

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose and Objectives of the Study:

The purpose of this study is three-fold:

- 1) To examine the evolution of NATO-Romanian Relations and explain and assess Romania's objectives in seeking to become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance;
- 2) To discuss the politics of NATO enlargement as related to Romania and analyze the evolution and different objectives of the policies of NATO member states vis-a-vis Romania; and,
- 3) To assess the implications of the decisions to be taken by the NATO allies at the Madrid Summit with respect to Romania and with regard to the Alliance as a whole.

At the Madrid Summit in July 1997 the North Atlantic Alliance decided to begin negotiations to admit three new members - Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Although there had been twelve applicants for NATO membership, only three were invited to begin negotiations. While most of the other candidate countries were not considered serious contenders for admission to the Alliance in the first round, at least two were - Romania and Slovenia. The NATO decision, to include three rather than five states, was therefore one which opted for a limited, rather than a broader-based, enlargement.

For Romania, the NATO decision was an intensely disappointing one. Despite some two years of very strong lobbying and great efforts to meet the NATO enlargement criteria, the country's application for admission in the first wave was turned down. Likewise, despite the fact that Romania had the support of at least nine of the sixteen NATO member states going into the Madrid Summit, a consensus of support for its admission could nevertheless not be found. In deciding to begin discussion to admit just three states to the Alliance in 1999, the Alliance opted for a more cautious "go-slow" approach to enlargement which reflected the limits of its political consensus.

This study examines the politics of NATO's decision related to possible Romanian membership in the Alliance and assesses its potential strategic and political ramifications. It also discusses the prospects for a second round of enlargement, and the likelihood of Romania's inclusion in such a round. In many respects, the question of the second round of enlargement will be the most important issue confronting the Alliance over the next several years. Whether NATO moves to a second round will determine the nature of the Alliance itself and the scope of its interests and role

in Europe. It will also provide an important indication as to whether new dividing lines are likely to emerge in Europe between those states that are part of Western institutions and those that are not. Romania will stand at the centre of this debate.

The Importance of Romania:

In the development of NATO's eastern policy and its policy on enlargement, Romania has constituted only one small dimension in the focus of the Alliance. However, next to Poland, Romania has, perhaps, been the most important countries on the list of the Alliance's potential candidates. First in the broad political sense, Romania is situated on the traditional dividing point in Europe between East and West. Its integration or non-integration into Western political institutions (beginning with NATO) provides an important indication of the extent to which that dividing line will be able to be transcended.

Second, Romania's relationship to NATO is indicative of the level of interest that Western countries are likely to have in political and strategic developments in southeastern Europe and in the Black Sea region. This is because Romania stands at a cross roads in the region. As indicated in the attached map, its strategic importance relative to Ukraine, the Balkans and the wider Black Sea region is readily apparent.

Lastly, Romania's membership or non-membership is also indicative of the relative balance which exists within the Alliance between its various competing political interests, in particular between those states favouring a broader role for the Alliance within Europe and those favouring a more restricted role. Romania's relationship to NATO is also indicative of the balance which exists between the Alliance's central and southern European interests. Just as Romania's admission would accord the southern region of the Alliance with enhanced weight and importance, its non-admission gives added weight to the central and northern regions of NATO, thus illustrating which political interests are in ascendance within the Alliance.

The Romanian Motivation for Seeking NATO Membership:

The Romanian government's principal motivation for seeking NATO membership has been consistent and clear. NATO constitutes the first step toward full integration into Europe. Failure to enter NATO also risks failure to enter the European Union at some point in the future, which in turn means being left on the eastern side of a new dividing line in Europe. In Romania, the success or failure of securing the country's entry into the Alliance has therefore taken on great symbolic significance.

Alliance Motivations:

On the NATO side there has been no clear unified motivation behind the Alliance's enlargement strategy. Previously in the Cold War when NATO expanded, strategic factors were key in governing the decision taken. However, in the post-Cold War period this has not been the case. Ostensibly NATO enlargement has been driven by the criteria enunciated in the Alliance's *Enlargement Study* released in September of 1995. However even these criteria have in fact not been the critical factors in governing NATO enlargement. Rather, enlargement (and the decision to include or exclude particular candidate countries) has been driven by policies and interests of individual member states as filtered through political interaction within the Alliance. The fates of Romania and other candidate countries have been determined by this political interaction.

Since September of 1995, when the *Enlargement Study* was produced, the position of the United States has been the most important to Romania's prospects for entry into the Alliance. In fact the United States (and Germany) have driven the enlargement process. Without the commitment of these two states to the process there would not have been a NATO enlargement process at all.

Romanian Diplomacy:

Since 1994-95, much of Romania's diplomatic attention has been focused on securing American support for its admission in the first round. The United States in turn has always been in the forefront in encouraging Romania to meet the NATO *Enlargement Study* criteria so as to earn entry into the Alliance. However, in the end, despite Romanian progress in meeting the *Enlargement Study* criteria, the United States, mostly for domestic political reasons, refused to support Romanian entry. It was thus ironically the American position which was pivotal to the exclusion of Romania in the first round.

Despite the pivotal role played by the United States, Romanian diplomacy endeavoured to cultivate support throughout the Alliance. By June 1997 France and eight other Alliance members, (mostly from the Alliance's southern region) supported Romania's candidacy. Countries such as the United Kingdom and many other northern European member states, however, remained lukewarm to Romania's entry in the first round.

Romania's NATO diplomacy has also encompassed its efforts to conclude bilateral treaties with both Hungary and Ukraine so as to meet the criteria of entry into the Alliance and build a basis for regional cooperation. The conclusion of bilateral treaties with both countries strengthened Romania's case for inclusion in the Alliance in the first round.

Ramifications of the NATO Decision:

As discussed in the Conclusion of the Paper (pp. 97-105), the decision to exclude Romania from the Alliance in the first round has many potentially far-reaching political and strategic consequences. As noted above, Romania now stands at the forefront of the coming debate within the Alliance on whether and how fast to proceed with a second round of enlargement. Whether NATO proceeds with a second round of enlargement, and whether Romania will be part of such an enlargement, depends most critically as it has up to the present, on the policy of the United States.

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I. INTRODUCTION:

i) Romania's Interest in Joining NATO:

On December 30 1989, one week after the start of the Romanian Revolution and only five days after the execution of Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, the new Romanian President Ion Iliescu announced his government's principal foreign policy goals. Central to these objectives was the country's desire to enter the "European house".¹ Since that time, closer relations between Romania and the West have been a cornerstone of Romania's foreign policy.

However, in the first years after the Revolution, authoritarian tendencies in Romanian domestic policy, coupled with continuing and sometimes glaring human rights violations, effectively froze the development of relations with the West. Events such as the brutal attack, at the behest of the government, by thousands of miners on protesting students in Bucharest in June 1990, severely damaged Romania's reputation in the West. These events, when combined with what was perceived as the continued appeal of "illiberal intellectual and political trends" in Romania, ensured that the West's scepticism about Romania remained strong.² As a result between 1990 and 1993, Romania's efforts to begin the process of entering Western institutions effectively stalled. Romania's 1991 application to join

¹ Cited in: Joseph Harrington, Edward Karns, Scott Karns "American-Romanian Relations" East European Quarterly 29 (June 1995): 207

² In this regard, as late as 1996, one analyst wrote that "elections notwithstanding, to think of Romania as an effective democracy requires a stretch of the imagination". See: Tad Szulc, "Unpleasant Truths about Eastern Europe" Foreign Policy #102 (Spring 1996): 59. See also: Vladimir Tismaneanu and Dan Pavel, "Romania's Mystical Revolutionaries: The Generation of Angst and Adventure Revisited", East European Politics and Societies 8 (Fall 1994). With regard to anti-liberal thought in Romanian intellectual circles see: Mark Temple, "The Politicization of History: Marshal Antonescu and Romania" East European Politics and Societies 10 (Fall 1996): 457-503. Further discussion of authoritarian and ethnic nationalist issues in Romania is found in: Michael Shafir "Extreme Nationalist Brinkmanship in Romania" RFE/RL Research Report 2 (May 21, 1993): 31-36; Michael Shafir and Dan Ionescu "The Tangled Path Toward Democracy" Transition 1 (January 30, 1995): 49-54.

the Council of Europe languished in limbo for nearly two years and it was also unsuccessful in securing Most Favoured Nation (MFN) in the United States.³

Beginning in 1993 however, Romania made renewed efforts to enter Western political institutions. This renewed effort was the product of four principal factors. First, in order to foster economic development, foreign investment was key. By 1993, Romania's foreign trade was shifting decisively toward Western countries (see Table One). Between 1993 and 1995, total Romanian trade with EU countries increased from \$4.711 billion (or 43.5%) in 1993 to \$8.247 billion (or 51.4%) in 1995.⁴ Yet, at the same time, Western investment was drying up as the Romanian government's go-slow approach to economic reform reached a dead end. Economic malaise contributed to a steady devaluation of the Romanian Leu relative to the U.S. dollar and to a progressive decline in real purchasing power.⁵ To attract Western investment, a stable investment climate was required. Such a stable climate could not be created on an ad hoc basis, but had to be entrenched in the context of both a dependable framework of law and through Romania's membership in western institutions. Only this would give investors confidence in the stability of the country's future direction. This was the most important impetus in Romania's decision to aggressively pursue integration in Western institutions.

	<u>1993</u>	<u>1995</u>
Germany	1637 (15.1%)	2806 (17.5%)
Italy	968 (8.9%)	2312 (14.4%)
Russia	915 (8.9%)	1235 (7.7%)
France	680 (6.3%)	871 (5.4%)

³ Joseph Harrington, Edward Karns and Scott Karns "American-Romanian Relations" East European Quarterly 29 (June 1995): 207-235.

⁴ The 1993 figures include Romania's bilateral trade with Austria, Sweden and Finland which did not become members of the EU until 1995. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1996 (Washington D.C., 1996) p. 968

⁵ Dan Ionescu, "Romania's Currency Plummeting" RFE/RL Research Report 2 (December 10, 1993): 43-48.

Egypt	180 (1.7%)	552 (3.4%)
Turkey	411 (3.8%)	548 (3.4%)
United States	408 (3.8%)	546 (3.4%)
Britain	340 (3.1%)	468 (2.9%)
the Netherlands	355 (3.3%)	450 (2.8%)
Hungary	269 (2.5%)	429 (2.7%)

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1996. Figures refer to total value of imports and exports in millions of U.S. dollars.

Second, a more decisive pro-western policy had become a more active and realizable Romanian policy option after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Although President Iliescu's government declared its desire to enter the "European house" immediately upon assuming power in 1989, until 1991 it nevertheless continued to walk a fine line in terms of balancing its relations with the U.S.S.R. and the West. In April 1991, Iliescu's government signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union which was heavily criticized by the Romanian opposition as putting the country in the Russian sphere of influence.⁶ However, the treaty was never ratified due to the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The collapse of Russian power ended any pretext some Romanian politicians might have had for needing to strike a balance in relations between the West and Russia.

Third, after 1991, Romania was suddenly faced with a Civil War in one of its neighbours, Yugoslavia, and by political instability to the east in the former U.S.S.R.. This increased the sentiment in favour of integration in western institutions which would provide some measure of protection and security against a possible spill over of unrest from those regions. The fear that Romania might end up on the unstable side of a new "demarcation line" in Europe further contributed to decisive turn in favour of a pro-Western policy.⁷

⁶ For discussion of President Iliescu's alleged pro-Russian inclinations see: Dan Ionescu, "The President, The Journalists, and the KGB" Transition (8 September, 1995): 36-39.

⁷ This language was used in Romania's letter of application for NATO membership sent by President Iliescu to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in September 1993. In the letter Iliescu stated that leaving certain countries out of the Alliance would turn them into: "'prisoners of a future decision' depending on the good will of the 'former allies in the Warsaw Pact'". "Letter of Application or [sic] NATO membership from the President of Romania to the Secretary General of NATO" cited in: Romania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White Book on Romania and NATO, (1997) pp. 61-62.

Fourth, on a historical and cultural basis, Romanians have traditionally seen themselves as a Latin Western people. The national image asserts a pure link to Rome, arguing that Romanians are directly descended from the Romans who settled the province of Dacia on the shores of the Black Sea two thousand years ago. This view is both popularly and officially promoted.⁸ Romanians also trace western principles in their constitutional government back as far as the Constitution of 1866, a document which constrained Royal Government and enshrined such rights as trial by jury as well as freedom of the press and assembly.⁹

As a result of these factors, in 1992-93 renewed efforts were made to adjust the country's internal political and economic policies in order to establish better relations with Western countries and Western institutions. These measures began to payoff in 1993 as Romania finally entered the Council of Europe (in October) and was granted MFN by the United States on a one year renewable basis (in November). Likewise, as NATO began to consider the issue of enlargement in 1993, Romania moved quickly to apply for membership.

In his letter of application, dated September 18 1993, President Iliescu noted that the principal Romanian reason for seeking entry to the Alliance was:

To support the continuation and strengthening of the process of internal democracy and the implementation of economic reforms in these [eastern European] countries, it is essential to guarantee equal security for all states in our geographical area. It is the only way to prevent the spillover of conflicts from our vicinity and the emergence of new risks to security.¹⁰

⁸ In this regard, the former Romanian Defence Minister, Gheorghe Tinca, asserted in 1996 that one of the reasons that his country should be admitted to the Alliance was that: "Romania was founded as a Roman-type state and represented the Western-type culture at least a millennium before Hungary". Gheorghe Tinca, "NATO Enlargement - How to meet Individual and Collective Interests" Central European Issues 2 (Spring 1996): 32.

⁹ See for instance: Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1992) p. 1 - 6. Also: Vasile Puscas, "The Process of Modernization in the Interwar Period" East European Quarterly XV (September 1991): 325-338.

¹⁰ "Letter of Application or (sic) NATO membership from the President of Romania to the Secretary General of NATO" cited in: Romania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White Book on Romania and NATO, 1997: 61.

NATO was, and is still, seen in Romanian policy circles as a stepping stone into the West. Around this perspective a strong national consensus has emerged, which has ensured that most of the parties represented in the Romanian Parliament support NATO entry as do the overwhelming majority of the Romanian people. Indeed, popular support in Romania for NATO entry has been consistently among the strongest in eastern European countries (see Table Two).

TABLE TWO - PUBLIC SUPPORT IN EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR JOINING NATO

	<u>September 1995</u>		<u>March 1997</u>	
	<u>Favour</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Favour</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
Bulgaria	55%	20%	52%	48%
Czech Republic	59%	27%	59%	41%
Hungary	58%	27%	59%	41%
Poland	81%	8%	92%	8%
Slovakia	61%	24%	63%	37%
Romania	67%*	4%*	95%	5%

* Romanian figures are for 1994.

Figures for 1997 exclude undecided voters while those from 1994-95 do not.

Source: 1994/95 polls conducted by the United States Information Agency and cited by Michael Mihalka "The Emerging European Security Order" Transition (December 15, 1995): 15-18; 1997 poll conducted by Central and Eastern European Eurobarometer and cited in: Romania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White Book on Romania and NATO (Bucharest, 1997) p. 51.

ii) NATO Enlargement Emerges on the European Agenda:

The origin of the NATO decision to enlarge the Alliance is found in the policies two of its key member states, namely Germany and the United States. German interest in enlargement emerged in 1992-93 as the product of three factors in particular. First, it was part of a desire to extend NATO's security umbrella to cover Germany's immediate eastern neighbours in Central Europe. Since these countries were deemed not yet to be ready for membership in the EC/EU, NATO came to be seen in German policy circles as the logical and natural first step in integrating these countries into the European (and German) space.

Second, German interest in an expanded NATO was rooted in the desire to reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship. The European-American relationship had been troubled in the period after German unification. This was primarily due to a dispute between Britain and United States on the one hand, and France and Germany on the other, over the efforts of the latter two countries to strengthen both the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the French-German military relationship outside of NATO. In London and Washington, these moves had been seen as undermining NATO in favour of an exclusive European defence option. In an effort to demonstrate Germany's continued commitment to trans-atlanticism, the new German Defence Minister, Volker R  he, became convinced of the need to pursue a bold initiative to try to reinvigorate both NATO and the transatlantic relationship.¹¹

German policy was also based on concern that America's enthusiasm for NATO was waning. In the United States in 1992-93, there was increasing frustration within Congress over the seeming irrelevance of NATO in addressing the security crises and problems in eastern Europe most, especially the war in Yugoslavia. In August of 1993, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar delivered a speech entitled: "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business", in which he argued that "NATO must either develop the strategy and structure to go out of area [in order to manage security crises there] or it will go out of business".¹² Senator Lugar called for the enlargement of NATO to include the states of Central Europe. This view found support in both the newly elected Clinton administration as well as in the German Ministry of Defence.

In the United States the Clinton administration was interested in enlargement, but nevertheless initially felt itself constrained by two concerns: First by the possible negative impact a quick decision on enlargement might have on

¹¹ See: Roy Rempel "German Security Policy in the New European Order" Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis ed. Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture (Boulder: Westview, 1994): 182.

¹² See: Stanley Kober "The United States and the Enlargement Debate" Transition (December 15, 1995): 6-10.

Russian-NATO relations;¹³ and, second, by the fact that in the summer and fall of 1993, a consensus of support for enlargement could simply not be mustered among the Alliance's member states.¹⁴

As a result of these factors, the administration instead proposed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Initiative as an interim solution.¹⁵ PfP was designed to further strengthen relations between NATO countries and eastern European states (see Table Three). It was launched by the Alliance at the Heads of State and Government meeting in Brussels in January, 1994.

TABLE THREE - PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE OBJECTIVES FOR EAST EUROPEAN PARTNER STATES AS AGREED TO BY NATO MEMBER STATES - JANUARY 1994

- a) facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting;
- b) ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- c) maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- d) the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- e) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

* From Partnership for Peace Invitation - Issued by Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on January 10-11, 1994.

In the American view, PfP constituted an interim solution and a stepping stone to possible future enlargement. However, some other NATO countries were still not convinced of the need for enlargement, seeing it as unnecessary for the security of the North Atlantic area and as possibly harmful to the cohesion and effectiveness of the Alliance. Thus, while NATO countries did include a commitment to the principle of enlargement in the January 1994 Summit

¹³ Ibid. p. 7.

¹⁴ See: "NATO Favours U.S. Plan for Ties with the East, but Timing is Vague" New York Times (October 22, 1993); "War Games in Poland Proposed" (January 8, 1994) and "Clinton Pledges Role in Broader Europe" (January 10, 1994) both articles in the Washington Post.

¹⁵ For discussion on the evolution of U.S. policy on PfP see: Sebestyén Gorka, "The Partnership for Peace and its Birth" Defence Studies #8: The Partnership for Peace: The First Year (Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1995) pp. 10-16; and Robert E. Hunter, "The Evolution of NATO: The United States' Perspective" RUSI Journal 141 (December 1996): 33-37.

Communiqué¹⁶, member states were still very divided on the issue. Given the lack of consensus within NATO on enlargement, PfP was a great disappointment to those CEE states who aspired to NATO membership.

Even so, for those eastern European countries which would not have been considered serious candidates in 1993-94, the NATO decision presented a potential opportunity. Since no country in the Alliance would likely have considered Romania a serious candidate for membership in 1993-94, the delay in proceeding with enlargement afforded the opportunity for Romania to make up lost ground.

It wasted no time in doing so. One day after the NATO Summit, President Iliescu announced Romania's intention to enter into a PfP agreement with the Alliance without any reservations.¹⁷ As noted in Table Four, Romania was the first CEE country to sign NATO's PfP Framework document, on January 26, only two weeks after the conclusion of the NATO Summit. It was also the first country to agree to an Individual Partnership Program to accelerate Romanian-NATO military cooperation. Indeed, in 1994, Romania participated in five NATO exercises, while NATO and other partner military observers were involved in two national Romanian military exercises for the first

¹⁶ The January 1994 NATO Summit Communiqué stated: "We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for the Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe". Paragraph 12, "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on January 10-11 1994".

¹⁷ Don Ionescu, "Romania Adjusting to NATO's Partnership for Peace Program" RFE/RL Research Report 3 (March 4, 1994): 43-47.

time.¹⁸ Certain units of the armed forces were also designated for common activities with NATO thus beginning the process of enhancing interoperability.¹⁹

Country	Framework Document	Presentation Document	IPP* Agreed
Romania	Jan. 26, 1994	April 28, 1994	Sept. 14, 1994
Poland	Feb. 2, 1994	April 25, 1994	July 5, 1995
Czech Rep.	March 10, 1994	May 17, 1994	Nov. 25, 1995
Hungary	Feb. 8, 1994	June 6, 1994	Nov. 15, 1994
Slovakia	Feb. 9, 1994	May 25, 1994	Nov. 24, 1994
Slovenia	March 30, 1994	July 20, 1994	May 30, 1995
Bulgaria	Feb. 14, 1994	June 6, 1994	Nov. 28, 1994
Lithuania	Jan. 27, 1994	June 10, 1994	Nov. 30, 1994
Estonia	Feb. 3, 1994	July 8, 1994	March 1, 1995
Latvia	Feb. 14, 1994	July 18, 1994	Feb. 8, 1995
Ukraine	Feb. 8, 1994	May 25, 1994	Sept. 14, 1995

* IPP - Individual Partnership Program

Source: Lt. Col. P.J.F. Schofield "Partnership for Peace: The NATO Initiative of January 1994" RUSI Journal 141 (April 1996): 9-15.

As PfP developed, discussions within NATO on the question of enlargement continued. As had been the case in 1993, 1994 again saw the United States and, to a lesser extent, Germany driving the process along, even as internal debates on the question continued within those two countries. In Germany, Defence Minister R  he remained strongly in favour. However, other key foreign policy decision-makers were more cautious. Both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel remained particularly concerned about the potential impact that enlargement might have in Russia.

While German opinion remained somewhat divided, 1994 saw opinion in the United States turn decisively in favour of enlargement. In January of 1994, the Senate adopted a Resolution by a vote of 94-3 in favour "prompt" enlargement of the Alliance. The administration was also committed to the goal of enlargement, even though it remained uncertain of how to minimize the prospects for regional instability. Secretary of State Warren Christopher

¹⁸ See: Lt. Col. Nicolae Dolghin, "Rumania's Position Regarding the Partnership for Peace" Defence Studies #8 - The Partnership for Peace: The First Year (Bucharest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1995) pp. 90-94.

¹⁹ See: Brig. Gen. Constantin Degeratu, "Romania and the Partnership for Peace" NATO's Sixteen Nations 41 (Special Issue, 1996): 29-32.

had summarized the American perception of the dilemma in the Washington Post earlier in the same month when he wrote:

If the Alliance fails to reach out to the East and ultimately embrace it, NATO may well sow the seeds of the very instability it seeks to prevent. ... But if there is a long-term danger in keeping NATO as it is, there is immediate danger in changing it too rapidly. Swift expansion of NATO eastward could make a neo-imperialist Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy.²⁰

While determined to proceed cautiously, by the fall of 1994, the Clinton administration was again convinced of the need to take a further step toward enlargement. Domestic events were very important in setting the tone for a new American initiative on this question. The November elections had swept the Republican Party into Congress where they captured a majority in both Houses. The Party's "Contract with America" had come out strongly support of the admission of the four Visegrad states to the Alliance by no later than January 1999.²¹ In this sense, continued foreign policy bipartisanship demanded a correspondingly assertive policy on the part of the administration.

The American push to move enlargement forward caused renewed controversy within the Alliance. Some European countries (most notably the United Kingdom) were reluctant to proceed further so soon after the January 1994 Summit. Nevertheless, once the American commitment to enlargement was recognized, no European state, least of all Great Britain, was willing to risk Alliance unity in an effort to delay the process further. In 1993-94 the transatlantic relationship was already under serious strain due to American and European differences over how to approach the war in the former Yugoslavia.²²

The NATO Minister's Meeting of December 1994 thus committed the Alliance to a further compromise which initiated an *Enlargement Study* to examine the "how and why?" of enlargement rather than the "who and when?",

²⁰ Cited by: Stanley Kober "The United States and the Enlargement Debate" Transition (December 15, 1995): 7.

²¹ The Republican Party document also supported the entry of other European states if they agreed to contribute to regional security. Ibid.

²² Interview, Brussels, October 1996.

which would be left for a later date.²³ This go slow approach was essential to maintain consensus both within NATO, and within its member states since many of the Alliance's members were yet to be convinced that the "why" of enlargement had been answered satisfactorily at all.

Despite continuing debate in Germany on the general wisdom and timing of enlargement, there was general consensus in Bonn in favour of including the states immediately to the east of Germany should enlargement proceed. Indeed, Defence Minister R  he revealed Germany's preferences quite clearly in February 1995 when he asked: "Why should countries like Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic not accomplish this [NATO entry] earlier? I think this can be done, and I know the Americans as well are thinking of a first phase of expansion before the year 2000."²⁴

In 1995, notwithstanding Romania's aggressive activity in PFP, none of the NATO countries were seriously considering that state as a candidate for admission to the Alliance in an initial round of enlargement. Indeed, in a May 1995 Report done for the North Atlantic Assembly, the President of the Assembly, German Karsten Voigt, and his Hungarian counterpart, Tamas Wachsl  r, named four Central European states as the primary candidates for membership in the Alliance in a first round. The report stated that:

We know that, objectively speaking, the chances of Poland becoming a NATO member in the near future are greater than the chances of Romania becoming one. There is simply a geographical factor that should be acknowledged here. This is one reason why Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and possibly Slovenia are considered 'likely' candidates at this point.²⁵

As expected, Romania reacted negatively to the Voigt-Wachsl  r Report which, given the authorship, suggested closely corresponding German-Hungarian interests on the question of enlargement. The Report also raised the

²³ See discussion by Geoffrey Lee Williams, "NATO's expansion: The big debate" NATO Review 43 ((May 1995): 9-14.

²⁴ R  he quoted in: Michael Mihalka "Eastern and Central Europe's Great Divide Over Membership in NATO" Transition (August 11, 1995): 48-55.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 49-50.

spectre of traditional German-Hungarian collusion, at the expense of Romanian interests. However, beyond the symbolism of this Report, which was after all not a German government document, Germany's general policy orientation on enlargement will also have confirmed that little support for Romanian admission in the first round was likely to be found in Bonn. For that support, Romania would have to turn to the other major power promoting enlargement - the United States.

II. ROMANIA'S NATO DIPLOMACY - SEPTEMBER 1995 - JUNE 1997:

From the time immediately preceding the release of the NATO *Enlargement Study*, until the fall of 1996, the Iliescu government skilfully orchestrated a diplomatic offensive which had as its objective the admission of Romania into the Alliance in the first round. This diplomatic effort, which was continued by the government of President Constantinescu in the fall of 1996, had six principal areas of concentration. The first five areas involved improving Romania's bilateral relations with:

- i) the United States;
- ii) France;
- iii) Other Alliance countries, most especially the states of NATO's southern flank;
- iv) Hungary; and,
- v) Ukraine.

The final area of Romanian diplomatic concentration was on NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and specifically on promoting the country's case through the "Intensified Dialogue" launched at the Alliance's Ministerial Meeting in December, 1995.

The focus of much of Romania's greatest diplomatic attention on its bilateral relations with member states illustrated the reality that NATO's decision on enlargement would be made politically in the national capitals, based on the interest assessments of the member states. This had been clearly stated in the *Enlargement Study* which noted that:

Ultimately, Allies will decide by consensus whether to invite each new member to join according to their judgement of whether doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area at the time such a decision is made.²⁶

i) Romania's bilateral relations with the United States:

It was no coincidence that at the end of September 1995, just after the release of the *Enlargement Study*, President Iliescu visited Washington. In fact, in the fall of 1995, the Romanian President visited the United States on two occasions. During both of these visits, NATO was the central issue on the agenda. The visits provided the opportunity for Romania to present its case for NATO admission to the highest American foreign policy decision-making authorities. During the first of these visits, a meeting with Bill Clinton (on September 26) provided an opportunity for President Iliescu to make his case directly to the American President. The visits also allowed Romania to press its strong desire for an improved bilateral relationship with the United States.

The thrust of Romania's bilateral diplomacy with the United States was designed to confront residual American scepticism about Romania's commitment to democracy and human rights while simultaneously building on a steadily improving military relationship. In terms of the bilateral military relationship, Romania's strong involvement in the Partnership for Peace had already regularized and this improved bilateral military contacts between the two countries. These military contacts expanded further in December 1995 when a Romanian engineering battalion joined NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.²⁷ The Pentagon's assessment of the Romanian military was generally a very positive one, based both on the professionalism of the Romanian forces and on progress that had been made in ensuring civilian control of the armed forces.²⁸ Likewise, much of Romania's core

²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: September 1995) Paragraph 7.

²⁷ Colonel Constantin Teodorescu, "The Romanian Engineer Battalion and IFOR" NATO's Sixteen Nations 41 (Special Issue 1996): 36-39.

²⁸ The positive relationship which existed between the American and Romanian militaries was illustrated in February 1996 during the visit by General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Bucharest for talks with President Iliescu and Romanian Chief of Staff

military modernization effort was centred on the procurement of American equipment, so as to meet NATO interoperability standards. In this regard, in June 1995 Romanian Defence Minister Gheorghe Tinca visited the United States and signed a confidentiality agreement facilitating the transfer of some sensitive U.S. military technology to Romania. Then in October, during President Iliescu's second visit to the United States, Romania purchased an \$82 million radar system from the United States for the improvement of its air traffic control capabilities.²⁹ Subsequently Romania also purchased four C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, concluded a deal on a preliminary level to build American Cobra combat helicopters on license in Romania and, in July 1996, secured \$400 million in loans from the U.S. to buy equipment in order to further modernize its forces.³⁰

While military relations were very good, the bilateral political relationship suffered from residual American doubts about democracy and human rights issues. These American concerns assured, for instance, that, in 1995, MFN was still being granted to Romania by the United States on a year-by-year basis. Congressional pressure had also resulted in the opening, in February 1994, of a U.S. Embassy Office in Cluj to monitor the treatment of Romania's Hungarian minority in Transylvania.³¹

General Dumitru Cioflina. In the same month, U.S. Defense Undersecretary Paul Kaminski also payed a four day visit to Bucharest to discuss NATO issues and U.S. support for modernizing the Romanian military. During his visit, General Shalikashvili described the bilateral military relationship between the two countries as "very very close". OMRI Daily Digest (February 8, 1996). The regularized military relationship is also illustrated by the fact that since 1995 an American Officer has always attended the Romanian National Defence College in Bucharest, representing the most continuous presence at this institution by any NATO country. Interviews at the National Defence College, Bucharest, April 1997.

²⁹ Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) Daily Digest (June 22, 1995)

³⁰ See: OMRI, Daily Digest (October 30, 1995); OMRI, Daily Digest (July 23 1996) and Div. General Florentin Popa, "Procurement in the Romanian Armed Forces" NATO's Sixteen Nations 41 (Special Issue 1996): 43-48.

³¹ This Office was opened especially as a result of pressure from Hungarian-born Congressman Tom Lantos, who had for a long time championed human rights issues in Romania. The progress made by Romania in meeting American human rights concerns, led to a decision, in 1997, to close the Office effective in August 1997. Interviews Bucharest and Cluj, April 1997.

The issue of the treatment of the Hungarian minority in the country was also linked to American perceptions of the general relationship which existed between Romania and Hungary. Although relations between Romania and Hungary were in many ways exemplary by 1995, a bilateral treaty to establish a framework for dealing with bilateral problems and especially with the question of the status of Romania's Hungarian minority had still not been signed. This issue was raised on a regular basis by American officials in bilateral meetings with their Romanian counterparts and was underscored during President Iliescu's visit to the United States in September 1995.³² It was also regularly raised by the U.S. Ambassador to Romania, Alfred Moses. In a speech delivered at Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj in February 1996, Ambassador Moses referred to Romania's efforts to strengthen free market and democratic structures:

Despite ... positive signs, much remains to be done before Romania can take its rightful place as one of the democratic, advanced nations of Europe. I know that for many of you the excitement and high expectations you experienced during the tumultuous days of December 1989 have not been followed by the fulfilment of all your dreams and expectations.

I believe Romania is on the right road to the right future but it is moving too slowly.

He then went on to link the issue directly to NATO enlargement:

Whether Romania will be on that [NATO enlargement] train will depend in part on what Romania does between now and then in concluding basic treaties with its neighbours, Hungary and Ukraine.³³

Romania's diplomatic initiatives with the United States in 1995-96 were concentrated on addressing America's principal concerns with regard to Romanian domestic policy and with regard to the conclusion of a basic treaty with Hungary (discussed in sub-section iv below). However, there was also a pronounced effort to underscore to the United States both the possible dangers of renewed instability which could result if Romania were omitted from a

³² For instance, during his meeting with President Iliescu, U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry noted that NATO admission for any country would be conditional on the settlement of any outstanding disputes with neighbouring states. OMRI Daily Digest (September 27, 1995).

³³ Alfred Moses, "Romania and the West" Central European Issues 2 (Spring 1996): 72-78; In the same speech Moses also stated that extremist Romanian Parties had no place in the Romanian government if the country wanted to join Euro-Atlantic structures. OMRI Daily Digest (February 26 1996)

first phase of enlargement, and at the same time stress the positive political contribution that Romania could make to NATO and to the support of American policy interests.

On the one hand, Romanian diplomacy consistently stressed the possible dangers involved in a limited first round enlargement that would just include the three Visegrad states in Central Europe. Romanians were especially fearful of the creation of a "grey zone" or "region of instability" between the West and Russia.³⁴ In early 1996, Romanian Defence Minister Gheorghe Tinca expressed his perspective of this issue as follows:

The risk of dividing Europe will exist, in my opinion, if NATO is hesitant about its enlargement, or, if it enlarges, takes an inappropriate course of action. The existence of a zone without a certain security status, made up of nations obsessed with unpredictability around them, continues to give the extension of Russian influence a chance, for the simple reason that it has room to extend.³⁵

The Romanians also raised their concern that new states, admitted in the first round (in Romania's case, Hungary), might subsequently veto the entry of states in a second round with whom they had political problems. Despite Hungarian pledges not to do so, the Romanians were clearly anxious that their country could become a possible hostage to the actions of Hungary.³⁶ As a way of resolving this, Romania suggested that both Hungary and Romania be admitted in the first wave, so as to avoid alienation and to continue to build the two countries' bilateral partnership in the NATO framework.³⁷

This approach played on the clearly stated American policy objective that enlargement should serve as a vehicle for uniting, and not dividing, the continent. The use of enlargement to facilitate this broader idealistic goal was key to

³⁴ Interviews Bucharest, April 1997.

³⁵ Gheorghe Tinca, "NATO Enlargement - How to meet Individual and Collective Interests" Central European Issues 2 (Spring 1996): 32-33.

³⁶ These concerns were raised for instance in April 1996 by Defence Minister Tinca. "Romania: Tinca on Hungarian Entry in NATO Before Romania" FBIS-EEU-96-067 (April 5, 1996): 69.

³⁷ "Romania: Melescanu Reiterates NATO Adherence Goal" *Ibid.*: 66. Romanian Foreign Minister stressed this theme of simultaneous Romanian-Hungarian admission in the course of his visit to the United States in July 1996. OMRI Daily Digest (July 26, 1996).

understanding the policy of the Clinton administration on NATO expansion. In this regard, the American Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter stated in 1995 that:

For the first time, Europe has a chance to found Continent-wide security on a basis other than the balance of power - with its associated risks of catastrophic clash of arms. This enlargement centres on an attempt to move Eastward one of the most thrilling human achievements of the past half century: the abolition of war, itself, among the states of Western Europe.³⁸

Similarly, in August 1995, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot underscored the administration's perspective of the ultimate integrative function played by NATO in Europe in strengthening democracy and free market reforms:

... enlargement of NATO would be a force for the rule of law both within Europe's new democracies and among them.... In several countries, the prospect of becoming eligible for membership in NATO has also been used as an argument for domestic political and economic reform. ... An expanded NATO is likely to extend the area in which conflicts like the one in the Balkans simply do not happen. ... enlarging NATO in a way that encourages European integration and enhances European security - the policy the administration [of U.S. President Bill Clinton] is determined to pursue - will benefit all the peoples of the continent, and the larger transatlantic community as well.³⁹

Secretary of State Christopher again reiterated this basic American policy in a speech delivered in Prague in March 1996:

Let me make one final critical point about our strategy of integration. The process will be inclusive. It will not build new walls across this continent. It will not recognize any fundamental divide among Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic parts of Europe. That kind of thinking fuelled the killing in the former Yugoslavia and it must have no place in the Europe we are building.⁴⁰

American diplomatic policy on enlargement was clearly premised on constructing a cooperative security architecture in Europe. In contrast to many of NATO's European states whose concerns with respect to enlargement were

³⁸ Robert E. Hunter, "Enlargement: Part of a strategy for projecting stability into Central Europe" NATO Review 43 (May 1995): 3-8.

³⁹ Strobe Talbot "Why NATO Should Grow" cited in: Transition (December 15, 1995): 8

⁴⁰ United States. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. "A Democratic and Undivided Europe - Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher" Cerin Palace, Czech Republic (March 20, 1996): 5-6

naturally most focused on CEE states within their immediate strategic space, the United States felt it could afford to take a more global perspective. This was certainly to the advantage of countries like Romania.

Even so, while the thrust of American diplomatic policy was idealistically driven, it could also not afford to ignore either the interests of its European allies with respect to enlargement, or the limits of the domestic consensus which existed in the United States. In terms of the latter consideration, despite the seeming overwhelming support that Congress had in the past given to NATO enlargement, there were clear limits to the nature of enlargement that the Congress would be prepared to support. Key in this regard were the possible financial costs of enlargement and the issue of how fast, and particularly how far, to extend the American security guarantee in Europe. This was always a central American policy consideration. In this regard, Secretary Christopher stated in Prague in March 1996 that: "The enlargement of Western institutions will naturally begin with the strongest candidates for membership - if it did not start with them, it would not start at all".⁴¹ Thus although the Clinton administration was by this time pushing for enlargement sooner rather than later, it did not initially envisage a broad-based enlargement in the first round. Instead the Americans pushed for a comprehensive and far-reaching "enhanced PfP" to address the concerns of those CEE states not admitted in the first round. However, this was never a very palatable alternative for those CEE countries, like Romania, which regarded such suggestions as mere "consolation prize" proposals. CEE countries remained unsatisfied that an "enhanced PfP" would adequately meet their political and security concerns.

The American administration's inclination toward a limited first wave enlargement, made the Romanian battle for inclusion a constant uphill fight. It also made it imperative that Romania show the positive role that it could play as an American ally in the region. In this regard, Romanian diplomacy endeavoured to underscore that Romania would be a net "provider of security" within the region while simultaneously working, where possible, in support of American policy objectives internationally. The closely cooperative military relationship which had developed between the Romanian and American militaries and Romania's resulting contribution to IFOR in Bosnia were key in this regard. At the same time Romania sought to demonstrate the wider positive role it was willing to play globally

⁴¹ Ibid.: 6

in contributing to the maintenance of international stability (an important American and Western policy interest). For instance, in August 1995, it dispatched a battalion to serve with United Nations' forces in Angola. The Romanian government also announced that effective in the fall of 1995, a total of four army battalions would be made available for peacekeeping duties as required. Given the poor state of the Romanian economy, these moves were a significant sacrifice and were welcomed by both the United States and the Alliance.

In other areas as well, Romanian political policies earned American goodwill. For one it supported United Nations' sanctions against Yugoslavia despite traditionally good political relations between Romania and that country. The sanctions (according to Romanian government estimates) cost Romania close to \$10 billion U.S. and had severely compounded the economic problems facing the country.⁴² Romania also made efforts to support the United States diplomatically, in forums such as the United Nations, where it was, on occasion, one of only a handful of countries voting with the United States on certain Resolutions.⁴³

By the summer of 1996, Romania had made significant strides to overcome residual American doubts about the country's strongly pro-western and pro-American orientation. American appreciation of Romania was firmly expressed in July 1996, during Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu's visit to the United States. Not only did Congress vote to extend permanent MFN to Romania, but Secretary of State Warren Christopher went further than any senior American had ever gone in suggesting that Romania's chances of securing American support for admission into the Alliance in the first wave had improved significantly. Secretary Christopher stated, in this regard, that Romania "has done a great deal" to qualify for early membership.⁴⁴ Events in the fall of 1996 brought further

⁴² Romania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White Book on Romania and NATO, 1997: 20. According to Foreign Ministry officials, this figure represented costs as of 1997 which were ongoing due to the slow process involved in restoring cross border economic activities between the two countries. Interviews. Bucharest April 1997.

⁴³ Joseph Harrington, Edward Karns, Scott Karns "American-Romanian Relations" East European Quarterly 29 (June 1995): 218

⁴⁴ OMRI Daily Digest (July 2 and July 18, 1996).

evidence of the rapid progress Romania was making. First in September, Romania signed, and then quickly ratified, its long-awaited bilateral treaty with Hungary (see below). Then national elections in November resulted in the defeat of President Ion Iliescu and in the selection of Emil Constantinescu as the new President. The transition of power was smooth and resulted in the initiation of much more radical free market reforms. Commenting on these developments early in 1997 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum asserted that they demonstrated Romania's "political maturity" and that they augured well "for relations with the U.S. and for Romania's quest to join NATO and other Euro-Atlantic institutions".⁴⁵

However, it subsequently became clear that although the United States was perhaps of the view that Romania had "done a great deal", in fact the dominant view in the U.S. was that the country had not "done enough" to earn American support for entry into NATO in the first round. This was made apparent in President Clinton's announcement on June 12 that the United States would not to support Romania's entry into NATO in the first round.⁴⁶ (see also pp. 87-97, below)

ii) Romania's bilateral relations with France:

In December 1995 President Chirac decided to resume French participation in NATO's Military Committee and to begin negotiations to rejoin the Alliance's Integrated Military Structure.⁴⁷ Romania's diplomatic efforts to cultivate French support for entry into the Alliance in the first round were based, in part, on the belief in Bucharest that Paris was likely to exercise enhanced influence in the Alliance in the period leading up to the NATO decision on

⁴⁵ OMRI Daily Digest (February 3, 1997)

⁴⁶ "NATO: Text of Clinton Statement Supporting Just Three New Members" (RFE/RL Internet News - June 13, 1997).

⁴⁷ For a discussions of the dynamics guiding the changing of French policy toward NATO see: Frédéric Charillon "France and NATO: Atlanticism as the Pursuit of Europe by Other Means" RUSI Journal 141 (December 1996): 45-48; 54. Anand Menon "France" in Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis ed. Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture (Boulder: Westview, 1994): 197-223.

enlargement. This fact, coupled with a history of traditionally close political relations between Romania and France, made France a potentially important diplomatic partner.

In November 1995, President Iliescu visited Paris for a meeting with President Chirac, who had been elected earlier that year. The visit set the stage for a flurry of diplomatic activity between the two countries in the following year.

In January 1996, French European Affairs Minister Michel Barnier visited Bucharest and held meetings with President Iliescu, Foreign Minister Melescanu and other senior Romanian officials. This was followed by a visit later in the same month by a French military delegation headed by General Alain Faupin from the Defence Ministry's Strategic Affairs Department.

While political consultations between the two countries were increasing, a French policy decision to support Romanian admission to the Alliance had not yet been taken. In an interview with a Romanian newspaper on January 22, President Chirac commented that Romania could rely on France to support it in an eventual bid for EU membership and that France wanted privileged relations with Romania since it was the "only Latin country in Eastern Europe".⁴⁸ However, no commitment was yet being made on the question of NATO membership. Indeed during his visit to Bucharest few days later, General Faupin publicly said that Romania's integration into NATO would not likely take place in the near future since it had to be carefully prepared.⁴⁹

However, in the spring of 1996, French policy shifted toward publicly supporting Romania's bid for membership in the Alliance in the first wave. Support for Romania was first announced at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Berlin in June 1996. The policy decision seems to have been based on three key factors.

The first key factor was political. France favoured a broader based enlargement which would not result in undue political weight being accorded to the German-supported central region states. Romanian admission to NATO in the

⁴⁸ OMRI, Daily Digest (January 23, 1996).

⁴⁹ OMRI, Daily Digest (January 31, 1996).

first wave would have added a southern region country to the Alliance thereby strengthening this region politically within the Alliance. Since France was interested in a broad expansion of NATO, Romania's inclusion also would have given greater credibility to future plans to enlarge the Alliance beyond the boundaries of the Visegrad zone. The assurance that other CEE states could look forward to broader enlargement in the future was, in the French view, important for stability. In the words of the French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette,

Countries which are not part of the 'first wave' of new entrants must be able to look calmly ahead to the continuation of the process. As for those who are not natural candidates for membership, they should not for that reason be abandoned in a "grey area", which would signal our indifference to their security.⁵⁰

In the French view, Romanian admission to the Alliance would have helped ensure that new dividing lines did not emerge and that a possible "second Yalta" (which the French have feared may become a "temptation" for both the United States and Russia) did not occur.

French leaders also expressed scepticism about the American concept of an "enhanced PFP" as a substitute for wider scope enlargement.⁵¹ While the French believed that a differentiation had to be made between east European states which were candidates for enlargement and those that were not, the American view was much broader. Official American policy underscored the position that there should be no boundaries in Europe and that all European states, including Russia, were potential candidates for NATO membership; NATO would, in essence, serve as the basis for a new united Europe. Defense Secretary William Perry emphasized this point in Copenhagen in September 1996 when he said that: "Anybody that is willing and able" should be able to join the "super" PFP and "NATO must be open to all qualified members, now and forever".⁵² The French concern was that the enhanced PFP would end up

⁵⁰ France. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council - Speech by M. Herve de Charette, Minister of Foreign Affairs" Bulletin D' Information en Langue Anglaise. (Brussels, December 10, 1996).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² United States. Department of Defense. "NATO and a 'Super' Partners in Europe (sic) - prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Seminar on the Future of Defense Cooperation Around the Baltic Sea, Copenhagen, Denmark, September 24, 1996" Defense Issues 11, Number 89.

constituting an ineffective "consolation prize" for NATO membership. Thus, the French gave voice to fears which were obviously shared by many CEE states, including Romania, as well.

While France has traditionally supported the concept of a Europe "united" from the "Atlantic to the Urals", its view of the ultimate purpose of NATO and PfP was narrower and relates to the reason it was seeking to reintegrate itself into the Alliance in the first place. France sought reintegration in order to enhance its influence in an Alliance which was becoming more broadly engaged in European security issues. Having become convinced that an ESDI alternative outside of NATO had, for the time being, reached a dead end, France turned to the idea of a reformed NATO which would act as a vehicle for the promotion of its interests in Europe. In the French view NATO could only perform that role if its military viability remained intact.

The second key factor underscoring French policy vis-a-vis Romania was geo-strategic. In the French view, Romania constitutes an important lynch pin in Europe since it is situated at a cross roads in Europe between the Balkans, Central Europe and the Black Sea/Caucasus regions. Its pivotal position makes it important with respect to political and military developments in each of these regions. France was supportive of Romania, not only due to the strategic importance of the country, but also due to Romania's proven willingness to carry an appropriate share of the "out of area" military burden of the Alliance.⁵³ France's own military reforms were oriented to restructuring its armed forces to more effectively project military power, both within Europe and outside the continent. With most other West European countries, notably Germany, consistently reducing their defence budgets, France was looking for other allies (especially in the southern region of Europe) with demonstrated will and commitment to carry a fair share of the collective defence burden.

Lastly, French policy was supportive of early Romanian admission to the Alliance due to the history of close Romanian-French relations and a resulting general confidence in French policy-making circles about Romania's

⁵³ In this regard the Romanian decision to participate in the International Force sent to stabilize Albania in April 1997, (while Hungary opted out of this mission) reinforced this French perception. Interview with a senior French Official involved in Romanian policy matters. April 1997.

long term stability and potential.⁵⁴ From the French perspective, Romanian progress in areas such as entrenching civilian control of the military, successfully creating a comprehensive bilateral partnership with Hungary⁵⁵ and affecting a smooth transition of political power after the November 1996 Romanian elections were positive signals in this regard. NATO, with a more Europeanized structure, was the overarching framework which, in the French view, would have consolidated these gains.⁵⁶

The ultimate refusal of the United States and certain other allies to accommodate French objectives, both with respect to a wider scope enlargement and with regard to the transfer of key alliance command positions (most especially of course the southern region command) to French control, was intensely frustrating and humiliating for Paris. The result of NATO decision at Madrid in fact revealed the weakness of France's influence within the Alliance. This extended Paris' humiliation to its bilateral relationship with Romania as well. Notwithstanding a year

⁵⁴ The country's close relationship with France began in 1866 and continued into the 20th century. France strongly influenced both Romanian culture and the development of the Romanian constitutional tradition. So strong was the French architectural and artistic influence that Bucharest became known as the "Paris of the Balkans". See for instance: Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1992) pp. 1-6. In the Cold War, the maverick positions adopted by both countries in their respective Alliance systems led to a continuation of closer than usual political relations. The post-Cold War period revived French-Romanian relations as the Romanian constitutional style of government was once again modelled on the French system and bilateral economic relations expanded. In 1995, France was Romania's fourth most important trading partner (see Table One).

⁵⁵ To facilitate Romanian-Hungarian rapprochement, President Iliescu approached France and Germany in 1995 to provide assistance and advice, based on the Franco-German model of reconciliation, on a range of bilateral issue areas. In response, France opened its archives to researchers from Romania and both retired and serving French and German officials have been brought together with Romanian and Hungarian officials to provide advice. Interview with a senior French Official involved in Romanian policy matters. April 1997.

⁵⁶ The analysis of French policy contained in this section is based on discussions held with Romanian, Hungarian, French and NATO officials in October 1996 and April 1997.

of consistent and very public advocacy of Bucharest's case by Paris, Romania was still denied entry into the Alliance in the first wave.

iii) Romania's bilateral relations with other Alliance countries, most especially with the states of NATO's southern flank:

Romanian diplomacy with other NATO allies focused on those countries of the Alliance with which it shares the greatest common political and security concerns. In this sense it was natural that states in the Alliance's southern region emerged as particularly important partners. In the second half of 1996, following on the decision of France to support Romania's candidacy, all the states of NATO's southern region (Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) came out in favour of Romania's entry into the Alliance. These decisions were generally reflective of a common interest which all these states shared in trying to ensure a geographic balance to enlargement; one which would accord the southern region of Europe commensurate political weight with that accorded to the central region.

This policy focus was an especially important theme in Italian policy, as Italy came to strongly support the entry, not only of Romania into NATO in the first round, but also of Slovenia as well.⁵⁷ Italy's importance to Romania had risen rapidly in the mid-1990s, not just in political, but also in economic, terms. As noted in Table One, by 1995, Italy was Romania's second most important trading partner.

⁵⁷ Interviews at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, October, 1996 and April, 1997. In October 1995, the instruments of ratification of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Italy and Romania were exchanged when Italian Foreign Minister, Susanna Agnelli, visited Bucharest. During the visit she supported, in principle, the admission of Romania to "European structures". OMRI Daily Digest (October 6, 1995). A bilateral military cooperation agreement was also concluded between Romania and Portugal in July 1995.

A close political and strategic interest in Romania was also maintained by the two NATO states which were the closest geographically to Romania; Greece and Turkey. For both of these states, Romania's position was both politically and strategically important.

Turkey: In November 1995 President Iliescu paid a state visit to Turkey. This was followed in April 1996 by a return visit to Bucharest by Turkish President Demirel. These visits were reflective of the desire to strengthen bilateral diplomatic and military relations between the two countries.⁵⁸ They also reflected the growth in the dollar value of Romanian-Turkish trade between 1993 and 1995 and the potential for further growth (see Table Five).⁵⁹ Most importantly, the visits symbolized the mutual political interests both countries shared.

The mutual interests shared by Bucharest and Ankara centred on their common concern for the maintenance of stability in the Black Sea region and the Balkans. Since 1989, both states have had an overriding interest in cooperating to promote regional stability and economic interaction. The two countries (together with Greece and eight other states) were members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) forum, which was founded in June 1992 with the goal of fostering peace, stability and prosperity within the region. In the future this forum may become more important for coordinating the development of envisaged "transportation corridors" for the delivery of Central Asian oil and gas to Europe, giving all states of the region a heightened interest in regional political and economic cooperation.

⁵⁸ Romania's rather well-developed defence industry has also been of interest to Turkey. In this regard, the two countries have concluded an arrangement to jointly build an amphibious armoured personnel carrier. "Romania: Turkey to Assist in Armored Amphibious Carrier" FBIS-EEU-96-026 (February 7, 1996): 48

⁵⁹ During the April visit of President Demirel to Bucharest, the two leaders pledged to work to expand bilateral trade to the \$1 billion level. "Romania: Illiescu, Turkish President Praise Bilateral Ties" FBIS-EEU-96-077 (April 19, 1996): 49.

Romania's central position in the Balkans, its boundary with Ukraine, the fact that it borders on the Black Sea and the importance of the Danube as a gateway to Europe have heightened its importance for Turkey. In Turkish thinking, a Romania within NATO would act as a stabilizing regional influence both in the Balkans and in terms of better anchoring the stability and independence of Ukraine. In this latter sense, Romania was a potentially important strategic addition to NATO in helping to prevent a future reassertion of Russian influence in the Black Sea region.

Romania was also perceived by Turkey as a "link to Europe", not just in a strategic or military sense, but also in political terms. In that latter sense, the inclusion of Romania in NATO was a possible precursor to Romania's entry into the EU as well. Turkey's own aspirations to enter the European Union made an eventual widening of the EU to include Romania of potential importance to Ankara.⁶⁰ Enhanced Western European interests (political, economic and strategic) in the Black Sea region would automatically have the effect of also enhancing Turkey's own position in the Western European hierarchy of concerns.⁶¹

TABLE FIVE-A: BILATERAL ROMANIAN-GREEK/TURKISH TRADE, 1993		
	Value (\$) and percent of Romanian trade with <u>state concerned</u>	Value (\$) and percent of that state's trade <u>with Romania</u>
Greece	\$147 (1.4%)	\$156 (0.5%)
Turkey	\$411 (3.8%)	\$454 (1.0%)
TABLE FIVE-B: BILATERAL ROMANIAN-GREEK/TURKISH TRADE, 1995		
	Value (\$) and percent of Romanian trade with <u>state concerned</u>	Value (\$) and percent of that state's trade <u>with Romania</u>
Greece	\$329 (2.0%)	\$310 (0.8%)
Turkey	\$548 (3.4%)	\$670 (1.2%)

⁶⁰ Early in February 1997, Turkey, angry at continual delays concerning its application for EU membership, threatened to veto NATO enlargement unless it was put on the list of future EU members. Turkey later backed away from this threat, but it underscored Turkey's strong interest in entry into the EU. Turkish Press Review (February 4, 1997).

⁶¹ The arguments made here arise through conversations with Romanian and Turkish officials in April 1997.

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1996. Figures refer to total value of imports and exports and are in millions of U.S. dollars.

Greece: The instability which prevailed in the Balkans after 1991, led the Greek government to have an acute interest in the maintenance of stability in that region. As a result following the end of the war in Yugoslavia in 1995, Greece put heightened emphasis on the improvement of its bilateral relations with each of the countries in the Balkans, including Romania.⁶²

The Greek-Romanian relationship benefited from the Orthodox religious and cultural tradition which the two countries share. This common cultural tradition is also shared by both countries with Serbia, giving both Romania and Greece a potentially unique role to play in the Balkans. In this sense, the presence of Romania within NATO would have made both Greece and Romania part of a common political and security framework to better coordinate their Balkan policies.

It was the political dimension which was most important in the Greek-Romanian bilateral relationship. The economic relationship, while growing, did not match the greater dollar value of Romanian-Turkish trade (see Table Five). The increased interest of both countries in bilateral political and military cooperation was evident in March 1997 when the Greek Prime Minister visited Bucharest followed closely by a visit by the Romanian Defence Minister, Victor Babiuc, to Athens. During the latter visit, Romania and Greece signed an agreement to boost military cooperation and Athens reiterated its support for Romanian admission to NATO in the first wave.⁶³

⁶² Greece. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "General Principles of Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans" and "Relations with Romania" (Foreign Ministry, 1996).

⁶³ OMRI Daily Digest (March 28, 1997); Greece. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues "News: Directorate of Bilateral Relations with Balkan Countries" (Issue #1 1997).

Other NATO Allies: Of the NATO allies outside the southern region, Canada, was the most important country to have indicated its support for the entry of Romania into the Alliance in the first wave. In February 1997, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien identified six states that he personally favoured for membership (the four Visegrad states, Romania and Slovenia), although he acknowledged that not all six would likely make it in the first round.⁶⁴ At the same time, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy argued for "broad based enlargement" with "as many as five countries which might be admitted in the first wave".⁶⁵ Canadian policy was based on: 1) The assessment that Romania's strategic position was of importance to the Alliance; 2) On the belief that Romania was meeting the NATO criteria for a democratic and economic development; 3) On the goal of developing a broader identity for NATO in keeping with the goals of Article Two (the so-called "Canadian article") of the North Atlantic Treaty⁶⁶; and, 4) On some important Canadian and Romanian economic links, which included the sale of Canadian nuclear technology to Romania for the construction of the Chernovoda power plant (a project which was vital to meeting Romania's energy needs and reducing its dependence on Russian oil and gas imports).⁶⁷

Although by Spring 1997, both Belgium and Luxembourg also came out in support of Romania's early admission, northern Alliance members were generally wary of a broad enlargement. Cost considerations were key for all member states, as were concerns about the political impact of a broad-based enlargement (both on the cohesion of the Alliance and with regard to the possible Russian reaction). Also important was the fact that the Alliance's

⁶⁴ Chrétien adds Romania to NATO list" The Globe and Mail (February 21, 1997).

⁶⁵ "Statement by Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy" NATO Speeches (Brussels: February 18, 1997).

⁶⁶ See: Chrétien adds Romania to NATO list" The Globe and Mail (February 21, 1997) and "Statement by Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy" NATO Speeches (Brussels: February 18, 1997). Article Two, included in the 1949 Washington Treaty as a result of Canadian diplomatic efforts, refers to the common values, based upon "free institutions", shared by NATO states.

⁶⁷ The plant was formally opened by Prime Minister Chrétien during a state visit to Romania in April 1996. Interviews. Bucharest and Cluj, April 1997.

northern members had more immediate interests with respect to potential members within their immediate strategic space, with the Nordic states particularly interested in Poland and the Baltic states. Romania was of less interest to northern European states, just as Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states were of less interest to the Alliance's southern members.

The United Kingdom: The United Kingdom has historically been very careful about the types of military commitments it has made in Europe. Britain's initial reluctance about the necessity of proceeding with enlargement at all, exemplifies this policy orientation. Only toward the end of 1996, did the British Government first publicly endorse a 1999 date for enlargement.⁶⁸ While enlargement came to be accepted by the British government as inevitable, it nevertheless remained wary of broad enlargement in the first round. In this regard, in October 1996, Defence Secretary Michael Portillo, spoke in a speech in Brussels of the "sombre significance of Article 5", strongly arguing for need for NATO to maintain its collective defence capability and, by extension, its internal cohesion. He stated that:

Much talk today is of NATO adaptation and restructuring, of reforms intended to equip the Alliance for the post-Cold War world and direct it towards new missions. But let us remember too that NATO has been so successful because its members committed themselves to hard defence, to maintaining the military capabilities at the top end of the spectrum of warfighting, the capabilities essential to meet threats to national survival.

This is not the time for NATO to go soft, and certainly not to convert itself into an organisation mainly capable of peacekeeping operations.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ United Kingdom. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. "Speech by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Malcolm Rifkind at the Churchill Commemoration, University of Zurich, Switzerland" (September 18, 1996). Britain, like France, but unlike the United States has also rejected the idea of unlimited NATO enlargement. In November 1996, Defence Secretary Michael Portillo told the Russian General Staff Academy in Moscow that NATO "does not now and is never likely to include every European state". United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. "Speech given by Michael Portillo, Secretary of State for Defence, to the General Staff Academy in Moscow today" (November 20, 1996).

⁶⁹ United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. "Speech by Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Michael Portillo: IRR, Brussels - European Security, NATO and 'Hard' Defence" (October 23, 1996). In this regard, senior British officials expressed their view in 1996-97 that the admission of Romania to the Alliance was likely "many years away" and that the Allies generally understood that an extended "family photo approach" to NATO enlargement would make the Alliance unworkable. Interviews, October 1996.

The British policy orientation notwithstanding, in January 1997, when Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind visited Romania, the Romanians made a strong political pitch for British support stressing Romania's potential strategic and political value to the Alliance as a provider of security. It was argued that Romania could play a particularly important role with other potential CEE candidates (namely Hungary and Poland) in helping to anchor the future stability of the Balkans and the independence of Ukraine.

This pitch corresponded closely to an emphasis in British policy on the importance of the stability and independence of Ukraine.⁷⁰ In response, Foreign Secretary Rifkind publicly acknowledged Romania's "strategic interest in the consolidation of Ukraine's independence and statehood".⁷¹ He also stressed that any "strategic partnership(s)" with Poland and Hungary had to be implemented very quickly. He also stated that he was "extremely impressed by changes in Romania in the last months". However, the Foreign Secretary stopped short of endorsing early Romanian membership in the Alliance.⁷²

British policy did not change after the general elections of May 1997 returned a Labour government to power in Britain. In the run up to the Madrid Summit, the Blair government came out in support of the American position (adopted by President Clinton on June 12) that the scope of enlargement be kept limited. Indeed, at the Madrid Summit, Prime Minister Tony Blair reiterated the long-standing British position that the Alliance had to be "very hard-headed" about giving out military guarantees.⁷³

⁷⁰ See for instance: United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. "Speech by Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Michael Portillo: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, Kyiv" (February 3, 1997).

⁷¹ OMRI, Daily Digest (January 28, 1997).

⁷² OMRI, Daily Digest (January 29, 1997).

⁷³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization "Doorstep Interview - by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Tony Blair" NATO Speeches (July 8, 1997).

Germany: After 1995, German policy on enlargement retained its emphasis on the importance of bringing Central European states into NATO in order to ensure the stability of the region to the east of Germany. As Foreign Minister Kinkel argued in April 1996:

The opening of the Alliance to the East is a vital German interest. One does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this. You only have to look at the map. A situation in which Germany's eastern border is the border between stability and instability is not sustainable in the long run. Germany's eastern border cannot be the eastern border of the European Union and NATO. Either we export stability or we import instability.⁷⁴

Due to the German focus on states immediately to the east of its borders, for most of the period from September 1995 to early 1997, Romania was not been considered by Germany to be a serious candidate for admission to NATO in the first round. Nevertheless given the dominant role played by Germany in eastern Europe in both a political and economic sense, Romania's profile in the hierarchy of German foreign policy interests in the region was not a negligible one either. As noted in Table One, Germany rapidly emerged as Romania's largest trading partner in the aftermath of the Cold War. Military cooperation between the two states also increased after 1989.⁷⁵

Thus, despite Germany's policy orientation, Romanian bilateral diplomacy with Germany was very active. On the military side, Defence Minister Tinca visited Germany in June of 1995 on an official visit and met with Defence Minister R  he. He also visited German defence firms and German military units. This was followed in January 1996 by a visit by Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, who met with both Klaus Kinkel and Defence Minister R  he. During the visit some forty measures for cooperation were agreed to within the German military aid and training

⁷⁴ Germany. Foreign Ministry. "Speech by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel on 'The New NATO'" at John's Hopkins' School for Advanced International Studies (April 30, 1996).

⁷⁵ Historically the presence of a large German minority community had also strengthened relations between the two countries. However, since 1989, economic hardships and the legacy of persecution in the Ceausescu years caused a majority of ethnic Germans to emigrate. Since the election of President Constantinescu as President, Romania has promised to facilitate the return of some German state property and, where possible, properties belonging to Romanian ethnic Germans. Interviews Bucharest, April 1997.

program for 1996, the same number as in 1995.⁷⁶ A return visit was made by Defence Minister Rühle to Romania in April 1996.⁷⁷ These high level visits culminated in an official state visit by President Iliescu to the Federal Republic in June 1996.

Thus, despite German scepticism, Romania continued to press its case for admission to the Alliance in the first wave. While initially Germany could afford to dismiss these requests, this was becoming more difficult by the fall of 1996 as Romania met most of the criteria set by the Alliance in its *Enlargement Study* (see below). Like the United States, Germany proposed a politically broader enhanced PfP structure as a substitute for immediate admission to the Alliance. Nevertheless, Romania retained its emphasis on admission to NATO in the first round and continued to reject an enhanced PfP as a substitute.

In this regard during a March 1997 visit to Bonn, the new Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Severin noted that Romania placed "great hopes" on German support for its entry into NATO in the first round. The Germans however continued to stress that while Bonn was prepared to act as a "lawyer" for CEE states in their efforts to integrate in Euro-Atlantic structures, NATO enlargement had to be seen as part of a process and that those states not admitted in the first round would not see the door closed behind them.⁷⁸

This position was reiterated by Foreign Minister Kinkel in an address to the Romanian Parliament in April 1997 when he stated that:

The great progress of Romania in the last several years will play an important role [in the NATO decision on Romania's entry into the Alliance]. Romania has clearly brought itself closer to NATO. ... The decisive factor remains: The Summit decision will be made on the basis of an all-European responsibility. The Alliance also remains open for the European partners who do not immediately get on the train. It cannot

⁷⁶ "Germany: Bonn Continues Military Support for Romania" FIBS-WEU-96-021 (January 31, 1996).

⁷⁷ "Romania: German Defence Minister Arrives in Bucharest" FBIS-EEU-072 (April 12, 1996).

⁷⁸ Germany. Foreign Ministry. "Kinkel trifft rumänischen Außenminister" (March 25, 1997).

and will not result in new dividing lines, no new spheres of influence, in Europe - that also applies to Romania.⁷⁹

Despite this declaratory German policy, there was a current of thought in some Romanian government and non-government circles which was suspicious about Germany's ultimate policy intentions. In particular, the German stress on the need for NATO to reach an accommodation with Russia worried many Romanians. In a worst case scenario it was feared that the NATO-Russian arrangement would result in the defacto division of eastern Europe into two spheres of influence; one German dominated and one Russian dominated. Those states not included in NATO in the first wave would be "left open" to Russian influence. The fear of some Romanians was that Russia would see Romania as a "gateway" into the Balkans and as an opportunity for developing its traditionally close relationship with both Bulgaria and Serbia.⁸⁰

German reaction to this Romanian concern was one of dismissal, mixed with concern. Both the Romanian "obsession" with entry into NATO in the first round and its fears of Russia were, in German eyes, the product of fifty years of communism. In the view of some Germans, the Romanians had become "prisoners of their own propaganda" and that therefore there was a serious risk of a political backlash in Romania if the country was not admitted to the Alliance in the first round.⁸¹

However, German-Romanian differences also had much deeper historical roots and in this sense many Romanians also harboured suspicions as to whether the Germans really saw their Orthodox country as "European" in the same

⁷⁹ Germany. Foreign Ministry. "Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Dr. Klaus Kinkel vor beiden Häusern des rumänischen Parlaments" (April 30, 1997).

⁸⁰ Early in 1997, Romanian concerns about Germany's policy toward Russia heightened when the State Secretary in the Foreign Office, Horst Wasserschmidt, visited Bucharest and reportedly told the Romanians that they had no chance of entering NATO unless their attitude to the Russians became friendlier. Interviews, Bucharest, April 1997.

⁸¹ Interview with a senior German official responsible for Romanian-German relations.

way that Catholic Hungary was viewed as "European".⁸² While officially Germany rejected any notion that Romania might be excluded from European structures for religious/cultural reasons, the issue remained below the surface and, despite the closeness of many aspects of the bilateral relationship, it contributed to continuing Romanian suspicions about Germany's ultimate policy intentions.⁸³

The truth was that German foreign policy decision-makers were never completely united on the timing and on the ultimate scope of enlargement. Larger political issues, most especially related to the possible reaction of Russia, were always most important in shaping the position of both the Foreign Office and Chancellor Kohl on this question. Thus, while on June 10, 1997, Chancellor Kohl did finally indicate German "sympathy" for Romania's admission to NATO in the first round, this decision may have been as much based on wider political factors (and possibly on the realization that Romania's admission was by that time unlikely) as it was on any real enthusiasm for Romanian membership in the Alliance (see also pp. 87-88 below).

iv) Romania's bilateral relations with Hungary:

Romania's efforts to improve its bilateral relations with neighbouring countries have been an integral part of its NATO diplomacy. In the period from the Fall of 1995 to the Fall of 1996, the greatest attention in this regard was paid to Romania's relations with Hungary.

At the end of August 1995, after previous negotiations between the two countries had stalled, Romanian President Iliescu launched an initiative to conclude three bilateral treaties and agreements with Hungary for the purpose of

⁸² These doubts have, on occasion, been expressed in Christian Democratic circles in western Europe over the last several years and also by Germany's Chancellor Kohl. See for instance reference noted by Arlene Broadhurst "Forward to the Past: A Long View of the Long Peace" in David G. Haglund ed. From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security After the Cold War (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1993) p. 58.

⁸³ Interviews with senior Romanian and German government officials and discussions with Romanian academics. April 1997.

creating the basis for comprehensive and permanent national reconciliation.⁸⁴ Early in September, Hungary took up the Romanian initiative and renewed negotiations began shortly thereafter.

It is scarcely a coincidence that the NATO *Enlargement Study* was released in the same month that Romanian-Hungarian talks were given new life through this initiative. In the *Enlargement Study* released on September 28 1995, it was stated that:

States which have ethnic disputes or external disputes, including irredentist or international jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the alliance.⁸⁵

Both the Romanians and the Hungarians were aware that this question of national reconciliation would be key in determining the scope of NATO enlargement as well as their own countries' chances.

The Historical Legacy: The Romanian-Hungarian relationship has had a difficult legacy to overcome. In first half of the 20th century, the relationship between these countries was largely conflictual centring on the political status of Transylvania (see map). This conflict was rooted in the fact that Transylvania and the Romanian lands south of the Carpathian mountains, Moldavia and Walachia, have historically been a boundary region in Europe where the Catholic/Protestant West has met the Orthodox and Islamic worlds.

From the 11th to the 16th centuries, Transylvania was part of Hungary. Then from 1566 to 1687, the region was subordinated to the Turkish Empire. Nevertheless, during this period (like other regions in the Turkish domains), it maintained a high degree of political, religious and cultural autonomy. This autonomy resulted in a very different pattern of political and social development than that which occurred in the Orthodox principalities of Walachia and

⁸⁴ His initiative centred on a proposal to draft three documents: a joint declaration of mutual reconciliation, a joint code of conduct for the treatment of minorities, and a treaty of partnership. See: Matyas Szabo, "'Historic Reconciliation' Awakens Old Disputes" Transition (March 8, 1996): 46-50.

⁸⁵ Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, pp. 3-4

Moldavia located to the east and south of the Carpathians. With the incorporation of Transylvania into the Habsburg Empire late in the 17th century, the region was pulled more firmly into the West exactly at the time of the Enlightenment. Even so, throughout the period of Habsburg rule, while Transylvania's overlords were Hungarian and German Catholics and Protestants, the majority of the population remained Romanian Orthodox.

In 1867 Transylvania reverted from being a Habsburg crown land (which it became after 1848 due to Hungarian nationalist support for the Revolution against Habsburg sovereignty) to again becoming an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary. It remained part of Hungary until the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during World War I. Taking advantage of Hungary's weakness in the aftermath of World War One, the Romanian army occupied Transylvania in 1918 and under terms of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, the area became an integral part of Romania. Although the northern part of Transylvania was temporarily returned to Hungary in 1940 under terms of the German-imposed "Vienna Diktat", the entire region was restored to Romania again after World War II.

The region has therefore been historically and culturally important to both Hungarians and Romanians. As Robert Kaplan has noted:

For Romanians, Transylvania (Ardeal, "the land beyond the forest") is the birthplace of their Latin race, since the ancient Roman colony of Dacia was situated in present-day Transylvania. For the Hungarians (Erdely) was site of their most famous victories over the Turks and of the democratic uprisings against Austrian rule that led to creation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy in 1867.⁸⁶

Soviet hegemony over eastern Europe after 1945 froze the conflict between Hungary and Romania for over forty years. However, the issue became reactivated in the aftermath of the fall of Communism in 1989. The ill-treatment of the Hungarian minority in the last years of the Ceausescu regime made for a very difficult reconciliation climate in the post-Communist period. Thus, while economic, political and military relations between Hungary and Romania improved after 1989, the negotiation of a treaty between the two countries which would resolve the question of Hungarian minority rights in Transylvania remained unresolved.

⁸⁶ Robert D. Kaplan Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) p. 150.

The Hungarian Minority Issue: The Hungarian minority in Romania numbers between 1.6 and 2 million people out of a total population of some 23 million. While some 98% of the Hungarian population is concentrated in Transylvania, the circumstances in which this population finds itself differs sharply. About half of the Hungarian population is concentrated in two counties in the central part of Romania - Harghita and Covasna Counties (see map). All told Hungarians make up about 84% of the population of the former and 75% of the latter. While Hungarians are in a majority in these two counties, in the rest of Transylvania they remain a minority in every county, including those on the Romanian-Hungarian border.⁸⁷

The political interests and aspirations of those Hungarians living in areas in which they are the majority are somewhat different from those living as a minority population in Transylvania. While political autonomy may be an issue for those Hungarians living in counties or cities in which they are in the majority, it is not as important for those Hungarians living in areas where they are a minority population.⁸⁸

From 1990 to 1993, the Romanian handling of the minority issue damaged the government's international reputation. An anti-Hungarian atmosphere existed in Transylvania which not only hurt Romania's relations with the West, but also Romanian efforts to build a constructive relationship with Hungary.⁸⁹ Occasional inflammatory

⁸⁷ There are also six small cities in Transylvania outside of the two Counties where Hungarians are 50% or more of the population. Likewise in Morash county (which borders on Harghita and Covasna) Hungarians and Romanians each make up about 50% of the population. Information provided by the U.S. Embassy Office in Cluj, April 1997.

⁸⁸ For these Hungarians the key issues have been: 1) reform of the Education Law (to allow University admission exams in Hungarian, lower the threshold of the number of students needed to start Hungarian schools, allow Hungarian vocational schools and expand University subject areas which can be offered in Hungarian); 2) the increased use of Hungarian in local government and administration; 3) the return of confiscated Hungarian property; and, 4) the establishment of a Hungarian Consulate in Cluj, the cultural centre of Hungarians (and also Romanians) in Transylvania. Interviews Bucharest and Cluj, April 1997.

⁸⁹ For instance, between 1990 and early 1993 there were no official or unofficial meetings between the Hungarian and Romanian Foreign Ministers and almost no progress in the negotiation of a bilateral treaty between the two

rhetoric out of Budapest⁹⁰ in the same period, coupled with a radicalization of the political programs of Hungarian and Romanian parties in Transylvania, further reinforced this trend.

Hungarian-Romanian Cooperation: While the diplomatic relationship between the two countries remained chilly up to 1993, the economic and even the bilateral military relationship steadily improved. For instance, despite the frosty political relationship, an "Open Skies" was concluded and military contacts between the two states steadily increased, especially after the entry of both Romanian and Hungary into PfP in 1994.⁹¹

On the economic side, the dollar value of the bilateral trading relationship grew sharply between 1993 and 1995 (see Table Six), even if the profile of each state in the other's overall trading framework remained small. Romania's trade with Hungary was greater than with any of its other immediate neighbours, but it was still limited when compared to its trade with Western countries. Even so, it was likely that the trading relationship would continue to expand if economic growth in the two countries could be maintained. Indeed, by 1996 there were some 1400 joint economic ventures between the two countries, with this number steadily increasing.⁹²

	Value (\$) and percent of <u>Romanian trade with Hungary</u>	Value (\$) and percent of <u>Hungarian trade with Romania</u>
1993	269 (2.5%)	271 (1.3%)

states. Cited by: Johnathan Sunley, Hungary: The Triumph of Compromise (London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1993) p. 28

⁹⁰ Most notable of these statements was the declaration by the former Hungarian Prime Minister, the late Jozsef Antall, that he was Prime Minister "in spirit" of all 15 million Hungarians (namely the 10 million Hungarians in Hungary proper and another 5 million Hungarians living in the diaspora). The statement provoked a storm of nationalist outrage in Romania.

⁹¹ Contacts included joint exercises and training as well as regular and high level staff talks. Hungary and Romania also backed each others diplomatic efforts to enter NATO, though Hungary also insisted that its own entry into NATO should not be delayed if Romania was judged unsuitable for entry into the Alliance in the first round.

⁹² Interviews, Budapest, June 1996.

1995	429 (2.7%)	487 (1.7%)
Figures are in millions of U.S. dollars and refer to total imports and exports.		
Source: International Monetary Fund, <u>Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1996</u> .		

The Conclusion of the Bilateral Treaty: As previously noted, it was the prospect of entry into NATO that gave impetus to the Romanian initiative of August 1995 to work towards settling differences over the conclusion of a bilateral treaty. This was true both of Romania's motivation and Hungary's as well. The Hungarian desire to make progress on this front was driven by the realization that Hungary's admission to the Alliance could hardly be taken for granted. If Hungary was to be seen to be uninterested in resolving its problems with Romania, support for its admission would begin to wane among the NATO Allies. Likewise, since the United States refused to declare itself publicly for any state, a political atmosphere was created in which prospective members were under continuous pressure to strive to earn American support.⁹³ There was also a certain degree of concern and scepticism in some circles in Budapest over whether there would ever be a second chance at entry into the Alliance. The fear that the country would be "lumped in with rest of eastern Europe" was a significant factor in motivating Hungarian leaders. Feeling that they had been abandoned by the West in 1945, Hungarian decision-makers were anxious to ensure that Hungary did not again miss what might be its only chance to enter the western community of states.⁹⁴

Although nearly all issues between Hungary and Romania over the conclusion of a bilateral treaty had been resolved by 1995, one outstanding problem remained. This centred on the status to be given to the Hungarian minority in Romania. The crux of the difficulty involved the nature of the rights to be enshrined for the Romania's Hungarian minority community. As noted above, the NATO *Enlargement Study* called on all prospective members to settle

⁹³ The case of Slovakia illustrated that front runners for Alliance membership could not afford to take their position for granted. Although, in 1993-95, Slovakia had been considered a front runner for Alliance membership, the authoritarian nature of its government soon caused its status to slip and by 1996 it was not longer considered likely that it would enter NATO in the first round.

⁹⁴ Interviews, Budapest, June 1996.

disputes "by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles". Among these OSCE principles is an obligation to respect human and minority rights in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. This Convention includes one Recommendation (1201) referring to the obligation to respect the rights of national minorities. Hungary had consistently argued that this article necessitated the recognition of the "collective rights" of the Hungarian minority in any bilateral treaty. Romania, however, just as consistently rejected this position, fearing that it would lead to agitation for political autonomy by the Hungarian minority as well as by other minority groups in the country. In both Romania and Hungary, a considerable domestic consensus existed against compromising on the fundamental issues believed to be at stake over Recommendation 1201.⁹⁵

While this dispute had effectively blocked a settlement prior to 1995-96, the release of the NATO *Enlargement Study* and the prospect of an approaching NATO decision caused both countries to move toward compromise. American pressure on the issue was especially strong. In September 1995, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry stated that NATO was not willing "to import security problems".⁹⁶ Likewise as noted earlier, in February 1996 the U.S. Ambassador to Romania stated that: "Whether Romania will be on that [NATO enlargement] train will depend in part on what Romania does between now and then in concluding basic treaties with its neighbours, Hungary and Ukraine". In the same month, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke noted that it was in Romania's "fundamental interest" to conclude these treaties.⁹⁷

Thus, despite scepticism early in 1996 about whether an agreement could be concluded prior to the Romanian elections in the Fall, an agreement was initialled between the two countries on August 14, 1996 and signed on September 16.⁹⁸ The dispute over Recommendation 1201 was dealt with in Article 15 of the treaty. While Romania

⁹⁵ Interviews Budapest and at the OSCE in Vienna, June 1996.

⁹⁶ Matyas Szabo, "'Historic Reconciliation' Awakens Old Disputes" Transition (March 8, 1996): 47

⁹⁷ Neue Zürcher Zeitung (February 22, 1996). Also: "Romania: PSM Leader on Holbrooke's Trianon Statement" FBIS-EEU-96-034 (February 20, 1996): 78.

⁹⁸ At the same time a bilateral agreement, aimed at enhancing military

conceded to accepting its responsibilities under the European Convention on Human Rights (including Recommendation 1201), Hungary agreed to a clarifying reference attached to the treaty stating that: "The Contracting Parties agree that Recommendation 1201 does not refer to collective rights, nor does it oblige Parties to grant those persons the right to a special territorial autonomy status based on ethnic criteria".⁹⁹

The ratification process began immediately, with the Romanian Parliament ratifying the treaty in October. The ethnic Hungarian Party in the Romanian Parliament (the UDMR) abstained from voting and the extreme Romanian nationalist parties did not participate in the vote.¹⁰⁰ The marginalization of Romania's nationalist parties and their inability to mount an effective opposition illustrated the extent to which the consensus on this question had shifted in Romania. At the same time, while the UDMR expressed official dissatisfaction with the aspects of the treaty, its abstention from the vote seems to have been based as much on its unwillingness to support a major policy initiative being made by the Iliescu government as it was on its opposition to the treaty.

In essence, NATO and American pressure was instrumental in shifting the political consensus in Romania.¹⁰¹ In the aftermath of the election, the UDMR entered into President Constantinescu's governing coalition. This development meant not only that many of the softer proposals of the UDMR now became government policy, but also that the

transparency between the two countries and deepening military cooperation, was also signed. See: "Agreement on Confidence and Security-Building Measures Complementing the OSCE Vienna Document of 1994 and on the Development of Military Relations between the Government of Romania and Government of the Republic of Hungary" (September 6, 1996)

⁹⁹ "Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness between Romania and the Republic of Hungary" (September 6, 1996).

¹⁰⁰ OMRI, Daily Digest, (October 4, 1996).

¹⁰¹ The extent of this shift became apparent in the subsequent Fall election campaign when President Iliescu again sought late in the campaign to play the "nationalist card" in order to revive his own flagging fortunes in the campaign. The President's efforts to play on an anti-Hungarian theme in the second round of the election failed. Even in Transylvania, where Romanian nationalists had in the past found their strongest support, some 70% of the population voted for Constantinescu, despite his generally softer line policy on ethnic minorities. Interviews, Bucharest and Cluj, April 1997.

good relationship between Bucharest and Budapest was consolidated. The countries had officially been supporting each others diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis NATO for some time, but this was now given new impetus.¹⁰² The political impact of the bilateral treaty was potentially extremely important for both countries. For Hungary, the treaty ensured it an invitation to join NATO by 1999. For Romania, it made it that much more difficult for NATO to simultaneously justify why Romania's application should be turned away.

v) Romania's bilateral relations with Ukraine:

The back drop to Romanian-Ukrainian relations centres on the legacy left by the demise of the Soviet empire. Both the boundaries imposed on Romania as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as well as the treatment of the Romanian minority (of some 400,000) have been contentious issues between the two countries.¹⁰³ Past Romanian claims to the territory of northern Bukovina (now Chernivtsi Oblast) in Ukraine and the agitation of the Romanian population there for reunification with Romania further soured Romanian-Ukrainian relations in the period after 1991. Likewise, the long-term status of Moldova (a country which is 64% ethnic Romanian but which has substantial Russian and Ukrainian minorities) is another issue of possible future tension.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Soon after Constantinescu's election he met with the Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn, at the December 1996 OSCE Summit in Lisbon. During the meeting Horn again reasserted that as long as Hungary's own entry was not delayed, it fully backed Romanian efforts at NATO and EU integration simultaneously with Hungary. OMRI Daily Digest (December 4, 1996). The bilateral treaty also had a positive impact in another sense in that the Hungarian lobby in the United States now joined with the Romanian lobby in proposing the entry of both Romania and Hungary in the first round. Interviews Bucharest, April 1997.

¹⁰³ The key boundary question has been the dispute over the status of Serpent Island. The continental shelf around this island is rich in oil and gas reserves and the demarkation of the maritime boundary is important to both sides. While Ukraine argues that the island should cause the maritime boundary between the two states to be drawn straight to the south, Romania holds that the island's small size and the fact that it is effectively uninhabited (apart from Ukrainian troops) means that the continental shelf demarkation should be unaffected by the island. Interviews, Bucharest, April 1997.

¹⁰⁴ The Moldovan government has in fact been reluctant to forge too a

Up until 1997, conflict between the two countries (especially over the status of the Romanian minority in Ukraine and over the interpretation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 which resulted in Romania's loss of both Bessarabia - now Moldova - and northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union) prevented any agreement on a bilateral treaty from being reached. However, after the conclusion of Romania's treaty with Hungary and the election of the new government in Bucharest, Romania's full diplomatic attention was turned to resolving its remaining differences with Ukraine. Early in 1997, Foreign Minister Severin declared that this issue had moved to the top of Romania's foreign policy agenda.¹⁰⁵ As a result of intense negotiations, and pursuant to some high level meetings between President Constantinescu and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, a draft treaty was initialled by the two Presidents on May 3.¹⁰⁶

The negotiation of a draft treaty was not without political costs in Romania, particularly due to the failure to specifically condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Opposition Deputy Chairman Adrian Nastase suggested that the treaty with Ukraine was being concluded at any price. The reaction of the more extremist nationalist parties was, not surprisingly, even harsher. The Greater Romania Party took the position that if the price of an agreement was abandoning claims to historically Romanian lands "we do not understand why we should join NATO at all". When

close relationship with Romania and both its political leaders and the majority of the population have rejected the idea, occasionally floated in certain circles in Bucharest, of reunification. Instead, Moldova's orientation has been decidedly pro-Ukrainian. Ukraine has been supportive of Moldovan desires to affect the pull out of Russian forces from Trans-Dniester and the two countries have engaged in close military cooperation. Most recently in March, 1997, Moldova and Ukraine agreed to a customs union and the Ukraine pledged to support Moldova's territorial integrity. This is partly a product both of the fact that, apart from the interwar period, Moldova was actually politically separate from Romania and under Russian rule, for the entire period from 1812 to World War I, from 1940-41 and again from 1944 to 1991. Since independence, Moldova's political leadership has been anxious to maintain its political autonomy from Bucharest. See: OMRI, Daily Digest, (November 6, 1995; January 7, 1997; and, March 3, 1997).

¹⁰⁵ OMRI, Daily Digest, (January 28, 1997).

¹⁰⁶ This included a February 1 meeting of the two Presidents in Davos, Switzerland. OMRI, Daily Digest, (February 3, 1997).

Romania subsequently renounced any territorial claims, leaflets were distributed in Bucharest and other cities denouncing the government's position.¹⁰⁷

Again, NATO admission was clearly driving the conclusion of this treaty. American diplomatic efforts with both Romania and Ukraine were reportedly particularly instrumental in moving both countries to an agreement.¹⁰⁸

vi) Romania's Diplomacy at NATO Headquarters:

While the decisions on NATO enlargement were made in the national capitals, the diplomatic interaction, which moved the process of enlargement along, occurred in Brussels. As one senior NATO diplomat noted, "Here process is King". In this "process" the importance of a state getting in on the ground floor of discussions in order to make its case as strongly and as early as possible, was virtually of equal importance to the quality of the case being made. Once the inertia of the bureaucratic process took over, it was very difficult for a state initially not part of the enlargement train to suddenly jump on board.¹⁰⁹

After the release of the *Enlargement Study* in September, the NATO Ministerial Summit of December 1995 called for an "Intensified Dialogue" with potential candidate countries. The "Intensified Dialogue" actually emerged due to continuing hesitation on the part of certain Alliance members about how fast to proceed with enlargement. Due to the upcoming Russian presidential elections some member states were wary of proceeding with an enlargement decision in 1996 while certain others were still generally interested in continuing to slow the process down. The

¹⁰⁷ OMRI Daily Digest, (February 4, 1997; March 4, 1997; March 7, 1997, and; March 12, 1997)

¹⁰⁸ Interviews, Bucharest, April 1997.

¹⁰⁹ Interview, Brussels, April 1997.

result was the "Intensified Dialogue" process, officially designed to more fully acquaint potential members with the Alliance and glean additional information about how they might contribute to NATO.¹¹⁰

Despite the frustration of some of the prospective candidates at continuing delays in the NATO decision, all interested CEE states immediately entered into the "Intensified Dialogue" process. For Romania the delay was, once again, less a source of frustration than it was an opportunity. As had been the case previously, the country was, in effect, given more time to meet the enlargement criteria. Six weeks after the December 1995 Summit, the Romanian Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the NATO Secretary General confirming its desire to participate. It also reasserted its strong wish to join the Alliance in the first round.

Four principal rounds of NATO-Romanian discussions took place between April 1996 and April 1997. The first meeting between officials took place on April 26, 1996. Talks centred on "Romania's Discussion Paper on NATO's Enlargement" which had been approved by Romania's Supreme National Defence Council in March. The Paper focused on Romania's view of the enlargement process and on how it saw itself fitting into this process. The following key points were made:

- Romania sought full membership in the Alliance and was prepared to take on all the obligations of NATO membership;
- Romania saw no viable security alternative to NATO membership;
- Romania supported an enlargement process that was transparent, gradual, deliberate and continuous; and,
- Romania was ready to join the Alliance in the first stage and was prepared to act as a "provider of security" in its geographical area.

In the two subsequent meetings which were held in June and October 1996, these general themes were discussed in greater detail and NATO also organized briefings for all states interested in membership on the issues of:

¹¹⁰ Interview, Brussels April 1997.

- NATO budgets;
- NATO procedures for handling classified information;
- defence planning;
- the minimum standards for an effective NATO member;
- force structure issues; and,
- NATO equipment standardization policy.¹¹¹

These themes were of particular importance since they touched on the problems involved in effectively integrating new member states into the Alliance's military structure in an effective manner. However, prospective members of the Alliance already had been able to glean much of this information from their participation on PfP over the previous two years. Likewise, on the NATO side, although the candidates provided additional information on their own readiness levels, in each of these areas much of this information too was already known to the Alliance. The role of the Supreme Allied Military Command (SHAPE) in this process also remained a distant one. Since the decision of whether NATO was to enlarge was to be a political one, and not military, SHAPE was not allowed to undertake any analysis which could possibly prejudice that decision. All of its analyses had to remain generic and non-specific.¹¹²

The down playing of the military considerations related to enlargement did not sit well with certain member states, such as the United Kingdom. As discussed earlier, the British were especially concerned to ensure that military effectiveness and cohesion of NATO was not undermined by the enlargement decision. This view was also held by

¹¹¹ Interviews, NATO October 1996 and April 1997. Further discussions on the issue of the costs of Romanian admission to NATO were also reportedly discussed during a visit by a Romanian delegation to NATO on April 3, 1997 "Romania: Delegation Expected at NATO Headquarters" (RFE/RL Internet News - April 2, 1997). n.p.n. Also: Viorel Ardeleanu, "Romania's Membership in NATO - A Case Study" (unpublished paper, May 1997).

¹¹² Discussions, SHAPE, October 1996 and NATO Headquarters, April, 1997.

SHAPE. In this regard there was always concern within the military command that a political deal with Russia might lead to certain restrictions on the ability of the Alliance to deploy forces, exercise and set up military infrastructure on the territories of new allies. As General Klaus Naumann, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, noted in February 1997:

... enlargement should strengthen the effectiveness of the Alliance and be carried out in such a way that NATO preserves its ability to perform its core functions of common defence as well as undertake peace support operations and other missions. It is clear, therefore, that there will be continuing and crucial military obligations in an enlarged Alliance. Hence, uppermost in the minds of NATO's Military is how to meet the Ministerial remit to maintain the cohesion and military effectiveness of the Alliance, before and after enlargement.¹¹³

SHAPE's involvement in the NATO decision-making process finally got underway in a more systematic way in February, 1997. In that month a "Defence Requirements Review" was initiated focusing on each of the 12 prospective candidates for membership. The Alliance's Major Military Commanders (MMC) were instructed to look at the strategic situation confronting each of the prospective members, the current capabilities of the Alliance to meet potential threats confronting those states, as well as at the capabilities of the candidate states themselves. While this analysis was useful, SHAPE was still restricted from engaging in any analysis beyond that which assessed current (and not possible future) capabilities. SHAPE was also prevented from looking at the possible impact of combinations of countries (such as for instance Hungary and Romania together) entering the Alliance simultaneously. This undermined the realism of the exercise, but as one senior NATO Officer commented, SHAPE recognized that it would be presented with a "fait accompli" and it would simply have to "make the best of it".¹¹⁴

In its dialogue with NATO, Romania had stressed one particularly dominant theme - that Romania would be an essential strategic asset to the Alliance. The final Romanian presentation to the NATO Council on April 28, 1997, strongly reiterated this message to Council Ambassadors. The presentation was made by Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea who argued that Romania would be a "net provider of security" in the Balkan region. The Prime

¹¹³ General Klaus Naumann, "Military Dimensions of NATO Enlargement - Address to the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels" (February 16, 1997).

¹¹⁴ Interview NATO, April 1997.

Minister's presentation (described as an impassioned and impressive one by one observer) also discussed both the democratic and economic reforms the country was engaged in as well as the steps that had been taken to improve Romania's relations with its neighbours. In this regard the Prime Minister noted that a bilateral treaty was to be initialed with Ukraine on May 3. In the hour long discussion which followed, fourteen Ambassadors spoke asking questions of the Prime Minister. The same seven states that had already indicated their support for Romanian admission in the first round, reiterated that support.¹¹⁵

Despite the strength of the Romanian case and the level of support it received, while the Ambassadors listening to the Prime Minister could, to varying degrees, influence the decision being made, they would not make it.

Ultimately that decision would not be made in Brussels. Rather it would be made, pursuant to direct government-to-government negotiations between the national capitals, by the Heads of State and Government meeting in Madrid.

III. ROMANIA AND NATO'S MADRID DECISION:

There has been no unified purpose behind the Alliance's enlargement initiative. In its official pronouncements, NATO has argued that the enlargement process has been initiated in order to extend western Europe's "zone of stability" eastwards to incorporate CEE states. Officially, enlargement has been held to be the nucleus of a broader "package" of measures designed to entrench a regime of "cooperative security" in Europe. Indeed, the rhetoric of cooperative security has been a dominant theme in all NATO Communiques since the end of the Cold War, as it has in the language of the other major European security institutions, namely the WEU and the OSCE.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Interviews Brussels, April 1997.

¹¹⁶ In this regard, the OSCE Lisbon Declaration of December 1996 states that: "... Freedom, democracy and co-operation among our nations and peoples are now the foundation for our common security. ... Our approach is one of co-operative security based on democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, market economy and social justice. It excludes any quest for domination. It implies mutual confidence and the peaceful settlement of disputes". "Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century" (Paragraphs 2 and 3); Similarly the NATO Final Communique of the same month asserts: "The evolution of the Alliance takes place in the context of our aim

However, cooperative security is in fact not so much a reality in Europe today as it is an aspiration, or a goal, which the North Atlantic community is officially striving towards. This is reflected, for instance, in the Madrid

Communiqué which states:

A new Europe is emerging, a Europe of greater integration and cooperation. An inclusive European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this process.

We are moving towards the realisation of our vision of a just and lasting order of peace in Europe as a whole, based on human rights, freedom and democracy.¹¹⁷

The fact remains that the core interests of the allies with respect to enlargement have been widely diverse. Some of the allies have, in fact, continued to have little real interest in enlargement at all. This fact, when coupled with a strong desire on the part of major allies such as the United States and Germany to accommodate and manage the broader political consequences (especially vis-a-vis the West's relationship with Russia) associated with enlargement, has necessitated the long and laborious process of constructing the "package" of measures (summarized in Table Seven) to accompany enlargement. Thus, the "package" agreed to by the Heads of State and Government at Madrid is less about constructing a new cooperative security regime in Europe than it is about reconciling NATO's diverse interests.

The actual enlargement portion of the package (to admit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) corresponds primarily to the interests of the United States and Germany. Without the commitment of these two states to enlargement, it would not have taken place at all. Enlargement gives Germany the secure eastern borders it desires and provides the United States with an Alliance which will hopefully be reinvigorated and able to serve as the basis

to help build a truly cooperative European security structure. ... We want to help build cooperative European security structures which extend to countries throughout the whole of Europe without excluding anyone or creating dividing lines. ...". "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council". December 10, 1996 (Paragraphs 3 and 4).

¹¹⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation - Issued by the Heads of State and Government (Madrid: July 8, 1997). Paragraphs One and Two.

for moving European integration forward. Simultaneously it begins the process of filling the security deficit which is said to exist in the eastern part of the continent.

The enhanced PfP portion of the package is designed to keep the door open for future enlargement and hopefully build a wider security regime in Europe. The main objective of the newly created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines, or spheres of influence, in Europe. This objective, as noted earlier, is an important dimension of America's diplomatic policy. Of course EAPC also creates the basis for closer political relations between eastern European states and the Alliance, allowing countries not included in the first round to continue to press, supported by patrons within the Alliance, for second and subsequent rounds of enlargement to include them as well.

TABLE SEVEN - THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PACKAGE

- enlargement of the Alliance to incorporate Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in NATO by 1999;
- a significant enhancement of the Alliance's political and security dialogue with those eastern European states not admitted to the Alliance in the first wave through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The Council will discuss all political and security questions confronting the Alliance and its partner states, with the exception of Article 5 (collective defence) issues;
- the conclusion of a NATO-Russia "Founding Act" as the framework for broad-ranging political and security cooperation and the creation of a "Permanent Joint Council";
- the conclusion of a NATO-Ukraine Charter as the framework for relations between Ukraine and the Alliance and the creation of a "NATO-Ukraine Commission";
- stabilization of the political relationship between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) through the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which accords the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) a greater role within the Alliance; and,
- reform of the Alliance's internal command structure to rebalance and streamline military responsibilities within NATO both to incorporate new member states and to reintegrate Spain and, if possible in the future, France into the military side of NATO.

The desire to avoid any antagonism of Russia has also been a strong motivating factor in Alliance policy, and has been an especially important factor in the formulation of both American and German policy. The "Russian factor" has been a major reason why the enlargement process has in fact moved so slowly. Although NATO has always firmly asserted that no state would be granted a veto over enlargement, every effort has been made to accommodate Russian concerns. As was noted in the *Enlargement Study*:

Russia has raised concerns with respect to the enlargement process of the Alliance. The Alliance is addressing these concerns in developing its wider relationship with Russia and the Alliance has made it clear that the enlargement process including the associated military arrangements will threaten no-one and

contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, enhancing security and stability for all. (Paragraph 28)

The result is the NATO-Russian *Founding Act* of May 1997, which is a product not only of the compromise worked out between Allied and Russian negotiators, but also represents the compromises agreed to between Alliance member states on the nature of relations with Russia. The *Founding Act* provides for a Permanent Joint Council to "provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern". At the same time it also states that "consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia" and does not restrict the rights of either NATO or Russia to "independent decision-making".¹¹⁸

Despite the agreement on compromise wording in the *Founding Act*, the views of Russia and NATO member states on many security related questions in Europe remain sharply divergent. In the Russian view, cooperative security rhetoric notwithstanding, the balance of power remains the fundamental guiding principle of relations between European states. Many of Russia's interests are not seen as analogous to those of the West in eastern Europe and, in this sense, NATO enlargement is still seen in negative terms in Moscow; as an effort to expand Western (and especially German and American) influence into central and eastern Europe.¹¹⁹ The Permanent Joint Council itself is seen in Moscow primarily as a vehicle for enhancing Russia's power and influence in the political and security issues confronting Europe, just as in many western countries the stress has been on limiting that same level of Russian influence in the Council. Thus, although the *Founding Act* proclaims an end to adversarial relations between East and West, the reality still remains quite different.

The NATO-Ukraine *Charter* is a result primarily of Ukrainian lobbying for its own "special relationship" with NATO to underscore Ukrainian independence in the face of the Russian-NATO deal. However, even here the desire

¹¹⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" NATO-Russia Summit (Paris: May 27, 1997).

¹¹⁹ Interviews, Brussels, October 1996 and April 1997.

to accommodate Russian sensitivities is evident. While the document establishing NATO's relationship with Russia is referred to as a "*Founding Act*" that with the Ukraine is simply a "*Charter*". Likewise, the NATO-Russian "Permanent Joint Council" has greater political weight than does the NATO-Ukrainian "Commission".

All NATO states have recognized that an enlarged Alliance will require a reformed command structure. All states have also been in agreement the lack of direct military threat to Alliance territory and the reality of reduced resources for defence, necessitate a simultaneous trimming down of the number of existing allied commands. Likewise NATO has, primarily in deference to Russian sensitivities, indicated that it does not presently see a need to establish permanent bases for allied military forces on the territory of new member states. Nevertheless, the establishment of new command headquarters, and the integration of the forces of the three candidate countries into the Alliance's command structure, will still be required.

The restructuring of the Alliance, to accommodate the command structure of an enlarged Alliance, has proved to be one of the most difficult aspects in the enlargement process. All Alliance member states have been anxious at least to maintain existing levels of influence within the command structure after enlargement. Some, such as France and Spain, have demanded a significant role within the command structure as a precondition to their reintegration in the Alliance. In contrast to Spain, France has not been satisfied with the role proposed for it within the Alliance. Specifically, France demanded the lead role in the Alliance's southern command area, a role which the United States, due to the presence there of the United States Sixth Fleet, has not been prepared to accept. As a result, while Spain elected at Madrid to rejoin the Alliance's military structure, France refused, putting off its decision to the outcome of future discussions.

i) Strategic Factors and Romania:

In analyzing the Alliance's Madrid decision, and in assessing why it was that Romania was not included in the first round of enlargement, it is important to remember that complex political factors dominated the process. In previous instances where NATO expanded (to include Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and even when Spain entered the Alliance in 1982), strategic considerations were of crucial, even pivotal, importance. However, in this latest round of enlargement, they were given little official attention. This was not surprising given both the cooperative security rhetoric which dominated the discussion of NATO enlargement and the strong desire of both Germany and the United States to avoid any possible antagonism of Russia.

While strategic considerations were generally not officially discussed in NATO circles (at least until the SHAPE "Defence Requirements Review" of February to April 1997), they were not entirely absent from consideration either. As noted in Section II above, to varying degrees, the policies of every NATO member on enlargement have been shaped by strategic considerations. This was certainly true of each of the major powers: German thinking on enlargement was closely premised on the importance of securing the stability of the Federal Republic's eastern border; French thinking was also closely based on strategic factors as well as on an effort to ensure the maintenance of a political balance within the Alliance conducive to French interests; British thinking was in many ways the most sceptical, again based largely on strategic considerations which questioned the necessity of taking on new security commitments in the centre of Europe where British interests have not matched those of the continental powers. In the United States as well, the idealism of American diplomatic policy notwithstanding, the nature of the political ratification process in the United States necessitated that the new commitments of the United States in Central Europe be justified both politically and strategically as being in America's vital national interests.

Romania's Strategic Value to the Alliance: The geographic remoteness of Romania from western European countries, when compared with other leading candidate countries, made NATO states understandably more wary of making a binding defence commitment to its security. Nevertheless, Romania's geographic distance from eastern Europe notwithstanding, the country's position was potentially quite important to the Alliance in three senses in particular.

First, Given NATO's stated goal of projecting stability to eastern Europe, Romanian territory was important since it stood at a cross-roads in Europe (see map). It is the second largest country in eastern Europe outside the CIS (being 230,340 square kilometres in area). It has a 225 km Black Sea coastline with a large harbour at Constanta. The Danube Delta, which opens into the Black Sea, is located in Romania, making the country a gateway from the Black Sea region into Central Europe. Given the political situation in Yugoslavia, the climate of economic (and possibly political) instability in Bulgaria and the key importance of Ukraine for the future of European security, Romania, bordering all of these countries, assumes a place of key strategic importance in the region. Romania complements Poland's strategically important position relative to Ukraine and, with Hungary, would have given NATO a much improved strategic position in the Balkans.

Second, Romania's membership in the Alliance would also have provided the Alliance with an enhanced position in the Black Sea region to the East. Of particular potential importance is Romania's possible future role as a corridor for the importation of oil and natural gas from Central Asia into Western Europe. Central Asia is estimated to contain some 65 billion barrels of oil and about 450 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.¹²⁰ These reserves are of great potential importance for all of Europe's future energy needs. For the last several years, states in the Black Sea region have been competing to ensure that the routes for the exportation of these resources pass through their own countries. Russia, which in 1991 lost control of the region where the oil reserves are located, has been especially anxious to ensure that the pipelines pass through its territory. This would be both an significant source of hard currency (through transit fees) and, more importantly, would constitute an effective political lever for Russia. Specifically, it would enhance its influence with both exporting and importing countries. Georgia has also lobbied hard for a major pipeline, since it could generate up to \$500 million annually in transit fee payments.¹²¹ The Georgian route has also been very attractive to states like Romania and Ukraine since potentially it could reduce the

¹²⁰ Cited by Ben Lombardi, Turkish Policy in Central Asia Research Report No. 709 (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis, Department of National Defence, December 1994): 33

¹²¹ Ariel Cohen, "The New 'Great Game': Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia" The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder # 1065 (January 25, 1996).

dependency of both states on oil and gas imports coming from, and through, Russia.¹²² In this regard, Romania has been anxious to promote the use of the Danube-Rhine-Main connection from the Caspian Sea to the North Sea which will, according to one estimate, carry some 10 million tons of cargo annually by 2000.¹²³

While transportation corridors through Russia will continue to be a necessity, in April of 1997 a deal was signed between Georgia and West European energy companies to construct one such pipeline through Georgia. This pipeline, which is to be operational by October 1998, will go some way to reducing the dependency of regional countries on routes passing through Russia. Up to the present, regional instability, both in Russia (most notably in Chechnya) and in Georgia (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) has made such economic ventures risky and uncertain. Moreover, Russia's continued military presence and influence in Central Asia has enabled it to shape political events and, where necessary, foster unrest.¹²⁴

Romania's entry into NATO would have made the Caspian Sea-North Sea connection more secure. It would also have had the effect of demonstrating the West's clear political and economic interest in the security of this corridor, thus perhaps fostering a shared interest on the part of all states (including Russia) in the stability of the Caucasus' region.

¹²² The bulk of Romania's \$1 - \$1.5 billion annual trade with Russia consists of Romanian imports of Russian oil and gas. The Romanian government has also underscored the importance of the Georgian route as, in the words of one senior Foreign Ministry official, "the" solution to Ukraine's present energy dependence on Russia. Interviews, Bucharest, April 1997.

¹²³ Cited by Ercan Özer, "The Black Sea Economic Connection and the EU" Romanian Journal of International Affairs 3 (1-1997): 108-117.

¹²⁴ For instance, Russia retains a military presence in the Caucasus of some 4,000 troops in Armenia and about 10,000 in Georgia (including in Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Georgia cannot reassert control over Abkhazia due to Russia's military presence and Moscow has rejected Georgian President Shevardnadze's calls for a Russian withdrawal from both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. "After the Summit, Concern in the Caucasus" Washington Post (March 25, 1997). Source for Russia's regional military presence: International Institute of Strategic Studies Military Balance 1996-97 (London: IISS, 1996) pp. 115 and 119.

In a more general strategic sense, Romania would have had a role as an added and important regional political and strategic counterweight to Russia - principally in terms of the value of Romanian territory. While Russia is militarily weak today, this will not necessarily continue to be the case in the future. Russian policy concerning its "near abroad" continues to have a strongly imperial orientation. In the Black Sea region, Russian military bases in both Trans-Dniester and Sevastopol are seen in Moscow as strategic outposts, important for the projection of regional influence (see map). The proximity of both of these base areas to the Danube Delta, the Turkish Straits and the Romanian port of Constanta causes Romania and other countries some long term concerns.¹²⁵

A final factor that would have enhanced Romania's importance to the Alliance is the broader presence it would have given NATO in the Black Sea region. Up to the present time Turkey has been the bedrock of NATO's presence in this region. However, recent internal political problems in that country illustrate that Turkey's long-term adherence to the Alliance cannot be absolutely guaranteed. In this regard, the entry of Romania into the Alliance would have constituted a hedge against both a resurgent Russia and a possibly unstable Turkey.

Despite the fact that some of these factors were clearly important to some of the NATO states supporting Romania's entry into the Alliance in the first round, they were not decisive. The United States, for instance, did not support Romanian entry in the first round. Even though the United States had been the leading proponent of using NATO to project regional stability (indeed it was the leading proponent and the backbone of NATO's military mission in Bosnia), it still did not regard Romanian admission in the first round as critical for the Alliance. Likewise, neither the potential value of Romania as a linchpin in the Black Sea-Central Asian corridor, nor the possibility of instability in Turkey, were yet regarded as factors making it important to extend the American military guarantee. Certainly the Clinton administration did not consider these factors vital enough to warrant risking a fight in Congress over the question of Romanian entry into NATO. The limited importance evidently accorded to Romania in a strategic sense

¹²⁵ Interviews, Bucharest, April 1997. See also discussion in: Trasa Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy (Westport CT: Praeger, 1995) pp. 74-80.

illustrates the extent to which the Balkan region is not yet considered a region of vital interest for many allies, particularly the United States (see pp. 92-95).

ii) Political, Economic and Military Factors and Romania:

Article Two of the North Atlantic (or Washington) Treaty commits the member states to the goal of strengthening their "free institutions". During the Cold War, the suppression of these "free institutions" in countries such as Portugal, Greece or Turkey was often overlooked in the interest of maintaining allied unity in the face of a greater and common military threat. Strategic considerations thus superseded political factors. However, in the post-Cold War period, given the absence of external threat, it is the political factors which have usually superseded strategic factors. In this context, it is not surprising that political factors, based on Article Two considerations, have served as the basis for NATO's official enlargement criteria.

The *Enlargement Study* stated that: "There is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance". Instead:

Enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis and some nations may attain membership before others. New members should not be admitted or excluded on the basis of belonging to some group or category.¹²⁶

Nevertheless, the *Enlargement Study* did outline certain criteria which would be used to evaluate whether candidate countries would be admitted to the Alliance. These were the extent to which they:

- i) "conformed to the basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (Paragraph 70);
- ii) showed "a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility" (Paragraph 72);

¹²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Study on NATO Enlargement, (Brussels: September 1995) Paragraph 7.

- iii) showed a commitment to the "resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist claims ..." (Paragraph 72);
- iv) were "prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and burdens of common security and collective defence" (Paragraph 73);
- v) were prepared "to subscribe to Alliance strategy" and "pursue the objectives of standardization which are essential to Alliance strategy and operational effectiveness" (Paragraphs 73 and 74); and,
- vi) had "established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defence force" (Paragraph 72).

In addition it was made clear in the *Enlargement Study* that NATO's absorptive capacity was limited and that the Alliance had to ensure that "all Alliance military obligations, particularly those under Article 5" would be met in an enlarged Alliance (Paragraph 44). More specifically it was stated that:

In enlarging its membership, the Alliance will want to ensure that it maintains its ability to take important decisions quickly on the basis of consensus and that enlargement results in an Alliance fully able to carry out both its core functions and its new missions. In addition to being fundamentally important in its own right, the Alliance's ability to act quickly, decisively and effectively is crucial to its role in the European security architecture and to its ability to integrate new members into it (Paragraph 42).

At least four of these criteria of course had little to do with the effectiveness and cohesive functioning of a military alliance based on common strategic and political interests. Rather they were about the integration of new member states in a larger community of states sharing common values. These criteria thus reflected both the cooperative security ideal which was driving especially American policy on NATO enlargement and also the real aspirations of central and eastern European states with regard to integration in the West.

The Romanian Government's case with respect to meeting the *Enlargement Study* Criteria: In its *White Book on Romania and NATO*, released in February 1997, the Romanian government presented its case about the extent to which it had met the NATO criteria. First, with regard to the assimilation of democratic values it argued that, since 1989, the democratic system in the country had become "steadily more mature". It argued that the parliamentary and presidential elections which were held in November 1996 (and in which 75% of the population voted) constituted the "acid test for the maturity and responsibility of all political parties and non-governmental organizations". The

smooth and comprehensive change of government which occurred in 1996, demonstrated that Romanian society had been entirely transformed and that "democratic values have been assimilated".¹²⁷

Second, with respect to the question of economic liberty and social justice, the Romanian government argued that the country had built the base for a functioning free market economy. In the Romanian *White Book* it was noted that in 1989 virtually everything was state-owned (unlike in Hungary or Poland). However, by early 1997, half the GDP was contributed by the private sector and that a comprehensive economic reform program initiated by the Constantinescu government would further modernize the economy by privatising state banks, cutting food subsidies, and liberalising the foreign exchange market.¹²⁸

Third, with respect to the requirement to improve relations with neighbouring states, it was argued that Romania had perhaps come the furthest with respect to any of the criteria in only a very short period of time. Its treaties with Hungary and Ukraine would serve as the basis for deepening cooperation with both of these neighbours. The Romanian government argued that the country had become well placed to act as a political consensus builder in southeast Europe. It also asserted that an improving relationship with Poland allowed for "emerging trilateral cooperation" with both Warsaw and Kiev which would help anchor Ukraine firmly in Europe for the benefit of the whole region.¹²⁹

Fourth, the Romanian *White Book* declared that by 1997, "...the whole defence strategy of the country is centred around future NATO membership...", making Romania ready to assume the responsibilities of collective defence. In

¹²⁷ Romania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White Book on Romania and NATO pp. 30-31

¹²⁸ Ibid. pp. 20 and 32-33. Also Radu Busneag, "Romanian Economy - Romania begins landmark privatisation process" RFE/RL Report (April 1997).

¹²⁹ In this regard, a Ukrainian-Polish-Romanian joint-battalion was under discussion as well as the creation of a three nation "Euro Region" in Galicia. Another Euro Region in the Lower Danube area is also likely. Interviews, Bucharest, April 1997.

this regard, Romania had instituted military reforms to reduce the armed forces to a strength of 195,000 (and perhaps even lower) by 2000 from some 228,000 in 1996-97. This would make the armed forces more efficient and flexible. Likewise, the stress for the future was on the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force of some 20,000 to 30,000 troops able to participate in a range of NATO and UN missions. Romania also declared its readiness to take on the financial burdens associated with this defence effort and pledged to increase its defence spending between 1997 and 2000 by some \$3.8 billion U.S. to meet the costs of converting its forces.¹³⁰

Fifth, Romania argued that it had accepted all aspects of NATO doctrine and strategy and was also endeavouring to meet the Alliance's interoperability standards. In this regard, Romanian officials underscored the country's active engagement in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in order to meet the 19 objectives for functional interoperability established for the 1995-97 period. It is now also engaged in the PARP program for 1997-98 which has set a further 45 interoperability objectives.

Romania's determination to meet NATO interoperability standards was also illustrated by the fact that most, if not all, of the extra \$3.8 billion envisaged for allocation in the 1997-2000 period was to be targeted on meeting interoperability standards. Priority areas were:

- \$800 million for new NATO compatible C³ systems;
- \$1.6 billion for modern equipment for those forces earmarked for NATO missions;
- \$1.2 billion for improving military infrastructure (including airfields and harbours); and,
- \$200 million for achieving operational interoperability for those forces assigned to NATO missions.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Romania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White Book on Romania and NATO. pp. 15, 34-35 and 37-38.

¹³¹ Romania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White Book on Romania and NATO pp. 35 and 38.

Sixth, the Government asserted that the military had been fully subordinated to the civilian institutions of the State. As noted in the *White Book*, all key policy making positions in the Ministry of Defence were by 1994 held by civilians. Likewise, the principle of parliamentary oversight over the missions, activities and budget of the armed forces was firmly established. The government was responsible to Parliament for all its policies, including national defence while all military related law was subject to oversight by the Romanian Constitutional Court.¹³²

In order to establish an even firmer basis for the principle of democratic and civilian control of the armed forces, a National Defence College was established in 1992. The purpose of the College was to educate students in military and security matters, allow for the discussion of military and security matters without political overtones and serve as a practical link between the military and civil society leaders. The College's students have been members of Parliament, officials from government and opposition parties, the media and the Romanian military. The College was unique in eastern Europe and also attracted military officers from the United States and other NATO and PfP partner countries.¹³³

Lastly, with regard to the impact of Romanian entry into NATO on the political cohesion and effectiveness of the Alliance, the Romanian government consistently stressed the theme in its diplomatic initiatives that the country would act as "a net provider of security" in southeastern Europe. Thus, as one of the most pro-Atlanticist states in

¹³² General Gheorghe Diaconescu, "A Democratic Force" NATO's Sixteen Nations 41 (Special Issue 1996): 25-28. In the Communist period, Romania's maverick position within the Warsaw Pact permitted the development of civil-military relations somewhat outside the Soviet pattern. The military's popularity in Romanian society is partly a product of the fact that even in the Ceausescu years, the armed forces were seen as the defenders of the society and not as the guardians of the regime. Lt. Gen. Dumitru Cioflina, "Restructuring and Modernizing the Romanian Armed Forces": 33. The historic independence of the Army is illustrated through its early support of the Revolution of December 1989. In fact, during the Revolution the military resisted the orders of Ceausescu to shoot demonstrators. As a result, at the height of the revolt, General Milea, the Defence Minister, was executed by the Securitate for his refusal to carry out such orders. Discussion of these events is found in: Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil pp. 92-115.

¹³³ Interviews, National Defence College, Bucharest, April 1997.

eastern Europe, it would not undermine the Alliance's cohesion since its track record of cooperation, in the PfP process and through the multinational peacekeeping missions it entered into after 1994, was a very strong one.¹³⁴

Shortcomings in Romania's Case: Romania's claim to have met the NATO *Enlargement Study* criteria was not one which was universally accepted. In those NATO countries which remained reluctant to see Romania admitted in the first round, Romania's adherence to the Alliance criteria was challenged in political, economic and military terms.

In political terms, questions were raised about the extent to which democracy could be said to have really taken hold in Romania. Aside from the fact that Romania's experience with democracy was a very short one, there was at least one school of thought which questioned the degree to which democracy could ever successfully assimilated in Romania. This school (represented most recently by the American Professor Samuel Huntington¹³⁵) held that Romania's Eastern cultural and religious tradition did not make its society one which was conducive to the assimilation of democratic values.¹³⁶ Romania's pre-1866 tradition was one of authoritarianism and absolutism and this political tradition continued to characterize government in both the 1930s and 1940s, and also in the Communist

¹³⁴ See: Romania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White Book on Romania and NATO. pp. 24-26.

¹³⁵ Samuel Huntington has argued that "Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and where Islam and Orthodoxy begin..." and that: "The identification of Europe with Western Christendom provides a clear criterion for the admission of new members to Western organizations". Samuel Huntington The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) pp. 158-160. See also Ben Lombardi's discussion of Walter Lipgen's arguments on this question in: "Security Architecture in Europe: The Question of Self Conception" in David G. Haglund ed. From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security After the Cold War (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1993) pp. 130-133.

¹³⁶ Recent opinion surveys which might be used to support this perspective include a March 1997 survey which finds that while 85% and 80% of Romanians respectively have "much" or "very much" trust traditional institutions such as the Church and the Army only 39% and 45% respectively have an equivalent level of trust in Parliament or the Government. Soros Foundation for an Open Society Public Opinion Barometer Romania March 1997 p. 46

period. The anti-democratic orientation of much of the country's intellectual thought was seen to be a product of this dominant non-Western political tradition and culture.¹³⁷

The official NATO position was that admission to Western institutions had to be based on generic criteria and not on cultural factors. Indeed, given the memberships of Greece and Turkey within NATO for the past 45 years, NATO could in fact adopt no other official position. The belief that historical and religious/cultural factors were irrelevant was an especially strong tenant of American policy. Indeed one senior American diplomat forcefully noted his view that: "Europe is not a cultural concept, it is not social concept, it is not a military concept. Europe is simply a geographic concept".¹³⁸

Nevertheless, residual, and mostly privately expressed, doubts remained very active, particularly in European circles.¹³⁹ Concerns with respect to aspects of Romania's human rights record and with regard to the residual appeal of extreme nationalist views have continued, despite democratization.¹⁴⁰ These doubts are deeply rooted, and in many European circles they go to the heart of the question of "What is Europe?" and to the issue of which cultural traditions belong to Europe, and which do not, and cannot, belong.

¹³⁷ See: Vladimir Tismaneanu and Dan Pavel, "Romania's Mystical Revolutionaries: The Generation of Angst and Adventure Revisited", East European Politics and Societies 8 (Fall 1994).

¹³⁸ Interviews. Brussels. October 1996. For further arguments in this regard, see critique's of Huntington's thesis, in particular: G. John Ikenberry, "Just like the Rest" in: "The West: Precious, Not Unique" (critiques of Samuel Huntington's thesis) Foreign Affairs 76 (March/April, 1997): 162-63.

¹³⁹ Interviews with European officials, June 1996, October 1996 and April 1997.

¹⁴⁰ Some of these nationalist views have found expression within the military. See for instance: OMRI, Daily Digest (October 11, 1995) and OMRI, Daily Digest (June 21 and July 5, 1995).

Second, in economic terms, there were serious concerns in many NATO states about Romania's economic performance. This in turn raised doubts about the extent to which the democratic order had been consolidated and might end up being threatened through economic instability. As indicated in Table Eight, Romania's performance lagged behind other prospective member states. In particular, foreign investment levels and per capita income were low when compared with the three Visegrad states which were to be admitted to the Alliance.

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Romania</u>	<u>Hungary</u>	<u>Poland</u>	<u>Czech. Republic</u>	
Per Capita GDP (1)	\$1,570		\$4,273	\$3,050	\$4,771
GDP Growth		5%	2.5%	5.2%	4.0%
Average Monthly Wage (2)	\$145		\$328	\$363	\$350
Cumulative Foreign Investment Stock (3)	\$2		\$13.1	\$10.1	\$6.2
Inflation	50%		18%	18.1%	10.8%
Unemployment		7.5%	11% (4)	13.5%	3.8%

(1) Figures in U.S. dollars.
(2) All figures are from 1996 in U.S. dollars.
(3) In billions of U.S. dollars as of the end of 1996.
(4) 1996 rate.

All figures (except where indicated) are forecasts for 1997.

Source: Business Central Europe, The Annual 1996-97

Despite its weaknesses, the Romanian economy did have certain long-term economic strengths which most other eastern European countries did not have.¹⁴¹ Romania's external debt was low in comparison to other CEE states and it was potentially the second largest market in the region (after Poland). Moreover Romania was building a base for the success of future economic reforms. Its secondary capital market (established with some \$20-\$23 million in U.S.

¹⁴¹ These include greater natural resources as well as more extensive industrial infrastructure, which was exposed to a greater level of western technology than was the case elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc. Interviews. Bucharest, April 1997.

financial assistance) was the most advanced in eastern Europe.¹⁴² These and other economic reforms (such as opening Romanian land and companies up to foreign ownership and privatising Romanian Banks) meant that the Romanian economy had the potential to expand significantly in the next several years.

Indeed, the reforms were key to generating some \$1 billion in loans for Romania in 1997, from the IMF, the World Bank and the European Union.

Nevertheless, the weakness of the Romanian economy raised concerns both about possible instability which might result if Romania's economic reforms were unsuccessful and about the wisdom of asking the country to engage in a major

military improvement program in order to meet Alliance interoperability

requirements.¹⁴³ These concerns were strong in the United States, where the focus of many in Congress was not so much on the potential of the country for the future, but rather on its immediate strengths and weaknesses. In this regard, just prior to the Madrid decision, the U.S. Ambassador to Romania, Alfred Moses, argued that "For Romania, the question was basically one of economic reform. Has it been consolidated or does it need more time?".¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Whereas other CEE countries (notably Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) started their stock exchanges with very few rules, the Romanian stock exchange and secondary capital market were slow in getting underway and instead, with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development, first built up a body of rules and regulations. Some 90% of RASDAQ's rules are taken from the U.S. NASDAQ. The RASDAQ is a crucial element in the Romanian privatisation program in that provides some 16 million Romanian citizens the ability to buy and sell shares. Since beginning operations in October 1996, RASDAQ's activities have been rapidly expanding with some 2740 listed companies at the end of March 1997. Interviews. Bucharest, April 1997.

¹⁴³ Romanian officials consistently argued that its military modernization program was required whether it joined NATO or not, and even that the costs of military modernization might actually be greater if it did not join the Alliance than if it did. Interviews, Bucharest, April 1997.

¹⁴⁴ Cited in: "Romania seeks place in NATO" Globe and Mail (July 2, 1997). Likewise U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued in late May 1997 that: "The Alliance should admit only those new democracies that have both cleared the highest hurdles of reform and demonstrated they can meet the

TABLE NINE - COMPARATIVE DEFENCE EFFORTS OF PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMBER STATES IN EASTERN EUROPE

	Total GDP (1996)	Defence Spending (1995)	Defence Spending (1996)	Total Military Personnel (July 1997)
Czech Rep.	\$42	\$1.1	\$0.988	61,700
Poland	\$109	\$2.6	\$3.1	241,750
Hungary	\$45	\$0.612	\$0.517	49,100
Romania	\$33	\$0.872	\$0.745	226,950

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1997-98. All figures in billions of U.S. dollars.

Lastly, despite praise for Romania's military performance from many quarters, doubts about the proficiency of the country's armed forces remained. As indicated in Table Nine, when compared with other potential candidate countries, Romania's overall level of spending in U.S. dollars has been low. This has been a product of the steady decline of the Leu against the U.S. dollar. Training has suffered as a result of low defence spending. For instance, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in 1996 Romanian pilots only flew an average of 40 hours per year compared with 60 hours per year for Polish pilots, 65 hours for Czech pilots and 70 hours or Hungarian pilots. However, all of these training hours compared unfavourably with the major NATO countries.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, when compared to other armed forces in eastern Europe, the Romanian armed forces have been well regarded within the NATO Alliance for their capabilities and their professionalism.¹⁴⁶ As noted by the former head of the U.S. military-to-military team in Romania, other than Poland, Romania is the only country in eastern Europe to field a full joint army, air force and naval package and "is in fact the most logical addition to NATO".¹⁴⁷ Romania

full obligations of membership". United States. Department of State. "Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement at North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Sintra, Portugal" (May 29, 1997).

¹⁴⁵ For instance, Air Force and Navy pilots in the United States average between 236 and 286 hours per year, those in the U.K. between 180 and 226 hours, those in France between 180 and 190 hours per year and those in Germany between 150 and 160 hours per year. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1996-97 (London: IISS, 1996).

¹⁴⁶ Interviews. Brussels, October, 1996 and April 1997.

¹⁴⁷ See Mark R. Shelley "NATO Enlargement: The Case for Romania" 3 Central European Issues (1-1997): 98-105.

has an indigenous defence industry which has long had access to various western technologies and it produces equipment ranging from small arms and ammunition to armoured vehicles, artillery and combat aircraft and helicopters. In the future, Romania plans to continue to acquire 70% of its equipment from national sources.¹⁴⁸ Likewise, when one compares Romania's defence effort to that of its immediate neighbour, Hungary, the forces which Romania has been able to field are much more impressive. As one senior NATO source apparently noted in July 1997, "If it were just a question of military competence... we'd be taking the Poles, the Romanians and probably the Slovenians".¹⁴⁹

Even so, despite these positive dimensions to the country's defence effort, many Alliance member states were clearly reluctant to spend possibly major additional resources to assist in the defence of a state which was, for many, a great distance away. This factor was an important one for states such as Britain, Norway, Denmark and also, as it turned out, for the United States.

iii) **The United States and the Madrid Decision:**

Although the North Atlantic Alliance is composed of equal sovereign states which take decisions on the basis of consensus, some of these states are clearly more equal than others. Thus, although by June 1997 more than half of NATO's sixteen member states were supportive of Romania's admission, some of the key states had not yet declared themselves. Critical for Romania was the fact that three of the four major powers in the Alliance were still not supportive of Romania's early admission. While Chancellor Kohl did express general support for Romania's admission on June 10, this support was lukewarm at best. Indeed shortly after the Chancellor indicated his support,

¹⁴⁸ Lt. Gen. Dumitru Cioflina, "Restructuring and Modernizing the Romanian Armed Forces" NATO Review 42 (August, 1994): 32-35.

¹⁴⁹ NATO's internal assessments of the Hungarian and Czech forces were by comparison apparently quite unfavourable, with these forces even being condemned as "thoroughly incompetent" in the Alliance's confidential military assessment. "NATO's chosen recruits prove unfit for service. The Guardian (July 7, 1997).

the German Foreign Office issued a statement noting that Kohl had merely expressed his general "sympathy" for Romania's admission in the first round and that this did not mean that Germany would necessarily be voting for Romanian entry.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, at Madrid, Germany was the first of Romania's "supporters" to give up the fight for its admission.¹⁵¹

The American position on Romania's admission was essentially the pivotal one. By the end of 1996, it was clear that given the level of support Romania was receiving from other allies, and considering the fact that no country had formally announced its opposition to Romania's early entry, if the United States placed its full support behind its admission, it would be admitted. In the final analysis no other Alliance member state, including the United Kingdom or Germany, would have been prepared to risk a rupture in allied consensus on this question. It was also equally true that if the United States remained unconvinced of the need to admit Romania in the first round, the country had no chance at entry.

On the surface, Romania's early admission to NATO seemed to be closely in congruence with the goals of America's declaratory NATO policy. However, notwithstanding the idealism of America's diplomatic policy, the United States nevertheless felt itself constrained by the limits of its domestic politics. More than any other country in the Alliance, the American policy decision had to be sold domestically. In this regard, three key factors prevented the United

¹⁵⁰ Kohl's "support" for Romania may have had less to do with the specifics of Romania's case than it did with Bonn's concerns with French policy. The American decision on June 12 to support only the Visegrad three for membership poured cold water on the long-standing French campaign for Romania. Given the French failure to gain the control they had initially lobbied for over NATO's southern command, French disappointment was already running high even before America's Romanian decision. President Chirac's weakened position after the French parliamentary elections on June 1 (in which the opposition Socialists and their allies won a majority in the National Assembly), may have contributed to Kohl's decision on the question of supporting Romania. Given Germany's priority concerns and anxiousness over the continued French commitment to European monetary union, the indication of support (all be it soft) for France's diplomatic position on Romania may have been seen as a small price to pay.

¹⁵¹ See: "Allies Admit 3 Countries to NATO" Washington Post (July 8, 1997).

States from supporting Romania: These were, the potential financial costs associated with Romania's admission; questions over whether Romania's security constituted a vital interest of the United States; and, the politics involved in convincing the Congress to ratify Romania's admission to the Washington Treaty.

Cost Consideration Factors: Financial implications associated with enlargement were of great importance in the United States. While the *Enlargement Study* did not state that factors of cost would be pivotal in determining the scope of enlargement, the *Study* nevertheless outlined in some detail, the areas where both prospective members and the Alliance itself would have to take on new, and perhaps significant, expense efforts. These were to include:

- . the establishment of multinational headquarters on the territory of some of the new members;
- . the establishment of additional space for new missions at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels and possible increases in the size of the International Staff and the International Military Staff;
- . increases in military budgets to fund reequipment efforts in prospective member states, improve interoperability and provide for the enhancement of training activities and regularization of joint exercises;
- . the establishment of infrastructure facilities in new member states to allow for speedy and effective reinforcement; and,
- . an enhancement of the Alliance's rapid deployment and regional reenforcement capability.¹⁵²

Estimates about how expensive enlargement would be varied widely. This was due both to differing analyses on the force postures required to credibly protect new member states and because the states to be included in the first wave were unknown. At the high end of these estimates was a U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) which suggested that enlargement could end up costing between \$61 - \$125 billion due to a possible need to deploy 10 Divisions and 10 tactical fighter wing equivalents east of Germany.¹⁵³

¹⁵² NATO. Enlargement Study, Paragraphs 51-62 and 66.

¹⁵³ See summary in: "U.S. worry over Russia and expansion costs" Jane's Defence Weekly (February 26, 1997).

Other studies envisaged much lower force levels and therefore much lower total costs. One study done by the RAND Corporation in 1996 estimated total costs at around the \$42 billion level based on a need of only 5 Divisions (instead of 10 as in the CBO study). Similarly a study done by the U.S administration early in 1997 was premised on the necessity of only 4 divisions and 6 fighter wings to defend Poland and other new member states.

Officially, the administration study, which was released early in 1997, did not indicate the number of states (nor of course which states) envisaged in its cost estimates. Nevertheless, the study's estimates were reportedly based on the admission of three states to the Alliance - one large state and two smaller-sized states. On this basis the Study argued that enlargement would cost a total of between \$27 and \$35 billion by 2009. These costs would arise from a focus on military modernization in the following areas:

- on training and exercises to learn and practice NATO operational concepts and procedures;
- on developing the ability to operate within NATO's C³I environment;
- on identifying and upgrading facilities for receiving and supporting NATO reinforcements;
- on entering the NATO integrated air defence system, including the establishment of fully interoperable air traffic control and Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF); and,
- on fielding adequate combat and logistics support capabilities that are mobile and, to some extent, deployable.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ The administration study broke down costs between by NATO member states and prospective members as follows: European NATO states: \$8-10 billion (for improving regional reinforcement capabilities); New allies \$10-\$13 billion (for force improvements in selected areas); NATO (including the U.S.) and new member states: \$9-12 billion for improvement in interoperability etc. It was expected that new members would reach a "mature capability" by 2009. It was hoped an initial capability would be achieved by 2001. United States. State Department. Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, "Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications" (February 24, 1997)

While costs in this study were lower than in other studies, the report noted that if the numbers of members admitted to the Alliance in a first wave were to increase beyond anticipated levels, then the costs would also rise. This meant, in fact, that Romania was seen as an added financial burden in the United States. This was also true in Europe as well, where the defence budgets of many countries, notably Germany, were already low and perhaps unable to sustain major new commitments.

Given the fact that the Romanian government planned some \$3.8 billion in extra defence investments between 1997 and 2000, the costs associated with Romania's entry into the Alliance may actually not have been prohibitive. However, what was probably of greater significance was the fact that, as of early 1997, Romania was not part of the main costing scenarios done by the United States on enlargement. This was in itself politically revealing in that it indicated that the pattern of thinking in the United States was still some distance from considering Romania a country which it was in the vital interests of the United States to defend.

Romania and American vital interests: American diplomatic policy was officially premised on constructing a new cooperative European security order in which the use of force, or the threat of force, would be eliminated as a possible aspect of inter-state relations. In the view of many in the United States, the elimination of the Soviet Union also eliminated the prospect of any large scale military threat in Europe. Russia was not only too weak to mount such a threat for the foreseeable future, it was also in its interests to progressively integrate itself with the rest of Europe, both politically and economically. This process, it was hoped, would gradually eliminate any adversarial relationship between the West and Russia. Indeed, as noted above, the NATO-Russia *Founding Act* had already proclaimed the end to any adversarial relationship between the two sides. In this context, for many Americans, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, dealing with the collective defence of allied territory, was no longer particularly important. For many it could now be considered to be little more than a "reserve Article" in the Treaty.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ Interviews, Brussels October 1996 and April 1997.

However, while this view was perhaps a dominant one in the Clinton administration and in American diplomatic circles, it was not universally held in the United States. Indeed both in the Pentagon and in Congress, there was strong resistance to any notion that the American military guarantee might be rashly extended. Likewise, despite a belief in the Clinton administration that the days of a large scale military threat in Europe were over, it was clear that smaller scale military conflicts (as in Yugoslavia) were possible.

Thus, the extension of the American military guarantee remained a central political issue in the United States. To have admitted Romania to the Alliance would have meant extending an American military guarantee for that country's defence and security. This guarantee could not be extended lightly, since America's global credibility would rest on the extent to which it honoured any commitment that was made. The key question that had therefore to be asked in the United States, as in every other NATO country, was whether the security of Romania constituted a vital American interest.

Through its intervention in Yugoslavia after 1994, the United States had signalled that the security of the Balkans constituted an important American interest, worthy of the commitment of U.S. forces. However, this commitment was taken on very cautiously and was always intended as temporary. From the outset the Clinton administration felt compelled to set time limits on the presence of American forces. Likewise, while U.S. forces were committed for "peacekeeping" operations in the context of an agreed ceasefire between the belligerents, there was a great reluctance to contemplate any commitment of U.S. ground forces for combat operations in the region.

Romania was in some ways even further afield from western Europe than Yugoslavia. Likewise, its strategic importance, as noted above, was more potential than immediate. In the future Romania's role as a "gateway" to Europe for Central Asian oil and gas might make the country more strategically important to the United States, but this was not yet the case. Similarly, the reemergence of a Russian threat to Europe might also increase Romania's importance to the United States, but again this was not the case in 1997. Indeed, while the Romanian line on entry into NATO was that its admittance would block any Russian efforts to expand its influence in the Balkans, if

anything American diplomats were more concerned about the possibility that Romanian entry might constitute a needless provocation of Moscow.¹⁵⁶

These factors made it more difficult for the Clinton administration to contemplate arguing before the Congress for Romania's inclusion in the Alliance. Indeed, the administration felt it would have enough trouble asserting that the United States had vital interests in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. While the administration asserted that Romania would still have a place in NATO in a future round of enlargement, it remained to be seen whether it would be any easier to assert an American vital interest in Romania in the future than it had been in 1997.

Congress and Romania: In Congress, the two issues discussed above, the cost of enlargement and the advisability of extending the U.S. security guarantee, were key to the ratification debate. The admission of new states to the Alliance had to be ratified by two-thirds of the American Senate. Despite the fact that both the Republican and Democratic Parties had campaigned strongly in 1996 in support of NATO enlargement, ratification in the Senate was far from a *fait accompli*. The Senate's long time foreign policy and military expert, Sam Nunn, had been an early sceptic on the issue of enlargement. Although Senator Nunn had retired from the Senate by 1997, scepticism within the Senate remained. As Senator Tom Harkin noted in July, "... there is no consensus on whether expansion of the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe is a wise and feasible policy".¹⁵⁷ This scepticism in the Senate existed even in the context of an enlargement decision which was expected to be limited to just Poland, the Czech

¹⁵⁶ Russia has been anxious about the growth of NATO naval activity in the Black Sea region, seeing it as an intrusion into a region that is a security sensitivity for Russia. In this regard, some recent American joint exercises with Ukraine have been regarded in Moscow as a particular provocation and as a blow at Russia's pride and prestige. The Russian position on Romanian entry into NATO was that there was in fact "no just reason" why Romania should want to enter NATO. Romania, they argued, was trying to attract the Alliance by playing the "strategic card" (as discussed in the Romanian White Book). Interviews with Russian Officials, October 1996 and April 1997.

¹⁵⁷ "Doubts raised on Nato Expansion" Washington Post (July 9, 1997)
Also: "Will NATO's Reach Exceed its Grasp" Washington Post (July 10, 1997)

Republic and Hungary. The administration was thus reluctant to risk its entire enlargement policy by adding Romania and possibly Slovenia to the list of NATO candidates.

As a result of these factors, President Clinton announced on June 12 that the United States was only prepared to support Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as NATO candidates. Simultaneously, Defense Secretary William Cohen, visiting Brussels, informed NATO allies of the U.S. decision.¹⁵⁸

The American decision, taken one month prior to the Madrid Summit, determined the nature of the decision that was taken in Madrid. The only action which NATO members supporting Romania could have taken to block the American decision would have been to veto the candidates supported by the United States. This was an action they were clearly unwilling to take for it would have risked rupturing the entire transatlantic partnership.

For some eighteen months the United States had been consistently pressuring Romania to meet the various criteria related to NATO enlargement. Yet, despite Romania's progress in meeting those criteria, in the final analysis it was the United States, primarily due to the realities of American domestic politics, which blocked Romania's entry. Prior to the American decision, one high ranking American official described the American and NATO dilemma with regard to Romania as similar to that of a student who had passed all his exams and was now looking for the right to graduate.¹⁵⁹ If the answer to this question was not an outright "no", it was at least "not yet".

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

¹⁵⁸ The concern over ratification was specifically cited by Defense Secretary Cohen as a key factor in the administration's decision to limit its support to the Visegrad three. "Clinton Urges 3 New Nato Members" Washington Post (June 13, 1997). See also: Trent Lott, "The Senate's Role in NATO Enlargement" Washington Post (March 21, 1997).

¹⁵⁹ Interview.

Drawing from the discussion in the previous sections of the Paper, Table Ten, below, considers the possible ramifications and risks inherent in the Alliance decision. These political and strategic ramifications are not presented in terms of a hierarchy, but rather as issues which may arise depending on the nature of the prevailing political and security climate in Europe as a whole.

On the one hand, in terms of those outcomes which might be described as positive, the decision will limit possible ratification problems which might otherwise have arisen in some member countries, most notably the United States. The financial costs associated with enlargement will also be lower and the decision may avoid early political complications in NATO's political relationship with Russia which might otherwise have emerged.

However, a second and greater number of outcomes arising from NATO's decision are potentially negative. First, as a consequence of the Alliance decision, NATO's strategic and political weight in the Balkan/Black Sea region will now be less than what it would have been had Romania entered the Alliance. NATO will thus have less ability to influence the evolution of events in the region and its interests in the region will be less pronounced. The Romanians have always expressed concern about the potential opportunities that this development may afford Russia. For the present, Russia is likely too weak to be able to take any immediate advantage of this.

TABLE TEN - POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF THE DECISION TO EXCLUDE ROMANIA FROM MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE IN THE FIRST ROUND

Potentially Positive Outcomes:

- The limits of consensus within the Alliance on the scope of enlargement will not be tested and ratification problems will be minimized;
- The financial costs associated with enlargement will be kept limited; and,
- Russia will not feel challenged in the Black Sea region thus limiting the prospect of a rise in regional NATO-Russian tensions.

Potentially Negative Outcomes:

- NATO's strategic position vis-a-vis Ukraine and the Balkans for "projecting stability" will be less advantageous than would be the case if Romanian territory were available;
- NATO's position in the Black Sea region will remain solely reliant on access to Turkish territory;
- Russia's present opportunity to pressure Ukraine and possibly to enhance its level of influence in the Balkan region will remain;
- Romania will not become an Alliance member and NATO will not be able to plan for regional contingencies on the assumption that Romanian forces will be available;

- Given economic sacrifices and political concessions which have been made to meet the NATO criteria, Romanian disappointment at not being admitted in the first wave is likely to be significant. This could possibly undermine the government's efforts to secure political support for continued austerity measures and increase support for hard-line nationalist movements in Romania;
- Hungary's likely admission to the Alliance may contribute to a rise in resentment within Romania at the different treatment being afforded the two countries;
- Scepticism with regard to NATO's future willingness to admit Romania and other east European states in second, and possibly subsequent, enlargement rounds will remain;
- Unless NATO moves quickly to a second round enlargement, a limited first round enlargement is likely to enhance East European concerns about the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe; and,
- Greater expectations will likely exist for the new EAPC to draw non-member Eastern European countries closer to NATO. If Eastern European countries see EAPC as falling short in this regard, a return to renationalized defence and security policies in Eastern Europe may follow.

However, this cannot be taken for granted in the future. In this regard, the longer the delay to a second round of enlargement, the greater the potential for an increase in Russian influence in the region.

Second, despite the seeming positive public reaction of the Romanian people to President Clinton's post-Madrid Summit visit to Bucharest, there is great disappointment in Romania at not being included in the Alliance in the first round. The fact that on July 16, Romania was also excluded from the group of countries possibly to be invited to enter the European Union early in the next century, will have heightened the country's deep disappointment and anxiety.¹⁶⁰

Romanians have always feared that missing the NATO train will result in their country slipping ever further behind those other eastern European states that are in that first wave. Indeed, the former Romania Defence Minister Gheorghe Tinca argued in 1996:

If out of the six Central European nations only some are admitted and if their integration requires high costs, then they will continue to be preferred in the orientation of the economic and financial Western support not because of any sympathies but as a need to strengthen their economy in order to generate internal resources necessary to integration.

¹⁶⁰ The six countries invited to enter talks with the EU were Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. "EU opening door to East" Globe and Mail (July 16, 1997).

The outsiders will have only leftovers and it will be quite natural that major foreign investors will not be interested in countries with no clear security perspective. ...¹⁶¹

Romanian anger at missing the NATO train was apparent in the immediate aftermath of President Clinton's announcement on June 12 that the United States would not be supporting Romanian admission to the Alliance in the first round. At that time President Constantinescu stated that Romanians would see the American decision as "cynical" and as indicative of the fact that the United States as "incapable of analyzing global interest".¹⁶²

The Romanian reaction was predictable considering the above factors and given the extraordinary efforts which the country had made to be included in NATO in the first round. After his election in the fall of 1996, President Constantinescu promised that his government would pursue the "greatest diplomatic offensive in the nation's history" in order to secure entry into NATO. There followed, in late 1996 and into 1997, a series of foreign visits by the President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister and members of Parliament. In order to demonstrate the bipartisan political support which existed for NATO enlargement the former Foreign Minister, Teodor Melescanu, was made Chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission of Parliament and thus headed visits by the Commission to the United States. Even the former King Michael, who was deposed by the Communists in 1947 but who had his citizenship restored by the Constantinescu government, was enlisted to visit European countries to plead Romania's case.

A national consensus has been built around the fact that there is no alternative to securing entry into NATO (and ultimately to other western institutions) and this is unlikely to change easily. Nevertheless, in some quarters in Romania the political compromises and economic sacrifices made over the last several years in order to meet the NATO criteria will now be seen as having been wasted. It is too early to tell if the resulting national disappointment, will lead to popular disillusionment with government austerity measures, to a backlash against the treaties concluded

¹⁶¹ Gheorghe Tinca, "NATO Enlargement - How to meet Individual and Collective Interests" Central European Issues 2 (Spring 1996): 32-33.

¹⁶² Lisa McAdams and Jeremy Branstein, "NATO: Romanian President Appeals For Membership" (RFE/RL Internet News - June 23, 1997).

with Hungary and Ukraine, to anger with suggestions of the need for further sacrifices to sustain increased defence spending so as to modernize the armed forces, or to a possible increase in support for hardline nationalist parties.

The final, and perhaps the most important, of the negative outcomes associated with the NATO decision, involves the political challenges that will be generated from pressure (both from potential second round candidates and their supporting NATO patrons) to move quickly to a second round of enlargement. This pressure is a certainty, given anxiety in Romania and other potential candidate states that any lengthy delay in moving to a second round will kill the chances of it ever taking place. This push by candidate countries is sure to be underscored in the coming months and years by NATO states such as France. Indeed, at the Madrid Summit President Chirac came out strongly in favour of a positive decision in 1999 on Romania's admission to the Alliance.¹⁶³

Just as certainly, however, pressure from many other countries within the Alliance will be for a "go slow approach" to a second round of enlargement.¹⁶⁴ The management of these two conflicting orientations will not be made easier by the continued existence of serious internal divisions and quarrels in the Alliance. Such internal divisions seem to be inevitable given the process by which the Madrid decision was reached and due to the even greater difficulties that NATO will have in reaching a consensus on a second round enlargement which will now be focused on extending NATO beyond the confines of Central Europe.

Romania's admission to the Alliance in the first round was perhaps the most important gesture that NATO could have made to reinforcing the policy position that there would be no new dividing lines in Europe. A broader scope to

¹⁶³ France. Ministry of Foreign Affairs "North Atlantic Council Press Conference given by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic - July 8, 1997" Bulletin d' Information en Langue Anglaise (July 10, 1997)

¹⁶⁴ In this regard, in June 1997, Helmut Schäfer, the junior Minister in the German Foreign Office described the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement as "frightening". He cautioned that "After the first round... we should think about a security system for the whole of Europe before more harm is done". Paul Goble "NATO: Analysis From Washington - NATO After Round One" (RFE/RL Internet News - June 19, 1997).

enlargement might well have had the benefit of easing the pressure on the Alliance with regard to proceeding immediately to discussions on a second round. Likewise, if east European states became convinced of NATO's determination to breach traditional dividing lines in Europe, they may well have placed greater confidence in EAPC as a genuine stepping stone to full NATO membership. Since Romania's entry in the first round was by now perceived as being so closely linked to the ultimate evolution of American policy, the country's admission could also have been the most tangible demonstration of the determination of the United States to put its full political weight behind an ambitious enlargement which went beyond what was conventionally expected. However, given the limited scope enlargement approved at Madrid, there will now be greater pressures on the EAPC process to demonstrate that it can act as an effective bridge in Europe and prevent the emergence of new dividing lines. The Madrid Decision has not ended the debate over Romania's entry into the Alliance. Instead, that debate has now merely entered a new phase. Indeed, the Madrid Communiqué asserts that Alliance will review the process of enlargement at another summit to be held in 1999, though it remains to be seen whether there will be sufficient consensus to move ahead with a second round at that time. The Communiqué also specifically references Romania and Slovenia as aspiring candidate countries that are in the first wave for consideration in a second round.¹⁶⁵

In the first phase of the enlargement debate, the process was driven by the interests of the Alliance's two most powerful member states - the United States and Germany. However, having now met most of its key strategic and political objectives in the first round of enlargement, Germany is unlikely to be as enthusiastic about proceeding to a second round. The United States role in the second round debate will thus be potentially even more important and pivotal than it was in round one.

This raises the possibility of convergence in American and French policy. However, the French push for a second round decision as early as 1999, may well be too soon for Washington. Indeed, although right now the United States remains officially enthusiastic about continued enlargement, this position will be dependent on retaining a bipartisan

¹⁶⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation - Issued by the Heads of State and Government (Madrid: July 8, 1997). Paragraphs Eight.

domestic consensus on the issue. If the absorption process with regard to the admission of the first round member states goes well, if the security climate in Europe remains favourable, if ratification by the United States is relatively unproblematic, and if Romania continues to make progress in its economic reforms, then the United States will likely continue to push for the movement to a second round. If however, circumstances in any of these areas change, then the enlargement process may stagnate. In this sense, the longer a second round decision is delayed, the greater the chance that the process of enlargement will be upset by political and strategic developments in Europe.

Whatever the timing of a decision to move ahead on a second round of enlargement, it will be necessary to convince Congress that America has vital interests in Romania which warrant that country's admission to the Alliance. This will likely only be possible in the context of a continued consensus in the United States that NATO enlargement is the essential cornerstone for constructing a new and peaceful European security order. In the absence of such an American consensus, political support in the United States for enlargement will collapse. If American support for enlargement collapses, so will enlargement itself.

As a result of these factors, Romanian and other east European leaders whose countries have aspirations to join the Alliance, will be filled with a heightened sense of urgency with regard to their diplomatic efforts to join NATO. These efforts will increasingly be seen as a race against time - and against the possible political and economic downturns that the future might hold. This will significantly enhance the political importance of the second round of NATO enlargement discussions. Indeed, the second round of discussion may well be considerably more important than the first in terms of both shaping the European security order of the 21st century, and in defining the role of the North Atlantic Alliance in that order.

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