

Utilities in German defence politics: The rational core of the German defence debate between 1990 and 1994

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1. Introduction

1.1. Subject

After the end of the cold war by the breakdown of the system of socialist states since 1989 the whole situation of security politics in Europe has changed fundamentally: the dissolution of the WTO on July 1, 1991 and the approach of the formerly socialist states into the system of NATO by constitution of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on December 20 of the same year have changed the ideas of security and possible concepts of strategy in Europe fundamentally. Until today it is not clear what the future security architecture of the continent will look like. The existing institutions and organisations have not yet defined conclusively their future place in the security system of Europe. The challenges resulting from the application for membership in NATO and European Community/European Union (EC/EU) by East European states and the sceptical attitude of Russia about that are not yet solved.

The FRG, too, is confronted with entirely new challenges: Relating to home affairs the German unification has to be mentioned which will bind enormous economic resources for years ahead. Thereby the until recently strong arm of German foreign politics based on economic influence in the world and trusting in civil means is weakened. Another important challenge regarding the security landscape throughout Europe was the reduction of the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and ex-National People's Army (NVA) to the maximum number agreed upon in the CSE treaty. For the Bundeswehr, a maximum number of 370000 was fixed.

Furthermore the FRG is integrated into international organisations, who are themselves in a process of reflecting their profiles of future duties or have formulated such a profile in the last years more or less precisely. It follows that in the FRG as well reflections took place about its future role in Europe as well as world-wide. A new foreign policy had to be designed against a background of limited economic possibilities.

One function of German foreign policy is security policy; one of its components again is the military as an instrument. Therefore, military means in foreign policy also underlies a re-evaluation. This re-evaluation was introduced in the 12th German election term 1990-1994. Therefore precisely this period is examined in this present paper.

The clear circumstances of the East-West-conflict where for FRG home defence of the national territory and collective assistance in the alliance comfortably coincided have dissolved. New

demands, formulated from inside and outside, on German military capabilities are being discussed since 1990. The different more or less small out of area actions of the Bundeswehr began with the second Gulf War, went on in Cambodia, Adria and ended for the period considered in Somalia 1993/94.

The final dissolution of the post-war consent regarding security politics is the subject of many - though not being discussed in the whole society - debates concerning the future role of FRG and its military forces in world politics. The controversially discussed main topics of this debate shall be named briefly:

First, the recovery of full sovereignty from which a world-wide responsibility for peace and security is deduced; second, the continued existence of the western alliance and the Bundeswehr though the former perception of threat is lost coupled with a re-evaluation of military power from defence abilities to crisis-reaction abilities, third and finally the lowering of thresholds for military operations - especially by the "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien" (VPR - guidelines for defence politics) of November 11, 1992 and the Weißbuch (White Book) of the Federal Defence Ministry (BMVg) of 1994 - which are expressions of the attitude that the future German military should ensure interests and not only defend national territory.

The shifts of main points of effort in German security politics have begun in 1990, as shown by the utterings and actions of the decision elite in security politics. A systematic and clear direction cannot be discerned, though.^[1] As indicators of a change in direction the different out-of-area operations carried out before 1994 can be referred to - particularly from 1992 to 1994, as in 1992 the VPR gave a first basis that showed something changing. A certain and well-defined task of military means among the instruments of foreign and security politics can hardly be discerned, though. The observable concrete operations do not follow a regularity, from which a clear assignment of duties to the military could be concluded. Coupled with the "strange search for legitimation"^[2] which began inside the military command in 1990, one could conclude that there was no rational calculus underlying the use of the military instrument.

This insinuation, though, would not have any explanatory value for the fundamental changes that went on in the description and execution of duties of the Bundeswehr. It would mean that the decision makers concerned with security politics acted bare of any rationality.

If one observes the process of politics until now from the outside, first of all it was thought about, which traditional duties should be fixed in spite of a new situation in security politics and which new duties should be created for the Bundeswehr under the changed conditions. It was neglected up to which point the Bundeswehr could be reduced in face of the disappeared threat.^[3] This means that certain decisions about the future direction had already been made.

But the assumption of a homogeneous decision elite which dominates the debate concerning security politics and calculates to militarise German foreign policy is a much too conspirational theory which does not cleanly separate between political and military actors.^[4] The insinuation of a homogenous and planning elite is of limited explanatory value. If the positions of political and military actors are assumed to be exchangeable or merging, then the actions in security politics could not be spontaneously classified as straight. But precisely this is not the point. Rather, the diverse out-of-area operations of the Bundeswehr convey the impression of a "test series", which seems to serve as a test of one's own world-political position, one's military

capabilities and the step-by-step habituation of the public to the use of the military as a means of foreign politics. They do not follow a clear assignment of duties by politics. Therefore, it is to be assumed that they are the practical expression of differing interests among the German decision elite. A strict conceptual separation of these interests is absolutely necessary because of the "primacy of politics" (Primat der Politik) that should reign security politics. Only in investigating the differing interests it can be deduced to what extent the "primacy of politics" is followed or neglected - or, whether rather military or rather political interests motivate certain actions in security politics.

1.2. Question

The 12th parliamentary term marks the start of a new evaluation of military means in German foreign policy. In the era of East-West Conflict two facts restricted Germany in the extensive use of military as a political instrument. The first were the allied reservations about Berlin and Germany as a whole. These were given up in Art. 7 I of the 2+4 treaty. In Art. 7 II of this treaty it is laid down that Germany possesses the full sovereignty in domestic and foreign affairs. The second restricting fact was a strategic one. The cases of national defence and giving NATO assistance were congruent because the front of a possible conflict between NATO and WTO was the eastern border of the Federal Republic of Germany.

After the breakdown of socialist systems and WTO the basis of the traditional German security policy concept has changed completely. A new role and responsibility of Germany in world politics is proclaimed. The military instrument now plays an important role in the design of new German foreign policy. The indicator for a more active use of military means in foreign politics is the development of out-of-area action since 1990. The different out-of-area actions of the Bundeswehr in Cambodia, Caucasus, Somalia and former Yugoslavia show possibilities and future military options. In comparison with the traditional options of the Bundeswehr until 1990 one can state that military action is widened and in a process of fundamental redefinition.

The aim of this project is to analyse how the wider spectrum of military tasking was implemented and legitimated by the decision elite.

The leading question is:

What have been the main influences on the formation of a new security policy?

In this respect the debate in Germany is fairly confusing. The decisions for out-of-area action were made by the government. One could assume that such fundamental decisions that concern such vital issues as the life of soldiers should follow certain prefixed guidelines of foreign policy. But instead, the definition of German foreign responsibility runs in a parallel course or even lags behind the detachment of Bundeswehr out-of-area.

It is in fact, unclear who exactly determines these decisions, who has a strong influence and what the special interests in the concrete actions are.

To explain which influences caused the new German security policy, it is revealing to examine the actual decision processes before out-of-area actions of the Bundeswehr were implemented.

Therefore the question is operationalized in the following sub-questions:

1. Who are the members of the security policy decision elite in Germany?
2. What changing frameworks they are confronted with?
3. What points of view and what calculations lead the participants of the discussion within the decision elite?
4. What patterns and inherent mechanisms of decision-making and processes of finding consensus must be distinguished in this circle?

1.3. Hypothesis

Thus the main hypothesis of the research project is:

The extension of the Bundeswehr assignment was accompanied by a debate, only partly public, that oscillated around different moral, interest-oriented and military operationable attitudes. Nevertheless it seems plausible to explain this phenomenon with the differing utility-calculations (or interest structures) of the defence arena actors.

The arena actors have different assumptions about the German role in international politics - to give two extreme emphasises: Germany as a civil or military power - and therefore differing positions how and when to use the Bundeswehr in foreign policy.

The interests of every actor depend upon the special case of out-of-area action - determined by necessity, strength and intensity of fighting troops - and the hope of the arena actors to carry through their maximum benefit by troop detachment.

Therefore a permanent bargaining in the decision elite takes place that gives a heavier influence to one or the other position - to give an example: doves favouring diplomatic instruments and trade versus hawks favouring military instruments and peace making.

Out of area action of the Bundeswehr is not explainable by so-called objective means - by clear, public and well-defined tasks - but by the bargaining processes in the decision elite.

2. Theoretical approach

This hypothesis leads to two main problems.

The first problem is the theoretical framework, especially the concept of rationality in the security politics arena. It is interesting that concepts of rationality are applied in many policy fields but are not esteemed as appropriate for defence policy.[\[5\]](#) Often it is argued that defence policy does not follow the rules of benefit maximising.

The second problem is how to measure the cost-benefit calculus and establish a benefit function of the decision-making actors. As I remarked, the benefit of an actor is its satisfaction of interests. For the research it is necessary to filter, specify and rank the interests of elite actors.

2.1. Method

The cost-benefit calculation of the decision elite seems to be the rational core of an apparently unsystematic discussion, and rational choice theory seems to be the appropriate instrument to analyse the political process in question. By the application of this method the decision-making will undergo a new interpretation that might lead to a new dimension of explanation.

The application of the theory of decision-making is a major tool in economics but relatively new in other social sciences. Decisions concerning defence politics shall be analysed by means of rational choice theory. The patterns of behaviour (e.g. statements, political initiatives etc.) shall be examined by the individual logic of the protagonists, i.e. by their cost-benefit calculation. Under certain assumptions the patterns of action can be described and solved as an interdependent maximisation process amongst individual actors.

The often heard argument that defence policy does not follow the rule of individual benefit maximisation is not convincing. If all other policy fields are analysed by means of rationality it seems to be consistent to apply this technique to defence policy too.^[6] Its success in other fields of inquiry it is at least worth a try.^[7]

2.2. Delimitations

The first methodological problem is to line out what individuals should be examined and to find out the number and size of the groups they build.

After a closer examination it seemed appropriate to examine the political top of the executive that deals with security questions. We can distinguish three different groups: the minister of defence and his advisory staff, the minister of foreign affairs and his staff and the Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) as holder of the guiding rules competence (Richtlinienkompetenz) with his close advisors.

Another group of the decision elite is the military top, more precisely the General Staff and its planning groups. Their role in the decision process is quite difficult to describe. On the one hand there is the demand of the "Primat der Politik", on the other hand the high military is consulted by politics what options are to be taken into account and what is military operationable. So they have an influence on passing decisions. That is why they have to be taken into account.

2.3. General Definitions

The second problem was to clarify what we are talking about when trying to analyse individual and group benefits. First is to know what a benefit can be, and second to bring it into an individual preference order. Only the preference order explains why groups differ and why they try to bargain amongst each other.

The idea of benefit and social preference orders comes from (the economic approach of) rational choice theory which is built on certain restrictive assumptions:

1. All individuals act rationally which means that they maximize their individual benefit.

2. Group decisions do not exist, as every decision results from individual decisions by members of the group.
3. Society tends to maximize not only benefit but also welfare.
4. All relationships in society are to be explained by exchange.

The main problems are to find out which interests an individual has and what individual order of rank different interests form. Interests are seen as "goods" . An individual is more satisfied than before if one of his interests is implemented. The higher the rank of an interest satisfied the more benefit for the individual results: The rational choice theory as an economic approach for political interest seeking is vehemently discussed in other social sciences. The main argument against its application refers to the measurability of political goods: Most goods in economics have a price that serves to determine the individual worth of a good - maybe in relation with the income. Interests in security politics have no directly measurable price. The difficulty to rank abstract security politics aims can only be solved by a combination of methods.

In a first approach the statements and essays of members of the decision elite give a first more or less intuitive frame for the following analysis. This frame will be put in concrete form by qualitative and quantitative examination of official statements of government members and a check of official defence journals. The aim is to find out the perceptible threshold of the individual wishfulness of different options of Bundeswehr action.

2.4. Special Definitions

1. The decision elite in the field of security policy is a small circle of politicians and military experts standing at the top of defence administration. Four different classes of interest seekers can be identified:
 - i. The chancellor (in the period considered: Dr. Helmut Kohl, CDU) and his advisory state ministers, as holder of the guiding rules competence (Richtlinienkompetenz) for all German politics.
 - ii. The minister of defence (in the period considered the most influential: Volker R  he, CDU) and his advisors who care for the field of defence policy and the members of Bundeswehr.
 - iii. The minister of foreign affairs (in the period considered Dr. Dietrich Genscher and Dr. Klaus Kinkel) and their advisors who are responsible for all diplomatic affairs These ministers are members of the small liberal party (FDP) with gentscherian tradition in diplomacy.
 - iv. Military experts from the top of the ministry of defence - especially the general staff that is consulted by the political top of the defence ministry and all experts who are allowed to perform a position about out-of-area action in official journals of the defence ministry (cf. Soldat und Technik, Europ  ische Wehrkunde, Truppenpraxis/Wehrausbildung, Informationen f  r die Truppe).
2. Every group of the security policy elite I have identified has an internally relatively

homogeneous idea of the tasks the Bundeswehr should master after 1990. These ideas are caused by their goal of maximising their individual (and group) benefit/interest. These groups differ more or less regarding the quality and quantity of accepting military means to attain maximum benefit/satisfying interests.

3. Behind the different ideas of the tasks the Bundeswehr should fulfil, there exist different hidden images about Germany as a major player in world politics. A characteristic hint is the formula "grown international responsibility of Germany" that is used by all members of the decision elite with extremely varying connotations.

If the groups have different images about Germany's role in international politics it follows that they prefer different strategies, or hidden agendas, to fulfil this role. These strategies grant military instruments a bigger or smaller role.

The hidden agendas cause the bargaining between the groups. In every case of out-of-area action the positions of appropriate means in foreign policy border on each other. The strongest interest determines the chosen direction and instruments.^[8] This means that exactly that interest group carries through its position who has the biggest promised benefit of a special foreign policy formation.

The bargaining mechanisms differ because the promised win and loss for all elite groups varies. The hidden patterns of a decision to send the Bundeswehr out of area are in default of a tradition deciding to operate out of area in evaluation.

3. Changing the frame

3.1. Political Changes

The breakdown of the socialist countries in eastern Europe in 1989/90 marked the end of the Cold War. This changed Europe's whole political and security landscape. The socialist block dissolved and its members became independent reform states who are on the way to transform their political, economic and social life to become western-type societies.

For that reason the system antagonism of East and West has vanished. New problems determine the security arena.

Social transformation and new political orientation cause instabilities and unreliabilities in the transformation countries. A "Europe of democratic states founded on the rule of law"^[9] constituting a new order of peace is still far away.

The main difficulty of transformation is to change a highly regulated political and economic system with the help of weak institutions. The rearrangement of social life has to be worked out with institutions rearranging themselves. This causes "tight reserves of legitimacy"^[10] for the transformation governments. The atmosphere in transformation countries can be described as a fundamental change by weak and changeable institutions accompanied by uprooting of social structures and generating both apathetic and also protesting political collective consciousness.^[11]

The dissolution of the COMECON destroyed the economic area in eastern Europe. The transformation states are looking for integration in world trade organisation as in European organisations. This requires the European Union to react and find new organisational forms for Europe.

The optimistic vision of a collective security system of equal European states is not yet reached. The asymmetry of political, economic and social life divides the continent. The situation after seven years - especially in the CIS - nurtures pessimistic judgements who foresaw the softening of NATO, the upraise of Germany to the European hegemonial power, instable constellations in eastern Europe and the flaring up of nationalism leading to smaller conflicts in the area of former socialist countries.

The fear of a German hegemonial policy result from the German unification in 1990. The first free election of the Volkskammer on March 18th 1990 ended with the success of the conservative "Allianz für Deutschland" of DA, DSU and CDU (48.1 p.c.) and gave the signal for the political and economic unification of both German states.[\[12\]](#)

Two facts caused the foreign policy questions to concern not only the German states but also the four allies:

1. The Paris treaties of October 23 1954 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the western allies spoke explicitly of the "rights and responsibilities of the four allies concerning Germany as a whole including the reunification and a peace treaty" .
2. In geostrategic perspective the German unification meant a change of European structures of power and influence in the eyes of all allies. It was followed up by a change of the own position. For the USSR giving up the GDR - after Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland - was equal to loosing the most important corner pillar of its hegemony over eastern Europe. The French President François Mitterand acknowledged German unification in the end of 1989 as a legal and political impossibility. His historical experience and his attitude to power politics produced the image of a German power, leaning on population and economic potential and developing hegemonial dynamics endangering order and peace in Europe. The British doubts were directed against the balance of powers and the heavy weight of Germany in EU. The USA supported the unification but wanted to harmonize it with the US-soviet talks about a new security order. The US condition was to fulfil unification in western structures - meaning NATO and EU/EC.[\[13\]](#)

The 2+4 talks and their result, the "Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland" (VaRbD) fixed international aspects of german unification by law, especially the German-polish relations and the German-USSR relations. With the acknowledgement of Oder-Neisse-Grenze in the Görlitz treaty of GDR of 1950 and Warsaw treaty of GFR of 1970, it got fixed in international law.[\[14\]](#) The USSR agreed to withdraw from the area of former GDR. In addition the USSR conceded the membership of unified Germany in NATO. The 2+4 talks also resulted in the permission by the USSR to deploy units of the Bundeswehr in the area of former GDR. So the USSR lost any influence in all former WTO states of eastern Europe.

The allies abandoned their whole rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole

by signing the 2+4 treaty (VaRbD)[15] and declare "the unified Germany therefore has full sovereignty concerning its domestic and foreign affairs"[16] from the deployment of the last ratification document by the USSR on March 3, 1991.

3.2. Strategic Changes

The signing of CSE treaty in Paris on November 19 1990 fixed the conventional armament in East and West at highest levels. The construction of CSE treaty conditions that the main reduction burden of conventional forces in Europe have to be done on NATO side by the unified Germany and on eastern side by the USSR.[17] "Thus the western military alliance becomes the most powerful in Europe. ... NATO will have to let itself ask for what purpose it needs so much." [18]

2+4 and CSC Treaty are the core elements of the following security developments in Europe. The USSR has now no military presence beyond its own borders. The CSC treaty is constructed on block structures and dissolves them by its requirements. The dissolution of WTO in July 1991 was the visible and formal sign of the fundamental change in European security structures.

NATO had lost its old enemy de facto and de jure. The search for sense of the still alive alliance had begun summer 1990. The London declaration of heads of governments and states of NATO on July 6 1990 was a first document of a new era of alliance.[19]

Any concept of collective security with a central role of CSCE and a less important role of NATO was outdated by the political development of 1990/91 and the second Gulf War. NATO and its leader USA manifested with "desert storm" its right to exist in international security system and in front of the members.

The official reason for remaining of the alliance was emphasised by the secretary general Manfred Wörner in 1991 as follows:

1. NATO had always been more than a pure defence alliance, but rather a community based on shared values of like-minded states enjoying equal rights which also has contributed internally to the reconciliation of former enemies.
2. After the ending of the threat by a soviet surprising attack new security risks arose from the instabilities inside the Soviet Union, in the transformation states of Eastern Europe and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in countries of the third world.
3. NATO was motor of future changes because of its will to cooperate with the Soviet Union and the consideration of its security interests and thus contributed to the building of a future European peace order.[20]

Those new accents in the political area made the new formulation of in the alliance's security concept necessary. The concept until then can be qualified by "defence and détente", as the Harmel report of 1967 said. The following strategic concept was "flexible response" that was introduced in NATO in the same year. It justified the forward defence at the border of both Germanies in Cold War times. After 1990 this was not longer necessary.

On November 7/8 1991 the heads of government and state of NATO members agreed on their

Rome summit about the alliance's new strategic concept. The new concept is founded on the alliances aims to assure all members security and to build a fair and durable peace order. This is the basis for all alliance policy. The new security situation opens the possibility to reach those aims with political instruments and with consideration of the economic, social and ecological dimension.[\[21\]](#)

This means that the alliances security concept is much widened. Political, economic, social and ecological competences were not the cause for the existence of NATO until 1990 because it was (and is) defined as a system of collective defence. The widening of the security concept serves to legitimate the alliance beyond the block confrontation because it opens new possibilities for a traditional alliance trusting on military power.[\[22\]](#)

Now the alliance's strategic concept has a third pillar beside the two pillars defence and détente, called cooperation. The new formula is now: Dialogue, Cooperation and keeping up the collective defence.[\[23\]](#)

But: The military dimension of the alliance that depends on certain principles stays the most important factor to reach any aim.[\[24\]](#) The essential principles of the alliance's military dimension are the same as in the times of Cold War: defensivity, indivisibility of security, presence of the USA in Europe, integrated military structures to assure collective defence and the same mix of weaponry.[\[25\]](#)

The new security situation in Europe demands for reduction and flexibilisation of military power according to the global context;[\[26\]](#) that means to counter arms proliferation and terrorism with military means. Political means are not worked out in the alliances concept. The pillar of dialogue meant the military dialogue to overcome the past by more contact and transparency in military things with former enemies. Other forms of dialogue are not inherent in the alliances concept.[\[27\]](#)

In the field of cooperation not many things are said how to operationalize it. It is just said that the alliance wants to guarantee the aim of cooperation in prevention and solution of crisis.[\[28\]](#)

Beside the vague formulations about the first two more civil pillars the alliances concept is getting very clear when talking about collective defence. Although the political element of security is getting more and more important, the military dimension is the indispensable central element to keep up collective defence.[\[29\]](#) In the field of crisis prevention and solution of crisis, the alliance can select from a diverse range of means. Dialogue and cooperation in crisis management should be worked out by other institutions like EU, WEU, OSCE and UNO.[\[30\]](#)

This short analysis of the alliances strategic concept shows that the alliance is talking about its political dimension but there is no sentence in the concept that says how this dimension should be filled out by concrete action. All concrete statements deal with military possibilities and matters. This makes sense if one takes into account that the principles of the alliance's strategy have not changed.

The tasks of the armed forces confirm this. It is said that the main task of the alliance's armed forces is unchanged to assure security and unscathed territory of the members.[\[31\]](#) The new threats and risks the alliance is confronted with can come from many different directions. This construction of a bow of risks and possible crisis from Islamabad to Rabat opens many possible

tasks for the alliance's military that are really new. General political aims, like stability for Europe, serve as justification for a wider spectrum of military tasks. In peace the alliances armed forces can help building confidence by verification and help in missions of the United Nations. In the crisis case, armed forces have to underline the alliance's endeavour for crisis management. In the improbable case of conflict/war armed forces should be able to reconstruct peace.[\[32\]](#)

This appears to be the new core of the alliance's concept: The flexibilization of the armed forces and the possible risks they have to meet opens to NATO a wider spectrum of rather loosely specified operational possibilities close to or far away from the alliance area. Beside the improbable case of aggression against NATO's territory, this is the new right of existence the alliance has constructed for itself.

Compared with the alliances concept the Weißbuch of German Federal Defence Ministry (BMVg) as the definite new concept how to use German armed forces reasons like foreign politics do. While NATO concentrates on military tasks that stay its most important field of action, the Weißbuch establishes not only Germany's new military but also its new foreign politics.

Beside collective defence in the alliance the Weißbuch defines conflict prevention and crisis management in an enlarged geographical area as future tasks.[\[33\]](#) The new risks are paraphrased with the need to stabilise eastern European states by integration and thereby prevention of return to former confrontative structures in Europe,[\[34\]](#) destabilisation of international environment introducing possible economic and financial risks for Germany, general underdevelopment, neglecting of human rights and the armament of underdeveloped societies.[\[35\]](#)

The Weißbuch makes clear that Germany might be hit by all the enumerated risks and that is the cause for crisis management by cooperation. This kind of policy is called a causality oriented policy on crisis and conflict solving. In this context armed forces can serve as an appropriate instrument to prevent, fence, or finish violence and war.[\[36\]](#)

The conception of new German security and defence policy is deduced from the constitution (Grundgesetz). The Preamble of the Grundgesetz says that the people of Germany give themselves a constitution in consciousness that they are an equal land amongst others in Europe and serve the peace of the world.[\[37\]](#) The central sentence in Weißbuch for all further reflections about security and defence politics interprets this passage of the constitution new: "From the constitution results the obligation to protect and the duty to design in German foreign and security politics."[\[38\]](#) So in the Weißbuch concrete interests of German politics that should be pursued by security politics are deduced from very general values.[\[39\]](#) This new interpretation of the constitution and the full sovereignty since the 2+4 treaty opened the possibility to redefine Germany's role in the world. The full equality of Germany under the world's nations is the basis to get more responsibility and commitment because it is stated that there were expectations of international society to get a more prominent German actor. This is caused by the central role, potential and history Germany has: "Today, Germany's international responsibility has grown, mainly for the security in and for Europe. Great expectations are directed towards Germany because of its central role, its potential and its history."[\[40\]](#)

The five central interests of German foreign and security politics are described as:

- preservation of freedom, security and welfare of the citizens of Germany and the intactness of its territory;
- integration with the European democracies in the European Union;
- permanent transatlantic alliance with the USA as a stabilising world power based on common values and parallel interests;
- introduction of our eastern neighbour states to western structures and design of a new, comprehensive and co-operative collective European security order.
- worldwide respect for international law and human rights and fair world economic order organized on market-economy lines.[\[41\]](#)

The two central functions of German security politics are

- protection against risks and
- active designing of stability and peace.[\[42\]](#)

After enumerating risks and functions of German defence politics the Weißbuch reflects its aims. Beside defence of the own territory, keeping and strengthening of the alliance's defence there are new military and political aims:

Military aims are the strengthening of the NATO and its enlargement by eastern European states and the blow up of the WEU and its eastern enlargement. Political aims are the deepening of European integration including the Union's foreign and security politics, the strengthening of the UNO and OSCE, the designing of co-operative security in OSCE, the extending of interlocking powers, the politics of conflict-prevention-oriented arms control in Europe and the promotion of democratisation, economic and social progress in Europe and worldwide.[\[43\]](#)

It is not clear, though, whether the aim of prevention, fencing and finishing of crises and conflicts that serve the intactness and stability of Germany and the alliance is a political or a military aim.

After having founded the new international role of Germany on the changed environment the Weißbuch takes the so constructed heavier burden as real and draws conclusions on role, task, structure and armament for the future Bundeswehr. The key sentence is here: "The Bundeswehr unchangedly [sic!] must credibly fulfil its purpose as instrument of foreign and security politics."[\[44\]](#)

Because the Weißbuch defines the Bundeswehr as an instrument of foreign and security politics it is an instrument to hold international influence in different institutions and organisations as NATO, WEU, OSCE and UNO. That means also that it has to meet all possible risks the NATO sees itself confronted with. The Bundeswehr serves also in the dialogue with eastern Europe. The Bundeswehr does not exclude certain tasks in the UN framework that can be humanitarian help in catastrophe and crisis regions, peace keeping, robust peace keeping and peace building.[\[45\]](#)

The analysis of the Weißbuch makes clear that the tasks of the Bundeswehr result from the aim of keeping an intact territory as well as to fulfil the necessities of security interests of Germany.

If both tasks meant the same it would not be necessary to enumerate both of them. It seems that here two different things are meant:

With security interests something different seems to be meant than defence of the national territory. This seems to be the core of the enlargement of the national defence policy tasks. If any non-military event is defined as a possible risk for national security interests any kind of military mean is justified to protect or defend national interests.

The definition of security interests in the Weißbuch by the defence policy is the only one findable. No one else has presented something comparable. This is why the defence elite can be identified as the pacemaker in the debate about new German security politics. One can see how far the planning of this group goes if one takes the example of UN-missions by German soldiers. The Weißbuch counts any kind of UN-missions to the Bundeswehr tasks neglecting that there was at the time of publication no consensus about the If, When, How far and based on what kind of decision. It is just said that German parts of UN-missions had to be clarified in the constitution.^[46] But the planning was finished before any political or legal decision about the permission of UN missions of Bundeswehr was made. Existing planning dictates certain decisions because one does not go back behind still finished work.

This is why one can say that the defence elite wrote German foreign politics newly by enumerating that there are security interests beside defending the national territory and planning for cases the constitution until then did not clearly count among the tasks of national defence like UN-missions.

3.3. A simple supply and demand model

As I have lined out before the military's reaction to changing political and strategical frames was a very fast one. The extension of military tasking is a good indicator for this thesis. The political decision elite reacted much more slowly and was not as certain in saying what it wanted. Until now there is no competing concept of German foreign and security politics to the Weißbuch. But politicians mostly know what they do not want. That is why their role is not neglectable. Their function is to obstruct the much too fast planning of the military.

In the following paragraph a simple model of how security tasks are generated will be developed.

The application of economic thinking is obvious because national security is an typical public good. Public goods are not rivalling, not assignable and not rejectable by the consumers. That means that all Germans have to accept the same quantity and quality of security. Especially national security is a very tightly policy arena. Other public goods like health, traffic etc. are more easily influenced by people. The public interest in security is rather small and causes no examination of the produced good security as long as certain fundamental security functions are provided. That generates a very elitist policy area where a small number of specialist actors are playing under exclusion of most other political actors and the electing people.

The produced public good security is determined by negotiations between military and security politicians in government. The military can be defined as the supplier of security and the government as the demander for security. Government can here not be described as producer but as broker who selects the best options and supplies in turn to the public.

Because there is just one producer one can characterize it as monopoly. On the other side there is just one demander if we aggregate the government as one actor; it follows that we have a monopson on the demand side.

The monopoly-monopson-constellation leads to a very simple exchange model that could explain how the framework influences the supply and demand of the public good security.

Between 1956 and 1989 the consensus between the two groups can be paraphrased as follows: The supply consisted of national and alliance defence (which were identical for Germany in the East-West-confrontation scheme). The demanded quantity and quality of military power was as high as the supply and produced a stable equilibrium.

The socialist breakdown and change of the whole security landscape in Europe made it necessary to innovate all exchange relations between military and government. A complete innovation and new formulation of security politics became necessary. It was not possible to fall back on any routine.

Here, as elaborated previously the changed framework of international and national, political and strategic factors plays an important role. This allows to deduce what and why military supply as political demand has changed.

The supply side: Military elite

Membership in NATO and UN determine the *direction* German security policy took. The US-concept of a "new world order" that should be established by the authority of the UN as well as the struggle of NATO to construct a new legitimating bow of risks and crises are the most important international conceptional and strategical impulses.

The *special way* German defence policy took depended on the personal taste of the military leaders. Conceptionally, the military planned faster than the politics and the Supreme Court (BVerfG) could decide and thereby structured so the accents in using armed forces out of area. Practically the military went by government's decision out of area (Gulf, Adria, Awacs, Cambodia, Somalia) and marked by this way certain points one could not go behind. This was forming for the following policy.

The supply side is confronted with fundamental change and uses this change to influence the demand side in its own sense by prescribing certain decisions.

The Bundeswehr is expected to be able to meet very different risks though restricted by personnel reduction to 370000 men. Beside the improbable need to defend the national territory there are many other tasks to meet resulting from of the alliance's and the national security interests: prevention of proliferation, keeping up important resource supply lines, countering terror and sabotage.[\[47\]](#)

For the military strategy, it follows that there are on the one hand slowly upgrowing armed forces for national defence and on the other hand highly flexible very fast mobilizable "rapid reaction forces" who are able to meet smaller suddenly arising instabilities. The inner legitimation pressure generates further ideas of fields military could be helpful. These are deduced from the fact that Germany is embedded in international institutions. Here all kinds of

UN-missions play an important role. Peace keeping, peace enforcement and collective defence were fixed in the deployment options catalogue of the Bundeswehr by the chief of staff.

Meanwhile peace keeping and peace enforcement both follow a certain procedure, the collective defence of Art. 51 UN Charta means in fact cases the military acting states themselves define that there is a cause to intervene or defend.

The most prominent argument for all these kinds of UN-action is that they defend freedom and democracy in all regions of the world.

Another legitimated argument is the Bundeswehr's contribution to the protection of the environment by monitoring pollution (in the Baltic Sea) on the occasion of manoeuvres (of the Bundesmarine).

The analysis until now gives a diverse range of supplied military action:

1. defence of the national territory;
2. collective alliance defence:
 - i. military precautions for maintenance of existence;
 - ii. verification;
 - iii. countering terror and sabotage;
 - iv. combating crime;
 - v. proliferation control/prevention of proliferation;
 - vi. keeping up important resource supply lines;
3. UN-blue-helmet-action:
 - i. peace keeping;
 - ii. developmental aid;
 - iii. humanitarian services;
 - iv. medical services;
4. peace enforcement;
5. collective defence:
 - i. punishment of an aggression;
 - ii. assure resource supply;
 - iii. acting in the own interests;
6. ecological/reconnaissance services.

The demand side: politicians

On the other side stands the political elite demanding for certain military services. Like on the supply side inner and international framework has to be taken into account. NATO- and UN-membership are also determinants for demand with a strong influence. But the constitutional restrictions lead to a demand differing from the supply. The real implemented military action over the alliance's territory and tasks concentrated more on a symbolic than a senseful German engagement.

Politics also asks for services that have no link to strategic concepts. Border protection as in Germany asked of Bundeswehr has only indirect relation to any strategic demand. Maybe it is the result of the immigration pressure.

The demanded scale of military services is much more smaller than the supply:

1. defence of the national territory;
2. collective alliance defence:
 - i. military precautions for maintenance of existence;
 - ii. verification;
 - iii. defending terror and sabotage;
 - iv. combating crime;
 - v. proliferation control/prevention of proliferation;
 - vi. keeping up important resource supply lines;
3. UN-blue-helmet-action:
 - i. peace keeping;
 - ii. development aid;
 - iii. humanitarian services;
 - iv. medical services;
4. border protection.

Facit:

From this simple model it is recognisable that both sides - demand and supply - define military tasks much larger than before 1989. So the military tasks are enlarged in two ways: First, the reasons to use military means because security interests are interpretable at will and second that former civil service's tasks were added to those of military.

4. Preferences and benefit functions of the

arena actors

4.1. The Chancellor

The role of the Chancellor is shaped by his work of German unification and his own conception of himself as statesman.

He talked first about the "grown responsibility of unified Germany" in 1991. If one took this word serious, Germany have to share the burden of international security and peace. Very early he rejected minimal solutions as only peace keeping by blue helmets of the Bundeswehr and favoured a participation in all military actions Chapter VII of UN Charta knows as well as measures in the context of a European security order.[\[48\]](#)

When the discussion about constitutional possibility of such military action came up, he said in November 1992 that a simple law would suffice to clear any doubt and that no change of the constitution was necessary.[\[49\]](#)

But he is a sensitive actor when concrete actions are discussed. In domestic affairs he is responsible for the consensus in government, internationally his main concern is the reputation of Germany in the alliance, the EC/EU and the united Nations.

In the government coalition he plays the role of a mediator between hawks (of the right wing CDU/CSU) and the doves (of the small liberal party). This way he can keep his power and delegate the more unpleasant duties to the two always battling ministers of foreign affairs and defence. He changes the coalition between those two depending what position serves the international reputation.

For example, the Chancellor acted very carefully when the minister of defence went ahead with enlargement of NATO and peace enforcing by out of area action of the Bundeswehr. During the visit of the general secretary of UNO who wanted to get more help of Germany Kohl stated that one had to take into account that Germany was the third biggest payer in the UNO and there was some discussion about the constitutional permissions of military out of area action.[\[50\]](#)

He tried to brake the R uhe initiative of NATO enlargement because he did not want to compromise the allies and the eastern European states that would not be taken into account in enlargement - especially Russia.[\[51\]](#) This shows the historical perspective the chancellor always takes up. He is grateful for the conditions of German unification Russia made possible and wants to keep the line of Westbindung that was one cause for the strength FRG developed after Second World War.

The chancellors orientation is not a militaristic one. The decision of the defence minister to reduce the number of Bundeswehr soldiers below 370000 in the beginning of 1993 was welcomed by him.[\[52\]](#)

The waiting position about out of area action by the Bundeswehr is caused in the care for international reputation that he was not willing to risk by, for example, a fast withdrawal from

Somalia. He held the position together with the minister of foreign affairs, that the UNO wanted to keep Germans there against his defence minister who wanted to withdraw Bundeswehr as fast as the US-troops.[\[53\]](#)

In the end the main attitudes of the chancellor that represent his interests can be emphasized as follows:

1. Keeping his power in government by mediating the interests of the ministers from different resorts (defence and foreign affairs) and different parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) as well as those of the different parliamentary factions that support government.
2. Finding a new position for Germany in European politics concerning old and new friends interests. This means to take Russian reservations into account while building a new European security order and not to alienate the western allies by a special German way.
3. Becoming a more influential member of the UNO by being a reliable payer and sharing more burden of any kind of intervention the UN-regime provides for.

4.2. The Minister of Foreign affairs

In the examined period two ministers of the small liberal party, holding government together with the bigger conservative parties, were in this office: Genscher held the office 18 years until May 1992. He was followed by Kinkel who is a kind of his scholar.

While Genscher put CSCE in the center of his reflections about Germany's role for peace and security,[\[54\]](#) Kinkel has a more global view.[\[55\]](#)

His attitude is unique in the context of new German security politics. His extremely civilian position convinced him that a military engagement of Bundeswehr to assure international security through UNO was only possible if the constitution was changed.

In this subject he preferred a consensual acting of all parliamentary factions as showed by his invitation in the end of 1992 to all heads of faction in the Bundestag and to the Ministers of defence, interior and justice.[\[56\]](#)

Two months before Kinkel had said for the first time that Germany wanted to become permanent member of the UN's security council.[\[57\]](#) When the UN general secretary visited Germany, Kinkel's problem was that he wanted to give the right signs to the general secretary under the restriction that there was first a change of constitution needed. That is why his statements in the beginning of 1993 laid a heavy emphasis on Germany's financial role in the UNO and the possibility to serve in any way except fighting.[\[58\]](#)

Kinkel's global view includes also assuring Germany's economic role in the world. As an export dependent nation that has no bigger reserves of raw materials Germany had to strengthen its position in the world economy. This means for him playing all instruments of dialogue, economic help, development aid and building relations.[\[59\]](#)

He has no hurry to enlarge the NATO or EC/EU by eastern European countries because the development of Russian politics seemed unclear. So he preferred a stepwise approach of

transformation countries to the West^[60] that should be decided by the alliance and the EU as a whole.^[61]

All those statements follow Kinkel's image of the military as the very last instrument to use. Every thought reflects to this attitude. Kinkel offered the general secretary of the UNO specialists to strengthen the department of peace keeping and stressed the political and financial performance Germany could give in the UN again and again.^[62]

The military seems to be just one means amongst others to obtain the desired political result. The government's decision to send German soldiers with Awacs surprised him on a New Zealand-Asia-tour but he saw no cause to return and represent his own party's opposite attitude.^[63]

It seems to be a mix of resignation and coincident interests that Kinkel gave up his strict opinion about military engagement only in an all-faction-constitution-change-consensus. He realized that it was not possible to reach any consensus with the SPD-opposition on the one hand. On the other hand he declared that the decided Bundeswehr engagement was not a military but a humanitarian one, as one can see on his statements to the Bundeswehr in Somalia.^[64]

All statements allow the conclusion that the main aims of the ministers of foreign affairs are to assure Germany's diplomatic position and can be paraphrased as follows:

1. Germany's first interest in international relations is to play a major role in the world economy.
2. Foreign and security politics should use a scale of means beginning with financial aid going to political mediation. The military is the last mean that should be handled careful and in consensus with the major political powers in parliament.
3. Because Germany's economic and political weight in Europe and the world is so heavy it should become permanent member of the UN security council.
4. If there is no other possibility to get reputation in the UNO then military can be sent to assist UN-peace enforcing troops. It can be necessary to do this against the opinion of parliamentary parties because the global influence is more important than an internationally incomprehensible German debate about its constitution.

4.3. The Minister of Defence

In the time between 1990 and 1994 the most and the strongest impulses came from the 1992 introduced minister of defence R  he. His attitude to new German security politics is determined by his plans as politician. His career plans do not end on the seat of a minister. In October 1992 he tried to become a vice-president of the big governing conservative party (CDU) - and failed. He used the position at the top of defence ministry to develop a sharp personal profile.

In the field of out of area engagement he first was on a similar position than the SPD-opposition and preferred a constitutional change. But if this was not possible than the government had to design a "Entsendegesetz" (dispatchment law) that gave a clear legal basis for all military engagement, peace keeping or peace enforcement.^[65] That shows very exemplary that he wanted two things: to care for the soldiers whose commander in peace he is and to develop an

own distinctive position in his own party.

The care for his portfolio lead him to quarrel with the minister of finance who had cut his budget and to reconsider the planning for the Bundeswehr's structure and compulsory military service.[66] He defended the Bundeswehr soldiers against an attack by the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces (Wehrbeauftragte) of the Bundestag who reported to the parliament that the Bundeswehr was not fit to fight at the beginning of 1993.[67] At the same time he enforced the Awacs engagement of Bundeswehr soldiers and declared that going to Somalia was very important for the German reputation in the UN. In contrast to the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces Rühle stated that German soldiers of the Bundeswehr had very good knowledge about Africa and were able to meet all requirements.[68]

After a very short engagement, it became clear that Somalia was not the right place to legitimate the widened tasks of the Bundeswehr and to show the ability of the soldiers. Rühle interpreted the shots on Pakistani soldiers in July 1993 not as a first sign to withdraw Bundeswehr, and said the German engagement was now of the same importance as before.[69]

But in fact he concentrated on other subjects and areas of military engagement. In September 1993 he started his lonely initiative for NATO's eastern enlargement. He reasoned about German vital interest not to become a western European border state. So he stressed any possibility to integrate eastern military units in manoeuvres and asked the inspector general (Generalinspekteur) to work out a study about chances and possibilities of cooperation.[70]

In the same month he published his central ideas about Germany's security politics. He made clear that his main point is that Europe and NATO should stay a military factor in the world and Germany should be their important member. He conceded that it was important to meet despots, gangs and terror to help people in the world. But he lined out that the main responsibility for Germany lies in Europe.[71]

One month later he clarified what he meant by starting an initiative to withdraw German soldiers from Somalia. The Chancellor and the Minister of foreign affairs did not accord with him. But in the end he reached the decision - maybe by convincing the members of the defence committee of the German Bundestag - of a fast withdrawal at the end of March 1994.[72]

This can be seen as a typical attitude for Rühle. As far as the NATO allies were no longer present in Somalia the Bundeswehr was no longer able to present itself as a good ally. In August, Rühle explained very clearly what he meant by commenting on the judgement of the Supreme Court about the constitutional permission of Bundeswehr's out of area action: "For me, it is not crucial whether we contribute humanitarily to this or that mission in the third world. One can say yes or no to that. Crucial for German politics is that we do not opt out when NATO or WEU decide to carry out missions on behalf of the United Nations. ... Therefore let me finally address the soldiers. Karlsruhe [the German Supreme Court] is no marching order for world-wide missions, as it is always claimed, but it is decided responsibly in every single case. Our main responsibility lies in Europe and its nearer surroundings." [73]

So the central aims and motivating interests of the Minister of defence can be enumerated:

1. The military presence of Germany in Europe is the main task of German security politics. The geopolitical perspective shows that Germany lies in the center of a still parted

Europe and is in danger to become a western "border state" ("Randstaat"). That is why it has to enlarge the western security alliances where it is member by any means.

2. One has to care for the Bundeswehr and its soldiers. That means to show what they are able to do and to deduce of their high competence that they need lots of money to keep this level and to meet future. So they have to be further qualified and equipped optimally. On the other hand it means that there must be a stable legal ground if soldiers are sent far away in any crisis region.
3. Any kind of worldwide action instructed by UNO is not as important as keeping up integrated action by NATO and WEU. If the western alliances engage in UNO's duty worldwide Germany has to be on board; a non-integrated out of area action is not feasible.

4.3. The Military Top

The military top can be described as a perfect homogenous and egoistic group. Following the theory of bureaucracy the military top is busy to care for itself under changing conditions as we find after 1990. Two main motives can be noticed: First, how to get a maximum military capability with the actual personnel and technical equipment; and second how to get the fees and soldiers to carry out the extended and new legitimating duties of new German security politics as described in the VPR and the Weißbuch.

Reminding an episode of the Somalia engagement makes clear what the military's attitude is. When Colin Powell asked the Bundeswehr in December 1992 to send him signal corps and sappers they denied because they said it was not clear what the governments attitude to out of area action was.^[74] But Powell's question provoked an investigation of the Bundeswehr about the present military capabilities and possibilities. The investigation gave that the Bundeswehr's capabilities would allow to fulfil any UNO mission in Europe including the cold areas. Any engagement in tropic or subtropic areas would require additional funds to buy new equipment.^[75]

This explains the sharp position of the inspector general (Generalinspekteur) who saw in the beginning of 1993 that the defence budget would not cope with more cuts.^[76]

On the other side there was the need to extend the Bundeswehr tasks that lead to the described problem of buying new equipment. First the extended tasks fulfilling the rules set by the UN in UNO or NATO missions were a welcome legitimating argument to keep the quantity of troops up. That's why the military accused the political debate about the possibility of out of area engagement of the Bundeswehr. They argued that there grew doubt about Germany's reliability and credibility in the alliance. The political declarations were not filled by a parallel acting. That meant that only national defence was not enough task for the Bundeswehr, rather meant national defence unwishful re-nationalisation of the German security politics.^[77]

In this perspective the Somalia engagement was a good occasion for the military top to show their belonging to the western alliance (as long as other allies were in Somalia, too), to test their capabilities under desert conditions and to give a good public relation performance to recruit more volunteer soldiers. Facing diminishing numbers of volunteers the Ministry of defence was interested to recruit volunteers by a image lifting Somalia mission of the Bundeswehr. This

served the public legitimacy and justifies the military's demand not to cut the defence budget. The vehement will to oppose the governments financial plans is expressed by the Generalinspekteur's blackmail of October 1993: He threatened not to fulfil the Chancellors duty of Bundeswehr development if there was not possible to assure a minimum of 30 percent of the whole defence budget for investment.[\[78\]](#)

On the other hand more volunteers correspond with the plans of a broader spectrum of tasks for the Bundeswehr that is also expressed in the image of a "new soldier" for the Bundeswehr. Like the inspector general (Generalinspekteur) demanded on the 34th conference of the Bundeswehr commanders the new soldier should show innere Führung, combat training and the willingness to fulfil any mission out of Germany.[\[79\]](#)

In sum, the interests of the military top can be deduced by its main interest of self preservation:

1. Self preservation by finding new tasks in out of area missions, especially in the closer European area that meets the capabilities the Bundeswehr equipment is able to.
2. Self preservation by recruitment of volunteers to tighten the military character - in accordance to the allies - of the service and to legitimate existence in front of the public opinion.
3. Self preservation by maintenance of federal funds and preservation of further cuts of the peace dividend seeking government.

5. Conclusion

As the example of the Somalia engagement of the Bundeswehr shows, all groups of German defence elite had a certain interest in sending troops there:

The minister of foreign affairs wanted to underline the German interest in a permanent security seat . The chancellor wanted to keep the promises he made the international community. The minister of defence wanted to demonstrate that the Bundeswehr is able to meet out of area risks; this was for him also a good accident to show the need of the institution Bundeswehr and to assure the federal funds. Finally the top of the military were able to present Bundeswehr to the public and to assure future recruitment of volunteers. On the other side a popular image was promising to get more money to meet the scale of risks they have designed themselves. The military top was in Somalia justifying its own existence.

The economic analysis of newer German security and defence policy confirms the first intuitive assumption:

The organization with the most vital interest dominates the decision situation. In our situation we find that all groups have a more or less big interest in sending Bundeswehr to Somalia. Nevertheless the motivation is very varying they meet at the point that the Somalia mission is anyway good.

This new empirically proved result could be the basis for a new theory of German foreign and security politics and allows to resolve strange conspirational "theories" by more empirically

founded thoughts.

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Footnotes:

[1] Mutz 1993 a: 36 ff. shows the differences in this point.

[2] Wette 1993.

[3] Wette 1993: 24.

[4] See for example: Bernd/Rud 1996, Grabert 1996 and Schäfer 1996.

[5] It is very interesting that the approach is exercised in fields that have more or less a

subordinate relevance for conflicts in society; see here: Kunz 1996 and Kunz 1997.

[6] It is astonishing that none of the recent German introductions into international relations esteems it worth to introduce in actor oriented or rational concepts. See: Albrecht 1986; Behrens 19984; Czempiel 19981; Frei 1977, Haftendorn 1975; Hütter 1976; Knapp 1991; Krippendorff 1986; Noack 1977; Pfetsch 1993; Röhrich 1976; Senghaas 1991; Wassmund 1982.

[7] A nowadays classical view gives Downs 19968.

[8] This statement is proved by Olson's (1968) "theory of groups" that explains the exploration of the stronger interests by the weaker ones.

[9] Senghaas 1990: 19 ff.

[10] Kreile 1991: 171.

[11] Kreile 1991: 171.

[12] Görtemaker 1996: 35.

[13] Görtemaker 1996a: 36 f.

[14] There was never a western or eastern German will to get back any other eastern areas. But the 2+4 Treaty fixes this political will because the final regulation was reserved for a peace treaty or an equivalent.

[15] Art. 7 I VaRbD.

[16] Art. 7 II VaRbD ("Das vereinigte Deutschland hat demgemäß volle Souveränität über seine inneren und äußeren Angelegenheiten.").

[17] PIB 1990.

[18] Zellner 1991: 71 f. ("Damit wird das westliche Militärbündnis zum stärksten Europas ... die NATO wird sich fragen lassen müssen, wozu sie so viel braucht.")

[19] The declaration lines out that the NATO will assimilate to the new structures in Europe that are no longer marked by antagonism and division of the eastern and western parts of the continent. Security depended on the neighbour's security and the keeping of defensive strategy show the direction NATO should develop in the next years (London declaration 1990).

[20] Wörner 1991. (1. Die NATO sei schon immer mehr als ein reines Verteidigungsbündnis gewesen, sondern vielmehr eine Wertegemeinschaft gleichgesinnter und gleichberechtigter Staaten, die auch im inneren zur Versöhnung ehemaliger Feinde unter ihrem Dach beigetragen habe (F-D). 2. Nach dem Wegfall der Bedrohung durch einen sowjetischen Überraschungsangriff ergäben sich neue Sicherheitsrisiken aus den Instabilitäten innerhalb der Sowjetunion, in den Transformationsstaaten Osteuropas und der Aufrüstung mit Massenvernichtungswaffen in Ländern der Dritten Welt. 3. Die NATO sei Motor künftiger Veränderungen wegen ihres Willens zur Zusammenarbeit mit der Sowjetunion und der Berücksichtigung deren Sicherheitsinteressen und diene so dem Aufbau einer künftigen europäischen Friedensordnung.)

[21] NATO 1993: 70.

[22] That kind of security concept was until 1991 only known from discussions of peace researchers like Galtung.

[23] The alliance's strategic concept, III, 25.

[24] NATO 1993: 71.

[25] NATO 1993: 72.

[26] NATO 1993: 73.

[27] The alliance's strategic concept, III, 29.

[28] The alliance's strategic concept, III, 30.

[29] The alliance's strategic concept, III, 31.

[30] The alliance's strategic concept, III, 34.

[31] The alliance's strategic concept, IV, 41.

[32] The alliance's strategic concept, IV, 42 ff.

[33] BMVg 1994: 39.

[34] BMVg 1994: 30 f.

[35] BMVg 1994: 32 ff.

[36] BMVg 1994: 39 says: Im Rahmen dieser Politik " ... kann auch der Einsatz militärischer Mittel erforderlich werden, um Gewalt oder Krieg zu verhindern, einzugrenzen oder zu beenden."

[37] Präambel GG.

[38] BMVg 1994: 41 ("Aus dem Grundgesetz ergibt sich die Schutzverpflichtung und die Gestaltungsaufgabe deutscher Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik.").

[39] BMVg 1994: 42.

[40] BMVG 1994: 42 ("Heute ist Deutschlands internationale Verantwortung gewachsen, vor allem für die Sicherheit in und für Europa. An Deutschland richten sich wegen seiner zentralen Rolle, seines Potentials und seiner Geschichte große Erwartungen.").

[41] BMVG 1994: 42 ("Bewahrung von Freiheit, Sicherheit und Wohlfahrt der Bürger Deutschlands und der Unversehrtheit seines Staatsgebietes; Integration mit den europäischen Demokratien in der Europäischen Union; dauerhaftes, auf Wertegemeinschaft und gleichgerichtete Interessen gegründetes transatlantisches Bündnis mit den USA als stabilisierender Weltmacht; Heranführung unserer östlichen Nachbarstaaten an westliche Strukturen und Gestaltung einer neuen, umfassenden und kooperativen gesamteuropäischen

Sicherheitsordnung; weltweite Achtung des Völkerrechts und der Menschenrechte und marktwirtschaftlich organisierte gerechte Weltwirtschaftsordnung.").

[42] BMVG 1994: 43. In original: "Schutz vor Risiken und Gefahren sowie die aktive Gestaltung von Stabilität und Frieden" .

[43] BMVg 1994: 44 f.

[44] BMVg 1994: 88 ("Die Bundeswehr muß unverändert (sic!) ihren Zweck als Instrument der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik glaubwürdig erfüllen.").

[45] BMVg 1994: 89. In the original text the tasks in the UN system are numbered as follows: Aufgaben im Rahmen der UN-Charta, die "... von der humanitären Hilfe in Katastrophen- und Konfliktgebieten über die Beteiligung an Einsätzen der Friedenssicherung bis hin zum Einsatz in der internationalen Krisenbewältigung reichen." (Tasks within the bounds of the UN charta "reaching from humanitarian aid in areas of catastrophes and conflict to the participation in missions of peace keeping up to missions in international crisis reaction.")

[46] BMVG 1994: 89.

[47] The alliances strategic concept, 1993, I, 13: "Sicherheitsinteressen des Bündnisses können von anderen Risiken berührt werden, einschließlich der Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen, der Zufuhr lebenswichtiger Ressourcen sowie von Terror- und Sabotageakten" .

[48] Der Spiegel 17/93: 20.

[49] FAZ 23/11/92: 1.

[50] FAZ 12/01/93: 1 f.

[51] FAZ 07/09/93: 2.

[52] FAZ 08/02/93: 1.

[53] Der Spiegel 24/93: 33; FAZ 07/09/93: 2, 19/10/93: 1, 21/10/93: 1, 28/10/93: 1.

[54] Genscher 1991 and Genscher 1992.

[55] Kinkel 1992.

[56] FAZ 23/11/92: 2.

[57] FAZ 25/10/92.

[58] FAZ 12/01/93: 1 f.

[59] FAZ 19/03/93: 9.

[60] FAZ 28/09/93: 3.

[61] Kinkel 1994.

[62] FAZ 30/09/93: 1 f.

[63] FAZ 02/04/93: 2.

[64] There he argued that no problems did exist because the German soldiers just had to transport the aid for people and the goods they need for themselves, FAZ 21/04/93: 1 f.

[65] FAZ 22/11/92: 1.

[66] FAZ 04/02/93: 1.

[67] FAZ 15/03/93: 3.

[68] FAZ 21/04/93: 2.

[69] Der Spiegel 24/93: 33.

[70] FAZ 08/09/93: 2.

[71] FAZ 10/09/93: 12.

[72] FAZ 19/10/93: 1 f., 28/10/93: 1., 13/11/93: 2, 16/11/93: 2.

[73] Das Parlament, Nr. 31, 05/08/94: 4 f. ("Für mich ist nicht entscheidend, ob wir uns an diesem oder jenem Einsatz in der Dritten Welt humanitär beteiligen. Dazu kann man ja oder nein sagen. Entscheidend für die deutsche Politik ist, daß wir nicht aussteigen, wenn NATO oder WEU beschließen, im Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen Missionen durchzuführen. ... Lassen Sie mich deswegen zum Schluß, noch ein Wort an die Soldaten richten. Karlsruhe ist kein Marschbefehl für weltweite Einsätze, wie das immer behauptet wird, sondern es wird verantwortlich in jedem Einzelfall entschieden. Unsere Hauptverantwortung liegt in Europa und in seinem näheren Umfeld.").

[74] Der Spiegel 51/92.

[75] Der Spiegel 2/93.

[76] Die Zeit 12, 19/03/93: 5.

[77] FAZ 08/03/93; Die Zeit 12, 19/03/93: 5.

[78] FAZ 06/10/93: 2.

[79] FAZ 06/10/93: 2.
