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Conference: |
Greece and NATO EnlargementbyTheodore A. COULOUMBIS |
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Nearly eight years into the post-Cold War period, the new world order/ disorder has yet to emerge clearly. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany, statesmen such as former U.S. President George Bush and a number of commentators announced a "new world order" premised on the universal acceptance of the values of pluralist democracy and free market economy. (1) The implacable antagonisms of the Cold War years would be eliminated and the planet would proceed to meet its future challenges, framed on a North South axis, with policies that would be collectively legitimized through a revamped United Nations Security Council which would now be free of the scourge of the mutually paralyzing practice of permanent member vetos.
Implementation of this global concert of powers approach to politics would be left, in addition to the United Nations, to much-needed regional organizations such as NATO, OSCE and the EU, including on occasion so-called coalitions of the willing that would act multilaterally following substantive consult-ation and employing peacekeeping and peace-enforcement techniques designed to insure a modicum of order in a demographically and ecologically endangered planet. The U.S.-led global coalition which opposed Saddam Hussein's attempt to devour Kuwait by military means was enthusiastically proclaimed as the materialization of the new orderly international system. Further, what appeared to have been dramatic peace breakthroughs in the Arab-Israeli, South Africa and North Ireland conflicts led some commentators to announce the "end of history." (2) Unfortunately this post-Cold War euphoria was not destined to last for long. History apparently returned with a vengeance in many regions of the former Soviet Union, as well as in the most volatile setting of the post-communist Balkans. (3) Nationalism and ethnic-ism (of the territorial/irredentist/autonomist varieties) replaced the discredited dogmas of Marxism-Leninism and a number of new conflicts erupted, with international attention focusing on the breakup of former Yugoslavia and, especially, on the tri-ethnic butchery in Bosnia. Thus, in some paradoxical way the uncertain transitions in the global system have deeply affected perceptions as well as develop-ments in the NATO setting in general, and in Greece in particular. The post-Cold War period of the l990s seems to have falsified the prophesies of both the universal order and the universal disorder schools of thought. At present, the world appears to be moving toward a variant of bipolarity defined in economic rather than military-political terms where one pole groups advanced, industrial, and democratic states while the second pole comprises regions of the Third World and the former Soviet bloc that are characterized by economic scarcity and underdevelopment as well as by political systems that range between traditional authoritarianism, unstable democracy, and praetorian managerialism. The first pole-a world island of economic interdependence, democracy, and political stability-is made up of North America, the European Union (EU), Japan and the remaining economically advanced countries of the OECD. Greece has managed to consolidate its presence in this zone of stable interdependence by virtue of entering the European Community on January l, l981. In the second pole, the so-called poor south of the planet, one finds countries with developing economies and conflict-prone polities that are unable as of yet to sustain consolidated systems of democracy founded on pluralist and self-checking civil societies. Recent and well-publicized examples of flash points in this region include humanitarian nightmares in Rwanda, Burundi, Algeria, Zaire, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Cambodia and North Korea, to name but a few. Hovering somewhere between the two poles are most of the former communist countries of central, eastern, and southeastern Europe. These states are traversing a very sensitive transition that will either guide them safely into the ranks of the pole of stability and peace or to the second pole of instability, civil strife and war. Unlike former Yugoslavia and certain regions of the former Soviet Union, countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia seem to be moving well on the road to a market economy and consolidated democracy, despite occasional difficulties. Finally, the outcome of the Russian transition experience is likely to prove a major historical test that will impact heavily on the contours of the emerging European (and global) security architecture. The purpose of this essay is to review Greek political perceptions of NATO's evolution since the Cold War, with special emphasis on the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. We will also attempt to portray Greek foreign policy priorities in the changing global setting and to review the debate between two schools of thought, one unilateralist and the other, dominant, multi-rateralist, competing for influence in the process of formulating Greece's foreign policy. Greece belongs institutionally to the pole of stability but, unlike its remaining partners in the EU, it borders on a region of fluidity and real or potential conflict north and east of its frontiers. Therefore, since the mid-1980s the near gamut of Greece's political parties, as well as an overwhelming majority of public opinion, have supported increasingly the process of Greece's multidimensional integra-tion into the mechanisms and institutions of the Western family of nations. The dominant paradigm premised on multilateralism and reflecting Greece's foreign policy priorities could be summarized as follows: The first foreign policy priority since l974 has been the consolidation of democracy and a strategy of economic convergence with more advanced EU partners designed to safeguard Greece's historic European option. Indeed, during the two decades that folllwed the collapse of the military dictatorship, Greece hhs crossed the threshold of a new and better era. In their efforts to achieve full integration into the "hard core" of post-Maastricht Europe, Greek policymakers, whether drawn from the ranks of New Democracy (in government between l990 to l993) or of PASOK (in government since October l993), have avoided the so-called dilemma between a Europeanist and an Atlanticist profile. They have opted instead for a Euro-Atlanticist stance akin to the British, Portuguese, and Italian models, recognizing that there is adequate complementarity in a strategy that pursues political and economic integration through the European Union and, simultaneously, relies chiefly on NATO for the provision of the collective defense and collective security values. The second (first from a defense and security standpoint) priority in Greek foreign policy objectives is the maintenance of a sufficient state of military balance in the Greek Turkish nexus of relations. Since l974, following the Turkish invasion and continuing occupation of northern Cyprus, all of Greece's political parties have perceived Turkey as posing a major threat to Greece's territorial integrity in the Aegean and in Western Thrace. In this connection, Greek bipartisan policy calls for the maintenance of an adequate balance of forces (especially in the air and sea) while avoiding, if possible, highly destabilizing and economically costly arms races. NATO has been repeatedly urged by Greece's foreign minister, Theodoros Pangalos, to consider seriously the development of an intra-NATO dispute settlement mechanism that would help resolve disputes peacefully as well as strengthen the appeal of the Atlantic Alliance as a collective security and collective defense providing institution. Under the government of prime minister Constantinos Simitis, the Greek stance vis--vis Turkey's oft-declared European option has been to move away from a strategy of conditional sanctions and toward one of conditional rewards. In other words, Greece now openly declares its willingness to lift its veto to a special relationship between the EU and Turkey provided the latter abandons its threats of going to war over the Aegean question and contributes substantively to a functional and mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem (permitting the reunification of Cyprus as a federal, bizonal and bi-communal state that is also a member of the EU and NATO). Cyprus could thus become one of the first candidates for NATO expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean setting. The remaining priorities of Greek foreign policy involve relations with post-Communist Balkan neighbors and with the non-EU and non-NATO states of the Mediterranean region. In the case of the Balkans, after a painful interlude (l992-94) of near involvement in the Balkan imbroglio, Greece has opted for a multilateralist foreign policy (together with its EU, WEU, OSCE and NATO partners) designed to contribute to successful transition policies toward democracy and market economy in each of the states north of its borders. By smoothing its troubled relations with Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and by continuing to cultivate good relations with Bulgaria and Romania, Greece has also proceeded to adopt a purely equidistant stance vis--vis Serbia and Croatia as well as Bosnia. The Greek policy toward the Balkans could be today summarized as trying to avoid becoming a part of the problem and joining instead the coalitions of the willing that wish to be part of the solution. In this respect, Greece has joined all the Western peacekeeping and peace-enforcement initiatives in Albania, Bosnia (and elsewhere in former Yugoslavia) including its mid-May l997 participation in partnership for peace military exercizes on the territory of FYROM together with troops from the United States, Italy and Turkey. The strategy of NATO expansion fits well with Greece's strategic objective of encouraging stability and peace in the Balkan region thus distancing the unpleasant contingency of having to face a second diplomatic/military front in addition to what has been widely perceived as a clear and present danger emanating from Turkey. Further, Greece's substantive support and involvement in EU programs such as PHARE and INTERREG fits the strategy of multi-lateral and stabilizing presence in the Balkans. With respect to Greece's role in the Mediterranean, the multilateralist formula applied to the Balkans is the orienting principle for Greek foreign policy in this region as well. Here the opportunities for NATO and EU initiatives are more than apparent. The Euro-Atlantic community has every incentive to extend the values of security and cooperation into this structurally unbalanced region (where the EU North is rich and demographically stable while the non-EU South is economically disadvantaged and demographically explosive). For the time being the EU/MEDA fund, which amounts to a very substantive 4.7 billion Ecus for the l995-99 period, is a concrete and much needed first step in a convergence strategy designed to facilitate economic and political development in the disadvantaged littoral states of the non-EU Mediterranean south. Greek policymakers also find that NATO offers excellent opportunities for military cooperation (beyond confidence-building measures) with critically important eastern Mediterranean states such as Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Cyprus. The opportunities for substantive cooperation between NATO and these states will increase geometrically if the nexus of Greek-Turkish difficulties is adequately addressed and Cyprus is permitted to join the ranks of NATO and the EU (given the overwhelming benefits that such a prospect ensures for both communities on the embattled island). For example, following a mutually acceptable settlement based on the package agreed upon by summit agreements of Makarios-Denktash (l977) and Kyprianou-Denktash (l979), Cyprus will be able to join the EU and NATO simultaneously with the proclamation of the settlement agreements and, then, one of the sovereign British bases on the island could be assigned a NATO support operational function. Also, the sense of security for the Turkish Cypriots (following the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation troops) will be enhanced if the NATO implementation force which will be introduced in Cyprus will include (especially in the North) a sizable Turkish troop contingent. Not surprisingly, relations with the United States are critical. From 1947 (the Truman Doctrine) to 1974 (the collapse of the Athens dictatorship) the profile of this relationship was of the classical patron-client variety. The United States, as a dominant superpower, and Greece, as a strategically located but internally divided small state, could not have avoided a center-periphery dependence relationship. It was indeed, the decisive American intervention in the 1947-49 period that prevented a Communist take-over in the Greek Civil War. The victors, the majority in Greece, were indeed grateful and Harry Truman's statue was erected over-looking a central and busy Greek boulevard. However, the vanquished, a sizable minority, viewed the United States as an "evil empire" that had been responsible for their final defeat in 1949. For over 20 years after that, and up to the early 1970s, Greek-American relations were adversely affected by a constantly escalating Greek-Turkish conflict over the fate of the island of Cyprus. Perceptions in Athens, which were paradoxically mirrored in Ankara, were that the United States was tilting systematically in favor of Turkey whose strategic value was exaggerated by American strategic thinkers. Anti-Americanism assumed even greater proportions by what the Greek people considered an American stance of benign neglect, if not outright support of the dictators, during the 1967-74 period when Greece was ruled by an oppressive military regime that not only violated basic human rights but also triggered a criminal coup against President Makarios of Cyprus (July 15, 1974) which, in turn, led to the Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory. After the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974, and despite the anti-American rhetoric of Andreas Papandreou and his left-of-center political party (PASOK), the image of the United States began to improve again. The gradual consolidation of democracy, the incorporation of the vanquished side of the Greek Civil War into the political process, continuing economic development, entry into the then-European Economic Community (in January 1981), the alternation of Left-and-Right-of-Center parties in power, and the establishment of strict civilian control over the Armed Forces have permitted Greece to move in the direction of becoming a "civil society." Pluralistic discourse and the emergence of independent and antagonistic media (radio and television that had been previously state controlled) also permitted the kind of complex public exchange that reduces dogmatism and challenges simplistic Manichean over-simplifications. Numerous revisionist thinkers (4) have suggested that recent Greek history should be revisited to account for acts of comission and ommission by Greek political elites, and avoid the convenient "devil theory approaches" that attribute all misfortune to dark, external forces of some variety. In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the passing from the scene of a charismatic prime minister who had come to prominence by denouncing Greek dependency on the United States, Greek elites have adopted a much more benign or, as a minimum, realistic view of the United States. They see America as the "only superpower"- interested in promoting its trade, investment and strategic interests globally, but also as a country whose well-being in secured by the perpetuation of stability and peace in the regions of Europe and the Mediterranean. Given these foreign policy priorities, Greece emerges out of the Cold War as a satisfied, status quo, strategically located, medium-sized power whose main objective is to engage in such institutionalized multilateral arrangements as NATO and the EU that consolidate a structure of cooperation and peace in its troubled neighborhood. Throughout the Cold War, NATO tended to be equated in Greece with the political and strategic will of the United States and was seen as being the primary instrument of Soviet containment. Although Greek strategists were concerned with the country's inadequate conventional capability vis--vis the more powerful Warsaw Pact conventional forces stationed in Bulgaria, they accepted a front-line state status la Germany, which afforded security on the basis of strategic deterrence and the balance of nuclear terror. Two additional dimensions, however, were specific to Greece. First, the aftereffects of the Greek Civil War called for a counter-insurgency mission for the Greek armed forces against a potential communist attempt to take over the country. The second dimension, which remains of special concern to the present day, related to a highly troubled partnership with neighboring Turkey over the issue of Cyprus since 1955, and over a number of highly disturbing Turkish claims in the Aegean region since 1974. The momentous changes surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact called for an appropriate reexamination of NATO's post-Cold War future. Like many of its EU partners, Greece now views NATO as a gradually expanding alliance providing the values of collective defense and (increasingly) collective security to its member states. The Soviet threat has been replaced by a whole new set of high level risks that include the spread of nuclear and biological weapons as well as missile launchers. The risk list includes international terrorism, narcotics cartels, and a variety of forms of internal and regional conflicts stemming from a sudden resurgence of nationalism, ethnic autonomism and religious fundamentalism. Expectations in Greece are that the United States will perpetuate its useful strategic presence in Central Europe. However it is assumed that the American presence will be reduced progressively to symbolic levels. On the contrary, the Greeks expect that the United States will raise its profile in and out of NATO in the most strategic central and eastern Mediterranean regions and that the new risk calculus of post-Cold War NATO will focus on a North-South rather than an East-West axis. In this respect, Greek policies have been adjusting toward preparing the country to capitalize on strategic assets such as the island of Crete (especially Suda Bay) and other important Aegean and Dodocanese islands. Given that their country's main security concern has been emanating from Turkey, Greek policymakers have sought to solidify a strategy of adequate deterrence founded on factors of hard as well as soft power. Thus Greece has been spending around 6% of its GDP for defense purposes over a number of years and has sought to maintain sufficiency in land, air and naval power vis--vis Turkey. In terms of soft power, Greek policy has sought to deepen its ties in the EU, NATO and the WEU on the premise that Turkey would not dare attack a country that is highly integrated into the Western family of nations. Greece's recently announced defense doctrine calls for $14 billion to be spent in the next 10 years on modernization and reorganization procedures (over and above the $3 billion per year scheduled for military expenditures). The new doctrine retains military conscription but strongly reinforces the category of 5-year enlisted professionals and reorganizes the Army reducing the number of Divisions and increasing that of Brigades relying on flexible, mechanized and highly mobile smaller units designed to fit needs for multinational peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations under NATO auspices. Greece's new weapons procurement program continues to rely primarily on U.S.-supplied sophisticated equipment, with Germany and France running a distant second and third in the suppliers list. "Bargain-basement offers" from post-Cold War Russia, in the spirit of PfP and the special NATO-Russia relationship, are logically to be added to the future list of important suppliers. Finally, we should stress here that the welcome improvement in Greek-Turkish relations that took place during the Madrid NATO Council meeting in July 1997 can open,if prudently pursued, avenues toward a Greek-Turkish reconciliation over the issues of Cyprus and the Aegean. Such reconciliation would dramatically facilitate NATO's stabilizing role in regions such as the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. Greek foreign policymakers and most members of parliament have repeatedly indicated their support for NATO enlargement, voicing, however, some concerns which if adequately addressed would smoothen further the whole process. The first such concern calls for an open door policy for NATO which should gradually accept new members, beyond the Visegrad three (especially in the Balkan region and Cyprus) when these countries are ready to meet the criteria for admission. These criteria include stable democracy, a market economy, full respect of human rights at home, and rejection of the use of force as an instrument of "dispute settlement" with neighboring states. A second concern reflects the wish that NATO expansion should be carried out in a way that does not awaken revisionist and nationalist forces in Russia which would force a new division in Europe, far more dangerous than during the Cold War. Accordingly, the historic May l997 Founding Act, which paved the way for a constructive engagement between NATO and Russia and which facilitated the enlargement of NATO while strengthening NACC and PfP mechanisms was especially welcomed as an effective contribution to the perpetuation of a stable and balanced security architecture from San Francisco to Vladivostok. The third concern, which will certainly preoccupy the parliamentary bodies of most NATO members, including the U.S. Senate, involves the financial cost of NATO expansion for purposes of infrastructure and logistics, and the resultant question of an acceptable apportionment of burden-sharing among the l6 current member states. If modest planning is adopted which avoids catapulting costs, one can assume that the ratification process will proceed easily in Greece (as well, presumably, as in most of the remaining member states). Turning to the procedural dimension, the Greek Constitution (art. 36, Paragraph 1) provides that ratification of international treaties and agreements negotiated and signed by the Greek government requires a two-step process. (5) The first step calls for a yes vote by a majority of those present and voting in Parliament, assuming the availability of a quorum. The second step involves the signature, signifying ratification, of the Head of State, the President of the Greek Republic. The 162 PASOK deputies, together with the 108 deputies from the New Democracy party hold an overwhelming majority of the 300 votes in Parliament. As both political parties have indicated that they will ratify the proposed NATO expansion, the outcome must be considered a foregone conclusion. Of the three smaller parties in Parliament, only the Greek Communist party, with 11 votes, will oppose ratification consistent with its long-time opposition to U.S. and NATO presence in Greece. Despite its nationalist/patriotic/unilateralist rhetoric, the small but vocal DIKKI (Democratic Socialist Movement) under Dimitris Tsovolas is also expected to back the expansion agreement with all of its nine votes. Synaspismos, a post-Euro-communist (now Eurosocialist) party with 10 votes in Parliament, is quite likely to vote for ratification. Finally, it should be mentioned, that the President of the Republic, whose powers are strictly symbolic and ceremonial has the power, in theory at least, to delay if not veto ratification. However, such a contingency is most unlikely given the style and substance of the President, Contantine Stephanopoulos. In conclusion, it should be apparent that Greece, as is the case with most of its Western partners, has gravitated toward a widely shared consensus regarding important questions of foreign policy strategy, with occasional debate and disagreement on matters of tactics and policy implementation. However, there remains, as elsewhere, a small, marginal but vocal group of politicians, journalists, and academics who do not join such a consensus. They have called themselves "patriotic" and they tend to criticize the multilateralist contours of Greek foreign policy in the belief that Greece's NATO allies and EU partners have been unfairly pressing Greece to accommodate Turkey's and FYROM's unreasonable demands in the interest of so called stability in the region. This argument cannot be dismissed fully because "equidistance" between a revisionist (Turkey) and a status quo (Greece) partner does not necessarily serve genuine neutrality. The patriotic school of thought, therefore, normally supports a unilateralist approach suggesting that Greece ought to turn itself into a "garrison state" making all the necessary sacrifices to permit it to stand its ground in a most dangerous neighborhood. This clearly nationalist orientation, which tended to multiply frictions between Greece and a number of countries well beyond Turkey came close to becoming dominant in l992-94 when Greece was passionately engaged in two vocal disputes with FYROM and Albania respectively. A number of newspapers and privately owned television stations competing for readership and viewership played up the emotions of the public. The nationalist rhetoric was most effectively articulated by two popular politicians, Andonis Samaras (the then New Democracy Foreign Minister) and Stelios Papathemelis (a prominent figure and former minister of Public Order of PASOK). Following the death of Andreas Papandreou in June l996 and, after the September l996 election, the rise of Constantinos Simitis (a moderate and multilateralist in political philosophy technocrat), the pendulum has decisively shifted in the direction of the multilateralist paradigm. This process was strengthened in March 1997 by the election of Costas Karamanlis as the leader of the loyal opposition party, New Democracy. The 42-year old Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy promises to provide effective and substantive opposition that avoids the populist excesses (especially in matters of foreign policy) of his predecessor, Miltiades Evert. In short, the prognosis for Greece's Western profile is solid for the foreseeable future given that the Greek socialists have unequivocally adopted a pro-EU and pro-NATO policy while the Conservative opposition's stance has been and continues to be enthusiastically pro-Western. Unfortunately, the situation in Turkey appears much more fluid and less likely to sustain a strong government in the immediate future that will have the necessary backing to move decisively toward a policy of genuine reconciliation with Greece. A rapprochement with Greece would permit Turkey to concentrate on its many problems in the East, be they with Syria, Iran and Iraq not to mention the continuously simmering Kurdish question. It is necessary, therefore, to continue the efforts toward confidence building and tension reduction which could eventually permit strong leaders in both countries to emulate the courage of Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Ataturk who had crafted a long lasting period of Greek-Turkish friendship in the early l930s.
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