Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. The role of international regimes in promoting democratic institutions: the case of NATO and Russia Sergei Medvedev [Back to Index] Chapter II. Domestic Conditions in Russia: Prospects of Democratic Transformation The problem of security interdependence and possible influence of international environment, including NATO instruments, on developments in Russia requires also the examination of the Russian domestic conditions. The first and foremost question here is whether the country (including the citizenry, the political elite, and socioeconomic and public institutions) is open and willing to be exposed to external influence. As noted by O'Donnell and Schmitter, the founding fathers of transition research, the process of transition is a change from a specific form of authoritarian rule to an "uncertain something else".(27) This remark can be taken quite seriously if applied to Russia. True, like in all other post-Communist states, the objectives of transition have been made clear in Russia as well: political pluralism, the establishment of a law-based state and market economy,(28) and most political forces, except the extreme left, accept this thesis in one or different form. But apart from political declarations, the actual vector of transition is still in question. The typology of patterns of transition, as established by Huntington (transformation, replacement and transplacement)(29) is of better help: Russia, as well as other former Soviet republics, followed the path of transformation from above, and that could be somewhat indicative of its prospects of democratization. The matter is, different patterns of transition are often employed as sort of a ranking-list for successful democratization.(30) Thus, the more pressure comes from below, the better a country's prospect for stabilization is considered to be. Regardless of whether the transition process was marked by a strategy of "plowing through" or by a clear ideological concept, "only developments initiated by pressure from below offered a reliable path to democracy", as Klaus von Beyme puts it.(31) In this context, the question of grass-roots of democracy in Russia should be examined.(32) This is an extremely complicated socio-psychological, historical and cultural issue (moreover, in Russia, this is one of the so-called "eternal questions", vechnye voprosy, along with the country's belonging to Europe, and many others), and treating it on a few pages inevitably involves over-simplification. We will try to address it in brief using a well-established methodological opposition of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft concepts of society. To put it briefly, Gemeinschaft societies are something organic and traditional, involving bonds of common sentiment, experience and identity molded together over a long period of time. Gesellschaft societies are contractual and constructed, in other words, results of conscious action.(33) The Russian society has always been in the Gemeinschaft side of this societal spectrum: sobornost', or communality, has been historically prevalent over basic structures of the civic society typical for Western Europe. A relative weakness of urban culture (again as compared to Europe) which could be nourishing civil institutions, has resulted in a situation when a peasant breaking out of an obschina (commune, or a German Gemeinde) and heading for the city could not be effectively socialized and was becoming a lumpen. This situation had been reproduced after the 1917 Revolution, and especially during the collectivization/industrialization in the twenties and the thirties: masses of peasants with their communal habits were thrown out of the village and concentrated around cities and large factories - but there they were not socialized but rather stayed in a transitory condition between the city and the village, in the so-called "settlements of urban type". These settlements (in Russian, sloboda), with their lumpen culture, in which, according to some calculations, over 40 percent of the Soviet population dwelled, were a perfect matrix of communal, Gemeinschaft-type lifestyle, and still form the social backbone in most post-Soviet states, Russia included.(34) In this sense, it was not surprising that the natural response to liberalization in late Soviet and in the current Russian society was the recourse to Gemeinschaft-type links, and not to Gesellschaft-type structures, as one could suppose. Instead of forming interest groups and parties, articulating its interests and channeling them into public institutions, the populace in most of the country relies on guaranteed and proven means of survival (families, friends, relatives, personal contacts in local bodies of authority, illegal or semi-legal trades, etc.).(35) Such social conditions clearly prevent the formation of democratic groundwork, and grass-roots of democratic institutions remain weak. People may pronounce in favor of democracy (and many a poll indicate this), but living in a Gemeinschaft-type social environment, they can not acquire democratic consciousness and habits simply from the press or television.(36) Another instance of Gemeinschaft-type sociopolitical response to liberalization has been the regionalization of the post-Soviet area, i.e. the breakup of the unitary Soviet state-society into individual regions (republics, Oblasts, districts, cities, local communities, army districts with their infrastructure and economy, etc.) and their sovereignization. As argued by Vladimir Kagansky, although this development objectively contributes to the abolition of totalitarian structures, it does not lead to introduction of grass-root democratic procedures (local autonomy and self-government, etc.). Rather, the regions, these Gemeinschaft-type units, take the place of individuals in post-Soviet political process, seek to exclude mass participation in politics, and are, in fact, authoritarian in regard of their subjects.(37) Finally, one has to mention the unprecedented growth of organized crime as yet another Gemeinschaft-type response of the post-Soviet society to liberalization. Criminal groups now controlling a major part of the country's territory are typical Gemeinschaft-type social structures (cf. "families" in Sicilian mafia), and in the conditions of breakup of old societal links, these well-organized structures that take care of their members appeal to many youngsters: in fact, organized crime emerges as a popular lifestyle. In summary, grass-root democratization in Russia meets tremendous obstacles inherent in the structure of the society. One should not be misled by introduction of democratic institutions which up to this day function without a real feedback from the masses (once again, trends in large cities are very different, but still not indicative in terms of the entire country). In this context, defining its strategy aimed at promoting democratic transformation of Russia, instead of institution-building, the West should rather be concerned with society-building, i.e. helping in creating interest groups and social structures at the grass-root and community level. Applying criteria of democratization to the emerging political regime in Russia is problematic as well. To better understand the nature of the current regime and its views on cooperation with the West, one has to compare it to the one of late 1991 and 1992. That period in the wake of the August 1991 putsch in Moscow was characterized by an unprecedented degree of cooperation between Russia and the West - not just political and diplomatic cooperation that was already there since the Gorbachev era, but cooperation among liberal elites on both sides. Western liberal circles, especially those related to international financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank, EBRD, and others) had had a considerable influence on the nascent Russian liberal sectors (primarily in finance, but also in trade in commodities, and oil exports) and a major say in shaping the format of the Russian economic reform. In fact, the Russian liberal elite, as well as the whole ideology of democratization actively promoted at the period, was vitally dependent on Western financial instruments, or, as prime minister of the reform government Yegor Gaidar used to say, "for implementing reform, Russia has access to resources that by far exceed our internal capacities".(38) The peak of this cycle of Russian domestic politics was the first quarter of 1992, when methods of shock liberalization devised with the help of Western consultants (price liberalization, privatization, etc.) were applied. Russia's foreign and security policies more or less followed the suit: it was during these months that Russia seriously regarded the feasibility of NATO membership. True, the social environment was by and large non-democratic (see above), grass-roots and a real groundwork for democracy still had to be created, but democracy was a prevailing ideology at the period, and there were virtually no, or very little, political obstacles for accepting Western influence. There was a certain ideal model, and patented external controllers (possessing of economic instruments) that supervised country's progress on the way towards this model. In a word, there had been an opportunity of a "soft" integration of Russia into Western economic and eventually security environment. However, this window of opportunity turned out to be short-lived. Starting from late 1992 (replacement of Gaidar as prime minister), and all through 1993, conservative counterpoises to liberalization continued to build up. The liberal consensus turned out to be too fragile, since distribution of property had not been accomplished yet, and a number of elites had not yet converted their statuses and had not got access to power. Tension increased, and a severe crisis, followed by a three-day armed conflict, broke out in Moscow on 21 September - 4 October 1993. These events started a wholly new political cycle in Russia. Unexpected even by the government, the use of military force to settle a political dispute dramatically increased chances for domestic stability: within one month after bombardment of the Parliament, the regions which had been reluctant to comply with federal tax laws for the last two years, started paying taxes. Stabilization was further increased by the December 1993 parliamentary elections won by nationalists and communists: the former opposition (and part of its ideology) was now incorporated in the bodies of state authority, and thus partially neutralized. (An even more striking example is the "domestication" of Zhirinovski by the ruling elite). Further moves by the authority included the Treaty on Public Accord and the amnesty to organizers of the October 1993 riot in March 1994. As a result, a new regime was established by mid-1994. For the first time in post-Soviet history, it was (and still is) characterized by a relative degree of stability. Principal elites which form the backbone of the new oligarchy (most importantly, the fuel and energy complex and the financial sector)(39) have finally completed transformation and conversion of statuses characteristic of all Soviet/post-Soviet power groups: Power in the Soviet political and econo- mic environment Access to property through illegal (1985-91) and legal (1992-1995) privatization Political power and financial resources under post-Soviet regime Accepting the habitual classification of elites into "chaots" and "stabilizers", one has to admit that in the new regime, the total weight of the latter by far exceeds that of the "chaots" (new elites specializing in risky financial operations, illegal arms transfers, etc.). What is also important, a new bourgeois class has emerged that will seek to preserve the structures of everyday life. At the top level, there is also propensity to political stability. The threat of political upheaval is unrealistic, and this was again proved by parliamentary elections in December 1995. They clearly showed that major political forces which have relatively stable electorates, in their ideologies, as well as methods in struggle for power, bend towards the center (the winner, the CPRF and its leader Gennady Zuyganov, are no exception), and that radicals on both sides of the political spectrum can only count on marginal support. In all likeness, the upcoming presidential elections in June 1996 also will not have a destabilizing effect: none of the main candidates (Grigory Yavlinsky, Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Gennady Zyuganov) are willing (or can afford, taking into account the interests of elites behind them) to rock the boat. Summing up, in 1994-1995 greater stability was reached at the middle (among principal elites, also at the regional level) and the top (among federal bodies of the authority) floors of the state pyramid.(40) But this kind of stability has little to do with democracy. The linkage between the middle and top floors is of purely corporatist and oligarchic character. Economic interests of elites are projected into the bodies of state authority beyond any democratic procedures: that is lobbying, bribes, kickbacks. (Once again, here is the logic of Gemeinschaft-type "private" links instead of legal and structured Gesellschaft-type ones). In fact, corruption (or simply "buying" politicians and whole parties) has become one of the principal features of the current regime. Instead of serving the interests of the citizenry, the state (represented by corrupt officials at all levels) engages in economic activity - not as a mediating and regulating unit, but as an active participant, since most officials, from local governors to presidential administration, cabinet of ministers and the Duma, have their own vested interests; Mikhail Leontyev calls this a "trading state".(41) Obviously, a trading state by no means can be called democratic: between the population and the state bodies is a barrier of economic interests of elites, and the political process goes on a short circuit between the middle and the top levels. In the meanwhile, democracy as an ideology is anyway no longer on the political agenda. One of the principal conditions of stabilization has been the incorporation of the opposition discourse in the lexicon of the authority. The unifying ideology of the regime has become a moderate nationalism, but recently also something transcending nationalism: the ideas of derzhavnost' (aspirations of a strong state and a great power status). Although the ruling elite was initially reluctant to use this term being afraid of too openly resounding the former opposition, it was finally derzhavnost' that became the basic legitimization of the new Russian regime. Derzhavnost' can be interpreted as a call to creating a strong, paternalist and to some extent expansionist state. Rather than nationalism, this ideology is a return to a traditional Russian form of legitimacy, characteristic of the Tsarist and the Soviet periods, in which the idea of a strong state replaces that of a nation, and the state is situated above the society.(42) The undemocratic and even authoritarian nature of the ideology of derzhavnost' is self-evident. Foreign and security policy implication of this ideology has been so far the assertion of Russia's national interests which in many fields are considered to be conflicting with those of the West (e.g. on the issue of NATO enlargement). The instructive example is the evolution of views of the former foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev in 1993-1995, who sought to follow the national-interest consensus, but still was considered to be too "pro-Western", just to be replaced in the wake of the 1995 parliamentary elections by Yevgeny Primakov, a figure much more appealing to derzhavniki. Thus, if not overtly anti-Western, the new regime is less favorable of cooperation with the West on political and strategic issues, as compared to that in late 1991 and 1992. Equally little is left of political cooperation among liberal elites in the West and in Russia. Of course this does not rule out the possibility of external influence, but the fact is, the domestic environment is much less encouraging and cooperative. On top of this, one can also speak of a certain disillusionment in the idea of cooperation with the West among liberal elites, as well as the wider populace. It has yet to be decided who is to blame for this (if anyone at all) - the West, that was not able to live up to the challenge and devise a strategy of engaging Russia comparable to the Marshall plan; Russia itself that could not create even an acceptable, let alone favorable, normative environment for Western investment; or was it Russia's uniqueness, Sonderweg, that prevented large-scale and long-term cooperation and the application of models successfully used elsewhere? We are not going to indulge in such sort of speculation, but the fact is that by 1994 even the ardent advocates of systemic cooperation had had to recognize that the West "had lost Russia",(43) or, like Mikhail Leontiev, went on to say, that the liberal period of 1991-93 "had ended in the defeat of the West that had almost completely missed the opportunity of a "soft" integration of Russia into the Western world and placed the political forces in Russia, that had been counting on the Western perspective, in the position of political outsiders".(44) The public, too, has become equally skeptical. A total of 72 percent of today's respondents link Russia's dramatic production slump and the decline in its standards of living with the attempts to emulate Western economic practices. This segment of the voters believe that Russia has its own road to take, while 75 percent of the population say that this country can do without Western assistance altogether.(45) Summarizing the argument of this chapter, the current situation is very much different from that in the early nineties, when the ideology of engaging and transforming Russia emerged, with its liberal concepts of aid and strategic partnership. Then, the West had considerable leverage in Russia's domestic transformations. As to the current setting, the nature of the emerging Russian regime, as well as of the entire new Russian statehood, is such that: The regime can not be called democratic since it derives its legitimacy not from popular support, but from the control over political and economic institutions, first of all property. In this setting, democratic procedures are mostly regarded as instruments in the struggle for power among the elites. The regime can be described as national capitalism, highly criminalized and corporatist, with a propensity to authoritarian rule. Although virtually no one questions the course of reforms and democracy, concepts of westernization and democratization have been largely compromised, and any kind of Western influence is more and more regarded with suspicion. As a result, Russia's interaction with the external environment is hampered for domestic social, political, ideological, and diplomatic reasons.