Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. The role of international regimes in promoting democratic institutions: the case of NATO and Russia Sergei Medvedev [Back to Index] Chapter III. Russian Approaches to NATO 1. Anti-Western Nationalist Approach This line of argument, as articulated especially by a number of communist and patriotic parties, including the winner of the last parliamentary elections, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Gennady Zuyganov), the Agrarian Party of Russia, Liberal-Democratic Party (Vladimir Zhirinovsky), and a number of others, implies a radical break with the policies of the last seven years resulting in diplomatic and political confrontation with the West, and probably a military standoff. As to the issue of NATO enlargement, the negative attitude seems to unite an even wider political constituency, from all presidential staff(48) through the executive branch, including most of foreign policy and military establishment (especially since the former chief of External Intelligence Service Yevgeny Primakov was nominated Foreign Minister of Russia in January 1996 and started manning the foreign ministry with his colleagues from the intelligence service(49)), and to the legislature. An instructive example were the Duma hearings on joint Russia-NATO peacekeeping exercises in Totsk near Orenburg in the summer of 1994, when virtually all "democratic" deputies voted for banning them, let alone such cases as NATO air strikes in Bosnia, when anti-NATO parliamentary consensus was unanimous. In general, according to Vyacheslav Nikonov, the Chairman of Subcommittee on International Security and Arms Control in the previous Duma, "in Russia, NATO has the worst image of all influential international organizations".(50) A more or less systematic argumentation against NATO enlargement goes back to the Autumn of 1993, and especially to the so-called "Primakov Report", prepared by the External Intelligence Service headed at the period by Yevgeny Primakov, in which it was clearly stated that NATO enlargement is a threat to Russia's national interests.(51) Not too many new arguments have been introduced into discussion since then. A comprehensive synopsis of the "No" argument (although not belligerent in tone) one can find in the Theses of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) "Russia and NATO".(52) In summary, Russia's objections boil down to two groups of arguments: 1. Geopolitical and strategic arguments: Elimination of the 1500km-wide security buffer consisting of de facto neutral, and, as a rule, weakly armed states which has taken shape in the center of Europe following the demise of the Warsaw Pact, will remove the backbone of military and strategic stability achieved in Europe in the wake of the Cold War.(53) For Russia, the disappearance of this belt will deprive her of a major advantage achieved by her sorting out of the Cold War.(54) As stated by a Russian military analyst in a comment on NATO Enlargement Study, "it is highly probable that NATO's forward defense lines will lie at the border of the Pskov Oblast, and some East European countries might home NATO troops and weapons of mass destruction".(55) NATO expansion might generate a number of serious strategic problems, such as turning the Baltic states and possibly Ukraine into the zone of bitter strategic rivalry. The wish of the Baltic states to join NATO, which will only become stronger if the Alliance extends to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as any discussions and maneuvers around further enlargement, will create a potential hotbed of real crisis in the center of Europe.(56) Developing this "CEE-related argument", a number of analysts state that NATO enlargement is simply the continuation of the eternal German Drang nach Osten,(57) and a contemporary form of German zone of influence in CEE,(58) which runs the risk (both for Russia and the West) of Germany's ambitions and power going unchecked. NATO enlargement will automatically give Russia the status of a potential enemy, since Central and Eastern Europe will be getting security guarantees primarily against Russia.(59) Some in Moscow see NATO enlargement (and in general, the very existence of the Alliance) as the principal check on Russia's rapprochement with Western Europe, first of all with France and Germany, and part of the U.S. design to prevent the fulfillment of "Russia's historical mission in Europe".(60) Much concern is voiced in Russia with respect to NATO's activity in republics of the FSU, obviously in the Western ones, but also in Central Asia (participation in PfP, etc.). Referring this to Western concepts of promoting "multiculturalism" (Brzezinski) and "geopolitical pluralism" in the FSU, many in Moscow fear that NATO's goal is to create a cordon sanitaire along the perimeter of Russia's borders: not only in Europe, but in Central Asia as well.(61) Another argument goes on to say that these countries' individual partnership with NATO will prevent the development of military and other forms of re-integration within the CIS, thus threatening Russia's interests in the "near abroad".(62) Finally, according to opponents of enlargement, decision on NATO expansion might undermine the geopolitical, as well as conceptual basis of most arms limitation regimes,(63) starting from the CFE Treaty to INF, START, ABM, chemical and biological weapons treaties (see below); in fact, the entire international network of arms control agreements, carefully designed for the last three decades, might unravel. 2. Another group of arguments, mainly resulting from these geostrategic considerations, deal with Russian domestic consequences of NATO enlargement: NATO enlargement will compel the Russian leadership to re-evaluate external threats, taking into account the capacities of an enlarged NATO; NATO enlargement might radically undermine (already weak) Russia's confidence in policies of the West, since this development will contravene the self-evident (although not formalized in any document) obligation of the West not to enlarge the Atlantic Alliance after the Soviet Union gave its consent to the reunification of Germany; consequently, this will not only reinforce the positions and arguments of radical anti-Western isolationists, but will also result in anti-Western evolution of even the most part of traditional pro-Western elites.(64) Enlargement might well reverse domestic trends in Russia towards refusal from interaction with the West and self-isolation. In the meanwhile, hard-line opponents of NATO expansion in Russia will get a chance to relate the mismanagement of domestic reform, as well as low profile of Russia in the contemporary world, to "unfairness" of the West.(65) Consequently, enlargement could prompt such changes in Russian domestic politics that would turn Russia into a revisionist power, interested not in strengthening, but in undermining the emerging political order in Europe which does not meet her interests. As put by Sergei Karaganov, "Russia will find out that it is to a certain degree "sealed" and will be destined to become a violator of the European order".(66) A popular argument is that NATO enlargement to the East will push Russia out from the CEE arms market and cast a final blow to the Russian military-industrial complex, especially at the moment when Russia started again receiving orders for spare parts and modernization of the Soviet weapons and military technology, and when there is a possibility to pay off part of the Russian debt to countries of the region with arms (like in the case of Hungary and Slovakia that were recently compensated for part of the debt with MiG-29 aircraft.)(67) According to the chairman of Committee on the CIS in the previous Duma Konstantin Zatulin, Russia's participation in PfP, let alone NATO enlargement, "spells death to the Russian military-industrial complex".(68) The "nyet" argument is translated into an almost universal consensus that Russia does not have any positive goals with respect to NATO.(69) But when it goes to practical policy designs, the political argument forks. Most critics of NATO, especially those directly involved in decisionmaking, opt for various kinds of moderate responses. (See below, Damage Limitation). In the meanwhile, a minority of NATO opponents (although not a marginal fraction) develop strategies of hard-line response to NATO enlargement. Among the "hawks" are some military commanders(70) and many military analysts, especially those in the so-called "special institutes" that become known to the wider public only on the occasion of publishing their "special reports" on NATO enlargement,(71) foreign policy advisers to radical Communist and nationalist parties,(72) as well as some experts in traditionally liberal institutions (US and Canada Institute, Segodnya daily).(73) Summing up the proposed responses, one can articulate the following: The first and immediate response cited by many is violating the CFE Treaty sublimits, first of all flank quotas for the Leningrad and North Caucasian Military Districts, since possible NATO enlargement, according to this argument, puts in question the validity of entire CFE regime.(74) Other arms control regimes that Russia could threaten to violate as a retaliation for NATO enlargement include START-2 (instead, Russia should respond by adhering to multiple-warhead ICBMs SS-18 and SS-24, supposed to be eliminated under this treaty, at least until 2010),(75) ABM Treaty,(76) and agreements on chemical and biological weapons.(77) According to another argument, in order to address the feeling of vulnerability as a result of drastic change in geostrategic balance, and to secure against the situation when the West could be tempted to capitalize on this change, Russia should consider greater political reliance on nuclear containment in Europe.(78) Konovalov supposes the following chain reaction: NATO enlargement--> automatic violation of CFE regime by the West --> in order to compensate for inferiority in conventional forces, Russia reviews her attitude to INF and puts back into service SS-20 and SS-23 or analogous missiles.(79) Frolov goes on to propose a preventive nuclear strategy: taking first steps towards new nuclear containment without waiting for formal NATO's decision to enlarge. Such steps need not necessarily involve the violation of START-1 and INF Treaty; "Russia should rather re-activate ground- and air-based tactical nuclear weapons de-activated under unilateral (non-treaty) Gorbachev-Bush initiatives in 1991", in order to prevent NATO's power pressure on Russia using its superiority in conventional forces.(80) "The West should be facing not the false dilemma of enlarging NATO or establishing partnership with Russia, but a vital choice between a ten-minute and a ten-month readiness to the nuclear war (let's call this a choice between a "tense" and "relaxed" containment). This will give Russia additional leverage in influencing the policy of the Alliance and add to hesitations among East Europeans and other prospective NATO candidates. Attractiveness of European neutrality will dramatically increase."(81) Another much cited response is the creation of the military alliance of the CIS states, sort of a new WTO, in which European members of the CIS will be joined by Central Asians "to counterbalance NATO expansion".(82) In fact, Moscow is already trying to operate an extended border defense strategy in the southern arc of the "near abroad".(83) Military reintegration has become an official Russian policy since the Autumn of 1995, when on 9 September 1995 President Yeltsin signed a Decree on "Russia's Strategic Course with CIS Member-States", calling for a "defensive union based on common interests and military-political goals".(84) According to this document, the CIS states are supposed to "commit themselves to refrain from participating in unions and blocs aimed against any of these states", and Russia is required to "interact with third countries and international organizations in order for them to understand that this region [the CIS - S.M.] is first of all the zone of interests of the Russian Federation". In other words, possessing of a loose and non-operable system of collective security (the May 1992 Tashkent Treaty), Russia would like to transform it into the system of collective defense, preferably within the entire CIS, using the remaining military infrastructure of the former USSR.(85) According to the Russian view, elements of such system could include a military-political union, joint efforts of Russia and new independent states in securing and possibly defending the external frontiers of the CIS, recreation of military-economic links of the single military-industrial complex, and transformation of the CIS into a regional arrangement under the UN Charter, authorized to carry out conflict prevention and crisis management on the post-Soviet territory under the guidance of Russia.(86) It is well realized in Russia that such developments could deepen, and in fact finalize, the division of Europe.(87) Finally, according to the critics of NATO enlargement, this development could provide Russia with an excuse and a reason to seek strategic allies, even if temporary, in the South and in the East; consequently, rivalry in Central Asia beyond the frontiers of the former Soviet Union, and in the Middle East will intensify.(88) Among possible new allies are often cited China, Iraq (in both cases, particularly in the latter, the nomination of the new Russian foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, could be an asset, since he is a specialist on the Far and the Middle East, and supposedly has a good personal contact with Saddam Hussein), Iran (some go as far as to plan the stationing of Russian forces and bases in the Persian Gulf and in the Straits of Hormuz),(89) and North Korea. A special case are the proposals of missile and nuclear technology transfers to India for which a US-British model is envisioned (American missiles and British warheads, and, correspondingly Russian missiles and Indian warheads). Assessing the credibility of these threats, one has to take account of at least three factors: availability of domestic economic and military resources; domestic political resource of that risky retaliation strategies; effectiveness of these threats in the eyes of Western decisionmakers. If one goes into economic and military resources, it is clear enough that currently, and in the nearest future, Russia can not aim to reach a military parity with the United States or NATO. The absolute size of the Russian economy is now comparable to that of Britain and France.(90) In the old days, the USSR had over 60 percent of arms on the European continent. According to the CFE Treaty and the 1992 Tashkent Agreement on dividing the Soviet quota, by the end of 1995, Russia was supposed to be left with as little as 15 percent. According to these calculations, the balance of military forces in Europe among NATO, CEE, the former Soviet republics, and Russia should be currently 3:1:1:1.(91) A virtual failure of the Chechen operation has also shown that it will take much time before the Russian army recovers after an unprecedented withdrawal from abroad and from the European part of Russia. In this sense, any talk of troop concentration and military standoff along the Western frontier of Russia is simply unrealistic. As regards the domestic political resource of such strategies, it is much weaker than one could expect. True, the public debate, heated by the recent parliamentary and the upcoming presidential elections has turned very much anti-Western. But is there an economic interest underlying such policies? Even a quick look at today's balance of main elites attests to the fact the situation is defined by those who have already found, or looking for, their niche in the international marketplace. As cited earlier, the backbone of the new Russian regime is the strategic link between the fuel and energy complex and the financial sector: both obvious beneficiaries of trade and financial links with the West. Other export-oriented sectors include part of ferrous and the entire non-ferrous metal industry, sectors and regions connected with precious metals and stones, wood industry, producers of mineral fertilizers, and, with some reservations, the so-called MIC-1, or the high-tech part of the military industry. At the political level these interests are represented by three most powerful groups: the oil group, whose economic and financial strength are symbolized by "Gazprom" and by "Imperial" bank, and political weight is embodied in the figure of the prime minister, the Moscow group represented by the Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and relying on financial capital ("Most", "Stolichny" and other banks) and construction industry, and (with some reservations) by the Soskovets group, named after vice prime minister connected with MIC-1 and precious metals and stones sector. The aggregated weight of these groups by far exceeds that of elites that would prefer a hard-line isolationist approach to foreign policy: MIC-2 and related military groups, the agrarian complex and leaders of agrarian regions (many in non-black-earth zone), and the so-called industrial party, represented by such people as Scherbakov and Kadannikov and the emerging "financial-industrial groups" (FPG). Speaking for the interests of a large number of decaying and internationally non-competitive industries (automobiles, general machine-building, etc.), they favor the policies of state protectionism with isolationist foreign policy implications. However, their political ambitions do not go far beyond public debate and the Duma, whose constitutional powers are largely limited. This is not to say that economic interests predetermine Russia's pro-Western stance. The emerging regime is clearly a national, and fairly nationalist, capitalism, and even many of liberal elites can not be ranked among advocates of pro-Western foreign policy. But it is evident that the current, and apparently a long-term, combination of interests does not allow for radical anti-Western policies, be it isolationism or confrontation. Finally, many of the threats, cited by Russian opponents of NATO enlargement are largely irrelevant, like the wish to violate CFE sublimits. First of all, this regards North Caucasian Military District, and the Transcaucasian region (Russian bases in Georgia and Armenia, peacekeepers in Abkhazia), which means that Russia will withdraw troops and resources from the European theater, and it yet has to be proved that the West (except Turkey) is not interested in such a development.(92) Secondly, and most importantly, this problem is in no way related to NATO enlargement: Russia is going to violate the CFE Treaty or review it at the upcoming conference regardless of whether enlargement will take place or not. Only the Chechen operation involves over 1,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers which is about the Russian sublimit for both Leningrad and North Caucasian districts. Moreover, there is a fair understanding of Russian concerns in the West, as indicated by the compromise with flank quotas maps reached between Moscow and Brussels at the meeting of the NATO Council on 20 September 1995. In this sense, Russian threats to CFE are hardly a credible deterrent. The same is true of threats to START-2 Treaty and ABM regime: Russia's concerns are not related to NATO enlargement and will stay in place irrespective of NATO's policy. As regards START-2, its ratification by the new Duma is highly doubtful, and arguments are wide-spread that it is "unfair" to Russia.(93) As to ABM, Russia is anyway concerned by the willingness of the US Congress to differentiate strategic and tactical systems within the Treaty.(94) In both cases, NATO can not do much to meet these concerns. A return to nuclear containment is probably affordable for Russia from the technical point of view, but definitely not from the political one, since this involves a radical break with the Western (in fact, global) economic environment, and would be opposed by main elites. The same is true of the creation of an "anti-NATO" bloc within the CIS. There might be some military-political issues of common concern (border control, breakup of the single radar and ground control system dangerous also for civilian aviation, links among military enterprises), but if it goes to a higher level of re-integration involving large expenditure for Russia, the same elites (fuel and energy sector and the banks) will most likely oppose this development. Ukraine, too, is definitely not willing or ready for a military rapprochement with Russia, preferring a strategy of balancing between Russia and the West, trying to win concessions from both. Other CIS states (with the exception of Byelorussia) also will not find it easy following the suit: the transfer from collective security to collective defense requires at least the presence of a common enemy, clearly absent in the CIS case.(95) In general, this idea enjoys very low support among the population: about 60 percent of respondents in recent poll admitted that their life is in no way connected with countries of the CIS.(96) In summary, despite a certain populist appeal (themes of 'humiliation' and 'defeat' are wide-spread in public opinion and the media, although not to the 'Weimar' extent), anti-Western nationalist approach with its firm opposition to NATO enlargement is not as politically viable as it seems. Political elite can be using this kind of argument for pre-election rhetoric exercise, but there's no consolidated interest underlying it. Domestic stability is unimaginable without a fairly liberal foreign trade environment that takes full account of exporters, and banks. Vitally dependent on exports of raw materials, Russia simply can not afford political and rhetorical isolationism, let alone confrontation with the West on such issue as NATO enlargement. In a wider sense, in mid-nineties Russia carries out its foreign policy in a changed global environment, much more influenced by Western values and institutions. It may be unenthusiastic about it, it may take a detached view and a separate stand within this order, it may even try to modify it by evolutionary means, but it definitely cannot confront it. In this sense, Russian nationalism is appealing but impractical.