

Integration of the Ethnic Minorities in the Bulgarian Armed Forces

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	2
Acknowledgment.....	4
1.Ethnic Picture of Bulgaria: Multifaced, but Not Too Much	
Troubled.....	5
The Turks of Bulgaria.....	8
The Gypsies (Roma).....	11
Other Minorities	12
2.Unwrapping the Ethnicity (Some theoretical premises).....	15
3.Political Misuse of the Ethnic Problems.....	18
4.Preceding Empirical Surveys on the Topic: Interethnic Mutual	
Relations and Tolerance.....	27
5.Main Findings from Our Survey.....	31
Content Analysis of <i>Bulgarska Armiya</i> Daily.....	41
Some Conclusions.....	43
References.....	46
Appendix.....	49

LIST OF THE APPENDICES, TABLES AND FIGURES

Questionnaire.....	49
TAB.1. Bulgarian Population by Regions and Ethnicity.....	61
TAB.2. Bulgarian Population by Maternal Language.....	62
TAB.3 Bulgarian Population by Confession.....	63
TAB.4 Intensiveness of the Interest toward Ethnic Issues, <i>Bulgarska</i> <i>Armiya</i> Daily, January - December 1996.....	66
FIG.1. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the pre- conscripts	64
FIG.2. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the recent- ly demobilized	64
FIG.3. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the profes- sional military	65
FIG.4. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the cons- cripts	65
FIG.5. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the whole sample	66
FIG.6. Intensiveness of the Interest toward Ethnic Issues, <i>Bulgarska</i> <i>Armiya</i> Daily, January - December 1996.....	67

INTRODUCTION

Survey with the working title "*Ethnocultural Situation in the Military Forces '96*" was conducted in November-December 1996 with 1028 respondents from 17 of the 28 former districts of Bulgaria - Sofia, Blagoevgrad, Burgas, Khaskovo, Kirjali, Montana, Pleven, Plovdiv, Razgrad, Shumen, Silistra, Sliven, Stara Za-gora, Targhovishte, Varna, V.Tirnovo, Vidin. Two main considerations were tak-en for the selection of the above listed clusters:

- Significant minority resident population presented;
- Military installations (garrisons) existing in the area.

Since official access to barracks and other military establishments was denied by the Ministry of Defence, main attention was concentrated to two cate-gories of respondents:

- Those, who are expected to be recruited soon to serve as conscripts, i.e. young males born in 1978-1980. These comprised 47.4% from the total number of respondents;
- Those, who recently (i.e., not earlier than in October 1995) did finish their compulsory regular military service. These comprised 23.2% from the total number of respondents;

In addition, enumerators were instructed carefully to approach conscripts during their recreation time out of the barracks, as well as professional military - NCOs (sergeants) and officers. Noncombat troops (Construction and Transpor-tation) were excluded from the sample due to the peculiarity of the service and predominant presence of minority contingent among the conscripts. Also excluded were Border Troops due to the specificity of their service - predominantly small units with patrolling functions. Conscripts represent 20.7% from the respondents, and professional military - 8.6% (among them, 2.4% sergeants, 2.6% officers from the grade of Lieutenant to Captain, 3.3 % officers from the grade of Major to Colonel, and 0.3% civilian employees). From these who currently serve or has recently demobilized, 69.9% represent Ground Forces, 18.1% - Air Forces, 4.5% - Navy, 0.4% Military Economy Bloc of the Ministry of Defence, and 7.2% - services or units, directly submitted to the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. Territorially, respondents were located as follows: 14.9% in the capital city, Sofia, 35.9% in big cities (regional or district centers), 26.9% - in other cities, 9.9% - in urban vicinities or suburbs, 3.0% - in villages, 2.9% - in separate military bases (military *gorodok*), and 7.1% - out of any populated by civilians settlement. Predominant part of the respondents - 58.3% - define them-selves as Eastern Orthodox by confession, which is the main Religion in Bulgaria, 28.6% as non-believers, 11.8% - as Moslems (from these 8.5% Sunni), 0.6% as Catholics, 0.4%% as Protestants, 0.1% as Jewish, and 0.2% as practicing other confessions. Among those who define themselves as "Christians", 74.6% consider the Eastern Orthodox Church as "their", 22.6% - "Christian culture as a whole", and only 2.3% and 0.2%, respectively, are bounded with the Catholic or the Pro-Testant Church. In the same time, almost 2/3 (63.4%) of those who define themselves as "Moslems", indicate their commitment to the "Islamic culture as a whole", while less than 1/3 - to Sunni tradition, only 3.5% - to Shia, and 1.4% reveal other Moslem trend.

This survey was not, indeed, deliberately planned as nationally representative one - on the contrary, due to the specific tasks it was covering only a restricted layer of the society, 18-22 years old males (more than 1/4 of the respondents were 19 years old, 15.9% - 18 years old, 13.0% - 21-years old, 12.2% - 20 years old, 11.9% - 22 years old, 4.8% - 23 years old; born in 1944/49 were 1.0%, in 1950/59 - 2.9%, in 1960/69 - 2.7%, and in 1970/73 - 3.2%; 99.2 of the respondents were males, with only two women - military officers). Nevertheless, it reflects relatively well both the ethnic picture of the concerned regions of the country, as well as of the country as a whole, what can be seen from the following description of the general ethnic situation in the country.

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1. ETHNIC PICTURE OF BULGARIA: MULTIFACED, BUT NOT TOO MUCH TROUBLED

Bulgaria is a country located in South-Eastern Europe, on the Balkan pen-insula. Its neighbours are - to the North Romania, to the West - Serbia (rump Yugoslavia) and Macedonia, to the south - Greece and Turkey. Its territory is 110 993,6 sq. km. As of 31.12.1996, its population is 8,339,8 thousand people.

According to the data from December 1992 census, 85.8% from the population are Bulgarians (7,271,608 people), and 14.6% are ethnic minorities (See Tab.1 for more details)*. In the beginning of the century, according to the 1990 Census, from a total population of 3,774,000 77.1% has been Bulgarians, 14.2% - Turks, 2.4% Gypsies, and 6.3% other. The most significant share is still that of the Turkish ethnic group (9.7%, or 822253 people). This group, however, suffered in a greatest degree by the emigration during the recent years: in 1989 some 350,000 of them were forced to leave the country after the shameful process of Bulgarization. There is no available exact data, because many of them leave on tourist visas and there is ever increasing movement out of the country and back, but - this time compelled by the economic hardship - the number of those left in 1990s is estimated as about 400,000, a level, which is matching the data for the ethnic Bulgarian population. Turkish minority is followed by that of the Roma/Gypsy (3.4%, or 287,732 people). It indicates the highest level of growth - 3.5 times during the century. The rest 1,1% (a total of 91,131) are distributed between negligible by size - less than 10,000 people - groups of Jews, Armenians, Gagauz, Greeks, Tartars, Valachians/Romanians, and many other.

Introduction of the ethnicity indication in the 1992 census for the first time after 1965 ignited many controversies, and were vigorously blamed by the nationalists. Gypsies, for example, claim to be at least twice more than the census revealed. This is to be explained by the fact, that many of them, especially the better educated, tend to identify themselves with the majority Bulgarians (when they are Christians), or with the Turks (the Moslem Gypsies). According to a Ministry of Interior estimation, the Gypsies number 577,000 people, or 6.45% of the Bulgarian population (Tomova,1995). Also, there was no separate category for the Bulgarian Moslems (the Pomaks), so that many of them had to choose whether to declare themselves as Bulgarians (mostly in the cases where they did not consider the distinct religion as of a major significance), or as Turks - even if they do not understand at all Turkish language. There are during the recent years a strong tendency for Turcization of

* All tables and figures are placed in the Appendix behind the main text.

this minority, sponsored from abroad. Macedonians, who formally are considered to be Bulgarians, were also denied opportunity to self-determine, but it is estimated, that their number does not exceed 6-7,000.

As it can be seen from the data represented at Tab.2, there is an explicit tendency for the Gypsies and the smaller minority groups to claim that their maternal language is either Bulgarian, or Turkish. This situation can be explained by the fact that for a long period of time minorities were denied any education in their own languages, and speaking of other than Bulgarian languages - especially Turkish - at public places was prohibited. It was only recently the Gypsy language became written, and education in this language was introduced. Still, however, Bulgarian is considered to be the only official language, and there is no exception provided for translation in Turkish or Gypsy for example in the court, when individuals from these minority groups are involved in the case.

The problem becomes even more complicated because of the involvement of confession. According to the data from the 1992 census, 87.0% of the population avowed themselves to be Christians (86.2% Eastern Orthodox, 0.6% Catholic, and 0.2% Protestant), 12.7% - Moslems (of these, totalling 1,078,326, 92.9% Sunni, and only 7.1% - Shia). It has to be noted, however, that in the most of the cases ethnic background was considered as enough sound reason for perfunctory attachment to a certain confessional group. That is why massive numbers were "put" into more general categories, while only 0.2% claimed other than Christian or Moslem faith, and solely 0.1% are considered non-believers. Sociological surveys reveal a different picture. A 1962 survey on the religiousness of the population in Bulgaria, using the indirectly inquiry method, showed that 35.5% of the adult Bulgarian population are religious, with considerable discrepancies among the various ethnic groups - 33% of the Bulgarians, 67% of the Turks, and 45% of the Gypsies (Oshavkov, 1968). This survey was conducted during the Communist totalitarian regime, when atheism was officially enforced, Eastern Orthodox church was entirely submitted to the state¹, Catholicism was prosecuted as an "imperialist tool", and only elder people were relatively free to follow holy rites. However, this attitude did not change significantly after 1989, when all restrictions on observing religious practices were lifted. Empirical studies conducted since then (S. Bozhikov, 1992, Gueorguiev et al., 1993, Mitev, 1994) revealed that between 37% and 48% consider themselves "Religious in a certain degree", while only 11-12% claim to be "deeply devoted". Moreover, Bulgarians' religiosity seems to be too much secularized - in their majority they tend to believe in the existence of God, but are confident that there is not Satan, or any supernatural forces, and after-life, or reincarnations, they do not pray and they generally vi-

sit church once or twice a year; while they regularly celebrate major Christian holidays, they do not observe religious fasts, and they are not familiar with the content of the Bible (Mitev, 1994). Bulgarian Moslems are far more devoted to their faith, but personally they do not qualify for an accurate placement under the denominations of Sunni or Shia; rather, the majority of them identifies themselves through "Islamic culture as a whole".

Comparing religiousness with ethnicity, we see, that while almost entire Turkish minority (98.9%) belongs to the Islam, there are some 143,000 Moslem Bulgarians, or 2.0%

¹ Curiously enough, in a degree matched probably only in Romania, even the clergy was enmeshed from the end of the 1950s in the Communist Party Nomenklatura. Historically, the Eastern (Greek) Orthodox Church always gave way to secular authority; unlike the Roman Catholic Church, it never formed an alternative power center. This enabled communist authorities in the Eastern Orthodox countries -- Soviet Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro -- to extend their control to the Orthodox clergy, something that was never accomplished by their counterparts in Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia with their powerful Catholic communities. That is why the Patriarch (Primas) of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is commonly and sarcastically referred to as "Maxim-Marxim." Not only did this prevent the Church from becoming a bastion of alternative thinking, but it has led in postcommunist Bulgaria to the Church's deep fissuring and to its marginal status in political affairs.

from the ethnic Bulgarians. Those are the so called Pomaks, who, as it is commonly believed, were Islamicized (similarly to the Bosnian Serbs) during the XVI-XVII centuries by the Turkish rulers. It is worth to note that because of the shifting policies toward them, competing influences, and certain adverse attitudes toward them from the part of the majority population, Pomaks feel themselves too much confused about their ethnic background. Especially these living in Western Rhodopes - i.e., in the areas, where Turks are almost missing, just opposite to the situation in the Eastern part of the same mountain - Pomaks tend to declare themselves as Turks and even as distant and bizarre nationalities - Japanese, Eskimo, Bushmens, etc. (due to the alarming number of similar self-qualifications, ethnic part of the 1992 census was repealed for some regions like Yakoruda). This is one of the reasons for the unusually high level of indicating "other" ethnic background in Blagoevgrad region (2.6%, when the average for the country was 1.1%). At the same time, a majority of the self-expressed as Turks are, actually, Pomaks.

As for the Gypsies, a prevailing proportion among them (60.4%) consider themselves to be Christians, and the rest are Moslems.

During the recent years it is observed an extended and aggressive invasion of some confessions, especially Protestant denominations and Islam, as well as of the numerous religious movements and sects - moonities, crishnaities, "Jehova's Witnesses", and so on. Being financially well equipped, they easily enter in the vacuity, caused by the looseness of the prevailing traditional confession, and the grave economic and moral crisis. They attract many young people, as well as re-presentatives of the Gypsies and Pomaks.

Minority population in Bulgaria is unevenly distributed at its territory. Immediately after the Liberation of Bulgaria from the five centuries of Turkish domination (1878), most of the then existing cities were with a predominantly mixed population, with prevailing number of Greeks and Turks. Bulgarians resided mostly in the rural areas. This changed very rapidly soon with the increasing number of Bulgarians - both reach people to form the new urban *bourgeoisie*, as well as impoverished peasants, who extensively moved to the towns hoping for better lives. These Turks, who did not leave Bulgaria, were almost without exception poor people without any land property (Ottoman Turkish system does not provide for an inheriting land, which usually was given as a reward for distinguished service to the Empire). They squatted at mountainous villages more densely in Eastern Rhodopes and Eastern Balkan (68% of the Turkish population of Bulgaria is rural, while the corresponding figure for the ethnic Bulgarians is just the opposite - 28% rural and 72% urban). As it can be seen from the data presented at Tab.1, there are two districts in Bulgaria where the Turkish population matches or even exceeds the Bulgarians - Kirjali, where Turks reach 65.7% of the population, and 66.5% claim that Turkish is their maternal language, and Razgrad, where the ratio is almost equal 47.3:47.4 (but population having Turkish as their maternal language outstrips by about 1% those with Bulgarian). Kirjali's peculiarity is even more impressive with the level of predominance of the Islam: 74.6% against some 24.8% Christians (for Razgrad this ratio is 52.5% Moslems to 47.4% Christians). Other districts with about 1/3 Turkish population are Silistra (33.5%), Tirgovishte (32.8%), and Shumen (30.3%). As a whole, Turkish minority is concentrated into two areas - North-Eastern Bulgaria (districts of Razgrad, Silistra, Tirgovishte, Shumen, as well as, in a lesser degree, Dobrich and Russe - 43.6%), and in South-Eastern Bulgaria (especially in the district of Kirjali, and in far less degree in Burgas, Khaskovo, Sliven, and Yambol) - 33.3%. 11.0% of the Turks live in the South-Central Bulgaria, 6.2% - in the North-Central, 5.4% - in South-Western, and only 0.5% - in North-Western. There are slight differences in the customs and attitudes between the two largest groups of Bulgarian Turks - those in North-Eastern part of the country, where they live mostly in a mixed with Bulgarians settlements, and those in South-Eastern Bulgaria, where there are separated from the majority population in mainly Turkish villages. The former ones are generally more faithful, there is almost no intergenerational gap, they are much more self-

contained with respect to the other communities, and thus - far more sensitive to the issue of religious and human rights (Mitev, 1994). As for the Gypsies, in no district their number exceeds 10% of the whole population, with Montana (9.1%) the most populated by them, and Dobrich (7.4%), Sliven (7.3%), Shumen (7.1%), Pazarjik (6.8%), and Stara Zagora (5.6%) with more highly Gypsy presence. There is no Gypsy population at all in the district of Smolyan. However, by the absolute numbers the first place as Gypsy place holds Plovdiv (23,403), followed by Stara Zagora (22,309). Until 1950s Gypsies were predominantly nomadic people with no permanent residence, but the Communist authorities forcedly dwelled them. As a rule, Gypsies share neighbourhoods and even apartment houses with Bulgarians, which is frequently a source of hostilities, but especially in the larger cities they form a relatively isolated quarters as the notorious Stolipinovo ghetto in Plovdiv.

Finally, while the average for the country - and especially for the Bulgarians - growth of the population is negative (-3.8% for 1994), among some minorities, especially those of the Gypsies and in a less degree of the Turks it is positive. Gypsies fertility matches this of the Third World countries. In the both cases, however, this growth is impeded by other factors - high mortality, especially infant mortality, among the Gypsies, and massive (e)migration among the Turks.

THE TURKS OF BULGARIA. Turks came to the Balkan peninsula in XIV century as conquerors. Facing feeble resistance and even mutual adversaries of the decadent Byzantine Empire, the three Bulgarian principalities, Serbia, and Wallachia, they relatively easily breakthrough their way to Central Europe. Immediately following the victorious armies were thousands of Anatolian nomads - Turks, Turkomans, Konyars, and Tartars - who, appreciating the newly conquered fertile lands, settled there with the intention to stay for ever. Their peaceful existence more than a dozen generations - until the Russian-Turk War of 1877-1878, which aimed at the Liberation of Bulgaria. According to the Turkish sources, during the war about half a million of Rumelian Turks has been killed, and about a million escape back to Anatolia, fearing revenge. Nevertheless, many, especially poor peasants, did not leave, and immediately after the Liberation about 1/3 of the new state's population was of Turkish background². Probably from a strategic considerations, during the truce negotiations in San Stefano Russia rejected the Turkish side's offer for a repatriation and exchange of respective minorities. Apparently, in Sankt Petersburg they were keen to preserve a Christian minority within the ailing Ottoman Empire in order further to justify their tutelage role and claims. However, in this way Bulgaria happened to be the homeland of the next to that living in Turkey itself Turkish population. With the further growth of the Principality to South, and especially with the annexation of the Kurjali sanjak, new masses of Turks in overnight reversed their positions from rulers to one of being subjects.

Turks in Bulgaria had their rights guaranteed by the international agreements, beginning with the Berlin treaty of June 1878. They had their own Mufti to handle religious affairs, their worship was legally permitted, and most of their social life was regulated by their own Boards - canonical, judicial, municipal, school - which only formally were approved by the authorities. However, especially after the military coup d'état on 19 May 1934, many of these rights were seriously abridged. Many Turkish schools were closed down and transferred into Bulgarian, and these which were let to teach, had to restrict their curriculum to the Quran. Moreover, the Bulgarian Turks, who were the first out of Turkey to adopt the newly established by Atatürk Latin-based scripts, were forbidden to use it and forced to return to the Arab alphabet.

Coming to the power, Communists promised generously more rights and freedoms to the Turkish minority. For example, they reopened closed Turkish language schools and created

² B.Simsir, 1988., pp.XII-XIII, 1-3. Bulgarian historians in their pre-1980 works also confirmed this, but later they were compelled to "prove", that virtually all Turkish population of Bulgaria is of Bulgarian background, forcedly converted to Islam during the Middle Ages, and forgot both their ancestry and language.

new, permitting education to be carried on the basis of the new Turkish alphabet. A theatre to perform in Turkish was launched in Shumen, and in the same city broadcasting in Turkish for the "Bulgarian population from Turkish background" was initiated. Soon, however, it became clear, that these are only steps from an well elaborated plan, leading to the reverse direction - to complete eradication of the Turkish consciousness, and, first of all - of any connection with Turkey, which, being in the adversary camp, was an enemy itself. All Turkish schools were put under the firm state control with the Ministry of Education (and the Communist Party "Science and Education" Department) preparing the curriculum and approving the ordered to accepted authors textbooks. Gradually, these schools were undergone to a process of a Bulgarization, where Turkish language lessons became fewer and fewer. The same was true for the Turkish language theatre, and local folk groups: all they were under the control of the District BCP Committee Department on Ideology. As for the several Turkish language newspapers and journals, they were published directly by the BCP's Central Committee.

In 1960s a new Law on Names was adopted, which invited Bulgarian citizens from non-Bulgarian background to change voluntarily their names, choosing Bulgarian ones. It gave an opportunity to some fussy intellectuals to attract the public attention and to score some beneficial marks from the CP leadership, useful for their further career. They applied to change their family names, which had certain Turkish sound-ing, translating them into Bulgarian (indeed, this had some limits, because there are names, which means not too pleasant in Bulgarian - for example that of the Marxist philosopher Academician N.Iribajakov, which means literally "narrow hips"). For a period of about 25 years no Turk - incl. these few who were part of the BCP no-menklatura - filled an application for changing of his or her name.

Ideologists of the Bulgarization policy decided that they can't wait more and stroke during the heavy winter of 1984/85. Turks were denied any right to have Turkish names, and with the help of some special paramilitary forces they were compelled to sign a filled form for name change. Thus, Hassan suddenly reincarnated as Assen, Ulvie - as Olga, and so on. These, who persisted not to accept their new names, were at first deprived of an access to their savings and to a health care, because their files with the original names were destroyed. If this was not enough, the next steps were exile and jail.

Until now there is not official data to reveal how much people were killed during the campaign, cynically called "A Revival Process". The Turk side insists on "thousands" (between 800 and 2500 killed only for the first three months of 1985³), which seems exaggerated. However, even more terrifying and longlasting was the experience of psychological torture, which was exercised over the Turkish minority. Finally, in the summer of 1989 this minority was forced to leave the country in an exodus, which has been unknown in Europe since centuries ago.

People were leaving under the tight control of the Police. They were selling their homes and most of their property, which they couldn't take with them (cattle), on extremely low prices. The beneficiaries were, indeed, first of all the local Communist Party bosses and Police chiefs. This was an important precondition for destroying any existing trust between the Turks and the majority Bulgarians. The departing left their cattle and house to be handled during their absence by their Bulgarian neighbours - often without any legal adjustment of the agreement, or, sometimes, transferring to these persons the full power to handle their property. In the most of the cases such transactions were fairly and properly executed - these, who returned, received back what they did leave - but, occasionally, there were examples of abuse and refusal of the self-styled "owners", to respond to the claims for restoring it back to the original ones upon their arrival. And this additionally spoiled the already worsened climate.

It is a pity that instead of being a bridge between the two states, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria appeared to be an ill-fated coin of change between the two countries. Pushed out of Bulgaria - earlier because of the Communist Party leadership's ambitions, now because of the

³ B.Simsir, op.cit., p.266.

economic problems - it can't also resettle in Turkey where official authorities lost their interest toward the issue, and it is perceived as "alien".

THE GYPSIES (ROMA). Ones who were most disappointed to see the outcomes from the 1992 Census, were the Gypsies; their leaders project the number of that colourful community to be somewhere between 600,000 and more than a million. In reality, it appeared to be far less - 287,732 (3.4% from the whole population).

There are not proved documents to show unequivocally when and where from Gypsies have come to the Balkan peninsula. Usually this event is dated vaguely at XV-XVI centuries, and India (esp. the Rajasthan State) is considered to be their ancient Motherland. It is observable, that Gypsies of Bulgaria has significantly darker skin than the ones, who lives in Northern and in Western Europe (even the Romanian Gypsies are lighter, but these living in the former Yugoslavia, apparently, belong to the same family as the Bulgarian). There are some indications that the "darker" family of Gypsies is considered to be of a lower "cast". Even with-in the frames of Bulgaria itself Gypsies preserve a very special hierarchy of commitments and loyalty, which hasn't be influenced by the overall changes in the social environment: they have their barons, neighbourhoods ("katun"), strict vocational patterns, and a system of internal social regulation. Much more than any other ethnic group, Gypsies are collectivists and extraverts; they feel themselves extremely bad when they are separated from their community. Nomadic nature of the Gypsies misleads external and superficial observers to consider them as alienated from the earth and the natural environment. On the contrary: inestablished attempts in the past to make them settle in the new multifloor buildings of the huge residential areas suddenly met some resistance - Gypsies preferred to stay in their slums, or, as a compromise, insisted to take an apartment on the ground floor, closer to the land (Mizov, 1993a,b).

A peculiarity of the Gypsies is their division between the Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and the Islam. In addition, they have their own superstitions, close to the animism. Some of the better-off Gypsies, following their predominant faith, describe themselves either as Bulgarians, or as Turks - which at least partly explains the difference between the claimed by the Gypsy leaders number of their tribe. Among the Gypsies there is an in-creasing supply of new-born Christians - especially attracted by the overseas' Protestant preachers - and Moslems, recruited by the Arab countries-sponsored missionaries. Authors note especially comparatively low ethnic self-identification of the Gypsies, who often tend to represent themselves as Bulgarians or Turks, especially when aspire to acquire better status in the society (Tomova, 1995: 19).

Compared with the overall fading demographical growth of the Bulgarian population, Gypsies demonstrate a remarkable fertility of 4-5 and more children. However, living under very bad conditions, they hold also the sad record of highest mortality and briefest life expectation. Gypsies are also the least educated layer of the Bulgarian population, and they are blamed for allegedly being responsible for the sharp growth in the crimes - indeed, the less sophisticated ones, beginning with the pickpocket and finishing with the stabbing and rape. However, such charges should be consider carefully, because sometimes these result from a pure racial prejudices. Unfortunately, sensations-seeking printing media is too much leaning to eye-catching titles as "Dark Skin Attackers Robbed a Shop", and thus it shapes audience's attitudes. Gypsies, who earlier were restricted to go out their ghettos, and could enter the cities' downtown solely as street-cleaners, now are far more visible, insisting persistently for change, which additionally increases spread of dislike among the better-off citizenry.

OTHER MINORITIES. When Bulgaria was released from the Turkish domination, Bulgarians made up not too much more than a half of the total population. At the same time, huge compact groups of ethnic Bulgarian population were left beyond the borders of the young Kingdom. Urban population, for example, was predominantly Turkish and Greek, and Bulgarians were prevailingly peasants. With the years to come, these features changes to the reverse. First of all, more and more Bulgarians came and settled in the towns and cities, where they became artisans,

manufacturers, and, indeed, in their majority - labourers. Most of the better-off Turks gradually emigrated to Turkey, seeing not too bright future for their businesses. The same was true for the Greeks, who also abandoned more and more Bulgarized towns - Plovdiv (Philipopol, Philibe), Nessebur (Messemvria), Tsarevo (Vassiliko), Pomorie (Ankhialo), and so on. On the Black Sea coast, for example, fishermen and sailors until the beginning of this century were vocations, which tended to be filled almost exclusively by Greek nationals, and only relatively recently the earth-rooted Bulgarians began to enter the sea.

Frequent Balkan Wars also became means for the redistribution of the populations among the countries and "ethnic cleansings" - far before this term to be invented. This, Northern Dobrudja -originally the first place for the Bulgarians to settle on the Balkans, the prominent "Ongle" ("The Corner" - called thus because of the Danube's sharp turn), was made by the Romanians an area free of Bulgarians. The same happened with Western Thracia and Macedonia - especially the Greek part, where the Slavonic character of the population was totally denied. New neighbourhoods appeared close to the towns, called with the names of the newcomers areas of previous settlement - Dobrujan's, Thracian's, Macedonian's - where streets were named after deserted by them towns, meaning broken past and destroyed lives.

There was political migrations also. After the Bolshevik revolution, a huge wave of White emigrants came to Bulgaria, attracted by the common Christian rite, close language, and generally friendly attitudes of the population⁴. In 1949-50 thousands of defeated Communist guerrilla fighters crossed the border and came to Bulgaria, where settled, waiting in vain the next Communist uprising, until in 1980s the Papandreu Government gave amnesty to them and let them back home. After the split between the Moscow-oriented Communist countries and Tito's Yugoslavia, Bulgaria be-came a refugee for the anti-Titoist elements. With the creation of the State of Israel, most of the 70,000 Bulgarian Jews, saved during the War from extermination, left for Israel.

Also, there is some Armenian population in Bulgaria - especially visible in the second-large Bulgarian town, Plovdiv - and less numerous Georgian one. Among the other negligible minorities we could mention also the Karakachans - mountainous shepherds, who are considered to be of ancient Greek background (the Greek Government warrants them passports just upon request) - and Gagauz -a small people, who speak Turkish, but are Christians of Eastern Orthodox rite.

The careful reader would ask here why we are silent about the Macedonians. There is, indeed, not enough place to describe in debt and with the details this problem which is among the most complicated for the relations between the Balkan countries. About a half a century ago a British author diplomatically wrote: "In regard to their own national feelings, all that can be safely said is that during the last eighty years many more Slav Macedonians seem to have considered themselves Bulgarians, or closely linked with Bulgarians, than have considered themselves Serbians, or closely linked with Serbia (or Yugoslavia)" (Barker, 1950)⁵. But let me briefly review the facts.

In 1876 the Istanbul Conference of the Ambassadors decided unanimously that the population of that province is mainly of Bulgarian background. It was, actually, the map, approved by that conference to be set up in real dimensions on March 3, 1878 as the so-called San-Stefano Bulgaria, one, which lasted only three months to be destroyed by the Berlin Treaty. According to

⁴ It is worth to be noted, that even after submission of Bulgaria to the Soviet Union, White Russian emigres were let to live peacefully in Bulgaria. In 1950s they were issued Soviet passports, but weren't forced to leave. Their male descendants, formally, were subject to conscription in the Soviet Army, but never were drafted - apparently, also because of concerns for "unreliability."

⁵ Allegedly artificial creation of the Macedonian nation and statehood seems to be a good illustration of the so called by B.Anderson (1991) print capitalism, or, rather, "print totalitarianism". See more detailed analysis in Nikolov, 1996, pp.10-15.

this treaty, Macedonia was returned back under the sovereignty of the Sultan and started its own struggle for liberation. There were, however, already too much strive for this land among the neighbour countries - especially Greece and Serbia - that it could never be let neither to be a separate country, nor to reunite with Bulgaria. And, after the Balkan Wars and the World War I, it was divided - as a pye - among Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece. The Serbs denied the Bulgarian background of the population, considering it to be "Southern Serbs". They were forcing students to start lessons with a "Pledge of Allegiance" ("*Ja sum pravi srbin*" - "I am a genuine Serbian"). As for the Greeks, they did not want even to hear about any Slavophon background of the population, and - as the most recent events revealed - appeared to be extremely sensitive toward the usage of the very term "Macedonian", considering it to be a part of their untouchable national legacy.

It was an invention of the Komintern to insist about including as a sixth Yugoslavian republic the Macedonian (it was, actually, Joseph Stalin, who, disliking in the end of 1947 his name-sake, J.B.Tito, saved Bulgaria from the fate of being the seventh Yugoslav republic). Under Tito's and the Communist Party orders a couple of philologists were closed behind the walls of the St. Prokhor of Pchinya monastery to shape the grammar of this tongue. It is well known, that Bulgaria, being the first ever country to recognize in 1992 the existence of the independent Macedonian state, made the unique for the international relations' practice remark of denying recognition of the Macedonian nation. As for the remnant Yugoslavia (most precisely, Serboslavia), nobody in Belgrade is tackling seriously to accept any Macedonian state out of the federation. Even the opposition, anti-Milosevic parties are openly speaking about the Southern Serbia, and it was only the complications in Bosnia and the EU/US monitoring, which hampered them from recovering the Serbi-an control over Skopje.

As for Bulgaria, there has been in the second half of the 1940s too much zeal among the new Communist rulers of the country to imitate as much as possible the Soviet model, that it was decided to remake the small Bulgaria as a small "USSR". Habitants of the Northern Bulgaria were told that they are no more Bulgarians, but Mizians, of Northeasterner - Dobrujans, of Southern - Thracians, and of Southwestern - Macedonians. In 1946 census, so much beloved by our Western neighbours, the people of Southwestern Bulgaria were forced - yes, namely forced, as solely the Communist authorities are able to do this - to inscribe themselves as Macedonians. And those, who persisted in perceiving themselves as Bulgarians, were prosecuted - as, lately, were those, who failed to correct themselves in time with the change of the Party line, and continue to claim Macedonian ethnicity.

Curiously enough, in the Macedonian issue almost all political forces in Bulgaria follow the rigid Communist pattern. There is only a handful of people, who consider themselves to be Macedonians (the so called OMO "Ilinden"), being ridiculed by the local population as "Skopje payees". However, authorities are exag-geratedly jealous in their efforts to suppress them, that there is danger of achieving the opposite - instead of this, to ignite further the "Macedonianism" idea. This already led to the absurdist situation in the last censuses in the both countries to claim the total absence of any neighbouring country's minority (respectively - Macedonian in Bulgaria, and Bulgarian in Macedonia), when most of the people from the both sides of the border have more or less close relatives from the other side. And when they meet, the last thing they would argue, is whether the tongue that they are speaking, is Macedonian or Bulgarian - a controversy, which prevented from signing a dozen of important agreements between the two countries.

Another group of the Bulgarian population, which is distinct because of its religion - the Islam - but is formally considered as a part of the Bulgarian ethnicity, are the Pomaks (the Bulgarian Moslems). They inhabit the Rhodopes mountains area (South Central Bulgaria), use almost exclusively Bulgarian as a means for communication, but are Moslems. Many of them do not accept the official concept of their violent conversion from Christianity to Islam in XVI century, no matter how plenty of historical clues lead to such a conclusion (for example, excavations of destroyed Christian churches in the most of the settlements, Christianity-inspired toponimy, usage of the adverse for the Moslems Crossing sign for blessing, and so on). Here is another example how a distance between ethnically close populations, created because of one distinct feature -

formally denied, but in fact encouraged - can make a total difference and to alienate them one from another.

2. UNWRAPING THE ETHNICITY (Some theoretical premises)*

If we depart from the etymological background of the *ethnicity* concept, it leads us to the Greek word *ethnos*, what means simply "people". This word and its meaning has been accepted in many other European languages since the beginning of this millennium. It has been used for distinction of the "common rural folks" from the urban population, as well of the Christians from non-Christians, especially from the Jews (See Souter, A., A.Pock, 1916). Even the most recent vocabularies or glossaries do not contribute for better understanding, stating "belonging to non-Christian and non-Jewish nations... belonging or having common racial, religious and linguistic features, especially for indicating of a racial or another group within a larger system... group of people, diverse from the whole community by a racial background or cultural traditions, usually striving for recognition or enjoying officially recognized properties of a group identity"; "people, which belong to a peculiar racial or cultural group, which, by a rule, do not inhabit the same country, where most of the members of this group live; condition or a fact or belonging to a specific ethnic group"; "group of people from a specific race or nationality, located in a place, where most other people are from a different race"; "ethnic classification or affiliation; subgroup of the population, having joint cultural heritage, distinguishes itself by customs, features, language, common history, etc." (Oxford English Dictionary, 1991: 535; Collins Cobuild Dictionary, 1995: 564; Longman Language Activator, 1994: 1069; Webster's, 1988: 467). From the beginning of 1980s ethnic group concept found meaningful usage in sociology and social anthropology for identifying of culturally different groups. Derivative term of *ethnogenesis* is commonly used for designating and identifications of processes of change, as a result of which population in the frames of a given society could shape a new identity. Relatively new practice among the scholars is to make distinction between two meanings of the term *ethnicity*: A. Ethnic group, i.e., established, corporative group; B. Ethnic category - certain population, which could share common cultural features and social institutions without forming a particular, separate group. Dozens are concepts about ethnicity, which can be found in the contemporary sociology. In the same time, T.Parsons in an already considered as a classic collective work edited by N.Glazer and D. Moynihan - "Ethnicity: Theory and Experience" - speaks quite pessimistically and abstemiously about the actual explanatory potential of this term (Parsons, T., 1975: 82). In a degree, this "elusive" category served as well for rebutting stratification theory as explanation for the solidarity of the homogeneous groups. According to some authors, ethnicity appears to be even more essential source of stratification and social partition than based on ownership class relations (Glazer, N. & D. Moynihan, 1975: 16-18; Watson, J., 1977). Glazer and Moynihan themselves divide ethnicity into two distinct categories - primordial and particular. Primordial ethnicity means such a differentiation among people, which is rooted in the deep historical experience, while particular one is connected with rise of certain specific and immediate circumstances, which justify

* This is an abridged version of the theoretical part of the study. More detailed exposition of the theoretical premises and concepts, which about Western experts are aware, but which are virtually unknown in Bulgaria, can be found in my article "Unwrapping Ethnicity", published in Bulgarian (Nikolov, 1996), as well as in the Bulgarian language version of this work.

why groups maintain their identity (Ibidem: 19-20). Currently, however, most researchers reject this separation, because it brings an undesired grade of determinism.

One can easily notice involvement of the category "race" when ethnicity is defined - which, instead of bringing in more clarification, confuses even more explanation. Term "ethnicity" is often used in the American literature as an analogue of "race". Humanities' partition into races is related to certain biological and anthropological clues, like colour of the skin, colour and shape of the hair, of eyes, and so on. Individual large races - Europeide ("white"), Mongoloide ("Yellow"), Negroide ("Black") did raise numerous different ethnicities. Features which differentiate ethnicity seem to be much more essential and in a significant degree molding and defining self-identity - language, common cultural legacy, common history, and so on. Even subraces - Anglosaxons, Caucasians, Semites, Anamites, etc. - to a large extent vary from the ethnicities, which usually refer to a narrower group of people. There exist already a large consent that the term "race" lacks any explanatory value (Barot, R. (ed.), 1993: 5). Distinction is to be seek mainly in the direction biological - cultural. For example, in the Social Sciences Encyclopedy "racial group" is defined as "consisting of people, who believe to share common biological making", while "nonracial ethnic group is identified by common cultural clues" (Smooha, S., 1985: 267-9).

In the British scholar tradition the term *ethnicity* replaces the outdated *tribe* especially in the African studies. Abner Cohen writes in his work "Customs and politics in Africa" "when groups compete for accomplishing specific goals, ethnicity means a distinctive feature of the group identification" (Cohen, A., 1969: 57. See also De Odem, 1974a, 1974b). Thus, Cohen displays ethnicity as a political phenomenon, which demonstrates itself when various groups compete for control over insufficient sources. According to this point of view, interrelations and inter-action between the groups in the name of the economic progress appears to be a necessary condition for the ethnicity as a political category.

Contrary to the Cohen's concentration on the competition and conflict as a decisive condition for the development of ethnicity, Norwegian social anthropologist Frederic Barth accepts more interactionist approach in his book "Ethnic Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture and Differences". Barth admits essential importance of the culture, but thinks that continuity of the innate and unique character of the ethnic groups depends not simply from the culture itself, but from the strict maintaining of the boundary, which indicates affiliation and toward given group non-affiliation to any other (Barth., 1969: 14).

Thus, consequently, the demarcation issue becomes methodological Parsons concludes that demarcation of racial groups all over the world is "a cultural symbol" (Parsons, Op.cit.: 74). An other prominent scholar in the field of ethnic relations, Michael Wiewiorka, uses the terms of "race" and "ethnicity" as mutually interchangeable, putting them in a common conceptual frame. When he states that "ethnicity combines in itself the twofold principle of inclusion and exclusion and separation of the inferior from the more overlying" (Wiewiorka 1992: 1-2), he practically reunites processes of inclusion and exclusion. Accordingly, the Other is simultaneously different and inferior on the exclusion level, but this does not at all deprives him from the possibility to self-assess himself as well to feel pride of self. According to Wiewiorka, talking about modernity requires clear recognition of the underlying tensions between the forces of progress and reason, on the one hand, and on the another - those of subjectivity, culture, and nationality (Wiewiorka, 1993). Such an approach permits to extend the ethnocentrism phenomenon far beyond the obsolete unique character of nations, to the current economic prosperity and competition for markets.

Impossibility to establish causal connection between race and culture is reproduced also in scholars' efforts to find interdependence between ethnicity and religion. Here, again, relation between race, culture, and ethnicity recurs (See Burghart, R., ed., 1987). However, actual connection between particular group and its religious affiliation, in no way can be accepted as an autonomous formative factor, as it is in the case with the relation between race and culture.

A good deal of the researchers, quite obviously, miss an important methodological suggestion, made by E. Durkheim in his classical "Division of Labour in Society" (Durkheim, E., 1964: 70-132). Modernization, writes Durkheim, means "a transition from mechanical to organic solidarity". Hence, process of ethnicity shaping can not be reduced to any given set of factors, since when one attempts to derive some universal principles would unavoidably bypass essential components and circumstances. This is a frequent and common mistake which leads to significant misunderstanding surrounding demands of various self-help and cultural groups, wrongly accepted as separatist claims.

Religious faith, without any doubt, plays essential, and frequently main role both in shaping of specific socio-demographic groups, as well as for their mobilization in the middle of socio-political conflicts and co-operation. Marxist theory tenaciously kept silent, neglected and even rejected significance of this factor, presenting religion as an artificially imposed and transitional phenomenon. Actually, primary, simplified interpersonal ties precede religion, which is one of the many components, an incorporated part from the initial conditions of the human development, leading to a premeditated group alignment (See more detailed Geertz, L., 1963). Interpersonal ties, usually submitted to a specific holy language to accompany any individual since he/she has been born, are unconstrained by the personal preferences, practical necessity, common interest, or any imposed moral obligation (Ibidem: 8).

Complexity and ambivalence of the relation between ethnicity and religion makes Bulgarian scholar G. Fotev to conclude that "when we identify certain ethnicity, or various ethnicities, we have to put the problem of religion and confession- numerous cases when within one ethnicity we find rooted different religions, which has different consequences for the ethnicity's historical life. But even if these consequences have characteristic of an acutely exposed internal antagonism, ethnicity as such is preserved (Fotev, 1994: 23). It is, however, without any doubt that when confession and ethnicity coincide (the most distinguishedly in the Jewish ethnicity, but no less strongly also with Moslem communities notwithstanding their detachment and national diversity) group links are strongest and preface coherent common action. Otherwise, we observe overlapping between religious and ethnic groups, although, as a whole, world religious dispose of far larger "constituency" than individual ethnicities. That is why religious identity, at times, is stronger than the ethnic one because of the sacramental component. However, S. Huntington's assertion about conflict based on nation and ethnicity being overcome and replaced by other sources of conflict such as cultural collisions among civilizations (Huntington, 1993) seems to be premature at least concerning what happened during the last years on the Balkans and Transcaucasia after the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its far smaller counterpart, Yugoslavia. There are still too much reefs around, which can cause more strifes like the one in Bosnia.

3. POLITICAL MISUSE OF THE ETHNIC PROBLEMS

Bulgaria emerged from the five centuries of Turkish domination as a multi-national state. While large groups of ethnic Bulgarians remained, according to the Berlin Treaty (July, 1878) outside the borders of the two semi-autonomous entities (The Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia), within the both only slightly more than the half of the population, resided mainly in rural areas and small towns, considered themselves Bulgarians, while the rest, were Turks, Armenians, Jews, Gypsies, Greeks, and so on. Turks lived both in cities and villages, and Armenians, Jews, Greeks were almost without exceptions urbanised, while Gypsies adhered to nomadic way of life. As in the most parts of the Ottoman Empire, larger cities were truly multiethnic places, where various ethnic groups, worships, languages, cultures lived in a relative harmony. Such a conclusion may seem too unexpected for the Western reader, but, in general, relations between various ethnic groups and nationalities on the Balkans has normally been ones of mutual respect and tolerance. This is especially true in the case of cohabitation of Bulgarians with other ethnic groups. As an American researcher, Frederic

B. Chary, who especially studied how Bulgaria saved "its" Jewry from the extermination during the World War II, quotes the German ambassador in Sofia of these times: "Bulgarians had grown up with Armenians, Greeks and Gypsies, they had no innate prejudice against the Jews as did the people of northern Europe"⁶ (Chary, 1977). As a matter of fact, tension and confrontation between the ethnic groups within the population of Bulgaria rather reflected projections and inciting by the malevolent political and partisan forces, than certain prejudices and bad feelings of the ordinary people between themselves. More will be said further on the problems of mutual relations between the Bulgarians and the Bulgarian Turks, but here probably is the suitable place to express regret, that in his otherwise well-established and broad study of the Turks of Bulgaria Bilal Simsir simply avoids to describe interpersonal relations between Bulgarians and the Bulgarian Turks - ones, indeed, far from any idyllicism, but nevertheless also free of premeditated hatred and obstruction (Simsir, 1988). Here, indeed, it is necessary to mention that lack of a job market competition under the planned economy also favored maintenance of normal - but far not close - relationships between Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks where they lived together.

Even the Bulgarian Revivalist and Liberation movement during the 19th century was not marked by any extreme nationalism and hatred toward the other neighbour nations; on the contrary, its main ideologist like G.Rakovski, V.Levski, L.Karavelov projected cooperation with other nations and peoples within the Ottoman Empire - incl. the Turks themselves - both during the struggle against the ailing Sultan regime, as well as in the future independent system of rule. A good example of this ethnic tolerance was the inclusion of Moslem Turkish representatives in the first Great National Assembly, and provision of the adopted then Fundamental Law, giving the right of minorities to use their maternal language even in such special cases as the military oath. Consequent years, especially after Balkan Wars and World War I, brought tragic experience for all of the Balkan peoples, which became commonly known as patterns and notions with exceptionally negative sense - *ethnic cleansing* and *Balkanization*. Huge masses of people were forced to leave locations, where their parents and grandparents has been settled centuries ago. This process of resettlement was associated with a great degree of violence, reaching the level of a genocide, as in the case of the notorious massacre of Armenians in Turkey in 1915. Nonetheless, Bulgarians, who were among the greatest losers then, generally preserved predominantly temperate and amicable attitude toward the "others". That is why, together with difficult guaranteeing of place to live for tens of thousands of Bulgarians, migrating from their settlements in Dobrudja (in Romania), Western provinces and Macedonia (in Yugoslavia), Northern Greece and Turkey, both Bulgarian state and people provided shelter for other minority refugees. Armenians did come, victimized by both Turkish and Bolshevik atrocities; after the 1917-1920 civil war in Russia many Russians found their new motherland in friendly Bulgaria, which was attributing to them own liberation. Later, Bulgaria was the only Germany allied country to prevent holocaust of "its" Jews in the Nazi death camps.

This legacy was quickly destroyed after the establishment of the communist regime in Bulgaria, which an author quite appropriately called "wrapped society"⁷ as an allusion about the well known self-styled artist Christo manner of portraying reality. National and ethnic policies of the regime appeared to be a raving, usually mutually controversial row of experimentations, campaigns and turns - at times too sharpened. We could recall that specialization in the field of ethno-national relations was conferred well before the October 1917 Bolshevik insurrection namely to Joseph Djughashvili, known better as Stalin, who became a commissar (minister) on Nationalities affairs, when Bolsheviks seized power. Similarly to the biologist Michurin, who strived to transform nature trying to cultivate tangerines in Siberia, outstanding "Teacher of the Peoples" undertook an implication of cul-

⁶ Bulgaria, for example, does not know antisemitic pogroms from the size and scope of these seen often about the end of XIX century in Russia, Germany, Poland and most of the other Central and Western Europe.

⁷ See Fotev, G. (1994): Ch. IV, pp.64-102.

tivation, eradication of "maleficent" shrubs and implanting over the immense space of the Empire, all of this using terror and violence. With an efficiency and cruelty to be coveted by all aspirants for worldwide power, he transferred the enormous territory of the Soviet state in a test ground for dreadful experiments, as if this was the Kremlin backyards. Vagariouly created Union and "autonomo-us" republics - some of these "set up", "abolished" and recarved repetitiously by a Politbureau decision - served only as a tool for accomplishing the Kremlin clique's intentions, which for notions like self-determination, national consciousness, and so on, were simply manipulative words. Stalin himself, who was not either Russian, nor a Slav, vigorously joined the Great Russian strategy, outstripping even the most daring Slavophiles' dreams. Through his entrusted numerous horde of guards he could afford to play with small peoples as if they were pawns, moving them from their native lands into interior, preferably in the desert or tundra. He was punishing harshly entire peoples for "treachery", dissension or disobedience of one or another fellow countryman, for each innocuous attempt to seek ostensibly constitutionally guaranteed rights. In his reminiscences Khrushchev depicts primitive antisemitism of the "Leader".

Stalin's disciples liked this policy even when they renounced their mentor. Khrushchev "endowed" the cleansed from Tatars Crimea to his native Ukraine, and later sent out hundreds of thousands of youngsters together with the "beautiful Moldavian", L.I. Brezhnev, to assimilate - literally and figuratively - the Central Asian virgin lands. Brezhnev himself in his brief instants of brain-waves tried to repeat his younger years' impulses and instructed young communists to build Baikal-Amur railway (BAM) and to digest the taiga near the Chinese border. Together with the Russian tanks here in Bulgaria returned also the confident apparatchiks, who survived with great efforts purges, and who professedly did not recall well their native Bulgarian language, striving to be devoted. In their endeavour to be as much as possible like "Big Brother", they tried to inhabit the re-drafted "People's Republic" Macedonians, Mizians, Thracians and who knows which other but Bulgarians. They propelled the idea for inclusion of Bulgaria into Titoist Yugoslavia, and in case the conflict between Stalin and Tito was avoided, now we should face a process of self-determination...

Bulgarian scholar K. Kertikov in two consequent articles analyzed earlier confidential papers of the high communist party leadership (Kertikov, 1991, 1992) from the 1946 - 1989 period. These papers from the party archives give the author basis to distinguish two completely opposite stages in the ethnonational policy of the ruling BCP. He denotes them as Phase "A" - a stage of speeding up the ethnic differentiation (1946-1956), and Phase "B" - one of the "national unity" through ethnic homogenization (1956-1989). Phase "A" carried out numerous indications of amateurism and utopianism - which did not impede its designers from manipulating fate, mind and consciousness of millions of Bulgarian citizens through prescriptions - often mutually contradicting - concerning who they are. Although hypocritical and biased, hitherto policy of flirtation with the Turkish minority from this period - publishing (indeed, under the strict CP control) of newspapers, broadcasting in Turkish language, and even confining certain privileges to selected members of the Turkish community (easier admission at Universities, better employment, etc.) - was drastically ceased. Then begun Phase "B". It was connected with thoroughly contrived and well organized active actions - replacement of passports and other personal ID documents, movement of groups of population from one place of residence to another, internment, change of names of persons with non-Bulgarian (non-Slav) names. In almost overnight even the very existence of any Turkish minority was refuted. The most prominent historians were mobilized to prove, that there isn't such a minority, but these are descendants of Bulgarians, who during the Ottoman-Turkish domination (1393-1878) has been converted to Islam and gradually has forgotten their Bulgarian background. The so-called "Process of Revival" was initiated, when special police forces were sent to the Turkish boroughs and villages to "help" this population to "recall" its Bulgarian roots. Authorities failed to foresee that in this relatively homogenous group exist well established self-consciousness as well as stable ethnic identification, both supported by a strong as in no other group of the

Bulgarian population religious impact. Under such circumstances any attempt for an outside interference is definitely doomed to a failure. Bulgarian Turks, no matter if they adjoin with Bulgarians or dwell densely in "theirs" villages, defied both attempts for being persuaded - often with pseudoscientific arguments - that they have "forgotten" their Bulgarian background, as well as police sieges, intimidation, physical abuse and extortion. This meant to change the given at birth names not only of the live members of the families, but also of the dead ancestors (which meant a vandalizing of cemeteries), and also of the relatives, who were living abroad and simply couldn't be aware about what was happening. In some instances the names of some people, who were absent from their residences because of being drafted, hospitalised or jailed, were changed twice - at home and at the place of their provisional whereabouts. All files and personal papers, consisting of the original nam-es, were invalidated and had to be destroyed - personal IDs, health service cards, account access books, driving licences, and so on⁸. The same nightmare as in the Kaf-kian world, but this time in reality: everybody had to choose between losing his/her personality and accepting an imposed one.

Earlier, during the 1960s and 1970s, similar campaigns were undertaken among Pomaks and Gypsies, and they were pretty successful, effectively reaching their goals without creating troubles for the authorities, both internally and internatio-nally: the human rights issue was still not a major factor in the international affairs. Surprisingly for the inspirers of this shameful campaign, this time things did not go so smoothly as they expected. There was, indeed, first of all an international reaction against the Bulgarian Communist leadership move. Initially it was pushed by Turkey, which felt itself responsible for the fate of the Moslems in the neighbour countries, but later continued also by the main Western democracies. Hitherto they were neglecting internal developments in Bulgaria, giving freedom to the rulers to deal with the society according to their whims. The Bulgarian Turks, also, resisted the measures - with some Oriental delay, indeed, but they confronted the imposed on them force. And, last but not least, the protests from the part of the intelligentsia were also unexpectedly massive; indeed, they still did not matched the scope of anti-Commun-ists protests in Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest, but they did not match the usually obedient subjects of the Communist oppression.

Bulgaria was already not the same country, known as the most submitted to Moscow, and populated with docile people. For the first time in its grim history of 45-years of Communist rule the-re emerged a significant opposition, which with the Communists had to comply, and later even to yield the power. This opposition grew almost exclusively on the basis of two important for the country issues - the environmental protection, and ethnic conflict. However, it had still to deal with the same difficult problems, which complicate additionally the transition to democracy. For example, when one of the speakers at the first free anti-Communist rallies in Sofia appealed to the crowd to support the repealing of the Turks' names policy, was jeered and forced to interrupt his speech (astonishingly enough, the same person later ran over to the Nationalist camp, which is also part of the Balkan style Bulgarian politics).

Hence those preachers of the "bright future", convinced that they can shift nature for their purposes, interferred in the most intimate mechanisms of the hu-man soul and consciousness. Consequences from the ransack of natural environ-ment, undertaken in the name of accelerated industrialization, are obvious ubiquitously - fertile lands, transferred into a lunar landscape, tainted air, pol-luted formerly clean rivers, where there is no record from the once biodiversity. Far more difficult, however, one can notice the harm caused to the human inter-action and psyche - mistrust and enmity among neighbours, confrontation betwe-en "own" and "alien", implanting feeling of being redundant, unwanted, inferior in the souls of thousands of this land's toilers⁹.

⁸ See for more details Bilal N. Simsir. Op.cit., esp. pp.265-266.

⁹ As much more democratic and developed economically is given society, as low is the ethnic tension there because of the weaker competition for not so scanty resources. A typical example is the Hungarian minority in Hungary's neighbour countries (Hungary has, similarly to Bulgaria and even in a greater de-

Unfortunately, bitter lessons from this antihumane experiment, cinically identified as a "Process of Revival", apparently were not apprehended by the successors of its originators and marplots, who remained anonymous and exonerated. Revenge strive found expression in organization and inspiration of chauvinist and ultranationalistic parties and formations - luckily, failing to spread any significant support by the voters. If we put aside occasional cases of violence by small skinheads-like groups, the most serious show of this approach found place during the 1996 local elections in Kirjali - the only Bulgarian district, where Bulgarian Turks exceed, and besides more than twice the number of the ethnic Bulgarians¹⁰. Former communists, overloaded by their past, mobilized all forces in order to prevent election of a Mayor from a Turkish background (some leaders of the BSP called Kirjali "our Stalingrad"), and when this happened, they demanded cancellation of the elections, which was overturned by the Supreme Court. Indicatively, during the last (April 19, 1997) parliamentary elections BSP failed to score even single seat in Kirjali.

Speculations with the ethnic presence in the Bulgarian politics and persuasions about the "mononational" character of the Bulgarian population rely on unprecise, often even totally erroneous. Among the faulty arguments they use, are that ethnic minorities' parties are banned in Western Democracies and the USA, where people from various nationalities reside. There is *no* currently any country in Europe which could seriously claim of being mononational - and even least likely is such states on the Balkans, which has been historically crossroad of numerous tribes, peoples, ethnic groups. Imposed by the current Bulgarian Constitution prohibition of political parties on ethnic and confessional basis is not only artificial and lacking vitality, but it contradicts the inscribed in the very beginning of the Fundamental Law essential right of the freedom of speech and convention. Groundless fears from a mythical conquering of Bulgaria caused also our country to defer signing of the European Convention on minorities. Employing ignorance by the prevailing part of the population, paid titled by deserved in the past academic degrees indoctrinators scatter deceptions from the pages of some dailies with vast circulation. The truth is that some ever decreasing tendencies toward suppression of the ethnic representation we can find in France, Greece, and Turkey, but parties with ethnic background of the Basques and Catalans found recognition in Spain - which was practically coped with illegal terrorist activities - as well as in Belgium, Great Britain and Finland (in the later nobody is impressed when a non-Finn is appointed on such positions as a Minister of Defence and a Minister of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, in such countries as Netherlands and Germany, parallelly with the economically justified measures for restricting immigration, already settled aliens are given voting and other civil rights before and separately from the procedure of naturalization. As for the USA, years long tradition of the two parties together with the amorphous, "omnivorous" character of the both main political parties practically rejects any effective participation of third parties - no matter which is their cast - at least on the federal level. In the same time, to speak about any restrictions of the opportunities for self-organization - incl. political - of the ethnic groups simply does not meet the reality. Prosecuted are only those who by terrorist means strive to impose their ideas, while even Louis Farakhan, who demands erection of an Islamic state on the US territory, is completely free to line up rallies both in open and closed space. One can not underestimate that almost all larger US cities

gree, borders with itself. Compact and politically organized Hungarian groups in Romania, Slovakia, rump Yugoslavia, and Ukraine voicingly defend their rights, which contrasts with passivity of their compatriots, living in Austria, who had accomplished enough ample satisfaction of their demands under the conditions of developed economy.

¹⁰ The number of the Bulgarian Turks in the region of the former Kirjali district (*okrug*), according to the data from December 1992 census, is 141,078, or 65.7% from the whole population - see Bozhikov (1993): 47-53. Fragile Bulgarians-Turks' ratio in the municipality itself is characterized with predominance of Bulgarians in the urban area, and of Turks in the surrounding villages. There are ongoing attempts to separate Kirjali into two, relatively ethnically clean parts.

(incl. the Federal district of Columbia - the capital city of Washington, D.C., as well as un-til some years ago New York too) have Black mayors. It is hardly to be denied, indeed, that statistically as a mean proportion Afro-Americans obviously yield to the majority of whites by social status and influence, but they are also to be blam-ed for this - it makes sense that too much among the most prosperous and promi-nent among the Black Americans are not heirs of the one time slaves from the plantations, currently regularly subscribed to the social security system, but first or second generation of immigrants mainly from the Caribic islands. Simultaneo-usly, only politically visually impaired "observers" may not sight the great differen-ce in the situation of the coloured people in the USA, who were until only three decades ago prohibited to drink water from the same tap used by whites, to use "their" restrooms or to sit next to a white person in the public transport, park or school. Reasoning, that "there Negroes are beaten" is already hopelessly obsolete - it appears, that misleading notions of the Bulgarians of being tolerant toward the "others" have nothing to do with the contemporary realities¹¹. Even the most conservative Western politicians (probably with the exception of people like Pat Buchanan, Le Pen and some other of that sort) comprehended that through administrative and repressive measures problems not only can not be solved, but new, even nore severe ones, emerge - violence gave birth to violence. Since a group of the population - in this case, ethnic, or simply of a specific eth-nic consciousness (even when it is formally not recognized by the authorities) - decide freely that existing in that society political intermediaries do not express enough well its particular interests, it has the unabridged right to look for own forms of politi-cal influence and representation. Every piece of legislation, which deprives it from this right, which restricts usage of own language, to profess its confession in that way as it understands, to follow own traditions and customs, and which im-poses advantages for a given language and given confession over the rest ones - such one piece of legislation is deteriorate and contradicts the very sense of the idea of civil society. The only guideline which fairly distributes power resources in the democratic society is people's vote, al the rest is mischievous. And here we think is appropriate to mention that it is already time to think about institutionalization of an *ombudsman*¹² here in Bulgaria, which should guarantee a true protection of the citizens from the tyranny of the state.

¹¹ As can be seen from the analysis of the major sociological survey "Ethnocultural Situation in Bulgaria - 1992", "the degree of negative attitudes of the Bulgarians in 1992 toward Gypsies is matching attitudes of the white Southerners in the USA toward Blacks in the beginning of 1960s... Contemporary American society in a significant degree has overcome, after many years of struggle for civil rights of the Afro-Ame- and support by the authorities at various levels, spread in the past racist dispositions. Obviously, Bulgarian society is still anticipated to walk a similar route - difficult, but solely viable in order to transfer itself into a truly modern and open society in the end of 20th century and beginning of 21st century (Georgiev Zh. et al., 1993: 77-78). Favourable for the Bulgarians comparisons with racist, supremacist and nationalistic frenzies in the Eastern (and not only) provinces of Germany, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, nothing to say about conducted by fire and brand ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia must not reassure us - even occasional, "skinheads" and similar groupings manifestations, including assaults against foreign diplomats, combined often with the negligently-instigating behaviour of the authorities in the least lead there, where long ago nobody beats coloured people.

¹² Word "ombudsman" is from Swedish background, but it has entered in many languages. This institution was introduces during the last years in Poland and Hungary, and most recently in Romania to be an additional warrant form implementing and following democratic procedures. In Bulgaria the last sanctuary for this is solely the Constitutional Court, which, however, has a complicated procedure and only a li-mited number of officials can apply to it. The Ombudsman is incompatible with the political partisan-ship and debates which reveal complete misunderstanding of democratic order concerning hierarchy and supremacy of the powers; it manifests the still unaccomplished in Bulgaria essential democratic principle about "mutual check and balance" between powers. An established statement about neces-sity to introduce the ombudsman in Bulgaria could be found in Georgiev (1997).

A wrong and risky strive is also the one to undermine certain differences existing between some of the subgroups within the ethnic Bulgarian population, esp. between the majority Orthodox Christian Bulgarians, and the Bulgarian Moslems ("Pomaks"), as well as with the still negligibly few Macedonia-leaning in Pi-rin Macedonia. Reducing them to a purely allotting ethnographical category re-returns us back - though to the opposite side - to the absurd dismembering of the Bulgarian nation to Thracians, Mizians, and so on. There is certainly a difference between Bulgarians as a whole, and such subgroups (linguistic, folkloristic, etc.) as Shop and Kapan, and between Bulgarians and Bulgarian Moslems, and Bulgarians and "Macedonians"; denial of such differences would not in any way help for maintaining national consolidation. In this sense it seems interestingly to mention existing difference in the designations of individual regional folk assemblages which existed in the past, designations, which - without any doubt - were approved at corresponding party level - some of these were permitted to use respective ethnographic names ("Thracian", "Shop", "Kapan"), while other were confined only to geographic ones - "Pirin", "Rhodopes"). Intent to impose clearly objective and easily perceived criteria for ethnicity and nation - common territory, language, economic life - usually lead to discrepancies, and, ultimately, to inexplicable phenomena. That is why it is necessary to have in mind also some not immediately palpable determinants as affiliation empathy, self-identification, complicity - otherwise we would fail to find the whole complication of the process of detachment of some nations from other ones, internal partitions within some existing nation, emergence of new nations. History offers numerous examples proving that "nation" and "ethnicity" are not phenomena or entities, existing once for ever. It is well known, for example, that Latin American Creoles are no more Spaniards, as well as the South African Boers once has ceased to be Dutch. If applying of plausible criteria and utter denial of "others" right to self-determine is explicable as a political or propaganda approach - though in no way justifiable - this is not a proper mode of academic examination. In a scholar's work it is inadmissible to reiterate administrators' attempts to match legal avowal (which actually means an access to the political and legal space, and not at all acceptance of the proclaimed ideas). Awkward reasoning "*they* are behaving in this way", which once transferred Great National Assembly's debates on the draft Bulgarian Constitution into a polemic over the Turkish Fundamental Law, is beneath criticism. Analogies made by self-proclaimed forerunners of "Bulgarian character" with Cyprus, Lebanon and Bosnia, aiming at intimidation of population and implanting of nationalism simply has nothing to do with the reality¹³. Use of terrorist means by ethnic minorities does not occur abruptly, it is usually a result from a lengthened, at times even unconscious, pushing the minorities to marginal positions in the society and imposing to them such patterns of behaviour and harmony which are against their disposition. That is why careful research and finding both points and features of compatibility and variance between living together different ethnicities is of crucial importance for avoiding confrontation and misunderstanding between them. It is to avoid some clear indications of

* Shops are settled in the area of Sofia, Kapans - near Razgrad in Northeastern Bulgaria.

¹³ Let us recall to those, for whom 1964 is too long ago, that feud in Cyprus was engendered and preceded by the active Greek interference in the Aphrodite's island affairs through supporting General Grivas' activities and policies of *enosis* (i.e., annexation, another word-synonym of the one well-known from the political vocabulary *anschlufi*). Committed by the moderate and resenting *enosis* archbishop Makarios' opponents coup d'état put to power pro-Greek marionettes, who were too impatient to turn Cyprus into Greek waters. Under these conditions Turkey's interference was unavoidable, though, indeed, far not justified. This example shows how dangerous and damaging is when *sources* of given phenomenon (as a matter of fact, in the case of Cyprus set up long before 1964) are replaced by their effect. In the same manner, to seek roots for the bloody confrontation in Bosnia in any kind of "Islamic arcs" is extremely simplified. Entire process of collapse of the charged with internal disparities Yugoslav federation was born both by inherited from the history and in this way irrecoverable factors, as well as from the Belgrade's strive to build federation not as an equal in rights union of peoples and ethnicities, but as a constellation, where Serbs dominated ubiquitously.

an ethnocentric leaning in both the Bulgarian politics and everyday life. Ethnocentrism appears to be based upon a set of prejudices or hatred toward one or more specific groups. Ethnocentrism usually is combined with group closure in itself, complacency, separation from the others by self imposed boundaries. These boundaries occur and are maintained by means of exclusion, which sharpen the division between the ethnic groups (Giddens, 1993: 260).

Among the things that found us unprepared to deal with after the democratic changes occurred in Bulgaria in the beginning of 1990s, was the prospect of minorities' representatives entering in the Armed Forces. Any underestimation of the enormous preventionist and educational work which is to be done, should be premature and impending. Having in mind how sensitive is this issue, when, moreover, cleavage among the predominantly Christian and minority Moslem population is involved. Any ethnic conflict is always a devastating experience, but an ethnic conflict between Armed Forces' servicemen, since there is a direct access to weaponry, would be an extremely negative event, which could have a large and unwanted effect over the whole society.

Integration of ethnic minorities in any country's Armed Forces has always been a troublesome and difficult task to be accomplished. No wonder, that usually dominating population group was trying either to avoid including the ethnically alien elements in the regular Armed Forces. If this proved to be impossible or ineffective, they tend to keep them as much as possible separated from a direct access to weaponry (i.e., assigning them to non-combat units), and/or from any commanding position above of certain level.

Communist authorities found an easy way to avoid this problem. They were drafting representatives of the ethnic minorities into the so-called Construction and Transportation Troops: non-combat units, which are used as a source of a cheap labour for building of mainly civilian objects - especially, huge industrial sites, high-ways, railway tunnels, bridges, etc., usually too difficult or too demanding (incl. from a financial point of view) to be given for executing by an ordinary civilian team of workers. However, besides this "economical" factor, there was also a political one: these troops, where dealing with weapons was kept to the possible minimum (usually only some old rifles, used mainly for the brief initial training, and for a probably more symbolic guard service), were an excellent place for mainly Moslem boys - Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies - to be drafted, short of any contact with the "normal" Armed Forces. This pattern followed strictly the Soviet and senior Warsaw Treaty Organization instructions to avoid formation of "a NATO Fifth Column" within a Warsaw Treaty country. Later, when the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan took place (in 1979), the top leadership started to worry also about the Islamic factor, "Moslem fundamentalists' threat", Brzezinski's "Arc of instability", and so on. This, among the other, led to a sharp detour in the official policy toward the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, which occurred about the end of 1984, and was described in more details above.

Among the problems which the future decision-makers are to face, is how to accommodate the representatives of the minorities groups in the Armed Forces - as soldiers, sergeants, and officers - in order to avoid possible clashes and unwanted quarrels within the barracks, which easily could spread outside. This is the problem that I chose for my research work at the Department of War Studies, King's College, London, in the Autumn of 1994, and later was continued with the support of the NATO Research Programme.

Such research is of special is even more substantive for designing future developments in the Military Forces, where presence of any kind of conflicts and misinterpretation could not only seriously undermine units' cohesion, combat readiness and effectiveness. Because of immediate access to weapons, such conflicts could easily augment into a bloodshed with instant impact on social peace. Such a development must be evaded without any hesitance far before first indications may take place. And this is the main purpose that our research is serving.

4. PRECEDING EMPIRICAL SURVEYS ON THE TOPIC: INTERETHNIC MUTUAL RELATIONS AND TOLERANCE

Some important pieces of research were done during the last years in the field of interethnic relations in Bulgaria - a formerly taboo-area for the scholars. Almost exclusively, however, this research concerns civilian population of the country.

An important variable to reveal the degree of these relations is the frequency of interethnic marriages. It appears, that both the most clearly distinctive and self-identifying groups - the Bulgarians and the Bulgarian Turks - are almost without exceptions endogamous. Moreover, the Bulgarians' willingness to marry a person from another ethnic group is the lowest among all interviewed groups (Georgiev et al., 1993: esp.p.55)

Mutual interethnic relations are predetermined most often by the existing and inherited from a generation to a generation stereotypes. Using a modified version of the well known Katz-Braily test, a team of Bulgarian sociologists established some important coordinates of the dispositions of the main ethnic groups in Bulgaria one to another (Georgiev et al., pp.60-76). Sampled representatives of the main ethnic groups (Bulgarians, Turks, Gypsies, Bulgarian Moslems) were offered to describe mutually (and Bulgarian - themselves) through rating 24 listed features. Thus, it appeared, that the Bulgarian Moslems maintain a predominantly positive image of the Bulgarians have ("Avoid the heavy work" - 57%, "Clever" - 53%, "Ambitious" - 52%, "Hospitable" - 51%, "Communicative" - 48%, and so on). The Turks also consider primarily, that the Bulgarians avoid the heavy work, but with a smashing 71%; with 45%-55% they perceive the majority population as "Communicative", "Clever", "Ambitious", "Neat". The most ambivalent is the Bulgarians' image in the eyes of the Gypsies: "Clever" (68%), "Ambitious" (66%), "Avoid the heavy work" (65%), but also "Greedy" (49%) and "Dissolute" (42%). Juxtaposed, the "We-image" of the Bulgarians about themselves consists of "Clever" (87%), "Hospitable" (78%), "Communicative" (69%), "Ambitious" (68%), "Neat" (63%), "Submissive" (50%), "Poor" (49%), and so on.

More than the half of the Bulgarians perceive Turks as "a real threat to the national security"; 61.7 argue against allowing the Turks to fill any important positions in the government; 83.8% consider them as religious fanatics; and more than one third demand as much as possible Turks to be exiled to Turkey.

Main labels, which Bulgarians (Christians, as well as Moslems), and Gypsies, attribute to the Turks, bear clearly the burden of the past (i.e., the five-centuries of the Turkish domination). Notwithstanding the many years of peaceful cohabitation, Bulgarians and Gypsies still feel toward the Turks heavy hostility, suspicion and fear (thus, 84% of the Bulgarians and 57% of the Gypsies perceive Turks, first of all, as Religious fanatics, 67% of the Bulgarians - as "Mutually co-operative", 56% of the Gypsies - as "Ungrateful", 53% of the Bulgarians and 47% of the Gypsies - as "Cruel", and so on). Meanwhile, the Turks evaluate themselves predominantly as "Honest" (76%), "Hospitable" (73), "Mutually co-operative" (68%), "Clever" (64%), "Modest" (57%), "Peaceful" (55%), "Communicative" (54%), "Neat" (54%), and so on. However, the most and sharply outlined negative attitudes among all surveyed groups are toward the Gypsies. Respondents indicate one and the same bad characteristics repeatedly: "Thievish" (99% of the both Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks, 90% of the Bulgarian Moslems), "Careless" (94% of the Bulgarians, 87% of the Turks, 78% of the Bulgarian Moslems); "Lazy" (93% of the Bulgarians, 88% of the Turks, and 83% of the Bulgarian Moslems), "Lacking discipline" (86% of the Bulgarians, 79% of the Turks, and 82% of the Bulgarian Moslems), "Musical, artistic" (85% of the Bulgarians, 77% of the Turks, and 84% of the Bulgarian Moslems), "Guileful" (65% of the Bulgarians, 52% of the both Turks and Bulgarian Moslems), "Mutually co-operative" (65% of the Bulgarians, small quantities for the rest of the groups), "Dissolute" (63% of the Bulgarians, 60% of the Turks), "Ungrateful" (62% of the Bulgarians, 67% of the Turks, 58% of the Bulgarian Moslems), and "Cruel" (60% of the both Bulgarians and Turks, and 50% of the Bulgarian Moslems). Curiously enough, the Gypsies have a surprisingly realistic self-image, and does not

idealize themselves at all. They consider themselves to be "Musical, artistic" (90%), "Careless" (74%), "Poor" (74%), "Mutually co-operative" (73%), "Neat" (68%), "Communicative" (65%), "Thiev-ish" (65%), "Hospitable" (61%); "Lacking discipline" (53%), and "Lazy" (48%).

The most vague are the stereotypes about the Bulgarian Moslems: if for any of the other groups respondents indicate, in average, more than seven characteristics, for the Bulgarian Moslems they are able to outline as little as four. This could be explained with the fact, that they live in remote and isolated areas, and rarely quit them to meet people from other communities. They are considered to be "Modest" (59% of the Bulgarians, 44% of the Turks), "Peaceful" (56% of the Bulgarians, 25% of the Gypsies), "Religious fanatics" (51% of the Bulgarians, 41% of the Gypsies, 35% of the Turks), "Submissive" (50% of the Bulgarians, 18% of the Gypsies, 34% of the Turks), and so on. The Bulgarian Moslems' self image is as the follows: 77% "Modest", 76% "Peaceful", 73% "Honest", 69% "Hospitable", 68% "Submissive", 54% "Communicative", and so on.

The same survey gathered data about the negative ethnic prejudices - "antipathy, based on erroneous and stable generalization. It could be only felt or expressed, could be directed toward the group as a whole, or to an individual because of his affiliation to this particular group", according to the classic definition by G.Allport¹⁴. "All Bulgarians are similar" for 65.9% of the Turks, 64.6% of the Bulgarian Moslems, and 67.3% of the Gypsies; "All Turks are similar" for 79.5% of the Bulgarians, 62.9% of the Bulgarian Moslems, and 61.4% of the Gypsies; "All Bulgarian Moslems are similar" for 67.8% of the Bulgarians, 59.7% of the Turks, and 52.5% of the Gypsies; "All Jews are similar" for 59.7% of the Bulgarians, 42.3% of the Turks, 16.2% of the Bulgarian Moslems, and 48.1% of the Gypsies; and "All Gypsies are similar" for 90.1% of the Bulgarians and 90.7% of the Bulgarian Moslems (sic!), and for 81.6% of the Turks. And from here on the extrapolation of the prejudices over the whole group begins. The majority of the asked Bulgarians (51.1%) perceives the Turkish minority as a threat for the national security (45.8% reject this, and 3.1% "Don't know"). This is true only for 21.5% of the Bulgarian Moslems, and 36.2% of the Gypsies. 83.8% of the Bulgarians, 56.1% of the Gypsies, and 43.8% of the Bulgarian Moslems consider the Turks as Religious fanatics. 61.7% of the Bulgarians, 33.6% of the Bulgarian Moslems, and 43.4% of the Gypsies deny the right of the Turks to occupy too important decision-making positions. And, finally, more then 1/3 of the asked Bulgarians (36.5%) - more the twice that of the Bulgarian Moslems (15.4%), and consider-ably more than the Gypsies (30.0%) would approve exiling of as much as possible Bulgarian Turks to Turkey.

Even more strikingly data appear for the anti-Gypsy prejudices, revealing a prevailing opinion for them as an "underethnicity". An overwhelming 92.3% of the Bulgarian Turks, 90.3% of the Bulgarians, and 86.9% of the Bulgarian Moslems are convinced, that the "Prevailing part of the Gypsies are inclined to the crime". 72.2% of the Bulgarians, 59.7% of the Bulgarian Moslems, and 70.3% of the Turks favour a separate residencies for the Gypsies, and preventing them from entering "our" residential areas (i.e., a strict getho policy). 85.2% of the Bulgarians, 88.3% of the Turks, and 74.6% of the Bulgarian Moslems agree that "Gypsies live bad because they are innately lazy, ignoramus, and lacking a self-control". And, finally, 70.0% of the Turks, 64.1% of the Bulgarians, and 57.7% of the Bulgarian Moslems assess public expenses for educating Gypsies as unjustifiable high, since they are unable to learn.

Too complicated are the minorities' attitudes toward the majoritarian ethnicity - that of the Bulgarians. 68.6% of the Gypsies, 66.9% of the Turks, and 53.7% of the Bulgarian Moslems agree, that Bulgarians are privileged compared with the rest of the nationalities in Bulgaria. 70.0% of the Turks, 62.4% of the Gypsies, and 52.4% of the Bulgarian Moslems consider Bulgarians as trying to avoid heavy work and striving to occupy commanding jobs. At the same time, 73.8% of the Bulgarian Moslems, 65.0% of the Turks, and 61.5% of the Gypsies reject the proposition, that Bulgarians couldn't be trusted and reckoned on. Also, 62.7% of the Bulgarian Moslems, 61.6% of

¹⁴ Quoted in reverse translation from Bulgarian.

the Gypsies, and 58.4% of the Turks disagree with consideration, that "Bulgarians are keeping adversary attitudes towards the other nationalities, living in Bulgaria".

The largely quoted here survey demonstrated, that the situation of the Gypsies in Bulgaria is very similar to that of the Afro Americans in the US South until the mid-1960s, and of the Black population of the South Africa until 4-5 years ago. For example, only 16.0 of the Turks, 10.2% of the Bulgarian Moslems, and as little as 6.0% of the Bulgarians would agree their child to study in a class, where most of the half of the students are Gypsies. For comparison, possibility for their children to share a classroom where more of the half of the students are Blacks, was rejected by 86.0% of the asked white parents from the Southern States¹⁵.

It is possible to juxtapose attitudes toward certain minority groups in Bulgaria as well as through a traditionally asked in many surveys in various countries question: "If the party, to which you sympathize, pulls out for the next elections in your district a suitable (a competent and honest) candidate, would you give your vote for him/her, if he/she is a Gypsy" (for the USA -an Afro-American). As much as 81.7% of the Bulgarians (and still more than the half of the Turks and the Bulgarian Moslems) would not vote for such a candidate. Here the level of the negative attitudes even sur-passes that of the 1960s US Southerners, who correspond to the rate of answers of the Bulgarian Moslems and the Turks, who are slightly more tolerant than the majority population, although among them prejudices are strong too. Apparently, the 45 ye-ars of the "Communist and Proletarian Internationalism" education failed to increase the mutual tolerance within society - on the contrary, it is leading, after the freezing, to an even harsher confrontation and competition between the majority population and the minorities.

There is a small satisfaction yet - compared with the other Eastern European countries, Bulgarians demonstrate a little bit higher tolerance toward the living together with them minorities, that do the Central Europeans. A comparative survey, conducted in 1991 in Poland, (then) Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary, gives the following results in answering the question "Would you wish to live in a neighbourhood, where Gypsies are living too?": negatively respond to it 85% from the Czechs and Slovaks, 76% from the Hungarians, and 72% from the Poles (Gheorghe, 1991). Similar position have 62.7% of the Bulgarians, 49.0% of the Bulgarian Turks, and 41.4% of the Bulgarian Moslems.

5. MAIN FINDINGS FROM OUR SURVEY

As it could be seen from the data, slightly more than one fourth of the surveyed (28.7%) claim to be non-believers, while 58.3 are consider themselves to be Orthodox Christians, and 11.8% - Moslems, predominantly Sunni. When we look at the data about different categories of surveyed population, it could be seen the big difference between all categories of youngsters - pre-conscripts, conscripts, and recently demobilized, on the one hand, and professional military, on the another. Thus, while among the three categories of young people (before, during, and soon after completing their military service) the share of nonbelievers varies between 28.6% and 28.9%, quite surprisingly among professional military this category comprises of 2% less than average. But even more outstanding seems, that while share of Orthodox Christians among the youngsters is slightly below the average (55.8% - 57.3%), while more than two thirds of the professional military (70.9%) consider themselves to be Orthodox Christians. Virtually no other Christian or non-Christian persuasion has been found among professional military (only 2.4%, i.e., two interviewed, declared themselves as Moslems, equally distributed between Sunni and "other"; having in mind the low number of professional military among the surveyed, later share could be supposed to be an error, accident, or deliberate distortion). It appears that huge majority of professional military - i.e., who were required to be loyal to the former ruling Communist

¹⁵ See more details about the evolution of the US white population's attitudes toward the Afro-Americans in Janda, Berry, Goldman, 1989.

party and its ideology, which also means to be atheists - after being deprived of their primary ideological affiliation, did replace it by the predominant religion. This is, indeed, no more than hypothesis which had to be surveyed thoroughly. Due to the unrepresentative share of professional military in the sample, no reliable conclusions could be made, but discrepancy between data for them and the data for the other groups are obvious. We recall highly hypocritical performance when on Easter 1990 leading personalities among the former Communist party hardliners, incl. the long years (1962-1990) Minister of Defence, appeared at the Cathedral church in Sofia at the ceremony, trying even awkwardly to cross themselves. During the following years Orthodox priests became permanent participants in the military ceremonies, and it is only natural that middle and low range commanders accept obediently this as an imminent property of their job characteristic. In the same time, professional military does not differ too much from the other groups when answer to the question "*Do you have at home holy books?*" - positively has answered in average 41.7%, among professional military - 40.7%. It could be supposed, however, that many interviewed have not perceived this question as concerning a limited set of books, for example, the Holy Bible, but a large variety of literature concerning religion and even the black magic, which are during recent years in a great supply, being distributed even free of charge. In the same time, professional military are far more tempered when assess statement that there has to be only one true confession in Bulgaria (6% against and average 13.5% "Yes"), 16.7% among them against and average of 27.0% confirm that Bulgaria is an Eastern Orthodox country. Concurrently, interestingly enough, professional military does not reject so categorically introduction of military priests (chaplains) in the troops - 56.8% against an average of 64.1% (they are, naturally, slightly more confident than the younger generations that existing behavioral officers could perform entirely the role expected from a chaplain - 23.5% against and average of 14.5%). Without forgetting that the number of surveyed professional military was not enough for any proper juxtaposition, these outcomes could be interpreted as a result of the longer life experience of the military officers; before all, here we are comparing perceptions of a younger cohort of people who only begin their autonomous lives, and a group with supposedly established views. A proof of this is that share of answers "I don't know" is remarkably low among the professional military - up to two times lower than the average.

Religious component of the survey reveals existence of enough large amplitude of tolerance toward other confessions. 58.6% of the interviewed reject notion of one confession being the solely true (while only 13.4% accept this), 56.9% do not accept atheism as a sin, 51.6% do not agree with necessity of outlawing other confessions other than Eastern Orthodox. In the same time, only 11.8% agree with the Marxist assertion that religion is a prejudice to be fight, while 58.8% reject it, but almost one third (29.4%) were not able to give a categorical answer. Finally, almost equally (38.5%:39.8%) are distributed supporters and opponents of the unrestrained freedom of confession here in Bulgaria. In the same time, only 13.2% of the asked celebrate all holidays of their neighbourhoods no matter if they are of an other than their's religion, 22.5% categorically do not recognise holidays of other religions, while slightly more than a half of them (52.1%) do not deny other religions' holidays, but do not accept them as such.

Looseness of the religious affiliation could be seen from the massive - 76.7% - disclosure that they never keep religious fasting, while as few as 2.8% keep it regularly, 7.3% - sporadically, and 13.1% - only in special cases. 91.7% claim that there are no such food and beverages which they do not use because of religious considerations. 38.7% of the self-determined as Christians have not read the Bible, and more than a half of the interviewed Moslems have not read the Quran. 65.9% of the interviewed do not use any religious calendar, and 30.4% use Christian calendar. Almost half (49.4%) do not pray at all, 44.6% pray only when they face troubles and encountering, and only 5.9% pray regularly. 31.5% do not pay any visits to religious temples, 18.8% visit these as historical and archi-

tectural sights, 46.6% pay such visits on great religious observances. As few as 2.9% pay such visits once a week, and only 0.2% - every day.

Religious rituals on such occasions as birth and baptising of a child, marriage, are accepted widely (69.3% - 70.6%), and only 15.1% - 18.6% prefer only laical attending of such events. On the contrary, religious rituals to accompany pre-dominantly seen as civil enterprises - inauguration of newly built structures or companies' offices, celebration of prominent civil anniversaries, military parades and other military ceremonies - seem to be not largely accepted (25.2% - 34.3% "Yes", and 43.3% - 50.9% "Not"). It makes impression that military domain is re-garded enough categorically as a domain, where clerical involvement is not too much desired with 25.2% agreeing to such involvement, twice as much (50.9%) objecting, and 23.9% undecided.

For the majority of interviewed religiosity does not make any difference for the morality of individuals - 62.6% do not consider believers - no matter which is their confession - to be more virtuous than the non-believers'. Only 13.9% of the interviewed among those claiming to be believers admit to get comfort and support from their faith; the rate of Americans that admit the same reaches 79%, when this of Europeans - 49% (BBS Gallup International Political and Economic Index, 1995). From the answers of another question - which circumstances could force an individual to put under risk his life - low level of importance of religious beliefs was also proved. Quite high is the level of those who would risk their lives for their family and beloved person (88.1%); still high rate, but significantly less (68.6%) - for the Motherland. Only 12.3% are those who would do this for their religious beliefs, and even less - 8.1% - for their political creeds. Approximately the same is value system of the Bulgarian respondents in this case (85.1% would risk their lives for their families and beloved, 70.3% - for the Motherland, 10.1% - for their religious beliefs, and 7.2% - for their political creed). The most close relatives are the highest factor for putting at stake own live with the Turks and Gypsies too (respectively, 84.7% and 80.4%), while Motherland fades little by little (respectively, 62.2% and 52.2%), while religious beliefs increase their weight for Gypsies (19.6%) and especially for the Turks (25.2%).

Weak religiosity of the Bulgarian population is displayed also in the insufficient support for the introduction of theology to be studied in the schools (still this has not been decided officially). 37.1% oppose theology studies at the public schools, but admit such voluntary studies at houses' of worship spiritual schools] 26.5% admit theology only as an optional subject at public schools, 16.5% reject completely theological studies everywhere, 11.1% admit only Christian studies in the public schools, while other religions should be studied out of the public schools, and as few as 8.8% admit introduction of an obligatory course of Christianity at the public schools.

Religious excuses, such as one's confessional prohibition of bearing a gun, killing or doing harm to any human being, etc., are massively rejected (by 70.2% of the interviewed) as possible reason for discharge from a military service.

Two thirds of the interviewed accept marriages between individuals with different religious beliefs. However, when they are asked if they personally would marry a person from another background, things change significantly. 92.3% would marry a Bulgarian, and only 7.7% not; respectively, 28.3% and 26.7% would marry a Turk and a Bulgarian Moslem, and as few as 10.7% - a Gypsy. Gypsies are generally avoided also as close friends by 70.4% of interviewed, and about one fourth of the interviewed even would not talk informally with a Gypsy!

More mixed are attitudes toward sharing the same working place with representatives of individual ethnicities: while virtually all asked - i.e., representatives of the minorities too - have nothing against working with Bulgarians, 28.2% contend working together with Turks, 31.2% - with Bulgarian Moslems, and almost half (48.1%) - with Gypsies. Somewhat different answers came when interviewed were asked more resolutely if, in case they own prospering private company, would hire workers from certain ethnicities,

or, when seeking employment, would apply in a private company owned by a representative of another ethnicity. Roughly 100% (resp., 98.7% and 98.5%) accept Bulgarians both as hired workers and as a boss. However, although rate of approval of other ethnicities in the both cases, with the exception of the Gypsies, is about 2/3 (Jews respectively 66.6% and 69.2%, Armenians 67.6% and 69.9%, Bulgarian Moslems 68.3% and 63.5%), Turks - largely known as industrious laborers - would be hired by 67.1% of the respondents, but a noticeable less - 58.4% - would work with a boss-Turk. A similar, though lower decrease is observed also in the case of the Bulgarian Moslems. Among the possibilities for the owner of company we included one more - Arab (a significant number of Arab owned small shops, restaurants etc. emerged during the last years in Bulgaria), and in this case we received a rate of answers, quite similar to this about the Turks: 57.6% would apply to work for an Arabian boss. Quite different is the picture with the Gypsies: they are rejected by more than two thirds (respectively, 66.9% and 70.5% answered negatively in the both cases) both as hired workers and even more as a boss. Viewed from the angle of the separate ethnicities, things seem as following: 99.1% of the interviewed Bulgarians would hire Bulgarian workers and 98.9% would work for a Bulgarian owner; about two thirds would hire, respectively Turkish (63.0%), Jewish (68.0%), Armenian (68.7%), and Bulgarian Moslem workers, but only slightly more than half (52.8%) would work for a Turkish boss, 55.7% - for an Arab boss, 59.1% - for a Bulgarian Moslem, 69.2 for a Jewish and 69.8 - for an Armenian boss; finally, 29.6% would hire Gypsy workers, and even less (25.1%) would work for a Gypsy boss. Turkish workers are even slightly preferred than Bulgarians for the Turkish respondents (respectively, 98.2% and 99.1%); common confession, apparently, increases chances of the Bulgarian Moslems to be employed by Turks (86.5%), while prospects of the Jews and Armenians are apparently diminished (resp., 52.7% and 57.3%), and Gypsies are also ignored (31.5%). Very similar are rates of preferences of the Turks toward their prospective bosses - respectively, 97.3% and 98.2% for a Bulgarian and a Turk, 86.6% for a Bulgarian Moslem, almost equal votes for a Jew (66.1%), Armenian (67.0%), and Arab (68.8% - here, allegedly, confession has nothing to do), and roughly 1/3 (33.0%) - would work for a Gypsy. With Gypsies scale of preferences changes: by an equal 94.1% they chose to hire Bulgarians as workers and to be employed by Bulgarians, 92.2% would hire his tribesmen and 90.2% would work for same boss, next are Bulgarian Moslems, preferred as workers by 84.3% and even more (86.6%) as bosses, 70.6% is the rate of preferred bosses both Jews and Armenians, while Jews are slightly more preferred as workers than Armenians (respectively, 68.6% and 66.7%); 60.8% would work for an Arab, and only little more than half (52.9%) for a Turk, while 60.8% would hire Turks for workers.

Similar attitudes we indicate in the answers of another set of questions about acceptance of representatives of other ethnicities to occupy certain significant social positions - teacher of the respondent's children, local marshal, military officer, and minister from the Bulgarian government. While almost 100% of the respondents accept these to be occupied by Bulgarians (which both here, and in many other places of the questionnaire, means that Bulgarians are largely accepted by the majority of the non-Bulgarian respondents too). All other ethnic groups receive more objection than acceptance: Bulgarian Moslems are rejected as teachers by 59.1%, as police chiefs - by 67.7%, as military officers - by 71.7%, and by 77.5% - as a member of the government; Turks - respectively by 64.3%, 76.5%, 79.0%, and 82.3%; and Gypsies - even more exceedingly - respectively by 84.7%, 88.1%, 88.1%, 90.5%. Furthermore, if 58.4% of the respondents would still accept their children to study in a class where there are a couple of Gypsy kids, respectively 78.6% and 82.4% would transfer their descendants from a school where half or more of the pupils are Gypsies¹⁶. Almost the same we face in the case of sharing military duty with Gypsies in the

¹⁶ This means slightly less rigid rejection of mixed education than it was revealed five years ago from the national-wide sample (see above in the text), but it should be too premature to make any decisive conclusions.

same unit: if 60.7% would accept they themselves or their son to serve together with a couple of Gypsies, 78.5% and 84.6% would resent serving in an unit where half or more of the soldiers are of a Roma background. Similar rates, though slightly more assenting, we see in the case with the Turks - respectively, 66.3%, 23.3%, and 15.6 would accept a couple, half or more Turks in the same unit.

It is worth to mention especially the next set of answers, which directly refers to attitudes accepting ethnic cleansing. The most vehement rejection is of living together in near touch with individuals from other ethnicities. Almost half (46.5%) favour having Turks out of their neighbourhoods, while more than two thirds (68.3%) would not accept Gypsies around after the metaphorical stories about how noisy, undisciplined and stealing are they. Also, here is the only place where Bulgarian Moslems are accepted as "part of us" - acceptance of them even slightly overrun the rate of majority Christian Bulgarians (11.4% agree the expell them, and 88.6% - not). If there is to be looked for an explanation of this, it is probably in the fact, that most Bulgarian Moslems live compactly in their towns and villages in the Rhodopes mountains, and only rarely share neighbourhood with other ethnicities (Smolyan region is the only in Bulgaria, where the number of the Gypsies is close to zero). Moreover, Bulgarian Moslems are generally perceived as being calm, submissive, hard working, which makes them, indeed, ideal neighbours. Situation changes when interviewed are asked while certain ethnic groups should not be permitted to live in the same city (36.0% against Bulgarian Moslems, 38.6% - against Turks, and 58.4% against Gypsies) and in the most abstract entity, the whole country, where rates of repellency of the concerned ethnicities are relatively close: from one third (32.8%) for the Bulgarian Moslems through about two fifths (39.8%) for the Turks, and almost half (47.0%) for the Gypsies to be deprived of permission to live in Bulgaria. This could be explained, on the one hand, with the fact that most people view their immediate environment as the most important, where their settlement, especially as much larger is it, as well as the whole country, seems to be perceived as an abstract entity. On the other hand, unequivocaly of the statements expressed here appeared to be weakened away because of the overall frustration from the life here in Bulgaria - which, according to many other research done seems to have reached the highest point in December 1996 -January 1997, i.e., the time our survey was conducted.

Differently, representatives of other ethnicities, other confession, foreigners and even atheists seem to be generally accepted as "human beings like everyone" (by, correspondingly, 50.4%, 55.0%, 81.6% for foreigners from Western countries, 62.0% - for foreigners from the Third World, and 69.7% for "Individuals, who do not believe in God"). Incomparably more cast-off are "Convicted for criminal offenses" (with 35.0% "I have nothing against such individuals, but in principle I am avoiding to communicate with such kind of people" and as high as 48.2% "I don't want to have any business with such kind of people"), "Alcohol addicts" (respectively, 45.0% and 41.1%), "Mentally ill" (44.3% and 42.1%), "Drug addicts" (28.7% and 63.9%), "Homosexuals" (21.7% and 67.5%), "Prostitutes" (36.0% and 46.2%), "HIV-infected" (28.2% and 55.6%), and "Religious fanatics" (22.6% and 72.5%). Nevertheless, significant, however, are the apparent reservations, with which respondents accept representatives from other ethnicities or confessions, compared with foreigners from Western countries and even those from the Third World. In the case of the representatives from other ethnicities 36.4% of the respondents chose the answer "I have nothing against such individuals, but in principle I am avoiding to communicate with such kind of people", and 13.2% "I don't want to have any business with such kind of people"; respective rates of answers for the "individuals from other confessions" are 31.3% and 13.8%.

We included a question, aiming at uncovering the main features that respondents attribute to the notion of being Bulgarian. The highest approval from eight propositions did receive assertion "One whose parents are Bulgarians" (79.9% "Yes"), next are with almost the same score "One who feels himself to be a Bulgarian" and "One, who defends Bulgarian

national interests" (resp., 73.9% and 73.3%). Being born in Bulgaria divides evenly those who accepts this to be sufficient for being Bulgarian, and the rest of proposed features has been assessed as completely insufficient for one to be considered Bulgarian: "One who speaks at home in Bulgarian" (57.2% "No"), "One who has a Bulgarian passport" (68.3% "No"), "One who lives in Bulgaria" (75.8% "No"), and, quite interestingly, the least important feature is "One who bears a Bulgarian name" (80.8% "No"). Apparently, respondents, notwithstanding the young age of majority of them, make clear difference between formal and informal qualities of affiliation to one or another ethnicity. Name, residence, documents, language has lost their former exclusive validity as taxonomy, presumably, in the eyes mainly of the younger generations, who witnessed great changes of values and transitory character of many consider-ed as granted circumstances. Being born in a Bulgarian family, self-feeling of be-ing Bulgarian, and protecting Bulgarian interests seems to deplete the necessary requirements for belonging to the specified ethnicity.

Ethnicity seems to have predominant role when one self-describes himself. Asked how they would answer to the question "Who Are You?", 38.5% indicate on the first place ethnicity, on the second place 24.9% - their profession or vocati-on, on the third 22.7% - other characteristics ("fair", "human being", "male", fami-ly status, etc.), on the fourth 11.1% their religious affiliation, and on fifth (2.7%) - geographical notions (town, region, etc.).

Still, perception of "Bulgarian" seem to be somehow controversial. 45.7% from the interviewed agree that Bulgarians are privileged compared with other ethnicities in this country, while 54.3% reject such statement; 69.1% agree that, in general, all Bulgarians are alike; more than 1/4 (27.4%) agree that Bulgarians can not be trusted and reckoned, and 28.9% - that Bulgarians are foes of the other ethnicities living in Bulgaria.

Nevertheless, tolerance toward the other ethnic groups seems still far from being too high. By a narrow margin (52.1%) interviewed support ethnic commun-ities' rights to have organizations aiming at preserving and improve their cultural traditions, and to study their maternal language at private (sic!) schools (50.6%), but deny their right to put road and street signs, company boards and ads at pub-lic places in their maternal language(15.1% approve this right, 68.7% reject it, and 16.2% "can not estimate"), and for printing books and other publications in their maternal language (respectively, 35.0%, 46.0%, and 18.9%). Almost evenly divided are those who accept ethnic groups to be represented at the Parliament and local municipal bodies, and those, who oppose such representation. 55.2% of the interviewed deny right of the minorities of having their political parties (a ban, which is incorporated in the Bulgarian Constitution). Curiously, the most disapproved, together with the "right of territorial autonomy" (only 8,9 "Yes", 78.0% "No", and 13.1% undecided), is to study all school subjects in their mater-nal language (resp., 11.4%, 77.5%, and 11.0%)¹⁷. Attitudes toward these political rights differ significantly from one ethnic group to another. While Bulgarians are too restrictive - less than half support ethnic cultural organizations (45.3%) and study of maternal language at private schools (46.5%), about one third admit

¹⁷ Of interest is here to compare these date with similar ones, representative for the population of four Bal-kan states - Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey. If 77% of Bulgarians and 83% of the Macedoni-ans agree ethnic minorities to speak their own language, this rate of approval is less in Romania (46%) and in Turkey (59%); population of Turkey seems to be less tolerant to the different religion (63%), while as much as 87% of the Bulgarians and 93% of the Macedonians and Romanians accept the right of mino-rities to have their own confessional practices. However, Bulgarians' fears against education in maternal language are well expressed in the less than 1/4 approval of the minorities' own schools, where in the rest of the countries this rate is respectively 52%, 66% and 33%, and also in the case with permitting minoriti- es to have their own radio and TV broadcasting - 19% approval in Bulgaria, and respectively 60%, 60%, and 29% in the other countries. It is clear, that anxieties from losing national territory are high in the most of the countries, but here also Bulgarian obsession with such a prospect (although here in Bulgaria such a threat seems to be less in Bulgaria than in most of the neighbour countries) is the highest. See BBS Gallup International Political and Economic Index, 1995, pp.229-230.

the-ir political representation at the Parliament (34.7%) and local elected bodies (33.7%), only one fourth (26.6%) support and more than a half (53.5%) reject their right to publish in their maternal language, little more than one fifth (22.2%) agree they to be allowed to have their own political parties, and by a high margin reject right to study maternal language at public schools (85.8%), right to put road and street signs, company boards and ads at public places in their maternal language (78.4%), and to have right for political authono-my(86.4%), ethnic groups' own stance is very contrasted. Turks and Gypsies decisively support right of having ethnic cultural organizations (resp., 89.3% and 76.5%) and study of maternal language at private schools (71.6% and 70.0%; so-mewhat more hesitating is their attitude toward doing this at the public schools, with 42.3% support among the Turks, 38.0% among the Gypsies, respectively 32.4%% and 40.0% reject this option, and one fourth of the Turks - 25.2% and about the same number of the Gypsies fail to give an opinion.), 85.6% and 80.4% from the Tutrls and 77.8% and 88.9% of the Gypsies insist for having their politi-cal representation at the Parliament and local elected bodies, 83.9% from the Turks and 77.8% from the Gypsies support their right to publish in their maternal language, 80.4% from the Turlts and 62.0% from the Gypsies want they to be allowed to have their own political parties, and by no less high margin demand right to put road and street signs, company boards and ads at public places in their maternal language (resp., 63.4% and 38.0%), and are strongly divided in the temptations to be admitted to have political authonomy (about evenly, by 1/3 - respectively 35.5%, 30.0% and 34.5% from the interviewed Turks demand this right, reject it, and are undecided, as well as respectively 30.0%, 42.0% and 28.0% from the Gypsies). Similar rates are given also by those declared themselv-es to be from an other than mentioned ethnicities, but their number in the sample is too low to be considered.

Once again the theory about the low rate of possibility for the majority to vote for a non-Bulgarian candidate on elections, being it highly competent and honest was proved. There are many other research data which point at the situati-on, that especially a candidate of a Turkish background would barely be elected by a predominantly Bulgarian set of voters, even if the other qualities would make him/her the preferred competitor. With the other features making him/her a pre-ferred candidate, 97.3% would vote for him/her, if he/she is a Bulgarian. How-ever, if only the ethnic background is not Bulgarian, rate of approval slides to ab-out and less than one third: 36.8% "Yes" for a Bulgarian Moslem, 34.2% for a Jew, 33.2% - for an Armenian, 30.7% for a Turk, and as few as 16.5% for a Gyp-sy. Only 21.0% from the Bulgarians would vote for a Turk - even if this is M.K. Ataturk or Ms.T.Ciller, even less - 11.0% - for a Gypsy, and less than one third (respectively 32.9%, 31.5%, and 30.2%) - for a Jew, Armenian, and a Bulgarian Moslem. Turks seem to be little more open: 93.8% of them would vote for a Turk, 86.5% - for a Bulgarian, 71.4% - for a Bulgarian Moslem, 40.2% - for an Armenian, 38.4% - for a Jew, and 23.2% - for a Gypsy. Gypsies themselves give their preferences prevailingly to Bulgarians (98.0%), next to own representatives (89.8%), and with strongly decreasing approval follow Bulgarian Moslems (60.8%), Turks (43.1%), and equal (39.2%) Jews and Armenians.

Especially transparent picture of the distances observed between the vario-us ethnic groups and nationalities can be produced on the basis of the answers to the question 34, where interviewed were asked to assess their attitudes toward ten listed groups of people - Bulgarians, Turks, Gypsies, Armenians, Jews, Russians, Serbians, Americans, Greeks, and Romanians, to each of whom respondents had to express their attitude of sympathy or antipathy by a scale from -3 (strongest dislike) to +3 (strongest sympathy). Answers were put on multidimensional scal-ing (see Fig.), using the Euclidean distance model, and in addition to the total sample, the same procedure separately was applied separately for each of the four main groups of respondents - pre-conscripts, recently demobilized, professio-nal military, and current conscripts. From the graphs it is clearly seen that in the all five cases as most distant, overloaded with negative attitudes, are seen Turks and especially Gypsies. Apart from this, there are some observable differences between the different groups. The

most untapped and narrow seem to be the picture of the attitudes of pre-conscripts (who represent also the majority of the respondents, and thus their answers heavily impact on the total sample's evaluation), and most differentiated is the picture of these who have the longest life experience and established conception about the world around, contrary to those youngsters who are still shaping their outlook. From the angle of the 16-17 years old pre-conscripts there is almost no difference between Armenians and Jews, Greeks and Russians, and Romanians and Serbians also seem too close both between themselves and to the rest of mentioned ethnic groups, with the exception, indeed, of the Turks and Gypsies. While for the most of the youngsters the most close to the Bulgarians, and most positively estimated group is that of the Americans, for the professional military this position is reserved for the Russians. This situation could be explained by the fact of the drastic value changes during the recent several years. It is far not surprising that professional military who has been selected on the basis of criteria, which included positive acceptance of Soviet Russia, and whose professional career, as a rule, included an education in Soviet Military Academies¹⁸, admire the most Russians, and tolerate also in a high degree Serbians.

Continuing with questions, immediately connected with the military service, we used the chance to locate how important place among the difficulties and abuses to be faced during the compulsory military service occupy shared life with representatives of other ethnicities - both as expectation for the pre-conscripts, and as an experience for the just demobilized individuals. It appeared that for the pre-conscripts *fears from facing co-soldiers from an alien ethnicity* are just in the middle (rated 5th from 10 listed options), while for the demobilized this selection slides as low as on the last, 10th place. Popular stories about *abuses caused by older soldiers* (similar to the Russian pattern of "*dedovshchina*") raise this option as a primary fear of the pre-conscripts, while among the demobilized (having in mind, indeed, that they had already passed through their turn of being "old guns", and also that due to the reduction of the service length and recent practice of initial isolation of the new recruits from the older ones cases of abuse lessened) this item did go to the third place, replaced on the first by "*Lack of entertainment*". Second place in the both cases occupies "*Isolation from their home and family*". Third fear among the pre-conscripts is "*Shortage of food*", which also found high level of publicization recently, while among the demobilized this item occupies fourth place. *Commanders* from each level - *officers, sergeants, and NCOs*, conversely, move one place ahead as a negative experience among the demobilized - resp. 8th, 7th and 6th as bad expectations, and 6th, 5th, and 8th for the demobilized. Among the least is indicated "*Physical overburden*" - 10th as bad expectation, and 9th as bad experience in the second group. In addition, pre-conscripts has listed several additional fears, which together are rated 10th, while added by the experienced former soldiers did go to the 7th place¹⁹.

It is typical during the military service soldiers to call their fellows with nicknames - sometimes successfully picked to correspondent to a specific feature or a peculiarity of the subject. Soldiers' "folklore" is one of often very smart and direct hits, and nicknaming occupies a special place there. First names of the soldiers appear to be forgiven during the service, replaced by the impersonalized ranks and family names. Human nature repels this, and then nicknames are born. We tried to collect some such nicknames among the recently demobilized soldiers. Less than one third (31.7%) denied being called with any nicknames or slang words. Among the most used nicknames majority emerged to be connected with ethnic and territorial background of the individuals. Remarkably many are designation used

¹⁸ See for more details *The Bulgarian High Command and the Prospects for Change*, by Ken Gause and S. Nikolov, to be published in *Jane's Intelligence Review*.

¹⁹ Among these, "abuses" in general, poverty, preposterousness of the military life, relinquished valuable time, lack of time for sleeping, as indicated by pre-conscripts; cold and wasted time by the demobilized.

to refer to Gypsy soldiers, some of them of insulting nature - "Brazili-an", "Mangal"²⁰, or "Tsigane", as well as those of a Moslem background -- "DPS" (from the abbreviation in Bulgarian of the predominantly Turkish minority party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms), "Ryazan" (literally "cut", i.e., circumciz-ed), "Pomak" (Bulgarian Moslem). Soldiers from a predominantly rural areas, who often are main source of the NCOs, confront those from larger cities with many pejorative nicknames; those originally from the capital of Sofia are called "Shop" (common name for the peasants from the villages surrounding Sofia), "Sofe", "Chestnut" (because of the trees surrounding Sofia's main street). Residents of the second large city, Plovdiv, usually deserve the byname "Mayna" derived from the local slang, and those from the shores of Danube or the Black Sea - "Wet". In addition, inhabitants of the area around Danube, especially Vidin, are called "Valachians" (i.e., Romanians, even they have nothing to do with the genuine Roma-nians), "Make" (Macedonians) for these from Southwestern Bulgaria, "Gagauz" for these from Varna region, and so on. Ethnic colouring of the most of these "nicknames" is more than apparent. This experiment confirmed our expectations that army life deepens some ethnic and even regional differences.

Professional military protrude also as almost exclusively by Bulgarian background - 96.4%. This is not a surprising outcome, because earlier existing screening at their military schools was effectively preventing non-Bulgarians from entering there.

Professional military seem less pleased with opening of the Military Forces for ethnic minorities to serve on equal foot with Bulgarians: they accept free access of the minorities to all kinds of units in a rate of 45.3, while the average score is 57.0 (with the pre-conscripts acceptance reaching as many as 80.0%); 26.7% of the officers and sergeants surveyed agree that some of them, especially Turks, should be effectively preventing from service in combat units (average 19.6%), and only current conscripts supercede them with 31.3% (28.0% for professional military) in acceptance of barring all minorities from service in combat units.

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF BULGARSKA ARMIYA DAILY. Paralelly with the main survey, a content analysis of the main military newspaper in Bulgaria, the *Bulgarska Armiya* (Bulgarian Army), published by the Ministry of Defence, was made for the whole volume of 1996. It was determined that during the year about 850 pieces of information, commentaries etc., which could be put under the topic of Ethnicity & Ethnic issues. This means that every day in average 2 such materials has been published, i.e., this topic has been among the main problems of interest for the editorial staff.

Predominantly, two terms has been used to denote the issue: "nation" - when the main population of Bulgaria has been referred, and "ethnic group" when any other ethnicity within Bulgaria has been described. On the contrary, in the cases when other Balkan countries has been concerned, category "national minority" has been put in usage, generally heavy loaded with solid negative connotation. Events in the rump Yugoslavia has been repeatedly used to show that once again problems surrounding certain national minority appear to be the main source of military confrontations. This framework coincides with the official at that time position of differentiation between the two categories, based on the thesis that ethnic groups are inseparable part of a given nation, while national minorities are solitary units within (behind) the nation, and thus it could endanger its integrity and self-reproduction. Hence, there are no ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, but only certain ethnic groups. This position prevented Bulgaria from joining the Europe-an minorities' convention, which is still not signed by our country. It was only re-cently the newly elected President and the UDF government

²⁰ From "Mango" - contemptuous address to a Gypsy. "Mangal" means also a primitive stove. Many Gypsies perceive as derogatory calling them Gypsy (which is derived from "Egyptian") or a Tsigane, and prefer to be called Roma, which means human being, man. Same designations are used also to designate anyone with darker skin, not necessarily of a Gypsy origin. Curiously, together, Gypsy (Tsigane) is used as insulting ("Bad man") among Gypsies themselves.

took steps toward solution of this controversy, which additionally hampers Bulgaria from entering European structures.

The staff of Bulgarska Armiya is far from disguise the real picture of the ethnic diversity in Bulgaria - on the contrary, they illustrate their publications with ample of historic and statistic data about the roughly 30 ethnic groups that exist in Bulgaria. However, more continual attention is paid to the Bulgarian, Turkish, and Gypsy ethnicities. In addition to the plainly informative and educative publications, several other approaches has been used throughout the year, more or less directly connected with elucidating and analyzing ethnic issues:

- Reference of anniversaries from historical events and national holidays for up-grading the national spirit and national pride of the Bulgarians, for keeping up Bulgarian self-consciousness;
- Upgrading the soldiers' combat esprit by stories for antecedent heroic deeds and recent successful performance of the Bulgarian military, its combat glory;
- Explicit tolerance toward initiatives and activities of the Bulgaria Orthodox Church, upholding rise of the national Bulgarian morale;
- Informations about new components of the draft national security concept, about prevailing protection of the Bulgarian borders and effective control over their trespassers;
- Maintaining high profile of the Bulgarian military and forces through facts about joint international projects in the military domain, business, science, transportation, and communications;
- Analysis, interpretations, using appropriate correlations and analogies, of the current ethnic problems and steps toward their solution in neighbour Balkan countries and especially in Yugoslavia.

Among the most frequently debated in the whole public space ethnic groups are Gypsies. On the pages of the military daily their image is connected with negatively assessed as socially unacceptable and punishable actions like house-hold crime, street gambling, transgression of national borders, etc.

Quite differently, the Bulgarian Turks' ethnicity is implicated in the media space indirectly - through deliberately conducted regional media policy and strategy as well as representation of fact and events particularly from the areas of Shumen, Kirjali, Khaskovo, and Rhodopes (both settled with meaningful Turkish population, and hosting principal military garrisons). In these cases, media information overhaul purely military substance, but covers problems of education, qualification, and employment of the local youth, cultural events, exposure the reasons and contents of the socio-economic reforms both on regional and national level, conditions of the schools and Orthodox churches, etc.

It can be said that a distinguished feature of the daily's strategy in covering ethnic issues is persistent - both straightly and implicatively - tracing of each allegedly outside interference in ethnic issues on the Balkans, for example Bosnian conflict, Greek-Turkish relations, FYR Macedonia, and so on. Editorial staff strives carefully to keep predominantly neutral style of presenting and analyzing events. However, in many cases it can be observed some preferences and leaning toward in some degree pro-Russian, pro-European, pro-Greek position at the expense of meager in relation to the United States, Turkey, NATO. This is done indirectly - through publishing without comment selected quotations or preprinted material from foreign press. On the other hand, constrained hold to the impartial position to a large extent limits enlightening capacity of the daily.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

It could be expected that observed rise of ethnocentric tendencies is compatible with the strive for making a combat-ready and motivated military, able to defend national territory. This, however, is not invariably the case. Czech sociologist S. Sarvas, who studied ethnocentrism of the Czech recruits, and typologized three groups among them - general ethnocentrists, economic ethnocentrists, and cosmopolitans (postmaterialists) (Sarvas, 1994), argues that - quite unexpectedly - not the ethnocentrists, but cosmopolitans seem to have the highest rate of confidence toward the military. General ethnocentrists place emphasis upon neutrality and national army, but military as such is not of interest for them; furthermore, they consider maintenance of a Military Force as a futile effort and would advocate reallocation of the military expenditures for some more immediate and effective purposes. The so called Economic ethnocentrists, on the contrary, see clear connection between economic prosperity of their country and its integration in the European structures, as a first step toward which they perceive joining NATO, and thus supporting quick modernization of the Czech military across the Western standards. "Classical" type of ethnocentrism appears to be bounded with an anti-military orientation, rejection of the military integration and, in general, less emphasis upon defense matters.

Data gathered in our survey are far from optimistic, and having in mind the worsening economic situation within the country, they don't offer expectations for any positive developments in the near future. Rather, one should ask him/herself how it was still possible to avoid until now any more serious conflicts on ethnic basis.

We still do not dispose of reliable data to evaluate how these attitudes will change under the circumstances of the military service. We could only speculate, that there will be an increase of the abuses and bullying on ethnic basis in any mixed unit. One of the arguments for such a reasoning is the fact that these abusive and harassing practices are especially frequent in the Construction and Transportation troops, where minorities' representatives are prevailing. From the other side, special climate of interpersonal relations within the military unit attaches a high degree of sensitivity not only toward the ethnic background of the conscripts, but even to the areas, where from one or another soldier comes. Most of the soldiers are of adverse mood toward the men from the capital city, Sofia, villagers - against these from the towns, and so on. Soldiers use pejorative, insulting and generalizing names for their fellows, who comes from the others area of the country.

Unfortunately, harassment on racial/ethnic basis is a hard to be overcome phenomenon, as especially the US and British experience shows. Recruitment of the representatives of minority groups became a must during times of war and shortage of white men supply. It became possible only very recently for the Afro-Americans to be promoted to senior officers' ranks (and their representative, Gen. Colin Powell, to reach the highest position for an active officer - Chief of the Joint Staff). According to an expert, David Mason, British Armed Forces still are not an equal opportunities employer (Mason, 1994; See also Beevor, 1994, pp.31-33). Mason concludes that "there are formidable challenges to established ways of thinking about military organization, about the nature of equal opportunities and, ultimately, about the nature of citizenship". The same challenges, probably only more demanding, since society as a whole seems to be unprepared to accept them, face the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Decisive stance toward NATO membership means also to look at this problem, ethnic compatibility, because future developments both internally and internationally will certainly pose serious demands in this field too. General conclusion that ethnic confrontation is not of crucial and immediate menace for Bulgaria now should not calm us. Combined with other negative factors, especially worsening economic conditions, ethnic tension, which has apparent sources, could ignite serious perils about the country's future.

Another important direction of reflection is connected with the military forces as such. Decline of mass armies, and from there termination of the conscription system is far ago viewed as an proximate prospect (See Janowitz 1971, van Doorn 1975b, Manigart 1990, Segal 1993, van der Meulen 1994, Haltiner 1997). Most Western countries, incl. USA, Australia, Canada, Great

Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, and more recently Netherlands and Belgium moved entirely to professional (voluntary) militaries especially in the aftermath of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty demise. Even in Israel with its specific highly effective all-national defence structure some evidence about transition from the classical military structure and universal conscription are observed (See Cohen, 1995). Though some apparent resistence from the high military commandment, similar development is imminent in the near future in Bulgaria too. As a rule, with the personnel having to be recruited entirely on the labour market, two phenomena are usually observed: increase of the women's and ethnic minorities' share in the troops. Afro Americans, for example, are in great proportions overrepresented in the Military Forces in each level - from privates to generals. Such a prospect of having after 30-50 years a Gypsy military, no matter how eccentric seems it now, must be considered and designed well in advance.

Our data revealed significant changes in the attitudes of the studied groups, following the age continuum. 17-20 years of age is, indeed, an life span of quick transition, time, where the child of yesterday, present teenager, is transforming himself in-to an elder, independent male. Recent years of overall changes accelerated strongly this process. Military Forces, released from the former political indoctrination, appeared to be too much detached from the process of socialization and shape of personality which occurs within the barracks. Recuperated Behavioral departments are still seeking their place and role within the troops. Here of a special importance could be the unique experience of the Behavioral units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Israeli military recruits young people from exceptionally disparate ways of life, from grown in local communities (sephardim) to as distant cases of experience as emigres from New York and from a remote Russian city. Thus, they could be seen as an analogous to various ethnicities. In addition, IDF recruits servicemen from the Arab origin, Druz, though they are not allowed to join combat units. All these different personalities are under the direct supervision of the Behavioral units during their initial training in order to form from these highly cohesive and effective combat units to endure decades of reserve services and to survive tests of the warlike and warfare. In this way IDF serves important social role, next to the heavy responsibility for the very existence of the Israeli state and nation - one of a "melting pot" of the contemporary Israeli society. Though not of such scale and ambition, Bulgarian military also could be the engine for absorption of existing in the society confrontational patterns, incl. of ethnic nature, and thus to accomplish a dual purpose, serving both itself and society as a whole.

An important, but still poorly used tool in this direction is the military daily, *Bulgarska Armija*. It should have to open more its pages to the sensitive topic of interethnic co-operation and overcoming the stereotypes and prejudices, instead of being appeased from presenting the negative examples from abroad. Recent drastic reduction of that daily's volume seriously curtail its potential to contribute for improvement of its educational role.

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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. In the life of every person there are plenty of reasons for a celebration - birthdays, familial anniversaries, New Year, Christmas, Easter, Ramadan, national holidays etc. Would you indicate which holidays you pay homage to at home?
2. Which are your most beloved holidays?
3. Which one from the largely spread denominations you would indicate as yours? (*please, mark only one answer*)
 - No one;
 - Eastern Orthodox
 - Catholic
 - Protestant
 - Moslem (Sunni)
 - Other Moslem
 - Jewish

- Other, indicate which _____
4. Which from the Christian Churches you should indicate as "yours" (*to answer only these, who had self-defined themselves as Christians, and there could be only one answer*)
- Eastern Orthodox
 - Catholic
 - Protestant
 - Christian culture as a whole
5. Which from the main Islamic traditions you should indicate as "yours" (*to answer only these, who had self-defined themselves as Moslems, and there could be only one answer*)
- Sunni
 - Shia
 - Islamic culture as a whole
 - Other Moslem, indicate which one
6. Do you have at home holy books?
- Yes
- Not
7. Which is the language that you usually speak at home? (*more than one answer is possible*)
- Bulgarian
 - Turkish
 - Gypsy
 - Other, write down which one
8. With which ones from the indicated below statements you agree and with which ones - not?
(*please, give an answer on each line*)
- | | Yes | No | Don't know |
|--|-----|----|------------|
| 1. There exists only one right confession, and those, who don't follow it, err. | | | |
| 2. Atheism is offense | | | |
| 3. Bulgaria is an Eastern Orthodox country and other con-fessions must be outlawed | | | |
| 4. There should be an unlimited freedom of confession he-re in Bulgaria | | | |
| 5. Religion is a prejudice, which with society have to fight | | | |
9. According to you, whether marriages between people who belong to different confes-sions are admissible?
- Yes
- Not
- I can't estimate
10. How do you regard religious holidays of other confessions, which are different from your own or your family's tradition? (*please, mark only one answer*)
- 1. I do not recognise these holidays
 - 2. I have nothing against any other religion's holidays, but for me personally they are not holidays.
 - 3. I celebrate all holidays, which have entered into the customs of my region's people, no matter if they are of other confessions or not
 - 4. I don't have opinion
11. Do you observe religious feast
Yes, persistently
Yes, but not persistently
Only occasionally

No

12. Are you familiar with the Holy Bible content? *(to answer only these, who had self-defined themselves as Christians, and there could be only one answer)*

Yes, completely

Yes, with predominant part

Only sporadically

I am not familiar with it

13. Are you familiar with the Quran content? *(to answer only these, who had self-defined themselves as Moslems, and there could be only one answer)*

Yes, completely

Yes, with predominant part

Only sporadically

I am not familiar with it

14. Do you use: *(please, mark only one answer)*

A Cristian calendar for 1996

A Moslem calendar for 1996

Other religious calendar

I do not use any religious calendar

15. Do you personally pray to your God? *(please, mark only one answer)*

Yes, I am praying regularly

I am praying in minutes of difficulties and ordeal

I do not pray

16. If you visit religious temples (churchs, mosques, synagogues etc.), how often you do this? *(please, mark only one answer)*

I never visit any teligious temples

I am visiting these as historical and architectural monuments

I am visiting these on greater religious holidays

I am visiting these once a week

I am visiting these every day

17. Do you consider that there has to be observed a religious ritual on each of the following events? *(please, answer on each row)*

	Yes	No	Can't estimate
1. Birth/baptizing			
2. Marriage			
3. Funeral			
4. Inauguration of new buildings, com-panies			
5. Celebration of important dates and anniversaries			
6. Military parades and other ceremoni-es where troops are involved			

18. Are there food stuff or beverages, which you do not use due to religious regards?

- Yes

- Not

19. Do you share statement that believers are generally people with better morale (bet-ter persons) that the non-believers, no matter which is their confession?

- Yes

- Not

20. If you have to select, would you: *(please, answer on each row)*

Bulgarian

Bulgarian		Turk		Gypsy		Moslem	
Yes	Not	Yes	Not	Yes	Not	Yes	Not

1. Marry to
2. Maintain close friendship
3. Talk
4. Share the same workplace
5. Want they to dwell out of yo-ur residential area, community, street
6. Want they to dwell out of yo-ur settlement
7. Want they to dwell out of Bul-garia
21. If you visit religious temples (churchs, mosques, synagogues etc.), how often you do this? (*please, mark only one answer*)

Yes	Not
-----	-----

1. One whose parents are Bulgarians
2. One who dispose of a Bulgarian citizenship
3. One who resides in Bulgaria
4. One who has a Bulgarian name
5. One who speaks at home Bulgarian
6. One who feels being Bulgarian
7. One who was born in Bulgaria
8. One who defends Bulgarian national interests

22. During the recent several years there are intense debate in the press concerning ethnic communities' in Bulgaria rights. According to you, may they have following rights here in Bulgaria: (*please, answer on each row*)

Yes	No	Can't estimate
-----	----	----------------

1. To create own organizations for protecti-on and development of their own culture
2. To publish books and other publications in their maternal language
3. Teaching in the schools of all curricula to be in their maternal language
4. To study their maternal language in pri-vate schools
5. In the settlements where they live to be permitted to place at public places boards (of companies, advertisements, road signs) in their maternal language
6. To have their own representatives at the National Assembly (the Parliament)
7. To have their own representatives in the local authorities
8. To have their own political parties
9. To have the righ of territorial autonomy

23. Let us suppose that you own a prospering private company using wage labour. Would you hire there: (*please, answer on each row*)

Yes	Not
-----	-----

1. A Bulgarian
2. A Turk
3. A Gypsy
4. A Jew
5. An Armenian
6. A Bulgarian Moslem

24. If you have to seek employment in a private company and you can chose, would you join it in case the owner is: *(please, answer on each row)*

	Yes	Not
1. A Bulgarian		
2. A Turk		
3. A Gypsy		
4. A Jew		
5. An Armenian		
6. A Bulgarian Moslem		

25. If the party to which you sympatise, promotes for the next elections in your precinct a highly competent and honest candidate, would you vote for him/her, if he/her is: *(please, answer on each row)*

	Yes	Not
1. A Bulgarian		
2. A Turk		
3. A Gypsy		
4. A Jew		
5. An Armenian		
6. A Bulgarian Moslem		

26. Do you have friends who self-determine themselves as: *(more than one answer is possible)*

Bulgarian-Christians
 Bulgarian-Moslems
 Turks
 Gypsies-Christians
 Gypsies-Moslems
 Jews
 Armenians

23. Do you personally believe in: *(please, answer on each row)*

	Yes	Not
1. Existense of an extraterrestrial intelligence		
2. Witchcraft		
3. Meditation		
4. Resurrection		
5. Predetermination of one's fate by a some kind of supreme force		
6. Holy (divine) character of the religious scriptures		
7. Immoerality of the soul		
8. Existense of the Holy Spirit		
9. Immaculate conception		
10. The Son of God descendance to Earth		
11. Deads' ressurection		
12. The next world		
13. Existense of the Heavens and Inferno		
14. The power of prayer		
15. Possibility for sins' forgiveness		

28. According to you, does human being have to risk his/her life in the name of: *(please, answer on each row)*

	Yes	No	I don't know
1. Motherland			

2. Own religious believes
3. Own political believes
4. Own family, beloved person

29. Do you think that religion provides support to you?

Yes

In a certain degree

No

I am not a believer

30. You, personally, would you accept: *(please, answer on each row)*

	Bulgarian		Turk		Gypsy		Bulgarian Moslem	
	Yes	Not	Yes	Not	Yes	Not	Yes	Not
1. Your child's teacher to be a								
2. Your residential area's Chief of police to be a								
3. An officer of the Armed Forces to be a								
4. A member of the Bulgarian Government to be a								

31. Would you agree your child to study in a class, where: *(please, answer on each row)*

	Yes	No	I don't know
1. There are a couple of Gypsy pupils			
2. Half of the pupils are Gypsy			
3. Most of the pupils are Gypsy			

32. Would you accept you personally or your son to be recruited to serve in an unit, where: *(please, answer on each row)*

	Yes	No	I don't know
1. There are a couple of Gypsy/Roma boys			
2. Half of the soldiers are Gypsy /Roma			
3. Most of the soldiers are Gypsy/Roma			
4. There are a couple of Turkish boys			
5. Half of the soldiers are Turks			
6. Most of the soldiers are Turks			

33. I'll read to you a list of certain human groups. Which of the indicated opinions re-flects the best you own attitude toward each of them? *(please, answer on each row)*

1. For me these are people as everybody else
2. I have nothing against these people, but principally I am avoiding to communicate with them
3. I do not want to have anything to do with these people

	1	2	3
1. Convicted for criminal offences			
2. Representatives of a different ethnic group			
3. Hard liquor addicts			
4. Mentally insane people			
5. People who believe in a different than mine's confession			

6. Foreigners from Western countries
7. Foreigners from the Third World countries
8. Drug addicts
9. Homosexuals
10. Prostitutes
11. HIV-virus infected
12. Religious fanatics
13. People who doesn't believe in God

34. Please, tell me which is your attitude toward the people from the listed below ethni-cities or nationalities, using the following scale: *(please, answer on each row)*

From -1 to -3 - antipathy

0 - neutral feeling

From 1 to 3 - sympathy

8 - I can't assess them as a whole

Bulgarians	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Turks	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Gypsies/Roma	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Armenians	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Jews	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Russians	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Serbians	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Americans (US)	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Greeks	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8
Romanian	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	8

35. Which of the listed below statements is the most close to your own opinion? *(warning: only one answer is possible)*

1. An obligatory for all students course of Christian doctrine have to be introduced in all public schools
2. A course of Christian doctrine have to be introduced in the public schools for those who wish to study it, and the rest of the religions have to be studied out of the public schools
3. There could be introduced course of Religion doctrine in the public schools, but only as a freely chosen subject matter
4. There ought not be introduced course of Religion in the public schools, everybody who wants it let him attends religious classes at churches, mosques, and so on
5. Courses of Religion ought not be taught in no place

36. Please, indicate which for from the listed below ethnic and confessional groups are typical indicated features.

(show table to the interviewed person. If possible, let him fill it alone)

	Bulgarians	Turks	Gypsies	Bulgarian Moslems
1. Apt, adroit				
2. Ungrateful				
3. Affable				
4. Lazy				
5. Smart				

6. Inclined to theft
7. Poor people
8. Greedy people
9. Inclined to togetherness
10. Hospitable
11. Insidious
12. Industrious
13. Quiet
14. Cruel
15. Modest
16. Honest
17. Music-loving, artistic
18. Depraved
19. Undisciplined
20. Carefree
21. Obedient

37. Some people would answer to the question "Who Are You" first of all indicating their profession, other - their nationality, third - their religion and so on. In a similar situation, what you'll indicate at: *(possible are as much answers as you find necessary)*

1. First place
2. Second place
3. Third place
4. Fourth place
5. Fifth place

38. Now I'll read to you a number of statements. Please, tell whether you agree or not with each of them:

	Yes	Not
1. Bulgarians dispose of advantages compared with the rest of ethnicities living in Bulgaria		
2. There are some exemptions, but in general all Bulgarians are alike		
3. One can't trust and reckon to the Bulgarians		
4. Bulgarians are adversary to the other ethnicities in the country		

39. Please, indicate in which degree you approve or not the following statements:

	Completely approve	Rather approve	Rather disap- prove	Comple- tely dis- approve	I can't estimate
1. Children have to be train in the spirit of respect toward authorities					
2. Bulgaria should be above all - this is a good point of departure in the policy toward other ethnici-ties					
3. Bulgaria needs not so much laws and political programs. but rather brave, able political lead-ers, whom people trust					
4. Women have to be equal with men, but first of all they have to care for the family					
5. If people speak less and work more, it will be better for all of us					
6. People could be divided into two					

main groups - weak and strong

7. Most of the people can be trusted

8. Everything is relative, there is no such strict regulations which to determine one's life

40. Do you think that citizens must have the right to be discharged from military service on the grounds of their religious belief?

1. Yes
2. Not
3. I can't estimate

41. *ONLY FOR DRAFTEES.* You face soon recruitment for serving your military duty. Please, indicate who and what raise your distressful expectations for the life within bar-racks, marking the greatest anxieties with 9, the smallest - with 1, and these of the listed, which do not worry you - with 0. (*please, answer on each row*)

1. Commanding officers
2. Sergeants, NCOs
3. Junior commanders
4. Older soldiers (last year's levy)
5. Fellow soldiers from other than your ethnicity
6. Physical overburden
7. Shortage of food
8. Lack of entertainment
9. Isolation from the customary milieu of close friends and relatives
10. Other, namely

42. *ONLY FOR RECENTLY DEMOBILIZED FROM REGULAR SERVICE RESPON-DENTS.* You recently completed serving your military duty. Please, indicate who and what raised your distressful experience and suffering during your life within barracks, marking the greatest between them with 9, the smallest - with 1, and these of the listed, which did not worried you - with 0. (*please, answer on each row*)

1. Commanding officers
2. Sergeants, NCOs
3. Junior commanders
4. Older soldiers (last year's levy)
5. Fellow soldiers from other than your ethnicity
6. Physical overburden
7. Shortage of food
8. Lack of entertainment
9. Isolation from the customary milieu of close friends and relatives
10. Other, namely

43. *ONLY FOR RECENTLY DEMOBILIZED FROM REGULAR SERVICE RESPON-DENTS.* Did it happen during your military service you to be addressed by some of the listed or other similar slang words. (*more than one answer is possible to be done*)
Listed were 11 common nicknames, often used among youngsters and especially among conscripts for designate descendants from different regions of the country and from different ethnic groups.

44. ONLY FOR RECENTLY DEMOBILIZED FROM REGULAR SERVICE RESPONDENTS AS WELL AS FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY. How you should access, according to your personal experience, place of the soldiers from other ethnic and religious groups (Turks, Gypsy, Bulgarian Moslems, Armenians and so on) in the Bulgarian Armed Forces (*please, indicate only one answer*)

1. They are soldiers as everybody else
2. Some of these (for example, Turks) must not be admitted to serve in combat units
3. None of these must be admitted to serve in combat units

FOLLOWING QUESTIONS HAVE TO BE ANSWERED BY ALL CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS

45. In many countries there are military chaplains assigned with the troops. How do you think, is it necessary to have chaplains in the Bulgarian Armed Forces?

1. Yes, it is necessary to have chaplains for the main confessions
2. Yes, it is necessary, but only for Eastern Orthodox chaplains
3. No, it isn't necessary, their functions are performed by the officers, responsible for the behaviour
4. No, it isn't necessary at all

46. Please, tell where you were born?

1. In the capital city
2. In an regional or former district (*okrug*) center
3. In a small town
4. In a village

47. Your gender is: M F

48. Which is your family status?

1. Unmarried
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Widowed

49. Which is the education level of your parents?

Primary or lower High (secondary) Semi-higher University Don't know

Father
Mother

50. To which confession belong your parents

Father
Mother

51. Your ethnic background is

1. Bulgarian
2. Turkish
3. Gypsy
4. Other (write down)

52. Which is the highest level of education that you have completed?

1. Primary

2. Secondary
3. Sergeants' college
4. Higher military college
5. Higher civilian college/university
6. Military Academy
7. Other

53. Which is your year of birth?

54. You are:

1. A draftee
2. Recently (during the past year) finished regular military service
3. Sergeant, NCOs
4. Junior officer
5. Senior officer
6. Civilian employed by the MoD
7. Conscript (soldiers and reserve officers on primary training)

THE REST TWO QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED BY ALL CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS EXCEPT DRAFTEES

55. Which is the branch of the Armed Forces that you serve or have served?

1. Ground Forces
2. Air Forces
3. Navy
4. Military Economic Bloc - MoD
5. Directly submitted to the MoD and General Staff units

56. Where your military unit, where you serve or served, is located?

1. In the capital city
2. In an regional or former district (*okrug*) center
3. In another town
4. In urban vicinity, suburbs
5. In a village
6. Military base, *gorodok*, instalation
7. Out of civilians' populated area.

TAB.1. BULGARIAN POPULATION BY REGIONS AND ETHNICITY					
REGIONS	Total	By ethnic origin			
		Bulgarian	Turkish	Gypsy	Other
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)					
TOTAL	8472724 (100)	7271608 (85.8)	822253 (9.7)	287732 (3.4)	91131 (1.1)
Sofia city	1182540 (100)	1147832 (97.1)	3353 (0.3)	10797 (0.9)	20558 (1.7)

<i>Blagoevgrad</i>	351333 (100)	295149 (84.0)	39550 (11.3)	7652 (2.2)	8982 (2.6)
<i>Burgas</i>	440053 (100)	358678 (81.5)	60940 (13.8)	16365 (3.7)	4070 (0.9)
<i>Dobrich</i>	232127 (100)	176812 (76.2)	34042 (14.7)	17210 (7.4)	4063 (1.8)
<i>Gabrovo</i>	161577 (100)	149665 (92.6)	8241 (5.1)	2314 (1.4)	1357 (0.8)
<i>Kirjali</i>	214639 (100)	70537 (32.9)	141078 (65.7)	1562 (0.7)	1462 (0.7)
<i>Khaskovo</i>	295118 (100)	247867 (84.0)	3371 (11.4)	12135 (4.1)	2342 (1.1)
<i>Kyustendil</i>	181615 (100)	174517 (96.1)	300 (0.2)	6248 (3.4)	550 (0.3)
<i>Lovech</i>	190080 (100)	176251 (92.7)	7495 (3.9)	5581 (2.9)	753 (0.4)
<i>Montana</i>	208090 (100)	186826 (89.8)	798 (0.4)	18867 (9.1)	1599 (0.8)
<i>Pazarjik</i>	325221 (100)	271393 (83.4)	29882 (9.2)	22124 (6.8)	1822 (0.6)
<i>Pernik</i>	162535 (100)	159780 (98.3)	200 (0.1)	1604 (1.0)	951 (0.6)
<i>Pleven</i>	346178 (100)	322454 (93.1)	15212 (4.4)	6559 (1.9)	1953 (0.6)
<i>Plovdiv</i>	733801 (100)	653132 (89.0)	47712 (6.5)	23403 (3.2)	9554 (1.3)
<i>Razgrad</i>	167469 (100)	79280 (47.3)	79.331 (47.4)	7639 (4.6)	1219 (0.7)
<i>Russe</i>	288244 (100)	237569 (82.4)	37519 (13.0)	8917 (3.1)	4239 (1.5)
<i>Shumen</i>	220544 (100)	135678 (61.5)	66764 (30.3)	15760 (7.1)	2342 (1.1)
<i>Silistra</i>	161177 (100)	100488 (62.3)	53959 (33.5)	4570 (2.8)	2160 (1.3)
<i>Sliven</i>	234562 (100)	195280 (83.3)	18916 (8.1)	17170 (7.3)	3196 (1.4)
<i>Smolyan</i>	159571 (100)	146423 (91.8)	12598 (7.9)	- (0.0)	550 (0.3)
<i>Sofia District</i>	289514 (100)	276394 (95.5)	736 (0.3)	10812 (3.7)	1572 (0.5)
<i>Stara Zagora</i>	397245 (100)	355266 (89.4)	15946 (4.0)	22309 (5.6)	3724 (0.9)
<i>Tirgovishte</i>	150734 (100)	94335 (62.6)	49413 (32.8)	6487 (4.3)	499 (0.3)
<i>Varna</i>	461949 (100)	402350 (87.1)	37539 (8.1)	14313 (3.1)	7747 (1.7)
<i>Veliko Tirново</i>	318102 (100)	293333 (92.2)	20271 (6.4)	2750 (0.9)	1748 (0.5)
<i>Vidin</i>	151881 (100)	144192 (94.9)	450 (0.3)	6142 (4.0)	1097 (0.7)
<i>Vratsa</i>	270522 (100)	256285 (94.7)	2759 (1.0)	9924 (3.7)	1554 (0.6)
<i>Yambol</i>	176303 (100)	163842 (92.9)	3539 (2.0)	8518 (4.8)	404 (0.2)

Source: Bozhikov (1993: 48)

Note: Regions, where survey has been conducted, are marked in italic.

TAB.2. BULGARIAN POPULATION BY MATERNAL LANGUAGE					
REGIONS	Total	Maternal language			
		Bulgarian	Turkish	Gypsy	Other
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)					
TOTAL	8472724 (100)	7311052 (86.2)	829254 (9.8)	257316 (3.0)	75102 (0.9)
<i>Sofia city</i>	1182540 (100)	1149576 (97.2)	3203 (0.3)	12499 (1.1)	17262 (1.5)

<i>Blagoevgrad</i>	351333 (100)	310965 (88.5)	32025 (9.1)	5699 (1.6)	2644 (0.8)
<i>Burgas</i>	440053 (100)	357814 (81.3)	63812 (14.5)	14711 (3.3)	3716 (0.8)
<i>Dobrich</i>	232127 (100)	177653 (76.5)	37508 (16.2)	13841 (6.0)	3125 (1.3)
<i>Gabrovo</i>	161577 (100)	149715 (92.7)	8694 (5.4)	2011 (1.2)	1157 (0.7)
<i>Kirjali</i>	214639 (100)	70489 (32.8)	142792 (66.5)	553 (0.3)	805 (0.4)
<i>Khaskovo</i>	295118 (100)	247867 (84.0)	3371 (11.6)	12135 (4.0)	2342 (0.4)
<i>Kyustendil</i>	181615 (100)	175117 (96.4)	200 (0.1)	5898 (3.2)	400 (0.2)
<i>Lovech</i>	190080 (100)	178161 (96.4)	6338 (0.1)	4777 (3.2)	804 (0.2)
<i>Montana</i>	208090 (100)	189367 (91.0)	798 (0.4)	16375 (7.9)	1550 (0.7)
<i>Pazarjik</i>	325221 (100)	278366 (85.6)	26555 (8.2)	19018 (5.8)	1282 (0.4)
<i>Pernik</i>	162535 (100)	160631 (98.8)	- (0.0)	1003 (0.6)	901 (0.6)
<i>Pleven</i>	346178 (100)	325508 (94.0)	13109 (3.8)	6010 (1.7)	1551 (0.4)
<i>Plovdiv</i>	733801 (100)	651431 (88.8)	51014 (7.0)	22802 (3.1)	8554 (1.2)
<i>Razgrad</i>	167469 (100)	80299 (47.9)	81724 (48.8)	4480 (2.7)	966 (0.6)
<i>Russe</i>	288244 (100)	238068 (82.6)	37867 (13.1)	8519 (3.0)	3790 (1.3)
<i>Shumen</i>	220544 (100)	136425 (61.9)	68063 (30.9)	14163 (6.4)	1893 (0.9)
<i>Silistra</i>	161177 (100)	100790 (62.5)	56118 (34.8)	2410 (1.5)	1859 (1.2)
<i>Sliven</i>	234562 (100)	192984 (82.3)	21662 (9.2)	16920 (7.2)	2996 (1.3)
<i>Smolyan</i>	159571 (100)	148623 (93.1)	10298 (6.5)	- (0.0)	650 (0.4)
<i>Sofia District</i>	289514 (100)	277231 (95.8)	932 (0.3)	10271 (3.5)	1080 (0.4)
<i>Stara Zagora</i>	397245 (100)	356926 (89.9)	15946 (4.3)	22309 (5.1)	3724 (0.7)
<i>Tirgovishte</i>	150734 (100)	94484 (62.7)	50061 (33.2)	5769 (3.8)	499 (0.3)
<i>Varna</i>	461949 (100)	403050 (87.2)	39089 (8.5)	12362 (2.7)	7748 (1.6)
<i>Veliko Tirново</i>	318102 (100)	292085 (91.8)	20471 (6.4)	2750 (0.9)	2796 (0.9)
<i>Vidin</i>	151881 (100)	143242 (94.3)	450 (0.3)	6191 (4.1)	1998 (1.3)
<i>Vratsa</i>	270522 (100)	260345 (94.7)	1505 (1.0)	7568 (3.7)	1104 (0.6)
<i>Yambol</i>	176303 (100)	163839 (92.9)	3539 (2.0)	8572 (4.8)	353 (0.2)

Source: Bozhikoy (1993: 49,50)

Note: Regions, where survey has been conducted, are marked in italic.

TAB.3. BULGARIAN POPULATION BY CONFESSION					
REGIONS	Total	Confession		Other	
		Christian	Moslem		
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)					
TOTAL	8472724 (100)	7373245 (87.0)	1078326 (12.7)	21153 (0.2)	
<i>Sofia city</i>	1182540 (100)	1169980 (98.9)	6505 (0.6)	6055 (0.5)	

<i>Blagoevgrad</i>	351333 (100)	291699 (83.0)	59585 (17.0)	49 (0.0)
<i>Burgas</i>	440053 (100)	370323 (84.2)	68674 (15.6)	1056 (0.2)
<i>Dobrich</i>	232127 (100)	179682 (77.4)	51949 (22.4)	496 (0.6)
<i>Gabrovo</i>	161577 (100)	151575 (93.8)	10002 (6.2)	- (0.0)
<i>Kirjali</i>	214639 (100)	53199 (24.8)	160181 (74.6)	1259 (0.6)
<i>Khaskovo</i>	295118 (100)	255141 (86.5)	39425 (13.4)	552 (0.2)
<i>Kyustendil</i>	181615 (100)	180916 (99.6)	459 (0.2)	249 (0.1)
<i>Lovech</i>	190080 (100)	176648 (92.9)	13080 (6.9)	352 (0.2)
<i>Montana</i>	208090 (100)	207292 (99.6)	748 (0.4)	50 (0.0)
<i>Pazarjik</i>	325221 (100)	276748 (85.1)	47883 (14.7)	590 (0.2)
<i>Pernik</i>	162535 (100)	162234 (99.8)	200 (0.1)	101 (0.1)
<i>Pleven</i>	346178 (100)	329615 (95.2)	16213 (4.7)	350 (0.1)
<i>Plovdiv</i>	733801 (100)	670832 (91.4)	59117 (8.1)	3852 (0.5)
<i>Razgrad</i>	167469 (100)	79425 (47.4)	87892 (52.5)	152 (0.1)
<i>Russe</i>	288244 (100)	242754 (84.2)	44293 (15.4)	1197 (0.4)
<i>Shumen</i>	220544 (100)	139266 (63.1)	80532 (36.5)	746 (0.1)
<i>Silistra</i>	161177 (100)	102348 (63.5)	58528 (36.3)	301 (0.2)
<i>Sliven</i>	234562 (100)	211052 (90.0)	23360 (10.0)	150 (0.1)
<i>Smolyan</i>	159571 (100)	71487 (44.8)	87834 (55.0)	250 (0.2)
<i>Sofia District</i>	289514 (100)	289514 (99.2)	2209 (0.8)	98 (0.0)
<i>Stara Zagora</i>	397245 (100)	372549 (93.8)	23944 (6.0)	752 (0.2)
<i>Tirgovishte</i>	150734 (100)	94886 (62.9)	55798 (37.0)	50 (0.0)
<i>Varna</i>	461949 (100)	403050 (89.1)	39089 (10.5)	7748 (0.4)
<i>Veliko Tirново</i>	318102 (100)	295381 (92.9)	22593 (7.1)	198 (0.1)
<i>Vidin</i>	151881 (100)	151132 (94.3)	700 (0.3)	49 (1.3)
<i>Vratsa</i>	270522 (100)	265909 (98.3)	4563 (1.7)	50 (0.0)
<i>Yambol</i>	176303 (100)	172563 (97.9)	3639 (2.1)	101 (0.1)

Source: Bozhikoy (1993: 51,52)

Note: Regions, where survey has been conducted, are marked in italic.

Derived Stimulus Configuration Euclidean distance model




FIG.1. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the *pre-conscripts*.

Derived Stimulus Configuration Euclidean distance model




FIG.2. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the *recently demo-bilized*.

Derived Stimulus Configuration Euclidean distance model




FIG.3. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the *professional military*.

Derived Stimulus Configuration Euclidean distance model




FIG.4. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the *conscripts*.

Derived Stimulus Configuration Euclidean distance model




FIG.5. Attitudes towards certain ethnicities, according to the *whole sample*.

TAB.4 INTENSIVENESS OF THE INTEREST TOWARD ETHNIC ISSUES, *BULGARSKA ARMIYA* DAILY, January - December 1996

Countries	Total	%											
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IÖ	Ö	ÖI	ÖII
Bulgaria	34.6	21	14	17	42	31	19	31	15	67	72	68	20
Greece	5.8	7	6.8	4.5	8.1	6.7	7.5	2.3	11	4.7	3.2	3.9	7.8
Macedonia	5.7	2	3.4	4.5	6.5	4	19	4.7	9.1	6.2	4.7	1.3	9
Romania	0.4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.3
Turkey	15.2	18	10	12	9.7	21	22	19	29	13	9.4	3.9	16
Former Yugoslavia	29.8	43	42	49	29	28	20	34	31	7.8	6.2	16	43
Aegean conflict	2.5	0	17	1.5	1.6	1.3	5.5	2.3	1.8	0	0	1.3	1.3
Cyprus' conflict	2.3	2	0	1.5	1.6	4	1.9	4.7	3.6	1.6	0	2.6	2.6
Balkan countries	3.2	3	6.8	11	1.6	1.3	5.5	2.3	0	0	4.7	3.9	0
Ethnic violence	0.5	2	0	0	0	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Fig.6. Intensiveness of interest toward Ethnic Issues on the pages of *Bulgarska Armija*, January - December 1996

