economic recovery of the country. The classical concepts of national security policy presuppose that a state, firstly, defines challenges and threats to its security and, secondly, develop responses to them. In fact, the Ukrainian leadership, trying to justify an existence of the large armed forces, have made an attempt to „invent“ a challenge comparable to the potential of the army.

Considering the military threat to Ukraine as real, the parliament voted down the first draft of the military doctrine in November 1992. This draft was described as „too pacifistic“. Several shortcomings of this document were pointed out. It did not include the definition of the probable enemy of Ukraine, a statement concerning the status of nuclear weapons and a ban of foreign military bases on Ukraine's soil. Ukraine's military doctrine, adopted in October 1993, met the deputies' demands. The maintenance of foreign bases was prohibited, nuclear weapons received official status as Ukraine's property, and the definition of the probable enemy was incorporated into the text of the doctrine.²³ This document defines the main principles of Ukraine's military policy:

- war could not serve as a means for solving interstate disputes;

²³ See the full text of Ukraine's Military Doctrine in: *Narodna Armia*, October 26, 1993, p. 2.

- reasons for military conflicts between Ukraine and the neighbouring states might be political, territorial, ethnic and religious;
- Ukraine has no territorial claims on other states and does not recognize any claims on its territory;
- Ukraine's probable enemy would be the state, „whose consistent policy constitutes a military danger for Ukraine, leads to interference in internal matters and encroaches on its territorial integrity or national interests“;
- the armed forces should be provided with modern weapons, including high precision weaponry, weapons with advanced destroying capabilities and space-based systems;
- Ukraine maintains a non-bloc status and has a keen interest in the creation of a pan-European security system.²⁴

With the adoption of the military doctrine, the Ukrainian parliament stated that the Ukrainian army will number 450.000 troops, which constitutes 0,8% of country's population.²⁵ According to the announcement at the beginning of 1994 the problems of military reform in Ukraine are solved and the armed forces are capable of defending the country against any kind of aggression.

Under the leadership of President Kuchma the concept of gaining security through military powerpolitics was somewhat softened. The appearance of direct military threat to Ukraine within the next five years was considered unrealistic. Up to the beginning of 1996 the armed forces have been reduced until 400.000-men level. A goal was announced to bring the size of the Ukrainian army to 250.000 men under arms.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

3. Civil control: legal and institutional aspects

The country started the military reforms with the elaboration of the legal basis for army's existence and functioning. The Ukrainian Parliament adopted in two years series of documents on military issues, including the Concept for defence and military building in Ukraine, the laws „On Ukraine's defence“, „On Armed Forces“, „On social and legal protection of servicemen and their families“, „On military duty and military service“ and more than 20 related documents.²⁶ Another aspect of the reformist activity dealt with the creation of the Ministry of Defence and the command system for the military groupings, re-organization of the structure of the military units' location etc.

The new Ukrainian Constitution defines basic principles of the state politics toward military as well as competencies of legislative and executive branches of state power with regard to the army.

Among general principles of state policy toward the armed forces there are the following ones:²⁷

- the defence of Ukraine, protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability is conducted by the armed forces of Ukraine;
- the organization and activity of the armed forces is determined by law;
- no one can use the armed forces of Ukraine and other military formations in order to perform activities aimed to restrict rights and freedoms of citizens, or aimed at seizing the constitutional order, bodies of power or preventing their activity;
- the state provides social protection to the citizens of Ukraine, who are the members of the armed forces or other military formations, as well as members of their families.

²⁶ Durdinets, Vasyl. "Modern Ukraine and security in Europe". *Golos Ukrainy*, June 25, 1993, pp. 2-3.

²⁷ Article 24 of the new Constitution.

The powers of the Verchovna Rada (the Parliament) regarding military issues include the following:²⁸

- to adopt and introduce changes to the State budget, to control the execution of it;

- to declare war and to conclude peace upon the President's proposal, to approve the decision of the President on the use of the armed forces and other military formations in the event of armed aggression against Ukraine;

- to approve the general structure, strength and functions of the armed forces and other military formations created according to the laws of Ukraine;

- approval of the decisions on granting military assistance to other countries, and on deployment of the armed forces of Ukraine to other countries and allowance to the armed forces of other countries to locate on the territory of Ukraine;

- adoption within two days from the moment of submission of decrees of the President on the introduction of martial law, emergency status, and on total or partial mobilization.

The Ukrainian Parliament has a right to approve a nomination of Minister of Defence by the President. The Parliament also adopts laws on military issues, including Military Doctrine, defines and confirms military budget, and controls the situation within the military through the mechanism of reports to the Parliament by military officials. The main parliamentary body which deals with armed forces is the Commission on Defence and National Security.²⁹

The President of Ukraine has the following competencies:³⁰

²⁸ Article 85 of the new Constitution.

²⁹ See also: Heinemann-Grueder, Andreas and Petersen, Meike. „Die unbekannte Grossmacht. Die Staatwerdung der Ukraine im Streit mit Rußland“. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* (Bonn), Vol. 37, No. 5, May 1992, p.p. 552-563.

³⁰ Article 106 of the new Constitution.

- is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; appoints and discharges the highest commanders of the armed forces and other military units; grants highest military ranks; is in charge of national security and state defence;

- presides over the Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine;

- submits proposals to the Verchovna Rada on the declaration of war and makes decisions on the use of the armed forces in the event of armed aggression against Ukraine;

- in the event of a threat of aggression, or danger to the state independence of Ukraine, adopts a decision on total or partial military mobilization and introduction of martial law in Ukraine.

The need to act as an independent state forced Ukraine to speed up the process of creation of state institutions responsible for national security policy-making. The institutional network has been established which includes the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, State Committee on Border Protection, the National Guard, the Security Service, and the Intelligence.

For the coordination of their activities the National Security Council and the Parliamentary Commission on Defence and National Security have been organized. In mid-1994 the position of the Vice Prime-Minister for national security was established. Later on it was the First Vice Prime-Minister, responsible for the national security and for the struggle against crime and corruption. The Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs, the Security Service, the National and Border Guards have been subordinated to the First Vice Prime-Minister.

The National Security Council of Ukraine (NSC) was created in July 1992. Among the initiators of the new institution were the President of the country, People's Deputies, heads of the ministries, public and political leaders. The National Security Council has a status of consultative institution under the

Ukrainian President, although existence of such a Council has not received any Constitutional approval. The NSC includes permanent members, who are the President, the Prime-Minister, the Advisor to the President for national security issues, Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, the Head of the Security Service. The Council acts on a principle of the regular meetings, which are prepared by the staff of the NSC. Later on the National Security Council was restructured and renamed into the Council on National Security and Defense (CNSD). The responsibilities of the Council are supposed to be defined by the future Law on the national security.

The CNSD deals with the key issues of the Ukrainian security, such as nuclear disarmament, the defence capabilities of the army, the protection of the state borders, the economic security, the disputes with Russia, etc. The problems of the Ukrainian science, the improvement of the epidemiological situation in the country, the deficit of the medicines, and others have also been discussed during the CNSD meetings.

President Kuchma strengthened the role of the CNSD by transforming it into the main analytical service for the President as well as by the subordination to the Council of the Institute for the Strategic Studies. The head of the Council is the advisor to the President on the national security issues.

While implementing the strategy of strengthening of Ukraine's administrative structures as well as the manageability of the country, the Ukrainian President has improved the control of his administration over the institutional system for the national security policy-making. For instance, at the beginning of 1995 the National Guard has been placed under direct authority of the President. One can also mention an appointment by Leonid Kuchma the first civilian Defence Minister in Ukraine's history.

4. Obstacles for the implementation of policy of civil control over the military

4.1. Political and social issues

Current economic, political and social difficulties in Ukraine should be seen against the background of the collapse of Ukraine as an ideological state. The ideology of independence, like the former Soviet ideology, failed to recognize differing interests of society as well as to propose a workable concept for the integration of society and for the development of economic prosperity and social welfare. Therefore, the achievement of national identity in Ukraine became problematic, especially in terms of the creation of Ukraine as a political nation, which must include all ethnic groups and nationalities living in the country.³¹

Economic and social decline and the inability of the central government to improve the domestic situation led to the emergence of regional identities, - only on a territorial and industrial basis in some cases, in others on an ethnic basis as well. As these local identities are formed for the purpose of survival and self-sufficiency, their relations with the central authorities are likely to be controversial and even hostile. Under these circumstances, the central government could control regional developments only by a limited number of means: by direct financial subsidies to certain regions and enterprises, by granting additional privileges to the more „powerful“ territories, and by strengthening the system of state administration.

Political stability in Ukraine is influenced by several closely related factors. The following major ones are:

- a) the process of reforming the former Soviet institutional structures of the state power on the basis of democratic principles;
- b) the organization of interaction between the various branches of Ukraine's administration;
- c) the forming of the local and national political and economic elites;

³¹ Polokhalo Volodymyr (Ed.). Political Analysis of Postcommunist Societies. - Kyiv: Politychna Dumka, 1995, pp. 163-174.

d) the creation of a civil society on the basis of private property as well as the relations between this civil society and the state.

Developments in the above mentioned fields have been complicated by the absence of a comprehensive system for the governance of an independent state as a result of the subordination of the Ukrainian state institutions to the Moscow government in the former Soviet Union. In fact, the lack of functioning institutions to run the state both contributed to failures of Ukrainian internal policies and delayed the process of democratic reform.

As for democratic reform of former Soviet institutions, Ukraine has been successful to some extent. Legislative power in the country is rested in the democratically elected parliament. The Ukrainian President, elected by the whole nation, represents the executive branch of state power. Reforms of the judicial branch are currently under way. Regarding the problem of creation of the new state institutions, one has to mention the formidable influence on this process on the part of the former administrative system and its representatives which still remain in power on the different levels of state hierarchy. Under this influence new administrative institutions function in a previous administrative manner, when the decision-making process is hidden, operative control over the industries is inadequately high, responsibility of leadership is symbolical, and the state penetration into all spheres of societal life tends to be unlimited.³²

The organization of the interaction between executive and legislative powers appears to be more difficult and controversial. Two related factors are of primary importance there. The first one is reforms within the system of interstate administrative relations (Vertical „Regions - Center“). The second one is the distribution of competencies between the highest branches of state power (Horizontal „President - Parliament“).

The President and Parliament compete with each other with regard to the division of powers on the local level as well as with regard to the control over the Cabinet of Ministers. The conflict of legislative and executive powers

³² Dergachov Olexander (Ed.). Ukrainian Statehood in the 20th Century. - Kyiv: Politychna Dumka, 1996, pp. 306-319.

could well lead to the delays in economic reforms, as none of these institutions will have interest to deal with them, struggling for the power and competencies.³³ Secondly, conflict in Kiev might revitalize political isolation of the country's regions which loose interest toward the national issues. The lack of reforms and a well-organised system of state administration will mean further weakening of manageability of the country, desintegration of interregional relations, strengthening of economical and social fragmentation of the state.

The election of Leonid Kuchma as President of Ukraine marked a new stage in the process of the formation of local and national political and economic elites. Firstly, the presidential elections reflected the lack of political leaders and public forces in Ukraine capable of managing the state properly. The professional level and the political experience of the representatives both of the presidential candidates and of the new presidential administration demonstrated the real deficit of national leaders for the task of nation- and state-building in Ukraine. Secondly, the victory of Mr. Kuchma caused a change of the national political elites and a struggle between the high-ranking representatives of the former Communist nomenclatura and the supporters of Kuchma, who are the local political leaders or the representatives of the technical intelligentsia.

This struggle appeared to be most acute in the economic sphere, where disputes concerning the control over the state economic property, foreign trade and finance are going on. In order to overcome the resistance of the representatives of the former Ukrainian government, President Kuchma put many of them under criminal investigation for corruption and blackmarketeering. To achieve order in the system of state governance the Ukrainian President created special investigative groups which are subordinated directly to the President. Moreover Mr. Kuchma came out against the juridical immunity of the people's deputies, as many of the former and the

³³ Tomenko Mykola. Ukrainian Perspective: The historical and political background of the moder public strategy. - Kyiv: Logos, 1995, pp. 68-76.

acting deputies were suspected of using their immunity to escape legal responsibility for economic wrong-doing.

Despite some changes in the political elites caused by the election of the new President, the ruling class of the Ukrainian society still consists primarily of the former soviet state and economy managers. These circles, which strengthened their positions on the top of the state pyramid through the control over and accumulation of state-owned property and finances, continue to govern Ukraine. Political parties and organisations has a little impact on the activities of the network of ministries, state committies, large enterprises etc. Consequently, the fate of the economic reform and the functioning of the system of state administration depend much more on the interests and goals of the „party of power“, than on the activities of political opposition or political will of the population.³⁴

Quite another challenge lies in fact that the acting political elite which is formed on the very narrow social basis and does reflect interests of an outnumbered social grouping, does not promote the country's political and regional cohesion, does not facilitate the process of creation of a political nation in Ukraine. The lack of national-minded political elites as well as conditions for their regeneration and development might lead to repetition of a historical situation, when (in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries) the idea of ukrainian independence and sovereignty collapsed because of desintegrated, isolated and Russia-oriented ruling class of the Ukrainian state.³⁵

Although the creation of a civil society has been proclaimed the pivotal goal of Ukrainian democratic reforms, this goal seems to have been missed. The state continues to be reluctant to support the new independent civil institutions and does not accept any criticism from their side. The lack of transparency in the activities of the Ukrainian institutions of state administration continues to contribute to keeping Ukrainian society out of national policy-making, thus

³⁴ See for example: Nebozhenko Victor. Why Shift in Elite is unavoidable in Ukraine. - Pidtext (Kyiv), Vol. 2, No. 14, 1997, pp. 3- 6.

³⁵ Polokhalo, ibidem, pp. 145-150.

strengthening the probability of political radicalism and extremism on the part of a neglected society and its public leaders against the state and its leadership.

The underdeveloped institutions and mechanisms of civil society contributed to the fact that the interests of major social groupings have not been formulated at all or are being realized only partially. This creates a space for tensions between the different social stratas. A need for political dialog and social compromise in the inter-groupings relations are replaced by political and social radicalism, by further destabilisation and debilitation of elements of the country's social infrastructure.³⁶

Such political and societal situation complicates the process of introduction of a system of civil control over the military.

On the one hand, the rivalries between the branches of state power automatically involve the military sphere contributing to politicization of highest echelons of command. Moreover, the attempts of the President to strengthen ist control over the military while lessening the parliamentarism influence on the army might lead to usurpation of presidential powers as well as to temptation to use the army for protection of these powers.

In fact, President Kuchma has already made some steps in this direction. At the end of 1996 he took under his authority all law enforcing agencies making the parlamentarian and civilian control over them less possible. The Conucil for National Security and Defence which is ditectly controlled by the President and his national security adviser is becoming the sole institution responsible for national security making process, including the control over the military. The Defense Minister General Kuzmuk, the former Commander-in-chief of the National Guard, the organization most loyal the President, has replaced the first civilian Defense Minister Valery Shmarov. Finally, according to the new Concept of National Security, adopted in early 1997, all military and

³⁶ Strekal Oleg. Conflict Potential in modern Ukraine: Sources and Developments. - In: Seidelmann Reimund (Ed.). Crises Policies in Eastern Europe. - Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996, pp. 100-103.

paramilitary agencies are unified into the “Ukrainian military organization”, which has the right to intervene in country’s domestic politics.

On the other hand, politically nonstructuralized society does not play any role in the conduct of military policy in the country. The access of civilians to the military information is denied and the gap between the interests of society and those of military is becoming deeper.

4.2 Collapsing military mechanism

While starting to reform the military, Ukraine’s leadership did overestimate country’s ability to re-build and to maintain modern armed forces. Despite a promising starting point with regard to the inherited military power, economic and social decline in Ukraine did not allow country’s leaders to carry out military reform properly, causing instead of modernization a desintegration and crisis within the army. Among the most acute difficulties in this connection one has to mention an enormous deficit of military budget, an issue of force deployment, an armament and disarmament policy, and a problem of Ukraine’s military doctrine.

According to the financial-economic department of the Ministry of Defence, the Defence budget covered in 1992 only 35%, and in 1993-1994 - 28% of army’s needs. An estimated figure for 1997 is about 36% of a needed amount of funds. In fact, the state provides money only for the salaries, meals and uniforms for soldiers and officers. In 1995-1996 because of a limited budget the expencies for new military technic and equipment constituted approximately 5-12% of necessary amount of money. Due to the budget deficit the armed forces are planning further troops reductions (about 65.000 of servicemen), sellings of army’s immoblities and lands, replacements of military posts with civilian personnel.³⁷

³⁷ See the statistical report of Defence Ministry in: *Kievskie Vedomosti*, Februar 22, 1995, p.3.

In the fall of 1993 the parliamentary Commission on Defence and National Security publicly expressed doubts concerning the defence capabilities of Ukraine's army.³⁸ Several major arguments were listed in this regard:

- military units are not furnished with new military techniques and equipment, while the techniques and weapons at the disposal of these units are becoming obsolete. Only 4% of military jets, for instance, are ready for combat actions;

- scarcity of oil and gasoline caused the postponement of military exercises throughout Ukraine;³⁹

- lack of training fields for the air defence and air forces makes these troops unfit for battle;

- the military budget does not cover the costs for ordering the new weaponry and the expenses for research and development of the new weapons systems;

- some steps aimed at re-structuring the army (such as the reorganisation of the Kiev Military District, the unification of the air forces and the air defence forces etc.) weakened its defence capability.⁴⁰ For instance, the decision to liquidate the 17th Air Force Army negatively affected the system of pilots' education and the ability of Ukraine's air forces to establish a second strategic echelon in a case of war. In addition, about 50% of army's equipment have been destroyed or stolen.

Since then the situation in the army has not been improved. According to some estimates only few battalions of the Ukrainian army are capable to fight. The officers corps remain underpaid. Ministry of Defense does order neither new systems of weapons nor research projects in military technologies.

³⁸ Lemish, Valentyn. "Defence and democracy". *Demokratychna Ukraina*, October 6, 1993, p. 2.

³⁹ During 1993-1994 Ukrainian officials were discussing the idea of whether to sell to Russia several strategic bombers because Ukraine was incapable of maintaining them. In early 1997 the deal has not been made yet. The grouping of Ukraine's strategic bombers (including 19 TU-160 and 25 TU-95MS) were to be transferred to Russia as a part of the Ukrainian payments of oil debt to Russia.

⁴⁰ Lemish, Valentyn. *op. cit.*

Servicemen, especially in higher command echelons, are becoming deeply involved in corruption and bribery.⁴¹

Ukraine still maintains the structure of troops deployment inherited from the Soviet Union.⁴² According to the Soviet military concepts the most advanced troops were concentrated along the western borders of the Ukrainian SSR. Because of internal (to avoid confrontation with Russia-oriented political forces) and external (to avoid negative Russia's reaction) political reasons, Ukraine did not change this former structure, although it recognized that the probable enemy of Ukraine is now to be found east of its border.⁴³ This is especially true with regard to air defence. No adequate system of air defence was created along the Ukrainian-Russian border. Moreover, the Ukrainian air force continues to use the „friend or foe“ identification system which is similar to that used by Russian forces.

The lack of any system for the protection of the border with Russia (especially weak is the protection of the sea borders at the Azov and Black Sea) also means that there exists no comprehensive early-warning system against probable attack from the east. The air defence system is described by military officials as underdeveloped. The most comprehensive grouping of air defence forces is located in southern direction from Kiev. Western and south-western groupings have been formed as a second strategic echelon of defence system of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, these troops are lacking modern radars and military jets as well as missiles of high precision. In northern and south-northern directions the air defence troops protect only separate objects.⁴⁴

⁴¹ For example, National Program against Corruption, set into force in April 1997, contains among its priorities a complex auditing of all army's activities. See: National Program against Corruption. - In: *Urjadovyj Kurjer*, April 17, 1997, p. 9.

⁴² It must be pointed out that, although Ukrainian military leaders have the intention to create highly mobile troops capable of moving to the any place in Ukraine, those plans have not been fulfilled because of lack of financing as well as because of the absence of appropriate concepts for such troops.

⁴³ Moshes, Arkady. "Three armies - three reforms". *Novoe Vremya*, Moscow, No. 19, 1993, p. 19.

⁴⁴ The information by the Commander-in-Chief of Air Defence Forces General Mychailo Lopatin is published in: *Chreschchatyk*, February 25, 1995, p.2.

According to the military doctrine of Ukraine, the armed forces have the task of fighting against any state or coalitions of states, against strikes from the air and cosmic space, attacks of ground forces and invasion from the sea.⁴⁵ These comprehensive tasks represent the major problem for the training of troops, as they are supposed to fight a non-defined enemy.⁴⁶ Moreover, this comprehensive, all-purpose strategic concept leads to the squandering of financial and material resources for the unrealistic task of preparing responses to any imaginable threat.⁴⁷

It has to be pointed out that the Ukrainian leadership recognised this problem at the beginning of 1995. In words of President Kuchma, all-purpose strategic concept does not correspond to financial capabilities of the state. Moreover, a principle of universal defence was defined as obsolete. An outdated concept would have to be amended through diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing probable military challenges.

On the other hand, the potential source of military danger to Ukraine seems to be well-known. The definition of the probable enemy in the military doctrine as well as numerous statements of the Ukrainian politicians made it clear that Russia most probably poses the major military challenge to Ukraine. Nevertheless, Ukrainian military units are not trained to meet an attack launched by this potential aggressor.⁴⁸

The Ukrainian army is lacking about 15.000 officers. Within this number 5.000 positions are the vacancies of platoons' and companies' commanders. The deficite of qualified specialists is also acute at the level of strategic command. Moreover, the fact that the majority of Ukraine's officers corps

⁴⁵ The text of Military Doctrine of Ukraine, *Narodna Armia*, October 26, 1993, p. 2.

⁴⁶ One can argue, however, that, theoretically speaking, the armed forces could be trained so as to respond to any kind of aggression. But in reality the Ukrainian army which is weakened by organizational, material, and financial difficulties may be able to deal with such comprehensive tasks only in the more or less distant future.

⁴⁷ Kostenko, Grigory. "The doctrine of national security". *Narodna Armia*, January 11, 1993, p. 2.

⁴⁸ "Nuclear by a whim of history: Ukraine's new military doctrine". *International Defence Review*, No. 2, 1994, p. 6.

consists of ethnic Russians means that such an army could not be relied upon to fight against any kind of „Russian imperialism“.⁴⁹

4.3 Interaction between military and politics: to which end?

Unlike in Russia, where the conflicts between political and military forces seem to be more and more stronger, the Ukrainian military does not pretend at an increased political role. Changes within the military hierarchy (as of today, Ukraine has a third Defence Minister, a second Commander-in-Chief of the navy; Deputies Defence Minister, Commanders of Operational Commands have also been changed) have been held under a strong political control and did not provoke any case of disobedience on the part of the military.⁵⁰

However, some significant shortcomings of the political interaction between the civil and military leaderships seriously defeated the vital national interests of Ukraine. Among those mistakes, the disputes over the division of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), the nuclear disarmament, and the attitudes toward the military cooperation within the CIS seem to be the most acute ones. In addition, one has to consider an attempt by the Ukrainian leadership to use military arguments during the conflict in Crimea.

The process of the partition of the BSF and the Ukrainian concessions to Russia, which have been made in this regard, demonstrated the weakness of Kiev's position vis-a-vis Moscow.⁵¹ The softening of the Ukrainian claims on the BSF (the whole Fleet, half of it, 10-15 percent of it, an attempt to sell the Fleet as a payment for the debts to Russia) only hardened Russia's policies toward Ukraine.⁵² Moreover, under the pressure from the side of Russian military officials, Ukraine agreed upon the creation of the base for the Russian

⁴⁹ On the other hand, some experts call not to underestimate the willingness and the capability of the army to fight even against Russia. Although the success of that fighting still remains doubtful.

⁵⁰ See also: Markus, Ustina. „Recent Defence Developments in Ukraine“. *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3. No. 4, January 1994, pp. 26-32.

⁵¹ For the background of the BSF division, see: Malek, Martin. „Die Schwarzmeerflotte zwischen Einheit und Teilung“. *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), Vol. 43, No. 5, May 1993, pp. 441-451.

⁵² "As for the Black Sea Fleet". *Narodna Armia*, April 2, 1994, page 1.

fleet in Crimea. By so doing, the Ukrainian leadership ignored the prohibition of the location of foreign troops on Ukraine's soil, which is the basic principle of the Ukrainian Military Doctrine.⁵³ Additionally, the allowance to locate foreign military base in Crimea put in doubt the major principle of Ukraine's foreign and security policy, i.e. the principle of neutrality. On the other hand, the division of the BSF defeated the political positions of the central Ukrainian government in Crimea, as Ukrainian authorities were blamed by the local politicians and the public leaders for the claims on „Russian glory“.

An uncertainty with the BSF damaged an important Ukrainian initiative for political-military cooperation among the countries of the Black Sea region.⁵⁴ This proposal was presented by President Kravchuk at the Parliamentary Assembly of Black Sea Economic Cooperation framework in Kiev in November 1993. Ukrainian „formula“ dealt with the limitation of military activity and developing confidence-building measures in the region. Several concrete steps were on Ukraine's list: to develop the specific conditions for the military exercises at the sea in order to limit the number of such trainings; to limit the number of combat vessels for the time of peace; to adopt the Declaration concerning the inviolability of countries' sea borders; to sign a memorandum concerning the non-use of navies against each other.⁵⁵

However, this initiative did not get an appropriate support by the neighbouring countries, primarily by Turkey and Russia. The major obstacle on the way of Ukraine's Black Sea initiative was the non-clear fate of the Black Sea Fleet as well as the controversial concepts for the Ukrainian navy. Ukrainian leaders stated that Ukraine would have the powerful fleet in the Black Sea, but did not propose any reliable concept for its purposes and functions. Moreover, Ukraine complicated its relations with Turkey - a motor of the Black Sea integration - by intentions to develop the elements of collective defence with Russia in this region on the basis of Ukrainian and Russian navies. Ukraine agreed to facilitate the process of development of the

⁵³ See the text of Ukraine's Military Doctrine in: *Narodna Armia*, October 26, 1993, p. 2.

⁵⁴ See the speech of the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Mr. Ivan Plyshch to the plenary session of the Parliament in: *Golos Ukrainy*, December 1, 1993, p. 3.

⁵⁵ *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 50, 1993, p. 2.

Russian Black Sea Fleet, which Moscow sees as a competitor against Turkish navy. Kiev also started to develop a strategy for its own fleet as being ally for Russian forces in case of combat actions at the sea.

The strategic aspect of the BSF presence in the region has been neglected by the Ukrainian side. After the two years of the Ukraine-Russian disputes over the fleet, the latter lost to large extent its fighting capabilities, primarily because of the lack of finance for the modernization of the combat vessels. In the time of disputes, the weakness of the fleet seemed to be in Ukraine's interests as the military capabilities of the Russian navy moved down. But today, when Ukraine is looking for the military cooperation with Russia in the Black Sea region and when the Ukrainian governmental officials are talking about the Ukraine-Russian common interests in the Black Sea basin, the destroyed fleet could not be of a great help for both countries.

In 1996-1997 the negotiations over the BSF seemed to come to a dead-end. The unsolved issue of the fleet division has damaged the national security of Ukraine and further complicated the development of the Ukrainian Navy. On the one hand, the Russian Duma passed a decree to stop the division of the fleet. On the other hand, the lack of openness of the negotiations led to the speculations that the Ukrainian leadership „betrays“ country's national interests by making considerable compromises with the Russian side.

The controversies in the Ukrainian policy concerning the nuclear disarmament endangered the country's national security in the three major ways. Firstly, the intentions to obtain the operational control over the ballistic missiles caused the direct military threat to Ukraine. Responding to these claims, Russian military officials incorporated into the text of the Russian Military Doctrine the paragraph, which defines the attempts to interfere into / or to damage the command and control systems of the Russian strategic troops located abroad as an direct military threat to Russian Federation which has to be prevented by all possible means.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ "The basic provisions of the military doctrine of Russian Federation". *Izvestia*, November 18, 1993, pp. 1, 4.

In order to lessen tensions with regard to control, Ukraine finally gave up an idea of operational control over the missiles and introduced so-called administrative control, while Russia continues to exercise operative control. As „the button in Russia“ did represent a definite trouble for the Ukrainian leadership in terms both of day-to-day service of nuclear forces and political responsibility for the weapons located on Ukraine's territory, the country's policy-makers were forced to find a compromise with Russia in this regard. After a year of negotiations both countries have reached an agreement on the issue. According to this document, the missiles can't be launched by Moscow from Ukrainian soil without permission by the Ukrainian President. A technical system which allows Ukraine's President to interrupt the launching command from Moscow has also been developed.

The second aspect of the nuclear issue dealt with the reaction of the international community. The speculations over the strategic weapons postponed the Ukrainian integration into the world community, while such an integration was considered by the Western leaders the most effective guarantee for Ukraine's national security.

Thirdly, a problem of technical safety of the warheads proved to be the most controversial issue of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. Time and again the Russian generals warned that „the second Chernobyl“ grows up in the Ukrainian nuclear silos. The Ukrainian side characterized these statements as political provocations. The dispute was complicated by a fact that none of both sides has published official documents or made details open for independent nuclear expertise.

Ukraine's official commission several times visited the nuclear bases and stockpiles and did not find any serious violations of security regimes and safety of the warheads' storages. What they discovered, was a nonsignificant increase of temperature (not radiation) in one of the storages which, according to the Ukrainian official statements, did not represent any meaningful threat to the warheads. Despite this optimistic reports, three warheads have been transported to Russia in emergency due to some technical problems which

estimatedly appeared as a result of unsatisfactory storage. As the process of withdrawal of nuclear warheads started at the beginning of 1994, the Ukrainian officials blamed Russia for the violation of safety rules, as the Russian militaries gave to the news media the maps of routs and schedules of the trains which will transport the warheads.

Another complication was a need to repair or change the warheads with expired technical guarantees. Although Ukrainian leaders were aware of the limits of servicing life of warheads, there were no ideas what kind of difficulty this may cause, especially with regard to Russian specialists servicing the weapons. The Russian side accused Kiev of blocking access to the warheads as well as expressed some claims because the services of Moscow's specialists working with Ukrainian warheads have not been properly financed by Ukraine. According to the high officials in Kiev, there were no attempts to prevent Russian specialists from servicing the warheads.

Concidering a deadline in technical readiness of the warheads and a danger of non-controlled weapons, Ukraine harried up to sell them as Ukraine's property (and not simply to transfer to Russia), signing the Trilateral Agreement in Moscow in January 1994.

The changing attitudes of the Ukrainian leadership toward the prospects of the military cooperation within the framework of the CIS could also be seen as a source of defeating the country's political image and national interests. During the first two years of its independence Ukraine was extremely cautious concerning any cooperation within the military structures of the CIS because of fears that such a cooperation would lead to the subordination of the Ukrainian army to the Russia-dominated CIS structures. The adoption of the concept of the non-bloc country was seen in Ukraine as a basic guarantee against any moves toward the military institutions of the Commonwealth. The Ministry of Defence opted at that time for the creation of an „independent army“, which should not be influenced by any policies of the CIS or Russia.

Such cautiousness, however, had some disadvantages. It ignored the prospect of the military cooperation with Russia and the CIS as being a decisive factor for the diminishing of the probable military threat from Russian Federation. The numerous attempts by the Ukrainian leadership to escape from the orbit of Russian influence in political, economic and military terms, caused the general political tensions between the two countries as well as brought the mutual suspicions concerning the intentions of each side in military realms.

The very implementation of the policy of neutrality proved to have a dual logic. While rejecting any possibility to join the military union which is led by Russia, Ukrainian officials, on the other hand, made it clear that in the case of military aggression they would look for the membership in some military coalition with the West. Moreover, Ukrainian leaders expressed their intentions to see Ukraine among the NATO members in the years to come and tried to sell to the West the vision of Ukraine as a „belt of military stability against any turbulencies in the East“.⁵⁷

The position of Ukraine between Russia and NATO has been of special concern to the leadership of the country because of the possibility that it may deepen Ukrainian dependence on Russia, there would be no counterbalance to Russian influence.⁵⁸ Thus the relations with the Atlantic Alliance have been perceived as a necessary lever against Russian ambitions in the „near abroad“. In this connection, Ukraine feels that the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative serves as an instrument for the evolutionary expansion of NATO eastward and confirmed that it counts on being admitted to NATO membership in the future.⁵⁹ Moreover, as the former Ukrainian Minister of Defence General Vitaly Radetzky, put it, Ukraine could give up its neutral status in the future, amending its constitution and military doctrine in order to allow Ukraine to find adequate security guarantees within the formula „16 plus 1“, i.e. NATO plus

⁵⁷ The Materials of the Conference "Security in Europe: the Central-European Component", Kiev, June-July, 1993, pages 15-17.

⁵⁸ Rühl, Lothar. "NATO-Initiative stößt auf Widerstand". *Die Welt*, January 26, 1994, p. 4.

⁵⁹ *Izvestia*, January 15, 1994, p. 2.

Ukraine.⁶⁰ This assumption has been confirmed several times during 1996-1997 by some Ukrainian officials, including security adviser to the President.

This dual logic fueled the Russian fears of being isolated from Europe. As for the West, such a logic contributed to the image of the Ukrainian policy as something unpredictable and unstable. Due to the controversies concerning the CIS and the non-bloc status, Ukraine found itself, so to say, between the two security structures, i.e. NATO- and the CIS-based.⁶¹

As for the years 1996-1997, the leadership under President Kuchma was trying and still plans to receive security guarantees from NATO in a form of a special agreement. Such an agreement, however, might well cause negative reaction in Russia and damage the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. The lack of strategic orientation damaged not only the Ukrainian foreign and security policy, it contributed also to the further desorientation of the armed forces, for such an „indefinite position“ complicates the elaboration of clear strategic objectives and tasks for the army.

4.4 Ignoring a „honorable duty“

One of the first decisions of the Ukrainian leadership on military issues was the decision on the depolitization of the army. The institute of political commissars was canceled and the activity of any political party within the military was prohibited. The servicemen were ordered to postpone party membership for the time of the military service. Nevertheless, it became obvious, that departization and depolitization of the army could not solve the problem of army's "combat spirit" and the problem of moral sentiments of soldiers and officers.

To improve the patriotic moods within the army and to strengthen the "feeling of the mission" among the servicemen, the Social-Psychological Service was established within the structure of the Ministry of Defence. The

⁶⁰ See the report on the press conference of General Radetzky in: *Kievskie Vedomosti*, June 2, 1994, p. 2.

⁶¹ See for example: Pavlenko Anatolij. Foreign Policy and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. - In: *Polityka i Chas* (Kyiv), Vol. 4, No. 1, 1997, p. 37.

basic task for this Service could be defined as "Ukrainization of Ukrainian army", i.e. the overcoming of Soviet military traditions, implementation of Ukrainian military history and traditions, introduction of Ukrainian language to the Russian-speaking military. In addition, the Ministry of Defence studies the functioning of the institute of chaplains which does exist in western armies. The Ministry is going to enlist in one form or another priests of different confessions for surveillance of the servicemen.

However, the process of army's ukrainization, which seems to be absolutely needed, was implemented too drastically and proved to be one-sided.⁶² The patriotic education of the servicemen was based exclusively on the history of Ukrainian Kossaks and on the struggle of Ukrainian Rebel Army during the World War II. The history of the Soviet Army, on which officers were brought up, appeared to be completely ignored. The pressure to quickly learn Ukrainian caused the psychological opposition of the Russian-speaking officers.

The rapid ukrainization contributed to the decrease of the patriotic sentiments within the army. The moral spirit of Ukrainian troops was characterized as unbelievably low. According to the poll, which was taken by the Union of Ukrainian Officers in the spring of 1993, 10% of the officers were ready to betray Ukraine at any moment; 33% stated, that they took Ukrainian oath because they have flats in Ukraine; 27% explained, that the main reason for servicing in Ukrainian army was the social quietness and stability in Ukraine. The poll also demonstrated, that about 40% of high-ranking military officials supported the idea of the common CIS army.⁶³

The main outcomes of the nonappropriate moral spirit are the low discipline in the army, high level of crimes and corruption, servicemen' unwillingness to develop their professional skills.⁶⁴

These negative tendencies continue to develop. For example, according to some polls held in 1995, more than 90% of students in high military schools

⁶² Motyl Alexander J. Dilemmas of Independence. Ukraine after Totalitarianism. - New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 108-111.

⁶³ The results of the poll were published in: *Golos Ukrainy*, April 22, 1993, p. 2.

⁶⁴ Moshes, Arkady. *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

considered army's intervention in the state politics as positive development. Only 30% of those questioned were ready to obey the orders of their commanders in case of fighting.⁶⁵ According to the results of questioning, which was ordered by the Ministry of Defence, 93% of Ukrainian officers are not satisfied with their living standards, 88% are aware of the lack of the social protection, 57% feel dissatisfaction with the military service.⁶⁶

The polls of 1996 show that only 4,6% of the officers had trust in the President as a Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. More than 90% of poll's participants were dissatisfied with their social and financial status.⁶⁷

The military service becomes more and more undesirable for the young conscripts. Every year the number of deserters from the army constitutes several thousand persons. The number of those, who escaped from the recruitment is even higher. In 1996, for instance, about 88% of conscripts managed not to serve in the army.⁶⁸ According to the figures of Ukrainian Institute for Youth Problems, 60% of conscripts, who ignored the obligation to go to the military, defined the main reason of so doing as a violation of basic human rights in the military.

A demoralization of the army not only defeats the combat readiness of the troops. Crimes, lack of discipline, violations of human rights etc. cause suspicions toward the army on the part of society, deepen a gap between civil and military parts of Ukraine's social community.

On the other hand, the military itself is splitted up along the opposing political lines. This "internal" division is manifested in the activities of such public organization as the Union of the Officers of Ukraine (SOU) and the Union of the Soviet Officers. While the former advocates creation of powerful

⁶⁵ Makeew, Sergij (et. al.). The existence of the Ukrainian military elite. - In: Politychna Dumka (Kyiv), Vol. 3, No. 1, 1995, pp. 18 - 19.

⁶⁶ See the results of the questioning in: *Kievskie Vedomosti*, May 25, 1993, p. 3.

⁶⁷ See: *Zerkalo Nedeli*, August 3-9, 1996, p. 5.

⁶⁸ See: *Ukrainska Gazeta*, March 20, 1997, p. 8.

Ukrainian army on the basis of nationalism and patriotism, the latter supports the ideas of the common CIS army.⁶⁹

One of the major risks, which are represented by the developments in Ukrainian army is the probability of proliferation of weapons and explosive materials within the country as well as an illegal export of weapons to the "hot spots" on the territory of the FSU.

Each year Ukrainian official structures confiscate from 10 to 12 thousand of weapons from Ukrainian citizens. These weapons come from the outside of the republic, they are stolen from the militia-men, non-departmental guards, etc. One more deep source is the army, with loosened discipline, unsatisfactory provision and armoury protection of the weapons stockpiles.

The number of thefts and losses of weapons and ammunition has speedily grown, the number of attacks on sentries and ammunition depots with the aim to capture of sub-machine guns and explosives has drastically increased. In the most cases, to capture the weapons try persons, who participate in their guarding and safe keeping. For instance, all crimes of this type in the Black Sea Fleet were perpetrated by sentries, and also by warrant officers and officers from arms service.

Commercial structures also do not lose their chance to grow richer. Cases are known, when small ventures and companies were going to organize the transit of large lots of weapons. This activity was aimed at the delivering weapons to the areas of conflicts in Azerbaidjan and Georgia. Many supplies were ordered directly by the warring parties from the "hot spots".

On the other hand, defence plants' officials more and more often receive tempting propositions to sell secret products which are produced exclusively on orders of the Ministry of Defence. The local enterprises, which started to

⁶⁹ The establishment and activities of SOU are analyzed in: Jaworsky John. Ukraine: stability and instability. - Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995. - McNair Paper Nr. 42.

produce light arms and ammunition (especially cartridges) attract more and more attention from the side of criminals and black-marketeers.

The absence of a control over the considerable massifs of underground weaponry leads to the aggravation of inner terrorism. The republic is flooded with the wave of attacks against the representatives of governmental institutions, threats to executives, people's deputies and even to the President himself. The investigation of these crimes in most cases shows exclusively criminal causes of violence. But the political-caused violence has the chance to show itself. The members of Ukrainian paramilitary groupings study the systems of weapons protection at military objects, look for the contacts with soldiers and officers who are in charge for weapons keeping safe. The weapons, which could be stolen by paramilitaries, could endanger the peaceful balance in some Ukrainian regions, especially in Crimea.

5. Conclusions / Proposals

The process of establishing the civil control over the armed forces has two basic aspects. On the one hand, it is a major instrument of the military reform. On the other hand, it is one of the major goals of country's military policy. Hence the development of an effective mechanism of civil control goes hand in hand with clarification of such fundamental issues as definition of goals and objectives for the army as well as classification of military threats for country's security, development of a military doctrine and a concept for national security strategy.

Obviously, the consensus between all major political forces regarding goals and principles of military reform and strategic orientation of the state in addition to pure military aspects of security is needed. Otherwise, the establishment of a democratic control over the military will be extremely difficult to complete.

Moreover, the principles of civil control as well as the principles of the military reform as a whole can not be elaborated and implemented by the military establishment alone. The leading role in this process should play political forces which in active dialogue with non-governmental and other public institutions contribute to re-shaping the military sphere in Ukraine.

Some experts argue that the developments in political-military affairs have already taken a very specific path, opposite to that of military reform on the basis of democratic principles. On the one hand, the non-systematic changes in the structure and composition of the armed forces led to enormous decrease in the combat readiness and fighting capabilities of troops. This *de facto* destruction - instead of reconstruction - of the military corrupted the very idea of democratic control over the military institution and provoked strong dissatisfaction with so called “reforms” among the officers, who are struggling now for physical survival as well as for the preservice of previous privileged *status quo*.

Thus, it seems very unlikely that the officers corps will accept ideas of further “civilization” of political-military relationship. Moreover, all civilians (and politicians as a part of them), who are supposed to implement democratic reform in political-military affairs, are usually blamed by the officers for the collapse of military *perestroika*.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian political leadership is not interested in reforming the military sphere on the principles of civilian control over the army and its political chiefs. Instead, the system of “checks and balances” has emerged between the army on the one hand and other paramilitary institutions and law enforcing agencies on the other. Using the power and the loyalty of the National Guard (whose units are better equipped, financed and trained than that of the Armed Forces) and the Interior Ministry, political elite is trying to secure its role and ability to govern against any probable disobedience on the side of the military establishment. Since army is currently treated as probable internal challenge for the ruling regime, the latter is preoccupied with elaboration of counter-strategies aimed at neutralizing this potential risk. Obviously, the increase of defence capabilities of the armed forces against an external aggression is not the prime topic on Ukraine’s political agenda.

Following the above mentioned general assumptions and rules one can propose some initial steps on the way toward democratisation of civil-military relations:

1. A new military doctrine should be adopted which reflects the modern political-military situation in the country and abroad, defines character and probability of military threats as well as realistic tasks for the armed forces. The separate chapter on civil control and civil-military relations should be incorporated in this new document.

One of the major tasks in this regard seems to be the restructurization of the military component of country's national security structure. As of today, Ukraine has a system of armed/militarized institutions which is about one million strong (i.e. army, Navy, National Guard, Border Troops, police, security services, Internal Troops, Special Forces etc.). The functions and tasks of all these units often overlap and the state budget is extremely overburdened by expenses to keep militarized institutions operational.

2. The Ukrainian Armed Forces should be reduced to the level of appr. 200.000 -250.000 servicemen. Otherwise it will be problematically not only to finance the military, but also to keep it under appropriate political and civilian control. To start with, one has to get rid of the principal which measures the size of the armed forces against country's entire population. Such a principal, however, is still operational in Ukraine defining the size of its military as 0,8% (450.000-strong) of the population. Instead, one can use the relation between army's size and the size of the active labor force.

3. Clear division of competencies between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff should be established. Moreover, the ministry should evolve into a civilian institution governed by a civilian minister. This perspective will reduce the influence of military establishment on the security policy-making as well as will increase effectiveness of civil control over the army.

4. The Ukrainian Army should be developed into the professional army with amount of conscripts gradually reducing. In the opposite case, the gap between the military and society (especially younger generations) will be deepened with simultaneous decline of discipline in the army and combat readiness of military units.

The professionalization of the army could be achieved in the following steps:

- to reduce the length of military service for conscripts (up to one year);
- to increase living standards for soldiers;
- to provide conscripts with possibility to learn in the army those professions which are needed in the society;
- to introduce alternative civilian service for all categories of conscripts.

4. One of the priorities of restructurization of civil-military relations in Ukraine is establishment of a strong institutional system for preservice of human rights in the army. As a foundation for such a system could be an introduction of a position of *Defence Officer* in the Ukrainian Parliament. As an example for such an innovation might serve the Parliament (Bundestag) of the Federal Republic of Germany where *Wehrbeauftragte* is responsible for solving all „humanitarian“ problems in the German *Bundeswehr*.

5. The most significant disadvantage of the modern military developments in Ukraine is servicemen' suspicion with regard to open information. The military establishment is trying to classify all possible information and to close all possible informational sources capable of delivering uncensored information to civilian institutions. One has to develop a process of *Glasnost* in military affairs providing society with correct information on what is going on in the army. The media access to the military institutions should be eased, national debate on military issues should be intensified.

6. The role and influence of the international community on the process of reforming Ukraine's military should be increased. One can argue in this regard that cooperation of Ukraine with NATO in the field of civil-military relationship could be the most promising one. NATO assistance would be especially helpful in such spheres as division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff; parliamentary control over the army's activities; society's access to the military information etc.

7. The military reform does need not only openness, it also needs independent analysis and research which is conducted by non-governmental institutions and proposes alternative scenarios for military policy. The following list contains preliminary topics for the in-depth research of civil-military relations in Ukraine:

- **Issues of Civil control in the framework of contemporary political-military strategy**

- theoretical approaches to civil control policies;
- experience in implementation of civil control strategies in nation-states;
- military security in the framework of modern concepts of national security;
- broader socio-political models of controlling the military.

- **Institutional and legislative foundations for political control over the military**

- comparative analysis of national legislation;
- optimization of the Ukrainian national legislation.

- **Reforming the former Soviet military in Ukraine: Issues of Civil control**

- approaches to civil control in the framework of Ukrainian military reform;
- practical implementation of civil control policies: achievements and shortcomings.

- **Observation of human rights in the armed forces**

- legislative norms for preserving human rights;
- data base on violations of human rights in the military;
- establishment of permanent monitoring of human rights issues.

- **Public attitudes toward the military in Ukraine**

- conducting permanent sociological polls on public opinion on the military;
- establishment of a data base.

- **Officers' opinion with regard to their role in society**

- conducting permanent sociological polls on servicemen's opinion on the issues of civil-military relations;
- establishment of a data base.

- **Interactions between the military and society**

- defining forms of mutual interaction between the armed forces and societal institutions: patronage over the troop, public protests against activity of the military, public donations, civil-military economic activities etc.

- **Retraining military officers: Problems of adaptation to new realities**

- investigating the process of army's reduction and monitoring the servicemen's adaptation process to the civil life.

- **Crimes and corruption in the army**

- defining forms of criminal activities and their impact on internal national security;
- monitoring criminal investigations against servicemen.

- **Taking control over paramilitary structures (National Guard, Special Forces, Police, Security Service etc.)**

- collecting information on different state paramilitary groupings with regard to their tasks, functions, budgets, jurisdiction etc.;
- preparing reports on preservation of civil control principles by law enforcing agencies.

- **Dealing with secrecy and openness while monitoring the activities of the Security Service of Ukraine**

- exploring issues of intelligence's and counterintelligence's intervention in the civil policy of nation-states;
- analysis of the current Security Service's activities and their correspondence with the civil law.

- **Conversion of military industry**

- Experience of nation-states in reforming their military industries;
- analysis of conversion strategies in Ukraine.

- **Arms exports**

- world tendencies in arms trade;
- Ukrainian arms sales.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alberts, David S.; Hayes, Richard E.: Command arrangements for peace operation. - Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995. - 136 p.

Bar-Joseph, Uri: Intelligence intervention in the politics of democratic states: the United States, Israel, and Britain. - University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.

Bonvicini Gianni; Gremasco Maurizio; Rummel Reinhardt; Schmidt Peter: A Renewed Partnership for Europe. - Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995/1996.

Demchenko, Mychailo: Army. Power. Politics. - In: Nova Polityka (Kyiv), Vol. 2, Nr. 2, 1996. - pp. 32 - 35.

Dergachov Olexander (Ed.): Ukrainian Statehood in the 20th Century. - Kyiv: Politychna Dumka, 1996.

Dunlap, Charles J., Jr.: Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of Civil-Military Relations in the United States. - Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies, 1996. - INSS Occasional Paper 11, October 1996. - 44 p.

Glennon, Michael J.: The Gulf War and the Constitution. - In: Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), 70 (Spring 1991) 2, pp. 84 - 101.

Gordon, Joseph S.: The GDR: from Volksarmee to Bundeswehr. - In: European security policy after the revolutions of 1989 / Ed. By Jeffrey Simon. - Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1991, pp. 157 - 187.

Hungtinton, Samuel P.: The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959.

Janowitz, Morris: The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. - New York: The Free Press, 1971.

Sherr, James: Russian orthodoxies. Little change in military thinking. - In: The National Interest (Washington, D.C.), (Winter 1992/1993) 30, pp. 41 - 49.

Baev, Pavel; Bukkvoll, Tor: Ukraine's army under the civilian rule. - In: Jane's Intelligence Review (Coulsdon), 8 (January 1996) 1, pp. 8 - 10.

Jaworsky, John: Ukraine: stability and instability. - Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995. McNair Paper Nr. 42. - 87 p.

Ilchuk, Leonid: Political-military aspects of emerging civil society in Ukraine. - In: Nova Polityka (Kyiv), Vol. 2, Nr. 4, 1996. - pp. 62 - 64.

Kuzio, Taras: Civil-military relations in Ukraine, 1989-1991. - In: Armed Forces and Society (New Brunswick, N.J.), 22 (Fall 1995) 1, pp. 25 - 48.

-- Ukrainian paramilitaries. - In: Jane's Intelligence Review (Coulsdon), 4 (December 1992) 12, pp. 540-541.

Markus, Ustina: Recent defense developments in Ukraine. - In: RFE/RL Research Report (Munich), 3 (January 28, 1994), 4, pp. 26 - 32.

Motyl Alexander J.: Dilemmas of Independence. Ukraine after Totalitarianism. - New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993.

Olynyk, Stephen: Emerging post-Soviet armies. The case of Ukraine. - In: Military Review (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.), 74 (March 1994) 3, p. 5-17.

Pavlenko Anatolij: Foreign Policy and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. - In: Polityka i Chas (Kyiv), Vol. 4, No. 1, 1997, pp. 36 - 39.

Polokhalo Volodymyr (Ed.): The political analysis of postcommunist states. - Kyiv: Politychna Dumka, 1995.

Sauerwein, Brigitte: Rich in arms, poor in tradition. The Ukrainian armed forces. - In: International Defense Review (Coulson), 26 (April 1993) 4, p. 317 - 318.

Seidelmann Reimund (Ed.): Crises Policies in Eastern Europe. - Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996.

Simon, Jeffrey: Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion. - Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995. - McNair Paper 39, April 1995.

Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson: Democracy and Russian military professionalism. - In: Airpower Journal (Colorado Springs, CO), Special Edition 1996, pp. 79 - 87.