Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Tendencies Towards Authoritarianism: A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Bulgaria Georgi Dimitrov, Petia Kabakchieva, Jeko Kijossev [Back to Index] IV. The Bulgarian Transition 2. Constitution of the leading political actors. The new political language Theoreticians of the transition from authoritarian regime to democracy argue that it takes place in several stages. Stage one comprises "limited democracy" or, according to other writers, "institutionalization of democracy," with the former elite keeping its influence. Stage two is defined as "democratization proper" or as "legalization of democracy" and simultaneously affirms the new political configurations and democratic institutions - none of the political forces, however, can control the results of the political process. That phase is sometimes interpreted as institutional instability. If this critical moment is surmounted, there are grounds to expect stabilization of democracy or democratic consolidation and to reach stage three, as certain writers call it "cultured democracy," where the democratic principles have asserted themselves and proved their heuristic potential to cope with the crisis, therefore at this stage there are no alternative forms of government. We will keep this conventional distinction in order to see whether it works in Bulgaria and what actually happened during these stages, with the three parliamentary elections - in 1990, 1991 and 1994 - serving as a point of departure vis-a-vis the overcoming of problems typical of the different stages. We will regard the first period as having ended following the passage of the new Constitution in 1991 and up to the election victory of the opposition, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) coalition, later that year. In that period the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) had a dominant influence in Parliament and the executive. The period saw the beginning of the establishment of democratic institutions. This process is usually said to have been the most intensive in a political respect since the multiparty system was introduced and parties mushroomed, the mass consciousness was politicized to extremes and this was manifested in the stormy election rallies and active turnout on Election Day. To answer the questions formulated above, we will start by exploring the process of consolidation of the main political parties and mechanism of political identification. 2.1. The first elections, 1990 The "leading political actors" referred to in this text are the three most influential political forces in Bulgaria, the only three to be represented in all three parliaments. Namely, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), identified and identifying as a single political actor even though it incorporates political formations that differ in both membership and character; the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the only party to run independently in the 1990 elections - in the subsequent elections, it coalesced with various partners from different parts of the political spectrum; and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). Insofar and when the text refers to "political elites," the latter comprise foremost the MPs from the leading political forces - the UDF, BSP and MRF. As mentioned above, we will examine the campaign platforms of those parties as publicly declared strategies on the guidelines of the change. Here is a breakdown of the Grand National Assembly elected in June 1990. The elections were carried by the BSP, which won 52.75% of the seats in Parliament; the UDF got 36%, the MRF about 6%, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) about 4%, and other political forces 1.5%. It is clear that the dominant force in this stage is the until then ruling political party - 46% of the Socialist MPs had previously held senior positions in the administration or party. (MPs in the Seventh Grand National Assembly, p. 12). Just 5.5% of the UDF MPs had previously held senior positions, and so had more than half (9 out of 16) of the Agrarian MPs. The latter is not accidental - that particular agrarian party (Bulgaria has several of them) is the orthodox one, i.e. the party that had collaborated closely with the BCP during socialism. It is normal for the Grand National Assembly MPs to have been well-schooled: 93% had higher education, 63% were into the humanities and 28% had academic degrees and titles. Of the 16 MPs with secondary education, as many as 15 were from the UDF, 12 of them having been expelled from higher establishments of education for political reasons. However, it was not simply a matter of education. The Grand National Assembly included a large group of prominent Bulgarian intellectuals known for their dissident activities - works of art or political action, most political dissidents and people of the arts being in the UDF faction. At the same time, as mentioned above, almost half of the Socialist MPs were administrative and party apparatchiks. The diplomats, top brass, prosecutors and judges were in the BSP faction, whereas the lawyers, philologists and "artists" were the "face" of the UDF (MPs..., p. 12). On the whole, engineers, jurists and economists prevailed in the Grand National Assembly, almost equally spread out in almost all parliamentary factions. It is clear that the MPs from the different parliamentary political forces were quite heterogeneous, the BSP majority coming predominantly from the former political and administrative elite, whereas the opposition comprised mostly people from the free professions, dissidents, and repressed by the communist regime. Under the circumstances, it is logical to expect that their ideological platforms, their political strategies, would differ substantially. Yet was that the case? Let us examine the findings of a comprehensive interdisciplinary survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Ideologies at the University of Sofia, "Parliamentary Elections '91. Ideological Aspects". The survey, headed by Professor Peter-Emil Mitev, included a content analysis of the campaign platforms of all parties that ran in the 1990 and 1991 elections. We are aware that the ideological message cannot be simply broken down to the political vocabulary. Still, the political vocabulary determines the specificity of the new political language, the categories in which the change is or is not conceived of. Here are the most commonplace of a preliminary list of 30 key words in the 1990 platforms of the BSP, UDF and MRF: BSP: will [do], Bulgaria, democracy, rights, freedom, people, national, social. UDF: will [do], freedom, democracy, rights, market, man, Europe, state. MRF: rights, freedom, democracy, Bulgaria, law, will [do], people, nation, man, parliament. And here are the rarest words: BSP: privatization (absent altogether), parliament, woman, control, responsibility, personality, religion, justice. UDF: privatization, family, security, religion, justice, woman, village, control, responsibility. MRF: absent altogether- privatization, private, personality, justice, labour, woman, village, responsibility, science; very rare - control, ownership, children, market, family. It is obvious that the three political forces, which bid for the electoral vote in a rather brutal manner, actually had the same dominant demands: freedom, democracy, rights; the BSP and the UDF being more definite in the subject position "will" [do], unlike the MRF, which felt less certain in this respect. Of course, there were different accents - in the BSP's case, on collective agents of civil society like "Bulgaria," "nation" and "people," whereas the UDF was more consistent in upholding liberal values - it used more frequently categories such as "market" and "man," and preferred "Europe" to "Bulgaria." There is an amazing similarity in the rarest topics as well: privatization, responsibility, justice, woman, control, personality. The focus is obviously on the political aspect of the change, but in the most abstract terms possible - freedom and democracy, the institutional mechanisms of their maintenance being neglected. Parliament is not a top priority for the two biggest political forces, nor is the law for the BSP. On the whole, the categories of economic change are not applied: the market is not one of the main topics, nor is ownership, and even less so, privatization. We have a rather abstract ideological picture of the guidelines of the change which bespeaks either an absence of preconceived political strategies or, conversely, hides the real strategies. People obviously have to find their political identity on the basis of something else lurking behind the programme rather than through the programme itself. The irrationalism that is deliberate or typical of the immaturity of Bulgarian politics or both, an irrationalism quite different from western visions of politics as rational decision-making, rational choice etc., is to be discerned even here. In Bulgaria, the vote is not swayed by the programme - it depends on psychological and unconscious symbolic identifications. Thus the political elites of 1990, organized in parties supposed to express the interests of different groups, actually use similar political language based on abstract political values and shirking of concrete responsibilities. The economic reform is not on the agenda. The following question, however, is also worth considering: could one possibly talk of political change aimed at the assertion of democratic institutions when the fundamental regulative principles of the purportedly coveted democratic market society and the technologies of their establishment - parliament, law, private property, privatization, personal responsibility - are either totally absent or rare in the ideological platforms of the leading political forces? Under the circumstances, how could one expect the economic reform to start and who could possibly start it? Then what is the structuring principle of the so-called political space - for unlike the apathy towards politics now shown by quite a few people, there was visible civil enthusiasm in those days? This is obviously an extra-political principle. In the MRF's case, it is clear that ethnic identification is crucial. In the case of the BSP and UDF, there are psychological identification mechanisms in which the following axes are essential: past - future; gained - lost; possibility - impossibility of adjustment etc. The other identification mechanisms are based on ideologies. This takes the shape of a clash between "communism" and "anti-communism", but that looks like another instance of forcible rationalization of certain psychological rather than ideological identifications. For the everyday, not the ideologically sophisticated intellectual consciousness, the family and personal biography acquire crucial importance not in the context of any firm social identifications - of the type "we hereditary communists" or "we descendants of the ex-bourgeoisie" even though this might well exist too. This, rather, appears to be a case of identification with the potential, not the actual social status, resulting from the unanimous appraisal of the family's social mobility. "Just see where we used to be, where we are now and how far we could have gone" - both in a negative and positive context. For the elderly, this is a look back, and for the younger, a look ahead, towards the prospects opening up from now on. In the aforementioned survey, Prof. Mitev claims that sociological surveys showed that the family played an important role in the red vote of young people. This gives him grounds to argue that we actually have proto-parties functioning as quasi-ethnoses, since the generational reproduction of political differences is the essence of quasi-ethnoses. So far the important point is that even at the very start of the so-called transition we have political behaviour which does not attempt to rationalize and make democratic values operational, nor to customize its messages to the different groups; it does not talk about market transition nor cultivates a political language but stakes on the carnival bodily-symbolic speech; political behaviour staking on psychological and ethnic, rather than on ideological and social identifications. In other words, we have a quasi-political space. This raises the following question: what policy and to whose benefit are the new, officially elected, political elites pursuing? Is there any actual political differentiation between them? Why do parliamentary factions that differ by social structure behave in a similar way? This plainly has to do with the priority values associated with the assertion of democratic institutions and defence of civil rights after decades of totalitarian rule. Still, the public media debate was quite different, outright antagonistic, from the consensus in the ideological platforms. What does that mean? It is apparently not accidental that the political reform in Bulgaria took off with preliminary bargaining at the so-called Round Table - the erstwhile dissidents and veteran oppositionists repressed by the communist regime, who subsequently became the backbone of their parliamentary factions, had to work from the very start with the "transformers" in the top party elite who had de facto sanctioned the change. At that, their main problem was establishment of political democratic institutions, while the "transformers" must have been thinking in the categories of structural adjustment of the economy, besides keeping a definite position in power. There could have been a division of labour from the very start: the political language was to be coined by the intellectuals, whereas the structural reforms were to be geared by the old party elite. The former drew on western theories but also expressed moral precepts to which they attached primary importance. The latter complied with economic realities and their own interest. And then, there was something else. We have tried to argue the thesis that the "transformers" had a clearly expressed group interest that centred on the preservation of their privileged position. This interest motivated a preconceived strategy on a change that would facilitate the preservation of the privileged status. Besides, they had impressive resources of power which included social and cultural, as well as economic capital, if we apply Pierre Bourdieu's distinction. Thus the germ of discrepancy between these groups was present even at this stage, along with that between the ideological picture of the transition and the pursuit of a strategically preconceived direction of transformation. What is important in this case is that although consensus on the fundamental ideological values could have been achieved at the Round Table, the platforms practically did not show operational strategies on the upholding of those values, and that was a prerequisite for preservation of the existing status quo, especially in the economy. Consequently, the first stage of the so-called transition, which should have institutionalized political democracy, actually did that only de jure with the advent of party pluralism, free elections, the passage of the new Constitution. De facto, the parties have proved to be quasi-parties that do not take parliamentary order and the law too much to heart, to judge from their programmes; nor present any marketization strategy whatsoever; quasi-parties that have not only failed to cultivate civic awareness and specific social identification in their electorate but even count on and uphold its psychological identification. The ideological picture is quite abstract and can therefore be filled out with the psychological fears and hopes of the people. Staking on abstract values, the political elites deliberately or not pursued another strategy - of a fanned-up, enacted change which actually veiled the preservation of the earlier status quo in view of the failure to launch the market reform and prioritize parliamentarism, the law, the principles of individual responsibility and civil control. Who stood to gain from that is self-evident. Quasi-political space actually serves a single political strategy: of discrediting the new order via its simulated quasi-enforcement. And yet, insofar as after that period (which we will call a period of simulated political change) there was a change of the leading apparent political actors, was there a real political clash between different political elites? 2.2 Stage two: elections '91 to elections '94 The elections for the 36th National Assembly, held on 13 October 1991, were won by the until then oppositionary UDF with 34.36%. The BSP election coalition won 33.14%, and there was just a single other party to hurdle the 4% threshold: the MRF, with 7.55%. University graduates were the overwhelming majority in this national assembly too, especially those into the humanities: a total of 73.2% of all MPs; The percentage of MPs with secondary education was lower than in either of the other post-1989 national assemblies: 2%. So was that of engineers (14.6%, vs 19% in the Grand National Assembly and 21% in the 37th National Assembly). However, there was an impressive number of jurists: 26.7% of the total (Kanev D., comp., 1996, pp. 20-21). That National Assembly, however, has gone down on record for something else. By the end of its term in office, there was a visible restructuring of parliamentary space: there appeared three new parliamentary factions of newly formed political parties. Two split from the UDF - New Choice and the Democratic Party, and one from the BSP, DAR (Democratic Alliance for the Republic). In addition, a sizeable number of MPs went independent: 16 from 240. (Perhaps that is why the social composition of each parliamentary faction is not on record.) What was the reason for that? We believe that this "splintering" of parties offers further proof of the above thesis of quasi-political identification with the parties. This quasi-political identification presupposes, on the one hand, the ideological inconsistency of the parties and, on the other, is a prerequisite for easy change of party identity depending on new priorities or interests. The deliberately fuelled parliamentary crisis in late 1994 was followed by new elections that officially legitimated the BSP's power. The situation when the 36th National Assembly assumed office was thus quite different from that at the end, and reviewing the 1991 and 1994 campaign platforms we will see whether that reflected on the strategy of the political forces. It is obvious that the distinctive features of that period fully correspond to the crisis in stage two of transition, described as "institutional instability." What we want to know is whether that is due to a real clash of different political strategies, is the result of political immaturity or are there other reasons. Let us go back to content analysis of the leading political forces' campaign platforms. In the 1991 platforms there is a general shift towards consideration of specific regulatory mechanisms of a possible new social order, as well as greater distinction between the leading political forces. To quote the aforementioned survey again: UDF campaign platform: Words with the greatest frequency: will [do], democracy, Bulgaria, Europe, village, freedom, nation, family, system, ownership, law. Market, social and privatization are mid-scale. Rarest and absent words: control, woman (absent). Parliament, people, labour, responsibility, children, religion, man. BSP campaign platform: Words with the greatest frequency: will [do], social, law, nation, market, Bulgaria, Europe. Ownership and state are mid-scale. The frequency of freedom, democracy and rights has dropped dramatically. Rarest words: responsibility, man, religion, personality, woman, control, justice, privatization. Nor are parliament and private very popular either. MRF campaign platform: Words with the greatest frequency: rights, freedom, nation, democracy, market, Bulgaria, Europe, ownership, will [do], religion. Rarest and absent words: parliament, children, woman (absent). Personality, control, responsibility, justice, labour, system. The UDF has obviously continued to uphold political values such as freedom and democracy but is also apparently embracing terms typical of the economic classical liberal model, if we bracket the frequent use of ownership and family - at that, with a new emphasis on the law. Restitution of land to owners in the countryside is clearly a priority. There is also a measure of nationalism: Bulgaria, as well as nation, appear alongside Europe. Privatization and market, however, have not been sufficiently problematized yet. This platform proved best-winning for the UDF perhaps because it combined continuity with the previous one with an attempt to operationalize UDF strategy. The 1991 platform was also the most coherent one in terms of a moderate liberalism balancing between a macro-approach calling for a "system" and collective agents such as Bulgaria and nation, and classical liberal values such as freedom, democracy, ownership and law. At the same time, the platform upheld traditional Bulgarian values like family, village and Bulgaria, but again balancing between our nation and Europe. Is it accidental that market in the BSP platform figures alongside Bulgaria, Europe, nation, but without too much emphasis on ownership. Privatization is seldom mentioned. What sort of a market economy is that: oriented to the outside world? On the premises of what type of ownership is this market economy - obviously not private, but perhaps group or corporative, the product of clandestine privatization of state-owned property. Is the shift away from political values like freedom, democracy and rights accidental too? A fear of freedom? Or has the political show accomplished its mission? At the same time, the BSP uses the term "law" more than any other leading political force. Global categories are adopted - Europe, Bulgaria, nation - but not individual such as man, personality, woman, nor civic ones like responsibility and control. The frequency of "people" and "labour" declines. The key term that distinguishes liberal from social doctrines, justice, is one of the rarest in both the 1990 and 1991 platforms. The ideology of what sort of party does the content analysis reveal? And are the notions of "left" - "right" applicable here? But the party is apparently "modern": it favours an open, market economy without encouragement of particular agents of civil society. It defends rule of law, but without a priority on parliament, control and responsibility, nor too much emphasis on freedom and democracy. Even without a focus on justice, despite the accent on social. "Justice" is more frequent in the UDF platform. Isn't that the old late-socialist elitist model of uncontrolled government "from above," now adjusted to the new European realities and guaranteeing, as it used to, certain social rights at the expense of curtailed civil and political freedoms? It could be argued that it is not the words but the spirit of the platform that is important. Yet content analysis remains one of the most reliable methods of dispelling ideological smoke screens and finding out real intentions. In the MRF's case there seems to be the greatest consistency between political and economic liberalism, combined, however, with an all too plain focus on religion. The absence of the aggressive "will" [do] that is so typical of the other two political forces indicates a disposition not for open direct policy but an orientation towards the use of other political agents in attaining clearly formulated particular objectives. And then, parliament is obviously not the principal mediator! (The MRF virtually played the key role in the toppling of the UDF from power and election of a new government in late 1992.) Still, despite the differences there are quite a few similarities too. The economic reform is again regarded in abstract terms, and although the UDF raises the issue of privatization, privatization is not a priority - nor is it for the BSP and the MRF. The category of "private," which generally designates private interest, is not too popular either. To say nothing of "parliament"! Nor are the political forces concerned with control and responsibility. "Justice" is one of the rarest words in all three platforms, along with "labour". There is no emphasis on concrete subjects such as personality, man and woman. By contrast, all three focus on Bulgaria, Europe, nation and market. This invites the conclusion that the political elite is consolidating around the concept of market economy, but probably along the Bulgaria-Europe axis. The transition is apparently rightist for all three forces, since the orientation towards market economy is not associated with the concept of justice. Besides, even though part of the forces pledge their commitment to freedom and democracy, the latter does not seem conceived of as parliamentary democracy, to judge from the "rating" of "parliament" in the campaign platforms. How could the electorate respect parliament when it is not on the agenda of those who have to be elected. At that, the will to power does not deem it necessary to be restricted by concepts such as responsibility and control. The UDF is trying to promote at least some forms of civil society by supporting private ownership, but foremost via restitution - of land, of expropriated or nationalized property, rather than through a preconceived strategy on privatization. So the pivotal problem of the fate of state-owned property is practically not on the agenda. Could the most commonplace terms demonstrate the priorities, objectives, and the rarest ones - the price, the means through which the former will be achieved? That would answer all questions. Rightist transition to market economy - but with what resources? Obviously through clandestine privatization of state-owned property. At whose expense? Obviously at the price of neglecting the potential agents of civil society. To the benefit of whom? Of uncontrolled and irresponsible power. In this case, could we talk of any civil, political and social rights at all? What will guarantee democratic government considering that it is not conceived in the categories of parliament, control and responsibility? If that is true, then we could argue that the platforms, set the framework of a joint elitist interest stemming from the authoritative status, from the self-confidence of "we" who are in power beyond any, least of all parliamentary, control. This is definitely a prerequisite for authoritarian government. At the same time, the differences which, in this case, make the UDF's moderate liberalism clearly distinct from the BSP's declared social-market, etatist rather than democratic model of transition, should not be neglected either. It was at that time that the political languages became different, i.e. demonstrated the presence of different actors. Parliamentary infighting, which led to a series of "splinterings," as well as the red hot media war that broke out in 1992, go to show that different elites had really appeared: the ones trying to impose the change, staking foremost on land restitution ("ownership," "village") and official adherence to democratic values (regardless of the rather Bolshevik treatment of people who think in a different way); the others terrified by democracy, freedom and rights, relying on the law, thinking about a market but probably from the perspective of state-owned property, which was still their main resource of power - hence privatization, as land restitution, prove unnecessary. The ideology of the UDF proved a winner with its electorate but failed to keep the Union in power. And vice versa: the campaign platform of the BSP did not help the party carry the general elections, but that did not prove fatal since the BSP practically won the battle in the corridors of power. It is naive to attribute the BSP's ultimate victory to personal mistakes and merits, even though they obviously played a part too. The 1991-1994 period showed that in the final count it is not ideology that matters most, nor even strategy or active exercise of executive power, but control over other resources of power. This means that legitimation of democracy is out of the question since those resources of power slip out of the public race for power. That is why the chances of the new political elites are beyond this public race and in the quest for control over those resources. For its part, on the level of everyday consciousness, the impossibility of democracy in Bulgaria is perceived as a shortcoming of democracy. The quest for control over the covert resources of power, combined with the overt dismissal of public control as an element of the exercise of power, antagonized people even more against the political elites, blurred the differences between them and lumped elites in one and the same category: "nasty bit of work, all of 'em," "don't give a damn about anybody but themselves." In other words, it constituted them in a single category of "the power-holders," or, in academic terms, the category of the "oligarchy" - a minority exercising power to its own benefit. Now that, as noted above, is a hidden form of authoritarian government beyond public control. Thus the situation prior to the successive parliamentary elections in December 1994 was practically much closer to that in 1990 than in 1991 regarding the dominant political force - the BSP, whereas the UDF was again in opposition. But - and this is an important but - the UDF had gambled away its time and the confidence of part of the general public. Did it come up with a new strategy under those circumstances? Let us go back to our content analysis of the 1994 campaign platforms, with special thanks to Prof. Mitev whose latest survey is yet to be published. The method is the same. BSP campaign platform: Words with the greatest frequency: will [do], Bulgaria, state - way ahead of the others. Followed by: social, law, market (less frequent than in the 1991 campaign platform), nation, security. Rarest and absent words: religion, personality (absent); man, people, woman, village, responsibility, children, rights, parliament. Followed by: justice, private, privatization and freedom. UDF campaign platform: Words with the greatest frequency: Bulgaria, state, law, will [do] (even though will [do] is the fourth most frequent word, it is used three times less than in the BSP platform). Followed by: ownership, responsibility, control. Rarest or absent words: woman, personality (absent); religion, man, justice, democracy, labour, village. MRF campaign platform: Words with the greatest frequency: Bulgaria, social, freedom, rights, will [do], law, state. Nation, man and market. Rarest and absent words: personality, woman, science (absent). Responsibility, people, justice, village, children. We have the same marked similarity of political vocabulary in the campaign platforms. The priorities are the same: Bulgaria, state, law, along with the avoiding of certain subjects concerning foremost important agents of civil society: personality, woman, people, man. What was an implicit tendency in the 1991 platforms, the BSP's in particular, now acquires distinct outlines, at that as a general tendency towards etatism, towards government without public involvement. This is an indicator of the self-isolation of elites within the group of the elite and their identification with government; besides, the other agents of civil society are no longer in their scope of vision - distinctly authoritarian attitudes. Nor is the radical drop in the frequency of the following key words in the 1990 platforms accidental: "democracy," "rights," "freedom." The picture appears to be quite sinister: powerful presence of the state, admittedly committed to the rule of law but not necessarily democratic; vs the almost complete absence of agents of civil society and discarded rights and freedom. Europe's "rating" has also dropped, in contrast to Bulgaria's unconditional domination - Europe is receding in the distance, we're staying in Bulgaria... This ideological picture is indeed quite reminiscent of similar ideological pictures from the recent past and sets one thinking about recommunization, at least as regards the political regime. The political vocabulary, however, has clearly expanded to include words like "market" and "ownership," therefore there is a change - in the economy at least - and a reversal seems unlikely. The obvious rejection of fundamental democratic values is hardly accidental, considering that the public race has proved capable of giving power but not real control over the resources of power. That sort of control is possible only by seizing the state resources with the help of strong-arm exercise of state power. Needless to say, there are also differences in the political language of the leading political forces. The BSP's "social," "market," "nation," "security," vs the UDF's "ownership," "responsibility," "control." This is the first time that a leading political force is prioritizing "control" and "responsibility" (notably, the newly established Popular Union, a coalition that ran in the 1994 elections on a joint ticket, likewise emphasizes "control"), but only in the fifth year after the change. And another paradox: the party that defines itself as "modern left" has a social-market orientation but does not accentuate "justice"; the Union of Democratic Forces apparently has a liberal-moral orientation but rules out "personality," "man" and "democracy." We realize that the contemporary world is "beyond left and right" (A. Giddens), but in a country like Bulgaria where every political force insists on identifying with either, those paradoxes are surprising. Of course, the complete campaign platforms beam much more messages and contain important subtle distinctions. They devote much space to reforms in finance, as well as social security and other spheres, proposing strategies that are quite different and far more operational than those in the previous platforms. Ultimately, content analysis of the frequency of key words is a method that simplifies ideological messages and political intentions. Yet vocabulary is insidious precisely because it reveals the main categories of thinking which stand out despite the verbosity of idiom that might sometimes have an entirely different ideological meaning. And, unfortunately, this vocabulary certainly does not indicate that the crisis of democracy typical of stage two has been surmounted. On the contrary, there is a departure - at that, general - from the democratic principles, the opportunity of progress towards "cultured democracy" having apparently been missed and irreversibly lost. We have the following paradox: in 1990 the Socialists (ex-Communists) won power but used the language of their opponents. They are now back in power, having largely reverted to the language from the preface to the change, and their opponents are increasingly resorting to that language. All leading political forces have changed their political vocabulary substantially, that of the MRF proving to be the most consistent. The vocabulary in the BSP's 1990 campaign platform stands apart, but the following campaign platforms are quite alike: in its 1994 platform, the Socialists highlight subjects that were explicated in 1991. The leitmotif in both platforms is "social market economy," within government control. Yet if we browse through the papers from the period, we will see that the principal message in the main report at the 11 December 1989 plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party's Central Committee, delivered by the then party leader and head of state Peter Mladenov and entitled "On the State of the Country, the Party and the Immediate Tasks" is: social market economy as a counterpoint to the command-and-administer system of government. Because: "What happened at the November plenum was not a change of one person for another but a change of policy, of party line... The party's November plenum marked the beginning of real restructuring and renewal of socialism in Bulgaria" (Rabotnichesko Delo, 12 December 1989). From this perspective it becomes clear that in 1994 the BSP resorted to more resolute fulfillment of "the immediate task" from 1989. Therefore even though its ideology might have certain ad hoc overtones, it is quite coherent. Whether this "social market economy" can be achieved and how is another matter (as mentioned above, although the BSP has proclaimed itself "a party of social justice," the word "justice" is quite rare in all three campaign platforms). By 1994, the BSP was also back with its pre-1989 traditional partner - the successor to the orthodox agrarian party, with just a single newcomer to the coalition, the Ecoglasnost Political Club. No other leading political force has changed its vocabulary as markedly, even radically, as the UDF: from the values foremost of political democracy in 1990, to a comparatively coherent economic and political liberal model in 1991, to an etatist model of government prioritizing, nevertheless, ownership. The demand for control and responsibility targets foremost its political opponent, the BSP, which is always qualified as "communist." To quote Prof. Mitev's survey in print: "In 1994 'the liberal state' disappeared from the platform of the blue [the UDF colour] coalition and the latter proclaimed itself in favour of 'strong and fair power' verbalized by the respective radical vocabulary: 'iron financial discipline,' 'let's use force,' 'let's stop,' 'let's persecute and punish,' 'let's thwart'... etc." What is that obvious change in language due to? At face value, the change could serve as an argument for the vagueness of the UDF position, for its weakness, its incoherence. A glance at the parties that were in or partnered the coalition in 1994 would confirm this thesis: they come across a rather rich ideological spectrum, from social democratic, green and agrarian to conservative and United Christian Democratic Centre. From the point of view of the electorate, the UDF's winning platform was the coherent liberal one from 1991, which made the Union a real political actor that stood up to the BSP, albeit for a short time. The loss of power, however, proved that ideology alone cannot be a winning card unless backed by control over a series of state resources. This means that the winning strategy is the etatist strategy, and in this context it is logical for the UDF, as well as for the other political forces, to resort to etatism. This locks the circle. Could it be sheer chance that the composition of the 37th National Assembly by occupation is generally quite similar to that of the Grand National Assembly: engineers are back as a majority (20.8% of all MPs), with jurists just behind (20.4%) and economists (15.8%) next. By contrast, there are fewer artists in the 37th National Assembly. The ideology of freedom has given way to the technology of power. The good news about this "comeback" is that the former and incumbent opposition is probably wiser and has realized which strategies are feasible in Bulgaria - a wiser opposition could be an opposition proper. This could now make a serious political battle possible. The bad news is that the price of wisdom is the rejection of democratic values and missed chance of applying an alternative strategy. Still, there's nothing you can do about it - you simply cannot outsmart your own reality. We can only count on the good news, as well as on the internecine contest within the group of the elite, which is more likely to be associated with the struggle for control over the main resources of power rather than with political identification - i.e. the power struggle.