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**FINAL REPORT**

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**TOWARDS CO-OPERATION OR CONFLICTS: DEVELOPING WESTERN AND RUSSIAN  
APPROACHES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONS  
(Abstract)**

The Project examines a number of patterns and trends in Russian and Western approaches to problems of European security. A special emphasis is made on international institutions as main features of the new geopolitical order in Europe. Using a wide interpretation of international security and risks (which may include a lot of non-military issues as well), author sought to identify the concrete role and relevance of institutions in that regard.

One of basic assumptions was, that there still exists a wide gape between security-instruments inherited from Cold war and real challenges of today's Europe. From that standpoint, ways decision-makers are thinking and acting is of tremendous importance. This, in turn, implies the problem of how their particular conduct is influenced by traditions, experiences, but most of all - by specific interests.

Author attempted to give an objective overview of interests and motives as related to countries, constituencies and to individuals as well. Levels of comprehension towards security environment and their relevance has been studied.

The project illustrates on a number of examples the increasing diversity of perceptions of today's Europe and its problems. In many cases, this diversity can seriously hampers joint international efforts towards security risks.

Author pursues the idea of similarity of many developments in Russia and in the West in security field. By all its political and cultural differences, Europe displays, after "iron Curtain" removed, a high degree of integrity, which has to be taken into account while tackling with modern security problems.

NATO as one of dominant institutional factors in Europe will have to adopt to new European realities more actively. A number of initiatives in NATO's co-operation with Russia has become eminent in that regard.

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**CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.**

Every next war in Europe ended with imposition of a new **order** manifesting the effected redistribution of power and roles among the states. So was the Cold war. Its aftermath is marked by an unprecedented activity in establishing and recombining a wide net of intergovernmental bodies, or **institutions**, They are bound to maintain and to manage the European geopolitical framework for the time to come.

The booming of institutions we witness is coherent with the extreme complexity and dynamism of the current European situation as well as with the increasing interdependency among all its elements. It also reflects eagerness of power centres to extend their influence and control ever further. The institutions in Europe develop to major sphere of international performance for political elites, attracting a growing amount of resources, mass-media coverage and scholarly efforts.

Contrary to armed controversies of the past, the Cold war did not concluded with a formal surrender - let alone the unconditional one - of any state or army. Rather, it culminated in display of universal, reciprocally-attained unity, accompanied by proclaimed commitments to common values throughout the rim "from Vancouver to Vladivostok". Apart from the problem of how the historic Charters adopted since 1990 correspond to the cultural diversity covered by their jurisdiction, that outcome of intra-block confrontation has implanted a number of ambiguities into the new European order. There's no unquestioned political and military authority emerged which, as it used to be in previous peace-settlements, might have immediately introduced an omni-effective mode of conduct.

Yet, the general vector of the new international architecture, seems, after a short period of uncertainty and speculations, to be given. Whatever the outcome of coming debates and votings, a two-pillar structure will evolve, reflecting the changing shape of the West itself. This structure will be enveloped into a transformed NATO with several outlets from it - to the east and maybe to the south as well.

The implementation of that design into a viable political entity will be a lengthy one. The agenda of NATO's enlargement to the east alone stretches, according to some weighty estimates, up to two decades (1). Thus, we're at the outset of a major, almost globally-framed and historically-conceived reconstruction. Every government and political force will have to orient their strategies and visions on that perspective.

Experts and scholars face the challenging mission to reassess many of ongoing political, economic and social developments in particular countries and regions against the backdrop of this NATO-sponsored project. The wide range of modern world's risks as well as the related security-policies have to be put into this context as well.

The situation of **Russia** is special in many regards. First of all - because of its nuclear status which for the perceivable future will uphold a strategic barrier between it and the West. Expectations for a rapid rapprochement between Russia and the West through participation in common security institutions must be tempered for that reason alone.

Furthermore, the "Russian universe" has again came into an intensive movement and thus appears the less comprehensible and less predictable than ever. The observers hardly manage to follow even visible flows and changes in Russia. The organic, generally hidden tendencies, let alone their driving forces, can often be identified only by analytical guessing coupled with a good deal of intuition. Keeping in mind Russia's mass-destruction arsenals, the situation there may be the best illustration for the "wild card"-perceptions endorsed by Defence Secretary W.Cohen in his contouring of the next century's security agenda (2).

From that standpoint, the applied politology must try to combine the balance-of-power notion, traditionally pivotal in interpreting relationship between Russia and the West, with a more **structures- and dynamic-oriented approach**. This would come in line with growing heterogeneity of Russia's society which is now in process of radical restructuring accompanied by a sweeping redistribution of roles and powers.

An adequate transcript of Russian realities requires, therefore, focusing primarily on effective functions and linkages rather than on formal statuses and affiliations. Formal patterns should basically not be taken at their face-value. Officially nominated hierarchy of "subjects of the Russian Federation" suggests almost nothing about real relationship between Moscow and its provinces. The key figures of the Russian economy - the "financial-industrial groups" - have only a remote semblance to what they present in accountant reports or on international fairs. Moscow's decision-making process in foreign policy may, in its appearance, have much in common with Western procedures. Still, it works on totally different principles. The same applies to relevancy of statements, of declared strategies, etc.

The end of the Cold war has provoked profound transformation in other parts of the OSCE-confined community as well, the developed West being no exception. There exists, mainly disregarded, kind of **parallelism** between developments in Russia and in both NATO and EU areas, deriving from a deep-rooted structural integrity of the entire zone.

Yet, in Russia, many otherwise widely-spread phenomena and problems are tending to their extreme, catastrophe-near forms. Similarly substantiated processes may develop quite normal and steady in Germany while converting to real risks and dangers in Russia (take economic or military reforms as examples).

This provides ground for "resonance-effects", when outbreaks on one end of Eurasia (say, an intra-ethnically conflict) provoke repercussions - if of a lesser intensity - on other ends of it or even beyond the Atlantic. Having been released from rigid Cold war constraints, the integrity-factors sometimes display their destabilizing capacity as well.

That problem is of serious importance for policy-planning. Russia's prolonged crisis, in its multiple manifestations, can eventually serve as a kind of "early warning" for the West, thus allowing to consider pre-emptive counter-measures ("pre-emptive diplomacy" as one of options).

Evolution of the post-Cold war institutions has raised the problem of **basic compatibility** between Russia and Western countries. This has become, in fact, the key conceptual pattern in assessing ways and chances for co-operation between them in various fields. The good will showed by policy-makers, if even on both sides, will not guarantee success of joint institution-building efforts while centrifugal forces, showed by larger constituencies, still prevail. Some experts - from Samuel Huntington to more practice-connected analysts (see 3,4,5) - have raised doubts on the idea of security- and institutional cohesion between Russia and the West after Cold war. Others put more weight on pragmatic, step-by-step efforts. They believe, that co-operation in key security issues will be that "golden clue", which would bring Russia and the West into a genuine mega-community in future.

As Secretary General J.Solana has said in one of his recent speeches, "A European security architecture worth its name must be one that gives the largest European State, Russia, its rightful place. The opening of NATO is therefore in no sense aimed at isolating or

marginalising Russia. We know that in the long run we will not be able to achieve increased security in Europe without Russia, let alone against it" (6).

This report follows a broad interpretation of *international security* by attaching to it a wide spectrum of military and non-military factors (7,8).

Expressed positions as well as activities displayed in dealing with European security can characterise certain *approaches* to these problems. Interplay of Russian and Western approaches to European security and institutions have been monitored in the course of this project, thus representing its *main issue*.

The project's *scope* has been largely determined by the author's overview of developments concerned, by availability of information and by space of this study.

The project, in accordance with initial proposal, has been essentially aimed at:

- comparing approaches in Russia and the West to problems of European security and security-relevant institutions;
- identifying zones of potential conflicts and of co-operation in that regard;
- examining driving forces, origins and motives of conduct in security matters;
- outlining the interest-patterns of particular states, bodies, groups and other "actors";
- tracing of how security concepts influence political decision-making;
- evaluating effectiveness and roles of institutions and of related policies in managing the problems of European security in future.

The author has collected an extensive dossier of publications, reports, statements, interviews, Internet-postings and other kinds of information. A part of it is presented and commented in this report

The methodological shortcomings of many of scholarly publications and opinions are to be seen primarily in overgeneralization of the institutional process in Europe. The geopolitically relevant international organisations are sometimes considered like homogenous entities with rigid hierarchical links within and between them. The dynamic exchanges among various motives, interests and priorities are often neglected. As related to Russia, where governmental bodies themselves constitute just some of rivalling groups, that kind of approach is especially misleading.

In that regard, a valuable contribution to the project has been provided by a series of reports published by North Atlantic Assembly and by WEU-Assembly during the latest years. Many of these reports are problem-oriented and address most complicated and controversial issues of today's Europe. The more constructive are the recommendation they suggest for policy-making. Regrettably, such analytical masterpieces are not known broadly enough to Russian scholars.

During the project's period, the author conducted a number of interviews with officials and experts from Russia (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Administration of president, State Duma) and from other countries. His judgements on Russia's external relations are partly based on experiences from a close co-operation with Moscow-city government and with other regional administrations.

A number of meetings in Belgium, Germany, the UK has been very instructive as well.

Being convinced, that strong links exist between developments on various geopolitical levels in Europe, the author sought to pay constant attention to situation in one of the most sensitive places - the Baltics and in Estonia in particular (as accredited correspondent of a Moscow-based news-paper in Tallinn).

12 titles have been published during the research period (see the List of publications) dealing with issues covered by this project. Some of them provoked public interests, were vividly discussed in Russian and international media.

The intermediary results of the project have been presented in NATO HQ: at two seminars (June 1996, January 1997) and at a study day (March 1997). The author would like to express appreciations to NATO-officials who supported him during these visits.

## **CHAPTER II. ORIGINS AND MOTIVES OF RUSSIA'S CONDUCT TOWARDS EUROPE**

The only Soviet government able to produce an elaborated "concept" or "political strategy" towards Europe were the Bolsheviks just after the 1917 Revolution. Their perceptions were based on Marx theory and on their own experiences during emigration or study at European universities. But most of all - on aspiration to guarantee and to legitimise their rule in Russia by attaching it to the "United States of Europe". All methods, including subversion and terror, were considered right, both domestically and internationally, to attain that goal, (1).

The subsequent communist leaders have gradually abandoned these ideas (but not the slogan itself) and joined the rivalry among major imperialistic powers. The ways and technics of Soviet international conduct became in the course of years increasingly sophisticated. This provided Moscow with substantial influence in various parts of the continent. On the other hand, all long-term visions have continually degenerated down to confrontational thinking and to quite plain geopolitical models.

Even after *détente* gained momentum in the 70-s, the Kremlin had not much to offer to international community in terms of concepts or practical co-operation, apart from rather primitive trade-exchanges and arms-control (the latter being generally conceived as "same policy through other means").

Especially striking was, during that more liberal and open period, the lack of positive initiatives and constructive projects towards European neighbours. Quite revealing is the fact, that the first fully-fledged "European" think-tank in Moscow, the Institute for European studies, has been launched only in 1987, i.e. far more later than its homogenes for the US., Africa, Latin America and others. Its major duty became promotion of Gorbachev's "common European home"-theory. The latter, yet, has hardly ever exceeded the scope of an intellectual exercise or of a typical Politburo-intrigue aimed against the "old guard" and their archaic doctrines (2).

As a result, the post-Soviet government of Russia inherited no workable concept to proceed with relationships to Europe. While the Western states were able to develop post-Cold war policies with a great deal of continuity, Moscow had to face a twofold challenge: to regain authority over the crisis-plagued country, and to elaborate a new kind of foreign strategy, starting practically from scratch. As later recognised, a lot of mistakes in policy-planning and -making have been made at that stage due to loss of adequate perception-criteria, often being substituted by ideological biases (3).

To assess properly Moscow's official posture towards Europe and European security during the latest years, one should not miss the problem of **awareness** of new Russian leaders regarding international environment and Russia's place in it. While being engaged into consulting process at various bodies, the author have been often confronted with, mildly expressed, unconventional perceptions of these matters, displayed even by high-ranking officials.

E.g., there exists a rather limited understanding of how, in fact, NATO, EU and other organisations are operating and what the legal nature of their central bodies is. Only minority of people involved, appeared to have an adequate idea about the basic differences between NATO and EU in that respect. Consequently, a number of misunderstandings concerning the role of NATO's Secretary General, or of the EU-Commission, have been frequently occurring. This has been reflected, e.g., in a number of official Duma and even MFA documents as well as in statements of political leaders.

There is still a tendency to see relationship between Russia and its Western partners through lens of numerical proportions of military arsenals, territories, etc., rather than while comparing key macroeconomic data. Therefore, some views and statements are based on a considerably distorted world picture (4).

Most Russian politicians somehow refrain from discussing the problem of international indebtedness. This is a sharp contrast to how a similar issue has been treated in countries of Latin America in the 80-s. Yet, Russia's foreign debt has meanwhile reached the record of ca. \$140 billions. The system of debt-servicing tends, in fact, to dominate the entire decision-making of Russian government. Major economically-relevant measures, including Yeltzin's decrees, are only part of international financing programmes (5, 6). One of the most meaningful indications for Russia's future is, that in the next decade the debt-repayment will reach \$10 billion annually, or 10% of national budget (7). Regarding this, the alleged link between financial and geopolitical agendas of Russia, as cited in domestic and international press prior to Clinton-Yeltzin summit in Helsinki appears not so improbable (8).

**"Views from outside"** on Russian foreign policy-making are also not free from some misperceptions. Comprehending motivations and origins of Russian conduct seem to remain among most serious problems for Western analysis.

Persistence of bi-polarity-clichés is reflected in inclination to see Russian politics as a constant opposition between "good and evil" (Democrats against communists and nationalists, "Westerners" against "Eurasianists" - see 9,10).

It suffice then for many observers to detect (or to believe so) a move to either side, and a conclusion reads: "Russia, despite its own internal chaos, has made a decisive and strategic military-economic turn towards a Pax Russica, i.e. imperial reintegration to its south and west, and is reasserting its position in Central Europe and the Balkans. Russia's military-diplomatic intervention into the Bosnian war (! - V.K.) and strong opposition to other European states' inclusion in NATO are the most visible manifestation of this process." (11)

Alex Pravda, Director of Russian and East European Center (Oxford) seems to reach the "heart of the matter" when he says referring to such judgements: "Alternative between democrats and reactioneers fits well into West's own perceptions".(12)

Other views imply a well-accustomed tendency to see a consolidated, if weakened, power "on the other side". Only this basic assumption can induce inventories of all-Russian

"interests" or "national priorities": "Russia's objectives in Europe are: to ensure a strong role for Russia in shaping the post-Cold War European security order; to prevent NATO from becoming the core of a new European security system excluding Russia; to keep Eastern Europe as a neutral buffer zone; to contain German power".(13)

Still, use of "Westerners vs. "nationalists/slavophiles" -terms can sometimes bring interesting empirical results. A valuable contribution in that regard was made by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's representative office in Moscow in 1993. The large-scales polls conducted in various regions among the "elites", showed, e.g., that "Westerners" considered the US. and the UK as being main partners for Russia, while most "Slavophiles" gave they preferences to Germany. So, from German perspective, these "division-lines" among Russian constituencies may appear not so dramatic.

Apart from this, the Stiftung's researchers stated, that "A consensus among Russians was found only where territorial integrity is at stake. On European security, opinions are far less definite, active opposition being limited to a minority"

The study indicated a relatively low bias of those polled toward "Creation of an international security system". It ranked only 5th, lagging far behind a rather isolationistically-sensed top-priority of "minimising costs for international security to concentrate rather on domestic problems".(14)

Some researchers see in the immense diversity and mobility of modern Russia's domestic structures rejection of any reasonable behaviour towards the West at all: "..there is no Russian "policy", merely a "complex" struggle between interests and cliques" (15).

Others, while recognising extreme inequalities in distribution of wealth and power in Russia, interpret this rather as coming of oligarchic, relatively well-co-ordinated, structures into place of former over-centralisation. "The current regime is not a personal dictatorship but an alliance of powerful regional economic and political forces".(16). This, of course, implies a totally different image of Russian state, presumably capable enough to pursue some external objectives.

The economy, in whatever condition it appears today, seems to contain main driving forces for acting on international arena. The well-known American analyst Paul Goble gives a penetrating assessment in this regard: " Moscow's foreign policy increasingly reflects Russian immediate economic needs and limited political possibilities rather than a long-term geopolitical conception. But at the same time, many of Moscow's latest moves on the diplomatic front suggest that the Russian government increasingly views economics not only as the reason for its conduct of foreign affairs but also as a lever to project influence over its neighbours. All the agreements reflect Moscow's increasing focus on economic issues rather than on a grand political design. In virtually every case, these agreements reduce the burdens on the Russian state budget. Or they increase the opportunities for new revenues either immediately or in the not so distant future. But in most cases, they do both. Consequently, while the economists now appear to have gained at the expense of the geopoliticians in the formulation of Russian foreign policy for the world at large, the latter may still have the last word in Moscow's approach to some of its weaker neighbours." (17).

The most influential units or "agents" in that context are "corporations". One of the prominent researchers of that phenomena in the West, John Galbraight, has transferred his analysis onto then Soviet soil. He pointed at "a paramount role of "corporation" in Russia as sources of interest". Those "corporations" - contrary to political parties - don't pretend state authority

but rather strive to influence state-machinery in own interests. In matters of foreign policy they pursue own, often quite mercantile goals".(18)

Taking basic economic features as a clue can bring to revealing suggestions on some longer-term trends: "A further orientation of production and export towards the needs of raw-materials-sectors is very probable. Russia will appear out from turbulences of transformation as a state with a medium economic potential and will belong to the group of medium European economies. The economic potential of that extent can not constitute a basis for an ambitious foreign policy. The reintegration in CIS-framework will meanwhile predominate".(19)

While Russian economy is "half way between reform and collapse", the Western interest would consist not so much in evolvement of a civil society in Russia but rather in contributing to a minimum of economic stability there (20).

This may correspond with views of former American ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock, who, while appealing for more pragmatism in seeking partnerships on the Russian side, pointed at desirability of what may be called a "twofold transparency" in that regard: "A sane relationship between Russia and the West presuppose an adequate perception of own and partner's interests. Moreover, a Russian government that fails to understand its own interests is the greatest threat" to the West."(21)

A short **review of main actors in Russian foreign policy-making** should, logically, be started with the role of **president**. According to constitution, he is the highest authority in determining country's international acting. For doing this in practice, he relies on support from MFA, MOD, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of CIS affairs, Ministry of Finance, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Federal Border Service and other constitutionally authorised bodies. To co-ordinate them more smoothly, a presidential Foreign policy council was formed in late 1995.

The latter move added yet another compact, decree-made organ to several others (Security council, Presidential council, Defence council, etc.) which now cover practically the entire sphere of state activity.

That family of councils constitutes a kind of framework for notorious "surrounding" - a complex clique of most influential individuals (bureaucrats, businessmen, some scholars, and till lately - a sportsman as well) who, in fact, compile what the president later says or signs concerning both domestic and international issues. The "surrounding" absorbs and summarises influences and interests from outside while remaining practically beyond control of legally empowered bodies. Moscow's political record after 1991 includes a lot of decisions initiated through the channels of "surrounding", i.e. via particular councils and presidential aides who, as a rule, are closely associated with one or several them. For Yeltzin himself this construction serves as yet another "check-and-balance"-device, this time within the closest reach. (22)

One of main written outputs of that process are annual presidential addresses. They mirror how political conjuncture in Moscow affected the official line in international affairs.

Comparing addresses over a couple of years shows, that the emphasis on rapprochement with the West and Europe in particular, after having been quite substantial in 1994, has been gradually reduced to 1997. A similar shift is apparent in respect to participation in international security institutions. Europe itself was in 1997 address referred four times less

frequently to than in 1995. After in 1996 the Partnership agreement with the EU has been qualified as "unprecedented one on scope and deepness", the EU was not even mentioned this year.

Relations to Ukraine, problems of CIS and "Russian-speakers" in the Baltics clearly occupied the central place in the concept of 1997 presidential address. Initially, this paper was composed with more accent on co-operation with Belarus reflecting efforts of former aide for international relations Ryurikow. Being associated with a group from a rather conservatively-minded group of politicians and high-ranking general, he made this to facilitated a broadly-conceived campaign towards integration with Minsk. But on insistence of A.Chubais, who just started to regain his positions around B.Yeltzin, those parts were shortened and substantially diluted.

One of the key-stones of "surrounding", the famous Security council (half-legal as well - see 23) has been over several years charged with elaborating of a new National security concept. The previous version appeared in parts within framework of Foreign policy concepts under SC-chairman Yu.Skokov in 1993. It called, i.a. to UN to grant Russia a special role in ensuring peace and stability throughout the fm. USSR, the Ukrainian being regarded as the major obstacle to it. As British military experts noted, "Russian policy makers are reluctant to see Ukraine move too far from Moscow's orbit." (24)

In spring of 1997, the priorities might have looked rather different. On insistence of the new SC-Chairman I.Rybkin, a "more flexible approach" has been reflected in the new draft, rejecting military threats to Russia and appealing to a closer co-operation with Ukraine on a bilateral basis.

Still, the presentation of the new concept has been postponed to incorporate the impact of agreements signed in the meantime with Ukraine as well with NATO. As Russian experts noted, "not the National security concept directs signing of international documents, but rather the latter, being signed, transform the concept itself". (25, 26)

**Organised political forces** in Russia display a wide but unstable spectrum of views on Europe and European security. Still, the general emphasis is clearly opposed to policies pursued by the president and his team. The parties and their leaders, being more closely tied to the real situation in the country, often transfer their critics against the Kremlin into international issues as well. This is most illustrative within Federal Assembly - the major arena of political performance in today's Russia.

This opposition between parliament and president became one of the few constants in the Russian politics. Western officials often express their discontent with the fact, that both chambers' participation on foreign policy-process has considerably complicated and slowed the advancing of important decisions, especially on arms-control: "In old days, we had a rubber stamp process and it was relatively easy. Now, I would say the Duma is probably corrupt, it's incompetent and it's dominated by communists and nationalists".

Contrary to B.Yeltzin, the left-wing opposition, which dominates Duma has learned to present their foreign policy views in few clear words. Despite a lesser access to mass-media they, this can, however, make a considerable impact on public opinion.

Communist leader Gennadii Zyuganov described in 1996 basics of his foreign policy as "extremely simple: maximum openness both to the West and to the East but with active support and protection for the internal market," He also argued that "everything that is

connected with the territory of the former USSR falls within the area of our vital interests." (28)

The communists are inherently suspicious towards NATO. Albert Makashov, a communist deputy in the Duma, said on Russia-NATO-Act: `` (The West) has often cheated Russia and they will probably cheat us this time as well because we have nothing to trade with," (29)

Nevertheless, the CPRF has so far refrained from more active moves against NATO. In accordance with their current tactics, the Communists do not pretend to much responsibility in key issues of state policy. The tempered position of the Communists on NATO may also have been resulted from a series of consultations their leaders had with minister Primakov in the course of the latter's talks with J.Solana.

The pro-Government "Our Home Russia" (NDR) faction gave to its opposition to NATO-enlargement a more balanced expression. It insisted on that limits on military activity outlined in the NATO-Russia Act should be legally binding and the Act as such must be subject to ratification. The NDR-leaders also constantly emphasise the role of the OSCE in Europe's security architecture. (30)

V.Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, used the NATO-issue, to advance his party's regional interests. Referring to financing problems in the LDPR-governed Pskov region, he demanded more federal subventions there, arguing that "The Russia- NATO Founding Act will make the Pskov region not merely a border region but a military zone". (31)

Irrespective particular motives, the group "Anti-NATO" has been established at the Duma uniting about 60% of deputies with Communists making over half of it. 25% of regional representatives from the Council of federation joint this group as well. A permanent "Anti-NATO" Commission was launched ready to attack the president any time in case further steps towards cooperation with NATO will be attempted..

Only about 15 deputies initiated the group under the name "For Atlantic dialogue". They appealed for contacts with parliamentarians from NATO-countries, for dissemination of objective information about NATO, supported enhancing of PFP-program and strengthening of civilian control over Russian armed forces.

Several activists of the radical Democratic Choice of Russia party ("Gaidar-party") founded the "Atlantic Union" proclaiming that "entering NATO and transformation of this defensive union into a political one must be Russia's main goal. If we are part of the European world then we must be in NATO." (32)

The "democratic opposition" as presented by "Yabloko"-faction eloquently criticised both NATO and the Russian president as well. "Yabloko"-prominence, Grigory Yavlinskiy declared, that "NATO's eastward expansion is an evidence that the West does not believe in Russia's becoming a democracy in the near future. The very fact of the expansion shows that the work done in Russia's foreign policy over five years has been in vain. NATO itself the expansion is a purely "bureaucratic exercise," as it does not solve the issue of the control over Russia's nuclear armaments, terrorism or environmental safety. Russia in itself is a large geopolitical figure which is supposed to progress in its own way. Russia cannot toe the West and until it has formulated its national interests it will continue to "sway from side to side".(33)

As to non-parliamentary forces, Alexander Lebed in his quality as leader of the "Peoples-Republican party" suggested, that "There cannot be any serious agreement now, because NATO is strong and we are weak." Still, in his professional view, the direct military threat posed by NATO expansion would not be great.(34)

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs** in Moscow started its post-Soviet activities issuing several conceptually-framed papers. The first basic document of that kind - "Foreign policy concept" - appeared as a draft in fall of 1992 and was formally adopted in 1993. Many observers noted both ideological and compilation-like nature of these and subsequent documents. They usually included a standard set of postulates like: "drawing a line under the past", "launching a new kind of foreign policy"; "return into international community", "preventing isolation from Europe", etc.

From the beginning, various sections of MFA lobbied for participation at international institutions. Council of Europe was most favoured target in that regard. Minister A.Kozyrjew welcomed many times the idea of Russia's joining of NATO as well, arguing that belonging to the same community of democratic states provides a solid fundament for this (35).

A.Kozyrjew's successor, Ye.Primakow, took a more cautious approach in that regard, trying to diversify Russia's external relations geographically. He refrains from extensive explanations on Moscow's foreign policy priorities stressing only pragmatism as the core of his concept.

Speaking in March of 1997 in Diplomatic Academy in Moscow he pointed out that prevention of war still remains top priority of Moscow's international strategy. In his view, abandoning of block-confrontation didn't led automatically to triumph of democratic principles in international relations. Regional conflicts, terrorism would long remain plagues for entire humanity. (36).

Ye.Primakow has succeeded with his main idea of combining links to the West and to NATO with more active relations with the East. While now his mission is considered by many in Moscow as approaching to its end, the signing of basic documents with NATO and, almost simultaneously, with China are considered by many as his major achievement.

Of all internationally-minded constituencies in today's Russia, **the military establishment** (as presented by General staff, Ministry of defence and related institutions) is best-provided with elaborated concepts, scholarly traditions and professional thinking. It possess a considerable level of motivation and strong corporate-feelings. Luckily, for the present regime, the Russian military has so far developed no far-reaching political ambitions of its own. Furthermore, its capability has been hampered during the latest years both by decay of its main power instrument - the army - and by corruption of key commanders.

As an inherently conservative structure, the military was relatively slow to accept new realities and to start reforms of own machinery.

While political circles in Moscow debated the ways of Russia's full-scale integration into international community, Igor Rodionov, then chief of the General Staff Academy, formulated the following security-priorities in 1992: the neutrality of East European countries; free Russian access to seaports in the Baltics; the exclusion of "third country" military forces from the Baltics and non-membership of the Baltic states in military blocs directed at Russia; the prevention of the CIS-countries from becoming part of a buffer zone aimed at separating Russia from the West, South, or East; maintaining the CIS states under Russia's exclusive influence. (37)

A considerable change in the attitudes of the Russian military has been connected with attempts of the next minister, Pave Gratschew, to adopt his concept to new environment. On the eve of Russia's joining PFP-program in April 1994 he raised the following demands: 1. Participation on consultations on European security on the formula 16+1; 2. Participation on peace-keeping operations beyond NATO-zone, like in Yugoslavia. 3. Permanent security dialogue with NATO, development of a new security doctrine. 4. Participation on military training. In fact, that statement marked one of the first step on the way to prepare a broader agreement between Russia and NATO.

Nevertheless, military establishment shows the most consequent and most professionally founded critics on NATO.

The few Russian **Intelligence community's** publications does not provide sufficient overview for making comprehensive judgements. Still, an outside reader can register a sense of uncertainty in some of the published reports. So, the first of such reports, presented by Mr. Primakov in 1993, was full of complains on eventual negative effect the NATO-enlargement might have made on domestic situation in Russia, meaning the "rise of anti-Western tendencies". The NATO itself have been - correctly - regarded as guarantee of post- W.W.II borders in Europe.

In 1994 the representatives of these circles, Mr. Gennady Astafiew and Mr. Michail Dmitriew gave a much more critical assessment of the upcoming NATO-enlargement. The Alliance itself has been considered as basically unfriendly or even hostile to Russia. A set of alleged motives behind NATO-Council decision of January 1994 have been reconstructed. They included: 1. The scepticism towards chances for democratic development in Russia and hence the eagerness to fix the strategic and geopolitical gains it managed to achieve; 2. The perception of Russian state as of being doomed to disintegrate even further. Russia would, according to such views, become an "ill man of Eurasia". It has to be isolated for the sake of the rest of Europe. 3. A destructive impact of NATO-enlargement on CFE-treaty. 4. Contradiction between NATO-long term goals and Russia's interests in the "near abroad".

The above-mentioned **corporations** are the real masters of today's Russia. Having usually a set of stable industries and banks as their cores, they, moreover, include many institutions and instruments necessary to survive and to be competitive in Russia. Their structures may embrace mass-media, own recreation and medical facilities, private security forces, communications and analytical centres. In that sense, corporations in their nature are more diversified than what is commonly understood under "financial-industrial groups".

Most corporations have developed sophisticated nets of influence within official bodies and succeeded in bringing their people to top positions. In fact, according to a number of indications, corporations are directly or indirectly involved in advancing of practically all crucial decisions on federal and regional levels.

A.Pravda, describing the role of corporations "in the clan struggle for power in Moscow", notes, that they have no fixed views on NATO expansion so far and "capitalise today on their vested material interests for the West". (38)

The famous Gasprom provides up to a quarter of budget revenues. It conducts a strong expansion in Western Europe and succeeded to come into alliances with some of leading companies there, thus participating in distribution of European market. Gasprom's activity is an outspoken long-term factor in Russia's external relations and can be compared in its

relevance and "weight" with Moscow's participation on major political projects, including co-operation with NATO. Some observers saw Gasprom-activity in Slovakia behind outcome of NATO-referendum in that country in spring of 1997.

The oil giant LUKOIL openly expressed dissatisfaction with the Western accent in the official intentional strategy. According to leaders of that company, the main challenge to Russia's national interests comes not in Bosnia or Baltics but in the Caspian area. Based on own analytical studies, headquarters of LUKOIL submitted the following list of key geopolitical "directions", it would welcome Russian government pursue: Caspian see, Kazakhstan, East-Slavic "direction", Middle-East, the West. (39)

The top-figure of another diversified "imperium", the Menatep, M.Chodorkovsky, openly disagreed with federal government on Baltic issue. He insisted, that economic priorities and not obscure political issues (like situation around Russian-speakers) have motivate Russian authority in contacts with Baltic governments. He reiterated the whole set of demands (mainly related to price and tariff policy) which have to be addressed immediately unless Moscow retreats further from Baltic markets and from this region altogether. (40)

The **regional elites** are widely regarded as very active and ambitious players on political arena in Post-Soviet Russia. But in fact, they constitute an extremely differentiated community. Only two dozens of regions - so called "donors" (netto-payers to federal budget) and some of national republics - can be considered as a really significant factor in domestic politics. This group of leaders shows at the same time most developed nets of international links of their own. Still, motives of that "going international" are, again, quite different and depend on a number of regional peculiarities.

The problem provoked by that tendency is interpreted by Paul Goble the following way: "Since the end of the Cold War, regional and even local governments in many countries have challenged the traditional monopoly that central governments have enjoyed over the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. This broad development does not presage the demise of the nation state as the predominant actor in international affairs. But it does undercut the ability of such states to pursue a consistent and coherent foreign policy. In Russia, there is an entire spectrum of regional and local activism in foreign affairs. Some regions - such as Chechnya - have sought a foreign policy role in order to advance their own independence. Others - such as Tatarstan or Sakha - have done so to promote their own economic interests. And still others -- such as Saint Petersburg -- have acted to shore up local patriotism." (41)

In particular, Russian border-regions show a growing activity in developing links to neighbouring countries - to Norway, Finland, the Baltics, etc.

Another group includes some of national regions (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Komi, Karelia), which succeeded in establishing multi-functional relations with countries of similar ethnical origin - mainly with Turkey and Finland.

**Public perceptions, private contacts and movements.** The role played by ordinary Russians while practising their links to abroad is largely overseen or underestimated. Nevertheless a broad and free involvement of a bulk of Russian population into relations to abroad - is an unprecedented phenomena in the modern Russian history. It may have serious implications already now and will extend its importance in future.

Revealing enough is the fact that over a quarter of Russian imports is being accomplished by so-called "shuttlers" - loosely organised groupes of individual traders who make their

living while supplying Russian cities with inexpensive consumer-goods, which they bring through their constant rides to foreign marketplaces. The often cited (and often misconceived) abundance in the Russian consumer-stores is largely due to these people's hard work. Numbering between 10 and 15 millions, they make the decisive contribution to prevention of an unemployment-catastrophe in the country. Apart from supplying own families, they make the prices for necessities acceptable for the bulk of compatriots. In fact, "shuttlers" constitute the major factor of domestic stability in Russia of today.

Internationally, "shuttlers" embody a breakthrough in relations of ordinary Russians with abroad. Fully independently from official doings, they explore the world as a daily reality and collect valuable experience by that.

The "Shuttlers" draw their own map of "international priorities". According to fragmented data, countries outside CIS, most frequently visited by "commercial travellers", are: Turkey, Poland, Finland, Abu-Dabi, Thailand and China (a striking difference to officially proclaimed long-term goals, displaying how far is the distance between people and oligarchy in Russia). As to Turkey, "shuttlers" activity is responsible for more than two thirds of imports - what is probably the most positive moment in relations of Russia to that country today.

As to Russia's national interests and its international stance in general, the average citizen demonstrates a great deal of realism, sometimes mixed with limited awareness or indifference. A poll made recently indicates that over two thirds of Russians realise that the country's international status has declined by comparison with the past. Yet, the restoration of the USSR or the resurrection of Russia as a great power is seen as an important task by only 13%.

The poll also showed, that over half of the Russian population is quite indifferent to NATO expansion while 20- 25% shares traditional ideas of the West and NATO as the source of the threat to Russia (for further details of that poll see Footnotes, 42).

These data question official thesis on unanimity of Russian public to key international issue, including NATO-enlargement. So far, the prevailing trend confirms the suggestion that citizens of the Russian Federation are ever more preoccupied with problems related to standards of their living and display little geopolitical ambitions. In that sense and on level of democratically-gathered public opinion, Russia seems to get closer to absolute majority of Western societies, thus providing most valuable ground for a real cohesion in future.

### **CHAPTER III. WESTERN VISIONS AND MOTIVES OF INSTITUTIONALISING SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA. LOOKING FROM MOSCOW**

On the verge of "velvet revolutions" in 1989, the most prominent representatives of Western political thinking - Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Henry A. Kissinger presented in the framework of the Trilateral Commission a predominantly Euro-centric model which was expected to emerge in the course of the just onsetting world-restructuring. The roles of NATO and of the US in the European affairs was even hardly mentioned in that study (1).

In the following couple of years this kind of approach has been represented by a number of European leaders. Not surprisingly, the French were most adamant supporters of challenging visions like "European confederation". Its designer, Francois Mitterand, envisaged to integrate all European states into that community in the course of a decade.

Based on the EC, "European confederation" would develop to "a permanent organisation based on trade, peace and security".(2).

A more elaborated concept of Europe after the Cold war, was put forward by Chairman of the EC-Commission J.Delor. His plan included a combination of concentric zones around the EC, thus implying the idea of bringing countries with different levels of development together.(3) Its critics pointed at the inevitable overstraining of financial potentials within the "core" of the EC for sake of incorporating of "new democracies".

J. Attali, President of European Bank for Reconstruction and development, submitted in 1989 an East-oriented strategy of economic expansion. To him, "The European West had to assimilate the Eastern part of the continent to pretend to status of a new center of world economy". (4)

It was clear from the beginning, that fm.USSR and later Russia will find only a loose institutional link to such plans. Moscow bureaucracy knew from previous talks with the EC-Commission, that these scenarios would hardly facilitate a rapid breakthrough in relations to the West. To launch a serious co-operation with the EC would mean a lot of efforts to ensure improvements on all levels of administration and economy.

At the same time, post-Soviet leaders succeeded in establishing contacts with Western states in various issues of international security. The partnership between Russia and the West actually started with proclaiming of a strategic consensus. The US-Russian Charter on Friendship and Partnership, concluded by B.Yelzin and G.Bush, stated, i.a. that after communism there's no geopolitical problems between the two sides any more (5).

B.Yelzin's defence minister Y.Shaposhnikov, Security Council chief Y.Skokov and others reiterated that from that time Russia will face no enemies, only risk. This in itself would provide a stable ground for a long-term co-operation with the West. (6)

Apparently, more adequate views on the evolving geostrategic situation have been submitted in 1992 by German Foreign ministry. Its Trans-Atlantic model included an upgraded role for the EU, thus envisaging in perspective an equilibrium across the Atlantic. Russia, according to that concept, would in course of time take its place among other "new democracies" to the East from that "open NATO" (7)

Events in fm. Yugoslavia showed then in "praxis" what the evolving relationships will about like. First of all, "Bosnia has demonstrated that American and European security interests no longer coincide as fully as they did during the Cold War." (8). A regional conflict as a Bosnian one could become subject of tensions between allies, who have been prepared within NATO to deal with totally different crises. Hence, a new the Trans-Atlantic framework had more than earlier to serve to alleviate problems between European and North-American "pillars".

As to Russia, its role in Bosnian conflict clearly demonstrated weak as well as more advantageous aspects. Undoubtedly, Russia's contribution, both military and political, was a peripheral one and effected within a US-supported framework. On the other hand, Moscow yet managed to play a balance between various participants. This kind of function, embodying a lot of uncertainties, continues to provoke discussions in Russian professional circles.

During the following years, most Western concepts of post Cold-War Europe regarded Russia as an outsider or as an potential adversary rather than partner. According to H.

Kissinger, "It is important for Europe and Russia to understand that Polish-Russian border is to become a border of political Europe. And in the same way it is important for Europe for two categories of borders not to come into existence - this one protected by NATO and that one having an equivocal status."

The proposals of J. Baker and then later of president Clinton to discuss eventual Russia's joining of NATO (9, 10) has been at once recognised as just another tactical move to facilitate actual plans on NATO-enlargement.

As long as geopolitical reconstruction of post-Cold war Europe was concerned, the division-line between Russian and Western approaches became more and more visible. In general these differences corresponded with basic contradictions between traditional collective security concept and NATO long-term strategy.

Yet, even some Western expert, especially this involved into arms control, questioned that kind of alternative. In their view, any kind of security system in Europe would be meaningful and worth of its creation, if it includes and secures the arms control process. Naturally, this suggests an active participation of Russia on building of such institution.

Such views are, e.g., developed by well-known American arms-control expert: r. "A balance-of-power system rests on deterrence. A world government, should it ever exist, would rest on unchallenged authority. Common security, however, the system of security now in place in Europe, rests on confidence. The entire system of security can be seen as one large confidence-building measure. Where security is concerned, Europe now enjoys the best of all possible worlds. The arms treaties will be the pillars of the post-Cold War order."

He criticised plans for NATO-expansion just as they could jeopardise that crucial balance and, moreover, would also violate principle of consensus, occurred out of nature of disarmament processes. "In eyes of Russians NATO expansion will deligitimate the entire settlement, and make it a central goal of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century to overturn what has been put in place." (11)

This kind of reasons seems to be the major one behind the opposition against NATO plans among the American elite.

More politically or, rather, morally motivated solutions have been proposed by A.Pravda. "The West should treat Russia as an ally which brought about the end of communism. Western gratitude turned out to be neither as politically generous nor as materially bountiful as expected". The constructive part of his idea consisted in developing of "a Brest-to-Brest structure (NATO-CIS) as a part of Vancouver-Vladivostok systems. If we want to influence security relations around Russia's borders, it is far more effective to make these part of a pan European program".(12)

Radical geopolitical changes in Europe initiated by anti-totalitarian revolutions, made many scholars in Russia and abroad to come back to foundations of the WWII-order.

I.Klepatzky, head of the strategy planing department at Russian MFA and W.Romanov, ambassador at large, defended Yalta-accords against one-sided interpretations. In their view, "Yalta" wasn't just an unclear "deal" between the great powers of that time. "Politicians of our time blame these agreements for most problems of block-confrontation using even OSCE-forums for such criticism". They stressed that parts of Yalta-system will play a fundamental role for the evolving Euro-Atlantic institutions as well. Russia should defend

remaining components of Yalta-system since they are indispensable to protect country's posture of equality in relation to other great powers.(13)

This reasoning is not entirely alien to Western analysts. Some of them recognise the relevance of post WWII order for Western stability and prosperity: "The world order created in the middle till late 1940-s endures, more extensive and in some respects more robust than during its Cold War years. Its basic principles, which deal with organisations and relations among the Western liberal democracies, are alive and well. Containment got most of the attention, but the liberal power's agreement to manage trade, security, and other big matters co-operatively has been more durable, and more successful than most recognise. It shaped the Germany and Japan of today, and now most of the rest of the world wants to join" (14)

The American approach to relations with Russia is clearly dominated by nuclear concerns. In words of Jack Matlock, there's no higher priority for Washington in dealing in Russia, than to facilitate control over weapons of mass destruction (15). The nuclear-oriented security strategy constitutes the backdrop against which most other American intentions and moves towards Russia, should be regarded.

Geopolitically, the US have clearly went over from containment to enlargement policy with an emphasis on preventive measures (16). The implications for Moscow may include ever closer co-operation with Americans in the entire spectrum of nuclear- or CW-security in various parts of Russia.

Leading American politicians strongly advocate continuity - both in ways and in spirit- in approach towards Europe and Russia. Z. Brzezinski speaks of "enduring imperatives of geopolitics" as well as of "Nixon-Kissinger legacy as a guide for post-Cold War U.S." (17). Apart from conceptual efforts of "Cold war veterans" direct participation of H.Kissinger in planning of NATO-enlargement is illustrative enough.

Some of American analysts still favour comparative judgements aimed to display basics of the US' international conduct as opposed to the Russian ones. Although relevance of such methods have obviously diminished after the Cold war, they still show the mode of thinking in policy-making circles and hence - a real approach towards co-operation with Russia.

W.Luti, e.g. argues that Americans and Russians are driven internationally by totally different "moral and psychological imperatives". So, he described "the bedrock values, upon America should base its strategic concept in the coming years".

- the US still exhibits a sense of international mission, while Russia has lost it after dissolution of the USSR;
- American government avoids "needles entanglements", thus differing from Moscow who is biased to "selective intervention" .

Still, in his view, while following their geostrategic interests, America and Russia inherently regard large parts of globe (respective - Latin America according to Monroe/Adams doctrine and the "near abroad" in Russia's case) as especially important and would never abandon or cede their privileged positions there. (18)

W.Luti is evidently right when saying that American leaders put far more bigger emphasis than the Russian ones on "vital link between policy goals and public conviction". Still, that concept bears the risk of underestimation of growing diversity of opinion and social priorities in American society.

In that sense, the following assessment of P. Goble is more revealing: "In the United States, state and local governments increasingly are passing legislation banning government purchases from companies that do business in a particular country or countries that the authorities in these governments find objectionable. In many cases, these local and state sanctions are simply a restatement of central policy. The U.S. government, for example, has a sanctions regime against Burma. But in some cases, the local and state policies are very different from those of Washington -- local actions against China, for instance -- and thus add a new degree of complexity to American foreign relations" (19).

American intelligence community gives, apparently, a realistic assessment of Russia's ability to resurrect military. According to a recent study of National Intelligence Council, "The US is unlikely to face any military "peer" for at least 15 years, and even after that the worst-case likelihood would be a second-rate enemy". Rather population-explosion and related problems will demand growing attentions and analysis. (20).

Nevertheless, a CIA statements demanded more vigilance towards Russia, claiming that the United States may have shifted too much of its espionage effort away from Russia. (21)

Maybe as a kind of extrapolation of visions provoked by imminent conclusion of Russia-NATO act, some highly qualified Western experts, including those affiliated with NATO, advanced more globalistic-oriented ideas. One of them - project of a extension of Western unity to an all-Northern unity, which would includes Russia (and Japan), as opposing to temptations of seeking advantages at one another's expense in the South. She added even that a growing awareness of this broad global situation was one of the factors in impelling the Russians to rapprochement with the West in the 1980s.(22)

The German geopolitical thinking has strong traditions and practice-proved methodology. Regarding Germany's history, size and location, it constitutes maybe the most elaborated intellectual resource of that kind in Europe. Yet, until reunification of 1990, the Germans have remained very reluctant to expose that potential openly

During the post-Cold war the German security strategy gradually recovered from previous restraints while basing itself on regained sovereignty and national interests. Naturally, the eventual divergence's to other Western partners and even allies are becoming apparent as well.

A series of comprehensive strategic documents has been issued, thus framing the patterns of new German security strategy.

In 1992 the official "Defence Policy Guidelines" - drafted by German Ministry of Defence - defined the new role of the German army after the destruction of socialism in Eastern Europe. This paper says that Germany will "follow in the future its own national interests", that "might not in all cases be coherent with the interests of our allies and other partners"..And it continues by emphasising: "Therefore the national interests are furthermore the starting point of a sovereign state's security policy." According to the "Defence Policy Guidelines" the "vital security interests of Germany" are as following: "partnership as equals between Europe and North-America; maintaining the free world trade and the unhindered access to markets and resources; influencing international institutions and developments in our interests and based on our economic power".

The new German Whitebook issued in 1994, after 11 years break, may be illustrative in that context as well. Strategists from German DOD give a detailed view on the global situation,

while outlining several national security priorities in that regard: so, Russia is mentioned there more often than any other country. (23)

The controversial strategic paper issued by the CDU/CSU-Fraction the next day of Russian troops' full retreat from Germany, outlined, with an unprecedented openness, the geopolitical priorities for what can be named "Germany's near abroad". The right-wing experts demanded to project more German influence onto neighbouring countries of Central Europe, to avoid the situation, "when Germany again would be put on the divisive line between East and West". That argument suggests, in fact, that this kind of security-rationales made Bonn to push so adamantly for NATO-expansion. Moreover, the paper can be interpreted as a confirmation to the fact, that German national interest, as formulated by CDU/CSU-led forces, played the crucial role in determining the geopolitical configuration for NATO-enlargement in Europe.

On the other hand, the chancellor Kohl's colleagues stressed the need to have Russia as another "center of power" in Europe alongside the EU. A wide-ranging relationship between EU and Russia must be fostered, thus facilitating a smoother integration of the Central and Eastern European countries into the EU.(24)

#### **CHAPTER IV. IDENTIFYING ZONES OF CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT**

One of the most striking features about security documents between Russia and Western countries is that they are often interpreted quite differently by the sides. Even more striking is the fact that the participants are reluctant to show concern because of such deviations.

Whatever the reason for such phenomena, the Russia-Nato Act is one of latest examples from this point of view. Many observers have got the impression that, judging on official comments, Moscow and its partners talk about different papers. While the Russian representatives assert that there "practically" will be a veto-right for Russia in some of the peace-keeping operations, their Western counterparts strictly deny any authority for Moscow to influence the decision-making process within Nato.

The deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke made it clear after Paris-summit, that: Russia, by putting its signature under the Act, have already accepted the decision on NATO-enlargement.

Boris Yeltzin declared on the eve of the signing of the Act, that Russia will reconsider its relationship to Nato in case the Alliance invites former Soviet republics to become new members. This contradicted directly with previous and later statements from the Western Governments that Nato is, basically, open to all "new democracies".

The Russian representatives and Kremlin-affiliated experts argue, that Russia, like before, categorically rejects the enlargement-plans and, in particular, will reconsider its relations to NATO in case it makes steps to adopt former Soviet republics. Still, regarding the earlier Moscow Tactics, this position should rather not be regarded as a final tactical one.

Some experts - both in Russia and in the West - concentrate on psychological problems NATO expansion may present in Russia, with no tangible solution in the near future. In view of Dmitri Trenin from Carnegi Endowment in Moscow, the real threat is that Russia would "over-react" to that Western move. (1)

A number of public opinion surveys as well as indications of a broader consent between Kremlin and Western governments (as examined in previous parts of the report) do not correspond with that judgement.

Ambassador Yu. Rakhmaninov, presented the most extensive analysis of legal collisions between NATO-enlargement and a number of international norms. He noted, p.e., that the State Department announced several times that that matter would be considered exclusively within NATO and would not be subject to discussion with other participants in the OSCE. He notes also, that a study of this issue observed, was aimed at "provoking Russia's negative response, which would bolster the plan for NATO enlargement".

He identified the principal defect of NATO-enlargement as "an open discrimination and its orientation towards an "unequal security" concept. The "club" principle of direct entry for the chosen ones creates a basis for dividing states and peoples into "clean" and "unclean" categories. This division is becoming institutionalised, since a great number of countries in the North Atlantic area can never become members of NATO (or at least not in the next few decades). Thus NATO cannot be an all-embracing security system." (2)

The foreign-policy expert W. Nikinov saw alternative to NATO-extension in creating a Transatlantic Security Council with powers at least equal to those of the UN Security Council. (include the provision of specific security guarantees, the imposition of sanctions, peacekeeping operations, and the organisation of military, political and humanitarian co-operation. Provision might be made for permanent members, for more effective decision-making. (3).

Speaking at the Royal Institute Of International Affairs in London on 4 March 1997, Secretary General stressed that NATO pursues far wider goals than integrating the new members. In that sense the Madrid Summit will not be one-decision meeting. NATO's enlargement is one part of a broader strategy and of a wider package that is designed to develop closer relationships with all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. The whole package is about uniting the whole of the Euro-Atlantic community around a common security culture. He rejected some known geopolitical concepts and categories as belonging in the dustbin of history: "dividing lines", "buffer zones", "spheres of influence"

Still - US. Secretary of Defence William Cohen, testifying at Senate Armed Services Committee on April 23, actually outlined confines for Russia's manoeuvring". "Russia will not be allowed to: Delay enlargement; Veto internal NATO decisions; Exclude any country from membership, now or in the future; Subordinate NATO to any other institution; Impose second class membership on any new member.

In the light of today's Russian reality, stability in that country may indeed be regarded as the key issue for maintaining international security. In that context, the stabilising role of Russian armed forces should not be underestimated. This approach, advanced by Chris Donnelly, Special advisor to NATO Secretary general, while evidently addressing the most vital Western interests, must not entirely correspond with current Alliance's priorities as of a military institution.

There seem to occur a collision between current trends in security environment and NATO's conceptual and military instruments. In a sense, NATO has been overwhelmed by a sweeping deterioration of main stability-providing patterns in the East. The strategic situation in today's Europe not only displays the ultimate military superiority of the West over Russian forces. Further development of that situation during the latest years led to a total alteration of

it. The ongoing decline of Russian army can itself provoke substantial risks for the West. In that regard, one must agree with the view that "It is in Western interest to see Russia develop competent and effective armed forces - but of course as an element of a democratic and prosperous society." (4)

How paradoxically it may appear at first glance the relations with the **EU** are today, in fact, the key factor in maintaining Russia's security and stability. The EU-countries constitute the main destination for Russian energy exports and hence supply it with at least half of its external revenues. This is vitally important for secure a relative balance in Moscow's foreign debt servicing. In a sense, co-operation with the EU area means for Russia chance to uphold further the fragments of national sovereignty and to retain certain freedom of manoeuvre on international arena.

Due to Gasprom's expansion into Europe, Russia's links to that regions will for decades guarantee a living-base for its economy and population. Moreover, this net of pipelines presents a real pattern of pan-European integration. This opens for both sides ways to get closer in various spheres, including international security.

In 1991 Russia signed an agreement with the EU Energy Charter which, in case it will come into force, would institutionalise this relationship and eventually broaden for Russian gas-companies the way into European markets. Still, the Russian side would be then obliged to provide more access to its own infrastructure and so lose the monopoly-advantages. The owners of Gasprom offer a strong rejection to these plans. So far this bargaining develops further providing one of few episodes, where Russia still plays as an almost equal partner.

The issue of Russia's full-fledged incorporation into the EU, being from time to time raised in scholarly circles, remains a pure speculation. Actually, such an option is even less probable than Russia's membership at NATO. No other of European institutions shows a higher grade of structural incompatibility with Russia, than the EU. Representatives of EU-governments have repeatedly rejected the idea of Russia's membership.

Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation between Russia and the European Union has been signed in Corfu on 24 June 1994 after a delay caused, i.a. by Frances interests in trade with nuclear materials. It now embraces a number of non-military security topics including political dialogue, environment protection, anti-criminal measures and others. Yet, that program hampers as well because of constant trade disputes between Moscow authorities and Commission.

The TACIS-program produced a number of success-stories on local or regional levels. Several military-conversion projects have been launched as well. Still, the view prevails that the hopes to involve Russian elites into a close co-operation with Europe through trade will hardly prove because of strong contradiction on tariffs and trade-strategy.

The EU-leader delegated to NATO main prerogatives of establishing security and military links with Moscow. Nevertheless, the Commission consulted with the Kremlin on several regional problems - both in Russia and in CIS-area.

Moscow enthusiastically accepted in 1990, and since then promoted the idea on "institutionalization" of European security through enhancing of OSCE-mechanisms. For the post-Soviet apparatus, it would mean a smooth transition to a new set of activities, a stable international status for a long period, secured positions in various international, OSCE-

sponsored bodies as well, in particular cases, a strong international backing in relation with other Moscow bureaucracies.

The arguments of MFA concentrated on alleged ability of OSCE to substitute for Russia absence of real allies, on "most representative status of OSCE with its 55 members" and on "a variety of potentials allowing to convert OSCE into major supporter of Russia's interests".

The West, in turn, expressed a couple of years ago a clear concern on alleged Russian attempts to use the OSCE, and UNO as well, as a "cover" for its expansion into "near abroad". Some experts even argued that this Russian idea nurtured constant demands from Moscow to provide Russia's peace-keeping activities within CIS with an OSCE status.

These concerns became generally irrelevant regarding the trend of Russia's withdraw from conflict zones within CIS.

Recognising that OSCE proved of rather limited effectiveness and, furthermore, became matter of controversy during the NATO-debate, Flavio Cotti, President-in-Office of the OSCE, argues that it still plays objectively not so visible but important role. Being equipped with no law enforcement mechanisms, the OSCE can be very useful in monitoring of security-related developments throughout Europe and so contribute to transparency of increasingly complicated situation there. (5)

## **CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK**

1. As assumed at the beginning of this project, the rivalry among major centres of power continues to dominate Russia's domestic life and increasingly affects its external links.

The developments in the armed forces are getting meanwhile especially dangerous. According to latest indications, military units in various parts of Russia start to express open protests, aiming their criticism against highest political bodies. The general level of security-risks in Russia itself is apparently in rise.

Some observers regard all this as additional signs of an irreversible disintegration of Russian state. Others put more weight on longer-term stabilisation-tendencies in the economy. Whatever the outcome, Russia's participation on international security efforts appears more problematic than ever.

2. This picture has been additionally overshadowed during the latest years by a sweeping mounting of Russia's financial burden. This affects quite substantially international conduct of Russia in various fields.

There is a number of indications, that Russia's rapprochement to NATO, as to the leading security institution in Europe, goes on in parallel to Moscow's contacts to WTO, Paris club, OECD and other financial and commercial organisations.

3. It seems so far, that Russia's participation on European security projects in the framework of OSCE or along with NATO, EU and other organisations, will remain quite limited. Apart from high-level contacts, there hardly will develop a joint activity of substantial scale.

4. Russian public's attitude towards co-operation with NATO is a mix of indifference with objection (partly irrationally motivated). There's no perceivable reasons for that situation to change significantly in the near future.

On the other hand, absence of strong negative feelings towards NATO is not an inexistent resource in itself. A gradual improvement of NATO's image among Russians is thinkable through displaying of practical usefulness of links to it. Joint rescue training and operations, financing of ecological projects and other efforts attached to people's everyday life would be most promising in that regard.

This kind of activity, however, must, be planned and conducted with more attention to commercial considerations. Rescue operations in Russia, led by a special ministry, have developed to an important business thus demanding compatible acting from partners. Former events sponsored by NATO's Civil emergency services stowed, e.g. insufficient understanding of these circumstance.

5. Being itself, i.a. an instrument for facilitating interpretability of the elites, NATO should focus in future on a more elaborated public work in Russia trying to identify common point of interests in business- scholarly and political circles.

## **FOOTNOTES**

### **CHAPTER I.**

1. Z. Brzezinski, speaking at a Conference for American politicians and analysts in Washington at 15 April, 1997, USIA.
2. W. Cohen speaking at a Pentagon press conference on report on the Quadrennial Defence Review, Washington, 19 May, 1997.
3. Z. Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership", Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994.
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5. A. Utkin. Russia and the West: Problems of Mutual Perception and Perspectives of Relations Building, 1993, p.15.
6. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 17 January, 1997.
7. Yu.Baturin, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 29 March, 1997.
8. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the White House, USIA, February 1996.  
Main priorities and risk-factors according to National security strategy:  
maintaining a strong defence capability, counterterrorism, fighting drug trafficking and other missions, combating terrorism, non-proliferation and counter proliferation, arms control, fighting international organised crime, the environment and sustainable development, promoting prosperity at home, enhancing American competitiveness, strengthening macroeconomic co-ordination, enhancing access to foreign markets, export strategies and advocacy programs.

### **CHAPTER II.**

1. The tendency of seeking to prolong own regimes through coupling them with the West and with Europe, seems to be genetically-rooted among Kremlin leaders of whatever ideological colour. There's a quite apparent similarity in conduct of L.Brezhnev, M.Gorbachev and now B.Yeltzin during "second parts" of their particular rules in that regard.

The explanation may be quite lucid: while being yet another time faced with eminent bankruptcy domestically, the Soviet/Russian sovereigns and their cliques attempted to associate themselves politically or institutionally with the West as with a more stable entity. The problem of endowing such links with substance, has always been for Moscow of a secondary relevance. Moreover, such seemingly "pro-Western" efforts have often been accompanied by even more oppressions at home.

2.The America-dominated policy tradition has been so strong, that even that limited effort of M.Gorbachev has caused criticism in scholarly as in political circles of Moscow for its ..."eurocentrism" (see: *New Contours of Western Europe*, I., 1992, p. 321).

Some of key projects conducted by the Europe-Institute itself at that time have been characterised by conclusions like: "In fact, only a strong US-Russian partnership could enable the NACC to become an effective organisation" ("*Harmonising the Evolution of US and Russian Defence Policies*, Fred C.Ikle, Sergei A.Karaganov, 1993, p.21 ).

One of the indications of how long-practised clichés can influence public perception of external environment is the fact, that the US are till now regarded by non-experts (in defiance of statistics) as our main trade partner. *Rabochaya Tribune* May 6, 1997

3. I.Shinkina, *RNF*, N 29, 1995, p.43.

4. During a session of the Duma's Committee on International affairs in the late 1994 several deputies submitted the idea of re-establishing a kind of a new alliance between Russia and Central-European countries (in particular, with Bulgaria and Hungary). They argued, that Russia, as a "world economic power", had only to submit several large-scale economic initiatives to attain that goal.

5. See, p.e., "*Kommersant*", 1997, N17, 6 May, p.25; Russia Gets \$800 million World Bank Loan For Social Reforms, *USIA*, 26 June, 1997.

A scandal around USAID and American mutual funds, who in fact controlled bond market in Russia, has been widely cited in Russian and international media..See: *Nezavisimaja Gazeta*, 3 June, 1997.

6. A. Kostin, Chief of Vneshekonombank. *Heritage WE Have Got*. *Izvestiya*, 6 May 1997.

7. Maxim Yusin, *Buying Kremlin's Compliance*, *Izvestia*, 24 January, 1997

8. Jack F. Matlock, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1996, *Dealing with Russia in Turmoil*, p. 40.

9. See: Z. Brzezinski, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 1995, *A plan for Europe*, p.30.

10. Ronald D.Asmus, Richard ., F.Stephen Larrabee. *Nato Expansion: The Next Steps, Survival*. vol.37, Spring 1995, p.21.: "Russia is in a period of national redefinition. A political struggle is taking place between Westernisers, who see Russia's future tied closely to Europe and the West, and the Eurasianists, who emphasise Russia's uniqueness and role as a Eurasian power."

- 11 Stephen Blank (Professor at the US. Army War College), Strategic Review, Summer 1994, "New Challenges to European Security", p.40.
  12. Alex Pravda, Russia and European security: The delicate balance, NATO Review, May 1995, p.21.
  13. F.Stephen Larrabee, Russia and NATO Expansion, January1995, RAND Project Memorandum, p.1.
  14. Russische Aussenpolitik 1993 im Urteil von aussenpolitischen Experten. SINUS, VCIOM, Buero Moskau, 1993. p.p. 44, 20,10.
  15. James Sherr, After the Cold War: The Search for a new Security System, CSRC, May 1995, p.6.
  16. Mark Galeotti, Decline and Fall - Russia after Yeltsin, Jane's Int.Rev. vol.7, number 8, p.386., ibid. Militarising of Russia's internal security, p.387
  17. Paul Goble, Washington, RFE/RL, 4 June 1997.
  18. See: Prof. S.Peregudov, The Corporate Interests and the State, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 3 June, 1997.
  19. Roland Goetz, Das russische Wirtschaftspotential als Basis seiner Aussenpolitik, 11, 1996, S.145.
  20. Mark Galeotti, Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1997, p.5,
  - 21.J. Matlock Foreign Affairs, "Dealing with Russia in Turmoil", May/June 1996, p. 44.
  22. A typical example was the war in Chechnia, when various groups found alternately their ways through this "decision-making" mechanics, thus bringing changes into scenario.
- Many politicians and experts in Russia openly challenge legitimacy of that system and hence, of presidential authority in its present shape as a whole. A.Pushkow, while criticising the basic concept of then negotiated Russia-Nato-Act, said, that under some circumstances this document "will be not accepted in Russia", even in the case Yeltzin puts his signature under it. Alexej Puschow, International Politik, Mai 1997, "Pyrrhussieg des Westens?", S. 33.
23. Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 18 March 1997.
  24. Newsbrief, July 1993, Vol.13 N 7 p.52.
  25. Izvestia, May 8, 1997.
  26. Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 7 June, 1997.
  27. John Rhineland, vice chairman of Arms Control Association (ACA), Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.12
  28. ITAR-TASS reported 27 March 1996.

29. Reuter, 14 May, 1997.
30. "Home and Motherland", N10(48), 6-14 March, 1997.
31. Interfax, 31 May, 1997.
32. RIA Novosty, 28 May, 1997.
33. ITAR-TASS, 6 May, 1997.
34. Interfax, 13 May, 1997.
35. A.Kozyrjew, NATO-Review, N 8.1994.
36. Dipkurier, N 4, 1997, p.2.
37. "Approaches to Russian Military Doctrine", "Voennaya Mysl", July 1992, (Special Edition)
38. Alex Pravda, "Russia and European security: The delicate balance", NATO-Review, May 1995, p.24.
39. F.Wasilenko, Expansion of Oil-Companies in "near abroad". Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 28 November, 1996.
40. Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 8 April 1997.
41. Paul Goble, Analysis From Washington, Decentralising Foreign Policy By Washington, (RFE/RL), 19 May 1997 .
42. A substantial majority of Russians -- approximately 66 % of those polled -- realise that the country's international status has declined by comparison with the past while about 75 % of respondents believe it is very important for the country to regain its position as a superpower. Realisation that the main factor in national development in the world today is not so much military as economic might.  
 About 65 % of Russians believe it is very important to develop relations with the states of the near abroad and also to protect the interests of the Russian-speaking population living there. The restoration of the USSR or the resurrection of Russia as a great power is seen as an important task by only 13 % of Russians.  
 Russians' perception of the external threat. Approximately 34 percent of those polled were able to indicate specific sources from which they imagine an external threat to Russia's security to proceed. West - 23.0% including United States - 13.0% including NATO- 5.0% East, or Third World - 7.2% Near Abroad - 2.5% Chechnya - 1.5%  
 Only approximately one quarter of Russians share traditional Soviet ideas of the sources of the threat to the country. Here the United States ranks first -- not only as the most militarily powerful state but also as the "main adversary" of Soviet times.  
 "Are You Concerned at Plans for NATO Expansion to the East?" Yes - 29.7% Yes rather than no - 16.4% No rather than yes - 9.2% No - 44.7%  
 Obviously only about 5 % of the population has more or less clear views of NATO as an organisation which threatens Russia in some way. Less than half the population is concerned

to some degree or other at NATO's future expansion. Here only 18.5 % of those polled believe, like the Russian military establishment, that this expansion of the North Atlantic bloc will result in the intensification of the military threat to Russia. Approximately 10 percent believe that it will lead to Russia's political isolation in the world arena as a whole and in Europe in particular.

About 40 % of respondents believe that Russia, in response to NATO expansion, should conclude a military alliance with Belarus and with the CIS countries. Slightly more respondents are inclined to a purely political response of a non confrontational nature -- 45 % of those polled expressed themselves in favour of strengthening the European collective security system.

An analysis of the figures makes it possible to suppose that 20- 25 % of the Russian population shares -- to a greater rather than lesser degree -- traditional ideas of the West and NATO as the source of the threat to Russia. It seems to us that they are in favour of a tough, strong-arm response to the expansion of the North Atlantic bloc and see in military might the main symbol of Russia's greatness and a very important instrument for safeguarding its security. At the same time over half the Russian population is quite indifferent to NATO expansion. See: Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye 7-13 June, 1997 Russian Public Opinion and Market Research Institute, "Russia and External Threats; Over Half the Population Indifferent to NATO Expansion"

### **CHAPTER III.**

1. On Trilateral Commission, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Henry Kissinger, 1989 , p.27.
2. Le Monde, 1 January, 1990.
3. Le Monde, 20 January, 1990.
4. J. Attali, Lignes d'Horizon, P., 1990, p.75
5. I.Kobrinakaja, RNF/ROPC, 1992, p. 41
6. V.Tsimburski, RNF, 1994.
7. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June, 1992.
8. Jim Hoagland, "Bitter Endgame in Bosnia", Washington Post, 4 November, 1993, p.A21.
9. James Baker, Russia into Nato, Die Welt, 10 December, 1993.
10. Giorgio Napolitano, Karsten Voigt, Tamas Wachslar, The Enlargement Of The Alliance, AM 274 DSC/NE (95)2, Draft Special Report of The Working Group on NATO Enlargement. "President Clinton had also written to President Yeltsin indicating that at some future date Russian membership of NATO could not be ruled out.( See The Sunday Times, 7 May, 1995.) US officials have denied that there was explicit language concerning future Russian membership of NATO embodied in the communication. Nonetheless, it is clear that this latter notion, and even its articulation, is anathema to most European members of NATO".
11. M. Mandelbaum, The Post-Cold War Settlement in Europe: A Triumph of Arms Control, Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.3.

12. Alex Pravda, Russia and European security: The delicate balance, NR, May 1995, p.19, 23.
13. L. Klepatzkii, V. Romanov. "In Yalta Three World Leaders Talked How To Prevent A New Split In Europe", Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn", N4, 1997, p.15.
14. G.John Ikenberry, The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos, p.79
15. Jack Matlock, "Dealing with Russia in Turmoil", Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, p.39.
16. Anthony Lake, From Containment to Enlargement, U.S.Department of State Dispatch, 27 September, 1993, Vol.4, No.39, p.658.
17. Z. Brzezinski,"The Cold War and its aftermath", Foreign Affairs, 1994,
18. William J. Luti, "Sources of American conduct as a basis for the formulation of a new national strategic concept", "Strategic review", Summer 1996, p.51.
19. Paul Goble, Analysis From Washington, Decentralising Foreign Policy, Washington, 19 May 1997 (RFE/RF)
20. US News, Study of National Intelligence Council, 12 May, 1997.
21. Reuters, 6 May, 1997.
22. Ira Straus, 5 May, 1997:
23. "Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr", Bonn, 1994..
24. Reflections on European Policy, Bonn, 1 September, 1994, S.2. "If Europe were to drift apart, Germany would once again find itself caught in the middle between East and West, a position which throughout its history has made it difficult for Germany to give a clear orientation to its internal order and to establish a stable and lasting balance in its external relations. p.3 ..." "In this way the problem of security "against" Germany was solved in the West by creating a system of security "with" Germany. "The only solution which will prevent return to the unstable pre-war system, with Germany once again caught in the middle between East and West, is to integrate Germany's Central and Eastern European neighbours into the (West) European post-war system and to establish a wide-ranging partnership between this system and Russia." No autonomy, since, "that historically German policy towards the East concentrated on closer co-operation with Russia at the expense of the countries in between." Expand the Union towards the East.

#### **CHAPTER IV.**

1. Dmitri Trenin, "Avoiding a new confrontation with NATO", NATO-Review, May 1996, p.17.
2. Amb. Y.Rakhmaninov submits the following lists of deviations between policy of NATO'-enlargement and a number of OSCE agreements (USA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 2, February 1997 "Some Thoughts on NATO enlargement"):

- "The declaration of the Helsinki top-level meeting on 10 July 1992 (Helsinki-2) regarded NATO "as a component of European security." This standpoint has been confirmed at the Budapest top-level meeting in 1994. This means that the decision on the enlargement of NATO prior to its transformation into a pillar of security in Europe is contrary to the arrangements adopted within the framework of the Helsinki process.
- NATO-enlargement undermines the fundamental bases of the Helsinki process since, first, it strikes at the equal right to security of all participants in the OSCE, according to which no state may ensure its security at the expense of others.
- This is why the indivisibility of security was called "common"; second, security represents a system of interconnected and mutually complementary aspects. No single one of these aspects can be detached or absolutized, the military and political dimension of security detached from the humanitarian, economic, environmental, and other dimensions, for example.
- The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 19 November 1990 says directly in Article XXI (clause 2): "In the event of some state of the said group declaring its intention to affiliate with the other group (NATO, that is--Yu.R.), any participant in the CFE Treaty shall be entitled to demand the convening of a special conference."
- It is essentially a question of a unilateral undermining of the basic treaties that enshrined an end to the state of war and the restoration of peaceful relations with the states that fought on the side of fascist Germany (the peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Finland).
- NATO's advancement eastward is aimed at a revision of the Treaty on a Final Settlement in Relation to Germany of 12 September 1990, which was intended to lay the foundations of a new peaceful order on the continent. Its most important provision, contained in Article 5, is that foreign troops and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems will not be deployed in the eastern part of Germany.
- In a number of statements (as in diplomatic documents also) the leaders of states of West and East emphasised that a principal condition of a settlement of the German question was prevention of the advancement of the NATO border beyond East Germany.
- Moreover, the applications of certain East European governments concerning NATO membership and the corresponding decision of the bloc's council were made without a preliminary comprehensive consideration of this matter in the national parliaments. Such an approach is far from observance of the principle of democracy in the solution of cardinal problems of peace, security, and international co-operation".

3. Vyacheslav Nikonov, Transatlantic Security: Beyond NATO, 301 PC/TO (95) 8 October 1995.

4. Chris Donnelly, "Defence transformation in the new democracies", NATO-Review, Nov., 96, p.22.

5, Flavio Cotti, "The OSCE's increasing responsibilities in European security, NATO Review, Nov.1996,

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