

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGREED NATO POLICY ON NONPROLIFERATION

Jeffrey A. Larsen, PhD

**Lt Colonel, USAF
Senior Research Fellow
USAF Institute for National Security Studies**

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents the history of the development of NATO's agreed policy on nonproliferation. It focuses on the period 1994-96, and compares how France, Germany, the UK and the US perceived the issue of nonproliferation and of NATO's possible role therein. It examines their respective policy positions on nonproliferation, as well as the key areas of agreement and differences between them. It describes the development and structure of an agreed NATO policy dealing with proliferation, including the NATO committee structure and reports; compares this to the US counterproliferation initiative; considers the domestic political considerations of Britain, France, and Germany; and suggests potential problems implementing the new program. Throughout the course of this study the author kept abreast of the efforts of the NATO working groups dealing with this issue, and the effect of recent domestic political events in each country. The work is written at the unclassified level.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has become increasingly aware in recent years of a growing threat to its security and freedom of action. While this new threat is vague, and not nearly as well-defined as was the traditional Soviet threat of the Cold War, the increasing capabilities of potential proliferant states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could pose grave risks to NATO's territory and population, to its forces operating in regional contexts, and to its freedom of action to conduct out of area operations. There is a growing consensus that this new concern must be addressed in both political and military terms. While the degree of support for specific programs varies by individual member state, the overall desire within the Alliance is to prevent future problems through common planning at the earliest possible stage.

Background. The development of an agreed policy on proliferation was a major goal for the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO undertook several activities after the 1991 Rome Summit that focused on preventing proliferation via traditional political means—export controls, coordination of efforts to control sensitive technologies, and so on. In addition, it continued work in the well-established field of passive defense, including protective measures for individual soldiers against chemical agents. It began developing a conceptual framework on air defense, to include ballistic missile and cruise missile defense technologies. All of these efforts, however, were by late 1993 considered insufficient to meet the new proliferation threat. There was a glaring absence of military measures available should prevention fail or deterrence break down. It was this shortcoming that the NATO Summit addressed in January 1994.

In January 1994 the NATO Heads of State and Government, meeting at the Brussels Summit, emphasized that the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means posed a threat to international security and was a matter of concern to the alliance. This was a prelude to the announcement, at the June 1994 Istanbul NATO Ministerial meeting, of NATO's new policy framework on proliferation, in which the Alliance observed that a number of states on NATO's periphery were continuing to pursue weapons of mass destruction or their delivery means; that WMD and their delivery means posed a direct threat to the Alliance and its forces; and that WMD proliferation could occur despite traditional international nonproliferation efforts. NATO stressed that its response to this threat must include both political and military measures to “discourage WMD proliferation and use, and, if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations, and forces.” France and the US have led the alliance in its study of this issue.

The NATO Study. NATO's policy framework most directly addresses two of the above categories—threats against NATO forces involved in regional contingencies, and direct threats against NATO territory. The Alliance is well on its way toward developing plans to meet such threats. The European view of counterproliferation initiatives differs from the United States' perspective through its greater emphasis on diplomatic, economic, and political means of countering WMD proliferation, but NATO does acknowledge the necessity for military options and preparedness.

Among the NATO members, France, the UK, and the United States have the most far-flung interests and military reach around the world, and are therefore understandably most concerned over the implications of WMD proliferation with respect to those deployed forces. In addition, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Spain face increasingly hostile governments in many of the littoral states of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East.

There are four general approaches which the alliance might take in developing an agreed policy on nonproliferation: de-fusing proliferation incentives; enforcing international sanctions against proliferators; offensive military action against proliferators; and developing ballistic missile defenses. The first two areas would supplement existing approaches undertaken by other international organizations. The third area, offensive operations, is the one NATO has been least likely to pursue in the past, since it is inherently a defensive alliance. Recent events, however, such as NATO's involvement in Bosnia, may reflect a changing mind-set. The last option, pursuing BMD, is merely a continuation of NATO's traditional collective defense role, but it must overcome residual skepticism by some European members engendered by the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980's. Nevertheless, some Europeans, especially the French, recognize that proliferation might eventually turn into an acute problem requiring military responses. Even Germany is beginning to accept the possibility that traditional approaches to nonproliferation may fail, so there is a need to think about military preparations should that occur.

The United States' official list of shortfall priorities, developed through its Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, identified fourteen key programs for increased funding and emphasis in four areas: intelligence, passive and active defenses, and offensive counterforce capabilities. This list is very similar to the list NATO prepared. That the US and NATO rankings overlap should come as no surprise, given that most of the items listed were common sense responses to this new threat, and given traditional American leadership in new military programs and strategies for the Alliance. There will not necessarily arise any new systems or programs as the result of this effort.

Most needed programs are already underway—the United States alone has two or three programs in the research and development stage in each of the shortfall areas.

The Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), created in 1994, was most concerned with the military ramifications and counterproliferation aspects of nonproliferation policy. This was an innovative dimension of North Atlantic cooperation, and was at least partly responsible for the French decision to return to the military side of the Alliance structure in late 1995. The North Atlantic Council approved the DGP's conclusions and recommended work program in June 1996. Whether the Alliance can or will fund the new requirements identified by the DGP, however, remains problematic.

The major hurdle to developing these capabilities is, as always, money. The DGP effort is an attempt to expedite those procurement processes that may best support NATO's nonproliferation efforts, but it is only one part of the overall Alliance force development process. All member states have said they are unable to support additional spending for new projects, so the question must be asked: what will NATO be willing to give up to have new capabilities within its current budget? Deciding who pays, how much, and for what, will drive much of the upcoming political discussion.

European Perspectives. The January 1994 Brussels Summit agreement was a defining event in the evolution of France's post-Cold War relationship with the Alliance. France was quick to agree to the new proposals—including the call for a major Alliance study of the proliferation threat. France's role as the first co-chair of the DGP was no accident. France saw the DGP chairmanship as a test of its new relations with NATO and the United States. The presidential election in May 1995 resulted in tangible changes to this renewed French interest in closer relations with NATO and the US, as the Guallist party reclaimed power after a long period of socialist control. The leaders of the new government were ready to pursue greater openness with NATO and were willing to abandon some of past caution in this regard.

Germany, on the other hand, feels that traditional nonproliferation means have served the West well so far, so there is no hurry for the Alliance to develop more military options—particularly given the low current threat environment. France has always viewed developments in North Africa with more concern than other Europeans, and is therefore more in line with the United States in advocating a major new counterproliferation initiative. But Germany sees the proliferation threat as a side issue, of no great importance yet. Overall the issue is a peripheral one to most government officials and academics within the Federal Republic.

Germans are also primarily concerned with moral and legal questions when it comes to security issues, rather than purely military aspects. Hence their disregard, and sometimes distaste, for many of the areas under consideration in the American counterproliferation initiative, and in NATO's DGP studies. German strategic analysts point out that it is difficult to open discussions on these issues within the German public. Germany has grown very defensively oriented. If Germany does decide it must participate in more aggressive nonproliferation efforts in order to show that it is a good NATO partner, it will focus its support and efforts on homeland defense, rather than protecting troops deployed on out-of-area missions.

The United Kingdom was an early advocate of a comprehensive political and military approach to the issue of WMD proliferation, hoping thereby to respond to the regional causes of such proliferation and provide the operational military means to deter and defend against these threats. The threat was not to London, but rather to its deployed forces. Given Britain's history and far-flung interests, it took a global view to this issue, similar to that of the United States and France. While early discussions within the United Kingdom focused on ballistic missile defenses and questioned the purpose of a NATO counterproliferation study, it eventually became a staunch supporter of the DGP effort. The new Labour Party government established in 1997 is not expected to alter that position dramatically.

Conclusion. The NATO nonproliferation effort surely ranks as one of the most ambitious and successful in Alliance history. A concerted effort by an alliance facing a new series of threats in an uncertain world led to the development of a comprehensive overview of the threats, the capabilities needed to meet those threats, existing shortfalls, and a plan to correct those deficiencies. The DGP's conclusions seem pragmatic, responsible, and modest. It remains to be seen whether the Alliance has the will to pursue these new programs in an era of fiscal austerity, public apathy, low-level threat, and military downsizing. In other words, NATO's nonproliferation agenda faces the same hurdles as have most of its predecessor programs. All of them seemed unlikely to succeed, too, yet most were eventually accomplished through a combination of leadership, changing international circumstances and public perceptions, and the slow, methodical bureaucratic process. One must anticipate that the NATO nonproliferation effort will be equally successful, over the long term.

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PART I

BACKGROUND: THREAT AND RESPONSE

We attach the utmost importance to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and, where this has occurred, to reversing it through diplomatic means... [However,] as a defensive alliance, NATO is addressing the range of capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use. It must also be prepared, if necessary, to counter this risk and thereby protect NATO's populations, territory, and forces.¹

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has become increasingly aware in recent years of a growing threat to its security and freedom of action. While this new threat is vague, and not nearly as well-defined as was the traditional Soviet threat of the Cold War, the increasing capabilities of potential proliferant states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could pose grave risks to NATO's territory and population, to its forces operating in regional contexts, and to its freedom of action to conduct out of area operations. There is a growing consensus that this new concern must be addressed in both political and military terms. While the degree of support for specific programs varies by individual member state, the overall feeling within the Alliance is one of meeting a future problem early through common planning.

This paper studies NATO's nonproliferation initiative and its attempt to develop an agreed alliance policy regarding this issue of concern. NATO's future holds the likelihood of more bilateral or multilateral actions under the umbrella of NATO approval, without necessarily being a consensual NATO activity.² In addition, while NATO's core function will remain—to guarantee the freedom and physical security of its members—its day-to-day functions will change to lower level aspects of a broad range of security issues.

¹ "Final Communiqué," Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1 (95) 57, NATO Press Service, 8 June 1995.

² This prediction has been borne out by the announcement, in early May 1996, of closer security linkages, including intelligence and code sharing, between the Western European Union and NATO. This fits in nicely with the long-standing French desire for an independent European security pillar, albeit in a more practical manner by its ties to NATO. See, for example, "NATO Strengthens Role of European Members at Spring Conference," *The Week in Germany*, 7 June 1996, p. 1.

As one analyst put it, this bodes a shift “from collective defense to collective responsibility sharing,”³ with important ramifications for future non- or counterproliferation activities by the Alliance.⁴

Obvious questions arose in 1994 as to the consequences of this new proliferation debate: Would counterproliferation efforts accelerate the trend of greater German military activism in multinational operations? Would counterproliferation (CP) serve as an early foreign policy test of the new government following France’s 1995 presidential elections? Would CP lead to more French involvement in NATO military activities? Would the elimination of Britain’s tactical nuclear force capabilities lead to a diminished role for the UK in future NATO initiatives, such as counterproliferation?

This paper examines these and other questions of interest to NATO’s developing policies on nonproliferation. It focuses on the actions of the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), since the DGP was most concerned with the military ramifications and counterproliferation aspects of nonproliferation policy. This was an innovative dimension of North Atlantic cooperation, and was at least partly responsible for the French decision to return to the military side of the Alliance structure in late 1995. The North Atlantic Council approved the DGP’s conclusions and recommended work program in June 1996. Whether the Alliance can or will fund the new requirements identified by the DGP, however, remains problematic.

The NATO nonproliferation effort surely ranks as one of the most ambitious in NATO’s history. A concerted effort by an alliance facing a new series of threats in an uncertain world led to the development of a comprehensive overview of the threats, the capabilities needed to meet those threats, existing shortfalls, and a plan to correct those deficiencies. The DGP’s conclusions seem pragmatic, responsible, and modest. It remains to be seen whether the Alliance has the will to pursue these new programs in an era of fiscal austerity, public apathy, low-level threat, and military downsizing. In other words, NATO’s nonproliferation agenda faces the same hurdles as have most of its predecessor programs. All of them seemed unlikely to succeed, too, yet most were accomplished through a combination of leadership, changing international circumstances and public perceptions, and the slow, methodical bureaucratic process. One must anticipate that the NATO nonproliferation effort will be equally successful, over the long term.

Background and Rationale for a Program on Nonproliferation

³ Stanley R. Sloan, “A Strategic Partnership Between Germany and the United States: American Expectations,” *Arbeitspapier*, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustine, Germany, December 1995, p. 15.

⁴ Traditional nonproliferation efforts include such things as export controls, critical materials lists, supplier embargoes, arms control agreements, and legal and political restrictions. Counterproliferation, on the other hand, usually implies military responses to the proliferation threat, particularly once nonproliferation has failed. Even these definitions are blurry, however; in the United States there was considerable friction over developing agreed interagency distinctions in the early going of the CPI.

The development of an agreed policy on proliferation has become a major goal for the North Atlantic Alliance. In November 1991 the NATO leaders at the Rome Summit adopted the NATO Strategic Concept, which noted the risks posed by “the buildup of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies...including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance,” and identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles as problems requiring special attention by the Alliance.⁵ Similar concern had been expressed in the United Nations. A 1992 Security Council resolution stated that the proliferation of WMD constituted a threat to international peace and security,⁶ and President Clinton made a similar address to the UN General Assembly in September 1993.⁷

Simultaneously the Alliance was undertaking a comprehensive review of its nuclear consultation processes and the Political Principles for the release of nuclear weapons. These discussions culminated in the 1992 meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group at Gleneagles, Scotland, in which the allies agreed to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, focus more on crisis management, and consider possible dispersal of remaining NATO nuclear assets as necessary to enhance readiness.⁸ These considerations were to mesh nicely with the growing concerns over WMD proliferation that arose in the following years.

At the October 1993 NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Travemunde, Germany, US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin proposed a counterproliferation initiative, which, despite a lukewarm reception by the European members, the Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Groups both discussed in their December meetings.⁹ That same month, in Washington, Secretary Aspin publicly unveiled the US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative.¹⁰

In January 1994 the NATO Heads of State and Government met at the Brussels Summit, and re-emphasized that the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means posed a threat to international security and was a matter of concern to the alliance.¹¹ This was a prelude to the announcement, at the June 1994 Istanbul NATO Ministerial meeting, of NATO’s new policy framework on proliferation, in which the

⁵“The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” Communiqué of the NATO Heads of State and Government, Rome Summit Meeting, 7 December 1991, para. 18.

⁶United Nations Security Council Resolution, 31 January 1992.

⁷William J. Clinton, “Address to the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 September 1993.

⁸Based on interviews with officers at SHAPE and NATO, spring 1996.

⁹Natalie J. Goldring, “Skittish on Counterproliferation,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1994, p. 12.

¹⁰Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller, editors, “International Perspectives on Counterproliferation,” Woodrow Wilson Center Working Paper No. 99, January 1995; and “Pentagon Begins Effort to Confront More Lethal Arms in Third World,” *New York Times*, 8 Dec 1993, p. 15.

¹¹“Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meetings of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994.” *NATO Communiqués 1994*, also in *NATO Review*, February 1994, p. 32.

Alliance observed that a number of states on NATO's periphery were continuing to pursue weapons of mass destruction or their delivery means; that WMD and their delivery means posed a direct threat to the Alliance and its forces; and that WMD proliferation could occur despite traditional international nonproliferation efforts. NATO stressed that its response to this threat must include both political and military measures to "discourage WMD proliferation and use, and, if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations, and forces."¹² France and the US have since led the alliance in its study of this issue.

What happened between the 1991 Rome and 1994 Brussels summits to increase the level of concern and response by NATO's member states to the issue of proliferation? Several events conspired to bring about this change of attitude. The Western optimism that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the coalition's victory in the Gulf War had waned. In addition, there were concerns within the Alliance about a revanchist Russia, about the failure of Western Europe or NATO to prevent the war in Bosnia, and about the potential of weapons proliferation placing WMD in the hands of states or groups with views antithetical to NATO's.¹³ Furthermore, there was a recognition, given findings by the UN Special Commission on Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in their inspections of Baghdad's weapons program following the Gulf War, that Iraq was much further along in its development of nuclear capability than anyone had imagined, and the West had endured a 1992-94 crisis with North Korea surrounding possible diversion of fissile materials into a weapons program and its intransigence toward IAEA inspectors. Finally, concerns by the Southern Flank NATO members (Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, and Spain) about rogue states in the Middle East and North Africa procuring WMD weapons and delivery means, and the increasing concern over fissile materials control and smuggling in the former Soviet Union, were growing—especially after the widely reported captures of small amounts of plutonium and enriched uranium in Germany in summer 1994.¹⁴ There was widespread appreciation within the NATO community that traditional non-proliferation methods had failed to prevent Iraq and North Korea from obtaining at least rudimentary nuclear capabilities, and that other states could follow the same pattern. This was no longer an academic question; the security of the Alliance was now threatened from a new direction.

Importance to NATO

¹²"Alliance Policy Framework on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *NATO Review*, June 1994, pp. 28-29.

¹³Robert Joseph, "Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, and NATO," *Survival*, Spring 1996, p. 116.

¹⁴Joseph, pp. 114-6.

Why is WMD proliferation a NATO problem? NATO's role under its strategic concept involves not only assuring the territorial defense of the members of the alliance. Its purpose is also to provide the foundation for a stable security environment in Europe, to serve as a transatlantic forum for consultation on any issue affecting member security and vital interests, and to act as a forum for coordination of efforts in these areas. In this sense, NATO is more than a collective security organization; it is the cornerstone for Europe's future security framework.¹⁵

The proliferation of WMD can undermine the achievement of a stable security environment in Europe. WMD potentially poses a direct military threat to alliance members, especially those in Europe, as well as their deployed military forces around the globe. There is no one uniform proliferation threat to NATO. Rather, the potential threats can be thought of in categories, such as the following:

- opponents armed with weapons of mass destruction and delivery means (such as ballistic missiles) in a direct confrontation with NATO military forces in a regional setting;
- direct military threats by rogue states possessing WMD capabilities against the territory and populations of NATO states;
- risks from shifts in regional power balances with global implications that were created by acquisition of WMD or delivery means;
- regional instabilities that are fueled by the proliferation of WMD and which negatively impact Western security;
- erosion of international norms and security systems;
- increased danger of accidents; and
- new avenues for international terrorism.¹⁶

Weapons of mass destruction are particularly sought after by states in unstable regions of the world, such as the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. It is the Middle East and North Africa that most concern NATO, given the availability and range of existing medium range ballistic missiles. The purpose of such weapons in the hands of such states, it has been suggested, would primarily be to deter Western forces from becoming involved in regional conflicts by acting on public opinion within the individual states and international bodies providing the troops.¹⁷

¹⁵For example, NATO's role in the development of Europe's future security structure is seen by its considering the inclusion of new member states through enlargement to the East; the Partnership for Peace program; and the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. See Gregory L. Schulte, "Responding to Proliferation-- NATO's Role," *NATO Review*, July 1995, pp. 15-19.

¹⁶Joachim Krause, "Proliferation Risks and their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?" *Survival*, Summer 1995, p. 136.

¹⁷Krause, p. 137. For more on incentive factors leading to proliferation within specific regions of the world see: Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, editors, *Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994); Brad

It is the first two categories above—threats against NATO forces involved in regional contingencies, and direct threats against NATO territory—that NATO’s Policy Framework most directly addresses.¹⁸ The Alliance is well on its way toward developing plans to meet such threats, as we shall see below. The European view of counterproliferation initiatives differs from the United States perspective in its greater emphasis on diplomatic, economic, and political means of countering WMD proliferation, although NATO acknowledges the necessity for military options and preparedness.

Among the NATO members, France, Great Britain, and the United States have the most far-flung interests and military reach around the world, and are therefore understandably most concerned over the implications of WMD proliferation with respect to those deployed forces. In addition, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Spain face increasingly hostile governments in many of the littoral states of the Mediterranean region,¹⁹ and Turkey has disputes with several potential proliferant states in the Middle East.²⁰ Modern delivery systems could potentially deliver WMD against the French homeland, for example, with little or no warning. France is quite concerned with countering these potential threats, particularly from the increasingly unstable south.²¹ Deterrence, in the form of vague nuclear threats, seems to be the preferred French response, as President Chirac reiterated in August 1995: “Only the [nuclear] deterrent force guarantees France against the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, of whatever type they may be.”²²

No NATO policy will work without the active participation, or at least tacit support, of four key member states: France, because of its independent nuclear capability, its desire to pursue counterproliferation initiatives, its non-integration in the NATO military command structure, and because it has often opposed US actions; Germany, because it is a major continental European power and has taken steps in recent years to overcome its historical legacy of unwillingness to act “out of area;” the United States, because of its global responsibilities and interests, as well as its traditional role in Alliance

Roberts, editor, *Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995); “Stealing the Fire: Nuclearizing the Third World,” in *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 1997, pp. 17-150; W. Thomas Wander and Eric H. Arnett, editors, *The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Technology, Motivations, and Responses* (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992); *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks* (Washington: Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress, August 1993); and Jeffrey A. Larsen and Gregory J. Rattray, editors, *Arms Control Toward the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1996).

¹⁸Krause, p. 146.

¹⁹Such as Algeria, Libya, and Iraq.

²⁰Including Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

²¹As reported by French participants in the US-CREST Franco-American Working Group on Proliferation, first meeting, Paris, October 1995; see also William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, *French Policy Toward NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, Vice Rapprochement* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 1994), p. 11.

²²Quoted in David S. Yost, “France’s Nuclear Dilemmas,” *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 1996, p. 115.

leadership; and Great Britain, because it is a nuclear power with global interests and one of the traditional leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Possible NATO Nonproliferation Roles

*NATO is seen as the only international body with the competence to counter the consequences of proliferation... the political 'mileage' for NATO will come from its defense-related contribution in a situation where traditional nonproliferation mechanisms have failed.*²³

There was considerable debate at the January 1994 NATO summit over the American push for a new counterproliferation initiative (CPI). Germany, in particular, was initially concerned about the US counterproliferation effort. It was not presented well, and Bonn thought that it meant a turn away from traditional nonproliferation efforts towards more military responses.²⁴ The result was a compromise within NATO to create a policy framework to consider *nonproliferation*. Some alliance members weren't even convinced that "prevention" and "defense" against WMD proliferation outside of Europe were desirable or necessary strategies for the alliance. But when the chance came to link the CPI to NATO through the new effort, Germany was happy to participate, hoping thereby to have some influence on the American program. The debate settled down considerably in the two years after the Brussels Summit decision, as people began to realize that it was a relatively modest effort, and likely to remain so, and that counterproliferation meant more than simply preemptive offensive operations. Counterproliferation is now seen by most participants as an adjunct to nonproliferation, not a substitute for it.²⁵ The term also gained acceptance within DGP discussions when addressing the military subset of nonproliferation efforts.

There are four general approaches which the alliance might take in developing an agreed policy on nonproliferation: defusing proliferation incentives; enforcing international sanctions against proliferators; offensive military action against proliferators; and developing ballistic missile defenses.²⁶ The first two areas would supplement existing operations undertaken by other international organizations. Defusing incentives would entail measures such as promoting democratic control over military forces, peacekeeping operations, and maintaining stability in Europe for reassurance to the NATO allies. This could include efforts within existing NATO *fora*, including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the

²³Michael Rühle, "View from NATO: NATO and the Coming Proliferation Threat," *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 13, 1994, p. 315.

²⁴Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶Rühle, pp. 313-4.

Partnership for Peace (PfP).²⁷ Similarly, NATO could use military measures to enforce or support international measures sanctioned by the United Nations, particularly within its sphere of interest—nominally, those states that are members of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The third area, offensive operations against proliferators, is the one NATO has been least likely to pursue in the past, since it is inherently a defensive alliance. However, offensive operations in a regional conflict may actually be seen as a form of preemptive defense, particularly when one's forces are threatened by WMD. And recent "out-of-area" operations, such as in Bosnia, may reflect greater willingness on the part of the Alliance to pursue actions deemed necessary that in an earlier era may have been politically impossible. One analyst has pointed out that the Atlantic Alliance is no longer a cooperative defense organization, but a "coalition in waiting" as it prepares to respond to the newest threat or conflict on its periphery.²⁸

The last option, pursuing BMD, is merely a continuation of NATO's traditional collective defense role, extrapolated to the threats posed by the new post-Cold War world. Nevertheless, it must overcome residual skepticism by some European members engendered by the SDI program in the 1980's—a program to which critics point in comparison with counterproliferation as an example of yet another regularly appearing, big new American program.²⁹ Despite these qualms, some Europeans, especially the French, recognized that proliferation might eventually turn into an acute problem requiring military responses. Even Germany is beginning to accept the possibility that traditional approaches to nonproliferation may fail, so there is a need to think about military preparations should that occur.³⁰

The NATO nonproliferation efforts please many member states, especially France. Some French officials pointed out that this was the first example of a true "European pillar" in NATO defense planning.³¹

The US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative

The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction") and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and

²⁷ Ruhle, pp. 315-6.

²⁸ David Greenwood, quoted in Sloan, p. 15.

²⁹ For example, Goldring, p. 12.

³⁰ Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

³¹ Interviews in Paris and Brussels, spring 1996.

extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and [I] hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

*-- President William J. Clinton, November 1994*³²

In 1994 the United States became once again the setting for bureaucratic struggles over a major new initiative, as the Departments of State, Defense, and other federal organizations squabbled over responsibility for the counterproliferation initiative (CPI).³³ The Pentagon viewed CPI as the military subset of nonproliferation, a position not held by State.³⁴ The stakes were high, involving considerable new and redirected funding for CPI projects and acquisition. The larger questions, however, still had to be answered: Who was or should be in charge of this effort? Which approach—State’s or Defense’s—was correct or better? The situation was made less clear by divided government, the result of the Republican party takeover of both houses of Congress in January 1995, dealing with a Democratic administration. Bureaucratic infighting over resources was nothing new, of course, and did not necessarily imply disagreement over the goals of the CPI, but it did reflect the importance and potential impact of this new program. The US has repeatedly emphasized that CPI welcomes and requires allied involvement and multinational cooperation to succeed.³⁵

Much of the rationale for the US CPI can be found in lessons from the Gulf War. America’s inability to fight a modern war in an NBC environment was made clear through combat preparations attempted in the sands of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The 1993 *Bottom-Up Review*, which identified the need to reorient the US armed forces to fight two nearly simultaneous regional wars (and in which, according to the *Review*, the threat or use of WMD was anticipated to be high in most scenarios), supported the findings of the war, and added credence to this shortcoming.³⁶

While the United States called its new effort a “Counterproliferation Initiative,” the term counterproliferation was explicitly *not* used within official NATO documents, including the January 1994 framework initiatives.³⁷ Nevertheless, this semantic distinction could not uncouple the links between the US Counterproliferation Initiative and the 1994 NATO Initiative. For example, both have two major components: prevention and protection. The money going into the US CPI efforts will, as in past cases of new strategies, eventually translate into new technologies for NATO’s use. Intelligence sharing is a key component of both plans. In addition, one of the primary objectives of the US CPI is a theater missile

³²“Executive Order 12938--Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 14 November 1994.

³³Interviews in Washington, fall 1994.

³⁴*Ibid.* For more on the definitional debate that occurred over these terms, see Roberts, fn. 29, pp. 13-14.

³⁵See *Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation*, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, May 1995.

³⁶Joseph, p. 117; and *Bottom-Up Review* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, November 1993).

defense (TMD) capability. Some European groups initially doubted the value of this, since it smacked of a revised SDI program. On the other hand, several NATO member states are seriously pursuing TMD, and SHAPE has completed a multinational memo of understanding on extended air defense.³⁸ The biggest difference between the two efforts—CPI and NATO’s nonproliferation studies—was simply the two year head start the US had on Europe.

The US Counterproliferation Initiative was announced in December 1993, and the Department of Defense had its own DoD Counterproliferation Policy in place by June 1994.³⁹ A follow-on missions and functions study was supposed to be completed six months thereafter, but was delayed and did not begin until October 1994. Acquisition programs led the policy world in the early American debate on counterproliferation. In many ways the process was started through technological determinism—the national laboratories and research and development community developed capabilities and solutions to problems that the US government didn’t even know it faced. Among the military services, the Air Force got its program together well ahead of the Army and Navy, and by late 1994 had already addressed the mix of policy, tactics, and forces in its “Counterproliferation Road Map.”⁴⁰ In the summer of 1994 the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) team within each of the major regional warfighting commands identified four major categories where the Department of Defense could provide expertise to the Defense Counterproliferation Policy: nonproliferation, active and passive defenses, and counterforce.⁴¹

The 1994 National Defense Authorization Act required the establishment of an inter-agency review committee composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, the Intelligence Community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to report on US nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities and programs. This Nonproliferation Program Review Committee (NPRC) performed a top-down overview of existing, planned, and proposed capabilities and

³⁷January 1994 NATO Summit Declaration; and Rühle, pp. 313-320.

³⁸Memorandum from the NATO Secretary General, “Coordination of Alliance Activities Concerning the Defence Aspects of NATO’s Response to Proliferation,” 2 August 1994.

³⁹For more on the US CPI, see “Department of Defense Response,” in *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1996; “Counterproliferation and Treaty Activities,” Chapter 7 in William J. Perry, *Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, March 1996; *Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs*, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, May 1994; *Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation*, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, May 1995; *Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation*, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, May 1996; and *Counterproliferation Master Plan: Strategy and Capabilities to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Headquarters, US Air Force (XOXI), May 1995.

⁴⁰“USAF Management Plan for the Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study,” HQ USAF/XOXI, National Security Negotiations Division, Plans Directorate, fall 1994.

⁴¹These initial categories have since been expanded to encompass seven functional areas: proliferation prevention, strategic and tactical intelligence, battlefield surveillance, WMD counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and countering paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD threats. *Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation*, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, May 1996, p. 5.

technologies, as well as a description of priorities and program options. Its findings identified several high-priority shortfalls in 16 “capability areas for progress” to address current and future national non and counterproliferation needs. Fourteen of those areas were considered to be underfunded.⁴²

In 1995 the Joint Chiefs of Staff created their own list of capability areas that they felt essential to pursue for national security. This list, which was developed by the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment team with inputs from the regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs), was essentially the same as the 1994 NPRC study, although some of the rankings changed. The CINCs put the highest priority on those areas where the most leverage could be gained through increased funding so as to get the best capabilities into the field quickly.⁴³

The JWCA list was adopted by the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC). The CPRC, created as a result of the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, is chaired by the Secretary of Defense and composed of the Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman of the JCS. It was tasked with assessing the success of represented agencies in implementing the recommendations of its predecessor organization, the NPRC, to review activities related to countering proliferation, and to make recommendations to modify those programs as required to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities.⁴⁴ It also coordinates counterproliferation program efforts to avoid redundancy and maximize efficiency among those government agencies involved.⁴⁵

The list which follows is the United States’ official determination of shortfall priorities, as approved by the JWCA and the CPRC. It is also apparently very close to the list NATO prepared in the DGP Phase III report (which remains classified).⁴⁶ That these lists are so similar should come as no surprise, given that most of the items listed are common sense responses to this new threat, and given traditional American leadership in new military programs and strategies for the Alliance.

Table 1: US Counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements⁴⁷

⁴²*Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs*, (The Deutch Report), Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, May 1994, p. ES-1.

⁴³*Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation*, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, May 1995, p. 27.

⁴⁴*Ibid*, p. 1. The CPRC mandate was to expire on 30 September 1996, but the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act extended the life of the CPRC through September 2000. *Air Force Counterproliferation Review*, October 1996, p. 2.

⁴⁵*Air Force Counterproliferation Review*, October 1996, p. 2.

⁴⁶Based on interviews with counterproliferation officers in NATO, SHAPE, USEUCOM, and JCS, spring 1996.

⁴⁷From *Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation*, May 1995, p. 73, and reconfirmed in the 1996 *Report*. This is a prioritized list of recommendations by the CPRC and is based on the 1994 NPRC Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation Areas for Progress and the JCS/CINC prioritized counterproliferation capabilities (the JWCA shortfall priorities list).

(in priority order)

- Detection, identification, and characterization of biological and chemical warfare agents
- Cruise missile defense
- Theater ballistic missile defense
- Detection, characterization, and defeat of underground WMD facilities
- Collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable intelligence to the warfighter
- Robust passive defense to enable continued operations on the NBC battlefield
- Biological warfare vaccine research, development, testing, evaluation and production
- Planning and targeting for above ground infrastructure
- Target planning for WMD targets
- Biological/chemical agent defeat
- Detection and tracking of WMD and WMD-related shipments
- Prompt mobile target detection and defeat
- Support for Special Operations Forces
- Defense against paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD threats
- Support export control activities of the US government
- Support inspection and monitoring activities of verifiable arms control agreements and regimes

There will not necessarily arise any new systems or programs as the result of this effort. Most necessary programs are already underway; indeed, as one official told the author, the United States alone has two or three systems in research and development for each of the bullet items in Table 2. In many cases, as well, an existing or planned capability has multiple uses in areas beyond non- or counterproliferation. Some new or newly emphasized areas that may come out of this study, however, include biological agent detection and identification, and layered ballistic missile defenses. The likelihood of the latter is questionable, however, given the well-known concerns over cost and effectiveness of a BMD system.⁴⁸

In July 1996 the Department of Defense held the inaugural meeting of its new Counterproliferation Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Its purpose is to provide coordination and oversight for DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative. The initial series of meetings were intended to focus on

⁴⁸ Interviews in Paris, Brussels, and SHAPE, spring 1996. For an excellent in-depth discussion of this dilemma and NATO's budgetary problems meeting the requirements set forth by the DGP effort, see Guy B. Roberts, "NATO's Response to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Emerging Reality of NATO's Ambitious Program," Paper prepared for the USAF Institute for National Security Studies, September 1996.

institutionalizing counterproliferation in the joint planning and doctrine development process, joint training and exercises, and on interagency and allied cooperation.⁴⁹

By early 1997 considerable progress had been made in many areas of the capabilities enhancement list. The FY97 DoD budget dedicated \$1.7 billion to efforts in thirteen items on the list, and an additional \$2.9 billion for theater ballistic missile defenses.⁵⁰ The largest recipients of funding were in the following areas: detection, identification, and characterization of BW/CW agents; robust passive defense to enable continued operations on the NBC battlefield; prompt mobile target detection and defeat; and support for inspection and monitoring activities of verifiable arms control agreements and regimes.⁵¹ In addition, the US government is coming to accept the importance and permanence of the issue, and has organized to incorporate counterproliferation in organizational mind-sets. Evidence of this has been seen in the new interagency bodies and review requirements established since 1994.⁵² The counterproliferation initiative, criticized and reviled when first introduced, has apparently achieved the acceptance it needs to remain a viable program.

PART II

THE NATO PROLIFERATION COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

NATO undertook several activities after the 1991 Rome Summit that focused on preventing proliferation via traditional political means—export controls, coordination of efforts to control sensitive technologies, and so on. In addition, it continued its work in the well-established field of passive defense, including protective measures for individual soldiers against chemical agents. It began developing a conceptual framework on air defense, to include ballistic missile and cruise missile defense technologies. All of these efforts were, however, by late 1993 considered insufficient to meet the new proliferation threat. There was a glaring absence of military measures available should prevention fail or deterrence break down.⁵³ It was this shortcoming that the NATO Heads of State and Government addressed in their January 1994 summit communique, which called proliferation a threat to international security.

The North Atlantic Council meeting in Istanbul in June 1994 laid out guidelines for the development of an agreed NATO strategy on nonproliferation. The ministers stressed that, in keeping with

⁴⁹*Air Force Counterproliferation Review*, October 1996, p. 1.

⁵⁰This number was increased by \$1 billion in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.

⁵¹*Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation*, May 1996, p. 25.

⁵²*Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

⁵³Joseph, p. 119.

NATO tradition, any solution must have both a political and a military dimension.⁵⁴ Accordingly, three committees were created to develop NATO's nonproliferation policy: the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP); the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP); and the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP). We shall review the organizations created to deal with the proliferation issue in some detail, because their makeup and approaches shed valuable light on the development process of a major NATO program.

Table 2: Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP)

- Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) meeting as a single body
- Meets irregularly to report SGP and DGP findings to North Atlantic Council
- Chaired by NATO Deputy Secretary General

There are also existing bodies of related interest within NATO such as the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary General and tasked with assessing the conceptual and operational aspects of extended air defense (EAD).⁵⁵ In June 1992 the North Atlantic Council tasked the NADC with investigating approaches to ballistic missile defenses, as well.⁵⁶ The NAC adopted a conceptual framework for EAD in June 1993.⁵⁷

Another interested body is the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). The CNAD has several sub groups, including an *ad hoc* group studying EAD and TMD, chaired by the United States, with 8 member nations and made up of non-NATO staff. It was created in October 1993 following the CNAD meeting, and presented its findings to the CNAD in April 1995.⁵⁸ There is a Defense Research Group studying the command, control, and communications aspects of EAD, and a NATO Industrial Advisory Study Group (NIAG) which studies the concepts, technologies, and cooperative programs of EAD. Finally, the NATO Military Committee sponsors an Advisory Group on Aerospace Research and

⁵⁴“Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul, Turkey, 9 June 1994, *NATO Review*, June 1994, pp. 28-9.

⁵⁵The Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support recommended in a June 1994 memorandum that these groups draft a strategy paper orchestrating the development and deployment of a NATO EAD/TMD capability. This would serve as the alliance enabling mechanism for deployment of such a capability early in the next century, if the alliance decided to do so. Unpublished memorandum by Robin Beard, June 1994.

⁵⁶David Martin, “Towards an Alliance Framework for Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence,” *NATO Review*, May 1996, p. 32.

⁵⁷Rühle, p. 319. National military authorities (NMAs) are currently refining a Military Operational Requirement for EAD, which is essentially BMD or TMD. Initially there were no formal lateral links or overlapping membership between these groups, although the NATO International Staff and the NMAs are represented on most of them. At the May 1994 NAC meeting, Germany and Denmark called for coordination between EAD and proliferation efforts. In one of his last acts, in August 1994 Secretary General Manfred Wörner tasked the representatives from CNAD and NADC to attend DPG meetings.

⁵⁸Martin, p. 34.

Development (AGARD), and SHAPE has a TMD Working Group, which completed a draft of its military operational requirement for theater missile defense for Allied Command Europe in October 1994.⁵⁹ As one analyst pointed out, “there is a bewildering variety of these groups often operating without coordination.”⁶⁰

To complement the SGP’s political efforts, a Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) was created to conduct parallel studies in a collegial, non-competitive atmosphere. There was no guidance as to which committee would finish first, or which would have priority; the two groups were expected to divide the work load and cooperate in their approaches.⁶¹ One of the purposes of the DGP was to gather together all such disparate groups working on various aspects of counterproliferation over the previous two to three years, re-direct their energies and their focus, and consider their findings without necessarily accepting all their recommendations.⁶² Unfortunately, the mandate for continuing the DGP beyond June 1996 did not give it the authority to oversee or consolidate the efforts of any of these groups.⁶³

The Political Dimension

The political dimension of NATO’s approach involves the traditional nonproliferation goal of preventing proliferation from occurring in the first place. Should proliferation occur, the allies would attempt to reverse it through diplomatic means. The primary focus of such nonproliferation efforts is outside of NATO, in other organizations and regimes to which NATO and its member states contribute-- including the United Nations and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The Alliance acts as one more venue for discussion and coordination of efforts in this regard.⁶⁴ Another aspect of the political dimension involves reaching out to NATO’s neighbors to the East, educating these states as to the dangers inherent in the proliferation problem and working with them to develop mutual programs to stem the spread of WMD materials and knowledge. The Alliance has conducted a series of *ad hoc* meetings with Russia and other countries in a “16+1” setting to discuss issues of proliferation,⁶⁵ and may continue these discussions in the Atlantic Partnership Council.⁶⁶

⁵⁹The SHAPE MOR calls for the protection of NATO forces, territory, and populations against ballistic missiles and suggests “an evolutionary defence capability that includes multiple defensive tiers or layers.” Martin, p. 34.

⁶⁰Roberts, fn. 144, p. 59.

⁶¹Interviews at NATO, spring 1996.

⁶²Interviews in Paris and Brussels, spring 1996.

⁶³Roberts, p. 59.

⁶⁴Schulte, p. 16.

⁶⁵“NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Facts and Way Ahead,” NATO Press Release, Brussels, 29 November 1995, p. 2.

⁶⁶“Final Communiqué,” Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10 December 1996; notes from NDU NATO Symposium, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 3 March 1997; and “Clinton Praises NATO Agreement with Russia,” *Colorado Springs Gazette*, 27 May 1997, p. 3.

NATO discussion on the political dimension of proliferation has centered in the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP). The SGP, comprised of representatives of each member state (including France), began its work by considering the political, security, economic, and other factors that drive states to want to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It undertook a geopolitical, strategic approach to proliferation, considering the sources of conflict and the underlying causes of proliferation desires by states. It then turned its attention to the instruments available to NATO and its member states to discourage proliferation by affecting a would-be proliferator's motivations.⁶⁷

Table 3: Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP)

- Chaired by NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
- Participants from Ministries of Foreign Affairs/State Department
- Sets out the alliance's policy framework, including contributions to wider efforts by the international community with respect to nonproliferation
- Supports, without duplicating, existing international fora and institutions pursuing political solutions to proliferation

Some observers have pointed out that the SGP was created in large part to appease the French, given their tradition of political-military oversight. The United States was more interested in the military studies by the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), but eventually grew to accept the SGP as useful for certain other related arenas—as long as there were limits to its interference with the DGP efforts.⁶⁸

Toward the end of its original charter the SGP expanded its interests to encompass a number of additional groups. In the spring of 1996 it incorporated the Group on Nuclear Weapons (GNW), a political body examining the control of weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union. GNW meetings had been poorly attended anyway, so the Group agreed to dis-establish itself in favor of holding discussions on issues of interest within the SGP.⁶⁹ Similarly, there was some discussion in 1996 on including the Political Committee with Disarmament Experts, which met semi-annually, within the SGP. These moves implied that the SGP would continue its existence beyond its original two-year mandate, perhaps continuing its charter for another two years in order to continue its work and meet sensitivities (particularly from the French) about eliminating this political body when it seemed that there was interest in

⁶⁷“NATO's Approach to Proliferation,” *Basic Fact Sheet* No. 8, NATO Office of Information and Press, September 1995, p. 2.

⁶⁸Interviews at NATO and Paris, spring 1996.

⁶⁹Interviews at NATO, spring 1996.

keeping the defense body—the DGP—around for the implementation phase of the nonproliferation effort.⁷⁰ Indeed, in May 1996 the North Atlantic Council extended the SGP’s charter, with an expanded mandate calling on members to assess and discuss the disposition of weapons of mass destruction in Russia, and to discuss proliferation issues with Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.⁷¹

The Military Dimension

The military dimension of the Alliance plan involved the creation of a series of committees to study the problem and suggest possible responses or solutions to proliferation or the possible use of a weapon of mass destruction, either against NATO or one of its members, or on NATO’s borders. NATO hoped thereby to strengthen the deterrence capabilities of its military forces, showing a potentially hostile proliferant that it could not coerce or defeat the Alliance through the use or threatened use of WMD.

The DGP began its work by taking a three-phased approach to considering the threat and possible Alliance responses. Phase I was a risk assessment, Phase II looked at implications and needed capabilities, and Phase III assessed NATO’s current plans, forces, and capabilities, identifying shortfalls within the Alliance. The emphasis was on shortfalls in equipment and technologies, rather than on doctrine. This may be a matter for future debate in discussions in the DGP during its unofficial “Phase IV”—the implementation of corrective actions to repair the capabilities requirements list.

The DGP co-chairmen included one North American and one European, on a rotating basis. The first two chairs were from the United States and France. Great Britain replaced France in 1995, and was replaced by Italy in the summer of 1996. Future European chairs will come from alternating geographical regions of the Alliance (that is, the 1997 chair should come from the Northern tier of member states).

France saw the entire DGP effort, and in particular the committee set up, as the first example of a true European pillar working within NATO defense circles, striving to solve an important issue through partnership and open discussion.⁷²

<p style="text-align: center;">Table 4: Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Co-chaired by a North American and a European country-- First co-chairs: US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and French head of MOD <i>Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques</i>

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹Roberts, p. 24.

⁷²Interviews in Paris, spring 1996.

- DGP Steering Group addresses common issues, e.g. intel, C3I, deterrence
- DGP had three sub-groups for Phase II:
 - Passive defenses (UK chair)
 - Active defenses (US chair)
 - Response capabilities (Germany chair)
- Participants from Ministries of Defense and NATO military staffs
 - Staff members essentially the same as national staffs for Nuclear Planning Group
- Address military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use, protect NATO territory, populations, and military forces
- Studies done in a four-step process:
 - Address risks to alliance from the proliferation of WMD
 - Determine implications for the alliance's defense posture
 - Assess current alliance capabilities to counter these threats
 - Determine capability shortfalls and possible remedies
- First report on threats presented to NAC in Brussels December 94
- Second report on implications for NATO's defense posture and needed counterproliferation capabilities presented to NAC in Brussels November 95
- Third report on current shortfalls and how to achieve those capabilities presented to NAC in Berlin June 96

Phase I: Threats. During its first phase the DGP conducted a classified assessment of the risks facing the Alliance. An *ad hoc* committee of the DGP developed a questionnaire for the states on their view of the threats and risk assessments. According to public sources, the DGP's findings validated the concerns expressed by the heads of state and government in their January 1994 summit communiqué, and reiterated by the defense ministers at the June 1994 Istanbul NAC meeting.⁷³ The report made evident the need to differentiate between types of threats and types of weapons. For instance, nuclear weapons seem to be most prized by proliferants, but biological weapons seem to have emerged as a key threat, and proliferant states (as well as non-state actors, such as terrorist groups) still prize chemical weapons for their psychological value.⁷⁴ Similarly, the report differentiated between regional actors and their different cultural personalities, focusing on a few key states of greatest concern. It is understood that likely proliferant states may behave much differently than the opponents whom NATO faced during the Cold

⁷³Schulte, p. 18.

⁷⁴Joseph, pp. 121-2.

War.⁷⁵ Finally, it considered technological trends to the year 2010, and examined the trading links between suppliers and client states with respect to WMD technology, materials, and expertise.⁷⁶

The findings of the DGP Phase I study also shaped the SGP's views. According to some sources, the SGP had begun its general studies in 1994, but soon lost focus. Following the DGP's success in its regional approach to threat analysis, the SGP also began using regional scenarios for its studies, with much greater success the result.⁷⁷

Apparently this phase of the study was difficult to conclude, due to political sensitivities within certain NATO member states over addressing specific regions or nations of proliferation concern. The group had problems reaching consensus on assessments of certain countries. In order to be a truly useable document, the information was classified. NATO did not wish to look like it was seeking new enemies, nor creating a rationale for continued funding.⁷⁸ The DGP's Phase I work was completed in December 1994, and the report was presented to the North Atlantic Council in May 1995.

Phase II: Implications and Needed Capabilities. Phase Two of the DGP effort took the results of the threat analysis and examined the implications for NATO's defense posture. This report, also classified, was completed in spring 1995 and presented to the North Atlantic Council in its November 1995 ministerial session. The report focused on NATO's ability to protect its territory and people from the threat of WMD, as well as to safely deploy NATO military forces on contingency missions into areas of potential WMD use.⁷⁹ Working groups in the Phase Two study looked at passive defenses, such as personnel protective measures; active defenses, including extended air defense (which work coincided with that being undertaken by the NATO Air Defence Committee and the Conference of National Armaments Directors); and proactive military operations—the areas most closely linked to ideas found in the United States' counterproliferation initiative. Germany served as chair of the response capabilities subcommittee—a conscious decision by the other DGP members, taken to ensure that any NATO response met the higher standard of German approval for nonprovocative and well-considered action.⁸⁰

The Phase Two study addressed the political-military consequences of the threat and the necessary capabilities for Alliance response by looking at illustrative scenarios already identified in this paper: direct threats to NATO territory; threats against the Alliance's ability to intervene in regional conflicts; and

⁷⁵Joseph, p. 122.

⁷⁶Ashton B. Carter and David B. Omand, "Countering the Proliferation Risks: Adapting the Alliance to the New Security Environment," *NATO Review*, September 1996, p. 13.

⁷⁷Interviews at NATO, spring 1996.

⁷⁸Interviews with NATO officials, spring 1996.

⁷⁹Schulte, p. 18, and *Basic Fact Sheet*, p. 3.

⁸⁰Interviews at NATO, spring 1996.

threats to other out of area missions, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. It was divided into two parts, Phases IIA and IIB. The first part considered how contingencies of concern to NATO might be altered by WMD use; the second identified a range of capabilities needed by the Alliance, given the WMD threat to NATO.⁸¹ The Phase II findings can be summarized in two broad categories, as follows:

I. Implications for NATO Defense

- The greatest threat posed by proliferation of WMD and their delivery means in the foreseeable future is to deployed NATO forces. NATO should therefore give first priority to protecting those forces involved in regional contingencies.
- A potential adversary may see possession of WMD as a means of overcoming NATO conventional force superiority.
- WMD could have a direct impact on operational outcomes by disrupting NATO force cohesion or deployment capabilities.
- NATO forces will be most vulnerable to attack while entering the region, when forces are concentrated at ports and airfields.
- WMD could alter the military balance in a region if they succeed in degrading the operating capability of NATO deployed forces, either directly or indirectly.
- Non-uniform capabilities for dealing with WMD attack among the NATO coalition members could offer an adversary opportunities for exploitation.
- Civilian reaction to WMD use in a region may have an impact on NATO resolve or ability to conduct operations.⁸²

II. Implications for NATO Force Capabilities

- Military capabilities complement prevention efforts.
 - All of the Alliance's military capabilities have a role in devaluing NBC weapons
- No one capability alone will suffice.
 - A mix of capabilities will serve deterrence and, should it prove necessary, combat
- The Alliance must complement nuclear deterrence.
 - Conventional forces, passive defenses, and intelligence and surveillance means must be included with nuclear considerations of deterrence and defense
- Greatest emphasis should be placed on Alliance core capabilities.

In addition, the DGP listed its priority capability requirements. This list provides the touchstone for future efforts in developing and acquiring new systems to enhance NATO defenses. The Tier I capabilities were identified by their multiple and synergistic value to the Alliance. Tier I capabilities are

⁸¹Interviews with NATO staff members, 1995-96; also Carter and Omand, p. 13.

⁸²This list from Joseph, pp. 123-4.

core integrative military capabilities that make the most substantial contributions to the Alliances' politico-military objectives for dealing with proliferation; serve as force multipliers to increase the overall effectiveness of the Alliance's defence posture for dealing with proliferation risks; and respond to existing conditions and expected near term trends.⁸³

Table 5: Tier I Needed (Core) Capabilities⁸⁴

- Strategic and operational intelligence
- Automated and deployable command, control and communications
- Wide area ground surveillance
- Standoff and point biological and chemical agent detection, identification, and warning
- Extended air defenses, including tactical ballistic missile defense for deployed forces
- NBC individual protective equipment for deployed forces

Beyond these top priority needs, the DGP identified additional capabilities that would contribute significantly to the Alliance's political aims and operational objectives for dealing with existing or expected proliferation risks. These Tier II capabilities included advanced computer applications, reconnaissance platforms and sensors, layered missile defenses, medical countermeasures, and special munitions capable of countering WMD.⁸⁵

Specifically, the Phase II report called for enhanced Alliance capabilities in five main areas: active defenses, passive defenses, response or counterforce capabilities, intelligence capabilities, and battle management. Within active defense, it recommended a balanced capability to defend against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Point defense will receive the highest priority in the near term, including a deployable system for regional contingencies. Over the longer term, the committee called for continued investigation into a multi-tiered high altitude anti-ballistic missile system.⁸⁶

In the passive defense realm, the DGP emphasized the need for early detection and identification of chemical and biological agents, as well as traditional protective measures. In the arena of response capabilities, the report called for a broad range of military capabilities to deny an adversary the ability to

⁸³Carter and Omand, p. 14.

⁸⁴List from NATO Press Release, 29 November 1995, pp. 3-4.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

⁸⁶Joseph, p. 124.

strike NATO with WMD. These capabilities must include the ability to strike at hardened underground WMD facilities with enhanced penetration capabilities and the ability to contain collateral effects.⁸⁷

Intelligence capabilities must be improved, particularly in the area of regional expertise, human intelligence, and technical assessment means. No non- or counterproliferation effort can succeed without open intelligence sharing between the participating states. Finally, battle management implies improvements to the command and control and political consultation processes within the Alliance.⁸⁸

The DGP Phase II report emphasized that these core capabilities for Alliance defense must be incorporated into national planning and training procedures in order to be fully effective. The report was presented to the North Atlantic Council in November 1995.

Phase III: Capabilities and Shortfalls. The DGP's next effort addressed current NATO and national capabilities, identified deficiencies, and examined areas for improvement and cooperation. In the Phase Three report, completed in the spring of 1996 and presented to the NAC in June of that year, the DGP prioritized defense systems requirements and recommended that NATO institutionalize this assessment process in future defense planning efforts by the Alliance.⁸⁹ It also suggested enhanced multinational training and exercises. These improvements in NATO's ability to counter the risks posed by proliferation should reinforce and complement international efforts to stop the spread of WMD by demonstrating the Alliance's resolve to meet this threat.⁹⁰ What the Alliance is trying to do is develop a general base of capabilities that can do multiple taskings, and be available for expansion later should the need arise. One area in which there is already publicly acknowledged cooperation between the US counterproliferation initiative and NATO organizations is an American offer to share ballistic missile early warning information with NATO allies. SHAPE is developing a concept of operations to implement this offer, in conjunction with the NADC and the CNAD.⁹¹

The NAC approved the report's recommendations for military capabilities improvements and its work program and timing at its Berlin ministerial session.⁹² The Defense Ministers endorsed the DGP's efforts at their meeting in Brussels the following week, and pointed out the need for greater emphasis on

⁸⁷*Ibid.* This capability requirement is partial justification, for example, for the newest nuclear weapon in the US arsenal, the B61-11 deep earth penetrator. "New Bomb," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May-June 1997, pp. , and *Colorado Springs Gazette*,

⁸⁸*Ibid.*

⁸⁹Schulte, p. 18; Carter and Omand, p. 12.

⁹⁰NATO Press Release, 29 November 1995.

⁹¹Martin, p. 34.

⁹²"Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996," Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (96)(63), p. 7.

protecting deployed troops in light of the Alliance carrying out new, non-Article 5 missions.⁹³ For the first time in 12 years, in fact, the NAC authorized an accelerated “catch-up” process to incorporate the recommended DGP programs in the two year force goals, the most recent report for which had just been given to Defense Ministers. Specifically, the NAC approved the DGP’s comprehensive program of 39 action plans designed to implement needed programs across numerous NATO bodies. Each action plan has defined milestones so that the DGP can monitor progress in achieving these goals.⁹⁴

The major hurdle to accomplishing any of this, of course, is money. The DGP effort is an attempt to expedite those procurement processes that may best support NATO’s nonproliferation efforts, but it is only one part of the overall Alliance force development process. All states have unofficially said they are unable to support additional spending for new projects, so the question must be asked: what will NATO be willing to give up to have new capabilities within its current budget? Deciding who pays, and for what, will drive much of the political discussion following the DGP’s Phase III report.⁹⁵ The DGP will continue to monitor progress toward achieving its 39 recommended action plans, which are designed to improve or achieve the core capabilities identified in Table 5. The DGP will also serve as a forum for explaining NATO’s nonproliferation efforts to member states and PfP partners.⁹⁶

Interestingly, the DGP effort was essentially the work of five key nations: the US, France, UK, Germany, and the Netherlands. Given that the most direct threat facing NATO comes against its Southern flank, it was surprising to some participants that various Mediterranean member states were not more involved. Spain, in fact, suggested that the DGP cease existence after presenting its Phase III report, despite the fact that Spain was scheduled to become the third DGP co-chair.⁹⁷

The Consultation Process

To better illustrate the process of NATO’s efforts in this major effort, we shall take a more in-depth look at the process and timing of the Phase III study. Figure 1 gives some indication of the complex consultation involved in the development of an agreed NATO statement. When the third phase of the DGP studies began in late 1995, it was obvious that the member states required supplemental questioning to determine shortfalls and needed capabilities, beyond what was discussed in the DGP. This additional

⁹³“Final Communiqué, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session on 13 June 1996,” Press Communiqué M-NAC(DM)-2 (96)(89), 13 June 1996, p. 5.

⁹⁴Carter and Omand, p. 14.

⁹⁵Interviews at SHAPE and NATO, spring 1996.

⁹⁶Carter and Omand, p. 15.

⁹⁷Interviews in Brussels, spring 1996.

information would come via the means of a questionnaire. The phase 3A process was accepted by all NATO members as a valid way of accomplishing the shortfall identification.

The DGP asked the Military Committee and the major NATO commands (NMCs) for military advice in this phase. A questionnaire was sent by the International Military Staff to each nation, and their inputs were synthesized by the SHAPE staff before a summary was sent to the Military Committee for review. This questionnaire included a checklist created by SHAPE, SACLANT, and the DGP, and asked several specific questions based on the tiers from the Phase II report: Was this area really a shortfall? Could it be addressed with an existing capability? Did the Alliance need a new capability? How should the issue be addressed—in a NATO forum, or by individual nations? And finally, what was the best approach to the problem—a NATO force proposal, or some other method? The international staff assumed that NMC's had lists of the current capabilities, which they would use to develop their responses.⁹⁸

The questionnaire was sent to the states in mid-September 1995. Most of the nations answered quickly. In the United States, the questionnaire went to OSD/ISP/CP (DoD counterproliferation plans and policy), then to the Joint Staff, which tasked each of the military services for their inputs. A memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter dated 22 December 1995 included a supplemental questionnaire to the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), which had last been done in mid-1995. (In the future, NATO hopes to incorporate these questions in the biannual DPQ.) The questionnaire was sent to many organizations across Washington, including the JCS, OSD, CIA, DIA, and BMDO. The Joint Staff captured the service inputs (which, given the timing and short suspense for a response, were in many cases done by duty officers in each office over the Christmas vacation). Within the US Air Force, for example, XOXI sent a tasking to the other Air Staff offices (plans, intelligence, acquisition, civil engineering, and so on) on 26 December, asking for a response within one week. These findings were consolidated and submitted to the Joint Staff on 17 January 1996. JCS/J-5 requested additional time from OSD for its overall military response, which it forwarded on 24 January. After combining these inputs with those from the other agencies around Washington, OSD sent the official US response to the questionnaire back to the NATO Military Committee.⁹⁹

After reviewing and synthesizing the results, the NATO Military Committee's assessment went to the major commands and the nations for further review and comment.¹⁰⁰ This happened within approximately three weeks of gathering all the country inputs—a very fast turnaround time for an

⁹⁸Interviews at NATO, SHAPE, and Washington, spring 1996.

⁹⁹This simplified version of the consultation and response process within the Pentagon is drawn from interviews with key participants in Washington, spring 1996. The question that begs answering, of course, is how complete and in-depth any ally's response could be given the short time period allowed—particularly since it was over the Christmas season.

international alliance. The assessment listed each of the shortfall areas, and gave a tentative answer as to whether the Alliance could meet the shortfall, based on individual states' capabilities.¹⁰¹ The nations then reviewed the Military Committee's assessment to ensure that it accurately reflected their views, responses, and capabilities, and to fill any holes in the capabilities chart with systems or programs that may have been left out of the earlier, rushed questionnaire.

There was considerable pressure from lobbyists during this phase, as each contractor, and each nation, tried to persuade the group that its particular system or program was the best choice to meet a particular shortfall. Lobbyist pressure was particularly intense in the realm of ABM systems.¹⁰²


Following this in-depth look at the consultative process in the United States, let us now turn to the other three major actors in the NATO nonproliferation study: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Together, these four nations led the Alliance efforts to meet this new threat.

¹⁰⁰Interviews at SHAPE, spring 1996.

¹⁰¹Interviews in Washington, spring 1996.

¹⁰²Interviews in Europe, spring 1996.

FIGURE 1: THE PHASE III CONSULTATIVE PROCESS (ILLUSTRATIVE)¹⁰³



¹⁰³Unofficial flow chart from NATO staff, winter 1995/96, which captures the spirit of multinational consultation on a major work effort.

PART III

COUNTRY STUDIES

France: Leading Proponent of Counterproliferation Planning

The 1994 French White Paper on defense called WMD proliferation one of the major challenges for international security and for French defense.¹⁰⁴ France is specifically concerned about missile-delivered WMD from North Africa or the Mediterranean region (including, over the longer term, Algeria).¹⁰⁵ It is also concerned about global proliferation trends because of the widespread deployment of French forces overseas. WMD raises the stakes for French force deployments in strategic areas outside Europe. It is therefore generally supportive of both the US and NATO nonproliferation efforts; indeed, one writer called the January 1994 Brussels Summit agreement “a defining event in the evolution of France’s post-Cold War relationship with the Alliance,”¹⁰⁶ since France was quick to agree to the proposals—including the call for a major Alliance study of the proliferation threat.

The fact that France was the first co-chair of the DGP was no accident. In fact, the entire NATO nonproliferation initiative was, according to officials in Paris, a French proposal. France saw the DGP chairmanship as a test of its new relations with NATO, a chance to see how things might work in this new relationship, both with the Alliance and with the United States.¹⁰⁷ Apparently the French government was happy with the arrangement and the results, leading to greater involvement in other areas, including a renewed interest in military cooperation with the Alliance.

France will cooperate with its allies as long as Alliance plans don’t affect French freedom of action, or the French domestic defense industrial base.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, France hopes to reap big economic benefits from a CP program, an incentive that also strengthens its support for these efforts.¹⁰⁹ Some have argued that France may choose to participate in NATO *a la carte*, rather than accepting the full political

¹⁰⁴*Livre Blanc sur la Defense, 1994* (Paris: Service d’ Information et de Relations Publiques des Armees, Ministere de la Defense, 1994), English excerpts.

¹⁰⁵Based on discussions of participants in the US-CREST Franco-US Working Group on Counterproliferation, Paris and Washington, October 1994-February 1995.

¹⁰⁶Robert P. Grant, “France’s New Relationship with NATO,” *Survival*, Spring 1996, p. 58.

¹⁰⁷Interviews in Paris, spring 1996.

¹⁰⁸Interviews with US-CREST Counterproliferation Working Group participants, Oct 94; also “Allied Perceptions of WMD Proliferation,” Paper prepared by the Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, fall 1994, p. 3.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.* Also Peter Lewis, “French Security Policy: The Year of the Disappearing Budget,” *Jane’s Defence* ‘96, January 1996, p. 42.

and military menu, in order to limit its role and responsibilities in new and costly NATO programs.¹¹⁰ Perhaps, but it definitely wants to be part of any counterproliferation programs, for reasons already mentioned. Ironically, however, in 1996, after leading the Alliance into agreement on the need for new initiatives to counter proliferation threats, French budgetary concerns and force structure cuts caused it to withdraw from at least one major defensive program having implications for counterproliferation: the medium extended air defense system (MEADS).¹¹¹

Events such as the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, possible US disengagement from Europe, and German unification have all contributed to the long-standing French desire for greater European defense cooperation. But while it may have preferred to use the West European Union (WEU) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for joint military actions or the development of options to respond to the proliferation of WMD, it recognized the limits of these organizations.¹¹² The failure of these European organizations to resolve the war in former Yugoslavia put their current value in sharp perspective. Closer security linkages between the WEU and NATO, announced in May 1996, may attenuate some of these lost dreams, calling as they do for the operationalization of a European pillar within or in cooperation with NATO, rather than completely independent of the Alliance.¹¹³

The Alliance nonproliferation efforts buttress France's preexisting movement toward greater participation in NATO affairs, including acting as first co-chair of the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation. Furthermore, many counterproliferation programs under consideration are inordinately expensive, so France desires partners in cooperative ventures. It also recognizes the probability of conducting future operations with the US, whether bilaterally or multinationally, and would like to coordinate plans and programs in advance. A key question for France will be how it adapts its deterrence doctrine to a new world of WMD threats in regional conflicts.¹¹⁴ Some French officials point out that nuclear deterrence, while difficult to measure, seems to influence potential proliferants (witness Hussein's caution in the Gulf War), so France is unwilling to abandon its tools for "ultimate warning."¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, *French Policy Toward NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, Vice Rapprochement* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 1994), p. 14.

¹¹¹"France Quits Anti-Missile Project," *London Financial Times*, 17 April 1996, p. 3. MEADS is a multinational air defense system funded jointly by Italy, Germany, the US, and formerly France.

¹¹²"Allied Perceptions of WMD Proliferation," p. 3.

¹¹³"WEU-NATO Security Accord," *News from France*, 17 May 1996, p. 2; also BGen Graham Merry-Whiting, "Europe's Security and Defence Identity: The Western European Union's Operation Development," paper prepared for the 1997 European Symposium, "NATO After the Summit," National Defense University, Washington, DC, 3-4 March 1997.

¹¹⁴Such adaptation could take the form of intra-regional deployment of NATO's dual capable aircraft, for example.

¹¹⁵Interviews with French officials, spring 1996. "Ultimate warning," in the French view, means pre-strategic, limited nuclear strikes against military targets.

The presidential election in May 1995 resulted in tangible changes to this renewed French interest in closer relations with NATO and the US, as Jacques Chirac and his conservative party reclaimed power after a long period of socialist control of the *Elysees* under François Mitterand. The leaders of the new government were ready to pursue greater openness with NATO and were willing to abandon some of Mitterand's caution in this regard.¹¹⁶ Of course, no French party of any political persuasion is willing to abandon the tenets of Gaullist defense and security policy, given the reverence in which DeGaulle is still held by the French public.¹¹⁷ But Chirac returned to these roots more decisively than Mitterand ever dared, stating in a speech to ambassadors in Paris in August 1995 that French deterrent forces protected France and its vital interests against both nuclear powers and any use of WMD by a proliferant. This was the first time a French president so bluntly rattled the nuclear saber by stating "don't tread on me," and represented a major change from France's earlier preference for emphasizing the *prevention* of proliferation as its first goal.¹¹⁸

The 1997 French general election returned the Socialist party to power, forcing the new government to deal with Chirac's conservative presidency. During the campaign Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was generally critical of Chirac's *rapprochement* to NATO in recent years. Early indications were that the new government wished to reconsider some of the more dramatic decisions by the president in moving France closer to NATO's military committees, although the Socialist platform had made little mention of defense issues during the election. Speculation was therefore that the new government would leave security issues in the traditional domain of the president, despite grumbling by the Socialist opposition.

France recognized that the dramatic changes in the European security environment during the first five years of the 1990's had made NATO more important than ever before, rather than less so. This caused a small but agonizing reappraisal within France of its role and place in the larger European security context, and its decisions to pursue closer links with NATO's military bodies.¹¹⁹ This has been most obvious in France's decision to be an active participant, leader, and first co-chair of the DGP, the first time it has joined a NATO defense committee since 1966.¹²⁰ At the same time, France has become active in NATO's Military Committee, and will henceforth allow its defense minister to "regularly take part in the

¹¹⁶Grant, p. 64.

¹¹⁷Johnsen and Young, p. 7.

¹¹⁸Interviews in Paris, spring 1996. One analyst has suggested that only a Gaullist president could move so far toward NATO and away from Gaullist principles of independence without being ridiculed for doing so; in other words, "only Nixon could go to China." Anand Menon, "French Shift to NATO Hails End of the European Army Dream," *The European*, 16-22 May 1996, p. 14.

¹¹⁹See Johnsen and Young.

¹²⁰Johnsen and Young, p. 11.

work of the Alliance, alongside his colleagues.”¹²¹ In announcing this decision in December 1995 in Brussels, France opened the door for expanded participation and cooperation with its NATO allies in future military activities. It has already agreed to take its place in different bodies under the jurisdiction of the Military Committee, and is working on closer working relations with SHAPE.¹²² It may also hope to procure partners in new technological endeavors, such as missile defenses, and ensure through a binding cooperative alliance that Germany continues to forswear nuclear weapons.¹²³ One means of doing this was made public in early 1997: the possible extension of France’s nuclear deterrent umbrella over a willing Germany.¹²⁴

At the same time, however, France does not want to surrender even the perception of national control over its ultimate deterrent, the *force de frappe*. It has decided not to participate in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, for example, fearing that this would mean “strategic subordination to the United States.”¹²⁵ Nevertheless, as French security expert David Yost has recently pointed out, France’s increasing involvement in NATO military affairs and apparent new flexibility regarding NATO consultative processes “could lead to a greater transatlantic consensus on principles of nuclear deterrence and employment,” with all of the implications this holds for counterproliferation activities.¹²⁶ Similarly, France wants no part in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) as it currently stands, since the DPC manages the Alliance’s integrated military system, not all of which France agrees with, and French national character prefers stronger civilian control over any military—whether national or allied.¹²⁷ It would prefer to see an evolutionary change within NATO to greater control by the North Atlantic Council, and the Military Committee (as the NAC’s key implementing body over nuclear policy).¹²⁸ The DPC will deal with matters relating to the integrated military structure, but France shall continue to use bilateral agreements to regulate its relations with NATO in this realm.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, certain elements of the French security community can foresee their eventual involvement in the DPC if it were to discuss nuclear matters. NATO, however, is not ready to make this commitment.¹³⁰

¹²¹Minister of Defense Harve de Charette, in a speech to the North Atlantic Council, 5 Dec 1995, quoted in Grant, p. 58.

¹²²Grant, p. 62; also “Balanced NATO,” *News from France*, 2 Feb 1996, p. 1.

¹²³Joseph, p. 117.

¹²⁴“France wants Nuclear Union with Germany,” *Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph*, February 1997.

¹²⁵Yost, p. 113.

¹²⁶Yost, p. 114.

¹²⁷Grant, pp. 65-66.

¹²⁸Grant, p. 71; Charles Millon, “France and the Renewal of the Atlantic Alliance,” *NATO Review*, May 1996, p. 15; and “France’s Changing View of the World,” *The Economist*, 10 February 1996, p. 47.

¹²⁹Millon, p. 15.

¹³⁰Interviews with French and NATO officials, spring 1996.

Germany: Still Leery of Military Options

The long-standing debate within Germany over its proper role in the world, which rested to a great extent on an interpretation of its *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) that German military forces could not be deployed outside its borders, faces new pressures from a world that demands that Germany assume its proper responsibilities in the international system.¹³¹ Chancellor Kohl, in his victory speech to the opening of the Bundestag in November 1994, reiterated that Germany would play an increasing role in peacekeeping missions and honor its international obligations.¹³² The German *White Paper 1994* agreed. Given the radical changes in the international security environment in the early 1990's, Germany "must assume new international responsibility," and "the Federal Government is prepared to assume this responsibility."¹³³ It also called nonproliferation of WMD a "priority task of security policy in the years ahead."¹³⁴ At the same time, the *White Paper* reiterated Germany's long-standing renunciation of the manufacture, possession of, and control over nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.¹³⁵ In 1993 Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel emphasized that "Following the end of the East-West confrontation, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is becoming one of the major dangers to world peace."¹³⁶ Kinkel has also stressed Germany's increasing responsibilities in United Nations activities.¹³⁷

What role will Germany play in efforts to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction? Perhaps more urgently, can the governing coalition maintain its slim majority in parliament and continue its current supportive policies? Many observers of German politics believe that Chancellor Kohl and his CDU coalition government are safe at least through the 1998 federal elections.¹³⁸ But there remains some concern by certain of Germany's allies over its level of commitment to these new military endeavors. As one NATO official (a non-German) said: "Of course Germany sees no problems or threats—until now,

¹³¹See, for example, "Federal Constitutional Court Deliberates the Issue of German Participation in 'Out-of-Area' Missions," *The Week in Germany*, 22 April 1994, pp. 1-2.

¹³²"Kohl Outlines Cabinet Goals," *The Week in Germany*, 25 November 1994, p. 1.

¹³³*White Paper 1994. White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr*, Bonn, Germany: Federal Ministry of Defence, 1994 (English version), para. 208, p. 24, and para. 319, p. 43.

¹³⁴*White Paper 1994*: para. 495, p. 81.

¹³⁵*White Paper 1994*, para. 107, p. 13. This was a reiteration of Germany's official commitment to remain non-nuclear in the 1990 "2 + 4 Treaty." See "Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany, Moscow, 12 September 1990," in Adam D. Rotfeld and Walther Stutzle, eds., *Germany and Europe in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 184.

¹³⁶"Policy Statement on 'German 10-Point Initiative on Non Proliferation Policy,'" Dr Klaus Kinkel, *Statements & Speeches*, German Information Center, New York, 15 December 1993, p. 2.

¹³⁷For example, see "Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr Klaus Kinkel, to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 21 April 1994," *Statements & Speeches*, German Information Center, New York, 21 April 1994, p. 4.

¹³⁸Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

they've never deployed troops.”¹³⁹ Germany's recent and growing involvement in UN and NATO military activities (such as in Bosnia) may change that perspective, although its emphasis on purely defensive measures was shown again by its refusal to send combat troops to Bosnia.¹⁴⁰ But these are tentative moves, requiring the building of public consensus; Germany is moving towards a more active international military role one small step at a time.

Nevertheless, for the most part Germany lacks interest in the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The German public generally sees no threat. While some German analysts recognize a vague threat to the NATO Alliance, especially to its Southern tier, and the need for some German response under the guise of SHAPE, there is no well-defined direct threat against German territory or people. Indeed, at least one or two of the potential adversaries discussed in the DGP's Phase I threat assessment are countries with which Germany maintains good relations.¹⁴¹ Germany feels, as do other European states, that traditional nonproliferation means have served the West well so far, so there is no hurry to change NATO's emphasis to more offensively oriented military options—particularly given the low threat environment. France, on the other hand, has always viewed developments in North Africa with more concern than other Europeans, and is therefore more in line with the United States in advocating a major new counterproliferation initiative. But Germany sees the proliferation threat as a side issue, of no great importance yet. Overall the issue is a peripheral one to most government officials and academics within the Federal Republic.¹⁴²

The German Ministry of Defense takes the problem and threat of proliferation more seriously than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is traditionally leery of any military answer to a problem. Yet even within the MOD the low level of concern can be seen by the fact that the one section in *Bundeswehr* headquarters that deals with NBC defense is scheduled to close by 1998.¹⁴³ This is of particular concern to the *Luftwaffe*, as it reorganizes its internal structure in 1997 it will rely less on standing forces and more on reaction forces. The belief in *Luftwaffe* headquarters, as they translate NATO doctrine into operational requirements, is that such forces will require *more* NBC training, capabilities, and associated infrastructure to protect deployed forces against these threats—particularly since the MFA could choose to deploy Germany's military forces on short notice in concert with an Alliance operation. But there is doubt about

¹³⁹Interview in Europe, spring 1996. This is not an uncommon view; see, for example, Ludger Kühnhardt, “Germany's Role in European Security,” *The New Germany in the New Europe*, SAIS Review Special Issue, Fall 1995, edited by David P. Calleo and Markus Jelitto (Washington: Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1995), p. 125.

¹⁴⁰“Cabinet Approves German Troops for Bosnia Task Force,” *The Week in Germany*, 27 October 1995, p. 1.

¹⁴¹Interviews in Germany and at NATO, spring 1996.

¹⁴²Interviews in Europe, spring 1996.

¹⁴³Interviews in Bonn, spring 1996.

the level of money or support that will be forthcoming to make this training happen once the current *Luftwaffe* Chief of Staff, who is favorably disposed toward NBC defense efforts, retires.¹⁴⁴

Germans are primarily concerned with moral and legal questions when it comes to security issues, rather than purely military aspects. German strategic analysts point out that it is difficult to even open discussions on these issues within the German public. Germany has grown very defensively oriented; offensive military actions appear unseemly to many Germans. Nor is there any real interest in these issues, nor in military matters at all, as long as they don't cost much or become a political issue. Many feel that terrorist actions, for instance, rightfully belong to the arena of police activity, rather than the military realm.¹⁴⁵ NATO will have a hard time selling any new counterproliferation initiative to the FRG.

At the same time, Germany, despite its general wealth, faces severe monetary pressures as a result of its reunification and the huge economic and environmental problems it inherited from the Eastern *Länder*, as well as by moving its capital to Berlin. There is simply no additional money available to support any new major efforts such as those envisioned by some counterproliferation enthusiasts. Some Germans feel that big new projects, such as a theater ballistic missile system, are not only unnecessary, but a transparent attempt by the US to try and procure help paying for what is essentially an American program.¹⁴⁶

Germany may be willing to support certain aspects of the NATO DGP effort, but most likely under the rubric of being a good NATO partner, rather than for any true belief in the value of a project. In particular, Germany may decide to participate in strictly defensive systems or arrangements, such as passive defenses and possibly active point missile defenses, should a missile threat against the German homeland be shown. In this regard, Germany differs from France in the rationale it chooses for potentially supporting a TMD program. France wants such a system to protect its deployed forces and as a boost to its military industries, but fears that building TMD could signal a lack of confidence in its *force de frappe* deterrent. Germany, on the other hand, recognizes the possibility that nuclear deterrence might fail, and therefore views TMD as a prudent defense for the homeland.¹⁴⁷ Germany will certainly not be interested in offensive or preemptive measures, nor in measures involving WMD use by NATO under any circumstances. As Foreign Minister Kinkel has pointed out, Germany believes that "military enforcement pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter against proliferators is only conceivable as a final resort in the

¹⁴⁴Interviews in Germany, spring 1996. The issue of military preparedness, or lack thereof, to meet an NBC threat in an operational environment is not peculiar to Germany. See, for instance, the discussion on NATO's Survive to Operate concept in Kurt J. Klingenger, "Sustaining NATO Air Operations in an NBC Environment," paper prepared for The Atlantic Council of the United States, June 1996.

¹⁴⁵Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*

event of a threat to international security and peace. In other words, military measures always require legitimization by the UN Security Council—except in defence against armed attack.”¹⁴⁸

Finally, there is the issue of economic cooperation between Germany and France on certain programs in the DGP list. Some Germans wonder whether France is sincere in its push for certain programs or systems as being in the best interest of the Alliance or Europe, or whether it supports only those that appear to be in France’s best interest. On the other hand, the German MOD has been generally pro-French with respect to armaments production and procurement, and agreed with France early on that NATO’s counterproliferation effort was the right thing to do.¹⁴⁹

We can project the likely arguments heard in the public debate in Germany over whether to support the NATO nonproliferation efforts. On the one hand, yes, it is good to be prepared, and prudent to develop plans and defenses against known threats. On the other hand, there are no current direct threats against Germany, and given the financial burdens of more pressing issues, funding for new NATO projects is unlikely to be forthcoming. Questions of likelihood and cost will most likely overrule those of prudence, should it come to such a Hobson’s choice.

Finally, some observers note that a major change for the good of general European security and stability is a territorially satiated Germany. Germany, according to this view, is no longer a front line state, as it was in the Cold War, and no longer views security issues from a territorial perspective.¹⁵⁰ Yet, when it comes to new issues which may require German commitment and resources, it can quickly reverse this attitude. As one analyst put it, Germany’s self-perceived role in Alliance security matters is to provide large numbers of conventional ground forces to deter a *revanchist* Russia in Central Europe. The other NATO members can worry about out-of-area issues, including new threats created by WMD proliferation, because of the security provided by Germany in the core of Europe.¹⁵¹

If Germany does decide it must participate in more aggressive nonproliferation efforts in order to show that it is a good NATO partner, it will focus its support and efforts on homeland defense, rather than protecting troops deployed on out-of-area missions. Germany, as this shows, has not yet fully adapted to the new international strategic environment, which is in many ways less benign than was the Cold War. As one German analyst put it, “the dangers of the old East-West divide have been replaced by the uncertainties

¹⁴⁸“German 10-Point Initiative on Non-Proliferation Policy,” p. 3.

¹⁴⁹Interviews in Germany, spring 1996. More recently, Defense Minister Volker R  he has supported France’s efforts to return to NATO’s military bodies and to have greater European presence at the top levels of the Alliance as a precondition to full French participation. “Germany Backs France on NATO Reform,” *The Week in Germany*, 18 October 1996, p. 2.

¹⁵⁰K  hnhardt, p. 107.

¹⁵¹Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

of a new world in disorder.”¹⁵² The FRG must recognize that some issues cannot be solved diplomatically, no matter how sincere it wishes they could be.

The United Kingdom: Steady Partner Despite Lower Force Levels

Acknowledging that the nature of the threat to NATO Europe may have changed, while the central role of the Atlantic Alliance as the guarantor of European security has not, [Foreign Secretary] Rifkind states, ‘We cannot ignore the fundamental threat of a direct attack on an Alliance member. The circumstances of such aggression against a NATO Ally may be very different from those of the Cold War, but the principle of collective security is the same.’¹⁵³

The United Kingdom has generally been very positive about the NATO nonproliferation process. While there was some initial nervousness within the body politic of the UK when the United States announced its counterproliferation initiative, the government has been very supportive. Early concerns within the public debate revolved around the preemptive nature of the CPI and its renewed emphasis on ballistic missile defense. There was some wariness among certain elements of the political and academic communities that this was all that counterproliferation meant. Over time, however, as in Germany, people in Britain began to realize that counterproliferation was not a replacement for nonproliferation efforts, but could support those efforts as long as it did not become overly weighted toward military solutions and was kept in proportion to other NATO programs.¹⁵⁴

Britain was an early advocate of a comprehensive political and military approach to the issue of WMD proliferation, hoping thereby to respond to the regional causes of such proliferation and provide the operational military means to deter and defend against these threats.¹⁵⁵ The threat was not to London, but rather to its deployed forces. Given Britain’s history and far-flung interests, it took a global approach to this issue, similar to that of the United States and France.

The UK wished to stress that NATO’s nonproliferation efforts were aimed not only at ballistic missiles and nuclear threats. Biological weapons posed an equally serious problem. All of the potential WMD threats led the West to consider a range of available responses, including active defenses. While theater ballistic missile defenses were a bit overemphasized in the early going, they eventually became

¹⁵²Künhardt, p. 111.

¹⁵³British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, speech to The Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom, Bath, UK, 2 November 1995, quoted in Stephen P. Lambert and David A. Miller, “US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Current Environment and Prospects for the Future,” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 1996, p. 81.

¹⁵⁴Interviews in Europe, spring 1996.

¹⁵⁵Joseph, p. 118.

categorized among other possible types of defense systems. The UK had an industrial BMD research and development strategy well ahead of any policy, so it welcomed the opportunity for this in-depth analysis of the issues, problems, and potential solutions.¹⁵⁶

The fact that the UK has only a minimal deterrence capability does not affect its support level for NATO efforts. Nevertheless, it would prefer to keep NATO's BMD efforts within the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty and the 1995 NPT extension in order to maintain the efficacy of its nuclear forces and their threat to Russia.¹⁵⁷

There is currently no British government support for increased defense spending for any reason. Fortunately for the government, defense spending is at the moment not a public issue. Nor, for that matter, is the question of proliferation. Occasionally the topic will reach the news, as when former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher discussed the threat of WMD proliferation and the need for the Western Alliance to develop a BMD capability in her Fulton, Missouri speech of March 1996.¹⁵⁸ For the most part, however, the UK believes that such concerns in the past have commonly resulted in programs smaller than those initially proposed, despite having a great initial impetus.

The UK may push to pursue medium-range defense capabilities, since they currently have none. This would allow it to protect its deployed forces, rather than British national territory, and would represent a modest effort to acquire limited capabilities to defend against an emerging WMD threat. Perhaps the only new big-ticket system to come out of this NATO effort, in British eyes, would be an Extended Air Defense program.¹⁵⁹ These hopes were diminished, of course, by France's decision to withdraw from MEADS. In addition, the UK recognizes other small areas in which it would be worth pursuing counterproliferation capabilities, such as a biological weapons immunization policy.

With respect to the future of the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation and the Phase IV work, the United Kingdom believed that the issue of proliferation should have been considered within NATO's core committees, the existing force planning process, the CNAD equipment cooperation arena, and so on, rather than by a unique committee with a limited charter and life-span such as the DGP.¹⁶⁰ There may have been some need to keep the DGP around for a couple of years to ensure that these issues did get embedded in the

¹⁵⁶Interviews in Europe, spring 1996; also "The United Kingdom and Proliferation" in "Allied Perceptions of WMD Proliferation," p. 3.

¹⁵⁷Interviews at SHAPE and NATO, spring 1996.

¹⁵⁸Thatcher claimed that NATO "provides the best available mechanism for coordinating the contribution of America's allies to a global system of ballistic missile defense—that is, one providing protection against missile attack from whatever source it comes." "Making 'Iron Curtain' Speech, Thatcher Calls for 'Atlantic Partnership,'" The Associated Press, 9 March 1996, <http://www.nando.net/newsroom>.

¹⁵⁹Interviews in Europe, spring 1996. Great Britain has had no aerial defense system since the Bloodhound missile was removed from service in the late 1980's.

¹⁶⁰Interviews in Brussels, spring 1996.

appropriate committees, and to consider further policy choices and issues, but they did not support the idea of the DGP remaining in place indefinitely. Similarly, the British held that the SGP was created simply as a political counterbalance to the DGP, and had served its purpose. The ongoing work of the SGP could easily be merged with the mandate of other existing NATO bodies, which would have continued thinking about the political aspects of proliferation.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, Britain concurred in extending the mandate of both groups at the June 1996 NAC meeting.

Britain has long committed its submarine forces to NATO strategy. In keeping with this record, it now has promised to dedicate a portion of its Trident missile force to NATO for use in a sub-strategic role, should that become necessary.¹⁶² Such theater weapons, wielded by a European ally but used on behalf of the entire Alliance, could prove to be a decisive deterrent against a proliferant state or group threatening the use of WMD against a NATO member. Britain thus supports, albeit perhaps unwittingly, the long-standing French call for a European pillar of the Alliance in security matters. It also makes up for the loss to SACEUR of Britain's dual-capable aircraft (DCA) role employing the WE 177 nuclear gravity bomb, which will be phased out of the UK weapons inventory over the course of the next several years.¹⁶³ By guaranteeing a certain number of SLBM missiles and warheads to SACEUR, the UK guarantees its own role in the continuing nuclear strategy of the Alliance, as well as making a significant contribution to NATO's ultimate deterrent against WMD threats or use.¹⁶⁴

The election of a new government in 1997 is not expected to alter Britain's position *vis* NATO's nonproliferation policy, or its support for these efforts. The Labour party did not campaign on issues of foreign policy, and its policy positions are closely aligned with the Tory party on most defense-related issues.

¹⁶¹Interviews in Brussels, spring 1996.

¹⁶²“Final Communiqué: The Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO,” Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1 (96) 57, 8 June 1995.

¹⁶³The last British free-fall gravity nuclear bombs will be dismantled by 1998. The United States removed its last tactical nuclear bombs from the UK in late 1996. Michael Evans, “RAF to Lose Nuclear Role After 42 Years on the Front Line,” *The Times*, 5 April 1995; and “US Removes Last Nuclear Weapons from Britain,” *Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph*, 29 October 1996, p. 7.

¹⁶⁴For more detail on the potential uses for Britain's substrategic Trident force, see Lambert and Miller, Chapter 4.

PART IV CONCLUSIONS

Operationalizing the Framework: Future NATO Requirements

Largely as a result of the DGP's work, the political-military community within NATO has clearly begun to accept the view that proliferation can profoundly affect the Alliance's security and its ability to act in regions beyond its borders. Yet the views of the national leadership in several key allied governments are poorly defined. Although progress in the DGP clearly suggests a growing recognition of proliferation as a serious security threat, the argument that traditional non-proliferation prevention policies and programs are sufficient to meet the challenge may prevail in some capitals, especially when decision-makers are confronted with hard policy and fiscal choices. If this occurs, NATO will almost certainly fail to take the steps necessary to meet the threat.¹⁶⁵

Competing interests (especially pending NATO expansion and its associated costs), decreasing budgets, and lack of an immediately perceived threat make the European allies unenthusiastic about funding any ambitious new programs, including the recommended nonproliferation plans.¹⁶⁶

There are several unanswered political aspects to the Alliance's ability to implement the DGP's new programs. One of the most important is that some capitals will be unwilling to abandon their emphasis on traditional diplomatic and economic means to try and stop proliferation. They may see military measures, even if only in the planning stage, as counterproductive to their other efforts if misinterpreted by a potential proliferant.

Yet as Ambassador Joseph points out, the Alliance cannot afford to give up on nonproliferation efforts, nor fail to prudently prepare for the possibility that these efforts may fail. In the latter case, he argues, the Alliance must proceed with developing strategies and procuring necessary military capabilities in order to adapt itself to the new international security environment—one which includes the increasing risk of facing a WMD-armed adversary in some regional contingency, or of being directly threatened by a Mediterranean or Middle Eastern pariah state. Attaining such military capabilities would enhance NATO's deterrent posture, and new conventional weapons would lessen its reliance on nuclear forces for deterrence and potential counterproliferation use. As Joseph puts it, "deterrence through denial is a stronger foundation for NATO policy than the concept of massive retaliation which...would be perceived as

¹⁶⁵Joseph, p. 126.

¹⁶⁶Roberts, pp. 47-48, "Allied Perceptions of WMD Proliferation," pp. 19-20; and interviews in Europe, 1995-96.

disproportionate or otherwise inappropriate.”¹⁶⁷ Theater ballistic missile defenses would play a role in this revitalized defense posture. Given the radically changed strategic threat to Europe, past concerns over strategic defenses require reconsideration by the Alliance.

Dividing responsibilities among states or organizations may be one way to finance these new programs. Reallocation of resources is the more likely path, however, and perhaps the only means of funding the DGP’s work program, given fiscal and political realities. But will any ally be willing to pursue this path? The options for NATO members appear to be either increased budgets or cutbacks in existing programs. Neither of these seems likely. In fact, as many observers within NATO pointed out, it may take a significant public catastrophe, such as WMD terrorist threat, accident, or use in a regional conflict to awaken the nations to the need for preparedness against these possibilities.¹⁶⁸

There are three possible funding options for the DGP work programs. First, NATO could ask its members to procure the necessary systems to meet the identified shortfalls. The US is already doing this in many areas. Second, several states could share the costs of these systems. Third, the Alliance could set up a common funding infrastructure to purchase outright these programs for NATO, on the model of the AWACS system.¹⁶⁹

NATO needed an organization to follow-up the DGP studies and ensure the implementation of its recommendations. For this phase, called the entry into force period, NATO chose to extend the DGP itself as the body most capable of accomplishing this task. Three key issues will demand answers in this next phase:

1. How to incorporate nonproliferation into long-range NATO planning cycles.
2. Which organizational bodies to use to oversee the implementation of these programs.
3. Practical issues of armaments cooperation and system selections.

The first two questions are addressed here; the third is too technical and classified for discussion in this paper.

In summer 1996, military authorities at SHAPE and NATO were tasked with developing and initiating new force proposals and revising the 1996 NATO Force Goals, taking into account the 39 recommendations of the DGP. Since the 1996 Force Goals had already been approved at the June 1996

¹⁶⁷Joseph, p. 127.

¹⁶⁸Colonel Roberts recognizes this dilemma in his paper, and suggests that there may be three areas of possible increased alliance preparation for these contingencies at little cost. His recommendations are: 1) to focus on collaborative intelligence sharing and analysis through the creation of a NATO Proliferation Risk Intelligence and Analysis Center; 2) to support common funding and burden sharing, using the Technical Cooperation Program as a model; and 3) to reorient doctrine by creating realistic training and exercises for selected forces to operate in out-of-area WMD environments. Roberts, pp. 48-50.

¹⁶⁹Roberts, pp. 62-64.

Defense Planning Committee meeting,¹⁷⁰ the DGP recommended a “catch-up” phase of force proposals be added as an extension of the 1996 Force Goals process. Following review in the NATO capitals, these revisions and a new draft Force Goals (including costing data) were presented to the Defense Ministers in their December 1996 ministerial.¹⁷¹ One of the agreed goals for the July 1997 NATO summit meeting in Spain was to pursue ways of “further enhancing our political and defence efforts against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery means.”¹⁷²

France had earlier expressed its desire to be a full partner in participating in these decisions, and in cooperating in such a catch-up process with NATO force planning as necessary over the next five years so as to be a full partner.¹⁷³

Apparently in 1996 the DGP recommended, and the NAC endorsed, that the focus of these near-term force revisions be on the protection of deployed troops, through defenses and response capabilities.¹⁷⁴ The most likely forces for deployment out-of-area, in combat or nontraditional roles, are the Combined Joint Task Force and ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. Both groups would be equipped and prepared to operate in an NBC environment. The view of the DGP is that the threat of retaliation with overwhelming force, including the option of using nuclear weapons, should deter the possibility of WMD use against NATO forces or territory. Should deterrence fail, NATO already possesses the capability to strike back at the aggressor. Although some states on NATO’s periphery are pursuing long-range ballistic missiles with WMD capabilities, the DGP felt that current BMD efforts to meet this long-term threat were adequate, not requiring a big, new NATO program.¹⁷⁵ The Alliance will instead address the more likely situation of preparing and protecting NATO forces participating in out-of-area operations facing the threat of CW or BW use—situations not only more likely, but also less expensive to counter.

The DGP also suggested that its membership comprised particular expertise to help NATO develop defense policy in several areas: doctrine, planning, training and exercises involving WMD proliferation scenarios; assessing the effectiveness of NATO’s defense response to proliferation, particularly the implementation of the DGP’s recommendations from its three reports; and serving as the forum for enlarged discussions of WMD proliferation issues with PfP countries. A Steering Group was

¹⁷⁰“Final Communiqué, Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group,” Press Communiqué M-DP C/NPG-1 (96) (88), para. 5, p. 2, 13 June 1996.

¹⁷¹Roberts, p. 36. NATO Force Goals are six year plans, updated every two years, which establish targets for individual nations’ contributions toward achieving the Alliance’s Strategic Concept

¹⁷²“Final Communiqué,” Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10 December 1996, p. 2.

¹⁷³Interviews in Paris, spring 1996.

¹⁷⁴Roberts, p. 39, and “Final Communiqué,” 13 June 1996.

¹⁷⁵Roberts, pp. 39-41.

established within the DGP to oversee and coordinate these efforts.¹⁷⁶ The DGP, in short, has become a well-established body capable of monitoring the next phase of NATO's nonproliferation program as it moves into the actual fielding of new concepts and capabilities.

Final Thoughts

*Although the allies have a number of concerns about the NATO CP initiative, these concerns are outweighed by the perceived benefits of the initiative to the Alliance and to the individual nations.*¹⁷⁷

It is commonly held by observers of NATO that at the end of its two-year study the DGP (and by endorsement the Alliance leadership) concluded that it was unrealistic to expect that there were sufficient resources to defend and protect NATO populations from a WMD attack—despite the grand rhetoric of the 1994 summit communiqué. The Alliance seems to prefer in the short-term to rely on traditional forms of deterrence to inhibit would-be attackers, while focusing on passive defenses in order to protect allied forces fighting or deployed in a potential NBC environment.¹⁷⁸ As one European analyst put it, “NATO’s main emphasis...will inevitably focus on defensive measures in cases where nonproliferation has failed.”¹⁷⁹ Indeed, WMD proliferation requires the Alliance to reconsider its traditional way of making decisions. Instead of a Cold War, with a known threat against which the Alliance could make pre-planned responses and preparations, Europe is now faced with a more obscure situation. This has weakened the NATO Military Commands, and makes adaptive planning necessary—an approach much more difficult than the old scenarios, requiring greater intelligence capabilities and analysis.

So what is the likely role for each of our four countries of interest in this paper? As mentioned at the start, no Alliance program is capable of succeeding without the implicit support and agreement of these major powers. The **United States**, for its part, will continue to lead the Alliance in its efforts in the non- and counterproliferation arenas. In fact, the US is so committed to its Defense Counterproliferation Initiative and the need for a parallel NATO program that it will “go it alone” if necessary. Should the Alliance change its mind, or refuse to adequately fund the DGP’s recommended action program, the United States will still continue to develop and field new capabilities to protect and defend itself against future threats stemming from the proliferation of WMD.

¹⁷⁶Roberts, p. 34.

¹⁷⁷“Allied Perceptions of WMD Proliferation,” p. 23.

¹⁷⁸Roberts, p. 68.

¹⁷⁹Rühle, p. 319.

France is also likely to continue its solid support for a NATO counterproliferation capability. It will rely on its nuclear deterrent capability for the ultimate defense of the French homeland, but it will also continue to move toward greater cooperation within NATO's military bodies for, among other reasons, the purpose of ensuring that the Alliance develops solid capabilities to deter and defend against potential proliferant states and groups along its Southern flank—the region of direct and immediate concern to France. This is likely to remain true despite the shift in government power following the 1997 elections.

Great Britain will continue to be supportive of the Alliance efforts, as well. Unfortunately, Britain has no desire to increase its diminishing levels of defense funding. Hence its fiscal contributions to the action plans and larger NATO programmatic responses to this threat will be minimal. Furthermore, 1997 elections shifted the balance of power within British domestic politics to the Labour Party.

Finally, **Germany** will likely continue to offer modest but grudging support for a defensive counterproliferation effort within NATO, as much in order to maintain its position as a good partner as for any true belief in the value or need for such programs. But it will continue to oppose offensive or counterforce aspects of an Alliance nonproliferation program.

The NATO nonproliferation effort surely ranks as one of the most ambitious in NATO's history. A concerted effort by an Alliance facing a new series of threats in an uncertain world led to the development of a comprehensive overview of the threats, the capabilities needed to meet those threats, existing shortfalls, and a plan to correct those deficiencies. As two past chairmen of the DGP recently wrote, "the pace and scale of the DGP's achievements since May 1994 represent a remarkable story for the Alliance and for transatlantic cooperation."¹⁸⁰ Without delving into the classified details of the DGP's reports, their conclusions seem pragmatic, responsible, and modest. It remains to be seen whether the Alliance has the will to pursue these new programs and systems in an era of fiscal austerity, public apathy, low-level threat, and military downsizing. In other words, NATO's nonproliferation agenda faces the same hurdles as have most other major changes in Alliance perspective—the dual track INF decision, the SNF modernization debate, and the shift from mutual assured destruction to flexible response in MC 14/3. All of them seemed unlikely to succeed, yet all were accomplished through a combination of quality leadership, changing international circumstances and public perceptions, and the slow, methodical bureaucratic process. One must anticipate that the NATO nonproliferation effort will be equally successful, over the long term.

¹⁸⁰Carter and Omand, p. 11.

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