

NATO RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP FINAL REPORT

NATO and OSCE, PARTNERS OR RIVALS?

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I

NATO and CSCE (now OSCE) have been closely intertwined since the birth of the latter, all-European, conference in the 1970s. For its part, NATO has naturally emphasized the security dimension of its broad politico-military role, combining deterrence with defense against the threat from the Soviet Union. The CSCE mechanism, in contrast, evolved through joint East-West efforts in Europe to deal with political and economic, as well as security issues, during a specific historical era, namely, the concluding "detente" phase of the Cold War. NATO was constructed as a defensive wall against possible aggression from the wide zone of control Moscow seized in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II. The Soviet zone was later solidified in the Warsaw Pact and while NATO's wall can best be seen as designed to keep intruders out, the Pact's function was instead to keep its own population in. OSCE, in turn, was a deliberate attempt to build a bridge over the twin walls provided by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Both NATO and CSCE played useful roles in bringing the Cold War period to a peaceful end, via the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR. The question now is how they can, singly or in tandem, contribute in a meaningful way to resolving the new problems confronting their European and North American partners. In particular, it will be necessary to assess NATO's continued relevance in the changed environment on the European continent following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with special attention to Russia's participation in the process. It is equally necessary to focus now on OSCE's possible role in ameliorating new and menacing problems, especially in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and to distinguish its proper purview from the sometimes overlapping roles of NATO and its Partnership for Peace, the European Union and WEU, and the Council of Europe.

At issue here, among others, are the problems raised by Russian attitudes toward the newly independent states which formerly were parts of the Soviet Union, or what some of its

leaders have termed the "Near Abroad". In this connection, special attention must be paid to the recurrent tensions between Russia and the Baltic states, as well as Moscow's very divergent relationships with the other Slavic states of the former USSR; Belarus and Ukraine.

Among the other problems/opportunities stemming directly from the dissolution of the USSR are issues deriving from the collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. Less directly tied to the abandonment of the Warsaw Pact are the endemic confrontations within former Yugoslavia, highlighted by the potential for further armed conflict in Bosnia. Both NATO and the OSCE bear heavy responsibilities in attempting to resolve these complicated and interrelated problems. In the end, the answer to the overriding question of whether NATO and the OSCE are destined ultimately to be partners rather than rivals may perhaps be found in such areas as the Balkans, in the interstices between the two organizations, as some say justice can be found in the interstices of the law.

Although NATO and the OSCE had very different origins and were conceived for quite different, in fact, contrary purposes they can be seen most fittingly as different manifestations of the same fundamental ideological trend, the urge for greater cooperation and unity in Europe. Karl Marx, in "The German Ideology", defined an ideology as the ideas of the ruling class. But a number of non-Marxist scholars and political observers, among them Lord Keynes, have noted that the dominant ideas of any period are likely to be those held by the older generation, as learned by them in their youth. This factor may lie behind the apparently cyclical nature of political beliefs and the recurrent clash of generations.

The dominant political ideas in Western Europe during the second half of the twentieth century have clearly been those of European integration, political as well as economic. Although the work of a number of thinkers and politicians who were active in the first half of this century contributed to the formation of the broad consensus which now exists, special attention must be paid to the role of the Pan-European movement in evaluating the intellectual history of this period.

Until well into the Nineteenth Century, literate individuals were only a small minority of the population in both Eastern and Western Europe. Accordingly, political ideas which encompassed more than village or local concerns tended to be a monopoly of the educated elite. The less well educated Europeans were, in particular, severely constrained by their inability to speak the language of their neighbors on the "other side of the hill." In consequence, interest in political issues beyond the parish pump variety tended, in both East and Western Europe, to be confined

to the aristocracy and the intelligentsia, including the clergy. But, within that elite group, there could be a broad identity of views.

As Henry Kissinger indicated in his study of the Congress of Vienna,

"To Metternich's contemporaries the unity of Europe was a reality, the very ritualism of whose involution testified to its hold on the general consciousness. Regional differences were recognized, but they were considered local variations of a greater whole...All of Metternich's colleagues were therefore products of essentially the same culture, professing the same ideals, sharing similar tastes. They understood each other, not only because they could converse with facility in French, but because in a deeper sense they were conscious that the things they shared were much more fundamental than the issues separating them." ¹

To the average man and woman in Europe, in contrast, Pan-European views must have seemed to reflect a kind of romantic chivalry rather than reality. The appeal of Pan-Europeanism during the 1920s and 1930s was therefore quite limited. It was not, in fact, until the havoc created by World War II had impelled ordinary folk throughout Europe to question the viability and rationality of the nation state system that the Pan-European idea was able to come into its own. As Michael Howard, Professor Emeritus at both Oxford and Yale Universities, has pointed out,

"By 1945, the peoples of Europe wanted only to live in 'a land of peace'. But this disenchantment with war had less to do with the spread of 'democratic values' than with the development of industrial warfare. This not only brought the huge and inconclusive slaughter of conscript armies on the battlefields but wrecked the cities and economies of Europe, bringing untold suffering to civilians on a scale that, even to the victors, did not appear balanced by any comparable gains." ²

The resulting attenuation of the nation state system, which had been codified by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, is merely one of the distinguishing characteristics of the current European political scene. Unfortunately, however, the erosion of loyalty to a particular state has not always resulted in the weakening of

¹ Kissinger, Henry, A World Restored, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1957) p. 320

² Howard, Michael, in The Wilson Quarterly, Winter 1997, p. 32

even older beliefs in the primordial values of narrow ethnic identities.

II

In current usage, the term Pan-Europeanism specifically denotes the movement launched by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in Vienna in 1923. Austria, the former seat of the Holy Roman Empire, had also played host to the post-Napoleonic concert of Europe, as orchestrated at the 1815 Congress of Vienna. Austria, however, had been reduced by the Great War to the same proportions as several other minor league states. But the physical infrastructure required by Vienna's former glories remained intact, as did much of its administrative expertise and personnel. As described by Winston Churchill in 1930, in The Saturday Evening Post, "This forlorn capital, for centuries the seat of an empire, now merely the nodal point of severed or strangulated railways, a London walled in by hostile Irelands, makes its unanswered appeal." It was only natural, therefore, that Austria and Vienna should seek to play a role in Europe grander than what could be justified by their now truncated geography.

The Austrian Government, which was eager to facilitate Coudenhove-Kalergi's activities, granted him some office space which had recently become vacant. His organization's address thus became "Pan-Europe, Imperial Palace, Vienna". Kalergi was, of course, not the only Austrian to have ambitions beyond the foreshortened limits of his homeland. A former Viennese art student and German soldier with the adopted name of Hitler launched an abortive putsch in a Munich beer hall about the same time as Kalergi published his influential book "Pan-Europe".

In contrast to the plebian Hitler, the Count was the son of an Austro-Hungarian diplomat, with an aristocratic international lineage dating back to the Middle Ages in France and Crete. Curiously, for a man who so closely identified himself with Pan-Europeanism, the Count was half Japanese as his father had met and married a Japanese lady while serving as a diplomat in Tokyo. The son reckoned his intellectual lineage much farther back than the Middle Ages, at least to Charlemagne, and perhaps to Caesar. Proud of his heritage, familial as well as intellectual, he was also proud to be living in Vienna. While before World War I, "all the other great cities of the Continent were national centres, Vienna alone was international, capital of the only international empire. This vast empire had a population of fifty-five millions, split into nineteen different nationalities." However, he lamented, this great empire "suffered from a mortal disease --

nationalism."³

In the immediate post-World War I era, that disease proved to be highly contagious. In Kalergi's opinion, "the prophets of the twentieth century, Wilson and Lenin, suffered defeat at the hands of the old forces of European nationalism"⁴ He resolved to do something about it and began to speak out on the dangers of continued European disunity, taking his inspiration from the Pan-American movement. "A hundred years later than America, Europe must proclaim to the world its own Monroe Doctrine: 'Europe for the Europeans!'"⁵

In another era, Coudenhove-Kalergi might have lived out his life as only an engaging dilettante, but in the inter-war years he had an idea worth pursuing, plus the social and political connections to push it forward. In addition to his writing and publishing activities, Kalergi embarked on an ambitious schedule of speaking engagements, as well as visits to leading politicians in many corners of Europe. His social prominence naturally smoothed the way for personal contacts with conservative figures, but he was also active in seeking out individuals from other social circles. He cultivated, in particular, two French socialists, Albert Thomas, President of the International Labor Office, and Aristide Briand, a prominent Socialist politician who served his country as both Premier and Foreign Minister. In England, the Count worked closely with Winston Churchill and other conservatives but cultivated political contacts among Liberals and Labourites also. He seems to have had more success, however, with literary figures such as H.G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw.

Like Shaw, Kalergi showed a good deal of sympathy on occasion for Benito Mussolini, whom he viewed as to some extent the reincarnation of Giuseppe Mazzini, the founder of the "Young Europe" movement in 1834. This flirtation with Il Duce, naturally enough, did not endear him to anti-fascists throughout Europe. Mussolini, with whom the Count evidently had a good personal rapport, seemed attracted by some of Kalergi's ideas, but finally expostulated, "Your policy is, as it were, geometrical. It has the merit of perfect logic., but is in my opinion quite

³ Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard, An Idea Conquers the World (London, Hutchinson, 1953) p. 47

⁴ Ibid, p. 77

⁵ Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard, Pan-Europe (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926) p. 93

impracticable." ⁶

Originally conceived by Kalergi as a capitalist and anti-Soviet movement, his Pan-Europe was naturally combated by the Bolsheviks. As seen with great clarity from Moscow, Europe was geopolitically only a Western appendage to the Eurasian landmass, the largest single part of which was occupied by the Soviet Union. Lenin, like Stalin, was also keenly aware of the economic shortcomings of the vast territory he had inherited from the Russian Empire and Lenin was hoping to make Germany, in the heart of Europe, into the keystone of his New (Bolshevik) World Order. His colleague, Leon Trotsky, had perhaps even more universalist ambitions but they too were rooted in the advanced industrial countries of Western Europe.

Shortly after the First World War, the Czechoslovak President, Thomas Masaryk, had conceived the idea of fusing the Eastern European and Balkan states which had emerged from the cataclysm of that war into a defensive federation. His ambitious plan failed but left a residue in the form of the Little Entente. Kalergi regarded even this vestigial remnant of Masaryk's grand vision as the "embryo of Pan-Europe" and vigorously attempted to spread his United Europe gospel in that area. As he described the situation in 1923,

"The closed territory of that national group...extending from Finland to Greece, embraces half of all the European states and a third of Europe and of the Europeans. This large federation, which would have meant a long step toward the United States of Europe, never took shape. In its place only the Little Entente came into being, consisting of an alliance between Czechoslovakia, the South-Slav Kingdom and Rumania. Closely related to that state system is also Poland (by its alliance with Rumania), as well as Austria. ...In any case, to the Little Entente must be conceded the credit of having introduced a new political system into Europe, analogous to the American state system" ⁷

Adolph Hitler's New Order, although derived from principles totally antagonistic to Kalergi, shared some of the same conceptions. As Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint have pointed out, "This machine (the New Order) would have existed to serve Germany's interests but it would have claimed incidentally to serve other interests too. The core of the Grossraum -- a

⁶ Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard, An Idea Conquers the World, p. 63

⁷ Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, p. 183

Germany which had engulfed Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg, parts of Belgium and Silesia -- would be to Europe what the Ruhr was to Germany...The notion of an economic entity larger than any existing political unity, of the need for Europe to organize economically on a wider scale, had been propagated by various champions of European unity ranging from men in official positions like Aristide Briand in France and Paul van Zeeland in Belgium to the League of Nations' Inquiry for European Union and private enthusiasts like Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi."⁸

Although a few other European visionaries had joined in supporting Briand's call in 1929 for a European Federal Union, the idea appeared to collapse for good in the early 1930s. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1974 edition) noted the movement's origin in Vienna but dismissed it as seeking, "...to establish French hegemony in Europe and promote a policy of keeping the USSR politically isolated. The active opposition of Soviet diplomacy, as well as the negative attitude of Germany, Great Britain, the USA, and other states, led to the collapse of the French project in 1931."

In fact, however, the concept remained alive, notably among the exile governments in London during World War II. Moreover, the personal ties which developed in such informal groups as the "Danubian Club" in the British capital continued to play a significant role for many years afterwards. The Polish army-in-exile performed a similar function for the many Poles who saw in regional association the most effective way to counter Soviet hegemony. Gathered together for several years in the same city or the same military unit, the common interest in a unified Europe could easily be seen. As one example, a group from the Polish Second Army Corps in Italy formed a club called "Intermarium" at the end of the war. Its objective as to bring together in a federal union all the nations between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas, hence the name of the group and its periodical.

In addition, a new world of pan-Europeans was being called into being across the Atlantic where Kalergi's ideas were popularized via "New Europe" circles in the United States. Driven out of Austria by the Anschluss in 1938, the Count moved his headquarters first to Switzerland and then, in the spring of 1942, to the United States. The impact of Kalergi and his disciples on public, or rather elite, circles in the United States is often overlooked. However, he and a large number of other European emigrés not only took refuge from the war in

⁸ Calvocoressi, Peter and Wing, Guy, Total War (London, Penguin Books, 1982) p. 213

America but they established new centers of learning there. One of the most important was the New School for Social Research in New York, where they spread their message about a united Europe. In addition, the Washington representative of the Pan-European Union, Otto of Habsburg, seems to have been particularly influential in governmental circles.

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that enthusiasm for a united Europe sometimes seemed greater in the United States at the end of the war than it was in many countries in Europe. In January 1947, John Foster Dulles, the Republican Party's long time eminence grise in foreign policy, endorsed the idea. Only two months later, at the instigation of Senators Fulbright and Thomas, as well as Representative Hale Boggs, the U.S. Congress indicated that it favored the establishment of a European federation within the framework of the United Nations. That indication of the popular will contributed to the resolve of the Department of State and Secretary George Marshall to push forward with the support for European economic integration he announced in June of 1947. This initiative was bound to have a negative, discriminatory impact on American exports, at least in the short run, but a critical mass of U.S. leaders realized that there was a direct relationship between international trade and domestic prosperity. They argued, therefore, in favor of helping to create an economically healthy Europe as America's most important trading partner.

In any case, renewed efforts were made immediately after the war to pursue the Pan-European idea, leading to the founding of the European Union of Federalists in 1946. Most of its adherents were primarily motivated by a desire to facilitate Franco-German reconciliation and many prominent leaders played an active role in that endeavor. In September 1946, Winston Churchill, no longer His Majesty's First Minister, delivered a speech in Zurich calling for the organization of a United States of Europe...."to re-create the European family, or as much of it as possible, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace in safety and in freedom....Let Europe arise!"⁹ As for Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union, it soon experienced a resurrection, concentrating principally on the creation of a European Parliament as the first step in laying the foundations for a federal constitution.

The European Parliamentary Union (EPU) was founded in September 1947 at a Congress held at Kalergi's first wartime home in exile, Gstaad. He himself was elected Secretary-General of the

⁹ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Seeks Unity* (New York, New York University, 1948) p. 20

organization, which included a cross-section of parliamentarians from across non-communist Europe; Socialists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, British Labourites, and Independents. A second European Parliamentary Congress met in Interlaken, Switzerland the following year.

The EPU also helped to organize a Congress of Europe, convened in The Hague at the instigation of Winston Churchill, which supported the idea of a European Assembly elected by the Parliaments of Europe. By 1949, the Council of Europe had been established and its Consultative Assembly held its initial meeting, with Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium as its first President.

As during the inter-war period, post-war European Federalism was focused on Western Europe and opposed to Soviet aggrandizement in Eastern Europe. Fear of further Soviet depredations was, in fact, the glue which held together a very jerry-built structure of European would-be unity. U.S. economic, political, and military support had to provide the structural stiffening upon which the eventual edifice would be built.

III

During the spring of 1947, a final futile attempt was made to reach four power agreement on German issues at a lengthy conference in Moscow. At that time, French officials showed a new willingness to support American positions relating to Germany if they could be assured of receiving adequate supplies of coal from that country. Without such supplies, they feared that Germany might recover from the war faster than France did, thus aggravating their country's constant preoccupation with its eastern neighbor. Washington's growing awareness of the interlocking nature of Europe's problems played an important role in the next act in the European drama.

The new U.S. approach, already signaled by departing Secretary of State James Byrnes, took on flesh when his successor, George Marshall made his memorable address at Harvard on June 5, 1947. He called upon the European nations to present a plan for their common needs and common recovery. The Europeans responded in July by setting up a "Committee of the Sixteen" in Paris to coordinate their joint planning. This group, later expanded to seventeen members, became the nucleus for the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), whose members pledged themselves to cooperate in reducing trade barriers and to promote the development of Europe's productivity.

George Marshall's invitation to Europe's suffering nations to present their recovery needs jointly was extended to all of them, including the USSR and its Eastern European neighbors.

Failure to do so could have cast considerable doubt on American bona fides and led to charges that Washington was to blame for dividing Europe along ideological lines. Marshall's speech specifically indicated that U.S. policy was "not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, deprivation and chaos." At the same time, Soviet acceptance of the offer would have placed the entire initiative in jeopardy. In the aftermath of the Truman Doctrine, and wide-spread fears about communist machinations in France and Italy, an American Congress already sensitized to Moscow's misbehavior in Eastern Europe was not likely to vote the vast sums required to repair devastation in the USSR.

Foreign Minister Molotov threw a scare into the American Government by arriving in Paris for the first meeting on the European recovery plan with a large retinue of experts. Within a few days, however, he had denounced the U.S. proposal, alleging that its program for European economic integration would require the USSR to abandon its own plans for resuscitating the Soviet and Eastern European economies. On July 2, the Soviet Union withdrew from the conference and its neighbors, increasingly seen as satellites, were obliged to follow suit. More tellingly, Moscow prevailed upon the Benes government in Czechoslovakia to rescind its initial agreement to participate.

As noted above, an important stimulus behind the Marshall Plan was U.S. concern over French fears that German economic recovery would eclipse France's performance and place its national security once more in jeopardy. Similar concerns among France's neighbors led to the creation of a military framework which was to parallel that of the Marshall Plan on the economic side. Responding to an initiative of the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, the representatives of five West European countries gathered together to pledge their close cooperation on a number of important issues, but most importantly on security and armament questions.

The five nations decided to merge two existing regional understandings, the first between Great Britain and France, and the second comprising the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The latter three countries were already linked together in the Benelux customs union, created by their exile governments in London in 1944. The resulting Brussels Pact on "Western Union" was modeled after the Dunkirk Treaty of May 1947 between France and Great Britain and was designed to serve two separate and distinct purposes. The first was to strengthen France's self-confidence by creating a credible mutual defense in the event of future German aggression. The second function was to provide all five members with a measure of joint security against the newer threat posed by Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

The Brussels Pact is recognized as the nucleus around which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization grew, but its original anti-German orientation is often slurred over. It is true that Foreign Secretary Bevin held open the possibility of Germany's eventual accession to the new group. But it would be misleading to ignore the extent to which fear of a resurgent Germany was the tie which held both the Brussels Pact and NATO together in their early years. In fact, muted echoes of that concern can still be heard in some circles today.

The American Government was still reluctant early in 1948 to consider close U.S. involvement in a European defense arrangement, even to the limited extent of strengthening bilateral ties with Great Britain. The Administration's nervousness stemmed not only from anticipated Congressional resistance but also from fear of triggering still more forceful Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. The delayed action "coup" of spring 1948 in Prague, which pushed Edward Benes out and Klement Gottwald into the Czechoslovak Presidency did much to remove American reservations on that point.

At the same time, Moscow showed renewed interest in the Soviet Union's Northern flank, concluding a Treaty of "Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" with Finland in April 1948. The Soviet Government then tried to exert some heavy-handed pressure on Norway, with which it also shared a common frontier, in an effort to bring it into a parallel understanding. But Stalin had to pay a substantial political price in the West for his undisguised iron fist policy in Prague and elsewhere.

Somewhat belatedly, the United States and the countries of Western Europe brought themselves to the point of making tangible economic and military investments in order to buttress their collective security. As Timothy Ireland pointed out in his study of NATO's origins, "...one of the results of the Prague coup was to make more explicit the linking of French security against Germany to the wider question of European security against the Soviet Union" ¹⁰

Apparently due to American objections, France had not been invited to the March 1947 talks in Washington among U.S., U.K. and Canadian officials to discuss the security problem in Western Europe. However, the French continued to participate in the Six Power London Conference about Germany, which included the three Western occupying powers plus the Benelux countries, and they

¹⁰Ireland, Timothy P., Creating the Entangling Alliance, (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1981) p. 69

were able to make their views felt in that forum. The French were particularly insistent there on the need to link western unity against the Soviet threat to a parallel unity on German matters.

Washington responded sharply at first to what were felt to be French high pressure tactics but later adopted a more sympathetic attitude to France's preoccupation with Germany. The Chairman of the State Department's new Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, had been a leader in combatting the idea of a mutual assistance treaty. However, the father of "containment" through essentially political means dropped his opposition to a treaty because he saw that it could help to integrate West Germany into the broader Western European community by erecting safeguards against German dominance.

Meanwhile, at the conclusion in February 1948 of the Six Power talks in London, the United States, Britain and France issued a joint communique reflecting their substantial agreement that Germany's western zones needed to be fully associated with the European Recovery Program. The British Government followed up this advance a few days later by calling Washington's attention to the Soviet effort to negotiate a bi-lateral security pact with Norway. Bevin proposed to meet the perceived Soviet threat to the security of the North Atlantic by moving to establish three interlocking security systems: 1) the five nation Brussels group, but with American backing; 2) an Atlantic security system, with stronger U.S. participation, and; 3) a Mediterranean security system, centered on Italy.

In responding to Bevin's initiative, Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak showed himself cool to the idea of trying to build an effective defense pact without U.S. participation. He was, however, quick to see the necessary link between economic recovery and military security. In a long speech to the Belgian Parliament on March 3, 1948, he pointed out,

"Les pays de l'Europe occidentale, aussi paradoxal que cela puisse paraître, ne réaliseront jamais la collaboration économique s'ils attendent les temps de prospérité pour se mettre d'accord.....Le plan Marschall est une occasion de collaboration économique. Le plan Bevin est une occasion de collaboration politique et économique entre les pays de l'Europe occidentale. Messieurs, ne laissons pas passer ces occasions qui s'offrent à nous."¹¹

¹¹ Smets, Paul-F., ed., La Pensée Européenne et atlantique de Paul-Henri Spaak (1942-1972), (Bruxelles, Goemaere, 1980) p. 133.

The Brussels five ended their conference shortly thereafter by signing, on March 17, 1948, a Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense. Also, and most important, the signatories invited other states with similar ideals to join them. The Treaty did not exclude Germany's eventual membership in the pact, but it did not confine itself to resisting attacks on a signatory by a non-signatory, and specifically referred to a possible renewal of German aggression.

The Soviet Union responded almost at once by withdrawing from the Allied Control Council governing Germany. The three Western powers then merged their zones into a single unit of forty-eight million people. A thoroughgoing currency reform was carried out and a new currency, the Deutschemark (DM), was introduced.

In the face of growing evidence of Western resolve to resist Soviet pressures, Moscow and the communist parties of Western Europe in the spring of 1948 launched a "peace offensive" designed to capitalize on the pacifist sentiment widely prevalent there, especially in France. But, by the end of June, the Soviet Government abruptly changed its tactics and imposed a blockade on Berlin, preventing any overland traffic from reaching western zones of that city. This stimulated the governments and air forces of the Western allies to supply Berlin by air with essential quantities of food and fuel through the following winter.

The blockade also galvanized public opinion in the United States and Western Europe and thus facilitated Western efforts to meet the Soviet challenge. The drama of the airlift to Berlin did much to build a feeling of common purpose linking the United States not only with its airlift partners, such as France and Britain, but also with the people of West Berlin and Germany.

President Truman then moved to solidify the growing sense of international solidarity by addressing Congress in the following terms:

"I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them protect themselves."¹²

¹² Truman, Harry S., Years of Trial and Hope (Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y. 1956) p. 242

The major roadblocks in the way of a mutual defense pact linking the United States and the countries of Western Europe were thus removed, on the basis of mutual accommodation between American and European concerns. It was not until a full year later, however, that the pact took final form in the shape of the North Atlantic Treaty. Much of that time was necessarily spent in bringing the views of the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government into agreement.

At the same time, the gap between European and U.S. perceptions was also a complicating factor. The Europeans, and particularly the French, wanted a firm U.S. commitment to defend the European allies, similar to the undertaking contained in the Brussels Treaty. Washington, and especially the Congress, insisted on weaker language patterned after the 1947 Rio Treaty governing relations among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. (The security framework of the Rio Treaty and the Pact of Bogota of 1948 were subsequently institutionalized in the Organization of American States.) The Rio language would permit each

signatory to decide for itself what response it would make to aggression.

Early thinking in the Department of State was cautious, tending to favor a unilateral U.S. guarantee to its European associates, which would not necessarily involve agreement on a treaty. In line with that thinking, the Brussels group would eventually be expanded beyond the five signatories of the Brussels pact, plus Portugal and the Scandinavian countries, to include Ireland, Austria, Spain, Switzerland, and Germany. The United States would thereby put the Soviet Union on notice that it would not countenance Soviet penetration of Western Europe. As an earlier U.S. President (James Monroe) had declared, partly in response to Russian pretensions in the Western Hemisphere, "we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."¹³

President Truman's newly established National Security Council favored the unilateral "Monroe Doctrine" approach, but also pointed to two alternatives. One would be a military assistance treaty based on article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self defense; the second, a regional treaty based on article 52 of the Charter. George Kennan reportedly preferred a unilateral declaration because of his doubts as to the utility of paper

¹³ Bartlett, Ruhl J., ed., The Record of American Diplomacy, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948) p. 181

commitments, and because a full fledged reciprocal military alliance would be unnecessarily provocative to the USSR.

Congressional leaders, and particularly Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a converted former isolationist, wanted to ensure that the European beneficiaries of an American guarantee undertook some reciprocal responsibilities. In their view, such reciprocity would ensure that the Western European nations would bear some of the costs and not leave the United States with the entire burden of providing for the common defense. Many Congressmen were also intent on avoiding an automatic commitment to go to war and believed that formal treaty language would serve to make the U.S. position clear.

A number of Western European leaders also favored a formal treaty arrangement, for diametrically opposed reasons, as they believed that only thus would the U.S. commitment be binding on future administrations. In April 1948, Paul-Henri Spaak told American officials that, while he himself did not believe a treaty to be essential, "all of western Europe, particularly France, would welcome such a move."¹⁴ Foreign Minister Bevin was even more explicit, noting that "if the new defence system is so framed that it related to any aggressor it would give all the European states such confidence that it might well be that the age-long trouble between Germany and France might tend to disappear."¹⁵

Also in 1948, a "Council of Europe" in The Hague brought together nearly 1,000 influential Europeans from 26 countries. They called for the creation of a united Europe, to be symbolized by the formation of a European Assembly. This proposal was examined by the Ministerial Council of the Brussels Treaty, and then by a special conference of Ambassadors and was the basis for the Council of Europe. Membership is limited to European States which "accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within (their) jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms."

The Statute of the Council was signed at London of May 5, 1949 and came into force two months later. Its headquarters were established in Strasbourg, a city selected precisely because it symbolized the need for Franco-German cooperation. Since then, as its current Secretary General, Daniel Tarschys, has expressed it, the Council of Europe has been building Europe brick by brick,

¹⁴ Ireland, op cit, p. 87

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 88

consolidating the foundations of its societies.¹⁶ Originally encompassing only ten members, the Council has since then expanded to 40 full members, plus five other countries (Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) which have applied for full membership and enjoy special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly. In addition, the United States and Canada have recently obtained observer status and Israel is also an observer. The Council's Parliamentary Assembly, which convenes in Strasbourg, France, it often confused with the European Parliament, the legislative organ of the European Union, which has its headquarters in Luxembourg but holds its monthly sessions in Strasbourg. The Parliamentary Assembly meets only three times a year for approximately a week.

The Council has sometimes been considered by Pan-European enthusiasts, such as Dr. Otto Habsburg, to have a possible future role as the upper house in an expanded European legislature, serving as a kind of House of Lords to the European Parliament.

Since 1985, in response to the recommendations of the Colombo Commission, the Council has carried out an active program of cooperation with the European Community/Union. "Quadrapartite" meetings take place between the Chairman of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers and its Secretary General and the Presidents of the EU Council and Commission.

In the early stages of the post-Cold War era, some officials of the Council of Europe, guided by then Secretary-General Lalumière, suggested that the human dimension of the OSCE be transferred to the Council of Europe. According to Dr. Arie Bloed, the OSCE's "somewhat tense relationship with the Council (resulting from that suggestion) has been relaxed...instead of competition both organizations now pledge to a complementarity of their roles." But Dr. Bloed adds that, "In practical terms, however, this vague notion of 'complementarity' leaves a lot of questions open."¹⁷

During an October 1990 quadripartite meeting in Venice, it was agreed as a measure of complementarity that the Council would have the leading role in welcoming East and Central European states back into the European family. It has also played an active part in the international community's efforts to implement the Dayton accords and has worked closely with the OSCE in setting up the Human Rights Commission in Sarajevo as well as with the United Nations in Eastern Slavonia.

¹⁶ NATO REVIEW, January 1997, p. 5

¹⁷ Bloed, Arie, OSCE ODIHR Bulletin, Fall 1995, pp. 19-20

IV

A military organization for the Brussels treaty, known as the Western Defense Organization, was created in 1948. Its headquarters was established at Fontainebleau in France in September 1948 and Field Marshal Montgomery was appointed the first Chairman of the WEU's Commanders-in-Chief.

As soon as the WEU was in place, the U.S. transferred military supplies from its stocks in Germany to the French forces there. The Berlin blockade was not lifted until May 1949, after confidential discussions between American and Soviet negotiators at the United Nations. By that time, however, the North Atlantic Treaty had been signed, on April 4 of that year, and the transatlantic relationship had entered into a completely new phase. Among other changes, the Brussels Treaty countries agreed to merge the WEU's military structure with that of NATO. The responsibilities of the WEU Commanders-in-Chief were transferred to General Eisenhower in April 1951, when he became the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

The new NATO phase was not only a striking departure from previous doctrine by the United States but by some European members of the alliance as well. Neither the Northern nor Southern flank European states had been invited to join the Brussels Treaty group, although Bevin apparently envisioned the eventual participation of Norway, Denmark, Italy and Greece in the security system of the Western democracies. The Soviet Union, as noted, proposed a bilateral pact to Norway setting off apprehensions about "Finlandization", both within that country and elsewhere.

Denmark and Norway had traditionally tried to adopt a neutral policy with regard to disputes between other nations. However, the severe repression suffered by Norway during World War II had persuaded most of its people that close association with a powerful neighbor was a surer way to preserve the nation's security in an uncertain world, and Moscow's threatening stance only reinforced that belief.

Sweden had been neutral in both World Wars and had not suffered as much during WWII as its western neighbors had. It advanced the idea of a joint defense system with Denmark and Norway, which received some support from Denmark in 1948-1949. The Swedish proposal did not include either Finland or Iceland, and Stockholm insisted that its limited Nordic framework would have to remain outside the alliance systems of the major powers. Norwegian demands for military collaboration with the Western powers therefore caused the Nordic option to collapse in 1949.

Sweden then opted for a policy of strict neutrality, while Finland accepted the limitations on its freedom of action imposed by its exposed position along the western frontier of the Soviet Union. Denmark and Norway, sobered by Soviet moves in Czechoslovakia and Finland, but not without a good deal of internal debate, threw in their lot with NATO. As a condition of joining, however, they placed restrictions on the emplacement of atomic weapons and the stationing of foreign forces on their territory.

In spite of their decision to go their separate ways on the matter of defensive alignments, moreover, all five of the Nordic nations resolved to continue their pattern of working together intimately on a wide range of issues. This pattern, institutionalized in frequent meetings of the Nordic Council, continued throughout the Cold War and remains unbroken to this day.

In the south, however, Bevin's objective of a Mediterranean component of the European security system was fulfilled only later through the reinforcement of NATO's twelve original members by the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in 1952 and Spain in 1981. Meanwhile, during the early 1950s, an ambitious plan to form a European Defense Community (EDC), linking France, the Benelux states, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Italy, failed when the French Parliament refused to ratify the treaty.

As a second best solution, the FRG and Italy were brought into the WEU under the Paris Agreements of October 1954. Italy was already a member of NATO, of course, and the Federal Republic became a member in 1955. The WEU link was still important, however, because the WEU framework imposed significant restraints on the Federal Republic, via voluntary arms control bans on nuclear and chemical weapons, which were not incorporated in the NATO Treaty. But aside from the vestigial restrictions on the West Germans, the WEU soon entered into a period of hibernation, which lasted until 1984.

The North Atlantic alliance is usually given the credit for providing the defensive shield against the USSR behind which Western Europe was able to organize itself after World War II. But, in addition to serving as a military shield in the East, NATO also provided a kind of "law and order" regime within the western camp itself by further institutionalizing constraints on the most dynamic and potentially dangerous member of the western community, Germany. The desire on the part of some of the Alliance's smaller partners to have the United States present in substantial force on the continent to serve as a counter-balance to a newly unified Germany's otherwise preponderant voice in

western Europe remains even today an important source of support for the alliance and other mechanisms for Transatlantic cooperation.

On a parallel track, within a year of the Atlantic Pact's signature, Robert Schuman proposed the plan which became the keystone of the future European Community. The French Foreign Minister's scheme was to scramble the basic elements of French and German heavy industry so thoroughly that it would become impossible to separate them for the purpose of war between the two partners. When his idea became reality with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, France and West Germany were joined by Italy and the Benelux countries in that common endeavor.

The Franco-German deal at the root of the plan was the understanding that French industry would receive German coal at the same price as it was sold domestically, thereby removing the price advantage formerly enjoyed by their German competitors. In exchange, France would drop its opposition to Germany's economic recovery and work for, rather than against, that objective in tandem with Great Britain and the United States. Moreover, the removal of Germany from the category of an enemy state opened the way for broader measures of reconciliation, including eventual membership in the North Atlantic alliance.

Given the ideological preconceptions with which they commenced their analysis, it was not surprising the the Soviet leadership interpreted the Marshall Plan as an essentially aggressive maneuver on the part of the United States. They resolved, therefore, to replicate the European Recovery Plan within their own sphere of control and established a weak imitation of the OEEC in the form of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. This group, known as COMECON, or, CEMA, was founded in January 1949 and included all the communist-dominated countries of Eastern Europe except for Tito's Yugoslavia, already substantially at odds with the Soviet Union.

COMECON was supposed to do for Eastern Europe what the Marshall Plan was doing for Western Europe by coordinating economic needs and potential, trading mutual experiences, arranging loans and exchanging technical advisers, etc. In reality, however, COMECON soon revealed itself as merely one more mechanism by which the USSR could exploit its satellites and force them onto the Procrustean bed of Soviet economic requirements.

A similar Soviet reaction to the more serious complication introduced into their military planning by the creation first of the Western European Union and then of NATO was considerably

delayed. In the interim, Moscow's efforts to block the military consolidation of Western Europe and the United States by propaganda and political agitation in the West failed. The USSR then moved to reinforce its hold over the military organizations of the satellite states by creating the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, but not until 1955.

By that time, much had happened. Rebuilding was well advanced in Western Europe and Washington's attention had to some extent been drawn away from Europe by the exigencies of the Korean War. That three year conflict did, however, add appreciably to the alarm in the United States and in Europe at the Soviet's Union's perceived belligerence throughout the world. Moscow's tactical blunder in vacating its UN seat at a critical juncture permitted the United States to transform the conflict, in political terms, from a Korean "civil war" into a United Nations struggle to defend South Korea. The U.S. armed forces, together with the army of the Republic of Korea, carried the brunt of the fighting. But a number of the European allies rallied to the cause to the extent of sending military units to serve under United Nations (U.S.) Command, thus reinforcing the already existing sense of comradeship within the non-Communist world, and particularly among career military personnel.

As the hostilities dragged on, however, differences of opinion about the conduct of the war mounted between the U.S. and its European allies, as well as within all of the countries involved. The USSR was therefore able to exploit some of the resulting European discontent in its propaganda efforts, especially in the bogus Stockholm peace initiative of 1950. Even this was not an unalloyed benefit, it developed, because an aroused public opinion in the United States raised an unwelcome challenge to the USSR by greatly increasing the share of the American budget devoted to defense.

At the root of much of the European concern over the inconclusive war in Asia was wide-spread apprehension that the Soviet Union might take advantage of America's preoccupation with that conflict to move against new targets in Europe. The Yugoslav leadership was apparently convinced that Moscow was preparing just such an adventure and Finnish worries were mounting also. Tito and his colleagues became so concerned at one stage that they indicated their willingness to accept military aid from the West in case of war.

However much Stalin might have liked to erase an irritating competitor like Tito in the Balkans, he and his Politburo colleagues were more concerned with the deteriorating situation in central Europe. Signs were multiplying that West Germany was well on the way back to acceptance as a fully legitimate member

of the European family, and that its rearmament and incorporation into NATO would not be far behind. A Treaty setting up a European Defense Community, which was to include West Germany, had already been drafted when the Soviet Union played its best remaining card.

In a note of March 10, 1952, Moscow called for negotiations among the wartime allies leading to a peace treaty with a unified Germany and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. The Soviet proposal also signified acceptance of German rearmament, provided the revived German state were committed to neutrality. How seriously this tardy Soviet bid was intended may never be known because it foundered in a series of acrimonious notes between Moscow and Washington.

It is clear that the Soviet Union's ostensible offer of a unified but neutral Germany served Moscow's propaganda purposes admirably for a number of years. However, doubt must remain that Stalin would have been prepared in 1952 to withdraw from East Germany, the most precious portion of his new European glacis in exchange for anything the far from united Western allies could agree upon. More than likely, the Soviet gambit was just another of the diversionary tactics so common in the annals of Soviet diplomacy.

V

NATO and OSCE, two of the many heirs of the Pan-European idea, were both spawned by what came to be known as the Cold War. This term evidently became part of the popular lexicon in 1948 and is usually ascribed to the revered American pundit, Walter Lippmann. Curiously, as John Lukacs has observed,

"...it was also in 1948 that the term 'West' acquired a new popular historical meaning...A genuine movement toward European Unity became current; together with constructive intellectual and religious tendencies, it was also manifest in politics through the broad emergence of Christian Democratic parties whose leadership was provided by the personal excellence of De Gasperi in Italy, Adenauer in Germany, Robert Schuman in France, Figl and Raab in Austria."¹⁸

Although Lukacs was correct in singling out the contribution made to post-war European unity by a group of outstanding

¹⁸ Lukacs, John, A New History of the Cold War (Garden City, Doubleday, 1966) p. 72

Catholic politicians, one must not underestimate the support this endeavor received from their socialist and liberal colleagues. Leon Blum, whose internationalist credentials had been well established during the inter-war period, validated them once again when he resumed the office of Premier in the much changed France of 1946. Many other international-minded socialists, in England, Austria, Germany, and the Benelux countries also played a role in resuscitating Pan-European ideals. Liberal and Non-Catholic Conservative figures, too, were active in pushing for common approaches to Europe's problems, their thinking often influenced by Masonic ideas which were hundreds of years old.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has a relatively short negotiating history, dating back only to the mid-1960s. However, there were several earlier attempts by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO), beginning in 1954 to convoke a European Security Conference, arguing that it would serve as a surrogate peace conference and thereby "draw a line under World War II." As early as November 1954, for example, Moscow convoked a Moscow Conference on European Security. But this first Soviet attempt to organize an all-European forum was attended only by representatives from the satellite states, leaving the USSR no better off than it was before.

Those early efforts, and Brezhev's renewed efforts in the 1960s, were clearly skewed in the direction of excluding Canada and the United States and so had failed to elicit a favorable Western response. However, by the spring of 1966, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, in calling for a European Security Conference, indicated that it could among other things, permit the normalization and improvement of Soviet relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. By then, the more encouraging situation in Europe, accelerated by West Germany's Ostpolitik, ensured that the idea would receive a heartier welcome.

Nevertheless, the next move in the renewed diplomatic minuet represented something of a step backward. In July 1966, the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, meeting in Bucharest, in reiterating the call for a European Conference on "questions of European security and cooperation", implicitly excluded the United States and Canada from participation once again.

Meanwhile, as early as 1956, the North Atlantic Council had adopted a Report on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, better known as the Report of the Committee of Three, or the Three Wise Men's Report, which stimulated renewed interest in political consultations among NATO members. Later, beginning in the 1960s, some thoughtful Europeans and Americans began to advocate a

serious study of "Whither NATO" in the changing international environment. In December 1966, the Alliance approved a proposal by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel to establish a study group to report on "The Future Tasks of the Alliance."

The resulting "Harmel Report", which was approved by all the Alliance members one year later, recognized that significant changes had occurred in the international situation and stressed the "the political tasks of the alliance have assumed a new dimension." Accordingly, the report recommended that, while maintaining its deterrent and defensive role, NATO simultaneously pursue a more stable relationship by working to "further a detente in East-West relations." Most importantly, it proclaimed that "military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary."¹⁹

In 1967, a Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, meeting at Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia returned to the charge with a renewed call for a European Security Conference. Notably, it denounced President Johnson's policy of "bridge building" with the countries of Eastern Europe as subversive and called for the abandonment of NATO in 1969, when its original term of 20 years was to expire.

NATO, for its part, tried to implement the conclusions of the Harmel Report on the complementarity of defense and detente by showing its willingness to explore arms control issues. During its June 1968 Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik, NATO declared that "a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated." The appropriate NATO committees also began their detailed studies of possible force reductions. The NATO Military Committee was naturally active in evaluating such arms control matters. However, preparation of the guidance for NATO

negotiators at the eventual MBFR talks was, significantly, entrusted to the Senior Political Committee.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 had a predictably depressing effect on the production of "We Europeans" oratory. But just one year later the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, meeting in Budapest, advanced a new "Appeal from Warsaw Pact Members to All European Countries" for a meeting of all European states. This language once again excluded the United States but Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin shortly afterwards informed Henry Kissinger, the President's National Security Adviser, that the Soviet Union

¹⁹ The Future Tasks of the Alliance, in NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1989) p. 402

would not object to U.S. participation. Nevertheless, Kissinger was not attracted to the proposal, regarding it as "the maximum Soviet program for Europe, put forward in the name of enhancing European security."²⁰

Most of America's allies were more enthusiastic, however, particularly when Finland also proposed a conference on European security and cooperation. This adroit Finnish move to curry favor with its powerful Soviet neighbor while simultaneously strengthening ties with Western Europe eventually gained it the honor of hosting the eventual conference, although that was still some years away.

These renewed conference initiatives were then cautiously welcomed by NATO at its spring 1969 Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik. A major thrust forward was provided by the election that fall of Willy Brandt as the new Federal Chancellor. He, and his principal foreign affairs adviser, Egon Bahr, launched an Ostpolitik, focused on reducing international tensions and eliminating obstacles to a broad ranging detente in Europe.

Henry Kissinger had some qualms about Brandt's policy inclinations. As summarized in his memoirs, he feared that,

"Brandt's new Ostpolitik, which looked to many like a progressive policy of quest for detente, could in less scrupulous hands turn into a new form of classic German nationalism. From Bismarck to Rapallo it was the essence of Germany's nationalist foreign policy to maneuver freely between East and West. By contrast, American (and German) policy since the 1940s had been to ground the Federal Republic firmly in the West, in the Atlantic Alliance and then the European Community."²¹

Kissinger and Nixon recognized that the Soviet overtures to the Western allies, especially the Germans, were an attempt to practice selective detente and thus to divide the U.S. from the Europeans. They realized, in addition, that turning the conference idea down flat would leave the U.S. isolated in the Alliance. Accordingly, as Dr. William Korey has explained²²,

²⁰ Kissinger, Henry, White House Years (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1979) p. 414

²¹ Kissinger, Henry, op cit, p. 409

²² Korey, William, OSCE ODIHR BULLETIN, Fall 1995, p. 9

the U.S. would support Brandt's Ostpolitik, but make agreement on a European Security Conference contingent on prior progress on Berlin and other German issues. The allies agreed and, at its December 1969 Ministerial Meeting, the Alliance stressed the need for careful advance preparation and the prospect of "concrete results." It also recalled the earlier Reykjavik proposal on mutual and balanced force reductions.

As it turned out, progress was possible on the German issues. Early in 1970, the FRG and the USSR concluded a major economic agreement under which Germany would supply large-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union, with favorable financing by German banks. In exchange, the USSR undertook to provide natural gas to Western Germany for a twenty year period. Later that year, the two sides agreed to a Non-Aggression Pact which asserted that neither of them had territorial claims against anyone. They also agreed to consider inviolable the frontiers of all States in Europe, "including the Oder-Neisse line which forms the western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland", as well as the frontier between the FRG and the DDR.

The FRG then entered into negotiations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, leading to the signature of parallel treaties with those countries. The United States, Great Britain and France also moved forward by signing a Quadripartite Agreement with the Soviet Union on Berlin, which regularized the status of West Berlin and provided guarantees for Western access to the city.

On the bilateral plane, also, the U.S. and the USSR seemed to be working toward a cooperative relationship, embarking on the long journey toward a strategic arms limitation agreement. In explaining the American agreement to a European Security Conference, State Department Counsellor Helmut Sonnenfeldt exulted that, "We sold it for the German-Soviet treaty, we sold it for the Berlin agreement, and we sold it again for the opening

of the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reductions)" ²³

Meanwhile, the two superpowers remained at cross purposes in Europe. The Soviet Union continued its efforts to wean the NATO allies away from their reliance on the United States, while Washington strove to reinforce its long standing ties with them. General de Gaulle's insistence on going his own way provided numerous opportunities for Moscow to insert itself into the

²³ Quoted in Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994) p. 759

inter-allied debate and the ensuing tug of war precipitated a number of mini-crises in NATO. De Gaulle resigned the French Presidency in 1969 and his successor, Georges Pompidou, was more restrained in his approach to East-West issues. He continued the French dialogue with Moscow, however, and in 1971 endorsed the convening of a European Security Conference.

Soviet attempts simultaneously to exploit its developing relationships with both France and the FRG served further to complicate matters. In the long run, however, both France and Germany understood very well the danger of moving too close to the Soviet Union at the expense of their relationship with the United States and, if sometimes with difficulty, resisted the temptation to do so.

President Richard Nixon, whose devotion to the idea of detente was not very apparent before his election in 1968, edged in that direction by calling for a new era of negotiations rather than confrontation. During the stormy six years of Nixon's Presidency, however, the very word "detente" came to be regarded with suspicion by the American public. His successor, Gerald Ford, found it politic to expunge the term from his political vocabulary. Before that happened, the momentum toward a European Security Conference had mounted to the point where it could no longer be denied.

At the same time, increasing disillusionment within the United States over the conflict in Vietnam, coupled with rising European concern about a possible American retreat into isolationism, combined to make the idea of force reductions attractive on both sides of the Atlantic. In June 1970, a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest had moved in the direction of reality by including the United States and Canada in its renewed call for a European Security Conference. East Germany's allies in the Warsaw Pact also apparently put some pressure on the German Democratic Republic (DDR) to adopt a less rigid diplomatic line and the dour Walter Ulbricht was gradually eased out of his position as leader of the East German Party (SED).

The Soviet campaign for a European Conference and the reciprocal demand on the part of the West for mutual and balanced force reductions merged in a peculiar way in the spring of 1971. The U.S. Congress was at the time engaged in one of its annual debates over the insistence of Senator Mike Mansfield that U.S. forces in Europe be reduced substantially. Senate support for Mansfield's position seemed to be growing in spite of the Administration's arguments that the forces should be maintained in order to strengthen the Western bargaining position in the event of MBFR negotiations.

Unexpectedly, and just days before the Mansfield Amendment seemed certain to be adopted, Leonid Brezhnev called for the beginning of negotiations on arms reductions in Europe. This undercut Mansfield's argument, and the amendment was defeated overwhelmingly, 36 to 61. We may never know precisely what motivated Brezhnev's dramatic helping hand for the Administration. Henry Kissinger considered it merely another example of the inflexibility of the Soviet Union's cumbersome policy-making machinery.

It seems more probable that Brezhnev and his Politbureau colleagues weighed the alternatives before venturing down the path to what were certain to be long drawn out negotiations. They may simply have wanted to avoid disturbing the improving prospects for an early breakthrough on SALT. Whatever the rationale, they evidently decided against pushing for an early American pullback from Europe, preferring the stability a substantial U.S. presence could offer. Once again, Soviet fears that West Germany could acquire access to nuclear weapons seem to have played a deciding role in the evolution of Soviet policy.

VI

In June 1971, NATO made an abortive attempt to send Secretary General Manlio Brosio on an exploratory mission to Eastern Europe to look into the prospects for force reductions, but the Warsaw Pact countries were unresponsive. Nevertheless, the NATO Ministerial Communique in December 1971 affirmed the organization's willingness to move ahead with MBFR, as well as a security conference, although the terms of reference of the latter were far from clear. The Warsaw Pact responded positively, but with reservations.

Finally, at their May 1972 summit meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon decided to proceed with both negotiations more or less simultaneously. The multilateral CSCE Preparatory Conference then opened in Helsinki on November 22, 1972, followed in January 1973 by exploratory MBFR talks in Vienna. Much of the attention of NATO Headquarters for the next several years was to be devoted to preparing detailed guidance for the Alliance negotiators at the two fora. France, in line with its opposition to bloc-to-bloc negotiations, refused to participate in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. One of its representatives did, however, attend the Senior Political Committee sessions devoted to preparing guidance for the talks.

Before the melodrama of Watergate brought President Ford

into office, the Vietnam War had been concluded and a good start had been made in negotiating a Strategic Arms Limitation agreement. The American Administration considered the CSCE negotiations to be a very minor part of its overall strategy. As Dr. William Korey has noted,

"Indeed, Kissinger considered the U.S. role in the CSCE negotiating process to be largely oriented to 'damage control,' to preventing agreements between Western Europe and the Soviet Union that could negatively affect perceived U.S. interests. Besides, he characteristically preferred dealing with Moscow in bilateral negotiations, not through multilateral discussions. He very much feared an excessive focus on human rights issues, which could lead to a direct confrontation with the USSR. That would jeopardize his prized bilateral relationship, which was oriented to restricting Moscow's expansion into Africa, Asia and Central America (as well as seeking its assistance in ending the conflict in Vietnam.)" ²⁴

Kissinger's ambitious plans to enmesh the Soviet Union in a web of mutually reinforcing ties with the West showed some early promise but suffered greatly from the debacle of Nixon's downfall. The embattled American President made a dramatic but futile attempt at NATO in June 1974 to rally international support for his domestic political position but without success.

Meanwhile, the diplomatic mills in Brussels and Geneva continued to grind until they had produced an agreement which was endorsed by the leaders of 35 nations at Helsinki on August 1, 1975. The Helsinki Final Act, a long and complicated, not to say prolix document, runs to some 40,000 words. It represented a series of hard-fought compromises between Eastern and Western delegates. Their debates were often illuminated, if sometimes roiled, by the numerous representatives of the "Neutral and Non-Aligned" countries (NNA's).

The Final Act was divided into three broad sections. The first dealt with security matters; in CSCE parlance, the "First Basket (panier) issues. This began with a lengthy Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States and had language designed to satisfy nearly all contending views. It covered such matters as sovereignty, the non-use of force, non-

²⁴ Korey, William, OSCE ODIHR Bulletin, Fall 1995, p. 9

intervention in internal affairs, human rights in general, and cooperation among states. This basket also included provisions dealing with confidence-building measures (CBM's), such as advance notification of military maneuvers and the exchange of observers at such maneuvers.

The Second Basket, a section very dear to the hearts of all Eastern European delegates as well as to some Westerners and NNAs also, grouped a number of provisions designed to expand cooperation in commerce, industry, science, technology, and the environment.

The Third Basket, most important to the United States and, with somewhat less intensity perhaps, to the other members of the Alliance, dealt with human rights issues. The Helsinki Final Act was often disparaged in the United States and elsewhere by pundits impatient for more rapid progress toward its proclaimed objectives. In the view of many of those critics, the West at Helsinki allegedly granted recognition to the territorial gains registered by the USSR as a result of the Second World War in return for token gestures by the Soviet Government in the field of emigration and human rights. In reality, as subsequent developments were to show, the actual impact of Helsinki and its successor conferences on the course of East-West relations turned out to be much more complex than its critics had dreamed.

A number of scholars and participants in CSCE proceedings have tried to explain the how and why of the agreements reached there. A former Russian (formerly Soviet) Ambassador Juri Kashlev has made an appropriately Marxian analysis.

"The idea of setting up a European organization as such has become one of the greatest initiatives of the second half of the twentieth century. Moreover, as it usually happens in history, the realization of this idea followed Hegel's rule of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Here I would like to underscore that the Soviet Union and its allies were trying to secure the outcome of the Second World War. The recognition of the German Democratic Republic and some other examples of that kind illustrate the situation better than anything else. On the other hand, Western countries aimed to stop the extraordinary growth of Warsaw Pact armament, to make the Soviet borders open for people and ideas, and by doing so dissolve the communist ideology. As the outcome of this tension a unique organization was established." ²⁵

²⁵ OSCE ODIHR BULLETIN, Warsaw, Fall 1995, p. 27

A more informal, and perhaps more persuasive, interpretation, which appeared curiously enough in the same journal, was offered by Harm J. Hazewinkel, a member of the Netherlands delegation at several CSCE meetings.

"During the Madrid Meeting, my GDR colleague at a certain moment said to me, 'In the end you give in a bit on the First Basket, we give in a bit on the Third Basket, and we all can accept the rubbish of the Second Basket.'" ²⁶

In any case, the Final Act did endorse the inviolability of national boundaries and guarantee signatories against any assaults on those boundaries. The only boundaries conceivably at issue, however, had already been accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany in a series of bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Moreover, one of the Act's seven Principles specifically provided that frontiers could be changed by peaceful means and by agreement. This was a provision that was especially important to the Federal Republic, in line with its insistence on keeping open the possibility of eventual reunification with its East German neighbors.

Finally, any suggestion that the Final Act, concluded thirty years after the Nazi surrender, should have in some way left open the concept of a non-peaceful change of borders in Europe would have been met, then as now, with almost universal derision. The Soviet leaders undoubtedly hoped that the Helsinki Final Act would constitute a surrogate peace treaty which would, in their terms, "draw a line under World War II", and thus provide a much desired aura of legitimacy to their rule. This did not happen, however, and the "Helsinki Process" by illuminating the regime's essential illegitimacy served instead to impell a number of fateful changes in the Soviet system and empire.

An important role in that development was played by the provisions of the Final Act calling for a series of follow-up conferences at which compliance with its various provisions could be assessed. This may have been one of the most significant aspects of the Final Act and the ultimate basis for a reasoned judgement on the validity of the "Helsinki Process" as a whole. The prospect of regular scrutiny of their compliance with the measures agreed upon in the Final Act turned out to be a very sobering one for the Soviet authorities and their counterparts in Eastern Europe. In some cases, this produced notable advances toward greater respect for human rights. Even when unsuccessful in the short run, the process maintained a high level of public

²⁶ ibid., p. 51

concern, which denied the offenders the luxury of ignoring their critics. Some Swedish observers were heard to mutter that these meetings, and in fact CSCE as a whole, were only "an interesting employment experience for the higher bourgeoisie of Europe." The organization and its plethora of gatherings did serve a useful purpose, however, as the world's experience since the 1975 Helsinki Conference has amply shown.

The first so-called Review Conference, which convened in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1977 was in the view of most observers unnecessarily confrontational. The proceedings quickly degenerated into a shouting match between the U.S. Delegation, headed by a former justice of the Supreme Court, Arthur Goldberg, and his Soviet counterparts. To some extent, this probably reflected Soviet realization by that time that Leonid Brezhnev's alleged diplomatic triumph at Helsinki contained within itself the seeds of grave difficulties for the regimes in Eastern Europe.

Because the Soviet Government and its fellow members of the Warsaw Pact had published the text of the Helsinki Final Act in official press organs, many of their citizens had taken the promises in it seriously. Not coincidentally, this was the time of the Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia, the rise of the Solidarity Trade Union in Poland, and the creation of Helsinki Monitor groups within the USSR itself. Brezhnev and his colleagues, it became clear, failed to appreciate the extent to which the Helsinki Final Act had given a certain imprimatur to the subsurface yearning throughout Eastern Europe for a more humane society.

It was also evident that, in such circumstances, there was no possibility of making further progress in such a dangerous direction at Belgrade. After many weeks of mutual denunciations, all the delegations were relieved to adjourn, agreeing only to meet again in Madrid in 1980, when it was hoped that the international atmosphere might be more conducive to serious negotiations.

That atmosphere was hardly improved by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, although the situation in that country had never been considered to fall within the purview of CSCE. Accordingly, when the preparatory phase of the Madrid meeting began in September 1980 it was in the shadow of the events in Kabul. A grueling diplomatic battle ensued over how the main conference would address "review of implementation" of the Helsinki Final Act. When the main Conference began in November, and thereafter until the following December, Western delegations, led by the United States relentlessly criticized the performance of the Soviet Union and its allies.

In December 1981, the Polish Government instituted martial law in an attempt to clamp down on rising discontent. By the time the Conference returned from Christmas recess, the allies had decided on a course of action which would maintain public pressure on the Eastern bloc regimes to live up to their commitments at Helsinki. Nearly 20 Foreign Ministers came to the reopening session in Madrid to denounce Soviet and Polish violations of those commitments. One month later, the Conference agreed to recess until the end of the year, hoping that the international situation at that time would be more propitious for progress on contentious issues.

When the Conference reassembled, late in 1982, tempers had cooled only slightly. However, over the course of the next 10 months, with considerable assistance from the group of Neutral and Non-Aligned countries, all 35 participants managed to reach agreement on a comprehensive and substantial concluding document. In addition to separate chapters on the Declaration of Principles, detailed coverage of human rights issues, and cooperation in the economic area, the Madrid Concluding Document provided for a number of subsequent conferences on specialized topics. These included experts meetings on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, as well as one on Mediterranean Cooperation, plus a Cultural Forum in Budapest in 1985. At the experts meeting on Human Rights in Ottawa, also in 1985, the United States and the allies pressed for a number of improvements in human rights conduct but the Eastern bloc was unwilling to accept those proposals, or the shorter proposal offered by the NNA's. A later meeting, in Bern in the spring of 1986, on a related topic, "human contacts", also failed to reach agreement on a final document. Significantly, however, the Soviet Union agreed to allow 119 Soviet citizens to join their families in the United States.

The most important spin-off from Madrid, however, was a Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe which convened in Stockholm early in 1984, after a short preparatory meeting in Helsinki. The Stockholm Conference eventually produced an accord which largely reflected the Western approach, broadening and strengthening measures for advance notification and observers, and making them obligatory. Most important, perhaps, the zone of CBM application was broadened to cover all of the USSR's European territory, reflecting de Gaulle's old vision of a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals".

The succeeding CSCE follow-up meeting convened in Vienna in November 1986, concluding in January 1989. In his speech to the closing session, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz was able

to point to a number of improvements on the European scene. While observing that some dark areas still remained, he observed that "the picture in the Soviet Union and some countries of Eastern Europe had brightened in significant respects." Specifically, he noted that the jamming of radio broadcasts had stopped, prison gates in the USSR had opened for more than 600 prisoners of conscience, including Helsinki monitors, and there was a greater freedom of expression and assembly in countries where those basic rights had been denied.

In addition to those substantial gains, Secretary Shulz was able to welcome the beginning of major negotiations on reducing conventional arms in Europe, as a follow-on to the Stockholm Conference. These negotiations replaced the sluggish MBFR talks, which had been running in Vienna since 1973. Significantly, France agreed to participate in the new conventional arms talks, a welcome change from its absence at MBFR. The Vienna Conference also scheduled several supplementary meetings on specialized topics, including one in Moscow -- on human rights. It was also agreed to have another review conference, back again in Helsinki, in 1992.

It was not coincidental, as they used to say in Pravda, that many of the favorable developments in East-West relations occurred after Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet Union's paramount leader in 1985. It was Gorbachev, or his speech writers, who coined the term "Europe-Our Common House" for an appearance in London, even before he became General Secretary of the USSR's Communist Party.

But, although Gorbachev incorporated new vigor into the Soviet approach, his efforts can be seen basically as the logical carrying out of his predecessors' attempts to convert Western Europe's unfocused interest in detente into concrete economic and political gains. He did, however, notably accelerate the already existing Soviet drive for closer ties with the West, partly through a more reasoned approach to the human rights aspects of the Helsinki Final Act. In foreign affairs generally, Gorbachev rekindled once again Leonid Brezhnev's repeatedly frustrated quest for international respectability, seeking thereby to achieve that elusive legitimacy which could justify the existence of the Soviet regime, at home as well as abroad.

The cumulative effect of the "Helsinki process" was dramatized during what became known as the annus mirabilis of 1989. When the Hungarian Government decided that summer to permit thousands of East Germans to flee to West Germany through Hungary and Austria, in spite of objections from the East German Government, it justified its action as obligatory under the Helsinki Final Act. The Hungarian stance, opening the floodgates

to emigration, led the way toward the rapid collapse of Moscow's Eastern European satellite regimes. As William Hyland, then editor of Foreign Affairs, pointed out a few years later, "If it can be said that there was one point when the Soviet empire finally began to crack, it was at Helsinki" ²⁷

VII

More or less simultaneously with the resurgence of interest in the possibilities of a more united Europe, the world, and not only Europe, began to assimilate a new global lingua franca with the potential to fill the kind of role played by French at the time of the Congress of Vienna. Originally an elite language, like nineteenth century French, English quickly spread more broadly because of the importance to European recovery of the U.S. contribution thereto. From that jump start, so to speak, it began to accelerate even more due to the popularity of American and English films and popular music and, more recently, by wide access to such high technology vehicles as the Cable News Network and the Internet.

English had its rivals as the favored mode of expression, even in Western Europe, where French cultural supremacy was widely accepted. In spite of official French insistence on parity for French in international organizations, however, at NATO English quickly became by far the most commonly heard tongue in both in meetings and in corridor conversations, even in Paris and then still more in Evere, outside of Brussels. General De Gaulle's decision to remove France from NATO's integrated military command structure and force NATO Headquarters to leave French territory in 1967 merely accelerated an already existing trend. NATO member states naturally wished to have as their Permanent Representatives individuals able to communicate effectively in the language of the organization's dominant state. Moreover, the inability of most U.S. Permanent Representatives to speak any foreign languages ensured that discussion at any meetings held without interpreters, such as the regular informal luncheons attended by the PermReps and the Secretary General, had to take place in English.

The story in Eastern Europe showed the other side of the same coin. The favored, not to say required, language was Russian and

²⁷ Hyland, William, Mortal Rivals (Random House, New York, 1987) p. 128

the Soviet Government, like its American rival took pains to bring many promising young people to Moscow and its many state universities where they could absorb the Russian language and the important message conveyed through it. In consequence, English did not completely dominate the meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, where Russian was de rigueur for most of the Eastern representatives. French was also a more effective rival at CSCE gatherings because it was the favored language within the EC caucus, which usually convened before the NATO caucus, which was itself dominated of course by English. Curiously, the Warsaw Pact coordination meetings were known as the Eastern caucus, which is itself an Americanism, of Indian origin.

The collapse of the Soviet system and the end of the Cold War permitted, encouraged, and in some ways required all of the existing Pan-European organizations to reexamine their organizations and missions. Even before that time, however, the European Community had begun to examine its opportunities and responsibilities in the security field. As early as December 14, 1973, shortly after the accession of Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland had raised the EC's membership to nine, its Foreign Ministers issued a Document on European Identity. This laid important stress on the fact that foreign policy and security issues had an important role to play in bringing about a more united Europe.

Limited progress was thereafter registered under the rubric of Political Cooperation, designed to harmonize the foreign policies of the EC members. However, there continued to be reluctance on the part of several EC members to put security questions explicitly within the Political Cooperation framework.

Several countries tried to take the next step in this process, but it was not until the London Report, in December 1981, that the European Council could be persuaded to agree that the Community's Political Cooperation network was entitled to address the "political aspects of security."

Later, several initiatives were launched, aimed at putting some flesh on the bones of this skeletal proposition, of which the most notable probably were the draft Treaty for European Union, inspired by Altiero Spinelli, and the Genscher-Colombo plan. Neither of those efforts survived the buffeting of inter-European and trans-Atlantic criticism but they did impart a certain impetus to the process of politico-military integration. Even so, when the Community adopted a Solemn Declaration on European Union at Stuttgart on June 18, 1983, the discussion under the Political Cooperation rubric was authorized only on the political and economic aspects of security. This move was endorsed by a European Parliament Resolution on February 14,

1984. Concurrently, the Commission of the EC worked toward bringing the production of military equipment within the scope of the Community's industrial policies.

A more concrete step came shortly thereafter, following suggestions from the French and Belgian Governments. This was the Rome Declaration of November 1, 1984, in which the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the seven WEU member nations stated that they were "conscious of the continuing necessity to strengthen Western security and of the specifically Western European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions" and "underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between the member states in the field of security policy, and to encourage consensus."

Francois Mitterand's sponsorship of the European Single Act of 1985, an amendment to the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the EC, advanced matters a few centimeters more. It was designed to reinforce Europe's voice in the transatlantic dialogue and its ratification by Ireland brought that country into the collective security framework for the first time. A European Political Cooperation Secretariat was established, separate from both the Commission and the Council. Over time, this strengthened the already existing tendency for member states to discuss political issues jointly, consulting and seeking to work together.

The resurrection of the WEU from its long dormant stage was conditioned in the Rome Declaration by the "indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area" and "the crucial importance of the contribution to the common security of the allies who are not members of WEU" and the need for concertation with them. The renewed interest in WEU's potential was then significantly accelerated by widespread European consternation over the U.S. willingness at the October 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to negotiate about possible sweeping reductions in nuclear weapons, without coordination with America's European allies. The European Socialist Parties, not always the most vigilant proponents of a strong defense posture, passed a resolution on the Reykjavik meeting which proclaimed, "The Western European Countries cannot delegate their responsibility for security to others."

More concretely, steps were taken to strengthen the WEU organizational framework, new and more energetic personnel were brought in to staff it, and in October 1987 the WEU at a meeting in The Hague reached agreement upon a "Platform on Security Interests", emphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons to European Defense. The Platform also defined the conditions for the further development of the WEU's role as a forum for regular

discussion of defense and security issues affecting Europe. The WEU Council again began meeting at the level of Foreign and Defense Ministers, and Spain and Portugal were welcomed into the WEU's ranks. In 1989, Greece and Turkey were accorded consultative status with WEU, followed by Norway. In November 1989, an Institute for Security Studies was formed, based in Paris, charged with assisting in the development of a European security identity as foreseen in The Hague Platform.

While the WEU Parliamentary Assembly has remained in Paris, its Council and Secretariat, formerly based in London, were moved to Brussels in 1993, facilitating coordination with both NATO and the European Union. The WEU, like the other modern Pan-European institutions, has continued to evolve in an attempt to adapt to the changed security situation in Europe. It currently consists of four different membership categories: 1) full members, who are members of NATO as well as WEU; 2) associate members, the European members of NATO not members of the EU (Iceland, Norway, and Turkey), 3) observers (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden), which are members of the EU but not NATO, plus Denmark, which is a member of both, and; 4) associate partners, those Central and Eastern European countries which are candidates for EU membership and have reached "Europe Agreements" with the EU.

In January 1994, NATO's Heads of State and Government, in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, recognized WEU's dual role as the defense component of the European Union and a strengthened pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. They also recognized the concept of "Combined Joint Task Forces" (CJTFFs), which are designed to facilitate asset-sharing between NATO and WEU. The purpose of CJTFFs is to make it possible, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, to use NATO assets in operations undertaken by the European allies under the WEU. However, the question remains of whether the WEU will retain its separate status or be incorporated into the EU. Until now, the latter option has been infeasible because several EU members are not interested in pursuing full membership in the WEU. It has also been argued that continued separation is desirable because this makes it possible to admit new countries, such as Finland, Sweden, and Austria, into the EU without necessarily extending specific security guarantees to them.

VIII

CSCE members repented with admirable speed to the end of the Cold War, proclaiming in November 1990 "a new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity." In the Charter of Paris For a New Europe, its participants declared that "henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and cooperation." The Charter reviewed the

progress made on the disarmament agenda by the Agreement on Conventional Arms in Europe and found it good. It also called for further movement on the Open Skies initiative, a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and other security measures. The Paris Conference noted, in particular, its "great satisfaction" over the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany, which had been signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990. Moreover, it sincerely welcomed "the fact that the German people have united to become one State" in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, and in full accord with their neighbors. It further endorsed the participation of both North American and European States as a fundamental characteristic of the CSCE.

Moving beyond justifiable self-congratulation, the Paris Charter also moved to establish new structures and institutions for the CSCE Process, focusing principally on the mediation of disputes and the prevention of interstate conflict. Accordingly, it established a permanent Secretariat to provide an administrative framework for the organization. (This was originally concentrated in Prague but some elements were subsequently moved to Vienna). The Charter also established a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, as well as an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. (Later in 1992 the latter was expanded into an Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.) In addition, the Paris meeting called for the creation of a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which held its first plenary session in Budapest in July 1992.

Other administrative organs also took shape in the 1992 time frame: an Economic Forum, which was not conceived as a permanent institution but rather as a procedure for convening conferences on specific problems of economic cooperation; a Conciliation and Arbitration Court "Within the CSCE", which reflects the fact that the Court is not supported by all CSCE members; and the Forum for Security Cooperation, which provides a center for the discussion of arms control matters.

Up until the spring of 1990, the United States had resolutely objected to the establishment of any standing institutions for the CSCE and accepted them at Paris only with great reluctance. A similar reluctance was often demonstrated by the representatives of Moscow, still identified at that time as the seat of the USSR. It thus required another six months of negotiations before all parties could be brought to accept a procedure for convening senior officials within seventy-two hours in a crisis emergency. Two more years were needed until the CSCE Foreign Ministers, meeting in Rome late in 1993, established a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), who would be in permanent session in Vienna, parallel to the Permanent Representatives at NATO, and available to meet on very short notice.

The next top level CSCE meeting, at Helsinki in July 1992, also rejoiced in "the end of the cold war, the fall of totalitarian regimes and the demise of the ideology on which they were based." In the meantime, the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting at Prague in January 1992, had accepted the Soviet successor states into the CSCE. The Baltic states had already become members but the January decision extended CSCE's membership into Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Some of them brought their intense rivalries and conflicts with them into the Pan-European system. These problems were paralleled and dramatized by the outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslav Federation, a charter member of the organization.

The Helsinki 1992 document is notable for the way in which it describes the relationships among the various pan-European organizations. In this connection, it welcomed "the rapid adaptation of European and Transatlantic institutions and organizations which are increasingly working together to face up to the challenges before us and to provide a solid foundation for peace and prosperity." The European Community, which it noted is closely involved in CSCE activities, was "moving towards a union and has decided to broaden its membership." NATO, "one of the essential transatlantic links, has adopted a new strategic concept and strengthened its role as an integral aspect for security in Europe. NATO has also offered practical support for the work of the CSCE." The newly established North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was seen as establishing "patterns of co-operation with new partners, in harmony with CSCE goals."

The Western European Union was praised for offering to provide resources in support of the CSCE and described as an "integral part of the development of the European Union," as well as "the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." The Council of Europe was also recognized as cooperating with the CSCE in the human dimension, and, like the others, is opening up to new members. Continuing its convenient checklist of complementary organizations, the 1992 Helsinki document praised the work of the Group of Seven and the Group of Twenty-Four for their assistance to countries in transition, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for their contributions toward the construction of a new Europe. In addition, Helsinki 1992 welcomed the fact that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had stated its readiness to assist the CSCE in pursuit of its objectives, and noted that several regional European groups also served to multiply the links uniting CSCE participants.

The CSCE itself was defined as "a forum for dialogue, negotiation and co-operation, providing direction and giving impulse to the shaping of the new Europe." Resurrecting the "Litvinov Doctrine" of the 1930s, the Helsinki meeting stated its conviction that "security is indivisible." Pointing with pride to the instrumental role CSCE had played in promoting change, it resolved that "now it must adapt to the task of managing them." Much of the organization's activity since that time has been devoted to precisely that task - managing change.

When the CSCE leaders met again at Budapest in December 1994 their summit declaration recognized the Conference as "the security structure embracing States from Vancouver to Vladivostok." Determined to give a new political impetus to the CSCE, they proclaimed that it would from January 1995 be known as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). To date, however, the change of name has not been reflected in any dramatic reorganization or operational reforms. A number of tracking changes were necessary in order to convert subsidiary CSCE organizations to an OSCE format but none of the name changes appear to have any legal consequences. Accordingly, some critics of the Budapest Conference have maintained that "the transition from the CSCE to the OSCE has been conceived more in formal than in actual terms."²⁸ Other participants and observers have argued instead that the changes were much more consequential and that without the new organizational framework, the OSCE's subsequent prominent role in working toward a settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have been possible.

Many of the Heads of State or Government who attended the Budapest summit session on 5 and 6 December 1994 evidently found their experience there a disappointing one. Although there were other reasons for their discontent, the windy oratory encouraged by the usual "take your turn" addresses from more than fifty national leaders seemed to lie at the root of much of it. In contrast, the working session preceding the summit, the Budapest Review Conference, which ran from October 10 to December 2, was by all accounts a more productive affair. Its meetings were enlivened in particular by some spirited debates on the future organization and purview of the whole Helsinki process.

The Russian delegation at Budapest argued strenuously for converting the Conference into a full-fledged international organization with a legally binding charter. Moscow also pressed for a decision making body, similar to the United Nations Security Council, with permanent and non-permanent members, which

²⁸ Ghebali, Victor-Yves, in NATO Review, March 1995

could perform an effective conflict management role. It also suggested the establishment of "Regional Tables", to consider security, stability, and cooperation in areas such as the Balkans, Mediterranean, etc. The Russian proposal would have established OSCE as the central coordinator for all security institutions in the area from Vancouver to Valdivostok, including NATO and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Additionally, the latter organization, which includes most of the former republics of the USSR, would have the primary role in promoting security throughout that area.

Many NATO members, and especially the U.S., were naturally opposed to such a blatant effort to put their Alliance under OSCE control and to elevate the ramshackle but Russian dominated CIS to the same level as the Western European security structures. In addition, many of the former components of the USSR were naturally just as opposed as NATO members were to sanctifying the primacy of Russia in its "Near Abroad."

Less ambitious but still activist proposals were advanced by several delegations. Austria and Hungary suggested a new "Adviser on Issues of Stability and Security", whose role would parallel that of the existing CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Germany and the Netherlands suggested instead that the role of the CSCE as a United Nations regional arrangement be strengthened, and proposed also to link it more directly to European and Transatlantic security organizations.

In the end, none of the competing proposals were adopted although some minor elements of the German/Netherlands proposal were accepted. The Russians were mollified somewhat by the change of name to OSCE and, potentially, by the prospect of a serious discussion on a "model of common and comprehensive security for our region for the twenty-first century." The results of this discussion were to be submitted to the next Summit Meeting, in Lisbon in 1996.

Both at OSCE Headquarters in Vienna and at NATO Headquarters outside of Brussels, most of 1996 was accordingly devoted to the elaboration of the proposed Security Model for the Twenty-first Century. Discussions in both locales during the summer of that year showed considerable anticipation, mingled with apprehension, about the end result of the study and its hoped-for implementation at the Lisbon Summit Meeting. It was also readily apparent that hopes for a favorable outcome were closely intermeshed with the thorny question of NATO's eventual expansion into Central and Eastern Europe.

Questions as to whether to expand NATO at all, when, and to whom, tended to dominate any discussion of further developments

in the European security field. There was considerable speculation among the delegates in Brussels and Vienna that Russia hoped to get some quid pro quo in CSCE for NATO's move eastward. It remains difficult to imagine, however, what concessions in the CSCE framework could compensate Russia for the incorporation of its former satellites into a military alliance originally engendered by the desire to defend its members against its Soviet precursor. A more likely scenario would foresee some kind of compensation for Russia in the provisions of the CFE Treaty, a development which has been under way for some time. It might also assuage Russian chagrin if some steps could be taken to emphasize the binding nature of CSCE commitments, even if converting them into specific legal obligations appears to be out of the question.

After President Yeltsin's successful reelection bid in the spring of 1996, the Western countries, and particularly the U.S., hoped that the summit gathering in Lisbon would provide a propitious setting for a one-on-one meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin which could stimulate a serious attempt to come to closure on a number of issues. Experience with the Russian Government seemed clearly to show that only Yeltsin's personal involvement in an issue would permit real progress to be registered on important issues. Yeltsin's continuing ill health unfortunately put paid to those hopes and in the event neither President attended the Lisbon meeting.

Whatever its end-game strategy for the negotiations on OSCE's future, the Russian Government returned to the charge along the lines of its previous proposals. In a memorandum of March 21, 1996, the Federation called for a political declaration which would be large-scale and comprehensive. Specifically, it called for the "Elaboration of a European Security Charter which would reflect the realities of present-day Europe and be comparable to the Helsinki Final Act in terms of its importance." On such a basis, it proposed moving towards "treaty and legal shaping of the security system in the OSCE region." Such a treaty would, it argued, provide for "a network of agreements on the coordination and allocation of functions between existing European and Euro-Atlantic institutions and structures." The Russian memorandum also called for "possible establishment in the future of a Security Council for Europe (or the OSCE Executive Committee) which would have appropriate powers."

Recapitulating some of its earlier proposals again, the memorandum called for the "substantial strengthening of the OSCE and its legal foundation", as well as the "introduction of a practice of convening 'Regional Tables', the streamlining and improvement of the Organization's institutions and mechanisms; and coordination of their activities with those of the Security

Council and other UN bodies. Finally, the Russian Federation proposed the "Convening in 1997-1998 of a European Conference entitled 'Europe of the 21st Century', to be attended both by the OSCE participating states and existing multilateral structures, with the aim of establishing and launching mechanisms of the interagency division of labor'"

The renewed Russian attempt to provide itself with a level of influence "more equal than others" via an OSCE Executive Committee or through a direct link with the UN Security Council, where it enjoys a veto, was not received any more warmly than its proposals at Budapest had been in 1994. Some OSCE participants found merit in a few of the Russian ideas but their end purpose was too transparent to attract wide spread support. As a result, the Russian initiative would find very few echoes in the eventual Lisbon Declaration.

When OSCE convened again at summit level in Lisbon early in December 1996, its leaders nodded in the direction of Russian wishes by promising "to establish a co-operative foundation for our common security." They also decided to continue their efforts to further enhance OSCE's "efficiency as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation capabilities." Further, it described the separate Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century as "as a comprehensive expression of our endeavor to strengthen security and stability in the OSCE region; as such it complements the mutually reinforcing efforts of other European and Transatlantic institutions and organizations in this field."

The Russian delegation could also take some satisfaction in the summit declaration's recognition of its "Regional Tables" concept as it welcomed "various initiatives fostering sub-regional dialogue and cooperation..." It was probably less content with the declaration's words about the situations in Georgia and Moldova and its tentative welcome of "recent steps towards a peaceful settlement in Chechnya, Russian Federation." The summit leaders also reaffirmed their "utmost support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders" and in the same context condemned a variety of actions which it considered to "undermine the positive efforts undertaken to promote political settlement of these conflicts." They did, however, agree that the Russian Federation should continue, as part of the International Community, represented by the United Nations and the OSCE, to serve as a "facilitator" in the search for a peaceful settlement there.

The summit declaration further noted that some progress had

been made towards a political settlement in Moldova but asserted that "real political will was needed now to overcome the remaining difficulties." High on the list of those difficulties was clearly the continued presence of Russian troops, in spite of the Moldo-Russian agreement of October 21, 1994 on their withdrawal. The summit leaders indicated that "We expect an early, orderly and complete withdrawal of the Russian troops."

The actual Declaration on a Comprehensive Security Model for the Twenty-First Century proved to be rather thin gruel, disappointing a number of delegations, including the Russian. It seems clear that some NATO members, and particularly the United States, wished to avoid any serious progress toward such a model as long as the more important issue of NATO expansion remained unsettled. Consequently, the final text bristles with such generalities as the pledge to "create a common security space free of dividing lines in which all states are equal partners....The OSCE plays a central role in achieving our goal of a common security space."

The Security Model Declaration again makes a gesture toward Russia's desire to "encourage bilateral or regional initiatives" and allows that "In exceptional circumstances the participating states may jointly decide to refer a matter to the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the OSCE" if its action may be required under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²⁹ In another gesture, not so clearly in accord with Russian wishes, although it could have wide application, the Model Declaration noted that, "Within the OSCE, no State, organization, or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region, or regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence."

With specific reference to the Security Model, the summit leaders insisted that "Our work on the security model is well under way and will actively continue. We instruct our representatives to work energetically on the security model...." and asked for a report to the next OSCE Ministerial Council, in Copenhagen in December 1997. Their declaration also sets out a rather bland agenda for continuation of work on the security model. Although unspoken, an understanding seems to exist that resolution of the NATO expansion issue would permit a more robust agreement on a security model to emerge in December. There is also a current of thought which points out that such declarations are, after all, largely hortatory in nature. The real importance of the Lisbon summit, in this view, is the progress that was made on more concrete issues, such as the promise to rework the CFE to

²⁹ Emphasis added.

adapt it to the new political and military realities in Europe.

Although the Lisbon Conference was in many ways only a reprise of Budapest, all parties appear to see hopes for more significant moves toward agreement during 1997. The most contentious issues remain the Russian push to emphasize the binding nature of OSCE commitments and the American resistance to allowing OSCE to become the centerpiece for the envisaged new security structure in Europe. An intensified series of negotiations; bilateral, multilateral, and "multiple bilateral" are foreseen as the mechanism to achieve tangible results, which could then be codified at the December meeting in Copenhagen.

IX

Henry Kissinger has, in his perceptive fashion, often pointed to the irony behind the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty. American proponents, including then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, felt obliged to deny vigorously the fact that NATO was a military alliance because of the American public's aversion to balance of power concepts. It was instead justified by the "doctrine of collective security, which Wilson had first put forward as the alternative to the alliance system....In short, the Atlantic Alliance, not really being an alliance, possessed a claim to moral universality.....Thus the European balance of power was being resurrected in uniquely American rhetoric." ³⁰ Many years later, when the Conference on Security and Cooperation came into being, and it really was intended to be a collective security organization, its existence could, among the confirmed opponents of realpolitik, take some of the moral high ground away from NATO.

A more important problem the CSCE faced, and its successor still faces is the comparative ignorance about its multifaceted activities among American and Canadian citizens. What little media coverage CSCE/OSCE has received in North America has dealt almost entirely with human rights questions. Also, Canadian and U.S. newspapers and other media still persistently refer to OSCE as a "European" organization, ignoring its Transatlantic character. To Europeans, on the other hand, human rights is only one aspect of the "Helsinki process", which has had an important bearing on European security issues and, potentially, on economic questions as well. More important, perhaps, North American critics tend to underestimate the extent to which the existence of the Helsinki process reinforces the ability of the United

³⁰ Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994) p. 460

States and Canada to maintain close cooperation with their European partners across a broad spectrum of political, economic, and security measures.

More broadly, the Helsinki process can be seen as an essential backdrop against which have been staged the more contentious and concrete dramas of military and economic rivalry, such as the deployment and elimination of nuclear as well as conventional weapons. The 1984 CDE Conference in Stockholm and its successor gatherings have continued to play an essential part in establishing the kind of Confidence and Security Building Measures that mitigate against the revival of military competition in Europe. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that effective Confidence Building Measures are not designed to increase the confidence of possible antagonists in one another. Rather, they serve to strengthen confidence in one's own ability to deal with any military contingency posed by the actions of others. OSCE has also played a helpful role in the economic development of Eastern Europe and the lands formerly part of the Soviet Union. At the same time, of course, all of the participating states continue to pursue in OSCE their national aims and thus, in classic diplomatic fashion, to expand their own freedom of action and to limit that of their rivals and possible adversaries.

The lengthy negotiations which led to the Helsinki Final Act initiated a new kind of diplomacy, or at least a new way of keeping score, and its follow-on meetings have illustrated both its weak and strong points. Among those weak points on the presentational side is the fact that there is no voting and, therefore, no clear indication of the relative degree of support for contending viewpoints. All decisions, even on such mundane matters as taking a coffee break, require a consensus of all the participants. As a result, the terminology agreed at OSCE meetings tends to be even more bland than that put forward in the United Nations by sponsors who hope to garner as many favorable votes as possible on a particular issue. On the other hand, practically universal membership in OSCE ensures that every nation, no matter how small, can be assured of an opportunity to make its views known to the nations most important to it.

Looking back at the Cold War and its abrupt end shortly after the Vienna Review Conference in 1989, it seems clear that the CSCE process proved to be a useful if rather blunt instrument for encouraging a more liberal attitude in the East toward emigration and human rights questions. It was also effective in working toward more "transparency" in the military security field. At a minimum, CSCE scrutiny required the Soviet Union and its allies to pay a certain political price for its refusal to live up to their Helsinki commitments. In particular, it helped

seriously to weaken the impact of Soviet propaganda on Western European audiences, some of which had been only too ready to welcome uncritically Soviet protestations of good will and peaceful intent.

At the very least one can argue that during the Cold War period CSCE erected a standard to which the wise and honest could repair. It is, perhaps, only an indication of what La Rochefoucauld called the "homage vice pays to virtue" that many who were neither wise nor honest tried to take up positions under the same banner. The CSCE process did, however, provide some self-corrective for that tendency, by the way it allowed such hypocrisy to be exposed to public view. This did, in fact, provide some incentive for nations to live up to their commitments.

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The end of the Cold War has unfortunately led to the revival of long repressed nationalist rivalries in the Balkans, as elsewhere, sometimes exacerbated by what has been termed the clash of cultures. Several continuing problem areas have recently lent themselves to OSCE intercession, including Moscow's often strained relations with the Baltic states. OSCE missions to areas rich now principally in ethnic hostility, such as Georgia, Abkhazia, Tajikistan, and Nagorno-Karabakh have, in spite of numerous setbacks, served to reduce the level of military conflict there. In addition, the fate of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Ukraine, and Serbia has apparently been favorably influenced by OSCE ministrations, leveraged by the possibility of eventual Hungarian membership in NATO.

As explored more fully below, OSCE, in cooperation with NATO, has labored, with considerable effect, to ameliorate the endemic struggles in Bosnia and Macedonia. It may perhaps be able to assist also in moderating some of the inflamed issues elsewhere in former Yugoslavia, in Kosovo for example, and even in Albania. OSCE's continuing review of successful efforts to maximize deterrence and minimize provocation among and within states could perhaps offer some helpful examples to the groups presently in conflict in several of those areas.

CSCE (and the UN) have often been criticized by the NATO partners for their inability to fashion tangible results on the political front. In fairness, however, one must concede that the military role, at least as conceived by its leaders, is much simpler than the civilian one. Military responsibilities have been largely confined to the concrete problems of boundary

separation and keeping the various factions from applying military violence to one another. In contrast, CSCE and the UN must be the great persuaders, inducing groups and individuals to cooperate, cease discrimination, and live together in peace on disputed territories.

The sometimes patchwork nature of the division of responsibilities in former Yugoslavia has, of course, provided many opportunities for verbal sniping from all sides in an attempt to avoid blame or direct it at others. Impatience and frustration have occasionally reached a dangerous pitch but cooler heads and the passage of time have usually led to more healthy sentiments. In fairness to all, it must be admitted that the international community has been saddled with an almost impossible task in Bosnia. The Balkans is one of those regions which truly "produces more history than it consumes" and Bosnia appears to be the focal point for all the animosities that geographic propinquity and historic grievances can produce.

In Bosnia and nearby areas, moreover, NATO and the OSCE are only two of a number of interlocking organizations which have worked to temper the excesses created by underlying tensions and hostilities. Throughout former Yugoslavia there has been a proliferation of agencies and individuals working on the ground to repair the damage caused by the war and prepare the way for an eventual peaceful recovery. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina oversees the operation and restructuring of civil police while the European Commission and the World Bank work on economic reconstruction. The U.N.'s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCR) is responsible for humanitarian relief, refugees, and displaced persons but the International Committee of the Red Cross cares for prisoners of war. The High Representative, former Swedish Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, is active in all those fields but has no direct authority in any of them.

To continue the list of OSCE tasks in Bosnia, it has the responsibility for arms control implementation, but again has to rely on military expertise and support from NATO. In addition, OSCE's monitoring of human rights is an important part of its functions but UNHCR and OHR are also much concerned. A similar pattern of overlapping functions is reflected in the preparation for and conduct of elections. OSCE carries the primary responsibility on this question but can only carry out its responsibility because of NATO's extensive support. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is, of course, much involved in election matters as well. Although few observers would characterize the elections of September 14, 1996 as free and fair, there appears to be wide-spread agreement that the results probably reflect the general will of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Nevertheless, there has been considerable criticism of the OSCE's performance in organizing and conducting the elections. In spite of this, one must grant the organization and its associates a good deal of credit for undertaking a most difficult and thankless task. One can hope that the experience of taking part in multi-party elections and particularly the conduct of the multinational staff which makes them possible, will provide an incentive for the still unreconciled populations of Bosnia to try once more to live together in peace, as they did for so many years. The outcome of the repeatedly postponed municipal elections, now scheduled for September 1997, should demonstrate how realistic such hopes are.

In short, international operations in Bosnia are a prime example of alphabet soup - with a good deal of overlap on nearly all questions. This has, however, not prevented effective joint action on a number of questions and, in spite of occasional personal or organizational perturbations, the general level of cooperation has been commendable. Earlier tensions between UN officials and the staff of UNPROFOR have been much attenuated through the latter's replacement by a NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) and more recently by the smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR). This holds true even though NATO operations continue to fall under the authority of the UNSC.

An encouraging example of serendipity may be discerned in the way common tasks have encouraged the further growth of cooperation among nations formerly lined up militantly against one another. NATO's creation of its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in January 1994 has greatly facilitated its operations in Bosnia, initially through its links with Hungary and Albania and later with 12 of the other PfP members who have provided forces for IFOR. In addition, the other participants in IFOR were Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia and Morocco, all of which except for Malaysia have been taking part in NATO's Mediterranean Initiative.

The memberships of PfP and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council now approximate the geographic spread of OSCE which, since the accession of tiny Andorra, numbers 55 members. All three groups have quite different functions, of course, with NACC devoting itself to broad multilateral discussions while PfP is essentially a bi-lateral framework for cooperation between NATO and the individual Partner nations. However, the personal and professional links created in one organization can sometimes facilitate parallel cooperation in the others.

Assuming that cooperation between OSCE and the NATO family of nations is logical and sometimes necessary, the question arises as to whether tighter structural links between them should

be established. But the necessity for closer cooperation between NATO and OSCE in areas such as Bosnia has already required and encouraged the growth of interlocking mechanisms to deal with joint problems. Moreover, although a number of members in both organizations have discouraged formal ties between them, in practice a significant amount of cross consultation now takes place on a regular basis. The objective in this, which does not appear to encounter serious objection, is to ensure coherence and mutual reinforcement across a wide spectrum of common problems.

As noted above, an important step in this direction was taken by NATO Foreign Ministers as early as their Oslo meeting in June 1992. At that time, they offered support, on a case-to-case basis, to CSCE activities in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. Following that decision, NATO's Senior Political Committee developed a set of principles for such support, without regard to whether it would come from national or collective assets. NATO subsequently made a similar offer to the United Nations.

In the case of OSCE, enhanced relations with NATO have been founded on closer contacts between the respective Secretariats and with the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE, as well as the exchange of relevant documents and participation in meetings and seminars. In the autumn of 1995, the North Atlantic Council acted to carry such contacts further, including systematic representation in one another's meetings. A representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office now briefs various NATO and NACC gatherings on OSCE developments. The OSCE has a permanent place in the Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping and briefings of the group by the Chairman-in-Office are valued highly. Other OSCE officials, such as the Secretary General and the Director of the Conflict Prevention Center, participate in appropriate NATO seminars. In line with this general policy, the Swiss Foreign Minister, Flavio Cotti, was invited to attend the NACC Ministerial in June 1996 and to make a presentation on current OSCE issues.

NATO officials, for their part, have reciprocated by increasingly frequent participation in OSCE meetings. NATO's Secretary General attends, either personally or through his representative, all OSCE Ministerial Council Meetings and Summits, as well as sessions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. High level NATO officials have spoken to OSCE gatherings on such matters as the Partnership for Peace and the Alliance's role in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, NATO and NACC officials have taken part in a number of OSCE seminars, such as those on CSBM's, military doctrines, peacekeeping, early-warning and conflict prevention, plus those on the OSCE Security Model. The NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping has been a particularly useful forum for discussing issues in that area. Similarly, the

practical cooperation activities carried out in the PfP framework have made possible a significant improvement in the ability of NATO members to work effectively with PfP in peacekeeping operations, whether mandated by the OSCE or the United Nations.

NATO has extended notable assistance to OSCE by making available to it verification experts with many years of experience in the implementation of the CFE Treaty. NATO has also provided tangible support to the continuing negotiations set up under the Dayton Agreement. Highly qualified professionals from NATO's Verification and Implementation Coordination Section (VICS) have helped to ensure suitable verification provisions in those negotiations and courses have been held to train inspectors. NATO military officers have been stationed in Vienna as personal advisers to the Chairmen where they serve as a channel between the negotiators, NATO Headquarters and IFOR/SFOR. All of this interaction has built a very practical system of daily cooperation which can not fail to enhance the ability of NATO, OSCE, and related organizations to deal with future crises in the European and Transatlantic areas.

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One can now, and none too soon, return to the original question posed by this study, i.e., whether NATO and the OSCE are destined to be partners or rivals in the post-Cold War era. In the light of the foregoing analysis, the answer appears to be a resounding "Yes and No." The affirmative side of that conclusion may be observed most convincingly in the extent of the cooperation and mutual support the two organizations have demonstrated in the conflict laden area of what was formerly Yugoslavia. At the same time, personal and institutional rivalries persist, in Bosnia and elsewhere. On balance, however, there are clearly more "Pluses" than "Minuses" on the final balance sheet.

OSCE and NATO, like the many other organizations spawned by Pan-European sentiments since the end of World War II, both have their strengths and weaknesses and strive to fulfill their original mandates. From this optic, NATO retains its essential character as a defensive fence against possible military threats, particularly from the East. OSCE, on the other hand, is still a bridge, designed to facilitate peaceful intercourse among its numerous members. NATO is sometimes described as OSCE's Executive Agent, dealing with low intensity conflicts which do not call for major military operations.

Fortunately for the purposes of this study, both fences and bridges provide important components for a stable and secure

European and Transatlantic area. NATO can be seen as the "architectural" element in the equation, while OSCE's role seems to be more along "horticultural" lines. The eminent British historical, Michael Howard, has recently recognized this concept with his comments,

"....I am always uneasy when I hear our American friends talk about 'a new European architecture'. Peoples are not building blocks; neither are we building on an open-field site. If there has to be an analogy let it be that of a garden. The peoples of Europe and their institutions should be regarded as distinct and living organisms, rooted in the particular soil of their regions...Like all plants, their institutions need manuring, training, and sometimes drastic pruning of dead or diseased vegetation. Weeds must be watched for and eradicated."³¹

Fully agreeing with Prof. Howard's views, one must still insist that minimal architecture is sometimes essential. While even the best trellis will not sustain growth without proper soil, water, sunshine and encouragement (fertilizer), a sturdy fence is often required to protect one's garden from the appetites of assorted predators. Accordingly, until NATO members are fully convinced of Russia's democratic orientation, there will be a felt need for some kind of joint protection against a renewal of imperial appetites in Moscow.

At the same time, OSCE may be envisaged as fertile ground on which to pursue the kind of creative horticulture which can stimulate the further healthy development of European security and prosperity. For, as Michael Howard also points out, "the work of cultivation is never ending." One can only add that "mending fences" is also a vital chore which must continue if the beneficial elements of nature are to bear fruit.

March 12, 1997

³¹ Howard, Michael, in The Washington Post, March 5, 1997