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June 1997

THE ARMY-BUILDING AND SECURITY PROBLEMS IN GEORGIA

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to the NATO Office of Information and Press for its support, especially to NATO Fellowship Programme 1995-97 that enabled me to prepare this article. It is also my pleasure to acknowledge that several parts of the work were done in co-operation with the Royal Institute for International Affairs, UK, the King's College, UK, and the Centre for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, USA. I am especially grateful to Dr. Roy Allison, Dr. Edmund Herzig, Ms Fiona Paton and Dr. Gail W. Lapidus for their kind assistance and advice, and to several fellows in the said research centres, who showed themselves so gentle and generous during my visits there. My particular gratitude is to Prof. Charles H. Fairbanks of John Hopkins University for his valuable advice during his stay in Tbilisi.

And finally, I thank all the team of the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development I am proud of being a member of, headed by Dr. Ghia Nodia, the conversations with whom have greatly contributed to shaping my way of thinking. One of the results of my NATO Fellowship was the fact that a security research group was set up in the institute, the group I have the honour to lead. While working on the article, I had the luck to take part in preparing the brochure *Developing the National Security Concept in Georgia* published by the institute, organising seminars on security problems, founding the institute monthly *Army and Society in Georgia*, the editor of which, Ms Tamara Patariaia, has also helped me a lot with my work.

While working on the article, I used information published in Georgian and Russian mass media, interviewed several people in the Georgian military and political circles, got acquainted with materials of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament: relevant laws, enactment, agreements and public declarations.

Introduction

Despite its century-old history, today's Georgia is ranked among new independent states. It came on the international scene along with the countries emerged after the break-up of the USSR. On May 26, 1997, the country celebrated only the 6th anniversary of its independence. During the preceding 70 years, as an integral part of the Soviet Union Georgia had practically no attributes of a sovereign state. Naturally, such a situation did affect the state-building process in Georgia before and does it now: developing an independent state, the Georgian society and political elite encounter a lot of difficulties caused by the lack of experience and political education, by the fear of responsibility and by the legacy of a colonial

past. Just this accounts for Georgia's complicated and discrepant relations with Russia, the legatee of the former Soviet Empire. All the above mentioned problems manifest themselves in such fields of the national security as army-building and definition and developing of the foreign policy. Analysing these difficulties, the given article aims to portray an unbiased picture of the Georgian military and foreign policies.

The article examines concerns of the Georgian national security, practical methods to handle these concerns, potential threats and adequacy of responses for their neutralisation. By its very essence, the article is in fact an analysis of the Georgian national security policy. Adhering to its title, however, we confine ourselves to the military-political aspects of the national security.

Today's security policy is quite a broad notion which covers all the main spheres of the state and social life. A state's security depends on economic and social policies, on efficient anti-crime activities, and on the state policy in the spheres of culture and environmental protection. Of course, such traditional fields as the foreign policy and the army-building, too, remain vital parts of the national security.

As mentioned above, the article does not aim at comprehensive analysing the young Georgian state's national security. It gives few details of the state economic or social policy, and of a crime-rate in the society. We undertake to examine the six-year history of the army-building in Georgia and the Georgian political elite's seeking international guarantors of the country's national security. As to possible threats to the country, we examine only those of military and political nature.

Such a choice may be explained by the inherent value of the military-political aspects of the national security and by their significance for democratic developments in a state. The army and the foreign policy are still the corner-stone of a modern state's life. The military-political frames of the article may be also explained by the fact that just civil-military relations have brought about a lot of problems for the whole time of Georgia's six-year independence: in 1992 Georgia experienced an overthrow of the government by force; in 1993 problems of the civil-military relations made for the country's defeat in Abkhazia and for its affiliation to the CIS which marked a new stage in its foreign policy.

It worth noting that studies of the army-building and civil-military relations are vitally important for deeper analysis of a state and a society. As Martin Edmonds, a well-known expert on the field, argues, studies of the public administration or comparative government require research of the civil-military relations¹. To understand development of events in a country, one needs to look into its military policy and the armed forces. The more regrettable is that actually in Georgia few have examined development of the Georgian armed forces so far. The society is unaware of such a discipline as the civil-military relations. Therefore the present article attempts to fill this vacuum.

As to combination of the foreign policy aspects of the Georgian national security and the army-building problems in one article, this is caused by an interlacing character of these two fields. Just the army and the foreign policy are a country's response to possible threats. The ideal security policy implies these two fields being in harmony with each other and with the political elite's general logic. This is an axiom of a stable security system. Our article endeavours to clear up whether there is such a harmony in Georgia.

Proceeding from the stated above, the article has the following structure: its first chapter contains a review of the relevant literature. There are general works on security and civil-military relations, and analyses of the eastern European countries' security systems. This literature serves for a methodological basis of the article and provides necessary materials for comparative analysis of Georgia's problems. The next parts of the chapter present the contemporary studies of the Georgian security policy. As already mentioned, there are few

local authors' works on the issue. Except a couple of articles, the Georgian analyses are either newspaper reports or are unknown to the society. Therefore, we examine foreign and, partly, Russian works on Georgia's military and political problems.

The second chapter ranges possible threats to Georgia, such as those existing outside the country and those caused by the ethnic problems in Georgia. These are the threats considered to be such by the Georgian political elite and the society. The chapter aims to show that: according to politicians' statements, scholars' approaches or journalists' opinions, Russia is the main threat to Georgia. All the other political/military problems are considered just in the light of Russia's threat. Besides, the Georgian leadership has not formally defined possible threats to the country yet and officials' words about Russia's threat have often been discrepant.

The third chapter is entirely devoted to the past and the present situation of the Georgian army with a brief historical review. Development of the contemporary armed forces is divided into three stages: creation of the National Guards (1990-91), the era of paramilitary organisations (1992-93), and creation of the united armed forces (since 1994). All these stages differ in the structure and the commandment of the armed forces, in the relations between the military and the political leadership and the society, in the role and the place of the army both in the system of the country's security and division of powers. All the three stages have also some common traits. One of the arguments of the chapter is that for the whole time of their development the Georgian armed forces have never been under efficient civil/political control. At the same time, while at the end of the first and on the second stage such a situation was fraught with the army's open interference in the political activities, i.e. with the danger of a military coup, the problem somewhat changed on the third stage: these days the army is centralised and the threat of disobedience and political adventures has reduced but the plan of the army-building and the mission of the army remain unclear. The army's readiness to resist possible threats can be called in question. Consequently, it may become a matter of doubt whether the country needs such an army.

Political opinions and even decisions of the top military does not always match those of some executive or legislative institutions. The army is still strongly influenced by the Russian military. This hardly contributes to the political control over the army or the national interests on the whole.

The chapter portrays the army and the society alienated from each other. If the first stage of the army-building aroused certain enthusiasm in the society, some time later the public's mood changed and the army was considered a criminal, useless or self-centred organisation. Today's Georgian army is a source of desertion and corruption and fails to attract even lower strata of the society.

All the three stages of the army-building are marked with the total deficit of professional officers and NCOs that results in low combat efficiency and mass desertion. Therefore, official statistics on the over-all strength of the army fall short of the real situation.

In conclusion, the chapter suggests that hitherto the Georgian army has been developing according to individual politicians' or the military commandment's ambitions rather than to a state program. The army suffers from frequent structural and staff changes. Finally, what is currently built up follows yesterday's, in particular the Soviet army's, model in miniature. Today's Georgian army is not ready to check possible threats to the country's national security. Worse still, by some of its characteristics, the army itself did carry a threat to the country earlier and, to some extent, does it now.

The fourth chapter examines a hypothesis that eclectic nature of the army-building and sometimes its obvious incompatibility with the country's foreign policy may be explained by discrepancies of the foreign policy itself. The main argument is that Georgia still has no fixed priorities in its foreign policy.

The fourth chapter also attempts to systematise dynamics of the Georgian foreign policy priorities. Having examined three stages of the country's foreign policy, the chapter suggests that we may be now on the fourth turning-point. To understand the Georgian foreign policy, one should start with the Georgia-Russia relations as they are considered the "key-stone" of the Georgian foreign policy.

The fifth chapter examines correspondence between the foreign policy and the army-building issues. It shows that while the Foreign Ministry has grown rather critical towards Russia, the army commandment remains pro-Russian and establishes foreign contacts on its own. The reason of this is that while Georgia's foreign policy has approached the fourth stage of its development, the army-building is still on its third stage marked with creating a Soviet-type and linked-to-Russia model of the army. Hence, the country's foreign policy have grown even more discrepant with still obscure priorities.

The chapter also examines the issues of the Georgian national security concept and the military doctrine. It shows that the country has not developed these essential documents yet because of fluctuations of its foreign political orientation. The absence of these documents makes for eclectic and incompatible character of the military and foreign policies.

In conclusion the article summarises all the issues and emphasises that in the light of the current military-political problems Georgia's stability and sovereignty hardly can be considered sufficient and developed.

REVIEW OF THE APPLIED LITERATURE

The themes and viewpoints of the article are, to a certain extent, under the influence of Martin Edmonds' book "Armed Forces and Society" (Leicester University Press 1988) and Samuel Huntington's works "The Third Wave. Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century" (University of Oklahoma Press 1991). These books, along with some other western authors' works, serve for the methodological basis and ideological background of our research, they are guides both to classify common characteristics of civil-military relations and understand peculiarities of Georgia's case.

Examining a wide range of the works on civil-military relations, Mr. Edmonds states the significance of the subject for other political disciplines and specifies the role and the place of civil-military relations in a country's security system. The author looks into the very notion of national security, examines functional characteristics of armed services and then proceeds to the problems of civil-military relations. Mr. Edmonds' analysis of civil control, refusals to serve in the army, transparency, common problems of military-industrial complexes and specific problems of the developing countries' armies provide with interesting and factual data for examining the army-building in Georgia. The hypotheses and reasoning of our article are based on some of Mr. Edmonds' ideas: every army, he argues, is 'a product of the society that brought it forth' (p. 44) and in advanced industrial states 'a disproportionately high number of officer recruits come from upper middle-class backgrounds'. Such a situation, in his opinion, makes for political stability in a country (pp. 60-67). From this standpoint, the situation in Georgia seems quite different, having alarming grounds for alienation between the army and the society.

As an element of the security system, Mr. Edmonds considers it very important to make the public confident of the efficiency and adequacy both of the national security system in general and of the armed services in particular (pp. 126-135). This argument, too, helps to understand the problems of the Georgian security system.

Speaking about Third World armies, he points out that: 'the maintenance of the state apparatus...is a primary concern of armed services in Third World states' (p. 191); most of post-colonial states have build up their armed services 'invariably modelled on their colonial masters' (p. 197). The author also examines frequent military coups which are characteristic of Third World states (pp. 203-204). All these provide additional information for comparative analysis and studies of the Georgian national security system. On the other hand, Edmonds' argument that Third World armed services may be sometimes 'modernising agents' (p. 202) can hardly be relevant to the role and the place of the Georgian army in the society.

In his above mentioned works (the chapter "The Praetorian Problem; Rebellious and Powerful Militaries") Samuel Huntington reveals the methods that armed forces apply to carry out such their political actions as military uprisings and attempted coup d'etats and gives some recommendations how to avoid the danger of a military coup. The author's considerations enable to examine prospects for a military regime in Georgia. Mr. Huntington's arguments about officers' conservatism and the need for their democratisation outline one more direction to study the problems of the Georgian army. On the whole, his works generalises mostly the case of Latin American and South European states and helps to understand peculiarities of the post-Soviet civil-military relations.

In his another article "Armed Forces and Democracy" (Journal of Democracy, October 1995) Mr. Huntington pays more attention to the civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. He points out some positive tendencies such as appointing civilian defence ministers, staff changes in the army, reducing Russia's dominance, developing national security concepts, re-deploying the army and assigning its new mission (p. 11). Although the themes of the article do not include Georgia, the story of the other post-Communist states' experience shed a new light on the problems of the military developments in Georgia that must be solved. He specified a relatively new approach to army-building issues which suggests that universal military service and the principle that every soldier is a citizen and vice versa has grown out-of-date (p. 17). This surely may have to do with the Georgian problems.

In this article Mr. Huntington indicates changes in the traditional mission of armed services as a universal problem. It seems that the author has no convincing solutions to this relatively new challenge of civil-military relations. He still considers officers' recognising the limits of their professional competence the corner stone of stable civil-military relations. At the same time, he claims that as external wars among the democratic countries occur increasingly seldom, the army may undertake the mission of maintaining peace and inner stability. The author, however, well perceives that such activities may result in politicisation of the armed services. Besides, they contradict professional ethics based on foreign-oriented missions.

The problem of incompatibility of foreign-oriented military ethics and a new, inner mission was brought forward by Huntington at the conference "Civil Military Relations and Consolidation of Democracy" (Conference Report, International Forum for Democratic Studies and George C. Marshal European Centre for Security Studies, June 1995, pp. 4-5). The problems of the army mission and professional ethics are urgent for Georgia too.

Other theses of the conference also contain some semblance with the problems of the Georgian army. The conference stresses that 'the role of the military is of crucial importance, both in the transition to democracy and in its consolidation' and 'that the wider context of democratic politics can have a decisive impact on the functioning of the armed forces' (p. 3); effective civil control over armed services requires civilian personnel proficient in military problems (p. 6); the problem of stable civil-military relations implies not only the danger of military coups but not less significant 'attitudes that civilian politicians and military leaders have toward each other' (p. 7); along with the capability of avoiding military coups, the problem also is whether 'civilians get the military to do what they want it to do' (p. 8). The majority of the participants emphasised such problems of Eastern European and Third World

armed services as their involvement in commercial activities, insufficient civil control, the necessity to develop a military doctrine.

We would like especially point out the anthology "Central and Eastern Europe: Challenge of Transition" edited by Regina Coven Karp (SIPRI 1993). Although it does not contain the Georgian case, the anthology examines developments of national security systems in some Eastern European states and provides valuable information for comparative analysis. Several its articles surely have to do with problems of the Georgian national security. For instance, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe's idea that despite its occasional successes, the future of the CIS can be called in question is rather interesting. Co-operation of the CIS states in the field of national security, the author argues, is a matter of bilateral rather than collective agreements (The CIS, Sources of Stability and Instability, p. 280-281). The article was written in 1993, so the following years well confirm some of the author's opinions.

Alexander Konovalov presents his viewpoint on the main problems of the Russian national security: involvement of the army in political and criminal activities and its open participation in the conflicts on the CIS territory. So far, the author claims, Russia has developed no definite approaches to the problems of national security (Russia: Security in Transition pp. 205-210). Here one should note Regina Coven Karp's consideration that Eastern European states are still bear in mind former Russian dominance which prevents them from co-operation with Russia (p. 11). The Russian theme of the anthology corresponds with the issue of the Georgian national security and strengthens our postulate about permanent and mutual Russia-Georgia suspicions.

The article "The Baltic States: Quo Vadis?" by Peter Vares and Mare Haab is also helpful to analysis of the Georgian national security. The authors show that hitherto the Baltic states have been facing problems in the regional co-operation (pp. 283-290) and their armies displayed a high rate of desertion (p. 303). Georgia, too, is concerned with just the similar problems. The authors' idea about deficiency of Soviet-style military training is also actual to Georgia. Their argument that defence and security policies are chaotic and ineffective without developed national security policy (p. 305) entirely corresponds with the main conclusion of our research. The authors' analysis of the Baltic military elite help us in writing the similar theme of our article.

We would like to indicate some more articles of the above mentioned anthology also important for understanding Georgia's problems. These articles may be applied when examining the current state of the Georgian national security and its future development. Pol Dunay claims the civil control over the army in Hungary to be superficial and separated from military reforms (Hungary: Defining the Boundaries of Security, p. 123); to improve parliamentary control, he says, MPs should be more active, while information of the defence ministry must be a matter of close examination (p. 145); the author indicates the dilemma of the Hungarian national security: the military reforms require money, while all the available finances are spent on maintaining the existing structures (p. 142).

Slovenia created the official basis of its national security during the first year of the country's independence, F. Stephen Larrabee writes (The Former Yugoslavia: Emerging Security Orientations, p. 179).

According to Daniel N. Nelson, Bulgaria has dismissed its former Communist top military (Creating Security in the Balkans, p. 165).

Besides the above specified works, we appreciate contribution of the "Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat" by Wm. Darryl Henderson (National Defense Press: Washington D. C. 1985) and "Why Ordinary Men Commit Extraordinary Crimes" by Michael C. Desch (Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, Winter 1993/94) to the methodological base of our article.

Examination of these articles provide us with more opportunities to perceive morale and inter-group relations in the Georgian army.

As already mentioned, all these authors does not deal with problems of the army-building and security in Georgia but this in no way diminishes the significance of their works for studies of the Georgian case. On the other hand, some foreign and Russian authors are interested just in cardinal problems of the state-building in Georgia. We are pleased to point out Charlz H. Fairbanks, Jonathan Aves, Roy Allison, Richard Woff and Olga Vasiliyeva: we applied their articles carrying out our research.

In his speech at the conference "Civil-Military Relations and Consolidation of Democracy" (Conference Report, June 1995), Mr. Fairbanks analysed some post-Communist armed services, including those of Georgia, and drew a conclusion that these services were none but armed groups of political parties and military leaders financed by business and criminal activities. Civil-military relations in these states, he says, are not based on law and the military weakness leads to the failure to protect the society (p. 18). These states, he argues, must focus their attention on strengthening their armed services rather than on political or economic reforms as just army-building provides a basis for the both (p. 19).

In his article "The Postcommunist Wars" (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1995), Mr. Fairbanks examines the same theme. He claims that organisation of the Georgian and some other post-Communist armed services differ from that of modern military structures so that the former can be considered spontaneously formed and poorly organised armed groups rallied around charismatic leaders. There is little difference, he says, between the paramilitary organisations and the formally regular armies as the both represent private armed forces (pp. 20-26). Such armies, in his opinion, can provoke but not settle conflicts (p. 22). Such armed forces 'are more dangerous to their countrymen than to enemy states' (p. 28). Having examined formation of these armies and motivation of their servicemen, he concludes that 'recruits are drawn through family, clan, local, or professional connections' and are biased towards plundering (p. 23). The author pays attention to the desertion in the post-Soviet armies explaining it by 'a lack of basic social cohesion' (p. 27). The deficit of professionals is yet another problem of the Georgian, and not only Georgian, army examined by Mr. Fairbanks. The problem, he says, is caused by the legacy of a Soviet past 'since Soviet citizens who were not Slavs generally did not follow military careers' (p. 19).

In his article "A Tired Anarchy" (The National Interest, Spring 1995), examining the Russian politics, Mr. Fairbanks dwells upon foreign policy aspects of the national security in Transcaucasia states. He notes a wide-spread opinion about Russia's destabilising and expansionist role in these countries. During the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, he says, Russia backed Abkhazia thus forcing Georgia into the CIS (p. 16).

No doubt, Mr. Fairbanks must be praised for covering vital aspects of the Georgian national security. We agree with his idea that civil-military relations have the same importance for Georgia as economic reforms. We also appreciate his general idea that 'without a public consensus on the existence of a real threat and public confidence in the government, the government is not able to rally people' (A Tired Anarchy, p. 20). We consider this the most essential problem of the Georgian national security. On the other hand, in "The Postcommunist Wars", writing about a Georgian paramilitary organisation Mkhedrioni (Djaba Ioseliani, the leader), he claims that 'Mkhedrioni members...belong to Ioseliani's ancestral (ethnolinguistic group)' (p. 25) which, in our opinion, is not quite correct.

Mr. Fairbanks gives few details about the outset of the army-building in Georgia when creation of the National Guards was accompanied with certain social enthusiasm. The author does not indicate that criminal aspects did not play a decisive role in motivation and organisation of some paramilitary organisations. Further still, some militia-like armed groups did display quite strong combat efficiency. There is a lot of evidence in history that militia can,

under certain conditions, defeat a regular army. For instance, such cases occurred during the American revolution and the Chechen war. The Georgian armed services have nothing similar to be proud of. In March 1993, however, they successfully resisted an attack upon Sukhumi designed by Russian officers. Of course, organisation of the Georgian army, its operations and motivations can be a matter of criticism but maybe the existing problems have more to do with mistakes and inefficiency of the country's military-political leadership. Nevertheless, Mr. Fairbanks does not examine these aspects of the problem.

In his article "Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States" (Adelphi, Paper No. 280, IISS, London, October 1993), Roy Allison looks into the conflicts in Georgia, the Russia-Georgia relations and the army building problems. Considering Russia a danger, he argues, Georgia backs the idea of regional co-operation, though there is no mechanisms of such co-operation (p. 63). In the author's opinion, the state of the Georgian armed services is determined by inner conflicts (p. 64). The army-building in Georgia, he says, is not based on rational economic choices and follows varying plans (p. 69). At the same time, the author quite logically predicts changes in the army-building caused by agreements with Russia.

Richard Woff presents rather interesting brief military-political review written at the end of 1994 (Europe - December 1994, Jane's Intelligence Review). He describes the state of the Georgian army at that time. Examining structural and personnel changes in the Georgian armed services, he concludes that these changes were occasional and caused by transient requirements and opportunities. Absence of the Georgian military doctrine is yet another problem defined by Mr. Woff (p. 561). According to the review, the year 1994 heralded a new stage of the army-building in Georgia, related to the appointment of a new, pro-Russia defence minister. The author's stance towards this stage is rather optimistic. He suggests that Georgia may develop a regional power by the end of the century. It seems that hopes for Russian aid gave ground for Mr. Woff's optimism. We think that the following years did not prove this optimistic prognoses. Co-operation with Russia brings about increasingly strong pessimism.

The "Georgia: From Chaos to Stability" by Jonathan Aves (RIIA, London, 1996) is focused on the theme of the Georgian national security. The author, too, divides the army-building in Georgia into two stages and suggests that Nadibaidze's appointment defence minister will be followed by structural reforms in the army which will contribute to consolidation of the nation (p. 20). At the same time, Mr. Aves defines a new threat carried by the army: he doubts loyalty of the Russian and Russia-trained officers who constitute the majority of the Georgian general staff (pp. 20-21). The armed services, in his opinion, are still corrupted (p. 55). The Georgians, he shows, keep on considering Russia a danger to the country. Georgia, in his words, hopes chiefly for western investments and Caspian oil transits (p. 3). Shevardnadze's autocratic authority and the president's age, separatism and Russia's pressure are, in his opinion, the main threats to Georgia (p. 60).

Mr. Aves says nothing about discrepant and undeveloped nature of the Georgian national security policy and about the absence of conceptual outlines which frame hypotheses of our article. But his stress upon the president's broad rights indirectly empathises that the Georgian policy is determined by one person's will but not by conceptual documents. This indirectly supports our idea especially taking into account the president's diverse statements and decisions at various stages.

"The Foreign Policy Orientation of Georgia" by Olga Vasiliyeva (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP-AP 2968, July 1996) attempts to define foreign policy aspects of the Georgian national security. In some cases, the author claims the Georgian foreign policy, in particular Shevardnadze's decisions, to be discrepant (pp. 33-37). She refers to Georgia's former foreign minister's statement that only powerful and stable states can afford a determined policy (p. 7).

At the same time, since 1992 the Georgian foreign policy, according to Mrs. Vasiliyeva, has been developing quite reasonably. The author classifies three stages of the foreign policy: a period of "political idealism" (1990-91) was followed by a time of "looking for partners" (1992-93). Since 1993, she argues, there have been a Russia-dominated period. Moscow, in her opinion, controls the army-building in Georgia (p. 70), though the Georgian political elite remains pro-Western.

The author acknowledges that Russia brought pressure to bear on Georgia to force it into the CIS (p. 39) but she doubts that the Russian security services are plotting unrest in Transcaucasia (p. 54). As Mrs. Vasiliyeva thinks, the Georgians sometimes blackmail Russia (p. 46).

One should note her consideration that the Russia-Georgia relations lack legislative bases and clear-cut political outlooks (p. 53).

Georgia's fate, the author argues, depends on the outcomes of confrontation between external forces. At the same time, she says Russia maintains its influence upon Georgia through controlling the Georgian frontiers and the conflict zones in the country, and by its military bases which does not cost Russia too much (p. 72). In her opinion, for the time being Georgia will hardly escape being tied to the CIS market, though the future of the Russian dominance may be called in question due to the lack of confidence and resources (p. 70). Generally speaking, Mrs. Vasiliyeva's article is of somewhat discrepant nature. It is also doubtful whether the country's stability and security should be linked to only foreign political aspects. The article, however, is quite noteworthy for its size and an attempt to analyse the Georgian foreign policy.

Along with the above specified works, when shaping and justifying our opinions, we availed ourselves of some articles published in the magazine "Armed Forces and Society". In particular: "Ethnic Conflict, Unit Performance and the Soviet Armed Forces" by Debora Yarsike Ball (AF&S, Winter 1994, Vol. 20, No. 2) and "Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Soviet State: "Loose Coupling" Uncoupled?" by Brian A. Davenport (AF&S, Winter 1995, Vol. 21, No. 2). Nor less valuable information have we got from publications of the Centre for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University. For instance: "Nationalism, Ethnic Identity and Conflict Management in Russia Today" edited by Gail W. Lapidus and Renee De Nevers (CISAC, 1995, Stanford University), and "The End of the Cold War is Also Over" by John J. Maresca (CISAC, 1995, Stanford University). We would like also to point out "On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty" by Harahan Joseph P. and Kuhn John C. (Department of Defense, Washington D. C. 1996). The article is helpful to learn the impact of this significant treaty on the Georgian security and the Georgian leadership's attitude towards the issue. We have applied also the publication "Vooruzhennyye i voenizirovannyye formirovaniya v SSSR; Vzgliady, pozitsii, dokumenty" (Rossiysko-Amerikansky Universtitet, Moskva 1991) which, actually for the first time, attempted to range and describe the armed formations operating in Georgia by 1990.

In conclusion, we would like to specify a couple of new Georgian publications in the field of national security. The already mentioned brochure "Developing a National Security Concept in Georgia" (CIPDD, Tbilisi, 1996) is not an analytical research: it contains a review of Georgian academic groups' or politicians' and NATO experts' opinions presented during the respective conference. At the same time, it can be considered a source for analysing the problems of the Georgian national security. The monthly bulletin "Army and Society in Georgia" (the former Military Chronicle, CIPDD, Tbilisi, 1995-97), too, is a rather interesting source. It mainly covers the current development of events, though there are some small subject articles. Several of them are our works and represent some particular themes of the given article.

These are the main analytical publications we applied when writing our article. They provide outlines of some specific stages of the Georgian national security, the foreign policy and the army-building. At the same time, we are bound to say that there is yet a lot of work to do. The periods 1990-91 and 1996-97 need deeper analysing. In the light of these factors, the present article attempts to make its reasonable contribution to the studies of the Georgian national security and army-building.

POSSIBLE MILITARY-POLITICAL THREATS

Georgia faces a number of threats brought about either by external factors or by the problem of its inner state/territorial arrangement. They may be defined as military-political threats since they are considered dangerous for the country's sovereignty and defence potential. At the same time, fair definition of the military-political threats to Georgia is a rather laborious task; let alone that any threat is a matter of private opinions and subjectivity, definition of the threats to Georgia is complicated by the absence of an official list of threats. The Georgian political elite has failed to develop the country's national security concept to clarify the issue. Below, we will revert to this problem which itself threatens Georgia's sovereignty. This time, we will try to examine the other threats determined by the geographical location, structure and youth of the Georgian state.

As it is known, threats may derive from economic or social problems and they may well develop political or even military nature: coup d'etats, ethnic and other conflicts are often determined by poor social conditions. We, however, confine ourselves to examining clear military-political threats, as just aggravation of a military-political situation may exacerbate social and economic problems making them dangerous. In other words, if no external enemy threatens a country or if the latter has a concept and a respective system to manage such a threat, it will be much easier to solve the other problems of the society. Otherwise, social-economic problems may easily result in inner unrest. The West talks about economic reforms and democracy-building, but never about the army-building which is the indispensable foundation of both, Charlz H. Fairbanks says², thus indirectly justifying that our choice - examining military-political threats independently from the other ones - is logical.

At the beginning, we mentioned that absence of the national security concept complicates definition of the military-political threats. It is possible, however, to find out what kind of problems do the Georgian society and political elite consider dangerous. This definition will be based on statements and decisions of some officials, information of the Georgian media and reports about the meetings on security problems. Some governmental documents and drafts may also give enough grounds for certain conclusions.

For the whole time of the country's independence, the Georgian society has considered Russia the main threat to Georgia. All the other external or inner political/military problems are viewed just in the light of Russia's threat.

In the Georgian first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia's times Moscow was seen directly threatening Georgia's sovereignty. Russia's image as an enemy was finally formed after Russian paratroopers broke up the nationalistic meeting in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989. That day heralded the final defeat of the Communism in Georgia and following reign of Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic government. The putsch in Moscow of August 1991 and a short-time ruling of the so-called GKChP was assessed in Georgia as really threatening to expel the nationalistic government and restore the Soviet Union. Moscow indeed demanded to dismiss the newly established National Guards and prefectural offices³. After the failure of the Moscow coup, at Gamsakhurdia's insistence, the Georgian parliament declared the Soviet troops deployed in Georgia occupational forces⁴. The military uprising of the opposition, started in winter 1991,

Gamsakhurdia also defined as a Russia-plotted coup. The latter statement which bears distinct traits of paranoid mentality peculiar to the first president of Georgia had some grounds: according to a lot participants of the events, the Soviet troops deployed in Georgia sympathised with the opposition and provided them with weapons. The Russian military themselves confessed that they had harboured anti-Gamsakhurdia mood⁵.

During the five years of Shevardnadze's regime which started almost immediately after Gamsakhurdia's fall the official attitude towards Russia was anything but clear-cut. Nevertheless, the Kremlin was and is still considered a serious danger to Georgia. The national opposition's opinion is abundantly clear: military-political rapprochement with Russia is detrimental to the strategic interests of Georgia, I. Khaindrava, a prominent representative of the right-wing nationalist Republican Party, says. The opposition claims that the presence of Russian military bases on the Georgian territory challenges the country's security⁶. One can argue with a great degree of certainty that this opinion entirely corresponds with that of the independent Georgian media. The opposition also unanimously reckons the war in Abkhazia of 1992-93 as primarily a war with Russia⁷. For them, the Russian danger is chiefly determined by neo-imperial essence of the governing circles and the political course of the northern neighbour.

The official stance of Georgia is not as congruent in its viewpoints and its forms as that of the opposition. There exists the Russia-Georgia treaty on friendship and good neighbourly relations and the treaty on Russian bases in Georgia (the latter is not ratified, though signed by Shevardnadze). However, it does not mean that the official Tbilisi does not view Russia as a danger.

The very existence of these treaties can be explained by the Georgian government's desire to deflect the Russian danger. Georgia's affiliation to the CIS, Shevardnadze says, was to neutralise expected negative influence of the northern neighbour⁸. On January 12, 1996, during parliamentary hearings on the friendship treaty with Russia, the chairman of the parliamentary foreign committee suggested that its ratification would indicate Georgia's good will and make Russia's position awkward compelling Moscow to meet Tbilisi half-way. Naturally, there was the fear of Russia, Russia's image as a threat, behind such statements.

Shevardnadze, however, has hinted only once that when saying 'negative influence', he means Russia's state policy aimed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. Immediately after the defeat of the Georgian troops in Abkhazia he declared that the Abkhazian autonomy had been occupied by 'a third country' and that he would not kneel before Russia again⁹. Nevertheless, he generally described the "Russian danger" as: a) the possibility of trespassing the border by mercenaries and North Caucasus volunteers to support separatist movements in Georgia or b) the imperial mentality of certain circles in the military-political establishment of Russia, especially among the opposition, who do not hide their desire of dividing Georgia or restoring the former Soviet Union. For instance, after Georgia's affiliation to the CIS, Shevardnadze declared that if Rutskoy or Khazbulatov, the main opponents of the Russian president, gained the upper hand at the internal political front of Russia, he would voluntarily resign, as they would not leave him alone¹⁰.

At the same time, in private conversations the Georgian governmental circles more and more openly suggest that the danger originates not from certain circles but from the Russian policy in general. The Russia-Georgia relations are criticised more frequently, which obviously has to do with the issue of Georgia's national security.

As early as April 1993 the Foreign Ministry of Georgia issued a statement saying that in the context of the Abkhazian conflict Georgia may raise the question of Russian aggression¹¹. But soon the open friction with Russian was over. Since early 1996 the official Tbilisi has been again expressing its concern with the danger derived from the Russian policy. Particularly, the C-in-C of the Georgian frontier troops, V. Chkheidze, censured unauthorised

actions of the Russian frontier troops in Georgia. This referred to the creation of a new Russian check-point on the Georgian-Chechen border and contacts of the Russian frontier troops with the Abkhazian self-proclaimed government¹². On August 14, 1996, the chairmen of the parliamentary defence and foreign committees stated that the Russian frontier troops in Georgia were interfering with the activities of the Georgian customs¹³. Regarding an arrest of a Ukrainian ship by the Russian frontier troops in the Georgian port of Batumi on December 4, 1996, the chairman of the parliamentary defence committee, R. Adamia, the c-in-c of the Georgian frontier troops, V. Chkheidze and a spokesman of the Georgian foreign ministry, M. Kakabadze, made a statement that such actions were damaging the sovereignty and prestige of Georgia and only a war could be worse¹⁴. Of late, Georgia has started to stress that the presence of the Russian frontier troops in Georgian ports is illegal¹⁵. In November 1996 the foreign minister, I. Menagharishvili, and the chairman of the parliamentary defence committee, R. Adamia, visited NATO headquarters. According to informal information, Georgia's concern with the Russian danger was among the issues to be discussed. Georgia is also wary of Russia's plans to increase its quota of conventional armaments in the Caucasus. This concern came out at a conference in Vienna in 1996, where Russia got a right to increase its conventional armaments on the European southern flank. On May 8, 1997, during parliamentary debates over ratification of the flank agreement of the CFE treaty (Conventional Forces in Europe), Mr. Adamia said he suspected that Russia would attempt to bring pressure to bear upon Georgia to deploy its additional armaments in Georgia.

Since the beginning of 1997, the Georgian officials' some statements about the Russian military have been much like those of the opposition.

On April 3, Parliament passed a resolution which declares "The Concept of the Stability of Georgia's Public Life, Strengthening Its State Sovereignty and Security, and Restoration of Its Territorial Integrity", initiated by the opposition Popular Party, to be a basic document for developing conceptual documents of political strategy. The concept says Georgia is still affected by the consequences of the Russian annexation in 1921 and the Russian military bases may become a basis for new occupation of the country¹⁶.

The official concerns about the threat from the north are reflected in current development of the Georgian attitude towards the Abkhazian case: Georgia more and more openly claims the role of the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia to be negative. On April 17, 1996, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution to settle the Abkhazian conflict. It blamed the Russian peacekeepers for ineffectiveness, involvement in smuggling and wilfulness towards local population¹⁷.

The above-mentioned document of April 3 stresses that the Russian peacekeepers have turned into frontier troops between the break-away Abkhazia and the other part of Georgia. On May 30, 1997, Parliament passed another resolution which negatively assesses the CIS peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia and stated that the further stay of the Russian peacekeepers is inexpedient¹⁸.

Of late, especially in 1997, the Georgian officials have expressed their concern with Russia's unwillingness to give Georgia its share of the Black Sea navy.

Georgia has great hopes of Caspian oil transits and the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor (TRACECA). Tbilisi expects also the historic "Silk Road" to pass the country from Europe to China. The Georgian mass media emphasise Russia's negative stance towards these projects as, if completed, they will create an alternative to the Russian transport routes¹⁹. Georgia has made no official statements about Russia's plans to break Georgia's economic hope but such concerns are expressed in other ways: in private conversations and by independent media²⁰.

Both the public and the politicians claim any treaties with Russia to be worthless, as contending with the northern neighbour one can always expect such an argument as tanks²¹.

The emphasis on a Russian danger by the Georgian social and political circles is understandable: the two countries' relations are full of friction and suspicions which is characteristic for the former master state and its former colony. But there are a lot of evidence to prove that the perceived danger corresponds with the real situation.

The argument about a Russian danger is usually supported with facts from the history of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict. The Russian backing of the Abkhazian separatists is recognised by many Russian politicians and experts, as well as by some Western researchers²². Without much detailing, one should recall a statement of the former chairman of Russia's federation council Shumeiko, who acknowledged that Russia had backed the Abkhazians in this conflict²³. The Abkhazian problem is still the main tool to press on the Georgian government, like as it happened when Moscow forced Georgia into signing the treaty on Russian military bases in the country²⁴. One can also speculate about involvement of the Russian military in the terrorist acts against the Georgian government. According to Georgian law-enforcement authorities, the former chief of the Georgian security service, I. Giorgadze, formally charged with the attempt upon Shevardnadze's life in August 1995, escaped being arrested and fled to Russia through a Russian military airfield²⁵. The Russian military are refuting this accusation, but they admit that Giorgadze kept his personal cars on the territory of the airfield. During the investigation of this attempt, 20 members of the commando unit "Alpha" of the Ministry of State Security of Georgia were arrested. It is interesting that this unit was created by assistance of the Russian security services²⁶. It worth noting that the unauthorised actions of the Russian frontier troops described above also testify in favour of real threats to the sovereignty and stability of Georgia from Russia.

Georgia's concern with the Russian danger is reinforced by some widely known political documents and statements of the Russian officials. The Russian military doctrine specifies peacekeeping missions within the CIS as aimed to protect Russia's vital interests. The Russian military admit that peacekeeping troops may be used to attain such strategic objectives as access to the sea²⁷. Yeltsin's decree "Russia's Strategic Policy with Regard to the CIS" gives priority to the defence of Russian economic and military interests within the CIS as well as to the protection of the Russian-speaking population in the neighbouring states²⁸. The practical significance of this decree can be illustrated by Shumeiko's statement about the possibility of constructing an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia by Western companies. The former chairman of the federation council of Russia, who was hardly associated with the openly neo-imperial opposition inside Russia, stated that the presence of the Russian military bases in Georgia means that Moscow has staked out this land and one should keep off²⁹.

Almost all the other possible threats, too, are associated by the Georgian political elite with the policy of the northern neighbour. This goes first and foremost for the ethnic separatism as one of the main problems of the Georgian statehood.

The problem of ethnic minorities and separatist movements turned into one of the main challenges to the Georgian statehood even before the declaration of its independence. These conflicts developed their political nature in 1990: Southern Ossetia refused to recognise the authority of the first post-Communist government of Gamsakhurdia. In August 1992 the war in Abkhazia burst out.

At present, Tbilisi controls neither Southern Ossetia nor Abkhazia and the separation lines are guarded by Russian peacekeepers. Quite an original situation has emerged in Adjara: the whole authority in this autonomy, inhabited predominantly by the Georgians, is in the hands of Aslan Abashidze's authoritarian regime. Formally, he recognises the integrity of Georgia and the priority of central laws, but he is hardly taking into account the centre in his practical policy. There is friction between the Adjarian leader and the political elite in Tbilisi. His

government acts quite independently, pursuing its own foreign policy not always consistent with the official course³⁰. The situation in the southern regions populated by the Armenians is also rather complicated. The state authority in the regions is shared with the local unregistered armed nationalistic organisations³¹. In August 1995, local forces demanded an autonomy from Tbilisi³².

In this context it is hardly surprising that the danger of separatism is perceived in Georgia in a particularly acute way and the restoration of territorial integrity is considered an essential problem of the national security³³. This became clear when, adopting Constitution, the Georgian parliament postponed debates over such an important issue as the territorial arrangement until the territorial integrity of the country is restored. Hence, Constitution was adopted without the corresponding chapter³⁴.

It is also widely believed that the problem of ethnic minorities is aggravated by the Russian influence³⁵. Shevardnadze did not consider the deployment of Russian bases a positive fact and when asked whether Russia would pay for its military presence he replied that the return of Abkhazia cannot be estimated in terms of money³⁶. It becomes clear that the Georgian official policy continues to view the problem of Abkhazia as a made-in-Russia one, feeling sure that just Russia can resolve it. Shevardnadze keeps on saying that 'the key to Abkhazia is in Russia'³⁷. The above mentioned parliamentary resolution of April 3 stated that 'the Abkhazian and South Ossetian tragedies' manifest consequences of the Russian annexation of Georgia in 1921. It is also clear that until recently the Georgian government has been willing to somewhat limit the country's sovereignty in exchange for assistance in returning the lost territories.

The political opposition also considers the issues of separatism and the lost territories an essential problem of the national security. It is more open in emphasising the danger of the Adjarian and Armenian separatism. The difference is in its approaches to the problem resolution policy. Opposition defines official approaches as 'sovereignty in exchange for territorial integrity', refusing to accept it as an effective way³⁸. Moreover, the nationalistic opposition almost identifies the Russian danger and separatism, considering the latter just another method of Moscow's neo-imperial policy. Here informal opinions of the government and the opposition partly coincide.

The problem of external threats to the national security of Georgia implies the relations between Georgia and the North Caucasus. Although the North Caucasus is not a subject of international law, it can play an independent role with regard to its southern neighbour. At least the official political circles in Georgia see the reality in these terms: during the Chechen war Georgia feared invasion of Chechen units and reinforced its northern border. These days, Georgia seeks for establishing closer contacts with the North Caucasus. Georgia, however, is rather discreet in its relations with this region.

The relations with the Transcaucasian neighbours are not free of contradictions either. There are some contested borders and the future delimitation and demarcation of the borders may lead to complications³⁹. There were a number of recent border incidents especially at the junction of the Transcaucasia republics' borders when Armenian and Azeri armed groups trespassed Georgia's border⁴⁰. The Georgian official circles expressed their concern that the Armenian-Azeri confrontation could spill over into the Georgian territory inhabited by representatives of these nationalities.

At the same time Azerbaijan has grown to be seen as a strategic partner of Georgia, due to coming Caspian oil transits through Georgia. Unfortunately this cannot be said about Armenia. The Georgian public is inclined to think that the above mentioned separatism of the Georgian Armenians is supported by Yerevan, in some way or the other. At the time, there was an outcry in Tbilisi about a statement of the Foreign Minister of Armenia concerning the thefts of cargoes bound for Armenia. The Armenian foreign minister stated that if the thefts continued, there might be some trouble in the Georgian regions with the predominantly

Armenian population⁴¹. The accuracy of these facts can be called in question but the discussion around them characterises the Georgian public's mood. Of late, the Georgian media has started to point out that with the Russian help Armenia might build up the strongest army in the region. However, on the scale of the threats to the Georgian national security the problem of Armenia is very far from being the first one. In the political circles there is a fear of the Armenian separatism in Southern Georgia but this danger is mainly associated with the Russian factor and the possibility of Russia or some of its state structures provoking a new ethnic conflict⁴². But in reality, the problem of relationship with Armenia and Azerbaijan is aggravated by the lack of mechanisms of co-operation on different levels which could minimise the existing mistrust and the possibility of various incidents.

The last external factor which is perceived not as an immediate threat, but as a potential danger, is Turkey. In this issue there is a sharp division in the attitudes of the socio-political circles. Neither the government nor the political opposition mention this danger. The opposition even views Turkey as a partner and a counter-balance to the Russian influence⁴³. But there are forces in Georgia who do not share this opinion and who are afraid of Turkish influence and the rise of pan-Turkism in Turkey. For the most part, these views are peculiar to the leader of Adjara Aslan Abashidze⁴⁴ as well as a part of the Georgian military. According to the independent Georgian media, during joint Georgia-Russia military training, Turkey was implied as the hypothetical adversary⁴⁵. One can state fairly confidently that this attitude toward Turkey is the legacy of the Cold War times, but one cannot ignore this mood either since it is shared by a certain part of the public. The idea of opening a Turkish university in Georgia faced a strong boycott which can hardly be explained by efforts of the Russian security services only.

Finally, after discussing the real, possible or imaginary military-political threats to the national security of Georgia, one has to tackle the issue of the level and character of the army-building and civil-military relations in Georgia. This area of the social/state structure has a direct impact on the security of the country. The condition, place and role of the armed forces in the Georgian socio-political system has external political implications as well: i.e. the Russia-Georgia military co-operation. The key question for studying the Georgian armed forces and civil-military relations is the following: is the Georgian army an element of the security structure or is it creating a problem itself?

THE GEORGIAN ARMED FORCES

The history of the modern Georgian armed forces officially started in 1990. The whole period of the army-building can be divided into three stages. But the issue has also its preceding history which is essential to understand the following events. It worth noting that the Georgian society was not ready for the army-building when the process started. The Georgians were less interested in following a military career.

Let alone the period of feudal wars, the Georgians joined to professional military service in 19th century after the country became a part of the Russian Empire. Very soon, a lot of Georgian aristocrats took up the profession of an officer of the Russian army and even created quite an interesting gallery of generals. As to ordinary residents, in a war time they used to enrol temporary militia-like units of volunteers. The Georgians, as well as some other ethnicities of the Empire, were not called up to a regular army. The situation, however, somewhat changed by the end of the century. The regulations of 1886 permitted conscription of the Georgians⁴⁶. Tens of thousands of the Georgian soldiers participated in World War I. A significant number of the Georgians met the fall of the Russian Empire in soldiers' and officers' uniforms.

This brief review is quite enough to show that Georgia could not develop a steady tradition of the military service. Unlike Russian or some European tell stories, the Georgian ones have no heroes in overcoats. In fact, commiseration was the only feeling the people showed for a recruit.

The negative attitude towards a regular army displayed itself during the country's independence in 1918-21, when first the government had no intentions to build up the army, while afterwards it did create armed services, though they hardly could be considered efficient: the Georgian army of 1918-21 suffered from desertion and corruption.

As already mentioned, aristocrats at least partly acquired a martial spirit but this even more alienated the other strata of the society from the military service. Until 1921 the army had been an alien body for most of the Georgians both from the nationalistic (imported by Russia) and social viewpoints. Just because of its social-democratic nature, the Georgian government of 1918-21 did not care for the army, having little confidence in the aristocrat officers.

At the same time, the Georgians were far from being especially peaceful people. Even peasants generally possessed weapons. During the Russian reign, there always was a good deal of those willing to enrol militia units. In 1918-21, lots of the Georgians also joined the National Guards created along with the army on the principle of militia.

Although Georgia did not like regular military service with its discipline, daily routine and unification, the Georgian men much more willingly enrolled militia-like irregular armed units: such a system was close to feudal or clan-based units widely applied throughout the preceding years of Georgia's history.

The Soviet time opened a new page in the military history of Georgia. The Soviet government put an end to a caste of the Georgian officers. On the other hand, some of its measures made, for a certain time, regular armed services attractive. During the 70-year Soviet rule, there were some cases of creating ethnic-based regular armed detachments. One should especially note several Georgian divisions which were operating during World War II⁴⁷. The victory in the war, Communist propaganda, the fact that the supreme commander and the country's leader, J. Stalin, was of Georgian origin, and the military's privileges in general, increased popularity of a military career. By the 50s, a new caste of the Georgian officers had been created in Georgia. Bearing deficiency of the Soviet mentality, they, at the same time, stood closer (if compared with their ancestors) to the people, on the one hand, and to the political elite, on the other⁴⁸.

In 1956 the process was reversed and by the end of the Soviet era officers had turned into a marginal stratum of the Georgian society⁴⁹. There were less than 20 Georgians among some hundreds of the students graduated from the Tbilisi Artillery Military College in 1978-79⁵⁰. According to some sources, since 1985 no Georgian officers have graduated the Soviet military colleges; in the 80s, by the proportion of one officer to 1,000 of the population, Georgia achieved the 72nd place among the other nationalities of the USSR⁵¹.

Several reasons account for a new stage of the alienation between the Georgians and the military service. In 1956, Stalin's successor, Khrushchov, abolished the ethnic-based armed units. Besides, it was born in on the Georgians that condemnation of Stalin's cult would impede their military career⁵². Georgian officers increasingly often resigned at a relatively lower rank which may be explained by the fact that while they were willing to serve in Georgia, there were few vacancies for them to reach high positions there⁵³. Fading away of the Soviet ideals, too, could be a cause of a drastic decrease in the number of the youth following military careers in Georgia in 60s-70s. Bloody breaking of a students' manifestation on March 9, 1956, also contributed to such tendencies.

Alienation between the elite of the society and the military gradually intensified. At the end of the Soviet time, few Georgians from more or less well-off families served either as officers or soldiers.

Nevertheless, some sources claim that some thousands of the Georgian officers served in the Soviet army when the USSR broke up⁵⁴. But given the society's above mentioned stance, the number of really combat specialists was relatively small: the majority served in enlisting and registration offices (voenkomats) or in logistics. After the fall of the Communist regime, the new Georgian government started collecting personal files of the Georgian officers who served in Russia. Their examination revealed that some 80% of the 300 Georgian officers with a rank of major and higher, who served in Russia by that time, occupied posts in logistics⁵⁵.

Such a situation marked the outset of the army-building in Georgia. Of course, a military career in the Soviet army and that in the Georgian one are nowhere near equal but the specified societal dimension of the military career of the Georgians shed a light on the problems that the young republic would face on the way of developing its own defence system. The lack of professionals, the people's traditional nihilism towards regular military service and deep historical roots of a feudal-militia mood have accompanied the army-building at all its three stages so far. On the other hand, the problem of the army-building, as well as the state development on the whole, have grown rather urgent for Georgia by the end of the 20th century. It quite logically derives from the break-up of the USSR and the necessity for the Georgians to pursue their own national interests.

The first post-Communist government which came in power after the elections of October 28, 1990, did not start the army-building from a zero level. In 1988, the Georgian nationalistic forces launched a campaign against drafting of the Georgians to the Soviet army. At the same time, a number of various ethnic conflicts burst out. Both factors contributed to the creation of illegal paramilitary units. By 1990 there were several such units with the number of enlisted members varying from 2 or 3 dozens to 1 or 2 hundreds. They were mainly armed with light weapons either brought from home or purchased on a "shadow market". Taking advantage of the weakness of the Soviet regime and increased popularity of the nationalistic movement, their leaders managed to get finances from state enterprises and purchase some weapons and equipment of the former Soviet civil defence system (DOSAAF)⁵⁶. These units were manned by relatives or friends, the locals from conflict zones, fellow party members and deserters from the Soviet army⁵⁷. As a rule, each member of the units decided by himself whether he would participate in some or other operation.

At the same time, Givi Gumbaridze, the last Communist leader of the country, who ruled at the time of Gorbacheyov's reforms and the nationalistic movement, attempted to arrange this field on his own. On June 20, 1990, then supreme council of still-Soviet Georgia adopted a law on labour (alternative) service. According to the law, all those of 18-27 age, who refused to serve in the army by reason of their religious beliefs, ethnicity or political ideas, had to be enlisted in the labour service. The government specified the most hard and detrimental activities, including rescue operations during natural disasters and catastrophes, for such conscripts⁵⁸.

In September, one of the paramilitary units, Mkhedrioni, got a legal status. It was declared the basis of Rescue Corps and registered as rescue service. Djaba Ioseliani, the Mkhedrioni leader, was declared chairman of the service board. Rescue Corps, i.e. Mkhedrioni, started to grow. The society believed that this was a preparation for building a modern Georgian army. So did the Mkhedrioni members⁵⁹.

The officials also started to think over creating a regular army. Givi Gumbaridze, then first secretary of the Communist party and chairman of the supreme council of Georgia, ordered to set up a special state commission. The latter raised a question of restoring the former Georgian brigade which existed in the Soviet army until 1956. The problem was negotiated

with the former Soviet military institutions⁶⁰. The last Communist government of Georgia, however, failed to succeed in the issue. In reality, there still existed some half-legal or illegal paramilitary organisations with 1-2 thousand poorly armed and trained recruits⁶¹.

Such a situation may be explained by the fact the Georgian Communists were late for developing the country's military policy: in October 1990 they were displaced by another force. Besides, formerly the Soviet republics were rather restricted in their independent military developments.

On October 28, 1990, the bloc "Round Table - Free Georgia" chaired by the former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia won the first multi-party elections. The bloc claimed restoration of the country's independence to be its goal. Naturally, this new political elite initiated the army-building.

On November 15, 1990, a newly adopted law banned drafting of the Georgian youth to the Soviet army⁶². On December 20, 1990, the parliament adopted the Law on Internal Troops-National Guards. Such a title of regular armed services was caused by declaring a transitional period on the way towards the country's independence. They said settling relations with Moscow would take some time, while independence required certain preparations. Forming of the National Guards, authorised to maintain inner stability, instead of a regular army was considered less irritating Moscow⁶³. The Law on Internal Troops-National Guards said nothing about the necessity to resist external aggression. Instead, there was a general idea of the need to defend the country's interests. At the same time, the law precisely specified maintaining of territorial integrity, inner stability and order as the objectives of the guards⁶⁴. The Georgian government, however, hoped that this service would serve for the basis of a regular army. The guards were manned by drafting. By the Spring of 1991, there were some 12,000 officers and enlisted soldiers⁶⁵.

This stage of the army-building was accompanied by the social enthusiasm: there were few conscription problems, a lot of men, who had never thought of their military career earlier, gave up their occupations and enrolled as officers⁶⁶. The parliament has established a special commission to work out a military doctrine and the army structure⁶⁷.

But as there were flaws in the first stage of the army-building it came to a miserable end.

As already mentioned, even in the Communist times there existed various armed services which act independently from each other. After the new government came in power, a part of them became enlisted in the National Guards while the others continued to exist informally. The problem was that the government divided the former unofficial units into two groups. While the members of the first were declared criminals and had to be prosecuted, the government closed its eyes to the second, having granted it an official status. The declared policy of uniting all groups into the official national guards and banning unofficial, independent groups was enacted only against the political opponents. No serious attempt was made to cooperate with them; and this could result in complications at the early stage of the state-building⁶⁸.

Another problem had to do with the government's staff policy. A part of the top military of the national guards was selected from the retired Georgian officers of the Soviet army. The majority of them had not served in the army for long and represented rear professions or draft committees. There were, however, some professional officers who did play an important role during the following events. But most of the key military positions were occupied by the civilians whose main merit was their proximity to Gamsakhurdia. For instance, Tengiz Kitovani, the chairman of the governmental defence committee and the c-in-c of the guards, was a painter by education. Subsequently, V. Kobalia, appointed chief of the guards headquarters, worked as a supplies agent in a bakery at the Communist times. From the very

beginning, J. Chumburidze and T. Dumbadze occupied important posts in the guards and the army. Earlier, one of them used to be a civil engineer, while the other worked at a sewing factory; both are generals now.⁶⁹ This phenomenon can be viewed as a civilian control of a peculiar kind, but being incompetent, these officers not only controlled but lead in purely military issues and received high ranks.

The third serious problem was caused by the flaws in administering and controlling the armed services. Despite the creation of such formal institutions as the governmental defence committee, the parliamentary security commission which included a defence subcommission, the main department of the National Guards, and some time later, in September 1991, the Ministry of Defence, their functions were not clearly defined. For instance, the Law on Internal Troops-National Guards stated that this structure was headed by the commander appointed by then supreme council. On the other hand, a special department of the interior ministry headed by one of the deputy ministers was authorised for general commandment of the guards⁷⁰. At the same time, the guards was subordinate to the governmental defence committee⁷¹. The latter practically ignored a respective subcommission of the supreme council that was to work out a plan of the army-building⁷². Moreover, these institutions were party- or clan-based. There were a number of rivalling military-political groups among Gamsakhurdia's supporters. They in fact somewhat divided the above mentioned structures. For instance, Merab Kostava Society dominated the parliamentary security commission (including defence subcommission) and had its own armed unit not enlisted in the National Guards. Tengiz Kitovani's armed units, partly representing the political organisation the Union of the Georgian Traditionalists and partly certain rural clans of the central Georgia, managed to take control over creating the National Guards. In his rivalry with the central institutions, Kitovani effectively managed to take into his hands both the executive (he was the commander of the Guards and a brigade general) and a part of the controlling authority of the army-building (the governmental defence committee was also headed by Kitovani).⁷³

The problem of civil-military relations was aggravated due the subjective factor of Gamsakhurdia, who was elected president in 1991. Let alone problems in the regions populated by non-Georgians and confrontation with his armed political opponents (to defeat the latter, he even tried to use the Soviet troops⁷⁴), Gamsakhurdia saw even his supporters raising against the president. Afraid of Kitovani's strengthened authority, he decided to subordinate the guards to the interior ministry and create a separate defence ministry. At the same time, he endeavoured to get rid of the influential Merab Kostava Society. Eventually, all these forces united against the president.

At first, the National Guards were manned by the ex-territorial principle but later on some of its battalions were named after various districts, while their commandment positions were occupied by the former local military leaders. The respective subcommission of the supreme council proposed to divide the guards (the army afterwards) into brigades which were to be joined in corps and evenly deployed in the country⁷⁵. In practice, there were created separate battalions and regiments. Their deployment depended on their ability to secure accommodation⁷⁶. In the Summer, because of the lack of officers and clashes in the government, enthusiastically conscripted recruits started deserting.

The staff and organisation problems, inter-party and clan confrontations hampered the army-building, caused its consequent failure and finally resulted in a mutiny against the government. In September 1991 the National Guards was actually disintegrated. This was caused by Kitovani's irritation over Gamsakhurdia's cautious stance with regard to the Moscow putsch. But it were just the above-mentioned problems which really affected the army-building. The first year of military developments clearly displayed the politician's and society's incompetence and the lack of historical traditions. The Georgian army turned into a new danger

rather than the cornerstone of the country's national security. In January 1992 some hundreds of the servicemen and volunteers of the guards, who had been declared illegal, overthrew Gamsakhurdia's government. Naturally, the success of the coup against Gamsakhurdia was conditioned by dissatisfaction of the some strata of the society with his inner and foreign policy. Moscow's role, too, must be taken into account. But the method of the overthrow was determined by the state of the armed services and civil-military relations

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The second stage of the army-building in Georgia started in 1992 and lasted till the Spring of 1994. Formally, its beginning was linked to a new government's rule and world-wide recognition of Georgia's independence, while the end to Georgia's joining to the CIS and consequent changes in the military policy caused by appointing V. Nadibaidze, a general of the Russian army, defence minister in April 1994.

At first sight, the new government made a range of decisions to create the army, develop a system of the control and administering the armed services. Gamsakhurdia, too, at the final stage of his reign, attempted to solve the problem of subordination in the army. After being elected president, he was declared supreme commander and in August 1991 gained authority over the armed services⁷⁷. A defence ministry was also created, though the system failed to start functioning.

It took a month for the State Council to take over authority from a temporary military council that came in power right after Gamsakhurdia's fall. The State Council made ready new elections and carried them out in October 11, 1992. Both the State Council and the parliament adopted some documents to regulate the army-building. In February 1992 the defence ministry was established anew. The first call-up to the army was carried out the same Summer. As to the National Guards, it was manned again and titled as a rapid-action force and was subordinated to the ministry as an independent unit. At the same time, the government started to form army brigades which were to join into two army corps. The defence ministry also contained a frontier department. According to official data, by April 1994 there were 50 units and detachments subordinate to the ministry with 49,406 officers, soldiers and civilian personnel altogether⁷⁸. There were also internal troops of the interior ministry. Restored Rescue Corps-Mkhedrioni kept on its existence independently. In 1992 the Georgian army got a part of the armament of the Russian troops deployed in Georgia. In particular, 109 tanks and 164 armoured personnel carriers, some aircraft and helicopters⁷⁹.

At the same time, by virtue of the laws on the state authority and on defence, the chairman of the parliament-the head of state, elected by universal suffrage, was declared supreme commander. He was authorised to co-ordinate defence policy and appoint the top military. He was also declared chairman of the security and defence council⁸⁰. Gradually, his competence in defence issues was expanding. The parliament was a controlling body which also was to appoint defence minister, defence committee, a budget, to approve a military doctrine, and declare war and the state of emergency⁸¹.

But these data on the over-all strength and the organisation of the army and control over the armed services remained only on paper. In 1992-93 the government failed to control a good portion of the country's territory or did it only nominally to say nothing of the army. In fact, this period saw domination of independent, quasi-official armed units. Having profited by the coup d'etat and the expulsion of Gamsakhurdia, as well as by the anarchy that followed, these formations effectively divided the territory and the economy of the country into spheres of influence.

At this stage, people with no military education or young cadre officers occupied top positions in the army. They came from the nationalistic movement and were not influenced by the spirit of the Soviet army, by their ethics they looked more like guerrillas. The spirit of militia and the corresponding staff principles grew prevailing in the armed services.

The symptoms of a civil war and the economic collapse of the state together with the rejection of conventional discipline lead to the phenomenon of "self-financing". At times it had an openly criminal character of plundering on the roads and in the areas of the troops' deployment. Many Soviet-trained officers began to acquire such a way of behaviour, losing their professionalism and quickly getting used to illegal supplies, insubordination and unauthorised actions⁸². A lot of military personnel, including some high-ranking officers, were involved in the oil, weapons or cigarette business, and extorting "patronage" or "protection" money.⁸³ At the same time the civilian leadership was not only helpless to intervene in the financial dealings of the high-ranking representatives of the para-military establishment, but it justified itself by the effective collapse of the financial-budgetary system and itself collected the money for the army and for the continuing war in Abkhazia by dispatching its representatives to the regions to demand cash from the local authorities⁸⁴. All this generated embezzling and corruption.

The problem of political control over the armed forces grew aggravated. Many decisions of the political leadership were ignored or implemented only formally. For instance, in December 1992 the security council issued a decree on uniting all the armed groups into one army. Within a year the problem of "illegal groups" arose again.

Those groups that agreed to subordinate themselves to a single command, did not change their behaviour to a significant extent. They received official names of "guards" or "army battalions" or "military police" but in reality remained internally autonomous, subordinate mainly to their immediate commanders. The formally nominated commanders often created their own units manned by their friends and relatives. These units sometimes participated in combats only at their own will - in the best tradition of feudalism. Inside of many of these units freedom of actions and decisions was no smaller, if not greater: their members could self-willingly leave the front pleading family problems.

The major armed services kept on clashing with each other even after their legalisation. In some cases, representatives of the guards, military police and the security ministry engaged in armed clashes. In December 1993 such a confrontation burst out between the defence and security ministries.

At this state, the leaders of the armed units or some power organisations were able to make negative statements against the parliament and the government. At his press-conference on April 27, 1992, then defence minister, Kitovani, declared that the head of state must deal only with the foreign policy, while to dismiss the defence minister one needed to ask the army and the people.

From this viewpoint, one can talk about the weakness, if not absence, of a civil or political control over the armed services in 1992-93. Formally, and to a certain degree, authority actually remained in the hands of political bodies which were constantly strengthening. This fact still needs examining. One can partially agree with the opinion that the leaders of the Georgian military units were not interested in social life and tried to avoid responsibility. They preferred to strive for power and money without coming to an immediate leadership position.⁸⁵ But the reason of this was not only the unwillingness of the guerrillas to return to politics, but also the policy of the head of state. Shevardnadze knew how to take advantage of the conflicts between these units and, unlike Gamsakhurdia, was not about to spoil his relations with all of them at the same time. Closing his eye to many sins of the

Mkhedrioni, which turned into the leading military and political force due to Gamsakhurdia's fall, and other units, Shevardnadze was strengthening the traditionally loyal to the authorities, and especially to the president, interior ministry⁸⁶.

One can conclude that political control over the military or the guerrillas was exercised only at times through personal relations and by playing on the squabbles among the armed units.

The growing alienation between the military units and the society was a dangerous factor of the civil-military relations in that period. Although not all the soldiers and officers were criminals, the general opinion about the military was extremely negative. This can be illustrated by the fact that the drafts of that time proved a complete failure. By some reliable data, there were in fact only 5-10,000 servicemen in the defence ministry⁸⁷. Despite the law on universal military service, more than a half of the army was manned by volunteers. The only link between the military and the society were some hundreds of patriotic young men who willingly joined the army as soon as the situation was declared critical. The guerrillas paid the society back. Their main complaint was: 'Why do people indulge in rest and entertainment while we are fighting?' A certain part of this blame rests with the political leadership for its unclear stance towards the conflicts raging in the country and its inability to persuade the society that sacrifices were necessary.

All the above mentioned traits of the Georgian armed forces and civil-military relations could not but had a negative impact on the combat efficiency of the army and on the security of the country on the whole. One can partly agree with Dr. Fairbanks that undisciplined militia of the post-Communist states 'are too inefficient to impose order internally or to win wars externally'⁸⁸.

The Abkhazian war revealed the weakness of the Georgian undisciplined army, though some of its units proved quite efficient. For instance, in March 1993 the citizens of Sukhumi and the recruits from the central part of the Kartli region successfully warded off a rather severe attack upon the city. The artillery units trained by Qarqarashvili, a professional officer (since 1993 the defence minister), performed rather remarkably. Some of the Mkhedrioni units, too, were distinguished for their combat ability. Besides, such units as "Orbi" (Eagle) or "Afghanelebi" (Afghans) were less involved in criminal activities. There existed a certain esprit de corps and not all of them were criminal. Unfortunately, their experience was not appreciated⁸⁹. Their final defeat, however, was determined not only by the general lack of discipline and experience, which was characteristic of the enemy too, but by the military-political course of the state leadership which will be examined below.

* * *

The defeat in Abkhazia and a new surge of the civil war accelerated the coming of the third stage of the army-building. It was related to the political decision of the Georgian leadership to join the CIS and rapprochement with Russia in the face of the country's military-political and economic crisis. Changes in the army started in April 1994. From that time onward, the head of state and the parliament authorised Vardiko Nadibaidze, Russia's general of Georgian origin, to head the army-building.

At first sight, the following things became apparent during that time: the abolition of the illegal or semi-official paramilitary units, the improvement of discipline and subordination in the army, the purging of non-professionals and those clearly involved in criminal activities, the restoration of the draft system, the clarification of the army structure, the restoration of the

budgetary subsidies. To a certain degree, political control over the army was improved as well. At present the army is less expected to plot political adventures.

As early as January 1, 1995, in his New Year's Address to the people, Shevardnadze stated that a positive breakthrough had been achieved in building the Georgian army.

Nowadays, according to official data, there are 7 moto-rifle brigades, one artillery brigade, a joint navy brigade, two anti-aircraft brigades, 2 airforce regiments, one helicopter wing, one radio-technical brigade and some detached battalions in the Georgian army. The over-all strength of the army is claimed to be 30,000 officers and enlisted soldiers⁹⁰. Besides, one should note internal troops, a paratrooper-assault brigade of the ministry of state security and frontier troops. They total 10-12,000 servicemen.

Having dismissed independent armed units, at the same time Shevardnadze removed the frontier troops from the defence ministry. In 1994 they were subordinated to a newly established frontier department which was to follow commands of the defence ministry only during a war. In 1994 there was also created a state guards service under direct authority of the head of state. Such division of the armed services, each under a general control of the government, made it less possible of monopolising the authority by any of them. In 1995 Shevardnadze was elected president and, according to a new constitution, got additional rights to control the armed services. The parliamentary defence committee, too, increased its activities. But there are still a lot of problems to solve. New threats emerge in the army-building.

The Georgian army is distinguished for one traditional characteristic. Despite the purges and the prohibition of illegal paramilitary units, the patriarchal mentality which displays itself in viewing these units as one's own fiefdom, has largely been preserved. From the defence ministry to battalions, the enlistment of school mates, relatives, etc. is a universal practice. Despite the extra-territorial principle of enlistment, detachments are basically formed by the people with certain regional or other connections regardless of their professionalism. But this gap between the law and reality seems insignificant if compared with some other problems of the modern Georgian army.

When discussing one of the main elements of the security system - civil control - one should refer to Constitution which guarantees the leadership of President and Parliament in the military policy⁹¹. But one can also cite the words of the chairman of the parliamentary defence committee, R. Adamia, he said in April of 1996: 'To say that our committee controls the law-enforcement structures would be grossly exaggerated'⁹². The Defence Minister, Nadibaidze, has repeatedly ignored the MPs' demand to bear his testimony to Parliament. 'If you don't like me, dismiss me', he says⁹³.

One of the essential flaws of the civil control lays in the fact that the ministry itself is not among controlling institutions. According to the Soviet tradition, it is a clear military body with no civilian personnel on the leading posts.

Most important of all, until now the new defence minister has more often consulted his Russian colleagues than the Georgian legislation. His such a pose suggests that the minister is in hope of the Russian backing.

The Georgian leadership itself certainly contributed to such a situation. In 1993-95, Russia and Georgia signed several agreements which give priority to the Russian assistance in the army-building in Georgia⁹⁴. Despite such a background, the Georgians still consider Russia a threat to the country. At the same time, the Russian military do not conceal their intentions to make the Georgian army patterned upon and spiritually close to the Russian one⁹⁵.

It was not by chance that since 1994 the Georgian army has been commanded by a line of old Soviet generals, who easily find a common language with their Russian colleagues,

though the Russia-Georgia relations have somewhat worsened in recent times. Foreign experts stress that such a situation is fraught with dangerous consequences and casts doubt upon reliability of the Georgian army⁹⁶.

At times, V. Nadibaidze revealed his own foreign political view which not always matched those of the foreign ministry, the parliament or the president. So far he has been advocating the idea of transforming the CIS into a military bloc⁹⁷ and resisted Georgia's active participation in NATO Partnership for Peace program. Some sources claim that he starts his working day by visiting the headquarters of the Russian Troops in Transcaucasia where he used to serve before his appointing minister.

All of these suggests that today's Georgian army is commanded by a foreign-oriented general and remains under Russian rather than civil control. Worse still, the situation is even more alarming as Parliament has not approved a program of the army-building yet and the process is in the hands of those who seem incapable of even theoretical handling of the northern threat.

The pro-Russia stance of the Georgian military establishment brings about yet another problem which, though not directly related to the problem of civil control, affects the army's general combat efficiency.

The Georgian army is currently being built and trained according to translated Soviet military regulations. The 5-year experience of conflicts is practically ignored. No western instructions are allowed. According to some young officers, during exercises the army applies tactics of the World War II, with no regard to the local features or the experience obtained during the Abkhazian conflict. The peacekeeping exercises "Cooperative Osprey-96", which took place in the USA in the summer of 1996 with participation of a Georgian kadets' platoon, made it clear that even this especially selected unit, despite its good drill skills, fell behind both in the physical and combat efficiency. Georgian soldiers are dressed in the traditions of the Soviet army of the 70s⁹⁸.

As one of the senior officers admitted, some articles of the military regulations had been rejected even by the Russian army itself. Surely, with the help of Russia the Georgian army will become like a second-rate Russian division of the late Soviet period. 'We are building a typical Soviet army', R. Adamia, the chairman of the parliamentary defence committee, says⁹⁹.

Almost total dependence on the Russian supplies of armaments is another dangerous aspect of the Russian influence upon the Georgian armed services. At the same time, Russia is in no hurry to provide the ammunition for the small amount of the Russian weapons which have been transferred to Georgia so far. The Georgian army has no enough ammunition even for military exercises¹⁰⁰. The most active assistance was provided by the Russian military for creating Georgia's anti-aircraft system. At present, however, this system controls only the space around Tbilisi and mainly tests its warning functions for Moscow. Because of the height of the Caucasus, Russia cannot install an early warning system on its side of the mountain-range. Therefore, with the help of the Georgian radars it can improve defence of its territory¹⁰¹. As to Georgia's national security, the role of the system remains controversial.

The ineffectiveness of the civil control displayed itself in the fact that the 1996 defence budget was adopted in a hurry and without a detailed discussion. A bill on the budget provided for allocation of \$42 million to the Defence Ministry. These funds, quite significant for Georgia, were introduced only in 10 articles, including one (about \$3 million) for "other needs". The Defence Ministry also owns some enterprises which enjoy certain financial privileges and thus are difficult to control. More or less legal mechanisms of self-financing still remain in the armed services. The ministry and its branches get a certain income from serving civilian ships in the port of Poti.

The deficit of professionals is an acute problem of the modern Georgian army. Let alone the level of knowledge of the top military, one must point out extremely poor competence of the middle and lower commanders of the armed service. As mentioned above, after the former defence minister Qarqarashvili's resignation in February, 1994, the army was subject to purges. As a result, lots of those with combat experience left the army together with criminals. According to many estimates, the army lost 50-60% of the guard warriors of the 1990-93¹⁰². The former Soviet professionals are represented among the middle and high ranking officers. As mentioned above, no Georgians have graduated from Soviet military colleges since 1985. This creates a total deficit of the commanders of platoons which is compensated by drafting reserve officers, the graduates of civil institutes. They not only lack the appropriate experience but quite frequently desert the army themselves¹⁰³.

The problem of professionals, as well as the old Soviet training system for soldiers, cause desertion. The situation is also aggravated by the disastrous financial condition of the soldiers. Despite the strengthening of the draft procedures in 1995-1996, by the fall of 1996, according to official data, there were 3,000 deserters registered in Georgia. This accounts for 10% of the declared strength of the Georgian army. But the real number of the deserters is at least twice as high. In the 11th brigade, by informal estimates, 25% of the personnel are permanently absent¹⁰⁴. Inspection of the 22nd brigade revealed that while 103 deserters were officially registered their real number was 350¹⁰⁵.

One of the main shortcomings of the civil-military relations in Georgia is the sustaining alienation between the society and the army. The desertion-rate illustrates the society's attitude toward the army. 'If patriotism means being dressed in torn uniform and eating what one is ordered to eat, than I am not a patriot', one of the deserters says¹⁰⁶. For their part, the top military usually blame parents and schools for improper bringing up of the youth. In fact, the contemptuous public opinion about the army that existed throughout the 70s and 80s is still in evidence.

At the early stage of the army-building a lot of intellectuals inspired by patriotic sentiments joined the army¹⁰⁷. During the domination of paramilitary armed units their ranks were lined up by the young men looking for thrilling excitements. But now, with rare exceptions, the process of the army-building remains in the hands those who, by their mentality and status, represent neither the upper nor the middle social stratum and do not adhere to the leading values of the Georgian society. According to preliminary data of a sociological poll, carried out by the Caucasian Institute, citizens of Tbilisi almost completely refuse to serve in the law-enforcement bodies. As many officers say, rural population dominates the army. Examination of a typical brigade has revealed that 15 out of the 19 its top commanders came from peasants' families, one from a worker's and one from a professional officer's family¹⁰⁸. It may be stated that most of the officers represent non-privileged strata of the Soviet and post-Soviet society.

As to the Georgian generals, they almost entirely are of the Soviet-origin kind and also came from peasants' or workers' families. The defence minister himself was brought up in a remote mountainous village, educated in Russia and by his mentality falls short of the cultural orientation of the Georgian elite¹⁰⁹. It is interesting that a joke about the Georgian army being a "peasants' and workers'" one is widely spread among Georgian officers.

It is commonly accepted that armed forces are a product of the society that brought it forth. Analyses of the officer corps of many countries also demonstrate that the army commanders are basically descendants of the elite with the corresponding education and social relations¹¹⁰. From this viewpoint, the Georgian military establishment is an exception to the rule. Its social-cultural identity can be perceived as provincial and backward and even as alien, representing a foreign worldview. Anyhow, this identity has little in common with the

governing and intellectual elite. This increases the gap between the army and the society and cannot help to improve the combat efficiency of the army.

The last, but not the least, area of the security policy, and civil-military relations in particular, has one more problem: absence of the national security concept and the officially accepted military doctrine or some adequate documents. One can state that the armed services of Georgia have been and are created according to ad hoc interests and accidental events¹¹¹. I will dwell upon this issue in the last two sections. Suffice it to say that the absence of a widely accepted security policy creates the problem of self-identification and defining one's mission among the officers. There is a widely shared belief among them that the political leadership has little interest in the army-building¹¹². The absence of such interests and especially of an open discussion over security issues is yet another cause of the alienation between the society on the one hand and the army and the government as a whole on the other. This has to do with the issue of insufficient civil loyalty in Georgia.

Concluding this section it is possible to say that the armed forces and the civil-military relations in Georgia did and do pose a serious challenge to the security of the country. If formerly there chiefly existed a danger of insubordination or a military coup, at present the main problem is the inability of the army to carry out its tasks adequately. It is accompanied, at the same time, by the lack of specific definitions of these tasks, the absence of the national security concept and the military doctrine. It is also clear that the army-building is not based on the defence principle but most likely the other way around.

Of late, especially in 1997, there have been some positive tendencies. The 1997 state budget proved slightly more detailed¹¹³. Contacts with NATO and Ukraine have intensified, creating favourable grounds for reducing the Russian predominant influence on the army. But still too little time have passed to make a fair judgement that the fourth stage of the army-building, adequate to modern international relations and values, has really started.

The six-year history of the army-building in Georgia has revealed a lot of problems. Some of them are common for developing and post-Communist states, while the others derive from the peculiarities of the Georgian mentality and the country's historical-cultural heritage.

There is some semblance between the problems of civil-military relations in Georgia and in developing countries: their armed services are modelled on their colonial masters, civil control is weak and the army is sometimes engaged in political adventures. In part, these elements are characteristic of the post-Communist countries too. By the desertion-rate or undeveloped principles of the military and security policy Georgia bears a certain analogy with these countries. As to the Georgian individual traits, they are represented by its geo-political location, historical heritage and relations with Russia. With regard to the army-building, they are displayed in the fact that the Georgians are not used to the regular military service and in incompatibility of the Soviet-type subordination and discipline, and the society values.

As long as these problems are not solved, the Georgian armed services can hardly be considered an efficient part of the country's national security. What is more, the army itself carries a certain threat to the country.

SEEKING FOREIGN GUARANTEES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY

Reasons of some army-building problems in Georgia can be found in fluctuations of the country's foreign policy. A current crisis in the military's self-identification may be explained by indefinite foreign policy priorities¹¹⁴. Some time ago, the former foreign minister of Georgia declared that 'only an economically powerful and politically stable state, which

Georgia currently is not, can afford a definite policy¹¹⁵. These words seem logical but, on the other hand, such an attitude can give a rise to numerous, including inner, political problems.

Relations with Russia, though rather discrepant and marked with Tbilisi's actually permanent wobbly stance, have always been the leading field of the Georgian foreign policy. In the second chapter we have already examined some characteristics of the Georgia-Russia relations. Very often, Georgia's decisions are none but mere reactions to the Russian moves. By the way, a lot of Georgians, who participated in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian wars, testify that just Russian officials or military decided the fate of some operations or local combats. Further still, the combats started and ended by their will, while the Georgian soldiers proved "scapegoats"¹¹⁶.

Anyhow, analysis of the Georgian foreign policy in 1990-97 allow to conclude that there has always existed a principle "to avoid a threat by approaching closer to it" which displayed itself in a feeling of awe towards some Russian circles. At the same time, it was considered quite relevant to seek alternative guarantors of the country's national security. In many cases, the both methods were carried out simultaneously, making the Georgian foreign policy look like wobbly and indefinite one.

Nevertheless, relations with Russia, and the foreign policy on the whole, may be divided into three stages with the fourth one about to begin. Such a division is related to some specific events. In 1990-91, the Georgian government raised against the Soviet central authority and declared a fight for independence from Moscow. In 1992-93, Georgia gained independence and was avoiding to join the CIS, the successor of the ruined USSR, for quite a long time. At the same time, there were negotiations on withdrawal of the Russian troops from Georgia and the hints of blaming the Russian political elite for backing the Abkhazian separatists. In Autumn 1993, after being enlisted in the CIS, Georgia declared Russia its main military-political partner. Since 1996, the Georgian leadership has been rather critical towards Moscow, on the one hand, and inclining to deepen direct contacts with the West, on the other. Such a shifting position points out undeveloped nature of the Georgian foreign strategy. But its discrepancy reveals itself also in the fact that on each stage practical steps often contradicted common statements and the tactics of this stage. It may be stated that this situation still exists, indicating, due to some political moves, half-way nature of the current anti-Russia criticism. One can suspect that the present course may be reversed.

As mentioned above, on the first stage of the Georgian foreign policy Gamsakhurdia declared the fight for independence from Moscow the main priority. At the end of his reign, as was shown in the preceding chapter, the first president of Georgia and then supreme council assigned the status of occupational forces to the Soviet army¹¹⁷. At the same time, Gamsakhurdia was quite willing to use the Russian military against his opponents, for instance in his clash with Mkhedrioni¹¹⁸. In January 1991, he formally permitted the Soviet internal troops to operate in South Ossetia Autonomy¹¹⁹. At the time of the Moscow putsch, the Georgian government, which had already declared the country's independence, took a conciliatory pose towards an extraordinary committee that temporarily came in power in the USSR and, after the latter's demand, transformed the National Guards into a detachment of the interior ministry¹²⁰.

On the second stage of its foreign policy, Georgia achieved a world-wide recognition of its independence with Shevardnadze as the president-elect of the country. By that time, the Soviet Union had disintegrated, so negotiations started with independent Russia. Withdrawal of the former Soviet, now Russian, troops from Georgia was among the themes on the agenda¹²¹. These events were developing against the background of increasingly often clashes between Russian and Georgian units and Russia's participation, according to some Russian politicians themselves, in the war in Abkhazia¹²². On December 22, 1992, the parliament of Georgia adopted a law on defence, stating Georgia as a neutral country¹²³. It seemed as if Georgia

preferred equitable relations, free from vassalage or any kinds of military-political alliance, with Russia. On the other hand, the Georgian leadership was seeking close co-operation with western countries or international organisations and Transcaucasia neighbours. However, on June 24, 1992, Shevardnadze agreed to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia and abolished Gamsakhurdia's decree on assigning the occupational status to the former Soviet army.

The Georgian mass media and political, including official, circles claimed that Russian cadre officers participated in assaults against the Georgian troops in Abkhazia in March and July 1993. In spite of this, Shevardnadze formally did not rise a question, as demanded by the opposition, of the Russian aggression. Instead, he met with Boris Yeltsin in May and signed a bi-lateral communiqué which required to set the status of the Russian troops in Georgia. After the Russian foreign minister's visit to Georgia, Shevardnadze declared that Russia's interests must be taken into account¹²⁴.

In 1992, Russian military indeed were going to leave Georgia but by the middle of 1993 their withdrawal stopped. The Georgians' irritation over the Russians increased just at that time. This fact, as well as Shevardnadze's statements after his negotiations with Yeltsin and Kosyrev and the further development of events point out that in the middle of 1993 Russia itself concluded one stage of post-Communist political turmoil and undertook to maintain its influence in Georgia which the Georgian government agree with. Proceeding from the above mentioned, we should once again state the conclusion about a wobbly and awaiting nature of the Georgian politics.

In September 1993, after the fall of Sukhumi, the Georgian troops left Abkhazia. Flared up at the fact, Shevardnadze once again declared that he would never kneel before Russia. But two weeks later, Georgia joined the CIS and signed an agreement on the status of the Russian troops in Georgia. This was one more evidence of the real price of public statements in Georgian politics.

October of 1993 was a new watershed of the discrepant Georgian foreign policy. From that time onward, Russia was declared the main guarantor of the Georgian national security. The two countries signed an agreement on the status of the Russian frontier troops in Georgia. Besides, Georgia signed some fundamental documents on the CIS collective security. According to the Concept of Collective Security, signed by Georgia on February 10, 1995, the CIS states have common military-political interests, while any increase of foreign military forces at the CIS frontiers was specified as dangerous¹²⁵. Georgia became a member of the CIS joint anti-aircraft system. As to the above mentioned agreement on the status of the Russian frontier troops in Georgia, it contained such violating the country's sovereignty elements as factual inability to control the Russian military's activities¹²⁶. On September 15, 1995, Shevardnadze agreed to a 25-year stay of the Russian military bases in Georgia. None of the parties, however, have ratified this agreement.

The logic of the new stage of the Georgian foreign policy was based on the Russian threat¹²⁷ and, on the other hand, on a hope of the Russian backing in, say, the Abkhazian problem. Shevardnadze did not conceal that in exchange of 25-year presence of the Russian military bases he expected Russia to help Georgia in returning Abkhazia¹²⁸. It is not ruled out that Moscow indeed had promised such an assistance. But presumably, at due time the Georgian army waged a war against Abkhazia, being inspired by some Russian forces¹²⁹. Some time later, it became clear that the second way to defeat the Abkhazian separatists, based on a fondly attitude towards Russia, too, was fruitless. This contributed to the beginning of a new, fourth stage of the Georgian foreign policy.

The new stage of the Georgian foreign policy, started in 1996, has been marked with anti-Russia criticism and gradual denying of the move towards partnership with Russia. In any event, the Georgian attitude regarding the plans to turn the CIS into a military alliance, is

becoming cool. On the contrary, in October 1996 Shevardnadze issued a decree on preparing the control of the maritime borders of the state with Georgia's own forces. The Georgian official circles began to discuss the perspective of complete withdrawal of Russian border guards from the country. For the first time it was stated that the agreement providing for their presence is not ratified and hence is void. It is noteworthy that as early as in 1995 the Georgian authorities declared that to begin controlling their own borders they have to prepare for at least a few years. Georgia also joined its voice to the demands to divide the Black Sea Fleet¹³⁰. Representatives of the Georgian Foreign Ministry and Parliament stress more and more often that in general the Russian military presence has no legal basis since, according to the constitution, all military agreements must be ratified.

The anti-Russia criticism has grown especially strong in the issue of Abkhazia. Of late, even Shevardnadze himself has stated that the Russian peacekeeping troops made nothing to get the refugees back to Abkhazia and settle the conflict. The Russia-Georgia partnership, he said, must imply not only deployment of the Russian military bases but assistance in restoring the country's territorial integrity¹³¹. On May 30, 1997, Parliament of Georgia passed a resolution stating the further stay of the Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia to be inexpedient¹³². "The Concept of the Stability of Georgia's Public Life, Strengthening Its State Sovereignty and Security, and Restoration of Its Territorial Integrity", approved by Parliament on April 3, 1997, and which will be examined below, specifies the Abkhazian conflict as a still not overcome consequence of the Russian annexation of Georgia in 1921¹³³.

The anti-Russia criticism and increasing demands to Moscow are accompanied and backed by intensified moves of the Georgian foreign policy in other directions. Georgia becomes increasingly interested in direct contacts with the West. During NATO Secretary General Javier Solano's visit to Georgia on February 11, 1997, the Foreign Minister of Georgia declared integration with European structures the country's priority¹³⁴.

In February of 1996 the President of Georgia declared an idea of the pact "Peaceful Caucasus". The President of Georgia declared that the sphere of vital interests and the main factor of Georgian security is the Caucasus and proposed to co-operate in the task of regional stabilisation. In 1997 the regional co-operation policy more clearly displayed its nature as an alternative to specific relations with Russian and the CIS. On February 13-14, during Shevardnadze's visit to Ukraine, both countries' presidents said they considered it of great importance to co-operate with the EU and participate in NATO Partnership for Peace program¹³⁵. On February 18-20 Shevardnadze visited Baku and signed a declaration on strengthening the two countries' strategic partnership¹³⁶. The Europe-Asia transport corridor and the Caspian oil transits were also among the discussed issues.

As early as on October 9, 1995, the international consortium created for extracting and transporting the Azeri oil made a decision to build two pipelines - through southern Russia and through Georgia. This fact was seen in Georgia as a growing Western interest in the region and a precursor of real assistance in the issues of state security. Fostering great economic hopes in this project, the Georgian political elite at the same time notes the discontent of the Russian politicians with the perspective of building the Georgian section of the pipeline which would mean its getting out of Russian control. As mentioned above, there is some truth in this concern of the Russians: in the official Georgian circles the oil pipeline is increasingly seen as one of the main guarantees against the neo-imperial Russian forces.¹³⁷

The TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) project, worked out under the EU auspices, too, is viewed as a tool to woo western investments and escape the Russian influence. In one of his interviews in April, talking about the TRACECA project, Shevardnadze noted that if Russia did not help to solve the Abkhazian problem, Georgia would do it by itself after creating its strong economic base¹³⁸.

However, speaking about the inconsistent nature of the Georgian foreign, and generally national security policy, one should take into account today's reality: along with attempts to escape the Russian influence, there are still moves towards the Russia-Georgia military co-operation.

When adopting the law on state border, the majority of the Parliament agreed to keep the provision on the possible defence of the boundaries by "foreign troops". Moreover, On January 19, 1996, the Georgian delegation presented to the summit conference of the CIS a new project of the peacekeeping mandate for the forces deployed in the zone of Abkhazian conflict. Demanding the disarmament of separatists, Georgia agreed to the Russian military rule in Abkhazia.¹³⁹

In the concept of April 3, 1997, Parliament rather negatively assessed the Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia and expressed its concern that they may turn into frontier guards between Georgia and Abkhazia. As already mentioned, this document points out some elements of the annexation policy in Russia's activities. At the same time, the concept still demands to withdraw neither the Russian peacekeeping troops nor the Russian military bases. Shevardnadze has repeatedly stated that the key to Abkhazia is in Moscow. At the CIS summit on March 28, 1997, he demanded to expand the peacekeepers' mandate and the zone of their operations¹⁴⁰. Along with declaring the further stay of the Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia inexpedient, the parliamentary resolution of May 30, 1997, demands to intensify their activities. Nor has Shevardnadze refused to ratify the agreement on the Russian military bases: on May 28 he said Georgia would not ratify the agreement unless Russia took decisive measures to restore the country's territorial integrity¹⁴¹.

When asked about Georgia's strategic partners, one should note, Shevardnadze specified Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Russia¹⁴². The unsteady nature of the Georgian foreign policy may be proved by the fact that, as shown above, the Georgian army is still under Russian influence.

Briefly, despite increased anti-Russia criticism and pro-Western statements, awaiting/responding to foreign partners' or adversaries' moves is the most specific characteristic of the Georgian foreign policy on the present stage.

In alterations of the Georgian foreign policy one can see compelled balancing of a state located in the complex geo-political area. This is an official explanation of the events. At the same time, the awaiting nature of the Georgian policy does not make for the neighbouring states' confidence and is facing some criticism: not only Russian politicians but the chairman of the Ukrainian parliament has declared that Georgia seemed to be late demanding its share of the Black Sea navy and it should had done it earlier¹⁴³. But "earlier" the Georgian government gave priority to the strategic partnership with Russia.

When speaking about strategic partnership, we must assume that there exists a set of country's strategic interests and the political elite's clear-cut stance towards the world affairs. It is just the national security concept but not politicians' statements which has to define Georgia's strategic interests and partners. But there is still no such a concept in Georgia and the Georgian political elite's world-view seems ad hoc and oriented towards a current political situation and foreign forces' advice. This fact once again shows the weakness and undeveloped nature of the Georgian security policy. There is still no answer to the question what a course will Georgia follow at least in the near future. More accurately, the answer entirely depends on external forces' will.

THE HARD WAY TOWARDS THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT

The issues of the preceding chapters bear out that the two important elements of the security system, the foreign policy and the army-building, are on different stages. Despite such a somewhat blueprint definition, the army-building has passed two and is now on the third stage of its development, which is basically Russia-oriented. At the same time, the foreign policy has reached its fourth stage marked with parting Moscow and looking for an alternative to Russia in the security issues. Such frequent changes of priorities for six years or the divergence in external and inner aspects of the national security clearly suggest that the absence of the national security concept and military doctrine is a vital problem of the army-building and Georgia's security.

Besides making the Georgian state policy difficult to foresee, the absence of the national security concept prevents from analysing whether a governmental decision meets the country's interests or whether it is adequate to check possible threats to the state. The absence of the conceptual documents of the national security determines an eclectic nature of the military-political moves. This may be confirmed by permanent staff and structure changes in the army.

The experience of the past 2-3 years shows that the number and structure of the Georgian armed forces is determined and changed in an arbitrary manner - according to personal views of particular military officers or politicians. For instance, in 1992 Georgian General Staff thought about the building of army with the strength of 60-70,000. On May 13, 1993, Shevardnadze announced that he approves in general the structure proposed by then defence minister Qarqarashvili.¹⁴⁴ As it was revealed later, army formally consisted about 50 thousands of soldiers and officers. In a year the new Defence Minister, Nadibaidze, declared he would drastically reduce the number of military personnel and units. Shevardnadze himself argued that the Georgian army should be a small one. 'It is better to have 5,000 well-trained fighters', he said.¹⁴⁵ The Defence Minister, unilaterally, announced at the same time that the nucleus of the Georgian army would consist of 7 battalions with 1,000 soldiers in each and the total number of the troops would be 20,000.¹⁴⁶ One year later, it was announced that there existed a 25,000-strong army composed of brigades with a trend of further growth. For today the strength of units of the defence ministry officially reached 30,000. One may only speculate what is the link between these structural and quantitative changes and the actual needs of the country.

It is also unclear whether the law on universal military service of Georgia corresponds with the country's basic needs and resources; the law was adopted in December 1992 as a temporary legislative act appropriate to the war in Abkhazia. These days the war is over but the law, following old, Soviet draft procedures, is still valid.

At the same time, unlike the security concept, the Georgian military-political forces have tried to work out a military doctrine. In accordance with the Soviet traditions, in Georgia a military doctrine is considered a political rather than clear military document¹⁴⁷, thus attracting interest of those interested in the Georgian politics. As already mentioned, in December 1992 the parliament of Georgia adopted the Law on Defence. It falls short of the current situation and the reality on the whole, declaring Georgia a neutral country and stating that the Georgian army must be able to defeat any enemy and be equal to the armies of the countries as large and populated as Georgia¹⁴⁸. This law hardly could be considered a doctrine. Therefore, later on the defence ministry started developing a new document on the army-building and security policy. At the end of 1996 the defence ministry presented drafts of military doctrine and the program of army-building.

Let us put aside the debate on the degree to which this proposal's provision declaring that "co-operation should take place predominantly within the framework of CIS" corresponds to the genuine interests of the state and its practical policy. It is clear, nevertheless, that these documents do not satisfy the requirements of a such sort of state programs. Their main shortcoming is ambiguity and superficiality. Having the objective of encompassing the political aspect of security issues, these projects did not reflect the geopolitical priorities and the possibilities of their implementation (i.e. the strategic and economic significance of the Black Sea for Georgia or its possible location on transcontinental transit routes). The question of foreign troops' presence is also excluded from these documents. Among the possible threats only "separatism of different kinds" is mentioned, as well as the "desire of a group of countries to reach a dominant position in the world". The military part of this set of documents is no less ambiguous. Describing the general structure of the armed forces which is in the process of being implemented, the program does not explain the objectives of the various kinds or the logic of their deployment. Nothing is said about the possible types of military actions and about the operational art, about the division of the army into mobile forces and the main reserve, about co-operation between the different services or about the perspectives of participating in peacekeeping operations. There is no answer to the question - is Georgia moving toward the development of such measures of civilian control as a civil defence ministry. The ambiguity of both the doctrine and the program make the evaluation of their implementation problematic.

The main thing, however, was that these documents were not put in the parliament as the very committee on defence and security of the Parliament qualified the proposals as unsatisfactory and largely copied from the Russian and Soviet sources.

So, as we have mentioned, the Georgian army is still built up without any plan.

But even if created, the program of army-building will hardly change anything, unless the more general and decisive for the state-building national security concept is adopted. Moreover, just the absence of the national security concept and foreign policy choices account for the difficulty developing the doctrine.

There is a common practice in democratic societies that a national security concept must range real and possible threats to the country and define the methods to neutralise or avoid these threats. A national security concept has also to specify a nation's vital interests. Public discussion and social consensus over such documents are especially important.

This is not to say that the Georgian political elite does not perceive the need for such a document at all. In 1996 a committee has been set up by the President's order to develop a national security concept. The representatives of the highest echelons of authority have started talking about "strategic allies", "main foreign policy priorities". On April 3 1997 the parliament seconded the above mentioned "Concept of the Stability of Georgia's Public Life, Strengthening Its State Sovereignty and Security, and Restoration of Its Territorial Integrity".

Let alone a discrepant nature of the Georgian practice to chose the country's strategic partners, one must state that the committee, created by the president's order, has made no significant statements, while the document of April 3 has a somewhat curious shade: it seems to move us away from the development of the concept rather than bring us nearer to it.

"Spring is the time for rallies" - this is the way one of the journalists assessed the 1997 February-March events in Tbilisi. It was during that period that the Abkhaz problem once again became a cause of social-political agitation. The parliamentary group which represents the Georgian refugees from Abkhazia went on a hunger strike. They demanded, among other things, that the parliament remove the Russian peacekeepers. They threatened to arrange mass rallies and start collecting signatures. The parliament had to do something. It was planned to take a final decision on April 3. But prior to it, on March 28, at a traditional CIS summit

meeting an agreement was reached on the expansion of the range of activities of the Russian peacekeepers instead of their withdrawal. It was once again stated that the functions of the peacekeepers would also be expanded. With this events in the background it was doubtful to expect the parliament to meet the demands of hunger-strikers, but on the other hand, it was considered dangerous to completely ignore them. Therefore, the parliament believed the adoption of "the Concept of the stability of Georgia's public life, strengthening its state sovereignty and security and restoration of its territorial integrity "prepared by one of the opposition grouping to be a way out.

As to the content, the document more or less openly mentions the Russian aggression on Georgia and Georgia's orientation towards the West. But adhering to the style of the Georgian traditional policy, this document contains such passages as "expedience of the stay of the Russian troops in Georgia needs examining" or "if restoration of the country's territorial integrity is impeded once again", etc. Generally speaking, the structure of the document makes an impression of an eclectic mixture of common and concrete issues.

But even if set aside the discrepant nature of the document, it cannot be considered a national security concept for the following reasons:

1. It was adopted by the parliament to serve as the basis for the identification of political priorities *in the future*;
2. It was adopted without any public consideration or even a parliamentary discussion;
3. Its text has not been published; journalists were asked to return the document since amendments were to be introduced in it;
4. The government, which should base its practical activities on conceptual documentation does not essentially recognise this document. Ministers have not dealt with it and as the results of the March 28 CIS Summit meeting have demonstrated that a concept is one thing, while "real deeds" are quite another.

It is quite interesting, that in the opinion of a number of MPs the concept which was adopted as "a basis" has no political or strategic meaning¹⁴⁹; it was adopted with the purpose of assuaging someone, or easing a party rivalry. There is no thing wrong with either of them. The only trouble is that the documentation intended for the identification of strategic, fundamental issues are being sunk so low and the very people who adopted it do not seriously comprehend their own creature.

In conclusion, it may be noted that the absence of both the national security concept and military doctrine is a multi-sided problem of the Georgian national security caused by a discrepant and often passive nature of the Georgian practical policy. It makes it difficult to find out what does Georgia need most of all: "returning" of Abkhazia at all costs or general struggle for strengthening the country's sovereignty and escaping the northern neighbour's influence. The absence of these fundamental documents also results in the fact that hitherto the Georgian government has not explained to the people what does the "returning" of Abkhazia mean and how does the political elite perceive territorial integration and restoring of the sovereignty in Abkhazia. Such particular plans must be based on the principles of the national security concept.

One more important thing is that without conceptual, publicly declared documents of the state policy, citizens cannot effectively control the whole authority, Parliament and Government. It is possible to state that the culture of "white paper" is not developed in Georgia which is in itself a problem of civil-military relations and of security policy as a whole.

SUMMARY

Georgia has passed a hard way of the state-building. Some positive results in achieving stability are clearly in evidence, especially after the Abkhazian and civil wars. But a lot of causes of the past conflicts still exist: the conflict in Abkhazia is "frozen", though there are some signs indicating prospects for its exacerbating; those forces of the foreign country who are likely interested in destabilising the situation continue to influence Georgia's domestic affairs, in particular its military policy; neither alienation between the society and the political establishment nor the population's inconfidence in the state institutions which display themselves in the above examined civil-military relations have been eliminated.

A good deal of problems have to be solved for creating the Georgian national security system. More precisely, the Georgian armed forces, though already loyal and subordinate to the civil government, need not only (and not so) additional financing but improving of educational and training levels. There is also a need for a dialogue with the society and structural and cadre reforms adequate to contemporary social values and possible threats. Civil control, respect to law and open accountability have yet to be established in the army. Today, it becomes more and more clear that the country's military policy falls behind and contradicts changing priorities of the foreign policy.

As a part of the national security, the Georgian foreign policy is more successful than the military policy. These successes, however, are sometimes determined not by Georgia's activeness and its government's inventive approaches but by changes in the world politics and the country's geographical location which make it more interesting.

The state policy, officially named "balance politics", often bears the signs of transient, passive and wobbly nature. The recent trend in relations with Russia, i.e. attempts to escape the Russian dominance, is still incomplete and discrepant. The Georgian policy may well again change its course. It is not surprising that a small country placed in complex political environment is biased towards balancing and compromising. But there is a lot of evidence in history that small countries can secure their place in the world community only by their political activeness, clearly stating a country's objectives and steadily progressing towards them. At the end of the 20th century, small countries enjoy much more opportunities to define their concerns clearly and defend the state interests, but this needs certain political will.

When speaking about a possibility of the wobbly policy still going on, the lack of political will or the fear of responsibility, we consider the absence of the Georgian national security concept first. Just such an openly declared document with clearly defined possible threats to the country and its interests, and the mechanisms to neutralise or defend them may point out the border between balancing and unprincipled policies. The national security concept must serve for a basis of the military doctrine and the program of army-building. The more regrettable is that even after six years of its independence, Georgia still has no such fundamental documents.

The absence of the concept and doctrine has resulted in today's orientation of Georgia towards co-operation with the EU, on the one hand, and still existing trends in the army-building towards military alliance with Russia and neglecting NATO Partnership for Peace program, on the other. Nowadays, the foreign and military policies are following the different ways. This reason prevents these two stabilising mechanisms from being effective.

The absence of the national security concept and military doctrine brings about three main problems of the Georgian state security:

1. Without such documents, civil control over the armed forces and public accountability of the government are unlikely to become effective. Consequently, it would be difficult to speak about democracy in Georgia.
2. The government seems unable or afraid to declare the country's clear political course and a system of priorities. This hardly contributes to the neighbours' or its own citizens' confidence.
3. The absence of these documents impedes developing a modern nation-state in Georgia. The society without a declared system of values and the policy to protect them will hardly be able to defend itself from possible threats. Moreover, is still obscure from whom and what must be defended.

All the other problems - unclear relations with Russia, the threat of separatism, desertion in the army, etc. - must be considered in the light of the main three.

A country's security is not only its foreign or military policy. But problems of these fields reveal undeveloped nature of the state which, for its part, makes it difficult to solve other, economic or social, problems. Of course, if there is corruption and desertion in the army or if civil control is off, the social and economic security may be out of the question. Further still, foreign policy problems and undeveloped civil-military relations give grounds for the current social and economic problems being used as a cause for a new destabilisation in the country.

We have mentioned the signs of stabilisation in Georgia. Coming in power of young politicians and the political establishment's increasingly active attempts to find efficient guarantees of the country's sovereignty give some hopes. From this viewpoint, Parliament and the Foreign Ministry are especially distinguished. One should hope that the wind of reforms will reach the military structures too and, sooner or later, the whole Georgia politics will acquire the developed and purposeful nature. But the absence of the national security concept once again reminds us of the flaws in Georgia's sovereignty and statehood. There are few guarantees that the Georgians are ready to defend both democracy and their national sovereignty. Everything is depended on good will of external forces.

¹ Martin Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*, Leicester University Press 1988, p.7

² *Civil-Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy*, Conference Report, International Forum for Democratic Studies and George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, June 1995 p.19

³ Reminiscences of the former Prime-Minister Tengiz Sigua (newspaper *Dro*, #3, January 1997, in Georgian)

⁴ Interview with the former chairman of the Georgian Parliament Akaki Asatiani (March 18, 1996)

⁵ Interview with the military attaché of Russian Federation in Georgia V.T. Golub (November 11, 1995)

⁶ *Developing a National Security Concept for Georgia* (CIPDD, Tbilisi 1996), pp. 48, 56, 63

⁷ In 1993 MP N.Natadze wrote an address to UN, emphasizing that Russia was conducting the war against Georgia. (Georgian TV program *Alioni*, July 26, 1993)

⁸ Newspaper *Sakartvelos Respublika* October 12, 1993 (in Georgian).

⁹ David Darchiashvili, *Russian Troops in Georgia - the Aims and the Means*, (The Georgia Profile, Vol. 1, #7-8, CIPDD 1996) p. 14

¹⁰ Interview with Shevardnadze (Georgian TV, October 9 1993, Georgian Radio, October 12, 1993)

¹¹ Newspaper *Sakartvelos Respublika*, April 21, 1993 (in Georgian)

¹² Interview with V.Ckheidze (Georgian TV, April 10, 1996).

¹³ Newspaper *Akhali Taoba*, August 15, 1996 (in Georgian)

¹⁴ Georgian TV, informational program *Matsne*, December 15, 1996

¹⁵ Newspaper *Alia* October 5-6, 1996

¹⁶ The Concept of the Stability of Georgia's Public Life, Strengthening Its State Sovereignty and Security and Restoration of Its Territorial Integrity., pp. 3-6 (It worth mention that the Concept has not been published and according to the resolution of the Parliament the work on the concept must be continued)

¹⁷ Newspaper *Sakartvelos Respublika*, April 20, 1996

¹⁸ Newspaper *Akhali Taoba*, #147 May 31, 1997

¹⁹ Inga Dadiani, *Rossia opasaetsia, Gruzia ostaetsia v viigrishe, (Russia is Afraid, Georgia Takes Advantage)* Monthly addition to newspaper *Rech*, #3 1997 (in Russian)

²⁰ As Dr. Fairbanks notes everybody in Georgia or in Azerbaijan believes that Russia wants to keep control over the oil and pipelines in the region and that's why instigates ethnic and political conflicts (Charles H. Fairbanks, *A Tired Anarchy*, The National Interest, Spring 1995; Charles H. Fairbanks and Elshan Alekberov, *Azerbaijan and the Ominous Rumbling Over Russia's "Near Abroad"*, Washington Times, Nov 1, 1994)

²¹ From the confidential conversations with the representatives of the Georgian political establishment., January 1996).

²² Johnathan Aves, *Georgia: From Chaos to Stability?*, RIIA, London 1996, p28

²³ Russian TV, *Segodnia*, December 21, 1994

²⁴ David Darchiashvili, *Russian Troops in Georgia: The Aims and the Means*, The Georgia Profile, Vol. 1, #9, CIPDD 1996, p14

²⁵ The Georgian Chronicle, CIPDD, Vol. 4, #10, 1995

²⁶ Newspaper *Zakavkazskie Voennie Vedomosti*, #158, August 15 1995 (in Russian)

²⁷ *Nationalism, Ethnic Identity and Conflict Management in Russia today*, Edited by Gail W. Lapidus and Renee De Nevers, CISAC, Stanford University, 1995 p.9

²⁸ Newspaper *Zakavkazskie Voenie Vedomosti*, #191, October 5, 1995 (in Russian)

²⁹ Newspaper *Zakavkazskie Voenie Vedomosti*, # 136, July 19, 1995 (in Russian)

³⁰ One can mention the refusal of Aslan Abashidze to meet US Ambassador in June 1996. (About Ajarian case see: David Darchiashvili, *Adjaria: the Crossroads of Civilizations*, CIPDD 1996. Unpublished paper in Russian)

³¹ Johnathan Aves, *Georgia: From Chaos to Stability?* RIIA 1996, p 45

³² *The Georgian Chronicle* Vol. 4 #8, August 1995 CIPDD p6

³³ *Developing the National Security Concept for Georgia*, CIPDD 1996 p 55 (In English)

³⁴ *The Georgian Constitution*, Tbilisi 1995, paragraph2

³⁵ *Developing the National Security Concept for Georgia*, CIPDD 1996, p 62

³⁶ Georgian TV, March 23, 1995

³⁷ Newspaper *Sakartvelos Respublika* #80, April 8, 1997

³⁸ *Developing the National Security Concept for Georgia*, CIPDD 1996, p50

³⁹ Confidential interview with the representatives of the Georgian Border Guard, September 19, 1996

⁴⁰ Newspaper *Shvidi Dge*, #42, October 18-24 1996 (in Georgian)

⁴¹ Informational Agency *Iberia*, March 29, 1994 (in Georgian)

⁴² In private conversations many Georgian politicians stress that if Russia wants to create a new problems for Georgia, it will make it in Javakheti: area inhabited mostly by Armenians. Regarding to this one should point out that there is a Russian military base in this region.

⁴³ *Developing the National Security Concept for Georgia*, CIPDD 1996, p49-50

⁴⁴ Interview with the advisor of A.Abashidze Givi Bolotashvili, October 1, 1996

⁴⁵ Informational Agency *BJI*, August 19, 1994., Newspaper *Droni*, November 21, 1995. (in Georgian)

⁴⁶ *Saqartvelos Sabchota Enciklopedia*, (Encyclopedia of Soviet Georgia) Vol. 9, Tbilisi 1985 p52

⁴⁷ *O Natsionalnikh Voennikh Formirovaniakh v Sovetskikh Voorujennikh Silakh*, The Institute of Military History of Russia, Moscow 1990 (unpublished reference in Russian)

⁴⁸ Former prime-minister of Georgia T.Sigua remembers that in 50s the commandment of Georgian national division appeared to be well brought up persons originated from well to do families. (Interview with T.Sigua January 1997)

⁴⁹ According to the former general military prosecutor N.Gogitidze his decision to enter one of the prestigious military colleges of the USSR surprised among his friends and relatives. It was happening in 70s (Interview with Nukri Gogitidze, former General Military Prosecutor of Georgia, November 1, 1996)

⁵⁰ Interview with the officers graduated from this college (December 1996)

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- ⁵¹ The information of Deputy defense Minister, General Guram Nikolaishvili., (17 October 1996)
- ⁵² According to many Georgian militaries and politicians after Stalin's death there existed unwritten law banning promotion of the officers of Georgian origin to higher ranks.(Interviews with former general military prosecutor N.Gogitidze., Colonel G.Kohreidze from Frontier Guards., Vice-Colonel T.Chinchilakashvili from Ministry of Defense., Colonel G. Tsitsishvili from Internal Troops., Former Commander of Georgian Navy A.Djavakhishvili., Former Prime Minister T. Sigua., Former member of the defense subcommission of the Supreme Council (1990-1991) M.Makashvili. Autumn 1996). This view was confirmed by researchers from the Institute of the Military History of Russia. The fact that militaries of non-Slav origins were not allowed to serve in the Soviet elite units is also mentioned in the special literature (Deborah Yarsike Ball, *Ethnic Conflict, Unit Performance, and the Soviet Armed Forces*, Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1994, Vol. 20, #2 pp242.,245.,246).
- ⁵³ Colonel-General Edward Vorobiov gives such an explanation of the fact that the number of the high rank Georgian militaries was gradually decreased (Interview with E.Vorobiov., January 1996)
- ⁵⁴ Interview with the former Head of the General Staff of Georgian Armed Forces general A.Tskitishvili (*Ibervizia.*, Georgian Independent TV Company., Program *Modus Vivendi.*, April 1992)
- ⁵⁵ Confidential interview with Georgian state official
- ⁵⁶ Interviews with former members of paramilitary armed units. Among them: A.Barbakadze (Traditionalist Party. Afterwards Deputy Commander of Internal Troops of Georgia) July 1995; J. Shaishmelashvili (Member of the "Mkhedrioni"., Former assistant of the leader of these formation Jaba Ioseliani) September 1996
- ⁵⁷ Deserters from the Soviet army joint the unit "White Eagle", which was created by yang captain of Soviet armed forces Gia Karkarashvili. Initially this unit was created on the basis of Mkhedrioni militia. Afterwards it joint the National Guards and played special role in contemporary history of Georgian Armed Forces.
- ⁵⁸ Communications of the Supreme Soviet of Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic #6 1990., pp16-17
- ⁵⁹ Interview with J.Shaishmelashvili., September 1996., The letter from the Shaishmelashvili's archive written by leader of Mkhedrioni about the registration of the Rescue Corps
- ⁶⁰ Interview with the former member of this commission, head of the Department of the Military History of the Ministry of Defense vice-colonel Tristan Chinchilakashvili. 1996 13 September
- ⁶¹ the brochure *Vooruzhennie i Voennizirovannye Formirovania v SSSR* (Rossiisko-amerikanskii tsentr mezhdunarodnikh i voenno-politicheskikh issledovani., Moscow, 1991, pp8-9) it is mentioned that there were about 6000 militiamen in Georgia by October 1990. We suppose that this figure is exaggerated and suggests that certain groups' leaders would present desired as reality. According to various witnesses there were some hundred Georgian militiamen in the conflict zones in this time. Perhaps Mkhedrioni when it was converted into the Rescue Corps did consist of several hundred men but the membership too often was quite formal and the composition was quite inconstant. No one controlled it.
- ⁶² Communications of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia, 1990, #11, p. 40 (in Georg.)
- ⁶³ Interview with former prime minister T.Sigua, 30 Jan. 1997
- ⁶⁴ Communications of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia, 1990, #12, p.27 (in Georg.)
- ⁶⁵ Interview with former prime minister T.Sigua, 30 Jan. 1997. This figure is repeatedly reported by other former officials
- ⁶⁶ The enthusiasm of those times is mentioned by several former soldiers and officers (interviews conducted by the author in Summer 1995)Such a mood may be felt in mass media of that epoch. (see e.g. *Mkhedari* (Warrior) #2, March-April 1991 p 3-7, in Georg.)
- ⁶⁷ Interview with the former member of the defense sub-commission of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia M.Makashvili, 5 January 1996)
- ⁶⁸ Newspaper *Sakartvelos Mkhedrioni* #2(22), 12 January, 1995
- ⁶⁹ L.Dolidze *Generalami ne Rozdaiutsia*, Tbilisi 1993 pp380, 387, 398 (in Russian)
- ⁷⁰ Communications of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia #12, 1990, p27
- ⁷¹ Interview with the former prime minister T.Sigua, 30 January 1997.
- ⁷² Interview with the former member of the defense sub-commission of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia M.Makashvili, 5 January, 1996
- ⁷³ Interview with the former member of the defense sub-commission of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia M.Makashvili, 5 January, 1996

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- ⁷⁴ David Darchiashvili *Mkhedrioni - Worriers of Georgia*, (Unpublished Paper, CIPDD 1995); Newspaper *Sakartvelos Mkhedrioni*, #2(22), 12 January, 1995
- ⁷⁵ Interview with the former member of the defense sub-commission of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia M.Makashvili, 5 January, 1996
- ⁷⁶ Interviews with M.Makashvili., with the former deputy commander of Internal Troops of Georgia A.Barbakadze, July 1995., Also the information from colonel G. Kohreidze (Frontier guards), 19 September 1996
- ⁷⁷ Communications of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia, #4, 1991
- ⁷⁸ Press conference of the Minister of Defense of Georgia V.Nadibaidze, 17 October 1995 (Informational Agency *Sarke*, 18 October, 1995)
- ⁷⁹ Georgian Military Chronicle Vol. 1, No 1, November 1994
- ⁸⁰ Communications of the Parliament of the Republic of Georgia, #2, 1992, p 40-41
- ⁸¹ Communications of the Parliament of the Republic of Georgia, #2, 1992, p 40
- ⁸² Interview with the officer of the first Army Brigade, established in 1992. Unlike with the National Guard the high level of the chain of command of this brigade was staffed by professional officers. Nevertheless, the Brigade lost its "professional" feature quite soon. Some of its officers joint the criminal activity. In summer 1993 Brigade refused to accept the new commander and forced him to agree with certain conditions
- ⁸³ Criminal case of "Mkhedrioni", Newspaper *Alia* #313, 25-26 January, 1997
- ⁸⁴ Newspaper *Sarangi* , 30 June, 1994; Interview with the former Prime Minister T.Sigua
- ⁸⁵ Charles H. Fairbanks, *The Postcommunist Wars*, (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, # 4, October 1995) p29
- ⁸⁶ Shevardnadze himself used to be a minister of Internal Affairs in communist times
- ⁸⁷ Interview with General Diula Abashidze, July 1995
- ⁸⁸ Charles H. Fairbanks, *The Postcommunist Wars*, (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, # 4, October 1995) p22
- ⁸⁹ Such an assumption is based on conversations with a lot of soldiers, officers and journalists, who sow the war. (interviews conducted during 1995-1996)
- ⁹⁰ Interview with the Deputy Defence Minister Guram Nikolaishvili (17 October 1996)
- ⁹¹ The Georgian Constitution, Tbilisi 1995, paragraphs 3, 65,73, 98-100
- ⁹² *Developing the National Security Concept for Georgia*, CIPDD, Tbilisi 1996 p46
- ⁹³ Newspaper *Droni*, 20 December, 1996; *Kavkasioni*, 19 December, 1996
- ⁹⁴ *Dogovor o druzbe i dobrososedstve mejdu rossiiskoi federatsiei i Respublikoi Gruzia, 3 Fevralia, 1994, paragraph 3; Dogovor o statuse voinskikh formirovanii Rossiiskoi Federatsii vremennonakhodiakhshikhhsia na territorii Respubliki Gruzia, Oktiabr 1993, paragraph 5.,19; Soglashenie o statuse i funktsiakh pogranichnikh voisk Rossiiskoi Federatsii na teritorii Respubliki Gruzia, Mart 1994.* These are acting agreements. The cooperation between Georgia and Russia is also mentioned in an agreement about Russian bases in Georgia of 15 September 1995, which has been signed but has not been ratified yet. One should also mention CIS collective agreements such as *Kontseptsia kollektivnoi bezopasnosti., Glavnie napravlenia dlia dalneiShego voennogo sotrudnichestva., dogovor o edinoi sisteme voenno vozdushnoi oboron*
- ⁹⁵ Interview with Dergilev, the editor in chief of the newspaper of Russian Troops in Transcaucasia *Zakavkazskie Voennie Vedomosti*, January 9, 1996
- ⁹⁶ Johnathan Aves, *Georgia: From Chaos to Stability*(RIIA, 1996) p21
- ⁹⁷ The Georgian Military Chronicle, Vol. 2 #8, December 1995
- ⁹⁸ The problem of obsolete Soviet Soviet stile military training is discussed in Western literature. This problem is also faced by other post Soviet states. (See: Peter Vares and Mare Haab, *The Baltic States: Quo Vadis? Central and Eastern Europe - The Challenge of Transition*, SIPRI 1993)
- ⁹⁹ *Developing the National Security Concept for Georgia*, CIPDD, 1996 p 47
- ¹⁰⁰ Confidential interviews with Georgian officers
- ¹⁰¹ The Georgian Military Chronicle, Vol. 12, #6, October 1995; The interview with the author of the article, the head of press-service of the internal troops of Georgia I.Aladashvili
- ¹⁰² Interviews conducted by the author in 11th brigade, which used to be a main core of the army in 1993. (December 1996)
- ¹⁰³ Interviews conducted by the author in 11th brigade, which used to be a main core of the army in 1993(December 1996)

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- ¹⁰⁴ Interviews conducted by the author in 11th brigade, which used to be a main core of the army in 1993(December 1996)
- ¹⁰⁵ Newspaper *Shvidi Dge*, #50, 13-19december, 1996
- ¹⁰⁶ Newspaper *Akhali Taoba*, #4, 7 January, 1997
- ¹⁰⁷ It is fact that initially the units like Mkhedrioni and Orbi mostly were staffed by persons springing from the central districts in Tbilisi, inhabited mostly by middle and upper middle classes and considered as a bearers of culture.
- ¹⁰⁸ The Research was conducted by the author in October 1996. The total number of the officers of the brigade is 81. The personal files of the members of brigade head quarter and battalion and company commanders have been learned
- ¹⁰⁹ The list and biographies of acting Georgian generals are represented in *Generalami ne rojdaiutsia.*, by L.Dolidze, Tbilisi 1993
- ¹¹⁰ Martin Edmonds, *Armed Service and Society*, Leicester University Press 1988., PP 44-67
- ¹¹¹ *Jane's Intelligence Review* by Rixhard Woff, Europe-December 1994., pp559-561
- ¹¹² From the confidential talks in the Ministry of Defense. Such problem was revealed also during the brainstorming, conducted by the author among the officers of the special unit of Georgian Frontier Guards in August 1996
- ¹¹³ *Army and Society in Georgia*, Vol. 5, No 1(17) 1997 p19-22
- ¹¹⁴ From the confidential talks in the Ministry of Defence and in several army units .,1996
- ¹¹⁵ Olga Vasiliieva, *The Foreign Policy Orientation of Georgia.*, SWP-AP 2968., July 1996.,p7
- ¹¹⁶ Such opinions are openly expressed by opposition and they are confirmed on confidential level by certain officials.
- ¹¹⁷ Interview with the former chairman of the Supreme Council A.Asatiani 18 March 1996
- ¹¹⁸ David Darchiashvili, *Mkhedrioni - Worriers of Georgia*, Unpublished Paper, CIPDD 1995
- ¹¹⁹ Interview with the former MP Michael Makashvili January 5 1996
- ¹²⁰ As it was said in the 2nd chapter such a decision was also prompted by internal political struggle, however it was done as an obedience to Moscow's demands.
- ¹²¹ *Sakartvelos Respublika* 27 April 1993
- ¹²² Statement of the former chairman of the Council of Russian Federation Shumeiko., Russian TV, *NT Segodnia*, December 21, 1994
- ¹²³ Communications of the Parliament of Republic of Georgia, #2 1992, p29
- ¹²⁴ *Sakartvelos Respublika* 27 July 1993
- ¹²⁵ Informational Bulletin "*Sodruzestvo*" #1(18) 1995. p 47
- ¹²⁶ According to the Russian-Georgian agreement on the status of the Russian troops in Georgia two joint commission are to be established: one is to estimate possible damages of the population's property caused by the militaries' activities or vise versa and another is to be authorized for solving possible disputes on the agreement in case of necessity. The agreement also states that both parties' representatives have to work out a plan of Russian gradual withdrawal. The issue of the withdrawal is to be clarified in a separate agreement
(*Dogovor mejdu Respublikoi Gruzia i Rossiiskoi Federatsiei o statuse voinskih formirovanii rossiiskoi federatsii vremenno nahodiashihsia na teritorii Respubliki Gruzia*, Moskva, Oktiabr 1993, pp21; 23; 24), but it has not been even elaborated. Shortcomings of such a control system could be seen in comparison with the agreement between Greece and USA on American military bases, according to which each installation is supervised by a Greek senior officer, who has an access to everything exempt of the codes (*Base Agreement Between Greece and USA*, Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe, SIPRI 1989 p169)
- ¹²⁷ As one Georgian politologists said, Georgia finds itself in the frightening magnetic field of the "big brother" (*Developing of the National Security Concept for Georgia*, CIPDD 1996., p50)
- ¹²⁸ Interview on Georgian TV 23 March 1995; More clearly it was stated by the Minister of Defence of Georgia (Informational Agency BJI., 23 November 1994)
- ¹²⁹ According to some witnesses Georgian landing operation conducted against Abkhaz at the beginning of the war was supervised by the Russian military. Even if not so, it should be pointed that Georgia received remarkable amount of the armaments just before the Abkhaz war and deputy commander of Russian troops in Transcaucasia General Beppaev contributed to this quite actively. It is hard to believe that the Russian military did not know the Georgian plans to start military operation in Abkhazia.

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- ¹³⁰ *Sakartvelos Respublika* #121, 28 May 1997
- ¹³¹ Newspaper *Sakartvelos Respublika* #80., 8 April 1997
- ¹³² Newspaper *Akhali Taoba* #147 31 May 1997
- ¹³³ "The Concept of the Stability of Georgia's Public Life, Strengthening its State Sovereignty and Security and Restoration of its Territorial Integrity" p3 (The concept has not been published yet)
- ¹³⁴ *Sakartvelos Respublika* # 34, 12 February 1997
- ¹³⁵ *Sakartvelos Respublika* #37,15 February 1997
- ¹³⁶ *Sakartvelos Respublika* #41, 20 February 1997
- ¹³⁷ *Developing the National Security Concept for Georgia*, CIPDD 1996 p55
- ¹³⁸ *Sakartvelos Respublika* #80, 8 April 1997
- ¹³⁹ The Georgian Military Chronicle Vol 3, #9 January-February 1996, p1
- ¹⁴⁰ *Sakartvelos Respublika* #72 29 March 1997; *Droni* # 26 4-7 May 1997.
- ¹⁴¹ *Sakartvelos Respublika* #121 28 May 1997.
- ¹⁴² *Sakartvelos Respublika* 21 February 1997
- ¹⁴³ Press conference of the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament Aleksander Moroz., Monfly addition to newspaper *Rech*, May 1997
- ¹⁴⁴ Newspaper *Sakartvelos Respublika*, 4 May 1994
- ¹⁴⁵ Interview with Shevardnadze, Georgian Radio, 21 February 1994
- ¹⁴⁶ Jane's Intelligence Review, By Richard Woff. Europe., December 1994., p 560
- ¹⁴⁷ One of the authors of the draft military doctrine General G.Nikolaishvili considers its creature as a mainly political document. (Interview, January 1997).
- ¹⁴⁸ Communications of the Republic of Georgia, #2, 1992
- ¹⁴⁹ Interviews with several MPs and experts from the Parliamentary committees, April-May 1997