

FINAL REPORT FOR THE PROJECT
"TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF NATO"

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INTRODUCTION

As the Cold War ended, a strong need for a substantial change in the international system made itself felt. International institutions as well as national states began first to examine their Cold War positions and second to redefine priorities and third to adjust themselves to the requirements of post-Cold War era. The Cold War institutions of the Soviet bloc had disappeared by the end of 1991 as the Soviet Union collapsed. As early as 1990, the Western bloc, on the other hand, adopted a strategy based on maintenance of the western institutions, however, strove for a revision of the Cold War institutions. Of the major Western institutions, NATO was the first which began to undertake a substantial internal reform and adapt to the changing international climate.

NATO has been preoccupied with developing a new understanding of security: A radical change in international system, the collapse of the security network of the Soviet bloc and the revival of ethno-nationalism as a local and regional destabilizing factor necessarily led NATO to examine its old concept of security. During the Cold War years, the concept of security had been associated predominantly with external threat, which had been narrowed down

to the Soviet threat, defense against attack and control of military force. The understanding of security had been sharply separated from the issues of conflict management, stability and peace. The priority had been given to deterrence and maintenance of status quo between the West and the East. On the morrow of the Cold War, the definition of security tended to be expanded beyond merely defense, control of military forces and maintenance of status quo. The management of crisis, the prevention of conflicts and the creation of a stable and dynamic international environment as well as establishment of dialog mechanisms and inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact members to the Western institutions, became major bases for the understanding of security during the post-Cold War years.

This is a radical departure from the Cold War era, though it is yet to be debated whether this will lead to a structural transformation of NATO, since it is still considered that NATO is no more than a Euro-Atlantic security organization. Put aside the question whether NATO will succeed achieving a structural transformation or not, which is not within the scope of this research, it is clear that NATO redefined its priorities, launched an institutional reform and is in the process of redefining its future roles.

As many international institutions have been in the process of defining their security priorities, Turkey also entered in a process of redefinition of her priorities, security concerns and her relations with the Western institutions. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey faced new challenges: In the north and the east, in addition to Russia, there appeared new states, each with historical links to Turkey and in the process of redefining their relations with Turkey as well as with other neighboring countries. The escalation of tensions in the region, particularly in the Caucasia, is witnessed. In the South, on the border of Turkey, an instability is continuing. In the north-west, the Balkans witnessed a turmoil, leading to a War in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as a swift come back of minority problems in the region. Not to mention that Greek-Turkish disputes over the issues of Aegean Sea and Cyprus problems continue.

The debate in Turkey suggests that political elites believe that Turkey has to redefine her security priorities and to restructure her relations with the West since Turkey could no longer take for granted her relations with the West. This belief is mainly based on the fear that Turkey's strategic significance might have diminished as the Cold War ended. Recent discussions also suggest that there is a peculiar fear among the Turkish elites that Turkey may be left out of a new

Western-led security arrangements and Turkey may even be isolated from the emerging European security architecture.

Indeed, skepticism towards the Western Alliance has begun to increase in the last two decades. Some intellectuals and those committed to using religious values as a guide to domestic and defense policy-making began to challenge Turkey's membership in the Western Camp. A plenitude of arguments was advanced and increasingly pointed out that the Western Alliance was a one-way street and Turkey's take was not commensurate with what she gave and that the Alliance and its members were not sensitive to Turkey's regional concerns.

Events unfolding in the Balkans and the Caucasia in the 1990s have given further impetus to this skepticism. The proliferation of seemingly uncontrollable conflicts in the Caucasia and ex-Yugoslavia all with 'spill-over' potential has, with media prodding and the rhetoric of politicians, prompted more and more Turks to wonder 'What is the Western Alliance and NATO for, anyway? ... What is Turkey getting out of the Alliance and NATO?'

This confusion and skepticism has been compounded by specific issues such as the debates surrounding NATO and European Union enlargements. A growing

sense of disillusionment with Turkey's links with the West is observable in Turkey. It seems that the opinion leaders of Turkey no longer hold uniform positive orientations towards the Western Alliance, but there is an increasing fragmentation and disillusionment within the Turkish elites.

The above-outlined arguments and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies both in Turkey and in the West for a redefinition of priorities and a quest for restructuring Turkey's relations with western-led security organizations. These developments are primary concerns for Turkey. As the Cold War ended, the issues of Turkey's political, security and defense priorities and Turkey's long term orientation have been opened for public discussion. Turkish policy makers have been experiencing a process of re-definition of these issues. Likewise, the end of Cold War had a significant impact on NATO: NATO itself is undergoing substantial changes. Hence, the end of the Cold War affected NATO, Turkey and the relationship between NATO and Turkey. In the light of these developments, the aim of this project is to conduct a survey of Turkey's elites perceptions of NATO in this international climate and to see if Turkish perceptions are changing and in which ways. We think that since NATO has always been the essential component of Turkey's Western orientation, such a survey would also shed light on Turkey's linkage to the

West. This research project aims to offer a survey of the political elites' views on NATO, NATO's future roles and Turkey's relations with NATO. It also aims to see if there is a correspondence between the present (defined as senior) and successor generation (defined as junior) opinion leaders' perceptions of NATO.

This study is divided into five sections. Section 1 describes the conduct of this research. Section 2 is devoted to the examination of the Turkish perceptions of NATO during the Cold War era. Section 3 explores Turkish perceptions of NATO's roles in the changing security environment in the 1990s. Section 4 looks into the perceptions of regional problems Turkey facing in the 1990s and section 5 outlines envisaged security arrangements for Turkey. Finally, the study is concluded with identifying the most important patterns prevalent among the opinion leaders.

SECTION I

CONDUCT OF THE RESEARCH

In order to make a more accurate assessment of how the Turkish opinion leaders perceive NATO, Turkey's roles within NATO, NATO's current and future roles and NATO's enlargement, a research team was formed at the Department of International Relations of the Middle East Technical University. Prof. Dr. Atila Eralp, as the principal investigator, Assistant Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türke^o, as the coordinator and supervisor, research assistants Cengiz Sürücü and Cengiz Çiftçi together with other five researchers carried out this research.

No research of this kind has so far been carried out in Turkey, though the opinion leaders in Turkey have been widely engaged in discussions about NATO, Turkey's membership to NATO as well as current and future roles of NATO. The lack of research of this kind led us to undertake in-depth interviews and to give questionnaires to opinion leaders in Turkey. 18 questions were asked to the opinion leaders. (For the questionnaire see appendix 1.) The opinion leaders are divided into two categories. The first category is characterized as the present opinion leaders and consists of Academics, MPs, staff of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Military Staff and Journalists, and the second category, the successor generation opinion leaders, is composed of the fourth year students of the Departments of International Relations, Departments of Political Sciences, students of the

Academy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prime-ministry Institute of Middle East and Public Administration. For the sake of shortness the first category is called the senior opinion leaders and the second as the junior opinion leaders.

We succeeded in interviewing and/or giving questionnaires to a substantial numbers of opinion leaders in Turkey. The total number of senior opinion leaders is 49 and junior opinion leaders is 306.

Table 1.1: Occupations of the Interviewed Senior Opinion Leaders

	Numbers	%
Academics	27	55,1
MPs	10	20.4
Journalists	3	6.1
Staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	6	12.2
Military Circle	3	6.1
Total	49	100

Table 2.1: The Junior Opinion Leaders Given Questionnaires

Departments Given Questionnaires	Number	%
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Departments of International Relations	161	52.6
Departments of Political Sciences	93	30.4
Prime-ministry Institute of Middle East and Public Administration	39	12.7
Academy Of Ministry Of Foreign Affairs	13	4.3
Total	306	100

As table 1.1 shows, 27 Academics, 10 MPs, 3 Journalists, 6 staff of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 3 Military Staff were interviewed. As to the junior opinion leaders, given the fact that Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey recruits its staff from the graduates of the Departments of International Relations and the Departments of Political Sciences of the main universities in Turkey, they were given questionnaires. As shown in table 1.2, we succeeded giving questionnaires to 161 fourth year students of the Departments of International Relations, 93 of Departments of Political Sciences, 39 of Prime-ministry Institute of Middle East and Public Administration and 13 of students of Academy Of Ministry Of Foreign Affairs.

Following Tables Illustrate Qualifications of the Senior and Junior Opinion Leaders

Table 1.2: The Senior Opinion Leaders According to Sex

	%
Female *	10,2

Male	89,8
Total	100

* Percentage of female leaders is low, however, this has nothing to do with our sampling but, it reflects the actual proportion of female opinion leaders in Turkey.

Table 1.3: Foreign Languages Spoken by the Senior Opinion Leaders

	%
English	81.6
French	38.7
German	10.2
Arabic	10.2
Japanese	2
Russian	2

Table 2.2: The Junior Opinion Leaders According to Sex

	Number	%
Female *	130	42.5
Male	176	57.5
Total	306	100

* As compared with the female senior opinion leaders, the proportion of the female junior opinion leaders is high, this reflects the actual proportion of female students at the noted departments.

Table 2.3: Foreign Languages Spoken by the Junior Opinion Leaders

Languages	%
English	87.9
French	16.7
German	23.2
Arabic	3.3
Japanese	1.3
Russian	5.6

SECTION II

TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF NATO DURING THE COLD WAR ERA

In order to assess the opinion leaders' perceptions of NATO during the Cold War years, questions 1-7 (see appendix) were asked to the opinion leaders.

Table 3.1 Perceived Objectives of the Establishment of NATO

(See question 1)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	No Response		Yes		No		Total %
	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	
To Prevent Soviet Expansionism	-	0.3	89.8	80.1	10.2	19.6	100
To Protect US Interests	-	0.3	4.1	26.1	95.9	73.5	100
To Protect US and Western European Interests	-	0.3	22.4	62.1	77.6	37.6	100
To Regulate Political and Military Relations of the Member States	-	0.3	44.9	57.5	55.1	42.2	100
No Idea	-	0.3	-	0.7	100	99.0	100
Others Senior * Others Junior **	-	0.3	16.3	1.0	83.7	98.7	100

* Four more responses are given: the objectives of the establishment of NATO were to contain Germany, to secure the interests of imperialist powers, to play active role in anti-Communist campaigns and to ensure the US cooperation with the European powers.

** Two more responses are given: the objective of the establishment of NATO was to contain Germany, and to secure interests of imperialist powers.

Table 3.1 suggests that the senior opinion leaders perceived that the objective of the establishment of NATO, in the first place, was to prevent the Soviet expansionism (89.8 %), second that NATO aimed to regulate political and military relations among the member states (44.9 %) and third, to protect the interests of US and West European states.

It is apparent that both the senior and junior opinion leaders perceived the Soviet expansionism as the main factor for the establishment of NATO (senior: 89.8 junior 80.1 %), however, the junior opinion leaders perceived that the protection of US and West European interests was as important as Soviet expansionism.

It may be said that while the senior opinion leaders regarded the establishment of NATO as being a defense organization against the Soviet expansionism, the junior opinion leaders appear to be critical, adding that the Soviet threat perception was not the only reason for the establishment of NATO, and the protection of the interests of US and West European states was as important as the Soviet threat.

Table 3.2 Perceptions of NATO's Contributions to the Coordination and Development of Political Relations among the Member States

(See question 2)

Sample size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
Strongly Contributed	28.6	12.4
Relatively Contributed	53.1	78.4
No Contribution	12.2	6.6
No Idea	-	2.6
No Response	6.1	-
Total	100	100

As table 3.2 shows, both the senior and junior opinion leaders interpreted that during the Cold War years NATO had 'relatively contributed' to the coordination and development of political relations among the member states. However, it is noticeable that the senior opinion leaders' conviction (53.1 %) of the contribution is relatively lower than the junior opinion leaders' conviction (78.4 %).

Table 3.3 NATO's Performance from the Perspectives of Member States' Interests
(Question 7)
Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
NATO Served for the Interests of the all Members	24.5	9.2
Served mostly for the Interests of US and West European States	28.6	54.2
Mainly Served for the US Interests	12.2	34.3
Mainly Served for the Interests of West European States	22.4	2.0
No Response	12.2	0.3
Total	100	100

Table 3.3 clearly suggests that both the senior and junior opinion leaders are of the opinion that during the Cold War period NATO did not equally serve for the interests of all the member states. 24.5 % of the senior opinion leaders believe that NATO served for the interests of all the member states, however, 28.6 % of them indicate that NATO served mostly for the interests of US and West European states, 12.2 % to only the US interests, 22.4 % to mainly for the West European states. Only 9.2 % of the junior opinion leaders believe that NATO served for the benefit of all the member states, but 54.2 % indicated that NATO served for the interests of US and West European states, 34.3% claims that NATO mainly served for the interests of US and only 2 % for the West European states.

Table 3.4 Reasons for Turkey's Accession to NATO
(Question 3)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	No Response		Yes		No		Total %
	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	
To Make use of NATO as a Platform to Solve Problems with Greece	4.1	0.3	8.2	22.2	87.7	77.5	100
To Provide Security Against Soviet Expansion	4.1	0.3	87.7	74.2	8.2	25.5	100
To Ensure the Continuation of US Aid within the NATO Context	4.1	0.3	32.6	61.1	63.3	38.6	100
To Integrate with the Western World	4.1	0.3	67.3	73.5	28.6	26.1	100
No Idea	4.1	0.3	-	0.7	95.9	99.0	100

Table 3.4 shows that senior opinion leaders primarily perceived NATO as a defense organization against the Soviet Union (87.7 %), second, to integrate into the Western world (67.3 %) and third, to ensure the continuation of the US aid through NATO (32.6 %). According to the junior opinion leaders, however, the Soviet threat perception (74.2 %) and integration to the West (73.5 %) had equal importance to Turkey's accession to NATO. Moreover, the junior opinion leaders perceived that ensuring the US aid through NATO was an important factor in Turkey's accession to NATO (61.1 %).

It may be said that although the Soviet threat perception was important, the senior and junior opinion leaders saw Turkey's accession to NATO as part of Turkey's integration to the West and continuation of her modernization process. Unlike the dominant view that Turkey joined the NATO because

Greece joined, according to the senior and junior opinion leaders this issue was not an important factor for Turkey's accession to NATO. On the question of making use of NATO as a platform to solve the disputes between Turkey and Greece, only 8.2 % of the senior opinion leaders responded affirmative while 22.2 % of junior opinion leaders considered that this was a factor in Turkey's accession to NATO.

Table 3.5 Effectiveness of Turkey in the Formation of NATO's Policies during the Cold War Period

(Question 4)

Sample size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
Not Effective	42.9	37.0
Relatively Effective	40.8	51.1
Mostly Effective	6.1	6.9
No Idea/No Response	10.2	5.0
Total	100	100

Table 3.6 How Important Role Turkey Played in the Implementation of NATO's Policies during the Cold War Period

(Question 5)

Sample size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
Indispensable Role	14.3	11.1
Important Role, but not indispensable	49.0	54.9
Not Important Role	28.6	31.7
No Response	8.1	2.3
Total	100	100

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that on the questions of the formation and implementation of the policies of NATO, the senior opinion leaders are of the opinion that Turkey was relatively effective in the formation of policies of NATO (40.8 %), and played not an indispensable but an important role in the implementation of NATO policies (49 %). Similarly, the junior opinion leaders have the view that Turkey was relatively effective in the formation of NATO's policies (51.1 %) and played not an indispensable but an important role in the implementation of the NATO policies (54.9 %).

It is believed in Turkey that she had played an indispensable role in the implementation of NATO's policies. However, this research shows that the senior and junior opinion leaders are of the opinion that Turkey's role in the implementation of the NATO policies is not so indispensable (14.3, 11.1 %) and Turkey's role in the implementation of policies is not so important (28.6, 31.7%). 42.9 % of the senior opinion leaders and 37 % of the junior opinion leaders are of the opinion that Turkey was not effective in the formation of NATO's policies during the Cold War period.

Table 3.7 During the Cold War Did Turkey Fulfill Her Expectations of National Security in Return for the Responsibilities Undertaken by Turkey?

(Question 6)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
Generally Yes	75.5	52.6
Generally No	18.4	37.3
No Idea/No Response	6.1	10.1
Total	100	100

Table 3.7 shows that general perceptions of senior and junior opinion leaders on the question of fulfillment of Turkey's expectations from the NATO is affirmative (senior 75.5 %, Junior 52.6 %), though there is a difference between the perceptions of senior and junior opinion leaders about the fulfillment of their expectations. It may be said that in the eyes of both senior and junior opinion leaders Turkey benefited from her membership in NATO.

SECTION III

PERCEPTIONS OF NATO'S ROLES IN THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE 1990S

In order to assess the opinion leaders' perceptions of NATO's roles in the post-Cold War years, the questions 8-12 and 15 (see appendix) were asked to the opinion leaders.

Table 4.1 How Did the Changes in the International System in the 1990s Affect NATO?

(Question 8)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
No Response	4.1	0.4
Importance & functions of NATO have not changed	16.3	5.9
Importance & functions of NATO have increased	20.4	11.1
Importance & functions of NATO have diminished	24.5	60.3
Importance & functions of NATO have disappeared	4.1	14.1
Others (seniors *, juniors **)	30.6	8.2
Total	100	100

* Functions of NATO should be redefined.

** Functions have changed, though importance has not.

Table 4.1 shows that while 16.3% of the senior opinion leaders state that importance and the functions of NATO did not change, implying that NATO is still a defense organization; 4.1 % of them believe that importance and

functions of NATO disappeared, asserting that NATO is no longer a useful organization. 20.4 % of the senior opinion leaders are of the opinion that importance and functions of NATO have increased and 24.5 % of them are of the view that NATO's importance and functions have diminished. 30.6 % of the senior opinion leaders indicate that NATO's importance and functions have changed and need to be redefined. This suggests that 75.5 % of the senior opinion leaders indicate that the importance and functions of NATO have changed, only 30.6 % of them clearly state that NATO's functions should be redefined, and the rest had no clear idea to what extent NATO's functions increased or decreased.

As to the perceptions of junior opinion leaders, 79.6 % of them are of the opinion that NATO's importance and functions have changed. 60.3 % of them state that importance and functions of NATO have diminished. On this issue, the junior opinion leaders are predominantly of the opinion that NATO's Cold War importance and functions have diminished. Only 11.1 % of the junior opinion leaders indicate that importance and functions of NATO have increased, and 8.2 % claim that importance and functions of NATO should be redefined. There is a convergence between the senior and junior opinion leaders' perceptions of the change in NATO's importance and functions: 75.5

% of the senior and 79.6 % of the junior opinion leaders state that importance and functions of NATO have changed. Unlike the senior (24.5 %), 60.3 % of the junior opinion leaders claim that NATO's Cold War importance and functions have diminished.

Table 4.2 What Should the Post-Cold War Objectives of NATO Be?
(Question 9)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
No Response	12.3	2.0
NATO should become a European security organization	8.2	10.5
NATO should become a military organization under the auspices of UN	12.2	20.7
While keeping the existing structure, NATO should become more of a political organization	51.0	19.7
Independent of UN, NATO should become an organization performing as peace-keeping and peace enforcement forces	6.1	41.3
Others (* Seniors, ** Juniors)	10.2	5.8
Total	100	100

* NATO should be abolished. NATO should replace UN. NATO should remain as it is

** NATO should be abolished. NATO should function in coordination with OSCE and WEU

As table 4.2 shows, 51 % of the senior and 19.7 % of junior opinion leaders assert that NATO's Cold War structure should be kept, but NATO should be reinforced with political functions. While 12.2 % of the senior opinion leaders desire to see NATO as a military organization performing under the UN auspices, 8.2 % of them would like to see NATO becoming a European security organization.

By and large it may be said that the senior opinion leaders seem not to be of the opinion supporting structural change in NATO and are of the opinion that NATO's new objectives and responsibilities should be limited.

Unlike the senior opinion leaders, 72.5 % of the junior are of the opinion that NATO's objectives should be changed: 41.3 % them indicate that independent of UN, NATO should become an organization performing peace-keeping and peace enforcement functions. This clearly diverges from the senior opinion leaders' perceptions (6.1 % of them responded affirmatively). Only 20.7 % of junior opinion leaders desire to see that NATO should become a military organization under the auspices of UN. 10.5 % of them support that NATO should become a European security organization.

Table 4.3 Perceptions of NATO's Geographical Intervention Areas
(Question 10)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
NATO should not intervene out of area	20.8	27.5
NATO should undertake out of area responsibilities with the UN recommendation	33.3	42.8
NATO should undertake out of area responsibilities with the decision of the Member States, not necessarily requiring the UN approval	29.2	20.9
No Response/No Idea	14.6	5.6
Others Senior *, Juniors **	4.1	3.2
Total	100	100

* NATO should not intervene beyond member states. NATO should intervene with the recommendation of UN provided that UN is substantially democratized.

** NATO should not intervene beyond member states. Out of area should be limited to Europe.

Table 4.3 shows that 20.8 % of the senior and 27.5 % of the junior opinion leaders are against NATO's intervention in out of area matters. A clear majority of both opinion leaders support NATO's involvement in out of area matters: 62.5 % of the senior and 62.7 % of the junior opinion leaders are of the opinion that NATO should undertake out of area responsibilities. However, 33.3 % of the senior and 42.8 % of the junior opinion leaders support the view that out of area responsibilities of NATO should be subjected to the UN recommendation, and 29.2 % of the senior and 20.9 % of the junior opinion leaders are of the opinion that NATO should be able to act on its own right.

Table 4.4 Accession of New Members to NATO

(Question 11)
 Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
Yes	58.3	59.8
No	31.3	32.0
No Response/No Idea *	10.4	8.2
Total	100	100

* However, of them some responded on the below question (V16) regarding which regions NATO should enlarge.

As shown in table 4.4, both the senior (58.3 %) and junior opinion leaders (59.8 %) clearly indicate that NATO should accept new members, and 31.3 % of the senior and 32 % of the junior opinion leaders are against NATO's

regions. Central Asia, which is geographically distant from Europe, is regarded as the last preference for the regions to be incorporated into NATO.

Table 4.6 From the Perspective of Turkey, What Should the Functions of NATO Be in the Post-Cold War Years?

(Question 15)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	No Response		Yes		No		Total %
	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	
NATO should continue to exist without changing its Functions	12.5	6.2	14.6	7.2	72.9	86.6	100
NATO should be activated to curb the threat in the Caucasia	12.5	5.6	56.3	42.3	31.2	52.1	100
NATO should be activated to curb the threat in the Balkans	12.5	5.6	54.2	51.1	33.3	43.3	100
NATO should be activated to curb the threat in the Middle East	12.5	5.6	27.2	48.5	58.3	45.9	100
NATO should become a platform where the problems with Greece can be solved	12.5	5.6	22.9	44.9	64.6	49.5	100
NATO should take a responsibility to maintain stability in the Mediterranean region	12.5	5.6	29.2	24.6	58.3	69.8	100
Others Senior *, Junior **	12.3	5.6	8.1	4.2	79.6	90.2	100

* NATO should be abolished. NATO should be activated to curb the threats directed to the Central Asian Countries. NATO should be made use against terrorism.

** NATO should be abolished. NATO should be activated to curb the threats directed to the Central Asian Countries.

As shown in table 4.6, from the perspective of Turkey, the roles and functions of NATO during the post-Cold War years should be as follows: the senior opinion leaders expect that in the first place, NATO should be activated to curb potential destabilizing factors in Caucasia (56.3 %), second in the Balkans

(54.2 %), third in the Mediterranean (29.2 %), fourth in the Middle East (27.2 %), and finally, NATO may be made use as a platform to solve the problems between Turkey and Greece (22.9 %). Insignificant percent of respondents are of the opinion that NATO should continue to exist without changing its functions. The pattern of expectations is slightly different for the junior opinion leaders: for them priority should be given to the Balkans (51.1%), second to Middle East (48.5 %), third, NATO should be used as a platform to solve the problems between Turkey and Greece (44.9 %), fourth to Caucasia (42.3 %) and fifth to Mediterranean (24.6 %).

If we may make a generalization from our findings on the issues of Turkish perceptions and enlargement as well as out of area matters, it seems that there is an inverse relationship between Turkish perceptions of NATO enlargement and NATO's out of area responsibilities. While the Turkish opinion leaders in general support NATO enlargement first, in the East-Central Europe, then to Balkans and last to Caucasia; they are of the opinion that NATO should undertake out of area responsibilities first in Caucasia and then in the Balkans.

SECTION IV

PERCEPTIONS OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE 1990s

To assess the importance given to security issues relative to the other problems Turkey face in the 1990s, and the regional problems in the 1990s, the question 13 (see appendix) was asked to the opinion leaders.

Table 5.1a Perceptions of the Problems Turkey Currently Facing.

(Question 13)

Senior Sample Size: 49

Variables	1. Most Important	2. Most Important	3. Most Important	4. Most Important	5. Most Important	6. Most Important	7. Most Important	8. Most Important
Environmental Problems	2.1	0.0	0.0	2.1	6.3	4.2	10.4	4.2
Extreme Nationalism	0.0	4.2	0.0	2.1	4.2	2.1	8.3	10.4
Fundamentalism	6.3	6.3	6.3	2.1	0.0	14.6	0.0	2.1
South-Eastern Anatolian Problem	37.5	18.8	4.2	4.2	8.3	0.0	2.1	0.0
Economic Problems	33.3	29.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	2.1	0.0	0.0
National Security	6.3	8.3	16.7	4.2	2.1	4.2	4.2	4.2
Education Problems	2.1	4.2	20.8	6.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
Democratization and Human Rights	2.1	10.4	14.6	10.4	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
No Response	10.4	18.8	33.3	64.6	70.8	72.9	75.0	77.1

Respondents are asked to mark from the most important issue to the least, as 1,2 ..8.

Table 5.1b Perceptions of the Problems Turkey Currently Facing.

(Question 13)

Junior Sample Size: 306

Variables	1. Most Important	2. Most Important	3. Most Important	4. Most Important	5. Most Important	6. Most Important	7. Most Important	8. Most Important
Environmental Problems	1.3	1.3	1.3	3.3	8.2	11.8	18.6	35.9
Extreme Nationalism	3.6	2.0	4.2	9.2	11.8	19.0	22.5	8.5
Fundamentalism	7.2	7.8	13.4	13.7	16.3	10.8	8.2	5.2
South-Eastern Anatolian Problem	21.9	27.5	18.3	12.1	9.5	4.2	2.0	0.0
Economic Problems	33.7	25.2	18.3	8.5	5.6	2.9	1.3	0.7
National Security	6.5	6.5	8.2	10.1	9.8	12.7	11.8	18.6
Education Problems	11.8	12.1	16.3	17.6	15.4	9.8	5.2	2.6
Democratization and Human Rights	11.8	15.4	17.3	16.3	10.5	9.8	7.8	2.0
No Response	2.3	2.3	2.6	9.2	13.1	19.0	22.5	26.5

Respondents are asked to mark from the most important issue to the least, as 1,2 ..8.

Tables 5.1a and 5.1b show that the senior and junior opinion leaders gave priority to the South-Eastern (senior 21.9 %, junior 37.5 %) and the economic problems (senior 33.3%, junior 33.7). For the senior opinion leaders, national security and the threat posed by fundamentalism occupy the third place by 6.3

%). Environmental problems, education and democratisation are not regarded as urgent but rather as persistent problems (2.1 %).

For the junior opinion leaders, problems related with the education system (11.8 %), democratisation (11.8 %) and fundamentalism (7.2 %) are the third, fourth and fifth issues. National security, extreme nationalism and environmental problems appear to be rather secondary in importance.

The figures suggest that among the eight problems the national security is placed as the third by the senior opinion leaders and sixth by the junior. In other words, the Turkish opinion leaders are convinced that the territorial integrity and national independence are not at stake. It is clear that the Turkish opinion leaders do not perceive national security as a topical issue. Nor do they relate it with the domestic problems. The national security issue draws much less attention than South Eastern and economic problems. This clearly suggests that the national security problem is not a vital, but rather a persistent problem.

Table 5.2 Perceptions of Regional Problems Turkey Facing During the Post-Cold War Years
(Question 14)

To assess the regional threat perceptions Turkey facing in the 1990s the question 14 (see appendix) was asked to the opinion leaders.

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	1. Most Important		2. Most Important		Third Most Important		4. Most Important		5. Most Important	
	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %	Senior %	Junior %
Aegean and other Problems with Greece	49.0	30.9	18.4	43.1	4.1	9.5	8.2	7.6	2.0	4.9
Instability in the Balkans	2.0	2.3	6.1	15.1	16.3	28.3	16.3	23.4	10.2	17.1
Problems with the Middle Eastern States	26.5	59.2	36.7	21.7	10.2	6.9	4.1	4.3	-	3.3
Problems with Russia	2.0	3.6	4.1	7.9	20.4	22.7	10.2	23.7	20.4	26.6
Instability in the Caucasia	4.1	2.3	12.2	9.2	18.4	25.3	12.2	23.7	16.3	26.3
No Response	16.3	1.4	22.4	3.0	30.6	7.2	49.0	17.4	51.0	21.7

Respondents are asked to mark from the most important issue to the least, as 1,2 ..5.

Tables 5.2 suggests that the senior and junior opinion leaders perceive a similar regional problems that surround Turkey: Aegean Sea and Middle East related problems are given priority. Almost half of the senior opinion leaders highlights

problems with Greece as the most crucial and % 26.5 of them Middle East issues.

The junior leaders share similar opinions, though priority is given to the Middle East: 60 % of them regard the Middle East related problems and 30.9 % of them see problems between Turkey and Greece as the most troublesome topics. Compared with the other problems specified in the table 5.2, these two regional problems are accepted as the most critical problems for the Turkish foreign policy. On the other hand, the problems originating from Caucasia, Balkans and Russia are perceived to be much less vital for the national security of Turkey.

SECTION V

ENVISAGED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR TURKEY

To outline envisaged security arrangements for Turkey, the questions 16-18 (see appendix) were asked to the opinion leaders.

Table 6.1 Can It Be Possible to Consider Alternative Security Arrangements to NATO, Provided that Turkey Cancel Her Membership of NATO?

(Question 16)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Variables	Senior %	Junior %
Yes	2.1	31.1
No	83.0	60.0
No Response/No Idea	14.9	8.9
Total	100	100

As table 6.1 suggests, insignificant percent of the senior opinion leaders (2.1 %) are of the opinion that it is possible to consider alternative security arrangements for Turkey, provided that Turkey withdrew from NATO. However, 83 % of them consider that Turkey should continue to remain as a member of NATO. For the junior opinion leaders, a greater percent of junior opinion leaders (31.1 %) consider that it is possible to organize alternative security arrangements to NATO. Still, 60 % of the junior opinion leaders clearly approve Turkey's membership to NATO.

Table 6.2 Perceptions of Alternative Security Arrangements for Turkey, subject to Turkey's Withdrawal from NATO.

(Question 17)

Only junior opinion leaders who responded affirmatively to the previous question (16) are assessed here. The senior opinion leaders are not taken into account because only 2.1 % of them had replied affirmative to the previous question, which is insignificant, and none of the 2.1 % answered to the question 17.

Sample Size: Junior: 122

Variables	No Response Junior %	Yes Junior %	No Junior %
Bilateral security arrangement between Turkey and USA	21.3	9.0	69.7
A security arrangement between Turkey and WEU	21.3	32.0	46.7
A security arrangement between Turkey and Islamic States	21.3	21.3	57.4
A security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Israel	21.3	14.8	63.9
A security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Germany	21.3	12.3	66.4
A security arrangement between Turkey and Central Asian Republics	21.3	32.8	45.9

A security arrangement between Turkey and Mediterranean States	21.3	29.5	49.2
A security arrangement between Turkey and Balkan States	21.3	18.0	60.7
Others (Junior *)	20.8	8.2	70.8

* Other security arrangements that are specified by the junior opinion leaders: “ Security arrangement between Turkey, WEU, Israel and USA”, “ Between the members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization”, “ Security Arrangement between Turkey, and Islamic countries of Middle East, Caucasia, and the Balkans” etc.

As shown in table 6.2, interestingly, 21.3 % of respondents did not answer to this question, though they had indicated in the previous one that it was possible to organize an alternative security arrangement to NATO, subjected that Turkey withdrew from NATO. It may be interpreted that they are undecided on the nature of alternative arrangements to NATO.

Of the respondents 32.8 % are of the opinion that Turkey should organize a security arrangement between Turkey and Central Asian Republics as an alternative to NATO, 32 % of them prefer strengthening Turkey's security arrangement with the WEU, 29.5 % are in favor of establishing a security alliance with Mediterranean countries, 21.3 % of them prefer creation of a security organization between Turkey and Islamic states, 18 % of them suggest that a security arrangement should be made between Turkey and the Balkan States, 14.8 % prefer trilateral security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Israel, 12.3 % would like to see a military arrangement between Turkey, USA

and Germany, and 9 % of them prefer developing a military arrangement between Turkey and USA.

Table 6.3 Given the Condition that Turkey Remains as a NATO Member, Which of the Following Security Arrangements May Be Contemplated.

(Question 18)

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 184 (of the 306 Junior opinion leaders, 184 responded)

Variables	No Response		Yes		No	
	Senior %	Junior	Senior %	Junior	Senior %	Junior
Bilateral security arrangement between Turkey and USA	18.4	13.0	24.5	26.1	57.1	60.9
A security arrangement between Turkey and WEU	18.4	13.0	32.7	43.5	49.0	43.5
A security arrangement between Turkey and Islamic States	18.4	13.0	4.1	11.1	77.6	75.8
A security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Israel	18.4	13.0	16.3	22.7	65.3	64.3
A security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Germany	18.4	13.0	4.1	21.7	77.6	65.2
A security arrangement between Turkey and Central Asian Republics	18.4	13.0	10.2	31.4	71.4	55.6
A security arrangement between Turkey and Mediterranean States	18.4	13.0	12.2	23.2	69.4	63.8
A security arrangement between Turkey and Balkan States	18.4	13.0	12.2	29.0	69.4	58.0
Others (Senior * Junior **)	18.4	13.0	36.6	3.9	44.9	84.1

* Senior opinion leaders specify the other options as follows: “ A security arrangement among regional states”, “ A security arrangement between Turkey and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council countries”, and “ A security arrangement between Turkey, Egypt and Israel”.

** The other security arrangements that are specified by the junior opinion leaders are as follows: “A security arrangement between Turkey, Middle Eastern Islamic countries and Israel”.

As shown in table 6.3, 36.6 % of the senior opinion leaders would like to see a complimentary security arrangement to NATO, without specifying the countries, but referring to regions. However, the content of such regional arrangements are not clarified.

Of the respondents, 32.7 % of the senior opinion leaders desire to see a complimentary security arrangement to NATO, specifically strengthening of Turkey's relations with the WEU. 24.5 % of the senior opinion leaders prefer an additional security tie with the USA, 16.3 % between Turkey, the USA and Israel, 12.2 % between Turkey and Mediterranean states, similarly between Turkey and Balkan states, 10.2 % between Turkey and Central Asian States, 4.1 % between Turkey and Islamic states, similarly between Turkey, USA and Germany.

What is clear is that the senior opinion leaders prefer to see complimentary security links largely with the Western countries, preferably with WEU and an arrangement which includes the USA. It may also be said that the senior opinion leaders are not keen on developing security links with Islamic countries.

Like the senior opinion leaders, as a complimentary security bond WEU is preferred by the junior opinion leaders (43.5 %). In the second place, junior opinion leaders prefer developing security links with the Central Asian Republics (31.4 %). This follows with a desire to develop a security arrangement with the Balkan states (29 %). 26.1 % of the junior opinion leaders are of the opinion that bilateral security arrangements with USA should be strengthened as complimentary to NATO. 23.2 % of the junior opinion leaders would like to see a security arrangement created between Turkey and the Mediterranean states. 21.7 % of them prefer creation of a security arrangement between Turkey, the USA and Germany. Only 11.1 % of them would prefer seeing a security arrangement developed between Turkey and the Islamic states as complimentary to NATO.

All in all, both the senior and junior opinion leaders would like to see regional security arrangements developed not as an alternative but, as complimentary to NATO.

Conclusion

The study shed lights, first, on the Turkish perceptions of NATO during the Cold War era, second, Turkish perceptions of NATO in the 1990s, third, regional threat perceptions in Turkey in the 1990s, fourth, envisaged security arrangements for Turkey during the post-Cold War years.

As to the first set of issues, this study suggests that both the senior and junior opinion leaders interpret NATO as the main western-led security organization which offered a security umbrella during the Cold War years, and above all, contributed to Turkey's integration to the West and continuation of her westernization and modernization processes. Hence, the senior and junior opinion leaders have a converging perception that Turkey benefited from her membership to NATO, though it may be noted that there is a more critical attitude of the junior opinion leaders. It is noticeable that while the senior opinion leaders are more concerned with the military aspects of the benefit, the junior opinion leaders put much emphasis on Turkey's integration to the West and continuation of Turkey's process of modernization.

As to the question of to whom NATO served, both the senior and junior opinion leaders state that NATO did not serve equally to all its members,

specifying that USA and West European states benefited from NATO more than other members of NATO.

This study suggests that Turkey did not play an indispensable, but an important, role in the formation and implementation of NATO's policies. This is contrary to the unsubstantiated general belief that Turkey was an indispensable member in the implementation of NATO's policies. It seems that even during the Cold War years the military aspect was perceived secondary to the political aspect of Turkey's relations with NATO.

As to the objectives of the establishment of NATO, apparently both the senior and junior opinion leaders state that the Soviet threat perception was the main factor, however, the junior opinion leaders state that the protection of the US and West European interests was as important as the Soviet threat. It may be said that while the senior opinion leaders tend to narrow down the objectives of the establishment of NATO, specifically to the security dimension against the Soviet threat, the junior opinion leaders appear to be critical about it. Contrary to the conviction of the senior leaders, the junior opinion leaders see other reasons for the establishment of NATO, adding that the Soviet threat perception was not the only reason for the establishment of NATO, and the

protection of the interests of the US and West European states was as important as the Soviet threat. This suggests that the junior opinion leaders tend to reinterpret objectives of the establishment of NATO in a more critical way. Moreover, the junior opinion leaders put emphasis on one of the functions of NATO that NATO was established to regulate and develop political and military relations between the member states. This supports the argument that NATO played a crucial role in the establishment and consolidation of western camp vis a vis the Eastern bloc.

It may be said that in the eyes of the Turkish opinion leaders, during the Cold War years, Turkey had largely fulfilled her expectations from NATO in return for the responsibilities Turkey had undertaken. Though it should be stated that not all the opinion leaders, particularly the junior ones, are satisfied with the fulfillment of expectations.

As the Cold War ended, the question, how the change in the international system affected NATO, became an important matter. As this study suggests in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the Turkish opinion leaders, NATO's Cold War significance and functions have dramatically diminished. It may be said that NATO even faced a legitimacy problem as the Cold War ended, since

NATO was seen merely as a defense organization against the Soviet threat and as the Soviet Union collapsed many began to question the very existence of NATO. As NATO began to revise its roles and functions, there appeared a strong need to redefine its future roles and functions. A parallel development may be seen in the changing perceptions of the Turkish opinion leaders: the overwhelming majority of the Turkish opinion leaders assert that the Cold War functions and importance of NATO are sharply diminished and there is a need to redefine its future roles. On the question of NATO's post-Cold War objectives, the views of senior and junior opinion leaders do not seem to be converging. While the senior opinion leaders support the view that NATO should be reinforced with new political functions, keeping its Cold War structure; the junior opinion leaders, on the other hand, argue that NATO should undertake structural reform and redefine its roles and objectives. By and large, it may be said that the senior opinion leaders seem not to be of the opinion supporting structural and organizational changes in NATO and are of the opinion that NATO's new objectives and responsibilities should be limited, whereas the junior opinion leaders clearly state that NATO should redefine its roles and objectives and undergo substantial structural reform. However, the junior opinion leaders do not clearly indicate in what ways NATO should function in the post-Cold War years. There is no clear pattern about whether

NATO should act on its own right or under the auspices of UN, though they support the idea that NATO should play a greater role in peace-keeping and peace enforcement.

On the question of 'out of area issues', both the senior and junior opinion leaders clearly suggest that NATO should undertake out of area responsibilities, though they have varying views on the question of how it should be decided.

Majority of the Turkish opinion leaders state that NATO may accept new members. As to the question of to which regions NATO should enlarge, the Turkish opinion leaders offer a clear pattern: Priority should be given to East-Central Europe, second to Balkans, third to Russia, fourth to Mediterranean, fifth to Caucasia and finally to Central Asia.

As this study suggests, the Turkish opinion leaders' priorities on NATO's roles on out of area issues are as follows: NATO should play an active role in curbing destabilizing factors first in Caucasia, then in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East and be used as a platform to solve problems between Turkey and Greece. The senior opinion leaders state that the roles and

functions of NATO during the post-Cold War years should be, in the first place, in the Caucasasia, second in the Balkans, third in the Mediterranean, fourth in the Middle East, and finally, NATO may be used as a platform to solve the problems between Turkey and Greece. The pattern of expectations is slightly different for the junior opinion leaders: for them priority should be given to the Balkans, second to the Middle East, third, NATO should be used as a platform to solve the problems between Turkey and Greece, fourth to the Caucasasia and fifth to the Mediterranean.

It may be said that while adapting itself to post-Cold War requirements, NATO should not be limited to Euro-Atlantic regions. The findings of this study suggest that Turkish opinion leaders would like to see greater involvement of NATO in her region. As NATO undertakes political responsibilities especially in the Caucasasia and in the Balkans, NATO may overcome the problem of being a Euro-Atlantic centric organization.

As to the regional threat perceptions, the Turkish opinion leaders see the Middle East and Greece related problems as the most important ones, and do not attach high priority for other regional problems. It is interesting to note that only junior opinion leaders envisage a future role for NATO in those regions

that they perceive as the source of most pressing problems for the Turkish foreign policy. Almost half of the junior opinion leaders wants NATO to prevent escalation of crises in the Middle East. Likewise, similar proportion of them wishes to see NATO as a forum to solve problems with Greece. As for the senior opinion leaders, although over half of them wants NATO to prevent crises in the Caucasia and the Balkans, only a slight proportion of them attach a first degree importance for the problems emanating from these regions. In the Middle East and Greece related problems to which they are sensitive, approximately only one-fourth of them envisages a future role for NATO.

As to the envisaged security arrangements for Turkey in the 1990s, this study suggests that almost none of the senior opinion leaders consider that Turkey may cancel her membership of NATO, therefore, they are of the opinion that an alternative security arrangement to NATO is not feasible. One-third of the junior opinion leaders states that it is possible to contemplate an alternative security arrangement to NATO provided that Turkey cancel her membership of NATO. However, out of one-third of junior opinion leaders, 21.3 % did not respond to the next question which offers variety of choices. This suggests that they are undecided. Out of one-third of junior opinion leaders 32.8 % are in favor of creating a security arrangement between Turkey and the Central Asian

Republics, 32 % between Turkey and WEU, 29.5 % between Turkey and the Mediterranean states, 21.3 % between Turkey and the Islamic states. This suggests that there is a tendency among one-third of the junior opinion leaders for an alternative security arrangement to NATO. It seems that there is a correlation between the fulfillment of Turkey's expectations from NATO during the Cold War period and a search for an alternative security arrangement because the proportions of those who replied 'no' to the question 6 (37.3 %) and those who seek an alternative security arrangement (31.1%) are similar. It should be noted that however, those who seek an alternative security arrangement to NATO do not seem to have a clear agenda.

As for the complimentary security arrangements to NATO, it is clear that the senior opinion leaders are not keen on developing security links with the Islamic states, they prefer establishing complimentary security links largely with the Western countries, preferably with WEU and an arrangement which includes the USA. Out of two-thirds of the junior opinion leaders, who seek complimentary security arrangements to NATO, the security link to WEU is preferred by the junior opinion leaders in the first place. In the second place, junior opinion leaders prefer developing security links with the Central Asian Republics. This follows with a desire to develop a security arrangement with

the Balkan states. One-fourth of the junior opinion leaders are of the opinion that bilateral security arrangements with USA should be strengthened as complimentary to NATO. One-fifth of the junior opinion leaders would like to see a security arrangement created between Turkey and the Mediterranean states. Similarly, one-fifth prefer creation of a security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Germany. One-tenth of them would prefer seeing a security arrangement developed between Turkey and the Islamic states as complimentary to NATO.

All in all, both the senior and junior opinion leaders would like to see regional security arrangements developed as complimentary to NATO. In the first place, both senior and junior opinion leaders make a clear reference to WEU as a full member and in the second place they make a reference to the Central Asian Republics.

All these suggest that the Turkish opinion leaders are in the process of redefining their security priorities and look for complementary regional security arrangements complimentary to NATO, rather than alternative arrangements.

Appendix

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TURKISH ELITE PERCEPTION OF NATO

This Survey is Conducted by the Department of International Relations, Middle
East Technical University

Thanks in advance for your contributions

Please do not write your name

Female ()

Male ()

Place of Birth

Date of Birth

Foreign Languages

1) In your opinion, what are the reasons for the establishment of NATO? (You can mark more than one).

- a) To prevent Soviet expansionism
- b) To protect the US interests
- c) To protect the US and the West European Countries' interests
- d) To regulate and develop military and political relations among the member states
- e) I don't know
- f) Others (please specify)

2) In your opinion, did NATO contribute to the co-ordination and development of political relations among member countries? (Please mark only one)

- a) Strongly contributed
- b) Relatively contributed
- c) No contribution
- d) I don't know

3) In your opinion, what were the reasons for Turkey's accession into NATO? (You can mark more than one)

- a) To make use of NATO as a platform to solve problems with Greece
- b) To provide security against Soviet expansion
- c) To ensure the continuation of the US aid within NATO context
- d) To integrate with the Western world
- e) I don't know
- f) Others (please specify)

4) What is your opinion about the role that Turkey played in the formulation of NATO policies during the Cold War? (Please mark only one)

- a) Not effective
- b) Relatively effective
- c) Mostly effective
- d) I do not know

5) How important role did Turkey play in the implementation of NATO's policies during the Cold War period? (Please mark only one)

- a) Indispensable role
- b) Important role, but not indispensable
- c) Not important role
- d) Others (please specify)

6) During the Cold-War, did Turkey fulfill her expectations of national security in return for the responsibilities undertaken by Turkey?

- a) Generally yes
- b) Generally no
- d) No idea

7) From the perspectives of the member states, please evaluate the Cold War performance of NATO. (please mark only one)

- a) NATO served for the interests of all members
- b) NATO mostly served for the interests of the US and the West European states
- c) NATO mainly served for the US interests
- d) NATO mainly served for the interests of the West European states
- e) Others (please specify)

8) How did the changes in the international system in 1990s affect NATO? (please mark only one)

- a) Importance and functions of NATO have not changed

- b) Importance and functions of NATO have increased
- c) Importance and functions of NATO have diminished
- d) Importance and functions of NATO have disappeared
- e) Others (please note)

9) As the Post-Cold War changes are taken into account; what do you think the future objectives of NATO should be? (please mark only one)

- a) NATO should become a European security organization
- b) NATO should become a military organization under the auspices of the UN
- c) While keeping the existing structure, NATO should become more of a political organization
- d) Independent of the UN, NATO should become an organization performing peace-keeping and peace-enforcement functions
- e) Others (please note)

10) In your opinion, what the geographical intervention area of NATO should be? (Please mark only one)

- a) It should not intervene out of area
- b) It should undertake out of area responsibilities with the UN recommendation
- c) It should undertake out of area responsibilities with the decision of the member states, not necessarily requiring the UN approval
- d) Have no opinion
- e) Others (please note)

11) Do you agree accession of new members to NATO?

- a) Yes
- b) No (If you mark this choice go to the Question 13)
- c) Have no opinion

12) If your answer to the Question 11 is 'yes'; to which regions, you think, NATO should enlarge? (You can mark more than one)

- a) East-Central Europe
- b) Balkans
- c) Mediterranean

- d) Middle East
- e) Caucasia
- f) Russia
- g) Central Asia

13) Please rank the following problems Turkey currently facing (please state as 1,2,3...8)

- a) Environmental Problems
- b) Ultrationalism
- c) Fundamentalism
- d) Southeastern Anatolian Problem
- e) Economic Problems
- f) National Security
- f) Educational problems
- g) Democratization and Human Rights Problems
- h) Others (please note)

14) Please rank (1,2,3...) the regional problems Turkey facing in the 1990s

- a) Aegean and other problems with Greece
- b) Instability in the Balkans
- c) Problems with the Middle Eastern states (Iran, Iraq, Syria)
- d) Problems with Russia
- e) Instability in the Caucasia
- f) Others (please note)

15) From the perspective of Turkey, what do you think, the functions of NATO should be in the Post-Cold War years?

- a) NATO should continue to exist without changing its functions
- b) NATO should be activated to curb the threat factors in the Caucasia
- c) NATO should be activated to curb the threat in the Balkans
- d) NATO should be activated to curb the threat in the Middle East

- e) NATO should become a platform where the problems with Greece can be solved
- f) NATO should take a responsibility to maintain stability in the Mediterranean region
- g) Others (please note)

16) Can it be possible to consider alternative security arrangements to NATO, provided that Turkey cancel her membership of NATO?

- a) Yes (If you mark this option, answer only the question 17 and not the question 18)
- b) No (If you mark this option, answer only the question 18)
- c) Have no opinion

17) If your answer to the question 16 is 'Yes'; in your opinion, which one or more option(s) among the following new security organization possibilities can be considered as an alternative to NATO? (You can mark more than one)

- a) A bilateral security arrangement between Turkey and USA
- b) A security arrangement between Turkey and WEU
- c) A security arrangement between Turkey and the Islamic states
- d) A security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Israel
- e) A security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Germany
- f) A security arrangement between Turkey and the Central Asian republics
- g) A security arrangement between Turkey and Mediterranean states
- h) A security arrangement between Turkey and the Balkan states
- l) Others (please note)

18) If your answer to the question 16 is 'no'; in your opinion, which one or more option(s) among the following new security arrangements, can be considered (given the condition that Turkey remains as a NATO member)?

- a) A bilateral security arrangement between Turkey and USA
- b) A security arrangement between Turkey and WEU

- c) A security arrangement between Turkey and the Islamic states
- d) A security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Israel
- e) A security arrangement between Turkey, USA and Germany
- f) A security arrangement between Turkey and the Central Asian republics
- g) A security arrangement between Turkey and Mediterranean states
- h) A security arrangement between Turkey and the Balkan states
- l) Others (please note)

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