

**Legitimacy And Support Of Defence And the Army In Local Communities  
And Their Democratic Representations In the Czech Republic**

**Final Report 1997**

**NATO Research Fellowship**

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**Abstract.**

The submitted manuscript deals with the development of legitimacy and support of defence and the army in the Czech Republic after November 1989. The author focuses his analysis on the period after a brisk decline of confidence in the army from the middle of 1993. He compares factors which participated in this decline with factors which led during the first two and a half years after revolution to a relatively great confidence of citizens in the army.

The author proved the validity of three groups of hypotheses:

1. This development of legitimacy is conditioned by a series of concurrent objective and subjective factors in local communities and their democratic representations.
2. At the level of political representations (government, political parties, parliament) the programme of transformation of defence is pushed to the periphery of state priorities due to the concept of policy focused mainly on economic problems.
3. The army lost its active role in helping to create civic and military relations, it became in particular isolated from society and citizens as regards information and co-operation.

As to the methodological approach the study is based on analysis of the contents of political documents and provisions focused on the transformation of defence, on the author's empirical research of citizens and representatives of local administrations and members of parliament in the Czech Republic in 1995 and 1996, implemented by the author in conjunction with investigations of public policy at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. The author confronted his findings with those of secondary analyses of similar investigations and with results of interviews with workers of the Ministry of Defence and commanders of regional units of the foreseen territorial defence army.

In the conclusion the author identifies opportunities to promote the legitimacy and support of defence and the army in the Czech Republic. In his opinion this involves creation of harmony between political decisive élites, the army and the public in local communities, in particular as regards restoration of their co-ordination and an increase of priority for support defence as a state policy. The first step towards it was made at the beginning of 1997 by adoption of the new concept of national defence strategy by the president and government. The second opportunity is to take advantage of the reform of public administration, in particular establishment of regional representations and citizens of communities and towns for the support of defence and collaboration with the newly established territorial defence units. The third opportunity involves according to the author the developing defence community in the Czech Republic which is beginning to transfer the problem of defence of the country into society as a whole and which is creating valuable stimuli for a change of military political thinking in particular in conjunction with preparations of the country to join NATO.



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AND THE ARMY IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES  
AND THEIR DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIONS  
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## X. Introduction

### Why this subject at this time?

*A thus defined subject may seem to those who were previously the authors or readers of reflections on the transformation of the Czechoslovak and later Czech Army somewhat too focused on social problems and it may appear to be from an area with which the plans on transformation were not concerned.*

*I do not wish by concentrating attention on legitimacy and support of defence and the army to reduce the significance of these documents programmes and reflections which predominated in the transformation (as remarked by L.Hodboï, 1996), programmes of reduction of numbers, reduction of the volume of military technique and perspective intentions and evaluation of results of reorganisations, creation of a logistic and information system, in particular the air force. Similarly as L. Hodboï I feel that completion of the transformation is hampered by the fact that „substantially less attention was devoted to the functioning of the army“.*

*If we compare the intended concept of the building of the army up to 1996 adopted shortly after the formation of an independent Czech Republic in 1993 with the actually achieved results of transformation we can see a picture of an incompleted complex process .Its course is characterised in particular by parallel destruction and somewhere only reduction of the communist army, its political neutralisation and subjection to civilian control. The creation of the basis of civilian control of the army is one of the most successful features of the democratic transformation of defence and the army in the Czech Republic. A major role in this was played by president Václav Havel implementing consistently his role of commander in chief, partly also by other institutions , such as the parliament and government. The advantages of this objective aspects of control of the army and defence was its relatively rapid legislative definition and enforcement already in federal Czechoslovakia and the fact that a close consensus was reached between members of parliament in the government and opposition as regards its perspective in the independent Czech Republic.*

***A yet unresolved problem of civilian control of the army remains despite many successful initiative activities of the army as regards more liberal information and communication with the public a certain isolation of the army in relation to other government departments, the public and local administration, in particular in local communities of large towns and medium-sized and small communities. From this ensues the very low grade of participating opportunities and actual participation, in particular local communities and their representatives. The beginning successful civilian control of the army at a central level thus does not proceed at the regional and local level and lacks a feedback. It was found that this absence of a feedback in civil control of the army influenced also central institutions and led at the government level, roughly from 1992 to the end of 1996, to reduced interest of the government and parliament in the activities and transformation of the army.***

***I have taken into account this deficit of the civilian control of the army when formulating the subject of my project. I assume that it will be urgent to deal with it in conjunction with building armies of territorial defence. It will be also necessary to elucidate it at a nationwide level during the reform of the public administration of the Republic as in addition to local administrations also regional ones should be created. The solution of these problems is only just starting. It is therefore urgent to include from the very beginning also the aspect of enhancement of civilian and military relations on the background of general improvement of the civilian control of the army.***

## **XX. On the methodology of research**

The objective of the research has been to analyse the trends and developmental opportunities of legitimacy and civic support of defence and the army of the Czech Republic in particular in the environment of local communities and their democratic representations. The project is concerned with the legitimacy and civic support of the army as part of the democratic transformation of society.

It should provide findings on the possible extension of participation of citizens and administrations in towns and communities in defence and in particular in the creation and functioning of brigades and battalions of the foreseen army of territorial defence of the Czech Republic. In general the solution of the project should provide stimuli and suggestions to strengthen a significant dimension of civilian and military relations, i.e. the purposeful development of contacts and participation of citizens and administrations in the defence of their own territory.

The project is based on the theory of legitimacy conceived in Habermas sense as the "consensus theory of truth", where "truth" is conceived as warranted assertibility" under conditions of ideal "communicative competence" (Habermas, J., 1973, Scaff, L.A., 1985 +). In its applied form the project uses Mayer's concept and classification of democratic legitimacy (Mayer, G., 1973). I am using as a basis his differentiation of legal and legitimate justification. While legal implies in line with laws, and the constitution, resp. "legitimacy" characterises a specific defined quality of civic relations to their political system", in our case its sub-system - defence and the army. Legitimacy is objectively based on values, standards, institutions, rules, procedures, people and the activity of a political system. Subjective expressions of legitimacy are perception, attitudes and the

behaviour of citizens. Thus legitimacy is part of the subjective dimension of the political system, its political culture. It is manifested at the macro - as well as micro-level of society (cf. Mayer, G., 1973). Subjective legitimacy is the expression of the relationship of citizens to objective elements of legitimacy and expresses the degree of their understanding (cognitive aspect), emotional relationship, appreciation and action (interest in participation). Legitimacy is based on the consensus of citizens, values and goals on which in turn the powers and activities of institutions in democratic society are based. I conceive legitimacy as civic justification of these institutions to act in the interest of citizens in the following grades:

**1. Predominantly active legitimacy** : agreement (confidence, satisfaction) of the majority of the population with the values, aims and activities of institutions and at the same time the good will of a substantial proportion of citizens to support and participate

**2. Partial active legitimacy** : general agreement of the minority or agreement of the majority with some values, aims and activities of institutions, incl. the will to support and interest in participation

**3. Passive legitimacy** : general agreement of the majority of citizens, however, minimal will to support and interest in participation.

This type of legitimacy is a minimal consensus which still justifies institutions to act in agreement with citizens.

**4. Non-legitimacy** : implies lack of agreement of the majority and no support and no interest in participation

+) )

The selected typology represents ideal types of legitimacy encountered in practice in a mixed form. I assume also that the quantitative definition such as "agreement of the majority", "minority" give any sense only when related to actual political situations and specific conditions of social development. This pertains obviously also to the period of democratic transformation in the Czech Republic, where we probably will have so use frequently some deviations from this ideal typology and conditions for their definition. Such an example is e.g. agreement (confidence) of the "relevant minority" of citizens instead of the majority.

The research foresaw a specific selection of indicators to assess the legitimacy of defence and the army. Therefore I broke down the concept of legitimacy into **operable variables** which are based on **two substantial components of legitimacy** : **a/ agreement of citizens** (confidence, preference, satisfaction) and **b/ expression of the will to support and interest in participation** in defence and the army. **Legitimacy in the investigation was indicated by:**

- **interest** of citizens in the defence capacity of the Republic as compared with interest in other important public issues

- **confidence of citizens in the army**

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<sup>+) )</sup> Scaff. L.A (1985) introduced 3 most recent interpretations of legitimacy: (1.) „Some theorists have moved towards developing a theory of *illegitimacy*, arguing that the real problems of the modern state lie with its essential lack of legitimacy. (2) Social scientists attracted to empirical theory have open dropped the term legitimacy altogether, hoping to avoid troublesome normative issues, and have instead looked only for quantifiable „regime support“. (3) Probably the most innovative direction has been taken by those investigating processes and strategies of legitimation used by the state (particularly in the domains of science, technology, education and communication) to shore up sagging belief in its right to rule.“

- **confidence in the Ministry of Defence**
- **satisfaction with the transformation** of the army
- **satisfaction with the safeguarding of defence**
- **types of support of the country 's defence** (participation in defence )
- **attitudes to stationing of military unit** at site of domicile
- **concept institutional and information measures** of the army (Ministry of Defence, regional commands) to ensure confidence of the population and local administrations as regards the stationing of territorial defence forces - **expectations and concept of collaboration** with units of the territorial army on the part of the local administrations.

**Subjects of research:**

**included:**

- a) citizens** - a selected sample of 1007 citizens of the Czech Republic (Investigation: Policy and public - citizens in May 1995)
- b) representatives of local administrations** ( an empirical survey on local representatives from selected localities (investigation Policy and public - local representatives in May 1995).
- c) workers of the Ministry of Defence** of Czech Republic . Interview with workers of Ministry of Defence and regional commands of prepared territorial army- in April 1997.
- d) members of parliament** of the Czech Republic ( 146 members - empirical survey in April 1996)
- e) results of survey as regards confidence of citizens** of the Czech Republic in the army since 1990 (secondary analysis).

**Techniques used for investigation**

The following basic techniques were used:

- standardised interview in empirical nation wide survey and survey in parliament
- consultative detailed interview with workers of the Ministry of Defence, regional commands and representatives of local administrations
- analysis of the contents of the documents
- secondary analysis of data from the literature
- statistical processing and testing of results of survey.

**Implementation of the survey:**

The survey was implemented partly in conjunction with a public policy survey I coordinate at the Faculty of Social Sciences Charles University, Prague since 1994 to 1996(+), partly it was an independent project. Both parts of the survey are coordinated to make it possible to combine and compare the results. It will be possible to confront the results of the project on the legitimacy and support of the defence and the army with the characteristic of the political orientation of citizens, their interests and relationship to the state and public policy. Indicators of legitimacy of defence and army were then compared with indicators of other state and non-government institutions concerned with public policy.

This interrelationship of the two parts of the surveys could enable us to obtain data on nationwide and local phenomena of legitimacy and support of defence and the army.

(+<sup>(+)</sup>)

As compared with the basic plan it proved possible to hasten the implementation of the field survey of citizens and representatives of local authorities by six months. This enabled me to supplement the work on the project by participation in another project - a survey in the Czech Parliament which I prepared in collaboration with the Sociological Institute of the Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic and Professor Simon from the East Carolina University in the USA. Conversely a roughly 6-month delay occurred as far as the discussions with representatives of the Ministry of Defence are concerned. This was due to a delay in the preparations of the new concept of the army of the Czech Republic. This delay was in a way beneficial for the project - in my discussions with army officials I was able to verify some of the conclusions of my research.

## Part I:

### Legitimacy and support of defence and the army as a public policy problem of the democratic transformation of the Czech Republic after 1989.

The grade of legitimacy and support of defence and the army is, no doubt, a public political problem. Its object is a social sphere which can be defined as public goods, individually indivisible and separate which cannot be ensured mostly by private agencies and the market. A peculiar feature of these public goods - the country's defence is its potential effect which frequently can be implemented with a long-term perspective. From the position of the state and society the state and quality of these public goods is subordinated to the function of defence of society against an armed threat from the outside.

It becomes thus the subject of public interest focused on long-term values of the democratic state. Components of this public interest are then also constitutive factors of its object, i.e. defence. This condition laid down in the law of defence of the Czech Republic is also the compulsory participation of citizens in the country's defence.

The country's defence as a nation-wide duty necessarily calls for an optimal agreement and support. A democratic state which would lose the legitimacy for its defence would have to change its parliamentary representation and government. Defence without the citizens support is possible only under exceptionally circumstances and is impossible for a prolonged period. Therefore we are reflecting on the legitimacy and support of defence as a significant problem of public interest in a democratic society, a problem which indirectly is a prerequisite of its existence and development (see Purkrábek, 1997).

## Chapter 1.:

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(+) This research „An Analysis of Public Policy Formation and Implementation in the Czech Republic“ (1994 - 1996 included 11 spheres of Public Policy, for instant social policy, ecological policy, housing policy, prevention of crime, and defence policy too. Due it there was very good opportunity for joining that research with my project.

# Development of the legitimacy and support of defence and the army after November 1989.

## **1.1. RECENT AND HISTORICALLY CODITIONED TRENDS OF CIVIC SUPPORT OF DEFENCE AND THE ARMY.**

After more than seven years following the breakdown of the communist regime after establishment of a successfully developing market economy and foundations of a plural democratic system the civic legitimacy of defence and the army and their public support in the Czech Republic still remains a serious problem. **The main reasons of these phenomena are following:**

**A) A change of the quality of civic legitimacy and support** which existed during the initial period of democratic and pro-market transformation of society into a more demanding legitimacy and support. While after the revolution the citizens appreciated that the army has become loyal and politically neutral to the democratic government and society, but still conceived it as an alien institution taken over by the revolution, during the subsequent period they put higher demands on it. They started to perceive it as an institution where they should have a say, which is subjected to civic control and thus is their own institution. Their confidence was no longer only gratitude that the armed forces did not become an impediment of the democratic transformation of society but they started to ask whether defence and the army are democratic, how the concept of „soldiers as citizens" works in practice.

**B) Dominance of concentration of social forces to create basic institutions of political democracy and in particular to enforce market economy in two waves of privatisation has diverted the attention of politicians and citizens to the majority of issues of public life which required public funding.**

**C) The third important reason which makes the problem of legitimacy and support of defence in the Czech Republic very urgent at present is the incipient orientation of citizens towards democratic values.**

The post-revolutionary period of euphoric and broad humanitarian ideas is over used by the Civic Forum headed by president Václav Havel, which led citizens to take over democratic powers and which met the desires of the public for a radical change. And what followed - the fascination with open opportunities of liberal freedom which gave priority to pragmatic action without detailed assessment of values - is also coming towards its end. People found that freedom of activity without borderlines of responsibility leads to wilfulness and sometimes even to crime.

My investigations the results of which I am presenting so far in outline in chapter 2 as well as other investigations conducted at the time in the Czech Republic (Potùèek, M., 1997, Øehák, J., Bártová, I., 1996 and others) confirm this trend. Attention of citizens is focused, so far only in some areas, to ensure the future and towards higher values of the democratic community.

**D) The fourth reason which emphasizes the urgent character of legitimacy and support of defence of the Czech Republic are changes in the perception of safety risks and a more realistic view as regards safeguarding the country in conjunction with the safety of Central Europe.**

During most of the time after November 1989 among people the hope prevailed that the Czech Republic has returned among friendly countries and nobody will threaten her. The only great anticipated menace - the assumed mass migration of the Russian population did not occur. Thus in some groups, e.g. university students, and at first also

in representative workers of the military commission of the political leadership of the Civic Forum illusions developed that the existing army can be "stopped" as regards provision of armaments, training of professionals or that it may be even restricted to a small symbolic group of professionals with "smart uniforms".

This illusion in a milder form did not even avoid political representatives who contributed in a major way to the disintegration of the Visegrad group of three, later four which was to play a useful part in filling the safety vacuum in Central Europe and the preparation of these countries for easier admittance to NATO (see in Purkrábek, M., 1996a). During the last 2-3 years political representatives as well as the public are gradually giving up this carefree attitude as far as safety is concerned.

**E) The fifth aspect which affects the level and form of legitimacy and support of defence and the army are guarantees citizens granted by defence representatives, in particular the Ministry of Defence and the army.**

The army is an important symbol of the country's defence. It is also a symbol of the state it serves and is part of. This double importance of the army as a symbol is sensitively considered and perceived by Czech citizens not only at present but in conjunction with various historical reminiscences and persisting stereotypes.

**First** of all I must mention a somewhat complex controversial phenomenon: a group of stereotype attitudes of citizens to authorities, in particular the state, not excluding defence and its institutions.

This stereotype developed as a defence mechanism of the nation which was deprived by the European powers de facto since 1620 and legally several years later of its own state for 300 years. The loss of the Czech state was associated by a tragic "decapitation of the nation" (Køen, J, 1992)..

In recent history the Czech nation had its own state only for twenty years between the first and second world war and three years before the communist coup in 1948 when it became for another 41 years the vassal of the Soviet Union. Thus during the almost 400 last years the Czech nation had its own state only 23 years and with the last seven years after the breakdown of communism a total of 30 years.

**This brief reminder of history is very important for understanding the typical controversial attitude of Czech citizens to the state and everything which represents the state.** Because it was at the beginning of its independence acquired for the third time (1918, 1945, 1989) a plebeian, equalitarian nation which considered the state as a rule as an alien suppresser.

Traces and cultural behavioural patterns persisted used by the people to defend themselves against oppressors. On the one hand they are characterised by an opposition to the state, by a national movement which developed to a great extent beyond the state as mentioned by the well known Czech historian Jan Køen (1992). On the other hand people tried to be smart in relation to the authorities. The Austrian monarchy and later also the communist regime tried to pacify the people by clever social advantages and benefits. An attitude developed which could be described briefly as follows: distrust of the state but get from the state what can be got. In the communist era this attitude was developed "up to-date" and reached the form of semilegal stealing of state property. Analyses of economists, opponents of the regime revealed that in the eighties the illegal gray economy which drew raw materials from state resources accounted for some 30-40% of the gross national product. The popular slogan then was "who does not steal, deprives his family" which meant the state which owned almost everything.

This double-faced relationship to the state penetrates even into the present time, partly it is however changing due to the increasing identification of citizens with the new liberal Czech state and the opportunities of civic liberty. Nevertheless it is apparent in a phenomenon which predominates in the Czech population and which we revealed in surveys of the relation of citizens to public policy. We used for it the term: "Czech liberal with the state wind supporting him from behind!". The finding was that 83.0% citizens are in favour of a liberally conceived freedom but at the same time 86.7% are in favour of a paternalistically conceived equality of citizens. 72.3% citizens are concurrently for liberty and equality. Everything suggests that the enthusiasm for freedom is not yet balanced by a feeling of responsibility for their actions incl. meeting their needs (see in Purkrábek, M.: The citizen and public policy, 1996b).

In relation to defence and the army this residue of the past was manifested in the tendency of young men to avoid military service and there was even the determined demand of complete professionalization of the army motivated by the desire to abolish the duty of military service.

This double-faced attitude even to the democratic state was manifested, as I shall demonstrate in subsequent chapters in more detail also in the different expression of confidence in the state representative, i.e. the Ministry of Defence (14% of citizens had confidence in him in May 1995) and the army which citizens perceive incl. soldiers called up for military service was trusted in 1995 by 36-38 % citizens (Purkrábek, M., Sarvaš, Š., 1996)..

**Secondly, the contemporary perception of defence and the army modifies the stereotype of attitudes which may be called a predominance of pragmatic attitudes based on experience over attitudes based on ideas.** It is associated also with historical experience of the Czech nation where active practical approach proved useful and where periodically up to 1989 the intelligentsia was persecuted and frequently was in opposition to the state. The Czech nation gave humanity very valuable ideas - it worked its way to the renaissance and capitalist world (Jan Hus, Jan Žižka already in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Jiří z Poděbrad in 16<sup>th</sup> century, Jan Komenský, 17<sup>th</sup> century, more recently T.G. Masaryk, Karel Čapek etc.). However, these ideological uprisings were always defeated and were followed by occupation by the conquerors. The attitude of citizens of the Czech Republic to ideas is similar as to culture which helped them, due to exceptional improvisation and spirit of enterprise to liberate themselves and finally do disrupt this large empire. However, also their subsequent great idea of the political Czechoslovak nation was finally defeated and led in 1993 to the splitting of Czechoslovakia. This feature was as regards the attitude to the army and defence promoted in particular by the scepticism regarding the expedience of defence and the army in conjunction with three instances when the army did not fight or interfere (against fascist Germany in 1938, in 1948 against the communist coup and in 1968 against the armies of the USSR and Warsaw pact). It was thus a response to the proclaimed role of the army which was not implemented.

This pragmatic view of the public based on experience is manifested also in the evaluation of all actual visible activities of soldiers in relation to the public, information provided by the army, economic and cultural and other collaboration of military units with civilians. This approach deprived of ideology and essentially pragmatic has deeper roots and is due to the haughtiness of the former army and the usefulness of military units stationed in communities and towns.

**The third "inherited" element of citizens attitudes to the army and defence are variations as regards the willingness of defence depending on the assessment of safety risks.**

The history of the country reveals a traditionally high willingness of defence. If the nation was to survive overpowered and encircled it had to defend itself. However the defence was usually uncoordinated (the revolt in 1618 - see Ernest Denis, 1909) and when was integrated (1938), the people was only too willing to defend the country, the political leadership failed).

Another feature repeatedly occurring in history was the striking diminution of willingness for defence when there was no immediate danger. Apparently the tradition of military elites and politicians is lacking who would be able to induce this will already at a time when there is still time for preparation of defence.

## 1.2. DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS OF CONFIDENCE.

This part should contribute empirical findings on the development of civic legitimacy and support of defence and the army based on indications of confidence and participation. The source of information were surveys of public opinion conducted by the Institute for investigation of public opinion in Prague as well as our own research conducted with the assistance of Factum Ltd, Prague and a survey of values among Czechoslovak male youth made by the Sociological Institute of the Academy of Sciences with the cooperation of the Military Institute of Social Research in Prague and some partial problems were obtained from other investigations made in the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (after 1989) and in the Czech Republic separately.

During the past seven years after the breakdown of the communist government and after the democratic government had taken over the army interest was focused on the confidence of citizens in the army. Only exceptionally the relationship of citizens to defence as a whole was investigated and the confidence of citizens in the Ministry of Defence.

The confidence of citizens in the army developed in at least three developmental stages which were related to three different periods of transformation of the army, depending on the transformation of society.

### Stage I:

Postrevolutionary stage : political neutralization and loyalization of the army ( from November 1989 roughly to June 1990 after the first free elections).

### Stage 2:

Stage of democratisation, reorganisation and reduction. (From June 1990 to the division of Czechoslovakia and its army on January 1, 1993)

### Stage 3:

Development of the Army of the Czech Republic by reconstruction and reduction of the Czech part of the federal army and beginning of its modernization to the standard of NATO armies ( from Jan.1, 1993 to the present time).

**In the FIRST POSTREVOLUTIONARY STAGE** the following associations predominated in the relations of citizens to the army :

**-ethos of safeguarding the democratic power** against a possible threat on the part of followers of the communist regime, gratitude for the " protective role" of the army in conjunction with the first free elections, the activities of the new parliament and government, appreciation of the loyal behaviours of the army.

- **criticism of the army for its communist provenience** , personal structure, excessive numbers and armament and isolation from citizens, a predominating feeling that it is still an "alien army".

-**appreciation of the neutralisation of the army** (ban of membership of soldiers in political parties) and humanisation of conditions of military service.

In this stage the army acquired a sort of confidence "in blank" on the part of citizens (January 1990 - 48% of citizens have confidence in the army, see fig. 1.). An important part in this respect was played by Václav Havel as commander in chief, who vouched for the army and the minister of defence general Miroslav Vacek. General Vacek by his loyal attitude, although he was not a convinced adherent of the revolution and by his charismatic influence "curbed" some compromised and undemocratic officers and the most compromised were discharged from the army (see Purkrábek, M., Rašek, A., 1991). During this period president Havel ensured a loyalization of the army with the support of some 1000 rehabilitated officers who had been discharged from the army after 1968 and represented a potent element of the internal democratic control of the army which was in close association with external civic control, in particular the defence and safety committee of the Federal parliament.

**In STAGE 2 of democratisation , reorganisation and reduction of the army** the reasons for the "in blank" loyalization credit of the army and the relation of citizens to the army started to express demands of democratisation.

In the citizens confidence in the army the following aspects started to dominate :

-**political democratic qualities of the leadership of the army** and professional soldiers. This led to powerful criticism of leading officials, in particular minister Vacek and some generals and higher officers and called for their discharge from the army (Information evaluation the Czechoslovak press articles, 1990-91),

-**criticism of conditions as regards activities and relations** in the army ( relationship of professional soldiers and conscripts, criticism of the system of education and training , slow organisation of democratic organisations and societies etc.). An important part as regards mediation of citizens views was played during this period by the mass media.

- **criticism of the reserved attitude of the army** as regards information and poor contact with the civilian population

- **inadequate social provisions and information** within the framework of reorganisation during shifts of military units from the western part of the country to the eastern one.

-**the situation associated with the division of the federal state** and army , in conjunction with which the public expressed fears whether the army will fulfil this difficult task.

***The development of citizens confidence in the army during this period was recorded in four surveys of public opinion .***

***In the first survey ( September 1990) the citizens confidence in the army declined to a very low level (36%). During this period criticism in army representatives, in particular minister Vacek, culminated. In the second and third survey (June 1991, April 1992) confidence increased .In this participated no doubt the fact that a civilian minister, a collaborator of the president during the period of dissent Luboš Dobrovský, became minister and that a major number of compromised generals and officers left the army and information on the army and ministry of defence was more readily disclosed.***

**Confidence in the army during this period was expressed by as many as 57% of citizens (in June 1991) and 66% (in April 1992).**

**The fourth survey of this period (September 1992) took place during the "sore" situation between the splitting of federal Czechoslovakia. As a result of the election in May 1992 Luboš Dobrovský had to abandon the post of minister ( he was a candidate of the Civic movement which lost the elections) and for the period up to the division of the army general Andrejčák a man lacking views of his own was appointed. Along with the departure of other collaborators of minister Dobrovský, e.g. deputy minister Antonín Rašek, who had considerable prestige among the public , citizens had a feeling of a provisional position of the army and its leadership.**


**Citizens expressed this uncertainty by the hitherto lowest confidence in the army - 31%.**

**STAGE 3:** The development of the new Army of the Czech Republic by reconstruction and reduction of the federal army and onset of its modernisation to a standard of NATO member states was characterised by a rapid rise of the citizens confidence in the army and a subsequent gradual decline. The trend is illustrated in fig.1.

**Fig. 1.**

**Trend of citizens confidence in the army of the Czech Republic from 1990**

% of confidence



**The citizens confidence is given in per cent and is the sum of more vehement confidence ( answers: certainly yes ) and weaker confidence (rather yes).**

## Surveys in 1990-1997

	Before separation					After separation							
Year	1990		91	1992		1993		94	95		96		97
Month	1	9	6	4	9	2	5	9	2	10	2	10	2
N	886	679	405	817	577	775	760	854	1023	982	996	1481	1136

Source: Surveys on the confidence of citizens in some institutions, Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Prague, 1990 - 1997.

*From the figure a marked increase of citizens confidence during the first year up to the middle of the second year is apparent (1993 and half 1994) when the new army of the CR was built but also a decline of confidence in 1995 and in 1996 ( the lowest since 1990) and a slight increase of confidence at the beginning of 1997.. The distribution of confidence by age is of interest. It indicates a rising trend of confidence in the army with advancing age in Federal Czechoslovakia as well as in the Czech Republic (in three surveys since 1993 confidence in the army was expressed on average by 44.3% 18-29 year-old citizens , 46.0% 30-44-year-old ones , 48.0% 45-5-old ones and 50.3% 60.year and older ones. While the initial increase of confidence is usually associated with a calming feeling that the army ensured without conflicts and successfully its division and with a certain national tinge that we shall create our "own army" and hope that problems which remained unresolved during the past three years after the revolution will be resolved , the decline of confidence remains unexplained. The actual reasons were evaluated by the public in our survey Politics and the public (May 1995) where we tried to identify factors of the citizens confidence in the army.*

### 1.3. ACTUAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CONFIDENCE IN THE ARMY.

Actual factors of confidence in the army were the subject of my investigation in May 1995 i.e. the year when according to the survey in February (Purkrábek, M., Sarvaš, Š.,1996) the citizens confidence in the army reached the lowest level since the foundation of the army of the Czech Republic in 1993 - i.e. 36% and lack of confidence reached the highest level - 50%.

Citizens, representatives and officials of local administrations assessed how important they consider for their confidence in the army the following facts :(tab.1)

Table 1.

Factors of citizens confidence and of representatives of local administrations in the army

N (citizens) - 1007

N (local selfgovernment) - 222

Data in %

Factors	Citizens	Local selfgovern.
Quality of personality heading Ministry of defence and the army	80	81
Standard of professional officers and NCO s	80	81
Behaviour of soldiers in public	77	80
Usefulness of army for society also in peace time	69	66
Interest of state representatives in army	67	73
Effectiveness of civilian control of army	49	49
Information of mass media	36	37
Own experience with military service	28	21
Views held by my political party or - organisation close to me	23	34
Views held by relatives and friends on army	11	11

*From the results of the answers ensues that the decisive importance is ascribed by citizens as well as representatives of local administrations to the quality of personalities heading the ministry and army, to the standard of professional soldiers and the behaviour of soldiers in public - i.e. the quality of the structure and behaviour of the army.*

*The second group of factors are in their opinion factors outside the army - the usefulness of the army for society in peace time , the interest of state representatives, information of mass media and personal experience with military service.*

***Local representatives emphasized slightly more the influence of the interest of state representatives than citizens and contrary to citizens they included also the influence of their political party.***

***The third less emphasized group of factors is personal and political information of respondents. This group comprised : personal experience with military service, views held by „my“ political party or organisation close to „me“ and views held by relatives on the army in citizens , in local representatives only the first and third factor.***

***On the whole the views of citizens and representatives of actual factors of confidence in the army are practically in agreement with the exception of the influence of political parties which is obvious in representatives delegated by political parties.***

***Further analysis revealed that views of respondents on factors influencing their confidence in the army depend above all on their political orientation and preference of political parties and on their education and age.***

***Those preferring right wing centrally oriented parties emphasized the influence of quality of the personal structure and behaviour of army representatives and the influence of interest of state representatives in the army. Respondents with the left political orientation preferred the soldiers behaviours in public and the usefulness of the army for society also in peace time.***

***Educated citizens ascribed greater importance to the interest of state representatives in the army., to the effectiveness of civilian control of the army, to the personal structure and quality of the army and to their personal experience from military service***

***A special group is formed by citizens with elementary education only and the youngest group of respondents (18-29 years). They consider the following factors less important : interest of state representatives in the army, effectiveness of civilian control of the army and standard of professional soldiers.***

***The correlation with the willingness of citizens and local representatives to support defence personally suggests that those who prefer above all the personal structure and behaviour of army representatives, interest of state representatives in the army and their own experience with military service support defence more actively. (More details will be found in part 1.4. Forms and types of willingness to support defence, see Fig. 2 in appendix).***

#### **1.4. FORMS AND TYPES OF CIVIC SUPPORT OF DEFENCE.**

In the quoted survey *Politiccy and the public* (1995) I investigated the willingness of citizens and representatives of local administrations to support the country's defence.

Respondents expressed their view on seven forms of support of the country's defence (yes, no, do not know, not interested in ).

Table 2.

#### **Views on and support of country's defence**

## N (citizens)- 1007 N (local selfgovernment) - 222

Data in %

Type of support	Citizens			Local administration		
	Yes	No	Don't know+	Yes	No	Don't know+
active help in case of readiness for defence	50	18	32	60	11	29
assemble information on preparations for defence	45	9	46	57	10	33
contribute to it as a tax payer	40	34	26	56	23	21
do military service as a conscript, military exercises	36	39	25	40	37	33
work in defence organisations	15	43	42	19	44	37
work in the army as a civilian specialist	13	57	30	18	57	25
become a professional soldier	9	65	26	10	66	24

+ the answer "don't know includes answer "I am not interested".

*The results of answers given by citizens and representatives of local administrations agree as regards the order of preferred forms of support of defence. They differ as to the intensity of support which is in all items higher among representatives of administrations with the exception of the item "become a professional soldier" where the results are identical (difference within range of statistical error). The representatives differ markedly from other citizens by a higher percentage support to the first three items: active help in case of readiness for defence (60 : 50%), assemble information on preparations for defence (67 : 45%) and contribute to it as a tax payer (even 56 : 40%).*

Together with my collaborator Dr.Sarvaš we prepared a typological classification of defence support.: (see in Purkrábek, M., Sarvaš, Š., 1996)

**Type I: active participants of defence.** Comprises respondents who agreed with at least 5 of 7 forms of defence support:

**Type II: legislatively active supporters of defence.**

This comprises the replies of those who are willing to participate in support demanded by legislative rules. This relates to agreement with 3 of the submitted forms of support.

**Type III: passive supporters of defence**

This group comprises citizens who did not select any form of active support of defence but wish to contribute in a passive way: by taxes and they want to assemble information on defence.

#### **Type IV: opponents of defence support**

Refuse all forms of defence support.

The percentage ratio of these types of defence support is as follows :

**Table 3.**

### **Types of defence supporters**

N (citizens) - 1007

N (local administrations) -222

Data in %

Types of support	Citizens	Local selfgov
I: Active participants	9	13
II: Legislatively active supporters	27	40
III: Passive supporters	41	34
IV: Opponents of defence support	23	13

*Thus a total of 36% of citizens and 53% representatives of local administrations wish to provide active support, passive supporters account for 41% citizens and 34% members of administrations, opponents of support account for 23% and 13%. Opponents are partly citizens and representatives of local administrations who do not consider the defence capacity of the republic important (18.8% citizens and 16.3% representatives of local administrations - see tab.5. in appendix).*

*A significantly greater support to defence is recorded surprisingly among citizens with higher education ( active support of readiness for defence, information on defence), as well as by middle-aged and elderly citizens ( information on defence, work in defence organisations, professional soldiers ) and citizens from the higher income groups. As regards contribution to defence as tax payers greater support was expressed by right political wing and left wing respondents, contrary to a small support on the part of those sympathising with the centre and extreme left wing and extreme right wing. A greater support of defence was recorded also among citizens whose social prestige rose after 1990 and who are able to "live a life as they wish", i.e. advocates of a liberal concept of life.*

*Among critical groups with a smaller support of defence we can include above all respondents of the lowest age group (18-29 years), with elementary education and citizens from the smallest and small communities ( less contributor as taxpayers) and citizens from large cities ( less compulsory military service).*

*In general we may, based on these results of surveys consider the support of defence expressed by citizens and representatives of administrations as matching the development of democratic transformation in the Czech Republic. Relatively*

*promising is the willingness to assemble information on defence and work in the army as a civilian specialist and professional soldier. Reserves are found in the attitudes of citizens to contribute to defence by paying taxes, in their willingness to work in defence organisations and to do compulsory military service.*

*Behind the willingness for defence expressed by citizens and representatives of local administrations in their view regarding the importance of the defence capacity of the republic ( index of importance 3.63 from the possible maximum of 5 i.e. 72.6% consider it important, see table 1. In appendix ) still lags the willingness of citizens to support defence. This pertains in particular to active support expressed by 36% citizens and 53% representatives of local administrations. A certain reserve space for improvement is provision of more information to citizens and representatives of administrations on different forms of defence support ( lack of information as regards different forms of support is admitted by 10-24% citizens and 10-25% representatives of administrations). Another possibility is to motivate the interest of those who so far are not interested in these forms of support ( 11 - 25% citizens and 6 - 16% representatives of administrations). Correlation between activity and selection of factors of citizens confidence provided evidence that the more active citizens lay as regards support of defence greater emphasis on personal aspects of confidence ( quality of personalities in charge of the ministry, behaviour of soldiers, standard of officers and NCO's but also their own experience and interest of state representative in the army ). The two most important sources of positive influence in the army are the mass media and political parties. The interest of citizens in information on the army is indicated also by their active willingness to participate in the support ( see appendix table 5. ).*

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## **PART II.**

### **Actual and expected position of local communities in the development of civic military relations**

#### **Chapter 2:**

#### **LOCAL SUPPORT OF DEFENCE AND ARMY AS THE BASIC GRADE OF DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS**

In the transformation of the army into a defensive army during reconstruction of its organisational pattern (brigade system) long-term close contacts of army formations and units and local communities were disrupted. Multiple dislocations of military formations took place, many of them are in localities which are not used to them. At present the process of adaptation of these formations and citizens to the new situation is under way. At the same time further dislocation changes take place, incl. the formation of a territorial defence army. In recent years nobody in the CR was concerned with detailed analyses of the impact of this fact on the decline of the confidence of citizens in the army. Some reports (e.g. a pilot study by workers of the Military Institute for Social Research in 1992) signalled that for some communities the departure of military units meant a deterioration of economic conditions, curtailment of cultural facilities , sports events etc. Similarly the arrival of military units into new communities was associated with demands with which the local administration coped only with difficulty due to the yet unstable conditions of the economic transformation ( housing shortage). This means that the dislocation and acceptance of military formations in new areas did not always promote the relations of citizens and the army, due to the fact that the local conditions were not prepared for it.

It may be expected that when a long-term decision will be made concerning the development of defence and the army of the Czech Republic ( when the continuation of its concept of defence after 1997 will be adopted and the membership of NATO will be clear) , the dislocation of the army will be stabilised and it will have closer links with the local communities of citizens and their administration and offices.

A special role in this respect will be played by the formation of the territorial defence army because:

- it is the widest dispersal of the army on the territory of the Czech Republic - it will be the concern of a broad spectrum of communities and towns, potentially of the whole territory of the country,

- it will be a new type of bond of the army with the civilian sector - it foresees the direct participation of the population in these localities in brigades of the territorial defence army, conscripts and reservists on exercises will account for the majority of the army. The great majority of the male population of these communities and towns will have experience with this service.

- territorial defence formations depend directly on the collaboration with civilian representatives and citizens. They will not be able to afford the luxury of isolation from the civilian public, as it is so far the case of the army centre.

- it is very likely that also the professional and conscripted part of the territorial defence formations will prove in this collaboration to communities and towns as an army "useful in peace"

It may be thus assumed that this very field of development of the army will contribute towards a marked turn in the relationship of citizens to the army which is tangibly their own, and not an alien, indifferent isolated institution.

**In this chapter I wish to deal with three groups of questions the elucidation of which could play a significant role in the concept of establishment of civilian and military relations at the level of local and regional communities:**

They include :

**a) orientation as regards the distribution of confidence in the army by size of communities**, which plays an important part in the Czech Republic due to the density of communities and settlements. Formations of the territorial army should be informed in advance on this matter.

**b) attitudes of citizens and local administrations to stationing of military units in their community**

**c) views on the importance of defence, as compared with the willingness to support forms of safeguarding defence in different size of communities.**

## **2.1. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT OF CITIZENS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES**

The territorial distribution of confidence in the army depends on a number of factors , in particular, however, on the citizens experience with military formations which were stationed in the given area before the 1989 revolution. During the first two and three years in the climate of rapid elimination of negative features of the past in many places the relationship of citizens to military formations, in particular to their representatives,

was very critical. This pertained to the noisiness of planes, privileges of professional soldiers as regards housing, the income of professional soldiers and other problems. During the subsequent period when military formations were transferred from the western to the eastern part of the country and when some military airports were abolished, voices were heard opposing the departure of the army. They were associated in particular with the influence of military units on the economy of towns and communities and the general assistance of soldiers to local cultural and sports activities etc.

Investigations of views as regards defence and the army to conducted in 1990 to 1997 (see investigations of IVVM, 1990 to 1997) indicate an increase and decline in the confidence in the army in different periods of the postrevolutionary development. I have characterised them in a general way in chapter 1. of the present study. In view of the great dispersal of settlements in the Czech Republic ( 6232 communities in 1995, see Krumphanzl, T., 1996) the territorial distribution of confidence in the army is of considerable practical political and military importance ( with regard to establishing territorial defence armies and their acceptance in different territories).

The territorial distribution of confidence and lack of confidence in the army had the following trend between 1990 and the beginning of 1997 not only in general but in different territories. Communities of the following sizes were investigated:

- under 500 population
- 501-5000 population
- 5001-20 000 population
- 20 001-100 000 population
- 100 000 population and more

**Table 4.**

## Local distribution of confidence in the army of the Czech Republic

Data in %

Size of community	Investigation in year and month												
	Before split of federation					After split of federation							
	1990		91	92		1993		94	1995		1996		97
	1	9	6	4	9	2	5	9	2	10	2	10	2
<b>under 500</b>	48	43+	74+	62+	29	75+	45	42	30-	19-	22-	5-	10-
<b>501 - 5000</b>	53+	39	55	61	37+	54-	41	43	25-	32-	24-	25	29-
<b>5001 - 20000</b>	44	32	43-	53	28	67+	50+	45+	34	35	45+	58+	37
<b>20001-100000</b>	42-	42+	46-	60	29	58	33-	39	35	44+	45+	50+	44+
<b>100001 +</b>	42-	28-	36-	49-	24-	53-	32-	36	50+	38	40	37+	51+
<b>Total for CR</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>35</b>

Data on confidence are given in per cent. They combine replies "certainly yes" and "rather yes". The remainder up to 100% is formed by replies "certainly not" and "rather not" and "I do not know".

From: Investigations of the confidence of citizens in some institutions. Institute for investigation of public opinion , Prague 1990-1997 (in Czech).

Symbol + or - after percentage data expresses a deviation from the nation wide average (at least 5%), i.e. + = above average , - = below average

**Methodological comment:** *When characterising the trends of confidence in the army we take into account that although groups representative of the Czech Republic are involved, these groups are of different size. At present no longer primary data are available for the majority and thus it was not possible to test their mutual validity ex post. Therefore we consider the results of these investigations orientational and unfortunately they are the only ones which record the trend of confidence after 1990. The number of these investigations (so far 13) enhances the reliability of the general picture of confidence during different developmental periods of the Czech Republic (before the split of the federation and after the establishment of the independent Czech Republic in 1993).*

*This is the reason why I used as an identification indicator of the rise or decline of citizens confidence in communities of different sizes the percentage difference compared with the average for the whole Republic.*

**The series of figures indicates the trend of increasing or declining confidence of citizens in communities of different size in individual years from 1990 to 1997.**

## 2.2. ATTITUDES OF CITIZENS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS TO STATIONING OF A MILITARY UNIT IN THEIR COMMUNITY

The further indicator of defence and army support were the answers of citizens to a question, whether they would agree the localisation of army's units in their towns. The result says, that such agreement of soldiers by citizens and local representatives on territory of their locality is very low.

**Table 5.**

### The grade of agreement with stationing of army unit in local community

#### The answers of citizens and local representatives.

##### Classification by size of community

Citizens N = 1007

Local representatives = 222

Size of community according to inhabitants	Citizens x)		Local representatives x)	
	agrees does not	does not agrees	agree	does not agrees
■ under 500	12,5	68,8	12,5	62,5
■ - 1.500	7,9	67,5	15,1	48,5
■ - 3.000	9,6	49,4	21,4	50,0
■ - 5.000	7,0	60,6	27,3	36,4
■ - 20.000	22,7	43,7	27,1	39,0
■ - 100.000	28,2	34,3	54,8	23,1
■ 100.000 +	21,9	35,0	34,3	17,6
<b>Total CR</b>	<b>18,3</b>	<b>48,5</b>	<b>28,8</b>	<b>38,3</b>

x) Sign . 000

Chi-Sq. 109,404

xx) Sign. . 002

Chi Sq. 56,274

*Replies "agrees" are sums of replies "certainly yes" and "rather yes". Does not agree implies the sum of replies "rather not" and "certainly not". The remainder up to 100% is formed by "halfway" answers (they accounted for 17.0% and 17.1%) and answers "do not know" (citizens 16.2% and administrations 15.8%).*

*In general the table indicates a rather limited agreement of citizens (18.3%) and representatives of local administrations (28.8%) with stationing of military units in their community. Disagreement of citizens (2.65x) and representatives (1.32x) predominates. Agreement with stationing of military units in the community is much lower than the percentage of confidence in the army as a whole, expressed by the citizens during the same period (1995 36% in February and 38% in October 1995).. It may be assumed that at a local level other circumstances are involved which cause deterioration of the attitude of citizens to actual representatives of the army, military units and formations.*

*From the table the differentiated distribution of agreement with stationing of existing or future military units in the community, depending on the size of the community, is apparent.*

*Significantly less agreement is expressed by citizens of smaller communities under 5000 population, a markedly higher grade of agreement was expressed by citizens of communities with more than 20 000 population and greatest agreement by those from communities with a population of 20 001 to 100 000. A similar difference was recorded also in views of representatives of local administrations, however with a double or triple rate of agreement. Least agreement was recorded among representatives of administrations of small communities (under 5000 population), greatest agreement was expressed by citizens and representatives of administrations from communities with a population of 20 001 to 100 000.*

For future stationing of battalions and units of the territorial defence army and its opportunities to establish effective civilian - military relations two observations may prove useful:

- a) Commanders should foresee a limited preparedness for collaboration with the army in particular in small communities (under 5000 population) where probably smaller units will be stationed or the spaces will be unused for manoeuvres et.
- b) a relatively more feasible situation for acceptance of formations of the territorial defence army can be anticipated in towns with a population of 20 001 to 100 000, i.e. the size of district towns, on the territory of which probably battalions will be stationed. In larger places ( with a population of more than 100 000) however in this respect the position is less favourable. In these areas obviously headquarters of brigades of the territorial defence will be stationed.

### **2.3. VIEWS REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFENCE AND WILLINGNESS OF CITIZENS AND ADMINISTRATIONS TO SUPPORT ITS SAFEGUARDING**

Another characteristic of the population by size of the communities was obtained from their views on the importance of the defence capacity of the Republic. These results although not excellent indicate a greater desire to defend the country than could be deduced from the confidence expressed to the army and agreement with stationing of military units in the community.

Table 6.

Do citizens and representatives of local administrations consider the country's defence important ?

Data in %      Citizens N = 1007      Local administrations N = 222

Citizens vers. Local adm.	Size of community							
	Total for CR	-500	-1500	-3000	-5000	-20000	-100000	100000 +
Citizens yes	43,6	31,7	47,4	43,4	62,0	37,8	43,8	42,9
Local administrations - yes	52,7	50,1	51,5	35,7	45,5	55,9	61,5	50,0

*Although the differences between citizens of communities of different sizes were not significant and nor were those between representatives of administrations, I included the table in the text to compare the views of citizens and representatives of local administrations. We assumed that representatives of administrations will emphasise the importance of defence much more vehemently than citizens. On the whole they consider it more important only by 9.1% but in quite important groups of communities they consider it markedly less important than citizens (from 1501-3000 population by 7.7% and in communities with a population of 3001-5000 by as much as 16.5%).*

This leads to the important question whether representatives of local administrations have sufficient advantage to act as an example as far as the attitude to defence is concerned.

Therefore we addressed a series of questions to them and citizens on their willingness to support in different ways the defence capacity of the country (as discussed in chapter 1). The questions pertained to ways of promotion of the defence capacity of the state.

Table 7.

## Support of defence capacity

Classification by size of community

Citizens N=1007

Representatives of local administration N=222

### Agreement with support (yes in %)

Type of support	Size of community							
	Total	-500	- 1.500	-3.000	-5.000	- 20.000	- 100.000	100.000 +
Preparedness for defence	49,9	54,3	48,2	41,0	38,0	50,4	57,5	48,8
	<b>59,5</b>	<b>53,1</b>	<b>60,6</b>	<b>71,4</b>	<b>63,6</b>	<b>62,7</b>	<b>69,2</b>	<b>41,2</b>
Information on defence	45,3	42,5	43,9	34,9	49,3	45,8	46,1	49,3
	<b>56,8</b>	<b>46,9</b>	<b>51,5</b>	<b>42,9</b>	<b>54,5</b>	<b>55,9</b>	<b>69,2</b>	<b>64,7</b>
Taxes 1)	39,6	32,8	38,6	28,9	36,6	38,2	46,1	45,9
	<b>55,9</b>	<b>31,3</b>	<b>39,4</b>	<b>50,0</b>	<b>45,5</b>	<b>67,8</b>	<b>74,4</b>	<b>58,8</b>
National service 2)	36,2	31,5	40,4	39,8	40,8	37,8	38,3	29,9
	<b>40,1</b>	<b>34,4</b>	<b>33,3</b>	<b>35,7</b>	<b>36,4</b>	<b>49,2</b>	<b>46,2</b>	<b>32,4</b>
Defence organisation	14,4	15,7	16,7	13,3	23,9	11,8	13,8	13,2
	<b>18,9</b>	<b>21,9</b>	<b>24,2</b>	<b>21,4</b>	<b>27,3</b>	<b>20,3</b>	<b>15,4</b>	<b>8,8</b>
Civilian expert in army 3)	12,7	10,2	5,3	18,1	12,7	13,9	13,2	14,7
	<b>18,0</b>	<b>28,1</b>	<b>6,1</b>	<b>35,7</b>	<b>18,2</b>	<b>18,6</b>	<b>20,5</b>	<b>8,8</b>
Civilian expert in army 3)	12,7	10,2	5,3	18,1	12,7	13,9	13,2	14,7
	<b>18,0</b>	<b>28,1</b>	<b>6,1</b>	<b>35,7</b>	<b>18,2</b>	<b>18,6</b>	<b>20,5</b>	<b>8,8</b>

**Bold figures: percentage of citizens replies**

**Brevier: percentage of replies of representatives of local administrations**

1) Sign.: .00131 Chi sq. : 41.465

2) Sign.: .05646 Chi sq. : 28.383

3) Sign.: .01488 Chi sq. : 33.429

*The table contains only affirmative replies to the question " What do you consider or do not consider a suitable way how to support personally the defence capacity of our Republic?" The remainder up to 100% are replies such as "no" , "do not know", "not interested".*

*From the table ensue two significant differences and one difference at the borderline of significance. It is above all the difference as regards consent of representatives of local administrations from different size communities that taxes are a suitable way how to support the country's defence. Consent is lowest in the group of the small communities where the rate of consent is even smaller than agreement expressed by citizens of these communities and is roughly equal in communities with a population under 1500 . The percentage of agreement rises with*

*the size of the community with the exception of the largest towns where it declines somewhat ( from 74% in places under 100 000 population to 58.8%).*

*The second differentiation pertains to agreement of citizens with the statement that to work as a civilian expert is a suitable way how to support defence. The lowest rate of consent was recorded among citizens from communities with a population under 1500, the greatest rate from localities with a population under 3000 , followed by the population from large cities. The third differentiation at the borderline of statistical significance pertains to agreement of citizens with national service as support of defence. The lowest rate of agreement was recorded in citizens from towns with a population above 100 000, which differentiates them from the other communities.*

*Comparison of agreement expressed by citizens and representatives of local administrations is of interest.*

*On the whole it may be said that the majority of forms of defence support are emphasised more by representatives of administrations than citizens (more so in medium-sized communities, as compared with small ones and large cities with a population of more than 100 000). This should be the case in all instances because people are involved who should help to create a positive attitude of citizens to the defence of the country.*

*It deserves attention that this is not the case in all forms of defence support. The greatest "debt" was observed in representatives of local administrations, as compared with citizens, in the following types of defence support and in the following groups of communities:*

*Differences between representatives of administrations and citizens in towns over 100.000 inhabitants in support:*

- *preparedness for defence ,*
- *defence organisations*
- *civilian expert in army*
- *professional soldier*

*Communities with a population 501 - 1500 and 1.501 - 3.000*

- *military service*
- *professional soldier*

These strong and weak types of support of different types of defence on the part of citizens and representatives of local administrations in different sized communities should be taken into account when creating a prerequisite environment for units and formations of the territorial defence. This stimulus should not be neglected by public relations officers in the army and they should inform on the subject their collaborators in the mass media and public administration.

### **Chapter 3.**

## **Harmony of central and local democratic institutions in the support of defence and army**

### **3.I. POLITICAL CENTRE**

#### **A. PROBLEMS OF PARTY POLITISATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATE CONCEPT OF DEFENCE**

Previous findings revealed one important fact: although in some respects the transformation of the defence of the Czech state and Czech army were successful (transformation from an aggressive to a defensive character, introduction of the principle of civilian control, reorganisation to a brigade system, reduction of numbers etc.), a major yet unresolved and increasingly acute problem are trends of civilian and military relations. Its solution is in a vicious circle, as in the Czech Republic it did not prove possible during the revolutionary transformation to achieve harmony between the political army leadership and civilians. The principle of concordance (R.L.Schiff, 1995) - i.e. harmony of these three areas is impaired above all by the political leadership of the country and it is faced increasingly with an indifferent attitude of citizens to the army. Everything what seemed promising during the first two years after 1989 (civilian control of the army, rapid first transformation steps of the army, government and parliament support of the army etc.) moved to the margin of state priorities and citizens interests. Under these circumstances the position of the army in society began to become very complicated. The Ministry of Defence and the army became isolated and instead of seeking a way out from this isolation they concentrated on mere rather passive defence of their existence. This defensive attitude seemed to justify the standpoint of conservative forces in the army which inhibited its transformation and rejuvenation (old officers defended even more their positions, this was manifested in particular in the central headquarters. Their numbers increased, as compared with those in the previous federal army. This led to the fact that the army lost gradually its outgoing character which produced during the first years after the revolution a favourable though critical response and led to a relatively great confidence and support of defence and the army. The Ministry of Defence adopted party politics - the ministers imitated as a rule the government and pushed the army to the tail end of priorities. Of 10 needed and planned laws the government submitted to the parliament only two by the beginning of 1997, i.e. after a period of more than 7 years.

#### **B. POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL PARTIES**

We observed that the brisk drop of the citizens confidence in the army occurred in the year of the elections into both chambers of the parliament (1996) and that the citizens confidence in the army during the period before the elections was very much determined by political preferences of citizens, in particular the right wing coalition parties (Purkrábek, Sarvaš, 1996). The question arises whether these parties did not underrate the defence and army support in their preparations for the elections and in their election programmes.

Based on an analysis of the election programmes of the political parties before the elections in 1996 (for details see table 3 in appendix) the political parties can be characterised by promises in their elections programmes what will be enforced:

First type - A: (Here we may include the ODS coalition party and partly the KDU-ÈSL coalition party)

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**ODS..Civic democratic party, KDU-ÈSL..Christian democratic party**  
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1. strategy of orientation on European safety structures NATO and EU
2. Modernisation and adaptation of the army to NATO standards
3. Professionalisation of the army under contemporary conditions of compulsory national service
4. Integration of the armed forces in society and promotion of citizens confidence in the army

Second type - B: ( Here we include the ODA coalition party)

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**ODA..Civic democratic alliance**  
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- 1.-3. same as in type A
- 4.No or slight emphasis on civilian and military relations

Third type - C: (Tis includes the ÈSSD opposition party)

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**ÈSSD...Social democratic party**  
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1. Joining NATO, collaboration with EU, however after a referendum and without stationing of foreign armies and nuclear weapons on our territory
2. as type A and B
3. as type A and B
4. omitting integration of armed forces into society

Fourth type - D: (This type includes the extreme opposition parties SPR-ÈSR and KSÈM)

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**SPR-ÈSR...Republican party , KSÈM...Communist party**  
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1. Refusal to join NATO, dissolution of NATO, proclamation of neutrality
2. Small professional army and abolition of national service (SPR-ÈR ) or a modern army with compulsory national service (KSÈM)
3. Omitting integration of armed forces with society.

***Obviously as regards contents and extent among the government coalition parties complied with the contemporary political and strategic ideas on defence and army transformation and its integration with society only the programme of the strongest coalition party, ODS. It lacked only the legislative safeguarding of defence and development of territorial defence.***

***We are surprised by the fact that ODA of all coalition parties had the least elaborated defence programme. In particular orientation on civilian support and integration of the army in society were lacking as well as legislative safeguarding and territorial defence.***

***KDU-ÈSL as a political party which had three consecutive defence ministers had a balanced but very brief defence programme - it lacked, similarly as ODS and ODA emphasis on legal safeguarding of defence and the army and the establishment of territorial defence.***

*It is of interest that none of the coalition parties enforced the demand of a territorial army, and that they emphasised in particular commandos.*

*Therefore despite the relatively poor attention of the election programme on defence the largest opposition party - ÈSSD, which emphasised both these aspects lacking in the coalition programmes became a serious competitor. This party demanded adoption of comprehensive legislation and also emphasised territorial and civilian defence. A weak point of the programme of the ÈSSD was omission of the problem of civilian and military relations.*

*The outcome of two serious omissions in election programmes of the coalition parties as regards the programme of defence was their reappearance in the otherwise well balanced part IV. Defence in the government programme of the Czech government (LN, June 20, 1996). The government devoted relatively little space to defence - 39 lines from a total of 677, which would not be substantial if defence were not underrated at the government and parliamentary level and if it were not necessary to resolve its substantial problems.*

*The shaping of the state defence policy at the onset of the new election period in 1996 was thus much more integrated than in 1992, however it did not yet quite overcome the errors of the past period.*

*Despite this a significant positive shift towards a more comprehensive approach of the coalition and strongest opposition party was achieved as regards defence and the army and also a more comprehensive wording of state policy in the sphere of defence, expressed in the Government programme.*

#### **ELECTORS AND ELECTION PROGRAMMES OF POLITICAL PARTIES**

*The question arises whether and how electors supported in the elections the main political parties , incl. sections pertaining to defence.*

*On this subject we possess indirect findings from investigations in the election year 1996 (Factum non fabula, s.r.o.,1996). Citizens replied before the elections to the question what the election programmes of political parties should contain. Before the elections in March 1996 they listed the army and relations with NATO as the 11th among 15 problems (36.1% and 31.6%), after health services, citizens security, social policy , housing policy , agriculture, protection by taxes , ecology , taxes, protection and promotion of local industry and minorities .*

*The political party considered by voters before the elections into parliament as the most competent one for ensuring defence - ODS, surpassed the votes of the opposition social democratic party by fewer votes than in 1992 (only by 3.3%) although the latter had a poorer election programme of defence (by 7.7%). The coalition party KDU-ÈSL gained votes (from 7.8 to 8.1%), although its defence election programme had serious shortcomings , if we consider the fact that this party held since 1992 the post of minister of defence, three of the four ministers being not very successful (see table 8.)*

*Although it is impossible to provide evidence of a direct relationship between the increase of votes and the standard of election programmes of political parties , there is a cumulative association : political parties which included the enforcement of more popular and topical problems at the expense of defence problems into their election programmes lost fewer votes than those which did so. If we compare the percentage gains of parliamentary political parties in the 1992 and 1996 elections into parliament, it is obvious:*

**Table 8.****Results of elections into parliament of the Czech Republic - competence of political parties to ensure defence , as seen by citizens**

Data in % for Czech Republic

Political party	Elections 1992 (% of voices)	Elections 1996 (% of voices)	Difference in %	Defence programme	Competence to ensure defence, (citizens view in 1996 - in %)
<b>Coalition:</b>					
ODS	25,3	29,6	+ 3,3	good	29,0
ODA	7,2	6,4	- 0,8	poor	6,1
KDU-ÈSL	7,8	8,1	+ 0,3	rather poor	5,5
<b>Opposition:</b>					
ÈSSD	18,7	26,4	+ 7,7	rather poor	6,3
KSÈM	7,2	10,3	+ 3,1	very poor	8,4
SPR-ÈÈS	5,9	8,0	+ 2,1	poorest	8,2

Competence to ensure defence, (citizens view in 1996 - in %)

Based on Factum surveys , Prague 1996 and our own analysis of election programmes of political parties.

*It is obvious that ODS has not obtained the corresponding number of votes in the 1996 elections which would be proportional to the satisfactory standard of its election programme as regards defence and greatest competence to ensure defence ascribed to it by citizens before the 1996 elections.*

*The parties of the opposition despite the poor standard of their election programmes and the low competence ascribed to safeguarding defence had more votes ( total by 12.9% as compared with the coalition (only by 3.8%).*

*The problem of defence is one of the factors which caused this difference in the election results. It is typical that in these elections those parties gained votes who gave priority to problems people considered very urgent such as associated consequences of the economic transformation. These parties promised more than the coalition to resolve the problem of health services, citizens security, social policy, housing policy etc. and to a lesser extent (ÈSSD) defence, joining NATO , as conceived by the majority of voters.*

From the hitherto accomplished development in the Czech Republic we may conclude that the recognition of the country's defence as a state priority is limited by party politisation and the still poor awareness of electors that it is necessary to support long-term public interests of society and the state, in particular its defence. This has, in particular as regards the election behaviour of political parties, an impact on the adaptation of their programmes to the consumer and short-term oriented mentality of the voters.

### **C. POSITION AND ACTIVITIES OF PARLIAMENT**

The parliament played an important role as regards its influence on the transformation of the army, in particular in the initial postrevolutionary period.

The assistance of the parliament to defence and the army took place in roughly three different periods with a different intensity and different success:

- 1. During the initial postrevolutionary period it was the adoption of two laws and the Military doctrine which were of fundamental importance for elimination of party politics and looyalisation of the army in favour of the revolution and humanisation of the army. In the Military doctrine the main principles of the defence strategy and concept of transformation of the army were outlined. During that period members of parliament were directly engaged in the staff policy of the army by participating in attests of the main army officials, they contributed thus to a more rapid elimination of corrupted generals and higher officers.**
- 2. During the period after the splitting of the federation when the independent army of the Czech Republic was formed the parliament participated in the enforcement of civilian control of the army and was successful in particular as regards approval of the budget. In a rather disorganised manner it was also involved in the control of the army transformation, in particular its rearmament and it proceeded with the "postrevolutionary" checking of officers. This, combined with the insensitive staff policy of minister Baudyš influenced in a major way a large number of young (not corrupted) officers and NCO's who left the army. The parliament failed completely as regards initiation and approval of the defence strategy and control of implementation of strategic objectives of defence. The parliament did not adopt (since 1993) any law on the legal safeguarding of defence and the army. Thus it became one of the factors which contributed to the shift of defence and the army to the periphery of interests and parliamentary topics and thus to a certain isolation of the army in society. No doubt, this underrating of defence in parliament influenced also the underrating of defence and army among citizens, as demonstrated elsewhere in this paper.**
- 3. The period of coming closer to NATO which influenced the attitude of parliament to the army roughly from the second half of 1996 onwards. This period may be characterised as a marked increase of interest of the parliament in defence and the army and a more rational procedure of its defence committee where the initiative was taken by the main coalition party, ODS, contrary to the preceding period when it was headed by a representative of KDU-ÈSL. It was the first chairman of the defence committee who had experience with the management of the army ( he was a deputy of the minister of defence) as well as international politics .**

It can be assumed that this orientation of the parliament will be able to ensure from the legislative aspect defence and the army and will initiate its outgoing attitude to society and the ability to achieve gradually compatibility with NATO.

#### 4. Actual activities of parliament as regards defence and the army.

It participated still as the parliament of the Czechoslovak federation in the first steps of the army towards neutralisation of party politics and humanisation of the conditions of compulsory national service ( adoption of the defence act in March 1990) and adoption of the law of civilian service which enabled conscientious objectors to refuse military service and substitute it by civilian service. These laws helped to mitigate the citizens aversion to the army and promoted the democratisation process in the army. The law on civilian service had to be amended because it was too benevolent and because there were not enough jobs for civilian service , however, even this revised step of parliament did a lot for the army 's image.

Important support was the adoption of the „Military doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic“ which was submitted by representatives of the Civic Forum and army officials ( with the major participation of the future commander of headquarters, Karel Pezl ) (see Vojenská doktrina ĚaSFR, 1991). This was the most important step of parliament which indicated the trend of transformation of defence and the army and gave the army a conceptual orientation. Unfortunately it was so far the only conceptual step of parliament except for the act of the Czech National Council on the Army of the Czech Republic of December 21, 1992 which only established, in conjunction with the separation of the federation, the new Czech army in six brief paragraphs.

For 1992 to 1996 the army elaborated with the silent consent of the government its own concept which was not secured by legislation on the part of the parliament.

In this respect the parliament of the Czech Republic "owes" the legislative safeguarding of defence and the army according to a document of the Ministry of Defence (see Concept of defence legislation, 1997) the approval of eight important acts:

- act on safeguarding the defence of the Czech Republic
- the Defence act
- act on the Army of the Czech Republic
- act on military administrations
- act on professional soldier
- act on basic (civilian) military service and military exercises
- act on armed forces of other countries on the territory of the Czech Republic and the armed forces of the Czech Republic abroad (military exercises)
- act on some provisions to resolve crises

*An investigation was made in the parliament of the Czech Republic in April 1996, i.e. two months before the parliamentary elections. The replies of the members of parliament evaluated the period of their four-year activities since 1992.*

*I should like to draw attention to two important findings which ensued from this survey:*

- a) their opinion on the participation of parliament in selected aspects of civilian control of the army,*
- b) evaluation of the legislative safeguarding of the transformation of the Czech army*

**Ad a) The MPs were least satisfied with the activities of parliament as regards the control of personal policy in the army ( although this control is not their concern; apparently they expressed their opinion still on the basis of postrevolutionary practice), next with the control of implementation of strategic defence objectives, initiation and approval of the defence strategy and its legislation and with the control of the army transformation. They were most satisfied with the parliamentary approval of the budget of the Ministry of Defence. With the implementation of selected aspects of civilian control of defence and the army. MPs of the government coalition were much more satisfied than the opposition.**

**In general the index of dissatisfaction is above the average value (2.5) in all investigated spheres. It may be assumed that the MPs expressed thus their criticism of the participation of parliament in the civilian control of defence and army in the period 1992-1996.**

**Striking is the relatively high rate of satisfaction of MPs of the coalition who were better informed on the actual state of affairs than the opposition, as the coalition held the post of the minister of defence and controlled the defence committee in parliament .**

**Ad b) Similar findings were obtained from the replies of MPs as regards their satisfaction with legislative safeguarding of critical problems of society. Of 17 problems their dissatisfaction with the legislative parliamentary support of defence and army held the 11th place (index of dissatisfaction 3.1 from a score of five possible points, i.e. dissatisfaction predominated). As compared with the grade of dissatisfaction of citizens and representatives of local administrations with this problem, the MPs are more critical than citizens and representatives of the local administrations , as apparent from fig. 1. in the appendix. (Index of dissatisfaction - MPs 3.1, citizens 2.2 and representatives of local administrations also 2.2 ). This raises an important question whether citizens rather than MPs are those who more underrate defence and the army. Obviously this is the case as apparent from our findings. At the same time there is another question: do MPs succumb to the moods of that part of their electors who lack a positive relationship to the army and defence ?**

**The answer depends on the political party represented by the MP. We found that our MPs consider themselves above all as representatives of their party (50%) and less so of all citizens of their electoral district (44%). They respond thus to pressure of citizens preferring their political party and comply with this pressure, depending which political party supports or does not support defence and the army. This is obviously the result of election of MPs according to the law on proportional representation. An electoral law based on majorities would most probably mitigate this limited responsibility of MPs to all citizens of the electoral district instead of mainly electors of their political party. This gives rise to a vicious circle which can be abolished only by the political élites (of political parties, the government), if they take the risk of temporary loss of popularity and if they will stimulate citizens - electors to support defence and army.**

#### **D. ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY**

**The government ( up to 1989 federal , since 1993 Czech) as the key institution of civilian control of defence and the army and the development of civilian and military relations played an important role in relation to defence and the army, in particular in the following respects:**

- 1. Under the decisive influence of president V.Havel it succeeded without**

conflicts in transferring the totalitarian army to the institution of a democratic state and during the first year after the 1989 revolution to achieve that its leaders took a loyal stand to the revolutionary development and protection of society from the danger of communist counterrevolution. This was extremely important in particular for creation of political stability before the first democratic parliamentary elections in May 1990.

2. On the common initiative of the Civic forum and its representatives in the army the government enforced the adoption of the Defence act and the act on civilian service. By these laws and other provisions the government neutralised the army as regards party politics and brought it to a national political position and initiated humanisation of conditions of military service.
3. The government achieved already in the first year elimination of corrupted generals and higher officers from the army and replaced them gradually by younger staff with a clean record to take up leading and commanding posts. It supplemented the officers corps by more than 1000 rehabilitated democratically oriented officers discharged from the army after aggression of the armies of the Warsaw treaty in August 1968. This provision was, however, only temporary due to the advanced age of these officers , but played an important role at the onset of the democratic transformation of the army. A substantial step of the government was also that the army was subjected to civilian ministers (since October 1990) and that they were able to communicate more freely with the civilian public.
4. It contributed to the elucidation of the strategic concept and position of the army in a democratic state, in particular by adoption of the Military doctrine of the Czech Republic approved by parliament in 1991. It transformed the army from an aggressive into a defensive army, it reduced its numbers and equipment consistent with the Paris contract and created prerequisites for its modernisation as regards organisation and information.
5. It ensured relatively possible financial resources for the transformation of the army , 2.13% of the gross national product and 6.2% of the expenditure of the state budget in 1996 , as compared with 2.61% of the gross national product and 6.7% of the state budget in 1993, the year when the independent army of the Czech Republic was established.

Despite this substantial participation of the government in the transformation of the army, it was unable to resolve several important prerequisites of development of defence and the army.

The main problems incompletely resolved by the government which influence civilian military relations include in particular:

1. Omission of the nationwide and interdepartmental coordination of defence. During the first postrevolutionary years this coordination was implemented via the Defence council headed by the president of the Republic. Later this institution ceased to exist and was not replaced by any other form of co-ordination. Thus the government contributed to the isolation of the army which endavours co-operation with other institutions but lacks such competences for co-operation as the government possesses.

In conjunction with preparations of another concept of the army by the year 2000 with a perspective to 2005, the army submits therefore the initiative to restore the coordinating role of the government as regards control of the comprehensive system of defence of the Republic. It suggests to establish by law a Security council which could control and coordinate defence also in the event of danger to the state.

2. The limited support of conceptual steps in the transformation of the army and position of defence and the army in society. The great attention of the government paid to problems of economic transformation pushed the problem of defence to the periphery of state interests. Although nobody in the cabinet denied the importance of defence, frequently it was stated that we shall deal more thoroughly with defence after having resolved the main problems of economic transformation.

3. The inadequate public support of defence and the army and inadequate development of civilian and military relations. Except for occasional visits of military units by the prime minister, members of the government except the minister of defence did not give public support to defence and the army. Therefore the self-confidence of army representatives declined and the army lost the outgoing character of the first two years after the revolution and became isolated as far as information is concerned.

6. The government was unable to prevent the return of party politization into the army, though this was abolished successfully in 1990. This "new" party politisation, this time by the democratic government parties ( ODS, ODA, KDU-ĚSL) started in 1993 when the post of minister of defence was taken up by a representative of KDU-ĚSL (the party which in the election programme of 1992 had a single point - joining NATO and nothing on the transformation of the army). Deputies of the minister were at that time a representative of ODS and KDU-ĚSL and at the same time politicians of these parties held the majority of leading administrative functions (personnel, foreign relations, logistics, etc.). Gradually the posts of deputy ministers were held by representatives of all three government parties, surrounded by politicians of their parties.

The consequences of this "new" party politisation of the army are manifested by:

- a more difficult conceptual and co-ordinating activity of the Ministry of Defence
- a decline of the professional standard of the administration of the ministry, by a "loss of skill, disharmony in the activities of different sections of the ministry , in some instances also by personal conflicts, moreover ventilated in the mass media
- lost ability of the ministry to inform the public on the army. The ministry abolished the majority of analytical departments , e.g. the Institute of strategic studies and its successor the Institute of operational arts, the Military institute of social investigations and the Public relations department),
- the party politisation of the army was however manifested negatively in particular in the selection of some personalities for the post of minister of defence and his deputies. While the first civilian minister, Dobrovský, had certain prerequisites attitude to the army and a certain experience from the military school, experience from diplomatic and journalist practice), the subsequent

ministers lacked these prerequisites. This led to the recall of minister Baudyš and the passive attitude of minister Holáček. The unsuitable choice and frequent changes of leading personalities in the Ministry of Defence (this applies also to the deputy ministers) interfered greatly with the continuity of the army transformation started successfully in 1990-1992. The discontinuity was manifested in particular in the unscrupulous abolition of some successful postrevolutionary procedures of the ministry and army as regards the development of civilian-military relations, e.g. underrating of the activities of the Council for collaboration with the army at the ministry and in all garrison towns, regular fortnightly briefings of the minister and his collaborators with journalists, the institution of confidants of conscripts in companies and abolition of the social system focused on the democratic education of officers and soldiers and solution of their social problems and reduction of the army press. Minister Baudyš prevented e.g. the institution of military chaplains in the army and his successor, also a Christian politician pursued this trend. Only when the present minister took his post, finally the decision was taken to introduce military chaplains. My detailed comments of the role of personalities heading the Ministry of Defence are not accidental. Citizens consider at present period their quality as the decisive factor of their confidence in the army (this was apparent from the reply of 80% of people - see our investigation Policy and the public, 1995). It is likely that the government drew a lesson from this experience and perhaps the more suitable choice of the present minister of defence, Výborný, made up for the previous mistakes. The new minister has experience from parliamentary work, legal erudition and a good relationship with the army.

#### **TURNING POINT IN THE GOVERNMENT POLICY IN RELATION TO DEFENCE AND THE ARMY**

I am glad to say that as regards government activities in relation to defence and the army during the first months of 1997 a fundamental change took place. This was obviously due to three substantial factors :

- a balance of political forces between the coalition and opposition and the beginnings of critical reflexion of government politicians after the 1996 elections (in particular the self-assurance of the strongest party, ODS, and its aggressive political style) and the substantial revision of the one-sided economic orientation of the policy contributed to greater respect for the development of state policy, as recommended throughout that period by president Havel,
- the critical state of the army, the readiness of action of which declined briskly (see Národní obranná strategie, 1997 ).
- the readiness of the Czech Republic for the approaching membership in NATO (from several hundred NATO standards the Czech Republic meets only several tens).

The government discussed at the end of March 1997 and approved in the presence of president Václav Havel the conceptual document prepared by the army Planned concept of the Army of the Czech Republic up to the year 2000 with a perspective to 2005. It involves actually approval of the military doctrine by the government and parliament in 1991 after a roughly 6-year absence of conceptual support of defence by the government, a second document of strategic character. From the document a more concrete orientation on NATO membership is apparent and an orientation on the creation of a modern, small ,

economic and effective army. The only weak point of the document is in my mind that the army (as well as the government) has not gone beyond its weak orientation on civilian support of defence. It pertains to the motivation and education of citizens only in two sentences and does not resolve so far the problem of their information and active participation except enlistment in the army. The document does not yet identify the level of civilian and military relations and the civic support of defence and the army as one of the most important problems of strategic importance. The activities of some workers of the ministry of defence, however, indicate promising advances also in this respect.

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### 3.2. LOCALITIES AND REGIONS

#### A. POSITION OF DEFENCE AND THE ARMY IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES - TOPICAL OPEN PROBLEMS

It is a paradox that one of the democratic institutions in the Czech Republic which develops most favourably - the local administration - contributes so little to the support and confidence of defence. This is a great loss because the local administrations have in the long run a greater confidence of citizens than the government and parliament (citizens expressed their confidence in the government in 1996 in an average of 10 surveys - the score being 48% - that of the parliament 31% , while the confidence in local administrations (two surveys) was 54% (table 8.in appendix). In our survey Policy and the public, 1995, citizens expressed their confidence. Of 13 institutions local administrations held the third place, after the president and prime minister and had much greater confidence than all the ministries.

Obviously local administrations are so far a minimally used resource of support for defence.

Since the genesis of democratic local administrations after the communal elections in 1990 there were, however, three actual and developmental obstacles:

a) The first obstacle was the lack of confidence of citizens in defence and the army, to which local representatives succumbed. Very frequently they initiated efforts to abolish local garrisons, in particular air bases, and frequently they succeeded. This still persists and as I have mentioned, in some places the representatives of local administrations have a less favourable attitude to the support of defence than the population of their communities.

b) The second obstacle is the great distance and minimal feedback from the locality to the democratic centre (government , ministries, parliament). It is due to the incompleteness of the system of public administration in the Czech Republic which still lacks the regional link of administration, although the constitution requires it. Party controversies , even inside the government coalition are the reason why regions (or counties ) were not yet established. Very probably this more than four-year effort to complete the system of administration will end by the establishment of regional administrations. The space of non-existing regional administrations was "taken over" by regional and district deconcentrated state offices and thus the state controls,

in the capacity of the district office, the communities via delegated powers almost directly. ( E.g. the Ministry of Finance established 387 such deconcentrated offices, the other ministries some 100-150).

The local administrations are thus due to the predominance of branch offices in a difficult position - they concentrate too much on the defence of their existence. They consider their dependence on close state offices excessive state guardianship. Indirectly this affects also their attitude to defence and the army, as the symbol of the state. This is enhanced also by the highly dispersed character of settlements in the Czech Republic (6.232 settlements per 10 million population) and the economic and administrative weakness of the smallest communities which did not yet integrate.

c) The so far little branched local structure of the still developing political parties frequently does not reach as far as the small or even medium-sized communities ( usually it goes only as far as district towns). This makes contact with these communities difficult as well as perception of their initiatives and feedback information at the level of the parliament and government and their ministries. This concerns very much the Ministry of Defence because after three reorganisations the military formations did not yet settle properly in the local communities of the new stations and still lack adequately developed contacts with them.

d) The consequence of this "incomplete character" of the system of administration in the Czech Republic is projected also into the activities of the Ministry of Defence and its influence on civilian - military relations.

(x)

I found that citizens and the local administration and its offices obtain information on the concept of the army transformation, on its activities and problems of soldiers lives mainly via central media. Army representatives can use direct contact with citizens and the local administration in places where they have military formations , using the assistance of the Councils for co-operation with the public which still function in some places, and at higher levels via the assistance of public relations workers.

In the whole, otherwise well elaborated system of public relations in the army ( see Communications with the public , MO ÈR , 1996), systematic training of local and regional politicians for this activity was not yet (and could not yet) be included.

The same applies to the preparation of the civilian environment for collaboration with the foreseen territorial defence army so far only officials for defence of the appropriate district offices are informed on territorial defence, i.e. officials of the state organ and not the local administration ( with the exception of the municipal authorities of large towns). Moreover mayors of municipal quarters in large towns and heads of district offices do not consider the problems of the territorial defence particularly important as its formations and units do not yet exist, as I was informed.

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(x) It seems that Chris Donnely's analysis in NATO review (Jan. 1997) expressed the main problem of such approach. He stressed „ In all cases, as societies transform, their armies lag behind. Moreover, in many countries this gap is getting bigger. It has become clear that this is a long-term and complex that will be difficult to solve“.

## **B. TWO GREAT PARALLEL OPPORTUNITIES: BUILDING THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE ARMY AND REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

From previous findings it is obvious that information on defence and the army from the centre, and moreover mostly of army origin, is less effective among Czech citizens than information received from civilians. It is also obvious that the information must be associated with actual experience of citizens as regards contacts with soldiers and participation in defence support. There is an opportunity to enforce both these lines of promoting support of defence and the army in conjunction with the implementation of two substantial changes in the development of the Czech Republic and its army.

*First*, this involves the implementation of the part of the concept of building the army by the year 2000 to 2005, which pertains to the formation of territorial defence units.

*Second*, this involves a decisive step in completing the administrative system of our public administration - i.e. the establishment of regional administration.

As the preparation of the territorial defence army was delayed ( it was a task in the previous concept for 1993-1996) and so far only the structure of the higher commands has been elaborated, it is probable that both processes -the establishment of regional administrations and the building of a territorial defence army will take place concurrently. For the building of territorial defence armies the staff of the higher commands (areas, regions) is ready and district commands are ready to be mobilised. So far implementation of the foreseen corrections of the planned dislocation of brigades and battalions is lacking with regard to the yet not implemented reform of public administration (defining areas and possibly changing districts). The ministry and army command should play an important part in the training of all who are interested in building a territorial defence army. The army lacks so far any activities in the following:

- **informing the public and appropriate workers of central and local departments** on the purpose and advantages of building a territorial army, on demands on local administrations and citizens as regards their stationing in communities, districts and regions and possibilities which this army will have in safeguarding the security of the population, its homes, economic and cultural values. These activities should be initiated by a supra-departmental authority which should help to relieve the army of its isolation as far as information is concerned, preferably this should be the foreseen State Security Council.
- **institutional safeguarding of the territorial defence army among members of the army who have only superficial information**, and making use of the already tested Councils for co-operation with the public which should be established as one of the first joint institutions for co-ordinating activities of formations and units of the territorial army to the public. The Ministry should already now prepare information and other basic documents for the initiation of activities of these Councils.

- **activities of the Ministry and army as regards public relations.**

I assume therefore that the Ministry of Defence and the appropriate higher commands of territorial defence will extend their public relations departments by specialists who will influence the population, administrations in places where the territorial defence units will be stationed, with emphasis on the weakest links of defence support - citizens and representatives of the administration in some groups of communities specified according to size. These departments in the army should in particular "revive" the positive experience from the first postrevolutionary years with regular briefings with journalists in the centre, in counties and districts with representatives of civilian institutions, schools, churches, economic and non-profit organisations etc. and arouse the interest of the media in the centre and in regions in programmes on the army and defence, and by creating a system of preferential information for interested journalists.

- **a system of training of the appropriate regional (future), district and local workers of the public administration on the concept and demands of defence and the army as regards co-operation and support on the part of citizens and the public administration.**

- **a still open problem is to enforce aspects of defence and the army in the functional orientation, competences and organisational structure of future regional administrations and offices.** I assume that those entrusted with referred activities of the state in regional administrations should be trained already in advance for their role in safeguarding defence. It is also important to make clear in advance what the ministry and army will require from the administrations in the regions. A special role should be played in the orientation of future regional administrations as well as district and municipal administrations by centres for the development of military thinking, information and training which would become local independent intellectual defence communities and should be formed by university and high school teachers and students, reserve and active officers and NCOs, sportsmen, cultural workers, churches and workers of the public administration. These defence communities could be informally interlinked and a horizontal network of activities would be created. Their inspirer and "supplier" of themes and theoretical premises could be the Association of citizens for the defence of the country which is now being established in Prague where important personalities - politics, culture and arts and universities - will be engaged along with personalities from the ranks of experienced military professionals.

I consider the combination of central, local and regional activities for the support of defence and the army as the most effective way how to overcome the considerable measure of indifference of citizens and officials of the public administration to the support of defence and the army. It may also prove to be a more realistic way to abolish the isolation of the army as regards information and politics than the best arguments on the need of defence presented by military officials themselves.

My personal experience with the preparations for the Association of citizens for defence have convinced me that there are sufficient numbers of personalities determined to contribute by their intellectual training and human and professional experience to the support of defence of the country and that all depends on creating opportunities which will give them a chance to make public appearance. I am convinced that also in the Czech Republic there in the near future a marked change will occur in the attitude of citizens and politicians to defence and that the army will overcome its isolation and become an esteemed institution on a nation wide level as

well as in places where its formations and units are stationed. Then citizens will consider it as their own and not an alienated institution, as it was frequently (for objective reasons) during the past half century and as it still is (due to inertia of subjective stereotypes) in our restored democracy.

## CHAPTER 4.

### Summarising conclusions and suggestions

The analysis of results of investigations focused on the legitimacy of defence and the army in local communities and their democratic representations in the Czech Republic provided the following findings.

**1. In general the legitimacy of defence and the army has, except for the first two years after the 1989 revolution, a declining trend on a nation wide scale.** A marked decrease of legitimacy of defence and the army was recorded in particular in 1995 and 1996. This is apparent specially in some segments of legitimacy, as indicated in the investigation. Confidence was lowest in defence institutions, the Ministry of Defence, in 1995 when only 14% of the citizens had confidence in it. Relatively little support was granted to the defence capacity which was considered important in 1995 only by 44% of the population (it held the 13th place among 17 important social problems). The key indicator of legitimacy - confidence of citizens in the army, which I tested by secondary analysis of 13 investigations from 1990 to the beginning of 1997, revealed a significant difference between 1990 and the first half of 1993 and the second half of 1993 to the beginning of 1997. While during the initial period in six investigations on average in 48% confidence of citizens in the army was recorded (despite the decline due to the splitting of the state and army), during the second period in seven investigations the confidence of citizens in the army dropped to 35% and at the end of 1996 it was lowest - 28%.

In other segments of legitimacy of defence and the army I found also that only 9% of the citizens are active as regards different forms of support of defence and 27% respect duties laid down by law. The majority of citizens - 64%, are passive and refuse to support defence. The willingness to participate in defence lags behind the participation of citizens in activities of other organisations, e.g. organizations for leisure time (34%), interest and professional associations (24%), ecological movements (22%) etc. The small support of defence and the army thus is not a manifestation of general passivity of the population of the Czech Republic in relation to public activities. On the contrary, in investigations of public policy I found in collaboration with my team that 34% of the citizens want to influence public affairs and 22% have at least a partial interest.

These findings indicated that competition and other factors are involved which have an impact on confidence and the support of defence and the army by citizens. Hypotheses of the project formulated the following as the main groups of assumed factors of confidence in defence and the army:

A. The influence of local communities and their administrations, B. narrow orientation of politics on the economic reform and short-term pragmatic practice and underrating of long-term values of social development and C. the modifying influence of historically-based stereotypes as regards citizens' attitudes to defence and army.

**2. An important cumulative group of factors which influence the legitimacy of defence and the army was the process of formation of new democratic**

**administrations in the communities.** The state gave the communities property on their territory incl. military buildings and equipment left by military formations which were dislocated during reorganisation of the army. In this deétatic euphoria the communities frequently demanded also premises and equipment still needed by the army , e.g. some air ports etc.

This gave rise to a certain rivalry which had also a political tinge and which added up with the then intensive criticism of the army - a residue of the old communist regime. This occurred at a time when military formations were dislocated to new places where facilities for housing of soldiers and their families were lacking and this created a new tension.

The consequences of three reorganisations of the army on the disruption of its relations with local communities obviously were not compensated by the advantages which communities can have from the collaboration with military units. This is apparent also from a finding in our survey: only a small proportion of citizens (18.3%) agreed with the stationing of military units in their community and the consent of representatives of the administration was only slightly higher. The weakest link as regards the attitude to stationing of military units in communities were citizens of small towns (under 5000 population) and also representatives of their administrations. This part of the territory of the Czech Republic is inhabited by 35 % of the population and it is obvious that their local representatives have not sufficient advantage to encourage citizens effectively to support defence and the army. For instance in communities with a population from 15 000 to 20 000 the representatives of the administration consider defence much less important than citizens of their communities.

This is associated with the incomplete reform of public administration and in particular the great dispersal of small communities where all functions of the local administrations were not yet developed and which still lack politically and professionally trained representatives and officials. A certain part is played also by lack of information and contacts in the sphere of the newly built defence and army. Citizens and representatives in these small places ascribe less importance to information on defence and the army than respondents from larger towns. By analysing relations of factors affecting confidence in the army we found that interest in information on the army promotes confidence in the army and willingness to participate in different forms of its support. This is one of the reasons why citizens of smaller communities have a worse attitude to the army although except for citizens of the smallest communities they consider defence equally important as citizens of larger towns. The causes of this weak interest of citizens from smaller places in information on defence are associated with the passivity as regards information on the part of those who could arouse this interest , in particular the mass media, government and army representatives , party officials and also representatives of local administrations.

### **3. The main factors which cause low legitimacy of defence support in the Czech Republic from the second half of 1993 are in particular:**

- **Loss of co-ordination between the government and different ministries, the parliament and others engaged in public policy as regards defence of the country.**

The beginning is the shift of defence to the margin of priorities of state policy as a result of the narrow concept of the policy focused above all on enforcement of market economy and privatization. The main coalition party in the government - ODS suppressed the orientation of the state on the long-term development and support of affairs of long-term public interest ( education , health services, social welfare , ecology and also defence) and preferred pragmatic short-term programmes for the

enforcement of market economy.

- **The small harmony (poor concordance) of political decisive élites (of the state and political parties), army and public as regards support of defence and the army.**

A state policy of defence was not developed but individual party aspects were enforced, dictated to a certain extent by voters preferences which did not favour the party which was concerned with such an "unpopular" sphere of politics as the defence policy. Political personalities had also a rather negative or indifferent attitude to defence , in particular to the army. This disharmony of political élites and the army was the reason that nobody except dispersed individuals influenced in a positive way or formed the nucleus of public opinion in favour of defence and army support.

The situation is made even more complicated by the unpreparedness of political élites to submit to the public a vision of the development of the Czech state and to formulate in a convincing and concrete way state interests in the sphere of defence. Analyses of historical experience provide evidence that the tendency of an indifferent attitude to the army was related always to a period when the country was not threatened from outside. When the country was threatened or invaded the attitude of citizens became as a rule more active and even surprised by its mobilising force, as it was the case in 1938, or the voluntary participation of our citizens on the side of the allies against fascist hitlerism and during the first world war. The political élites in the centre, in regions (where they still lack their local administrations) and also in towns and communities can overcome by their influence and example the passive attitude of citizens during the period when there is no immediate risk. Unfortunately the almost regular elimination of intellectual and political élites in this country, approximately every 20 years in this century interfered with the continuous development. This discontinuity of available political élites is apparent not only in the centre but also at a regional and local level.

- **Also the third link of concordance for the support of defence and the army - the public, began roughly in the middle of 1993 to lose interest in defence and the army and expressed it by a decline of confidence in it.**

The promising overcoming of old antimilitarist stereotypes in 1991 and 1992, when people started to consider the army their own and not an alienated institution, was after a brief half-year period of patriotic enthusiasm in 1993 discontinued by the disparaging attitude of the government and the almost catastrophical policy of the minister of defence, in particular as regards staff. Minister Baudyš proclaimed a large proportion of professional soldiers as traitors. The most capable young people left the army and army service was not attractive. Citizens conceived this as the abolition of the old army which can be helped only by transformation into a small , completely or predominantly professional institution which they would be willing to trust. This is apparent from the increasing number of people advocating professionalisation of the army. This applies in particular to people with a right wing or central political orientation.

- **The army was in the triangle of defence support, roughly from the middle of 1993, a passive link. It lost its postrevolutionary legitimacy and along with it its position in the government and parliament and was satisfied with an isolated defensive of its existence.**

The ministers proceeded with the „disarmament“ of the army in the area of strategic thinking and communication with the public by abolishing the appropriate institutions and

by uncontrolled personal transformation. The army was isolated as far as communication and its position were concerned.

Under these conditions the Ministry of Defence did not enforce approval of any of the eight needed laws and its efforts of co-operation with government partners was faced with lack of competence and support of the government.

The implementation of the Concept of building the army in 1993 to 1996 lost, as time went on, its functional character and was restricted mainly to organisational measures. From the aspect of legitimacy and defence and army support in local communities the ministry and army did not make use of the opportunity for developing contacts with citizens and local administrations offered by the establishment of the territorial defence army. So far only the staffs of higher commands exist and location of formations and units is delayed to the time when regional administrations will be established. As to civilian partners only civil servants in district administrations, not local administrations (with the exception of municipal administrations in large towns) are informed on the territorial defence army. The army has so far wasted the opportunity to make local administrations and communities familiar with actual provisions which will be taken to ensure their safety.

After adoption of the new Concept of building the Army of the Czech Republic by the year 2000 with a perspective for 2005, which was approved by the government and president in March 1997 there is a possibility to create a territorial defence army. This gives the army an opportunity to penetrate systematically to local communities and administrations under more favourable conditions for communication. It is anticipated that simultaneously also the still lacking regional administrations will be established. Army representatives will have the opportunity, if they make use of it, to influence their competences also as regards co-operation with future commands and territorial defence formations. There is an opportunity to complete information contacts between army and local communities and their administrations with the assistance of and via regional administrations and offices.

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## **IV. Appendices:**

### **Tables:**

- 1. Comparison of the citizens', local representatives' and member's of Parliament satisfaction with solving main problems of society.**
- 2. Missing Acts in the period 1992 - 1996 ( Personal view of Members of Czech Republic's Parliament.**
- 3. Emphasis of political parties on defence and army in election programmes in 1996.**
- 4. Political self-identification of local representatives and citizens in the Czech Republic in 1995**
- 5. Willingness of citizens to participate in public activities..**
- 6. Views on representative's ability to solve following community problems**
- 7. Ability of local government to resolve problems in community**
- 8. The Trust of citizens and local representatives in institutions**
- 9. Correlations : importance of defence, satisfaction with defence policy, with transformation's changes , attitudes to forms of support of defence, citizen's factors of confidence to army.**

### **Figure :**

- 1. Agreement with stationing of army unit in the community (comparison of the citizens' and local representatives views)**
- 2. The relations among trust in army, activity to forms of defence support and citizen's factors of confidence to army.**

Table 1.

**Comparison of the citizens', local representatives' and members' of Parliament satisfaction with solving main problems of society.**

Citizens N = 1007    Local representatives N = 222    Members of Parliament N = 146

Numbers means % of replies

from 200 Members ( weighted dates)

Society problems	Grades of satisfaction						INDEX OF SATISFACTION
	VERY SATISFIED	RATHER SATISFIED	HALF TO HALF	RATHER DISSATISFIED	VERY DISSATISFIED	DON'T KNOW AND DIDN'T ANSWER	
<b>• Development of education members of Parliament</b>	1	14	30	40	15	1	3,5
citizens	1	16	34	29	11	9	3,1
local representatives	4	16	37	31	8	4	3,4
<b>• Health care members of Parliament</b>	2	14	23	30	30	1	3,7
citizens	4	20	33	30	12	1	3,2
local representatives	3	24	33	30	9	1	3,2
<b>• Housing members of Parliament</b>	0	9	25	23	42	1	4,0
citizens	7	16	22	25	25	5	3,3
local representatives	7	16	19	32	23	3	3,4
<b>• Child care support members of Parliament</b>	2	20	28	27	22	1	3,5
citizens	2	13	32	30	15	8	3,2
local representatives	4	17	34	32	8	5	3,1
<b>• Municipal development support members of Parliament</b>	5	32	35	21	6	1	2,9
citizens	2	16	39	19	8	16	2,7
local representatives	3	20	31	31	13	2	3,3
<b>• National defence policy members of Parliament</b>	5	33	22	24	13	3	3,1
citizens	1	13	23	18	10	35	2,2
local representatives	4	17	23	18	9	29	2,2
<b>• Environmental care members of Parliament</b>	7	27	30	22	13	1	3,1
citizens	2	11	31	34	19	3	3,5
local representatives	2	17	31	30	19	1	3,4
<b>• Social policy reform members of Parliament</b>	10	30	21	11	27	1	3,2
citizens	2	12	26	31	22	7	3,4
local representatives	3	17	35	24	16	5	3,2

• <b>Situation of minorities members of Parliament</b>	8	32	31	19	6	4	2,8
citizens	3	8	23	26	21	19	3,0
local representatives	3	19	29	23	12	14	2,8
• <b>Economic reform, market development members of Parliament</b>	32	31	17	14	5	1	2,3
citizens	4	23	36	20	11	6	2,9
local representatives	8	31	37	16	7	1	2,8
• <b>Promotion of Czech culture members of Parliament</b>	2	27	27	29	12	2	3,2
citizens	2	14	37	23	10	14	2,8
local representatives	2	19	36	24	13	6	3,1
• <b>Unemployment members of Parliament</b>	32	33	18	12	4	1	2,2
citizens	3	18	30	25	13	11	2,9
local representatives	6	25	30	25	10	4	3,0
• <b>Prevention of crime members of Parliament</b>	5	25	20	34	15	1	4,3
citizens	1	4	11	32	51	1	3,3
local representatives	2	3	14	41	39	1	4,1
• <b>Promotion of NGOs members of Parliament</b>	3	22	34	23	17	1	3,3
citizens	1	6	31	14	8	40	2,0
local representatives	2	11	36	20	9	22	2,6
• <b>Prevention of corruption members of Parliament</b>	5	21	20	21	32	1	3,5
citizens	1	2	8	28	53	8	4,1
local representatives	2	4	9	29	50	6	3,5
• <b>Informing citizens about public affairs members of Parliament</b>	15	25	32	19	6	3	2,7
citizens	4	28	40	17	8	3	2,9
local representatives	8	34	30	19	9	0	2,9
• <b>Development of democratic political systém members of Parliament</b>	34	27	15	15	8	1	2,3
citizens	4	19	38	19	9	11	2,8
local representatives	8	30	33	14	8	7	2,6

**Index of satisfaction** - is calculated as the average of replies on the scale 1 (very satisfied) - 5 ( very dissatisfied), that means higher value of Index is higher dissatisfaction.

Table 2.

<b>Missing Acts in the period 1992 - 1996 (Personal views of Members of Czech Republic's Parliament )</b>		
<b>PROBLEMS</b>	<b>N = 146</b>	<b>In %</b>
POLITICAL DEMOCRATIC SYSTÉM		29,9
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS, LAUNDERING DIRTY MONEY		9,4
HEALTH CARE		7,5
EDUCATION		7,1
ECONOMIC REFORM, MARKET DEVELOPMENT		6,3
FAMILY AND CHILD CARE SUPPORT		5,1
CRIME, DRUGS		5,1
ECOLOGY		4,7
SOCIAL ACTS		4,3
NGO		3,1
HOUSING POLICY		2,8
<b>NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY</b>		<b>2,8</b>
AGRICULTURE		2,8
<b>LOCAL ADMINISTRATION</b>		<b>1,6</b>
CULTURE		1,2
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES		1,2
OTHERS		1,2
RESTITUTION OF CHURCH PROPERTY		0,8
YOUTH		0,8
DON'T KNOW		0,8
DIDN'T ANSWER		0,8
MINORITIES		0,4
UNEMPLOYMENT		0,4
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>100 %</b>

Source: Survey of Parliament of Czech Republic, Faculty of Social Sciences Charles University, Prague and Institut of sociology, Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic, April, 1996. In: Purkrábek, M, Duben, P.: : Czech Parliament and Public Policy in period 1992-1996, in: Veřejná politika a její aktéři, FSV UK, Vesmír, Praha, p. 163.

Table 3.

**Emphasis of political parties on defence and army in election programmes in 1996**

Political Party	Strategy of defence	Army	Civil-military relations	Scope of text (Number of lines from total number pages of programme)
<b>Coalition parties:</b>				
<b>O D S</b>				
(Civic democratic party)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Active factor in European and world security</li> <li>- Priority: joining NATO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Concept, consistent with needs of economics</li> <li>- Make organisation more transparent</li> <li>- Improve the style of control</li> <li>- Increase the number of professionals</li> <li>- Reinforce authority and discipline</li> <li>- Adaptation of standards NATO</li> <li>- Effective use of financial resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Compulsory military service</li> <li>- Army prestige</li> <li>- Promote the citizens' confidence</li> <li>- Improve scope of information and communication</li> <li>- Integration of armed into society</li> </ul>	186 lines in election programme of 91 pages
<b>O D A</b>				
(Civic democratic alliance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emphasis on security risk</li> <li>- Priority : join NATO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Adequate budget</li> <li>- Speed up professionalisation</li> <li>- Effectiveness of arms system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- no recommendations</li> </ul>	32 lines in 41 pages
<b>KDU - ĚSL</b>				
(Christian democratic Union Czech People's Party )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Active international collaboration</li> <li>- Join NATO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- complete building small semiprofessional army</li> <li>- Civilian control</li> <li>- High standard equipment, mainly produced in CR</li> <li>- Economy in army</li> <li>- Compatibility with NATO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- civic responsibility for defence</li> <li>- assistance of army to population in peace time</li> <li>- Civic support and collaboration of citizens</li> </ul>	71 lines in 56 pages

## **Opposition parties**

### **È S S D**

( Czech social democratic party )

- Membership in NATO without stationing of foreign armies and nuclear weapons
- Recommends referendum on joining NATO
- Emphasis on territorial and civil defence
- Use of local scientific and industrial resources
- Adoption of comprehensive legislature on defence, economic mobilisation state reserves
- social security of soldiers
- solution of staff problems
- do away with bullying
- elaborate a modern concept of military education and research
- no suggestions

24 lines in 17 pages

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### **S P R - R È S**

(Republican Association - Czechoslovak Republican Party )

- Proclaim neutrality
- Refuse joining NATO
- small professional army
- abolish compulsory military service

7 lines from total of 4 pages of election programme

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### **K S È M**

(Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)

- Reinforce state sovereignty against dependence on FRG and USA
- collaboration with neighbours
- Refuse to join NATO
- Referendum on joining NATO
- modern army
- compulsory military service

17 lines in 12 pages of election programme

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Sources: Election programmes of 6 parliamentary political parties published before elections into Parliament of Czech Republic in 1996.

Table 4.

### Political selfidentification of local representatives and citizens in the Czech Republic in 1995

Citizens N = 1007    Local representatives N = 222    In %

<b>Political identification</b>		
	<i>local representatives</i>	<i>citizens</i>
	<i>average 5, 54</i>	<i>average 5, 26</i>
1 with extremely left wing	0,5	0,7
2 with very left wing	1,8	3,6
3 with left wing	9,6	9,8
4 with left centre	5,0	8,8
5 with political centre	36,7	37,9
6 with right centre	12,8	16,4
7 with right wing	28,0	16,8
8 with very right wing	5,0	4,0
9 with extremely right wing	0,5	2,1

From: Own survey Policy and public, may 1995 on sample of Czech Republic.

Table 5.

### Willingness of citizens to participate in public activities

(N = 1007    In %)

<b>A c t i v i t i e s</b>	I participate	I wish to participate	I should like to but cannot	I do not want to participate
voluntary organizations for leisure time (culture, sports)	20	14	23	43
voluntary organizations providing public services	6	16	29	49
ecological movement	4	18	28	50
movements for human rights	2	18	23	57
interest and professional associations	13	11	16	60
trade unions	13	7	16	67
local administration	5	9	19	67
state administration	5	6	16	73
church and religious organisations	7	5	7	81
protest movements or particular activities (strikes etc.)	5	9	4	82
right wing political party	3	4	8	85
centrally oriented political party	2	5	8	85
left wing political party	3	3	5	89
national political movement	1	1	2	96

Source: Survey Policy and public, ( may 1995) Faculty of social science Charles university, Prague, see: Purkrábek, M. a kol (1996) Veřejná politika a její aktéři. FSV UK, Vesmír, Praha, p. 32.

**Table 6.**

**Views on representatives' ability to solve following community problems**

Citizens N = 1007

Local representatives N = 222

Dates in value of WA

	Citizens		Local representatives	
	value of WA	order	value of WA	order
<b>A)</b> cleanliness and appearance of community	3,51	1	3,89	1
<b>B)</b> cultural facilities	2,72	9	3,35	8
<b>C) security</b>	<b>2,94</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3,54</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>D)</b> engineering networks	3,29	4	3,47	6
<b>E)</b> collection of waste materials	3,41	3	3,83	2
<b>F)</b> health care	3,23	5	3,32	10
<b>G)</b> education and nursery schools	3,01	6	3,69	3
<b>H)</b> supplies and services	3,44	2	3,24	11
<b>I)</b> employment	2,48	11	3,68	4
<b>J)</b> housing	2,06	12	2,33	9
<b>K)</b> public transport	2,49	10	3,01	12
<b>L)</b> sport facilities	2,84	8	3,36	7

Value of WA - value of weight arithmetic average of answers on the scale 1 - 5 (1 certainly no - 5 - certainly yes).

Source: Survey Policy and Public (may, 1995) Faculty of social sciences, Charles University, Prague..

**Table 7.**  
**Ability of local government to resolve problems in community**  
 Distribution according to a size of community

Citizens N = 1007    Local representatives = 222  
 Dates in value of weight arithmetic average of replies on the scale 1 - 5 ( 1 certainly no, 5 - certainly yes).

Problems	Citizens							Local representatives						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A)	3,34	3,56	3,48	3,28	3,81	3,78	3,08	3,74	3,7	3,57	3,91	3,89	4,31	3,82
B)	2,29	2,36	2,39	2,18	3,04	3,19	2,76	3,16	2,91	3,01	2,99	3,59	3,68	3,39
C)	<b>3,21</b>	<b>3,26</b>	<b>3,09</b>	<b>2,83</b>	<b>3,11</b>	<b>2,91</b>	<b>2,22</b>	<b>3,29</b>	<b>3,31</b>	<b>3,64</b>	<b>3,73</b>	<b>3,59</b>	<b>3,72</b>	<b>3,49</b>
D)	3,09	3,32	3,78	3,19	3,42	3,34	3,06	3,03	3,24	3,51	4,09	3,48	3,53	3,82
E)	3,65	3,62	3,49	3,24	3,49	3,31	3,14	3,61	3,94	3,79	4,09	3,76	3,86	3,94
F)	2,69	3,32	3,63	3,07	3,45	3,26	3,11	2,84	3,36	4,29	3,18	3,61	3,08	3,15
G)	2,79	3,47	3,24	2,64	3,24	2,99	2,66	2,87	4,01	3,86	3,82	4,05	3,46	3,67
H)	2,88	3,25	3,34	3,34	3,61	3,73	3,56	3,37	3,09	3,51	3,09	3,44	2,92	3,11
I)	1,87	2,19	2,28	1,89	2,78	2,74	2,91	2,16	2,34	2,43	2,18	3,16	2,57	3,09
J)	2,09	2,29	2,25	2,18	2,05	1,87	1,98	2,35	1,94	2,14	2,55	2,36	2,57	2,39
K)	1,97	2,58	2,27	2,19	2,63	2,42	2,87	2,74	2,48	2,51	2,73	2,98	3,55	4,38
L)	2,48	2,92	2,81	2,27	3,13	2,99	2,74	3,06	3,52	3,51	2,98	3,53	3,31	3,32
<b>Agregated satisfaction</b>														
	2,70	3,01	3,00	2,69	3,15	3,04	2,84	3,02	3,15	3,31	3,28	3,45	3,38	3,46

Signification by citizens .01    The proportion in case of satisfaction with solving problem of security and size of community is indirect : -0,2169 Pearson correlation coefficient, e.g. it declines with the size of communities.

Categories:    1.....up to 500 inhabitants    5..... 5001 - 20000 inhabitants  
 2..... 501 - 1500 -,-    6..... 20001 - 100000 -,-  
 3..... 1501 - 3000 -,-    7.....více než 100000.-,-  
 4..... 3001 - 5000 -,-

Common problems:    A. cleanliness and appearance of community  
 B. cultural facilities  
 C. security  
 D. engineering networks  
 E. collection of waste materials  
 F. health care  
 G. education and nursery schools  
 H. supplies and services  
 I. employment  
 J. housing .  
 K. public transport  
 L. sport facilities

Source: Survey Policy and Public (May, 1995), Faculty of social sciences, Charles University, Prague.

Table 8.

**The Trust of citizens and local representatives in institutions**

Citizens N = 1007

Local representatives N = 222

Dates in % of replies

<b>The Trust in the following institutions:</b>					
	<i>Certainly yes</i>	<i>Rather yes</i>	<i>so half to half</i>	<i>Rather no</i>	<i>Certainly no</i>
<b>- president</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>
	<b>28</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>- prime minister</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>
	<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>- the main control office</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>
	<b>5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>- local and town self-governments</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>4</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>- ministry of finances</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7</b>
	<b>4</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>- jurisdiction</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>5</b>
	<b>3</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>- ministry of ecology</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>5</b>
	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>- ministry of health care</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>13</b>
	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>- ministry of social affairs</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>8</b>
	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>- ministry of defence</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>9</b>
	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>- ministry of education.</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>6</b>
	<b>1</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>- parliament</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>7</b>
	<b>1</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>- ministry of interior</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>15</b>
	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>18</b>

Replies „ I don't know“ are not in this table

**Brevier: Replies of local representatives**

Source: Survey Policy and public, (May 1995), Faculty of social science, Charles University, Prague.

**Tables 9.**

**Correlations: importance of defence, satisfaction with defence policy, with transformation's changes, attitudes to forms of support of defence, citizen's factors of confidence to army.**

Citizens: N = 1007

**VARIABLES:**

**P3FN = citizens' replies: how important is defence country (importance)**

**P4FN = citizens' replies: how are they satisfied with defence policy (satisfaction)**

**P21N = grade of satisfaction with transformation changes in Czech army (transformation)**

**P22N = agreement of stationing of army units in community (stationing)**

**P23A-GN = activity to forms of support of defence (activity)**

**P25A-JN = factors of citizens' confidence to army (factors)**

**Correlations (variables P3FN, P4FN to P21N and P22N)**

	P21N	P22N
P3FN	.4886**	-.0748
P4FN	.0324	-.1424*

N of cases: 415      1-tailed Signif: \* - .01 \*\* - .001

**CORRELATIONS /VARIABLES P3FN P4FN WITH P23AN TO P23GN.**

	P23AN	P23BN	P23CN	P23DN	P23EN	P23FN	P23GN
P3FN	-.0873	.0011	.0371	.1591	-.0017	-.0693	.0579
P4FN	-.0700	-.0834	-.1020	-.0757	-.1256	-.0149	.0529

**CORRELATIONS /VARIABLES P3FN P4FN WITH P25AN TO P25JN.**

**N of cases: 339 1-tailed Signif: \* - .01 \*\* - .001**

	P25AN	P25BN	P25CN	P25DN	P25EN
P3FN	-.0888	-.0087	.0770	-.0030	.0365
P4FN	.1542*	.1973**	.0498	.2904**	.2332**

	P25FN	P25GN	P25HN	P25IN	P25JN
P3FN	-.0193	.0229	-.0329	.0496	.0733
P4FN	.1868**	.1097	.0554	.2541**	.1012

**CORRELATIONS /VARIABLES P3FN WITH P4FN.**

**Correlations: P4FN**

**P3FN -0.0221**

**N of cases: 647 1-tailed Signif: \* - .01 \*\* - .001**

**" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed**


**Figure 1.**

**Agreement with stationing of army unit in the community  
(comparison of the citizens' and representatives' views)**

**Citizens N = 1007**

**Local representatives N = 222**


**Data in %**



**Source: Survey Policy and public, Faculty of Social Sciences Charles University, Prague, May, 1995.**

**Figure 2. The relations among trust in army, activity to forms of defence support and citizen's factors of confidence to army**

Citizens N = 1007



- K - Quality of personality heading Ministry of defence and the army
- U - Standard of professional officers and NCO's
- CH - Behaviour of soldiers in public
- S - Usefulness of army for society also in peace time
- Z - Interest of state representatives in army
- C - Effectiveness of civilian control of army
- I - Information of mass media
- V - Own experience with military service
- P - Views held by my political party or organisation close to me
- M - Views by relatives and friends on army

**On figure was not proved positive determination of the trust in army by majority of activity. (Correlation is only  $R = 0.0122$ ).**

**Only by 2 factors we are finding positive dependence between activity and trust : by informations from medias and by informations from political parties.**

