

**FINAL REPORT ON THE PROJECT
“DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY {ESDI}
AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON THE TRANSATLANTIC LINKS”**

This report has summarized the results of the research carried out by Doctor V.SHTOL in accordance with a Research fellowship which was awarded to him by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in July, 2001.

Introducton

By the beginning of the nineties of the last century it became clear for many people in Europe and North America that the time has come to balance relations between two sides of the Atlantic in a new fashion and for the European NATO member-countries the time has come to undertake some measures to increase their responsibility for the common security and defence. European countries embarked a process designed to strengthen and develop a european "basis" of NATO-European Security and Defence Identity [ESDI], as well as to provide a genuine military capability without duplicating the command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO while simultaneously increasing their contribution to the Alliance's missions and activities. Such an approach was seen as responding both to the European aspirations to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and also to promote the creation of more stable and balanced transatlantic relations, consolidating the North Atlantic union as a whole.

But the development of the relations in the world and especially in NATO was characterized not so smoothly as was supposed.

The study of processes, connected with NATO's role in the transformation of the European security environment assumes an important significance now when the world saw large strategically important changes, touched upon all the european and euroasiatic area. Events, taking place since the nineties of last century give rise to new decisions, realization of which would essentially change the Alliance's structure and its military establishment.

To-day in the conditions of a new security situation, when the massive threat from the East gone and EU is aspiring to develop Common Foreign and Security Policy, security problems should be solved in a new fashion. In this connection an important step towards closer cooperation between the USA and their European allies was taken during

the January, 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. At this Summit the 16 member-countries of the Alliance officially approved the Program of formation and development within NATO European Security and Defence Identity [ESDI], directed at the strengthening of the European 'pillar' of NATO, while reinforcing the Atlantic links. The ESDI would enable European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security defence. They expressed their support for strengthening this European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union (WEU), which has begun to develop as the defence component of the European Union(EU).In order to avoid duplication of capabilities NATO has agreed to make its collective assets and capabilities available for WEU operations, undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. Creation of ESDI within NATO was considered an integral part of the internal adaptation of this organization's political and military structures, which would permit the European Allies to provide a genuine and effective military capability to the Alliance's missions and operations as a manifestation of transatlantic solidarity.

In this connection we decided to begin our research with studying NATO Summit documents and resolutions as well as materials published in the press and on this basis to determine what the ESDI is and its role in NATO as well as its influence on the transatlantic links. Besides we tried to consider the problems of creating autonomous military structure of the European Union and their coordination with ESDI and the problems of development of NATO's second european pillar (either parallel development of both structures or their merging and developing into a unified structure of ES). In connection with the last events – terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, war in Afghanistan and Iraq – we also tried to see their influence on NATO and the relations between the USA and their european allies as well as their transatlantic cooperation. And it became clear that NATO is turned out to be in a very interesting situation. Events of September, the 11 stroke a terrible blow on the United States but

more terrible in a political sense they stroke on NATO. It turned out that the Alliance is practically useless from the point of view of repulsing new threats. Besides the NATO is turned out to be put aside in the second time in these five years during the most serious crises (Afghanistan and Iraq). Moreover the creation of the EU own military capability can be compared with a delayed-action bomb, which was put under the future of the Alliance.

§ 1

During the existence and development of the Alliance the balance of the American and Westeuropean influence has been permanently changing. Its displacement either to one side or another depends first of all on correlation of efforts between the United States and their Westeuropean partners in different spheres of NATO activity.

Neither by the creation of the Alliance nor during long-time period after its formation there were no doubts about legitimacy and expediency of the US leading position in it. It was considered that without the USA Western Europe would not be able to defend itself. But in the long run the situation has been changed. The changing correlation of forces on the international scene revealed deep geostrategical differences between the USA and their Westeuropean NATO allies bringing about new moments in their relations.

The most bright expression of this became a line on the formation of “the European core” in NATO. This line was contrasted with two opposite “scenarios” of the development of american-Westeuropean relations. One of them envisaged maximum drawing of the USA into the defence of Europe, represented as the only possible guarantee of Westeuropean security for the sake of which Westeuropeans should go against their own interests if they run counter to the american ones.

In accordance with the second scenario Western Europe should free itself from the military-political cover of the United States or even completely reject it and substitute the North Atlantic Alliance for exclusively Westeuropean military-political alliance.

In West Europe both these “scenarios” finds definite support and at the same time they are vulnerable from the critics. It is becoming clear after all that both recommended lines of behaviour are too radical. The first one ignores the increased economical, political and military capabilities of the Western NATO countries and makes quite irrelevant the question of returning Alliance to the times when the US right to dictate their will to their allies was not practically contested. Another line underestimates the role which the USA is playing in military-political activity of NATO and which could be extremely difficult for the Westeuropean partners to undertake in full scope.

The attractiveness of the idea of formation and enhancement of the “European core” in NATO is explained by the fact that it is deprived of the extremes of both atlantism and europeism. The talk is not about either NATO’s transformation into a branch of the American Defence Ministry or the liquidation of this block. It is proposed to strengthen NATO in every possible way and more actively develop contacts between its westeuropean partners by increasing their role in the formulating and realizing NATO’s politics. That is the accent is made on the “europeization” of NATO who is supposed to make through the creation within the Alliance westeuropean own mechanisms as well as through their activities. On a parity basis with it some other institutions out of NATO such as WEU and EU should act. This line is presumed to be prevailing now in the westeuropean military-political development.

From the opposite side of the Atlantic ocean the main meaning of NATO’s europeization is seen to mobilize the US westeuropean allies for more active military preparations within the Alliance and to intensify their orientation for atlantic links and to prevent the appearance of “Neutrality syndrom” in westeuropean policy. In this connection they exercise steady pressure on West Europe so that it improves its contribution into NATO’s war preparations. The USA would like to turn the block’s europeization only to that.

§ 2

The development of the westeuropean military-political integration up to the end of the eighties progressed mostly towards the enhancement of the “NATO eurogroup” because a number of the European Union countries not wishing to reduce its national sovereignty limited artificially the Western European Union’s authority in the sphere of Security.

However in the early nineties in connection with the change of geopolitical situation in Europe the NATO european member-countries embarked upon a process designed to increase their contribution to the fulfilment of the Alliance’s missions and activities and to enable them to assume greater responsibility for the common security and defence as a manifestation of transatlantic solidarity. This was done with a view to provide a genuine European military capability without duplicating the command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO. Such an approach was seen as responding both to the european wish to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and to the need for a balanced partnership between the North American and European member-countries of the Alliance.

By 90-ties the relations between WEU, EU and NATO have changed. And everywhere it was underlined that it was WEU’s vocation to be simultaneously “defence identity” for EU and “European pillar” for NATO. For the first time these aims were announced at the Maastricht Summit in 1992 and at the Ministerial meeting of WEU in Petersberg in 1992 and developed in Amsterdam Treaty in 1997.

The essence of the Treaty on European Union, which was signed in Maastricht was that the European Communities were supplemented by a Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. In this connection the Summit in Maastricht also adopted a Special declaration on WEU, which was thought as a main real structure

for EU could lean on in this sphere. Thus the Maastricht declaration called upon the WEU to develop itself as a “defence component” of EU and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, that is to serve as a bridge military organization between the USA and Europe.

For the first time the term “European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was used in the Maastricht declaration. According to it the European Identity should exist in three dimensions:

1) The North Atlantic Alliance, adapted to create opportunities for the Europeans to assume greater responsibility in the defence matters;

2) Intensified Common Foreign and Security Policy able to determine and defend European interests and actively react to events;

3) Strong WEU, capable to secure politically and practically political control and strategic direction of the WEU-led operations of Petersberg type, undertaken by the European allies.

The activity, directed at the preparation and realization of the ESDI has been conducted within these organizations.

In the Alliance the policy directed at the formation within NATO the European Security and Defence Identity was officially approved in 1994. It was directed at strengthening the European pillar of NATO while reinforcing the transatlantic links, that would enable European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence and to make more essential and effective contribution into operations and activities of the Alliance as an expression of their common responsibilities. Simultaneously it would also strengthen the transatlantic partnership.

So the European allies began the process aimed at strengthening their contribution to the Alliance’s missions and activities called to create opportunities to increase their responsibility for common security and defence as a manifestation of transatlantic solidarity. This was done with a view to providing a genuine European military capability

without duplicating the command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO. Such an approach was seen as responding both to the European wish to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and to the need for a balanced partnership between the North American and European member-countries of the Alliance.

In the political sphere the formation and development of the European Security and Defence Identity was aimed at strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic links. It was supposed to create capabilities for the European allies to assume greater responsibility for their common security and defence and to enable a more coherent contribution to be made by the European allies to the security of the Alliance as a whole.

In the military sphere the development of the ESDI calls for assets of the Alliance together with the forces of non-NATO countries in agreed circumstances to be placed under the authority of the Western European Union for operations in which the Alliance itself may not be directly involved.

In this connection one of the main requirements of the ESDI is accordingly for arrangements, which enable the necessary elements of the NATO command structure to be used to assist in the conduct of operations led by the Western European Union. These elements have therefore been described as “separable, but not separate”, since they can be placed under the authority of the Western European Union while remaining integral parts of the Alliance’s own military structure.

§ 3

Another important aspect in the development of the European Security and Defence Identity is the concept known as “Combined Joint Task Forces” or “CJTF”.

What it is CJTF? A CJTF is a multinational {combined} and multi-service {joint} temporary task force, organized and formed for the full range of the Alliance’s military

missions and requiring multinational and multi-service command and control by a CJTF headquarters. It may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations.

The CJTF concept was put forward at the end of 1993 and approved at the Summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels in January, 1994.

At this Summit Heads of State and Government endorsed the concept as an important part of the adaptation of the Alliance structures to changes in the European security environment.

This concept is designed to provide NATO with a flexible means to respond to new security challenges, including operations involving the participation of nations outside the Alliance. It is aimed at improving NATO's ability to deploy at short notice appropriate multinational and multi-services forces matched to the specific requirements of a particular military operation. It will also facilitate the integration of non-NATO participation in NATO-led operations. Many features of the CJTF concept have already been put into practice in the context of the NATO-led peace-keeping operations in the Balkan region.

So they endorsed the formation of the ESDI. Besides they connected the CJTF concept with practical military-political cooperation within the "Partnership for Peace" Programme.

The need which it was created to fulfil arose from the changing security situation in Europe and the emergence of smaller but diverse and unpredictable risks to peace and stability. It was also stipulated by internal adaptation of NATO, reduction of its forces as well as in connection with the adaptive Treaty about the Armed Forces in Europe the most of NATO forces in peace time was turned over to full subordination of National command of their countries. As a result NATO does not have now a standing army its own but the majority of the so-called "NATO forces" are national forces which remain under national control and would only become available to the Alliance and be placed under the responsibility of NATO military commanders in specific circumstances in

accordance with the procedures agreed by member countries in advance. The Alliance now has only headquarters and command structures of different level, the role of which consist in ensuring joint military planning, in development of common standards for training and strategy required to enable national forces to carry out new tasks ranging from collective defence to peace-keeping and help them in conducting organizational measures necessary to their common education and training, command and control. It is precisely in this connection it was agreed that future security arrangements would call for easily deployable, multinational, multi-service military formations tailored to specific kinds of military tasks. These included humanitarian relief, peace-keeping and peace enforcement as well as collective defence. The forces required would vary according to the circumstances and would need to be generated rapidly and at short notice.

As an example of such forces there are Implementation Force, Stabilization Force as well as Kosovo Force.

At the core of the CJTF concept which was evolved to meet this needs are the command and control arrangements essential to allow such forces to operate effectively. The wide variety of circumstances under which CJTF might operate places considerable demands on the command and control arrangements for such operations. The role of CJTF headquarters is therefore crucial. A CJTF headquarters will be formed around core elements {the nuclei} from selected “parent” headquarters of the NATO command structures. It will be augmented from other NATO headquarters and by nations and contributing Partner countries as necessary using modular approach in order to meet the requirements of the specific missions.

Consequently no separate structures are required for the CJTFs arrangements for assignment of forces to CJTFs by member nations follow normal NATO force planning procedures. Nevertheless the flexibility which is built into CJTF concept places considerable demands on arrangements for commanding and controlling the task forces that is to say on CJTF headquarters. In this connection as it was said above core elements

of a small number of CJTF headquarters are therefore being established within selected “parent” headquarters of NATO’s command structure. CJTF headquarters rely primarily on “dual-hatted” personnel – i. e. personnel undertaking other responsibilities when not operating in a CJTF context.

The minimum baseline for the Alliance planning was the principle that at least two CJTF headquarters had to be able to undertake large-scale operations. This capability should be complemented by the ability to form a number of smaller-scale land-based and sea-based CJTF headquarters. These must be able to command land forces of brigade or division size with comparably sized naval and air force components. The proposed structures had to be able to meet CJTF Hq “nuclei” requirements and to provide the requisite ability to generate CJTF Hq staff for both NATO and WEU-led operations.

A number of trials of the CJTF concept have been completed, for example, in the context of the Exercise Allied Effort in November, 1997, in which a number of Partner countries participated as observers; and in the context of the Exercise Strong Resolve in March, 1998 in which Partner countries participated and were integrated throughout the structure of the CJTF. The aim of the trials was to validate the evolving CJTF headquarters concept.

Based on these trials and other relevant staff analyses the Alliance began the full implementation of the CJTF concept in 1999. This process which includes the acquisition of necessary headquarters support and command, control and communications equipment is scheduled for completion in the late 2004.

So the CJTF concept is designed to provide NATO with flexible means to respond to new security challenges. It is aimed at improving NATO’s ability to deploy at short notice appropriate multinational and multi-services formations matched to the specific demands of a particular military operation. This concept will also ensure the integration of Non-NATO participation in NATO-led operations. Undoubtedly that NATO will get as a result an important instrument for crisis management in 21st century.

ESDI strengthening would depend not so on the Institutional changes but on the forces modernization in accordance with the challenges of the new security environment.

§ 4

ESDI would be simply empty words if it is not connected with the enhancement of capabilities

The most significant role in this is called to play a “Defence Capabilities Initiative” (DCI), which became one of the most important results of NATO’s Summit meeting in Washington in April, 1999. The aim of this initiative is to ensure effective operations with the consideration of new roles and possible future missions – from reaction on the humanitarian catastrophes up to the peace enforcement operations and operations of high intensity while defending the territory of the Alliance.

As the NATO General Secretary Lord Robertson stated, “Defence Capabilities Initiative” is directed not only to preservation of interoperability of forces and assets of all NATO allies but also to improvement and modernization of their capabilities to resist new security challenges”.

DCI is specifically oriented on those areas where NATO should develop its operational potential to meet effectively the security challenges of the nearest years and decades. DCI is aimed in particular to improve the interoperability of military forces of member-countries. In addition the task was set to improve Alliance’s military capabilities in the following areas, which are partially coincided with one another:

- “mobility and deployability”, i. e. the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are needed, including areas outside Alliance territory;
- “sustainability”, i. e. the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations;
- “effective engagement”, i. e. the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations from high to low intensity;

- “survivability”, i. e. the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats;

- “interoperable communications”, i. e. command, control and information systems which are compatible with each other to enable forces from different countries to work effectively together.

DCI is not only basis for the improvement of the capabilities of the European member-countries and reinforcement of NATO’s “European pillar”, but for steady military and political viability of the Alliance.

Current gap in technology and capabilities between the USA and their European allies manifested especially during the war in Yugoslavia entails some consequences:

- Very soon the armed forces of the European countries could not cooperate with the americans because of their “technological backwardness”. The US achievements in intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition, command, control and communications, precision-guided weapons begin fully supercede the allies on these spheres.

- Would lead to new tensions in the Alliance if the European armies would find themselves in a situation when they had to carry out dangerous missions demanding great human resources and possibly connected with considerable losses while the United States will provide high technological logistics, strategic air and sea lift, intelligence and air power.

- Might bring about the problems of finance burden distribution and intensification of mutual sense of injury in connection with the Europe’s growing dependence upon the United States.

- Might at the end bring the political and military significance of NATO down to a minimum because the possibility of reciprocal measures on the part of the US-European coalition to serious threats for the European and american interests is becoming less real.

The continuation of political and military support of the Alliance on the part of the USA would depend on the ability of their European allies to make their worthy contribution to the joint operations.

The talk is not going about NATO replacement but about the fact that the most important for the Alliance's viability in future will be sharp reinforcement of the European military capabilities.

About the significance of military capabilities for ESDI to succeed NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson spoke at London conference "The Globalization of Defence Industry: Policy Implications for NATO and ESDI" in January, 2001. He specifically said: «To-day, Europe simply does not have the capabilities it needs to be a truly effective security actor both for NATO or EU operations. There must be no illusions on this matter... As we enter the 21 st Century, the Euro-Atlantic community - North America and Europe together - has to face some tough challenges when it comes to improving our capability. We need to address the capability gap, and ensure our forces can work together. And we have to get the best equipment our tight defence budgets allow. All of this is necessary, if we are to ensure that Europe has the capabilities necessary to meet its aspirations, and be a stronger partner to North America in security, but also if we want to make sure that NATO countries to be able to carry out its missions effectively in the future».

In another speech in Munich in February, 2002 he said: «Yet the United States must do much more in facilitating the process of European defence modernization. By easing unnecessary restrictions on technology transfer and industrial cooperation. Washington can improve the quality of capabilities available and diminish any problems our forces have in working together».

The Revolution in Military Affairs in the USA, as was pointed out before, will deepen the gap in the equipment of the american and european forces that is why the European defence systems should be technologically raised up to the level which would permit them to join the american ones. Otherwise the matters will turn so that US-european cooperation will convert into empty phrase, political slogan.

The Defence Capabilities Initiative, which indicated at the necessity of improving about 58 different military-technological projects is carried out poorly. For the past

period, judging by the assertions of the official persons, this programme was only half fulfilled. In this connection despite the NATO authorities statements that the development of ESDI and DCA would promote the transatlantic links, in reality it could be quite opposite. European reluctance to make valuable financial contribution to the collective security gives rise to doubts among Americans in regard to the reliability of the European identity within NATO. This doubt was increased after the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where the lack of equality between the US army and armies of other NATO member-countries was discovered quite obviously.

§ 5

The formation of the European Security and Defence Identity became not only an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and military structures, but also an important element of the development of both the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU). Both of these processes have been carried forward on the basis of the European Union's Treaties of Maastricht in 1991 and Amsterdam in 1997 and the corresponding declarations of the Western European Union and decisions taken by the Alliance at successive Summit meetings held in Brussels in 1994, Madrid in 1997 and Washington in 1999 as well as at NATO's ministerial sessions.

The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 1991) reflects the agreement of the leaders of the European Communities on the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which was able to determine and defend European interests and react promptly to the events. This agreement included the reference to the Western European Union as an integral part of the development of the European Union as well as the request to the WEU itself to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the European Union which have defence implications.

At the meeting of the WEU which took place in Maastricht (December, 1991) concurrently with the meeting of the European Council WEU member-states issued a

declaration about the agreement on the need for a genuine European Security and Defence Identity and a greater European responsibility in defence matters.

In January, 1994 NATO Heads of State and Government welcomed the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and allowing the European members of NATO to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all NATO's allies. They again reaffirmed that the Alliance was the essential forum for consultations among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of the allies under the Washington Treaty. They also welcomed the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. They further announced that they stood ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available on the basis of consultation in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy.

At the Summit meeting in Madrid in July, 1997 NATO Heads of State and Government welcomed the major steps taken with regard to the creation of ESDI within the Alliance.

As a result of the decisions to develop ESDI within NATO, arrangements have been defined as part of the adaptation of the Alliance to cover all aspects of NATO support for WEU-led operations. These include:

- Taking WEU requirements into account in NATO's new defence planning procedures for developing forces and capabilities. (The WEU began contributing to the Alliance defence planning process in 1997);
- Introducing procedures for identifying NATO's assets and capabilities on which the WEU might wish to draw with the agreement of the North Atlantic Council;

- Establishing multinational European command arrangements within NATO, which could be used to prepare, support, command and conduct operation under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. Under these arrangements the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (Deputy SACEUR) acquires a distinct role both in normal times and in the context of WEU-led operations in relation to the forces to be made available to the WEU

- Introducing consultation and information-sharing arrangement to provide the coordination needed throughout a WEU-led operation undertaken with NATO support.

- Developing military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions.

In practice these arrangements would mean that if a crisis arose in which the WEU decided to intervene and the Alliance choose not to it could request the use of Alliance assets and capabilities possibly including a CJTF headquarters for conducting an operation under its own political control and strategic direction.

In this case the assets requested could be made available for the WEU's use by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by case basis. Conditions for their transfer to the WEU as well as for monitoring their use and for their eventual return or recall would be registered in a specific agreement between the two organizations. During the operation NATO would monitor the use of its assets and maintain regular political liaison with the WEU. European commanders from the NATO command structure would be nominated to act under WEU political control. The assets would be returned to NATO at the end of the operation or when required. Throughout the operation including its preparatory phase NATO and WEU could consult closely.

The next steps in the further development of ESDI within the Alliance include further work to complete or refine agreements on the use of NATO assets and command arrangements and on information-sharing and joint testing and evaluation of crisis management procedures followed by exercising of command elements and forces. These measures would help to develop the concrete procedures needed to support WEU

operations and to ensure that they are well rehearsed in case they have to be put into action. CJTF concept was adopted. According to this concept NATO could provide “separable but not separate” military capabilities for the operations undertaken by the European allies without the USA. It is also aimed at providing improved operational flexibility and permitting the more extensive and mobile deployment of forces needed to respond to the new demands of all alliance missions. It was foreseen the wider employment of multinational formations organized by the European members of the Alliance.

The important turning point which made the European governments to remember their decision to elaborate common European defence policy and to form common armed forces was a war in Kosovo. During this war it became evident that the United States have more effective means of intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition, more effective precision-guided weapons as well as the advantage in such spheres as strategic air and sea lift, logistics and communications. The war showed the gap between the military capabilities of the allies. It also demonstrated that the Europeans could not be able to support their initiatives in economy and diplomacy by adequate military means. For most of the EU-member states – especially France and Great Britain – the subject of serious concern also became complex and ineffective processes of decision-making in the EU/WEU and NATO on the problems of crisis management in Europe by military means. Thus the Kosovo crisis made much more contribution to the development of the European Defence Identity than the whole decade of postMaastricht considerations on the Common Foreign and Defence Policy.

Kosovo revealed such unpleasant fact for Europe – it depends on the military might of the USA. Together it underlined also another fact that the Americans do not want to risk the life of their soldiers in tangible european conflicts that do not represent a real threat to the US national interests. The lesson for the europeans is evident: the US would stay an important factor of preserving peace and security on the continent until Europe

would not show its willingness to take greater responsibility for ensuring their own defence. As a result this main lesson of Kosovo pushed EU to revise its attitude to the European cooperation in the field of defence, but not to weaken NATO and with the aim of creation of EU's military structures capable to strengthen diplomatic means.

As the Italian Foreign Minister said in an interview for the "Panorama" Magazine in April, 1999: "Europe should elaborate its own vision of security. But together with deep appreciation to the USA for their deeds, Europe should realize that it is weak because it does not have its own autonomous defence policy. The European Union should be a supplement but not the alternative to NATO. But we could not allow ourselves to further depend on the USA".

§ 6

But true break-through in the sphere of security took place at the end of 1999 when the EU decided to make its own unified defence system. But for this the WEU should be integrated into the EU structures and the European Union itself gets its own army.

The EU Summit in Helsinki (December, 1999) gave a new turn to the development of ESDI which marked a new stage in evolution of agreements about European security and defence, that is:

- the EU intention to absorb WEU in near future;
- to deploy by 2003 military force of up to 60000 troops;
- to create permanent political and military structures, including a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff.

All this points out to again found by the Union determination to become a serious and independent member of process of ensuring Security.

The outcome of the EU Council in Helsinki shows that the EU not only goes further the former statements on the ESDI's problems but vitally gets out of the model of the transatlantic partnership, agreed by Alliance's Foreign Ministers in Berlin in 1996, the

aim of which was the development of “separable but not separate” European Security and Defence Identity within NATO.

At the same time it was underlined that the Western European Union should be a little bridge between the EU and NATO, emphasizing the independent character of relations between these organizations.

Should the WEU be absorbed by the European Union this understanding would be invalid because the EU would take the WEU’s functions.

The main landmarks in the creation of the Common European Foreign and Security Policy were EU Summits in da Feira (Portugal, June, 2000), Nice (December, 2000) and Goteborg (June, 2001). These Summits adopted important documents for the framing of mentioned political course. These documents contained the directives for the main conceptual political and structural changes which should be carried out to create an effective security and defence system of the EU. It was also emphasized that new systems in no way to be a competitor or alternative to NATO but on the contrary it was said about inevitable arrangements of close contacts, coordination of actions and deepening of cooperation between NATO and EU.

The mechanism of implementation of a common foreign policy is sufficiently complex, but at the same time flexible as it permits EU member-countries to keep some independence. It might be supposed that an intergovernmental process of coordination and decision of the problems of Foreign policy of security and defence will remain for a long period. The EU member-countries now say that it is not possible to admit that they are ready to move from the “common” foreign policy to “unified” foreign policy. It has been remaining different approaches both to separate countries and regions and to certain political problems. It has been planned further enlargement of the EU and naturally it would insert its corrections into the formation of CESDP and its mechanisms. Where this process will come to would depend first of all on the fact what identity the EU will select for itself and it might be realized that the coordination within the framework of 15 States

is one process but in the framework say of 20-25 or 27 States is a new qualitative level of complexity. But this process has been started and is developing.

Strategically the main part in taking decisions about conducting operations of one or the other types should belong to the EU Council of Ministers. There were created as we have already mentioned new political and military structures: a Political and Security Committee, consisting of the representatives of member-countries which is called to follow for the development of international situation and to promote the elaboration of the EU unified foreign policy; a Military Committee which includes on a permanent basis representatives of the Chiefs of Staff gives recommendations to the Political and Security Committee; a Military Staff, receiving instructions from the Military Committee is engaged in implementation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (evaluation of the situation, strategic planning and so on)

The period of framing Common European Security and Defence Policy was completed in Nice by the creation of permanent structures and by adoption of the commitments to ensure capabilities and decisions concerning NATO and third countries.

The Political and Security Committee who consists of the ambassadors would play an important role in the formation of the EU policy in case of crisis and in the control for its consistent realization. In crisis situation a High Representative of EU would be the Chairman of the Committee. The Committee would exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation. It would be assisted by the Military Committee, consisting of the military representatives of the fifteen EU member-states. This Committee would give recommendations on military matters and realize the effective military management of the Military Staff.

The EU Military Staff consisting of a hundred members would be engaged in observation and analysis as well as operational planning.

The European Union also outlined collective aims in forming capabilities in three strategic directions: strategic mobility, headquarters and command arrangements for combined forces and means of collective information for these purposes.

On November 21, 2000 a Capabilities Commitment Conference of Defence Ministers of the European Union took place. At this conference every minister pledged substantial contribution of his state to the formation of capabilities. This conference became the first concrete realization of EU's determination to create common military capabilities.

Talk is about the fact that by 2003 EU will have the capability to conduct peacekeeping and other operations on the European or the nearest to Europe theater of operations deploying within 60 days and sustaining for at least one year military forces of up to 60000 troops with their own system of command and control, intelligence and logistics as well as with air and naval support.

The ministers also came to a conclusion that the proposed now by the EU member-countries resources of 100000 troops, 400 combat planes and 100 warships would ensure the needs of new European forces.

The most considerable contribution to the Eurocorps of 13500 troops was promised by Germany, then goes France (12000 troops) and Great Britain of 12500. Italy and Spain committed themselves to offer 6000 troops each; Netherlands – 5000; Greece – 3000; Finland and Sweden – 2000 each; Belgium, Portugal and Ireland – 1000 troops each and Luxemburg – 500.

The fifteen EU member-states agreed methods of cooperation with NATO in order to have possibilities to use its assets and capabilities according to the commitments adopted by the Alliance in Washington. These procedures were approved by NATO at the end of 2000. There were foreseen some commitments which could be undertaken by the States which are not members of the EU in order they could take part with the WEU-led crisis management operations.

It was envisaged the creation of the Committee of the Contributing Countries which would unite during the operation member-countries that is countries of "fifteen" with the third states and which would provide these states with the possibility to play an important role in the crisis management.

The following features in our opinion pushed the European Union to the formation of its own security system:

- US pressure on the allies more like as twisting hands with the aim to make them to contribute more to the strengthening of NATO;

- US open disregard the interests of their allies including the security matters. For example, unleashing the war in Yugoslavia the americans has been striving to move into Balkans in order to show once more their strength and might and mainly to tie their allies into the bloodshed;

- Material considerations such as the unification of defence capabilities of the EU member-countries that would permit them to allot suitable means for the procurement of modern armaments and military techniques;

- The ability fond by the Westeuropean countries to proceed first of all from their own interests in economic, trade, currency, scientific, technical and even foreign policy matters has become a symbol of independence and affirmation and permit them to go out of subordinate position in the military-political sphere.

The question of forming EU own defence structures went to the level of practical solution immediately roused serious differences in NATO.

First of all the USA has expressed their displeasure with the aspirations of the Europeans to have more independence in defence matters and striving to have a right of "veto" on every decision of the command of the rapid respond forces. They are also insisting that the European rapid response forces should be subordinate to the Alliance.

France does not agree to this and has taken a firm position putting out an idea of autonomous system for strategic planning of the created force. Great Britain is altercating

with France and under the pressure of the USA is showing inconsistency in the question of forming European armed forces. It departed from some principal agreements. The Defence minister of Great Britain G. Chun said that until schemes of cooperation between the EU and NATO would not be worked out in detail there is no reason to form European forces of rapid response.

§ 7

Discussions on this problem were added by impetus in the form of the “Joint Declaration on the European Defence” Joint Communiqué on the results of two-way Anglo-French summit in St.Malo at December, 1998. The official circles as well as means of mass information proclaimed St.Malo as a true “turning-point” in the EU approach to the Security.

At the first time European plans in defence sphere came out of the institutional arrangements and were filled with real military content. In St. Malo France’s position was adopted according to which “The Union should have the capability to carry out autonomous operations in defence sphere; as far as Great Britain is concerned it strived to underline the organic link between EU and NATO. Both countries said, that “The Union should have necessary command, control and information systems, reconnaissance and surveillance systems and the capability for appropriate strategic planning without unnecessary duplication of all that is available within NATO”. Tony Blair’s government agreed with France’s opinion as to the fact that the strengthening of European defence capability would not only harm the transatlantic links but quite opposite would be necessary element which would preserve the NATO’s important role and The US participation in European Security System. Crossing this European Rubicon in defence sphere Great Britain opened a new chapter in the European integration and set up premises for the beginning of a new dialogue between Brussels and Washington on defence and security matters.

All this was made on the understanding that The European Security and Defence Policy does not foresee the weakening of links with the North Atlantic Alliance as NATO remains a basis for the transatlantic security and proceed from the fundamental reality: the Europeans have numerous common economic and social interests. They share aspirations to the union of stable democracies in a stable environment. Devotion to this is a basis for European construction. It also stimulates the creation of the European defence by EU member-countries. But all this could have results only if it relies on the effective bodies and serious military capabilities on the creation of which the European Union concentrates its effort now.

Plans for the formation European armed forces are very modest and only give the EU opportunity to conduct military operations where the USA choose not to. Yet during many years ahead EU military operations would depend on NATO command structures and US assets in such spheres as intelligence and logistics.

It is difficult to imagine that the EU could independently begin any serious military operation without the US approval. But it is this remaining uncertainty and unclarity of operational aspects of military structure and the EU future operations evoke anxiety on the other side of the Atlantic. Trying to satisfy the Americans the EU is considering the problem to propose to the key NATO military representatives status of permanent representatives or observes in the EU Political and Security Committee and Military Committee. One more EU initiative is to propose the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe to take part if necessary in the EU Military Committee activity. Nevertheless 11 out of 15 EU member-states have plans to send to the Military Committees of NATO and EU the same representatives and this would ensure transperance and smooth enough cooperation.

The United States expressing earlier anxiety in regards to the European defence identity now have moved a number of conditions concerning in particular close coordination of EU actions with NATO while keeping supreme role of the latter in

ensuring security as well as including into European planning six European members of NATO not being EU members (these provisions were then included into the EU documents on CESDP). But it is evident that fulfilling the project and meeting new security threats are only possible within euroatlantic partnership, close cooperation with the USA and NATO as a whole. Positive evaluation of the process started by the European Union is contained in the Common Statement of the USA and EU at the Summit in Geteborg where it was stated that this project would strengthen the EU and the “European pillar” of NATO.

During last time the European Security and Defence Policy has made an impressive way forward on the provision the European Union with necessary structures and assets to react in crisis situations.

Talk is not about the formation of the European Army but about the forces contributed by some countries on a national basis, components of which could be used for crisis management outside the EU area with the agreement of appropriate capitals and the UNO mandate. Providing the EU with the capability to manage fast crisis situations and with appropriate command structures together with the policy of defending all 15 EU members does not run counter either to the policy of the non-alignment, conducted by some countries or to NATO’s role. So the EU member-countries again confirmed that the North Atlantic Alliance has been the basis for the collective defence of its members which has exclusive advantage – it has all military and civilian crisis-management capabilities to regulate international disputes: from diplomatic control during precrisis situation up to the financial, administrative and tactical abilities to conduct restoration works after the finish of war stage.

The European Union always declared its readiness to conduct consultations with other countries about the problems of military crisis management.

The need of strengthening European role in NATO was underlined by its Secretary General G. Robertson who characterized it as a question of absolute necessity. If NATO

would like to be as strong organization in the future as it was in the past it should develop good, effective and reliable links with the European Union as the role of the latter is rising in this sphere. Noting that “strengthening of Europe’s role in NATO does not mean the reduction of the North America’s role”, Lord Robertson underlined the fact that transatlantic relations remain key to support the effectiveness of NATO and that a real stability in Europe and protection of its democratic values is not possible without stable transatlantic links.

In 2001 practical realization and consolidation of agreements assume within the EU appreciable character. Impulse to this process was given by September, 11 tragic events in Washington and New-York and subsequent alteration of world situation.

As far as the North Atlantic union is concerned the period after September, 11 was very complicated from the point of view of transatlantic relations. After the terrorist attack on New-York and Washington NATO for the first time triggered Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but not for ensuring security of the European allies as it was supposed but for the defence of the United States. However the USA began to form antiterrorist coalition not on the principles of Atlantic solidarity but on a pragmatic basis. (It includes Great Britain, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kirghizstan and Pakistan). A cold shower for European allies became the statement of US deputy defence minister P. Woolfowitz, which was made during his visit to NATO headquarters in October, 2001. In this statement he thanked the allies for a proposed help but underlined that in the matter of ensuring its own security his country could not rely on the “coalition of states which are always ready to act” By this he had in mind the experience of Kosovo crisis when the so-called “war of committees” in NATO seriously complicated the adoption of decisions.

Since then NATO General Secretary Lord Robertson has began to talk about the necessity of NATO’s transformation and first of all in the decision-making process.

One more challenge for NATO connected with changed world situation, with the state of transatlantic relations, enlargement and new quality relations with Russia was a

development of a new strategy. Addressing the meeting of NATO Defence ministers in Warsaw at the end of September, 2001 Lord Robertson spoke about the necessity of working out the preemptive strategy against some outcast countries as the United States called them. But apparently this idea might be only a part of a new strategy which would replace the one adopted in Washington in April, 1999. And the basis of this strategy would be apparently formed by a concept preemptive strike, adopted from the US Foreign policy doctrine according to which Washington could strike first on countries, which in its opinion have some relations to world terrorism. And so the Alliance would get also the possibility to strike preemptive blows on targets out of the area of their responsibility because in May, 2002 in Reykjavik NATO countries agreed that the Alliance must meet threats to their security from wherever they may come. For this apparently the Alliance has been creating on the US suggestion a rapid-reaction NATO Response Force of up to 21 thousand troops from three services Army, Air Force and Navy.

The Leaders of European integration – France and Germany – already do not exclude now the possibility of creation in the nearest future on the EU basis a real confederation – a sort of the United States of Europe. Besides the EU has a definite basis for that in the form of Common legislative and executive authorities (Europarlament, Eurocouncil and Eurocommission). And since 1999 Customs and Currency unions were added by common currency-euro and the decision to form European quick reaction force, autonomous from NATO. All these events make such “dreams” a reality.

The Americans as a whole refuse to take Europe as a collective member of NATO though the Europeans argue that they have parliament, common currency and will have their own Armed Forces and so on – why not the only US partner united by common principles of administrations. But in future the Americans would have to take this into consideration. The United Europe with its own armed forces would turn some times into an independent center of force not dependent on the US dictate. And this in its turn will

bring to the weakening of NATO and even to the Alliance's disunity. Then the USA could lose control over Europe.

Apparently Washington was guided exactly by this, when it demanded to conclude an official agreement between NATO and EU which would guarantee the North Atlantic Alliance priority over any independent operations of the European Union.

But the EU leaders at that time resolutely rejected such demand and in resolution on the results of the Helsinki meeting put down that Eurounion would take independent decision about military operations and would conduct the without dependence on any NATO actions. And though the Europeans underlined that their close cooperation in defence matters would not only harm the European identity in NATO but strengthen the Alliance as a whole, this is the first portent to the independence.

Taking into account that in due course the European Union will take in overwhelming majority of the European countries it is evident that NATO already in the nearest decade will be doomed to say good-bye to the role of "first violin" in decision of the problems of the European security. And as some western experts note the only chance for NATO to prevent disunity is its transformation into consultative mechanism between the EU and USA.

At the same time the EU would play more important and active role in forming structure landscape of European Security. In difference from NATO "new EU" would have not only powerful military capability but would have at its disposal wide arsenal of economical, financial and political levels of state management. Taking into account the fact that the majority of regional problems of Europe must not be effectively solved only with military means because they do not have long-term military solutions, the main active character in solving European security problems would be undoubtedly the EU.

And by this the leadership of the EU would try to make out of the European Union a Center of economical and political force, which is naturally unthinkable without military-political identity. At the same time Washington has understood that this process is not

reversible and it is better to keep it under its control has agreed on the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU.

§ 9

Apparently in this connection and with the change of international situation at the end of 2002 NATO and the European Union have signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership. As it was reported the EU would be given technical capabilities to conduct own military and peacekeeping operations but at the expense of NATO's capability especially in military planning, logistics, mobility and intelligence. European command structures would also coordinate their actions with NATO command structures.

Displacement of accents in NATO policy, moving to the front line problems of fighting with terrorism and new security threats in different regions of the world could bring to the beginning of contradictions and serious discords in the Alliance. The decisions of the Prague Summit of 2002 correspond first of all to the US interests, who would like to see NATO as an instrument for their position-of-force policy in solution of many political problems. But in its present state the Alliance could not play a role of efficient ally of Washington. This is affirmed in particular by the experience of military operations in Afganistan and Iraq, conducted by the Americans really independently without NATO. But nevertheless the USA are interested in keeping up and support NATO because the Alliance to-day is a main instrument of American presence on the continent and not only military but also political and economical.

Just another time the USA through the NATO headquarters in Brussels undertook an attempt to narrow the damaging transatlantic capabilities gap within the Alliance. The Symbol of this is the creation of the so-called NATO Response Force, consisting of land, sea and air elements, numbering up to 21 thousand troops who by 2006 must be ready to move quickly to wherever they might be required.

In personnel and material matters new problems come up before the Europeans as together with the formation of the EU rapid reaction force of 60000 troops in NATO there is the European Security and Defence Identity with the task as it was said earlier of achieving agreements, which permit to use necessary elements of NATO's command structures to support WEU-led operations. A paradoxical situation is arising. NATO does not have permanent army and the majority of the so-called "NATO forces" is composed of national units who are remaining under national command and are turned over to subordination of NATO military commanders in specific circumstances according with the procedures agreed by member-countries in advance.

And so we have two powerful political organizations and this is a reality. But the other reality is that the majority of member-countries belong to both organizations. And reservoir from which troops are derived is one. But the aim declared by the European Union to deploy military forces of up to 60000 troops who could fulfill peacekeeping tasks will demand not less than 200 thousand troops because rotation would be necessary. But the European allies, having in the armed forces about 2 million troops could hardly allocate 40 thousand troops for the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans. That is why European forces are still a "paper army". For Great Britain as an example this means that units, who according to paper are ready to be transferred to the European forces have already been in action under NATO's aegis for example in Kosovo or together with the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Conclusion

As a conclusion we would like to pay attention to the situation in NATO or around it and make some remarks in regards to further development of the European identity and its influence on the transatlantic links.

1. The last events have shown that in its present state the Alliance could not play a role of effective ally of Washington. This was testified by the experience of the military

operation in Afghanistan and war in Iraq, conducted by the Americans practically on its own without NATO support. And though the strategic role of Europe has diminished the USA nevertheless are interested in keeping and support NATO because at present the Alliance is a main instrument of the American presence on the continent and not only military but also political and economical. In this connection adapting to the time demands, NATO, using the ESDI's experience regarding the CJTF, would reform its military structures into more flexible and effective joint (multi-service) task forces on a multinational basis by simultaneous reduction in a number of headquarters. In this case NATO would become an organization capable to take quick decisions and if necessary to send combat formations to suppress terrorists' sallies.

2. Displacement of accents in NATO policy, moving forward problems of fighting terrorism and new security threats in different regions of the world could influence in our opinion the further development of the European Security and Defence Identity. The creation according to the decision of the Prague summit of NATO Response Force would be on a constant basis. This force should always be ready to conduct military actions throughout the world that is it should have its own command and headquarters and that is why it could not be dependent on ESDI.

3. The Alliance should develop good and effective links with the European Union. Saying that "more Europe in NATO does not mean less North America", Lord Robertson underlined that transatlantic relations remain a key to the effectiveness of NATO and that without good transatlantic link could not be real stability in Europe or defence its democratic values. In that connection NATO is undertaking steps to intensify the participation of the European countries in ensuring security and strengthening by this cooperation between Europe and North America. NATO and other organizations such as EU and WEU should set close ties during joint sessions exercises and regular consultations, directed at the strengthening of cooperation. They are going to form such Armed Forces who are required to manage the more probable crisis situations and

conflicts of the Future. It is working out the understandings on ensuring such a position under which one of these organizations that would head the activity on prevention the threat to peace in connection with such conflicts would have necessary powers, force and military equipment.

4. As far as the economic capabilities of EU member-countries will be increasing, their political ambitions would not be only increasing but would be supported by economical power. In this case the strengthening of Euro as a possible alternative to dollar is of great significance. At the same time the growth of political ambitions, economical and financial powers of Europe would not be supported by the adequate strengthening of military might especially in modern weapons and military equipment. Moreover the dependence of Europeans on the USA in this sphere would be increasing. That is why it is unlikely in nearest future to look forward to the creation in Europe the Center of Force who could be a military-political alternative to the United States.

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